Pibor County, Jonglei State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 148,475
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 219,745
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 228,287

Ethnic groups: Murle, Kachipo, and Jie/Jiye

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 54,008 IDPs (+23,842 Q1 2020) and 4,253 returnees (-6,900 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Emergency (Phase 4); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4); April to July 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Pibor County is one of two counties that form the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). It borders Jonglei State to the north and west, Eastern Equatoria State to the south and Ethiopia to the east. The lowlands of the Lotilla plain characterise the north-western part of the county, while the highlands and hills of the Boma plateau comprise the south-eastern part of the county.

Pibor encompasses two livelihood zones: the southeastern semi-arid and the pastoral zone, as well as the maize, sorghum, fishing and natural resources zone (FEWSNET 2018). An estimated 40% of the population of Pibor households engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 0.85 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022), with yields for the Pibor Administrative Area (comprising both Pochalla County and Pibor county) as a whole also reporting 0.85 tonnes per hectare in 2023 (FAO/WFP 2023). Pastoralism and agriculture are the main sources of livelihoods for communities in Pibor County. In the lowlands of Lotilla plain to the northwest, communities primarily engage in pastoralism. In addition to cattle, they rear goats, sheep and chicken. Livelihoods are supplemented by agriculture, including growing sorghum, maize and pumpkin. On the Boma plateau to the southeast, communities are primarily agricultural, growing sorghum, maize, sweet potatoes, okra and groundnuts. In addition, communities throughout Pibor fish during the rainy season and collect wild fruits during the lean months. Climatic conditions regularly affect both livelihood activities in Pibor County, given frequent floods and droughts. The county boasts a number of gold and other mines around Boma and potential oil reserves. Reaping the economic potential of mineral, livestock, and wildlife resources in Pibor, however, continues to face significant political, military, economic, legal and logistical obstacles.

The largest ethnic group in the county is the Murle, whose social relations are based around a generational or age-set system, as is also the case for a number of ethnic groups in Eastern Equatoria State. Membership of a Murle age-set traditionally comprises males born within a period of around two decades, though more recently new age-sets have tended to be established with a greater frequency than in the past (and comprise males born over a decade or less). Sub-divisions are also present within an age-set. Social relationships among age-sets often take precedence over familial ties, and exert a strong influence upon political and economic relationships. As well as being sources of common identity, conflict management and unity, age-sets have also been associated with violent conflict, notably when members of an age-set break away from an age-set to form a new age-set, in a process that can be exploited by political or military elites in the community. Moreover, the culture of younger age-sets has become increasingly militarised, in a process which has accompanied increasing conflict and armed group activity in Pibor County (Murle Heritage, n.d.).

During the dry season (January to April), Murle pastoralists move to riparian areas and water points along the county’s northeastern border with Pochalla, to Bor Dinka areas close to Bor South County to the west, and to Lou Nuer areas in Akobo County to the north. However, climate pressures have seen increasingly unpredictable flooding and the seasonal shrinking of rivers in recent decades, forcing Murle pastoralists further eastward and northwards than previously, with insecurity limiting movements to Greater Kapoeta to the south. Widespread flooding across late 2019-2021 had a significant impact on livelihoods and the well-being of Pibor residents, and contributed to high levels of internal displacement in the county.

IPC projections for Pibor are at Emergency levels (IPC Phase 4) of food insecurity as of November 2022, and are project to remain at Emergency levels until at least July 2023.  This represents a decrease from the Famine-likely (IPC Phase 5) designation in western areas of Pibor through mid-2021 (with insufficient data to provide food security forecasting in eastern areas of Pibor). Despite this, 25% of households in Pibor county meet 25-50% of their caloric needs through humanitarian assistance. At least 25% of households in Pibor meet between a quarter and a half of their caloric needs through humanitarian assistance.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

Pibor Payam hosts the area’s headquarters in Pibor Town. The extensive flooding since 2019 has had a significant impact on local infrastructure, including Pibor Town, and limited access to services.

In 2021, the Famine Review Committee reported that market access continued to be limited, both physically and financially, due to flooding and insecurity, which has also affected access to income-generating activities. In the rainy season, movement around Pibor County is limited due to poor road conditions and Pibor Town is sometimes dependent on imports via plane from Juba for some goods (REACH 2021).

Pibor County is home to two (2) Early Childhood Development centres, twenty-five (25) primary schools and one (1) secondary school (located in Pibor Payam).

Pibor County was reported to have twenty-six (26) health facilities including fourteen (14) functional health facilities, among them ten (10) PHCUs, two (2) PHCCs and two (2) hospitals in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 0.53 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 0.44 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO, which ranks Pibor as among the ten counties with the lowest ratios of PHCUs/person in South Sudan. Boma Hospital is reported to be moderately functional while the functionality of Pibor County Hospital is unreported.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there are currently over 203,000 people with humanitarian needs in Pibor County. This figure represents 89% of the estimated population of the county reported in the HNO. Pibor has experienced regular humanitarian crises relating to large-scale conflict with neighbouring communities, including the Dinka Bor and Lou Nuer. At times, these conflicts have been exacerbated by involvement from security forces and/or armed opposition groups (UNMISS HRD 2021; UN Panel of Experts 2020).

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

As a minority ethnic group in South Sudan, the Murle (the largest ethnic group in Pibor County) have a long and complicated history of cooperation and conflict with state authority and with the SPLM/A. Except for a short period of SPLA control from 1987-1992, Pibor was a Sudanese government garrison town during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005). Boma (in the highlands east of Pibor), however, was an SPLM/A stronghold from July 1983 onwards, and represented the first significant capture by the movement. In recognition of its significance, the name ‘Boma’ was subsequently adopted by the SPLM/A for the lowest level of its administrative system (Thomas 2015, p.186). From 1992 Sultan Ismail Konyi, a Murle leader supported by Khartoum, held Pibor town until Murle militia commanders integrated their forces into the SPLM/A in 2007. In the early 1990s, Pibor became a destination for people fleeing the Dinka-Nuer conflicts that followed in the wake of the SPLM/A split in 1991, though by the mid-1990s the relationship between parts of the Murle and Nuer soured following escalating Murle raids into north-east Jonglei (Thomas 2015, pp.202-204).

The Murle prior to independence

Pejorative stereotypes of the Murle persist within Jonglei State and beyond, often focusing on internal violence within the Murle community, and an alleged propensity to engage in raiding and abductions against neighbouring communities. These accounts have tended to function through presenting Murle society as existing in a vacuum, by ignoring reciprocal violence between the Murle and their neighbours and the particularly marginal position of the Murle within South Sudan’s political economy. Additionally, depictions of internal violence neglect to acknowledge the presence of internal violence within a number of other ethnic groups in South Sudan, which has intensified as a result of the militarisation of social relations in many conflict-affected areas. One consequence of such representations is a recent tendency for some members of the Murle community to downplay or substitute their Murle identity with that of ŋalam (a term signifying a lack of cattle, often applied to highland Murle agriculturalists from the Boma plateau) during times of physical danger (Felix da Costa 2023). Another consequence is for raids or abductions to be attributed to the Murle with little or no evidence provided.

During the Comprehensive Peace Agreement era (2005-2011), relations between the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle communities deteriorated, with conflict alternating between more limited cattle raiding and phases of mass violence involving heavily armed militias attacking population centres. Concurrently, Jonglei State became the site of overlapping violence between the SPLA and various militias and rebel groups, alongside punitive ‘civilian disarmament’ campaigns in areas with historically complicated relations with the SPLM/A (Thomas 2015, Ch. 8). The Murle and the smaller neighbouring groups of the Jiye/Jie and Kachipo (from south-eastern Pibor) as well as the Anyuak (discussed further in the Pochalla County profile) have also experienced tension and occasional conflict, though have participated in various peace initiatives to limit conflict, notably the Liliir Peace Conference of May 2000. Although Murle youth (particularly from the Nanaam area) have been actively involved in raiding in parts of northern and western Jonglei State, attacks and abductions in these areas are often attributed to the Murle, though may later transpire to involve groups other than the Murle. This tendency has also occurred in parts of Central and Eastern Equatoria states, where the Murle have been linked without evidence to small-scale attacks in areas which are geographically distant from Pibor County.

As noted above, the Murle are a generation-based society, with conflict between age-sets being socially sanctioned under some circumstances. However, this has been complicated by the politicisation of age-sets by elites (Arensen 2015; Murle Heritage, n.d.). Intermittent conflict among age-sets has occurred in recent years (e.g. Sudan Tribune 2016a; UNMISS 2017; UNSC 2018), though has intensified since 2022. Across the year numerous defections from age-set groups – as well as ongoing intra-age set conflicts – caused significant insecurity in and around Pibor, Lekuangole, and Gumuruk, leading to violent interactions among parts of the Tithi, Bothonya, Lango, Kurenen, and Guzuli age-set groups. Although age-set fighting has declined in towns, violence prevails in the more rural bomas, especially areas that are inaccessible during the rainy season. These include Kongor, Wuno, and Munchak of Lekuangole Payam, Thangiang, Kelero, and Bichbich in Gumuruk Payam, and Manyirany, Beeh, and Akilo in Pibor Payam.

Armed opposition and the creation of GPAA (2010-2016)

Pibor’s current status as an Administrative Area can be traced back to events in 2010, when a primarily Murle opposition group was established by David Yau Yau. This occurred after Yau Yau lost an election for the state parliamentary seat for Gumuruk, amid alleged disapproval for his candidacy among Murle elders (Small Arms Survey 2013a). Yau Yau aligned himself with the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) established by another Jonglei opposition commander, George Athor, who provided the relatively small group with weapons and support (Todisco 2015).

Low-level fighting in and around Pibor was contained after Yau Yau accepted a presidential amnesty in June 2011. However, in August 2011 Murle youth – who were alleged (though not confirmed) to have used weapons from Yau Yau’s brief insurgency – carried out an attack against Nuer civilians in Pieri (Uror County), reportedly killing hundreds and stealing significant numbers of cattle (Todisco 2015, p.20). This triggered an escalating series of attacks and counter-attacks between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities, including a major Lou Nuer attack on Pibor at the end of 2011.

In 2012, the SPLA launched a disarmament campaign in Pibor, during which Human Rights Watch alleged that SPLA soldiers committed serious human rights violations, including beatings, rape and torture (HRW 2013). Discontent towards the SPLA encouraged another insurrection in August 2012, when Yau Yau organised a second and larger insurgency, this time under the mantle of the SSDM/A ‘Cobra Faction’ (Small Arms Survey 2013b). Fighting between the Cobra Faction and the SPLA occurred in 2012 and 2013, with Human Rights Watch reporting evidence of killing of civilians by both groups (HRW 2013). The International Crisis Group reported that in early 2013 the SPLA provided arms to the Jiye/Jie, and launched co-ordinated attacks against Murle cattle camps in the Boma area (ICG 2014, p.23).

Negotiations between Juba and Yau Yau that had been underway during late 2013 concluded in May 2014, effectively ensuring the Cobra Faction would not be involved in the national conflict (2013-2018). The principal outcome of the negotiations was the formation of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) as an autonomous administrative zone within Jonglei State, led by an administrator holding comparable status to a state governor. Though the reintegration of the Cobra Faction bolstered the government’s control of Pibor, the GPAA (which was renamed as Boma State from 2015-2020, under the shift from 10 to 28/32 states) would be affected by internal power struggles, as well as accusations of marginalisation by non-Murle groups (discussed further in the profile for Pochalla County). Additionally, disputes over internal boundaries – notably relating to Verteth Payam** – were also reported in the GPAA, which overlapped with claims over gold producing areas in the Boma area (Todisco 2015, pp.55-57). Amid internal competition for the leadership of the area, fighting was reported in Pibor town in February 2016 (Sudan Tribune 2016b), while in September 2016 the senior Cobra Faction commander Khalid Boutrous Bora announced his defection from the government (VOA 2016).

In recent years, representatives from parts of the Kachipo and Anyuak communities have made calls to exit the GPAA (Radio Tamazuj 2022), with tensions among the Anyuak community discussed further in the profile for Pibor County. Additionally, a series of political developments involving elites from the Murle community have impacted the GPAA in late 2023 and early 2024 (Eye Radio 2023; Radio Tamazuj 2024).

Escalating sub-national violence and peacebuilding (2020-present)

In early 2020, a series of small-scale raids into several Dinka and Nuer areas of Jonglei State that were attributed to Murle militias – alongside tensions relating to the reconstitution of the GPAA as part of the post-R-ARCSS governance arrangements –  resulted in attacks on various locations around Pibor, allegedly conducted by Dinka from Twic East and Duk counties, and Lou and Gawaar Nuer, with Lou Nuer forces occupying Lekuangole. UNMISS HRD verified that at least 51 Murle villages and settlements were attacked or occupied in late February and early March 2020 (UNMISS/HRD 2021, p.6). In response, an estimated 7,000 Murle fighters attacked Pieri in Uror County in May, drawing in Lou Nuer elements of the SSPDF and SPLA-IO to defend the area (UNMISS/HRD 2021, p.6), with hundreds reportedly killed (Al Jazeera 2020). Reprisal attacks by alleged Dinka and Nuer militiamen (numbering 17,000) in Pibor were reported between June and August, with Murle youth recovering some abductees and cattle stolen by the attackers after they were forced to withdraw from Pibor once the rains arrived. UNMISS HRD estimated that at least 738 persons were killed and 320 wounded during months of violence, and also noted the alleged involvement of elements of the SSPDF, NSS, and SPLA-IO in providing support to the belligerents, alongside planning and support from elites with connections to the communities in question (UNMISS/HRD 2021, pp. 10-12).

Despite sometimes turbulent relations between parts of the Dinka and Murle, there is also a relationship of cooperation between Bor South and the GPAA with crucial market linkages and community ties, especially around Anyidi. As such, even though Dinka Bor elements allegedly participated in the attacks into Pibor, Murle communities displaced to Anyidi for security. Progress in improving relations between the communities involved in the conflict was marked with the signing of the Pieri Peace Agreement in March 2021, which has resulted in the reduction of violence and the return of some abducted women and children.

However, implementation of the agreement has been affected by shifting political and security alliances, whilst community leaders face the challenge of exercising influence over and instilling patience among armed youth groups, whilst overcoming distrust between the same groups. Communities have also become frustrated with the government and the international community for failing to support communities to deliver on the resolutions made in Pieri in early 2021. In particular, the lack of internal cohesion among the Murle has continued to drive violent age-set clashes in Pibor County, while the continuation of alleged low-level Murle raids into neighbouring areas perpetuates historical enmity. After an alleged Murle attack on a Gawaar Nuer cattle camp in Duk, armed groups (alleged to comprise Gawaar Nuer and some Dinka) attacked Pibor again in May 2021 leaving some 150 people killed (Radio Tamazuj 2021a).

A further breakdown in the peace agreement took place in November 2021 when two Bor Dinka youth were ambushed by suspected armed youth from the GPAA. In response, youth from Anyidi Payam killed seven Murle residing in Bor town (Radio Tamazuj 2021b), and further conflict in Baidit Payam in January 2022 killed 38 people after youth (allegedly from Gumuruk) attacked the area (Eye Radio 2022). As a result, the Bor-Pibor road was made inaccessible by Dinka Bor youth for humanitarian and commercial vehicles, affecting the delivery of goods and services to GPAA throughout 2022. It also led to the temporary withdrawal of Dinka Bor representatives from the ongoing Pieri peace process. For the Lou Nuer and Murle, the first half of 2022 remained stable. Conversely, the Dinka Bor remained tense. In July 2022, small-scale cattle raids, road ambushes, and abductions continued along the border between Lou Nuer and Murle communities. Sporadic attacks allegedly perpetrated by Murle youth in November were perceived to be the main motivation for a remobilization of Dinka and Nuer militia, whilst lethal raiding continued into December (Craze 2023, p. 2).

In late December 2022 and January 2023, large numbers of alleged Dinka and Nuer militia from south-western and northern Jonglei (alongside some Nuer militia reportedly from Ethiopia’s Gambella Region) attacked areas to the west and north of Pibor town, with over 300 people reported killed in the ensuing fighting and attacks (UNMISS HRD 2023). The violence in the GPAA was characterized by significantly more abductions (which form part of Lou Nuer attacks on the Murle) than usual. While Murle armed youths mobilized to defend their community, groups of alleged armed Murle youth launched attacks in Nyirol county on 26 December. In the first half of January 2023, suspected Murle groups attacked Duk Padiet in Duk county, Waat in Nyirol, and Walgak in Akobo, alongside raids in parts of Uror.

The return to violence on the one hand can be seen as a failure of the Pieri Agreement, but in another light, has served to reinforce the legitimacy of the Pieri Agreement: Lou Nuer ostensibly attacked not because the Agreement failed, but because they characterised ongoing (alleged) Murle attacks in central-southern Jonglei as violations of the Agreement justifying a retaliatory response. This presents an opportunity to build on the Pieri process and gains, while addressing the gaps that the outbreak of violence has highlighted. In March and April 2023, rumours of a mobilisation by Lou Nuer, Gawaar Nuer, and Bor Dinka against the GPAA were widespread (Craze 2023). However, and thanks to sustained engagement of government and peace actors across the areas, as well as a prolonged dry season reducing the prospects of successful raids, no mobilisation materialized. Nevertheless, small-scale raids by suspected Murle have persisted into neighbouring communities, undermining the ability of authorities and supporters of the Pieri process to convince Lou Nuer, Bor Dinka, and Gawaar Nuer to maintain restraint. This was made visible during an attempt by Lou Nuer from Uror to mobilize against the GPAA in July 2023. While the mobilisation attempt ultimately failed, it highlights the precarious nature of prevailing peace in Jonglei and the GPAA.

Minority communities within Pibor

Finally, relations between the Murle and the neighbouring Toposa, Jiye/Jie, and Anyuak groups in the south-eastern areas of Pibor County have been affected by intermittent raiding and cross-border violence. In July 2016, serious clashes during an alleged Murle cattle raid against the Jiye/Jie in Boma Payam resulted in the deaths of 86 people (Radio Tamazuj 2016). Similar clashes with large death tolls in Boma Payam were reported in April-May 2019 (Radio Tamazuj 2019a; Radio Tamazuj 2019b), which were followed by efforts to restore peace (UNMISS 2020). The same month, the Jiye/Jie were alleged to have been attacked by cattle raiders from Greater Kapoeta (Radio Tamazuj 2019c). Later, in January 2023 – and amid Murle-Anyuak violence in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region – suspected Anyuak militia from Ethiopia (including armed men wearing Ethiopian police uniforms) attacked and torched Nyat village (Radio Tamazuj 2023).

More recently, some Toposa pastoralists from Eastern Equatoria State are reported to have been engaged in raiding into Pibor’s Verteth Payam whilst seeking to recover stolen cattle (UNMISS 2024, p.3). In March 2024, violence – allegedly involving elements from the Anyuak and Murle communities – was reported, as is discussed further in the profile for Pochalla County.

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Pibor (Headquarters), Boma, Gurumukhi, Kiziongora, Lekuangole, Marrow, Mewun, Verteth

UN OCHA 2020 Pibor county map: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-pibor-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

  • A primary road connects Pibor town to Bor, through Gumuruk. The road was designated “not passable” by the Logistics Cluster during rainy portions of 2022, while the road was considered passable during the 2023 dry season. according to the Logistics Cluster. A secondary road also connects Pibor to Akobo, which was deemed impassible during the rainy season of 2022, and “passable with difficulties” up to Likuangole during the dry season 0f 2023 (with the remainder deemed impassable). Another secondary road runs south-east to Boma, with tertiary roads connecting Boma to Pochalla in the north-east and to Kuron and Kassangor to the south and south-west (respectively) in Eastern Equatoria State. This road network was deemed impassable during the rainy season of 2022 and the dry season of 2023, with the exception of the Boma-Kassangor tertiary road deemed “passable with difficulties” during the dry season.

 UNHAS-Recognised Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: Pibor, Boma

Additional MAF-Recognised Airstrips: Upper Boma, Lekuangole, Nyat

REFERENCES

Al Jazeera. (2020). Hundreds killed in inter-communal clashes in South Sudan. Retrieved 27 October 2023.

Arensen, M. (2015). Historical Grievances and Fragile Agreements: An Analysis of Local Conflict Dynamics in Akobo. NRC. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2023). A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Felix da Costa, D. (2023). ‘The politics of being Murle in South Sudan: state violence, displacement and the narrativisation of identity’, Journal of Eastern African Studies. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Eye Radio. (2022). Peace Commission calls for deployment of forces in greater Jonglei. Retrieved 27 September 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023). Kiir revokes membership of Yau Yau from SPLM Liberation Council. Retrieved 1 November 2023.

Human Rights Watch. (2013). “They Are Killing Us” Abuses Against Civilians in South Sudan’s Pibor County. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

International Crisis Group. (2014). South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Murle Heritage (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.murleheritage.com/. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2016). More than 80 killed in a cattle raid in Boma state: official. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2019a). 50 killed in Boma cattle raid. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2019b). 17 killed, 10 injured in Boma inter-communal clashes. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2019c). 9 killed, 450 cows raided in fresh inter-communal clashes in Boma. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021a). Calm returns to Pibor after 10 days of bloody clashes. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021b). Jonglei State investigates Bor revenge killings. Retrieved 27 September 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2022). Kachipo community demand exit from GPAA. Retrieved 16 November 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023). Humanitarian situation dire after Jebel Boma attack. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024). Pibor’s David Yau Yau joins Machar. Retrieved 1 April 2024.

REACH. (2021). Western Pibor Rapid Assessment, February 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2013a). David Yau Yau’s Rebellion. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2013b). SSDM/A-Cobra faction profile. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2016a). Skirmishes in Pibor county not political, officials say. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2016b). South Sudan president summons Boma governor over military clashes. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Thomas, E. (2015). South Sudan: A Slow Liberation. London: Zed Books.

Todisco. C. (2015). Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administrative Area. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNMISS. (2017). UNMISS peacekeepers protected civilians in Pibor against feared attack. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

UNMISS. (2020). Communities in Jonglei work to bury their differences and build peace. Retrieved 21 February 2024.

UNMISS. (2024). UNMISS Brief on violence affecting civilians (October to December 2023). Retrieved 18 March 2024.

UNMISS HRD/Human Rights Division. (2021). Armed Violence Involving Community-Based Militias in Greater Jonglei: January – August 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNMISS HRD/Human Rights Division. (2023). UNMISS Brief on violence affecting civilians (January – March 2023). Retrieved 20 July 2023.

UNSC. (2018). Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 17 February to 3 June 2018), S/2018/609. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

UN Panel of Experts. (2020). Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2521 (2020). Retrieved 20 July 2023.

VOA (2016). Militant Faction Vows Again to Fight S. Sudan Government. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

REPORTS on PIBOR

Arensen, J. (2010). Drinking the Wind: Memoirs of an African Odyssey. Kijabe: Old Africa Books.

Arensen, J. and Lyth, R. (2011). Chasing the Rain: An African’s Quest for God. Kijabe: Old Africa Books.

Felix da Costa, D. (2016). The Politics of Murle Identity, Experiences of Violence and of the State in Boma, South Sudan. PhD Dissertation. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Felix da Costa, D. (2016). ‘The ethics of researching in conflict: personal reflections from Greater Pibor and South Sudan.Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, 8 (1), pp. 31-43. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Felix da Costa, D. (2018). Changing Power Among Murle Chiefs Negotiating political, military and spiritual authority in Boma State, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Felix da Costa, D. (2023). ‘The politics of being Murle in South Sudan: state violence, displacement and the narrativisation of identity’, Journal of Eastern African Studies. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Gordon, R. (2014). In the eye of the storm: An analysis of internal conflict in South Sudan’s Jonglei State. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

McCallum, J. (2017). The Murle and the Security Complex in the South Sudan-Ethiopia Borderlands. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Oxfam. (2022). The Impact of Food Insecurity on Women and Girls: Research from Pibor and Akobo counties, Jonglei State, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Santschi, M., et al. (2014). Researching livelihood and services affected by conflict. Livelihoods, access to services and perceptions of governance: An analysis of Pibor County, South Sudan from the perspective of displaced people. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Thomas, E. (2015). South Sudan: A Slow Liberation. London: Zed Books.

Todisco. C. (2015). Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administrative Area. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Toma, I. (2019). Education-focused Gender Analysis Case Studies: Pibor and Juba, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNMISS. (2012). Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: Verteth Payam, like several other payams in Pibor County, was re-designated as a county by the Chief Administrator after the establishment of the GPAA, although without recognition as such within national government policy and official statistics that form the basis for the county profiles. The administrative status of these changes remains a grey area in analysis and reporting.