US20030235309A1 - Local area network - Google Patents
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- US20030235309A1 US20030235309A1 US10/383,572 US38357203A US2003235309A1 US 20030235309 A1 US20030235309 A1 US 20030235309A1 US 38357203 A US38357203 A US 38357203A US 2003235309 A1 US2003235309 A1 US 2003235309A1
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- H04L63/0471—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload applying encryption by an intermediary, e.g. receiving clear information at the intermediary and encrypting the received information at the intermediary before forwarding
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- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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Definitions
- This invention relates to communication networks, more particularly it relates to security within these networks.
- Wireless personal area networks WPANsTM use radio frequencies to transmit both voice and data, and are specified by standards such as IEEE standard 802.15 or 802.3 from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA), among other specifications.
- IEEE-SA Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association
- the 802.15 specification is ideal for linking notebook computers, mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), digital cameras, and other handheld devices to do business at home, on the road, or in the office.
- Admission to the piconet is based on the outcome of the following protocols between the prospective joining device and the PNC of the piconet.
- the joining device and the PNC engage in a mutual entity authentication protocol based on public key or symmetric key techniques.
- the true device identity of both the joining device and the PNC is determined using this protocol.
- a link key can also be derived based on the authentic keys of both parties.
- Another protocol involves using authorization techniques between both devices, based on access control lists (ACLs).
- ACLs access control lists
- the Access Control Lists may be dynamically updated, similar to PDA functionality, where a determination is made whether an entity is added or removed from the ACL at entry. This determination may be made by an operator, such as a human operator.
- this update mechanism may be invoked by an open enrollment period followed by a lock-up step, for example, which may be confirmed by a button push or be a simple re-set of the whole list. This may be performed by actuating a re-set or re-initialize button on the device.
- devices in the piconet fully depend on information provided by the PNC regarding which devices have been admitted to the piconet, since admission is based on communication between the PNC and a joining device only. If however an improper list of devices, DeviceList, in the piconet has been distributed by the PNC, either by error or maliciously, the security of the network is jeopardised.
- Each device has a short hand address, such as a local 8-bit ID, and a long hand address, such as a global 48-bit device ID.
- the invention provides a method of establishing and maintaining distributed security between a plurality of devices in an ad hoc network, the method having the steps of; associating each device with a unique device address;
- each of the devices generating a public key for distribution to other devices; each of the devices authenticating itself periodically with the other devices in order to determine status of the other devices;
- each of the devices using the public key and the group key to perform key agreement in order to establish a secure communication channel with the other devices in the group;
- each of the devices is responsible for its own security by generating, distributing its own keys to the other devices.
- the invention provides a method of establishing and maintaining distributed security between one correspondent and another correspondent, the correspondents being members of different ad hoc networks and forming a group of communicating correspondents, the method having the steps of,
- each ad hoc network having a gateway and transferring traffic between the correspondents via the gateways;
- the one correspondent is responsible for its own security by generating, distributing its own keys to the other correspondent.
- the invention provides a distributed security system for a plurality of devices in a network, each of the devices being responsible for generating, distributing and controlling its own keys for access to the network and using the keys to establish a trusted network, each device's membership to the network being checked periodically by other devices by using a challenge response protocol to establish which devices are allowed access to the network and the trusted network.
- FIG. 1 is a communication network
- FIG. 2 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels
- FIG. 3 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels
- FIG. 4 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels
- FIG. 5 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels
- FIG. 6 shows communication between piconets
- FIG. 7 shows a flowchart outlining steps for establishing secure communication between devices in different piconets.
- FIG. 8 shows secure communication between piconets
- FIG. 1 shows an overview of a distributed security system 10 having a plurality of communication devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 in a communication network 18 , in a preferred embodiment.
- the communication network 18 may be a wireless personal area network (WPANTM) such as a piconet, in which the devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 connect to each other in an ad hoc fashion.
- the devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 may be portable and mobile computing devices such as PCs, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), peripherals, cell phones, pagers, consumer electronics, and other handheld devices. It will be understood that such devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 include addressing information to facilitate communication within the network 18 .
- PDAs Personal Digital Assistants
- the addressing information includes a local device ID, having 8 bits for example, and a device ID, such as, an IEEE MAC Address including 48 bits. Therefore, upon a device 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 joining the network it is assigned an unused local ID.
- a device 11 will act as a master or a piconet network controller (PNC), and the other devices 12 , 14 , 16 act as slaves for the duration of the piconet 18 connection.
- PNC 11 sets a clock, a hopping pattern determined by device ID, and assigns time for connections between all devices 11 , 12 , 14 16 .
- each piconet 18 includes a unique hopping pattern/ID, and the PNC 11 gives slaves 12 , 14 16 the clock and a local device ID, which is optionally used in conjunction with the EEE MAC Address, to form the piconet 18 .
- the PNC 11 activates an access controller 20 using ID's of the devices and optionally an access control list such that devices 12 , 14 , 16 that have been positively authenticated and have been authorized are admitted to the piconet 18 .
- the PNC 11 also includes a traffic controller 22 to regulate data flow within the network 18 . This may be done by allocating time slots to each device 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 for message distribution.
- Each of the devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 includes a security manager function 24 .
- the security manager function 24 generates keys for communicating with other devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 within the network 18 , and distributes these keys to selected device members 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 of the network 18 .
- Each device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 includes a transceiver 25 for establishing a communication channel with other devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 .
- the security manager function 24 also indicates to the other devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 in the network 18 the other devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 to which the key is being distributed.
- the security manager function 24 can establish a trust set, or TrustList, which indicates which of the devices 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 in the network the security manager 24 of that particular device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 is prepared to trust.
- the security manager function 24 may also attribute different levels of trust to each of the established trust sets. In this way the equivalent of a centralised network 18 can be established where a device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 trusts every other device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 ; or an entirely decentralised network 18 is provided where a device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 trusts no other device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 but itself.
- the security manager 24 receiving a key from another device 11 , 12 , 14 , 16 can determine its source and allocate to that key a level of trust that determines the functions for which the key will be used.
- the security manager 24 may determine that the key is from a trusted party 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 and the key may be used to both decrypt messages received from that trusted party 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 and encrypt messages sent to that trusted party 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 .
- the security manager function 24 may determine that the key originates at a party 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 not trusted by itself and only permit the key to be used for decryption.
- the device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 may choose to ignore data, rather than going through the effort of having to decrypt the data first. This option may be useful for dealing with unsolicited communication or ‘junkmail’.
- the security manager 24 also includes methods of determining which of the devices 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 are presently active in the network 18 . These methods include the functions of each device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 re-authenticating itself with each of its key sharing parties 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 at predetermined time. One such method includes the steps of periodically performing a ‘heartbeat operation’ in the form of a challenge response protocol to determine which devices are presently included in the network 18 , and adjusting the groups and trust levels accordingly. Thus, each device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 may dynamically update its own TrustList to reflect changes in the trust relationships.
- this update mechanism may be invoked by an open enrollment period followed by a lock-up step, possibly confirmed by a button push, or it may be a simple re-set of the whole list, for example by pushing a re-set or re-initialize button on the device 11 , 12 , 14 or 16 .
- some of the changes might be invoked by a third entity that performs remote or delegated trust management for that device.
- Group 1 if device C is the key source, and since device C is part of the TrustSet(A), this key by device C is distributed which is used for both encryption/decryption permitted as C, and device A only accepts keys transferred to itself by devices DEV ⁇ TrustSet(A), for encryption and decryption purposes.
- Group 2 as device D is not part of TrustSet(A), then A accepts a key from device D, and any other devices E, F,G and H, which are not part of TrustSet(A), for decryption purposes only.
- the device A desires to communicate to Group 2 members, the device A generates a new group key to form a new group, Group 3, and device A distributes this new group key to the members of Group 2′, that is device D. Therefore, the groups then under the control of the security manager of device A will then be Group 1, Group 2, as mentioned above, and Group 3, as shown FIG. 3.
- Group 1 having devices A, B and C, if the key source is device C, then this group key is used for encryption and decryption, as device A trusts all devices B,C,D,E,F,G and H, which of course includes the key source C.
- Group 2 having devices A, D, and G, with the key source being device G, once again device A uses this group key is used for encryption and decryption, while device D uses it for decryption only as it does not trust any other device A,B,C,E,F,G or H.
- Group 3 having devices D and E, with the key source being device E, device D uses the group key for decryption only as it does not trust device E. As device A is not included in Group 3, it does not receive the key.
- Group 2 does not include the full list of member devices, A,D,G and H. Therefore, device D can not communicate with device F as the heartbeat operation will indicate that device D is not alive. Since the 8-bit address or the 48-bit address of device is unavailable, there is no communication between D and device F. Therefore, device D uses the group keys for decryption only.
- these different group structures as shown in FIGS. 2, 3, 4 and 5 may be established within the same network 18 by using a decentralised or distributed security management scheme having the ability to set different levels of trust per device.
- This may be used in a number of ways, such as admission of devices A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H, such as PDAs to a piconet 18 based on different subscription models.
- one subscription model may include charging a fee for airtime/bandwidth fee, while another model may be based on charging for content.
- the models may be implemented in a building, such as an airport or fitness club, the network 18 includes a fixed PNC 11 on a ceiling and the PNC 11 multicasting to subscribing devices only, or the models may be implemented between individual devices.
- the network 18 includes a fixed PNC 11 on a ceiling and the PNC 11 multicasting to subscribing devices only, or the models may be implemented between individual devices.
- charging models that differentiate between airtime/bandwidth cost and content/subscription cost are possible, as these charging models might be operated by different entities A,B,C,D,E,F,G or H, or another intermediate entity.
- FIG. 6 shows communication between a device A in piconet 1 with another device B in piconet 2 , where Z 1 and Z 2 are members of piconet 1 and piconet 2 , respectively.
- Z, and Z 2 include transceivers 25 for establishing a communication channel or relay channel 26 between piconet 1 and piconet 2 .
- Z 1 listens in on all traffic and sends all traffic destined for device B to Z 2 via the relay channel 26 .
- Z 2 Upon receipt of the traffic relayed by Z 1 , Z 2 further broadcasts this traffic to B.
- Z 1 and Z 2 include WPAN functionality and may act as data relay agents only, and thus may not process data.
- Piconet 1 and piconet 2 include respective PNC, and PNC 2 and thus devices A and B only need PNC 1 and PNC 2 , respectively, for allocation of time slots, and the function of protection of content is performed by the security manager 24 of each device A, B.
- device A In order to facilitate communication between devices A and B, in different piconets 1 and 2 , device A is associated with a router 28 which stores information related to other devices in its piconet 1 , and routing information having instructions on how to route traffic from device A to other devices, such as device B.
- device B is also associated with a router 30 having similar functionalities.
- any device A or B is associated with a router and these routers 28 , 30 query each other periodically in order to update router information, due to the dynamic nature of the ad hoc networks 18 .
- device A in order to establish a secure communication between device A and B, device A performs the steps of acquiring device B's full static address or device ID and a public key or symmetric key in order to perform key agreement, in step 110 .
- the key agreement yields an authentication key for subsequent communication.
- device A receives a response, in predetermined time, that proves possession of the group public key, in step 114 , then device A generates a new set of group keys and transports these keys to device B, in step 116 .
- Device B can then acknowledge receipt of group keys in step 118 .
- devices A and B require each other's authentic public key and each other's full device ID for authentication and establishment of a secure channel 26 , as different piconets may use different short hand address addresses for each device A or B. Therefore, device A and device B form a trusted group and a secure channel is set up if device B trusts any of the intermediate routers, otherwise device B creates its own keys in order to set up a secure channel 26
Abstract
Description
- This application claims priority in U.S. Provisional Application Serial No. 60/362,865, entitled “Local Area Network”, filed on Mar. 8, 2002 and U.S. Provisional Application Serial No. 60/363,309, entitled “Local Area Network”, filed on Mar. 11, 2002.
- 1. Field of the Invention
- This invention relates to communication networks, more particularly it relates to security within these networks.
- 2. Description of the Prior Art
- One of the most significant recent developments in wireless technologies is the emergence of wireless personal area networking. Wireless personal area networks WPANs™ use radio frequencies to transmit both voice and data, and are specified by standards such as IEEE standard 802.15 or 802.3 from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA), among other specifications. The 802.15 specification is ideal for linking notebook computers, mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), digital cameras, and other handheld devices to do business at home, on the road, or in the office.
- These wireless networks are formed by a number of devices joining and leaving the network in an ad hoc manner, hence such networks are known as ad hoc networks or piconets. Thus, the set of devices connected to the ad hoc network any given time may fluctuate, and so the topology of the network is dynamic. It is desirable to control access to the network and to provide a mechanism for establishing and maintaining security. Traditionally, security is established using a central device or a piconet controller (PNC) which controls access and distributes keys within the network. A drawback of this scheme is that each member of the network is required to trust the PNC.
- Admission to the piconet is based on the outcome of the following protocols between the prospective joining device and the PNC of the piconet. The joining device and the PNC engage in a mutual entity authentication protocol based on public key or symmetric key techniques. The true device identity of both the joining device and the PNC is determined using this protocol. A link key can also be derived based on the authentic keys of both parties. Another protocol involves using authorization techniques between both devices, based on access control lists (ACLs). The Access Control Lists may be dynamically updated, similar to PDA functionality, where a determination is made whether an entity is added or removed from the ACL at entry. This determination may be made by an operator, such as a human operator. For devices that lack a user interface, this update mechanism may be invoked by an open enrollment period followed by a lock-up step, for example, which may be confirmed by a button push or be a simple re-set of the whole list. This may be performed by actuating a re-set or re-initialize button on the device.
- Thus devices in the piconet fully depend on information provided by the PNC regarding which devices have been admitted to the piconet, since admission is based on communication between the PNC and a joining device only. If however an improper list of devices, DeviceList, in the piconet has been distributed by the PNC, either by error or maliciously, the security of the network is jeopardised. Each device has a short hand address, such as a local 8-bit ID, and a long hand address, such as a global 48-bit device ID. For example, in a piconet in which since all devices share a common broadcast key, the list of admitted devices to the piconet is L:=(local 8-bit device ID, global 48-bit device ID), then the failure to obtain the complete and authentic list of admitted devices has the following consequences:
- ‘Fly on the wall’ scenario:
- If a device obtains an incomplete list: L′⊂(L′≠L) of admitted devices, all devices in the complementary set L\L′ are ‘invisible’ to the device. Hence, the device might mistakenly think it is sharing secured information only with devices from the list L′, whereas actually it is unknowingly sharing with other devices of the set L as well. This obviously violates sound security practice.
- ‘Switchboard' scenario ’:
- If the binding between the local device ID and the global device ID is incorrectly received, for example if 2 entries are interchanged, a device might direct information to the improper device and so compromise the intended security. This property also holds in other settings where a key-generating party does not share complete and authentic information on the composition of the key-sharing group itself with the other members of this group. Therefore, these scenarios present a security model in which there is complete trust or a security model in which a device trusts no other device, however a hybrid model of these two models is possible.
- Accordingly it is an object of the present invention to mitigate or obviate at least one of above-mentioned disadvantages.
- In one of its aspects the invention provides a method of establishing and maintaining distributed security between a plurality of devices in an ad hoc network, the method having the steps of; associating each device with a unique device address;
- assigning to one of the devices a control function to control access to the network by other devices;
- each of the devices generating a public key for distribution to other devices; each of the devices authenticating itself periodically with the other devices in order to determine status of the other devices;
- arranging the devices into a plurality of trust groups, each group having a group key for distribution within the trust group;
- associating a trust level to each of the devices;
- each of the devices using the public key and the group key to perform key agreement in order to establish a secure communication channel with the other devices in the group;
- whereby each of the devices is responsible for its own security by generating, distributing its own keys to the other devices.
- In another aspect, the invention provides a method of establishing and maintaining distributed security between one correspondent and another correspondent, the correspondents being members of different ad hoc networks and forming a group of communicating correspondents, the method having the steps of,
- associating the one correspondent and the other correspondent with unique device addresses;
- controlling access to the different ad hoc networks;
- each ad hoc network having a gateway and transferring traffic between the correspondents via the gateways;
- the one correspondent generating a public key for distribution to the other correspondent;
- the one correspondent authenticating itself periodically with the other correspondent in order to determine status of the other correspondent;
- determining a group key for distribution to the correspondents in accordance to the step of controlling access;
- associating a trust level to each correspondent; each of the correspondents using the public key and the group key for performing key agreement in order to establish secure communication within the group;
- whereby the one correspondent is responsible for its own security by generating, distributing its own keys to the other correspondent.
- In yet another aspect, the invention provides a distributed security system for a plurality of devices in a network, each of the devices being responsible for generating, distributing and controlling its own keys for access to the network and using the keys to establish a trusted network, each device's membership to the network being checked periodically by other devices by using a challenge response protocol to establish which devices are allowed access to the network and the trusted network.
- These and other features of the preferred embodiments of the invention will become more apparent in the following detailed description in which reference is made to the appended drawings wherein
- FIG. 1 is a communication network;
- FIG. 2 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels;
- FIG. 3 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels;
- FIG. 4 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels;
- FIG. 5 is a group structure for a security model having different trust levels;
- FIG. 6 shows communication between piconets;
- FIG. 7 shows a flowchart outlining steps for establishing secure communication between devices in different piconets; and
- FIG. 8 shows secure communication between piconets;
- Reference is first made to FIG. 1, which shows an overview of a distributed
security system 10 having a plurality ofcommunication devices communication network 18, in a preferred embodiment. Thecommunication network 18 may be a wireless personal area network (WPAN™) such as a piconet, in which thedevices devices such devices network 18. The addressing information includes a local device ID, having 8 bits for example, and a device ID, such as, an IEEE MAC Address including 48 bits. Therefore, upon adevice device 11 will act as a master or a piconet network controller (PNC), and theother devices piconet 18 connection. ThePNC 11 sets a clock, a hopping pattern determined by device ID, and assigns time for connections between alldevices piconet 18 includes a unique hopping pattern/ID, and thePNC 11 givesslaves piconet 18. - The
PNC 11 activates anaccess controller 20 using ID's of the devices and optionally an access control list such thatdevices piconet 18. ThePNC 11 also includes atraffic controller 22 to regulate data flow within thenetwork 18. This may be done by allocating time slots to eachdevice devices security manager function 24. Thesecurity manager function 24 generates keys for communicating withother devices network 18, and distributes these keys to selecteddevice members network 18. Eachdevice transceiver 25 for establishing a communication channel withother devices security manager function 24 also indicates to theother devices network 18 theother devices other devices device - Thus, the
security manager function 24 can establish a trust set, or TrustList, which indicates which of thedevices security manager 24 of thatparticular device security manager function 24 may also attribute different levels of trust to each of the established trust sets. In this way the equivalent of acentralised network 18 can be established where adevice other device network 18 is provided where adevice other device - Similarly the
security manager 24 receiving a key from anotherdevice security manager 24 may determine that the key is from a trustedparty party party security manager function 24 may determine that the key originates at aparty device - The
security manager 24 also includes methods of determining which of thedevices network 18. These methods include the functions of eachdevice key sharing parties network 18, and adjusting the groups and trust levels accordingly. Thus, eachdevice devices device - Referring now to FIG. 2, in order to describe the distributed security model, as an example, assume the
PNC 11 permits access to devices A, B,C,D, E, F, G, H, then the DeviceSet:={A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}. However if the device A only trusts devices A, B, C then TrustSet(A):={A, B, C} that isGroup 1. Also, device A may participate in other groups having a different trust set, such asGroup 2, having only device D. Thus thesecurity manger function 24 of device A sensesGroup 1 andGroup 2 with different constituent members and different levels of trust. For example, inGroup 1, if device C is the key source, and since device C is part of the TrustSet(A), this key by device C is distributed which is used for both encryption/decryption permitted as C, and device A only accepts keys transferred to itself by devices DEV ∈TrustSet(A), for encryption and decryption purposes. InGroup 2, as device D is not part of TrustSet(A), then A accepts a key from device D, and any other devices E, F,G and H, which are not part of TrustSet(A), for decryption purposes only. Accordingly if device A desires to communicate toGroup 2 members, the device A generates a new group key to form a new group, Group 3, and device A distributes this new group key to the members ofGroup 2′, that is device D. Therefore, the groups then under the control of the security manager of device A will then beGroup 1,Group 2, as mentioned above, and Group 3, as shown FIG. 3. - The flexibility of the
security managers 24 of devices A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H permits different network structures to be mimicked. For example, using the notation above, if DeviceSet:={A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, and TrustSet(A):=Universe, then device A can be considered an altruistic device which provides a structure equivalent to a centralized model. Conversely, if TrustSet(D):={D}, then device D is an egocentric device, and is a structure equivalent a completely decentralized model. Then, looking at FIG. 4, device A participates inGroups Group 1 having devices A, B and C, if the key source is device C, then this group key is used for encryption and decryption, as device A trusts all devices B,C,D,E,F,G and H, which of course includes the key source C. However, inGroup 2 having devices A, D, and G, with the key source being device G, once again device A uses this group key is used for encryption and decryption, while device D uses it for decryption only as it does not trust any other device A,B,C,E,F,G or H. In Group 3 having devices D and E, with the key source being device E, device D uses the group key for decryption only as it does not trust device E. As device A is not included in Group 3, it does not receive the key. - In FIG. 5, where one of the device F is hidden from the other members in the
network 18, thenGroup 2 does not include the full list of member devices, A,D,G and H. Therefore, device D can not communicate with device F as the heartbeat operation will indicate that device D is not alive. Since the 8-bit address or the 48-bit address of device is unavailable, there is no communication between D and device F. Therefore, device D uses the group keys for decryption only. - Thus, these different group structures as shown in FIGS. 2, 3,4 and 5 may be established within the
same network 18 by using a decentralised or distributed security management scheme having the ability to set different levels of trust per device. This may be used in a number of ways, such as admission of devices A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H, such as PDAs to apiconet 18 based on different subscription models. For example, one subscription model may include charging a fee for airtime/bandwidth fee, while another model may be based on charging for content. In this example, the models may be implemented in a building, such as an airport or fitness club, thenetwork 18 includes a fixedPNC 11 on a ceiling and thePNC 11 multicasting to subscribing devices only, or the models may be implemented between individual devices. Thus, by separating the role of thesecurity manager 24 from that of thePNC 11, charging models that differentiate between airtime/bandwidth cost and content/subscription cost are possible, as these charging models might be operated by different entities A,B,C,D,E,F,G or H, or another intermediate entity. - It will be seen therefore that a
versatile network 18 is provided, and moreover the removal of a device A,B,C,D,E,F,G or H from thenetwork 18 does not require re-establishment of all keys in thenetwork 18 as the individual devices A,B,C,D,E,F,G or H control the distribution of the keys. FIG. 6 shows communication between a device A inpiconet 1 with another device B inpiconet 2, where Z1 and Z2 are members ofpiconet 1 andpiconet 2, respectively. Z, and Z2 includetransceivers 25 for establishing a communication channel orrelay channel 26 betweenpiconet 1 andpiconet 2. Thus, Z1 listens in on all traffic and sends all traffic destined for device B to Z2 via therelay channel 26. Upon receipt of the traffic relayed by Z1, Z2 further broadcasts this traffic to B. Z1 and Z2 include WPAN functionality and may act as data relay agents only, and thus may not process data. Piconet 1 andpiconet 2 include respective PNC, and PNC2 and thus devices A and B only need PNC1 and PNC2, respectively, for allocation of time slots, and the function of protection of content is performed by thesecurity manager 24 of each device A, B. - In order to facilitate communication between devices A and B, in
different piconets router 28 which stores information related to other devices in itspiconet 1, and routing information having instructions on how to route traffic from device A to other devices, such as device B. Correspondingly, device B is also associated with arouter 30 having similar functionalities. Thus, any device A or B is associated with a router and theserouters - Referring to FIG. 7 and FIG. 8, in order to establish a secure communication between device A and B, device A performs the steps of acquiring device B's full static address or device ID and a public key or symmetric key in order to perform key agreement, in
step 110. In thenext step 112, the key agreement yields an authentication key for subsequent communication. Once device A receives a response, in predetermined time, that proves possession of the group public key, instep 114, then device A generates a new set of group keys and transports these keys to device B, instep 116. Device B can then acknowledge receipt of group keys instep 118. Thus, devices A and B require each other's authentic public key and each other's full device ID for authentication and establishment of asecure channel 26, as different piconets may use different short hand address addresses for each device A or B. Therefore, device A and device B form a trusted group and a secure channel is set up if device B trusts any of the intermediate routers, otherwise device B creates its own keys in order to set up asecure channel 26 - Although the invention has been described with reference to certain specific embodiments, various modifications thereof will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as outlined in the claims appended hereto.
Claims (21)
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US20160261574A1 (en) | 2016-09-08 |
US8681993B2 (en) | 2014-03-25 |
US20090296939A1 (en) | 2009-12-03 |
US20140173276A1 (en) | 2014-06-19 |
US9356778B2 (en) | 2016-05-31 |
US9871776B2 (en) | 2018-01-16 |
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