Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office
Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office
Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office
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<strong>Exploring</strong><br />
<strong>Unknown</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong><br />
Selected Documents<br />
in <strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Civil Space Program<br />
Volume III: Using Space<br />
Edited by John M. Logsdon<br />
with Roger D. Launius, David H. Onkst,<br />
and Stephen J. Garber
Contents<br />
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix<br />
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi<br />
Biographies of Volume III Essay Authors and Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv<br />
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii<br />
Chapter One<br />
Essay: “The <strong>History</strong> of Satellite Communications,” by Joseph N. Pelton . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1<br />
Documents<br />
I-1 and I-2 Arthur C. Clarke, “The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications,”<br />
May 25, 1945; and Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-Terrestrial Relays:<br />
Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?,”<br />
Wireless World, October 1945, pp. 305–308 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11<br />
I-3 John R. Pierce, “Exotic Radio Communications,” Bell Laboratories<br />
Records, September 1959, pp. 323–329. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22<br />
I-4 Memorandum from S. G. Lutz to A.V. Haeff, “Commercial Satellite<br />
Communication Project; Preliminary Report of Study Task Force,”<br />
October 22, 1959 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31<br />
I-5 H.A. Rosen and D.D. Williams, Commercial Communications Satellite,<br />
Report RDL/B-1, Engineering Division, Hughes Aircraft Company,<br />
January 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<br />
I-6 “Memorandum for Conference on Communications Satellite<br />
Development,” December 7, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39<br />
I-7 White House Press Secretary, “Statement by <strong>the</strong> President,”<br />
December 30, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41<br />
I-8 Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Relation to Space<br />
Communication,” Public Notice-G, 1627, March 14, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . 42<br />
I-9 and I-10 F.R. Kappel, President, American Telephone and Telegraph<br />
Company, to <strong>the</strong> Honorable James E. Webb, Administrator,<br />
NASA, April 5, 1961 (with several attachments); and<br />
James E. Webb, Administrator, to F.R. Kappel, President,<br />
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, April 8, 1961 . . . . . . . . 45<br />
vii
I-11 President John F. Kennedy to Honorable Newton Minow, Chairman,<br />
Federal Communications Commission, May 15, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60<br />
I-12 Ben F. Waple, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications<br />
Commission, “An Inquiry Into <strong>the</strong> Administrative and Regulatory<br />
Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong> Authorization of Commercially Operable<br />
Space Communications Systems: First Report,” FCC Report 61-676,<br />
4774, Docket No. 14024, May 24, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61<br />
I-13 National Aeronautics and Space Council, “Communication<br />
Satellites,” July 14, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65<br />
I-14 Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on <strong>the</strong> Judiciary, House of<br />
Representatives, et al., to <strong>the</strong> President, August 24, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . 67<br />
I-15 Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President, Memorandum for<br />
<strong>the</strong> President, November 13, 1961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71<br />
I-16–I-18 Senator Robert S. Kerr, “Amendment to <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics<br />
and Space Act of 1958, Space Communications,” November 28, 1961;<br />
E.C. Welsh, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Council, Executive <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> President, Memorandum to <strong>the</strong><br />
President, April 11, 1962; and “Communications Satellite Act of 1962,”<br />
Public Law 87-624, 76 Stat. 419, signed by <strong>the</strong> President on<br />
August 31, 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72<br />
I-19 Edward A. Bolster, Department of State, to Mr. Johnson,<br />
Memorandum, “Space Communication,” May 3, 1962; with attached:<br />
“Role of <strong>the</strong> Department of State in Space Communication<br />
Development” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85<br />
I-20 Project Telstar, “Preliminary Report, Telstar I, July–September 1962,”<br />
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89<br />
I-21 Memorandum from J.D. O’Connell, Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President<br />
for Telecommunications and Director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Telecommunications<br />
Management, to <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,<br />
Secretary of Commerce, Administrator, National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Administration, and Chairman, Federal Communications<br />
Commission, “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development<br />
of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities,” September 17,<br />
1965, with attached: National Security Action Memorandum 338 . . . . . 91<br />
I-22 National Security Action Memorandum No. 342, “U.S. Assistance in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service for<br />
Less-Developed Nations,” March 4, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95<br />
viii
I-23 David Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, to <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary of State, “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite<br />
Technology,” Telegraphic Message, November 9, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96<br />
I-24 Memorandum from J.D. O’Connell for <strong>the</strong> President,<br />
February 8, 1967, with attached: “A Global System of Satellite<br />
Communications: The Hazards Ahead,” February 8, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . 99<br />
I-25 Leonard H. Marks, Ambassador, Chairman, “Report of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Delegation to <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive<br />
Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite<br />
Consortium (First Session), Washington, D.C., February 24–<br />
March 21, 1969,” April 10, 1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108<br />
I-26 “Second Report and Order in <strong>the</strong> Matter of Establishment of<br />
Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental<br />
Entities,” Docket No. 16495, June 16, 1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120<br />
1-27 George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, “Personal Notes,”<br />
December 23, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132<br />
I-28 Committee on Satellite Communications, Space Applications Board,<br />
Assembly of Engineering, National Research Council, “Federal<br />
Research and Development for Satellite Communications,” 1977 . . . . 135<br />
I-29 John J. Madison, Legislative Affairs Specialist, NASA, Memorandum<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Record, “Advanced Communications Technology Satellite<br />
(ACTS) program meeting, October 13, 1983” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145<br />
I-30 William Schneider, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,<br />
Science, and Technology, and David J. Markey, Assistant Secretary of<br />
Commerce for Communications and Information, “A White Paper<br />
on New International Satellite Systems," Senior Interagency Group<br />
on International Communication and Information Policy,<br />
February 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147<br />
Chapter Two<br />
Essay: “Observing <strong>the</strong> Earth From Space,” by Pamela E. Mack<br />
and Ray A. Williamson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155<br />
Documents<br />
II-1 Dr. Harry Wexler, “Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,”<br />
Journal of <strong>the</strong> British Interplanetary Society 7 (September 1954): 269–276 . . 177<br />
ix
II-2 S.M. Greenfield and W.W. Kellog, “Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle,” The RAND<br />
Corporation, R-365, August 1960, pp. v–vi, 1–23, 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183<br />
II-3 Hugh L. Dryden, for T. Keith Glennan, NASA, and Roy W. Johnson,<br />
Department of Defense, “Agreement Between <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
Defense and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> TIROS Meteorological Satellite Project,” April 13, 1959. 203<br />
II-4 U.S. Department of Commerce, Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, “National Plan for<br />
a Common System of Meteorological Satellites,” Technical Planning<br />
Study No. 3, Preliminary Draft, October 1960, pp. 1–3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204<br />
II-5 Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, for James E. Webb,<br />
Administrator, NASA, and Lu<strong>the</strong>r H. Hodges, Secretary of<br />
Commerce, “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of<br />
Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
January 30, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206<br />
II-6 Robert M. White, Administrator, Environmental Science Services<br />
Administration, National Environmental Satellite Center,<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce, to Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate<br />
Administrator for Space Science and Applications, NASA,<br />
August 15, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211<br />
II-7 and II-8 George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and<br />
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to D. James Baker,<br />
Acting Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S. Department<br />
of Commerce, February 22, 1993; and Jim Exon, Chairman,<br />
Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense<br />
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, to Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce,<br />
June 2, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213<br />
II-9 National Performance Review, Department of Commerce,<br />
“Establish a Single Civilian Operational Environmental Polar<br />
Satellite Program,” September 30, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216<br />
II-10 Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, The White House,<br />
“Convergence of U.S. Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental<br />
Satellite Systems,” May 5, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221<br />
II-11 and D. James Baker, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere,<br />
II-12 U.S. Department of Commerce, to John Morgan, Director,<br />
EUMETSAT, May 6, 1994; and D. James Baker, Under Secretary<br />
for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S. Department of Commerce, to<br />
Jean-Marie Luton, Director, European Space Agency, May 6, 1994 . . . 224<br />
x
II-13 Peter C. Badgley, Program Chief, Natural Resources, NASA,<br />
“Current Status of NASA’s Natural Resources Program,” Proceedings<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Fourth Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment held 12, 13,<br />
14, April 1966 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1966),<br />
pp. 547–558 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226<br />
II-14 “Prepared by Jaffe and Badgley at Seamans’ Request:<br />
NASA Natural Resources Program,” May 13, 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237<br />
II-15 Leonard Jaffe, Director, Space Applications Programs, OSSA, to<br />
Deputy Administrator, thru Homer S. Newell, Associate<br />
Administrator for Space Science and Applications, “Meeting at<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), August 25, 1966, regarding<br />
Remote Sensing and South America,” August 31, 1966, with<br />
attached: Robert G. Reeves, For <strong>the</strong> Record, “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Geological Survey (USGS), 10 a.m., August 25, 1966,”<br />
August 31, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240<br />
II-16 <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Secretary, U.S. Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior,<br />
“Earth’s Resources to be Studied from Space,” News Release,<br />
September 21, 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244<br />
II-17 Charles F. Luce, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior,<br />
to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator, NASA,<br />
October 21, 1966, with attached: “Operational requirements for<br />
global resource surveys by earth-orbital satellites: EROS Program” . . . 246<br />
II-18 Irwin P. Halpern, Director, Policy Staff, NASA, Memorandum for<br />
General Smart, “Earth Resources Survey Program,”<br />
September 5, 1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248<br />
II-19 Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Administrator for Policy, NASA,<br />
Memorandum for Dr. Mueller, et al., “Earth Resources Survey<br />
Program,” October 3, 1967, with attached: Draft Memorandum<br />
for Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Newell, “Issues Re: The Earth<br />
Resources Survey Program” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250<br />
II-20 Edgar M. Cortright for George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator<br />
for Manned Space Flight, Memorandum to Assistant Administrator<br />
for Policy, “Earth Resources Study Program,” November 17, 1967 . . . . 253<br />
II-21 Interior Department, “Appeal of 1971 Budget Allowance: EROS,”<br />
November 25, 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256<br />
II-22 Robert P. Mayo, Director, Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget, to<br />
Honorable Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior,<br />
April 14, 1970, with attached: “Statement for Senator Mundt”. . . . . . . 257<br />
xi
II-23 Arnold W. Frutkin, Memorandum to Dr. Fletcher, Administrator,<br />
NASA, et al., “Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-1,”<br />
December 22, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259<br />
II-24 James V. Zimmerman for Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator<br />
for International Affairs, to Dr. John V.N. Granger, Acting Director,<br />
Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs,<br />
Department of State, September 12, 1974, with attached:<br />
“Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying<br />
by Satellite: A Report of <strong>the</strong> Secretary’s Advisory Committee<br />
on Science and Foreign Affairs,” July 24, 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262<br />
II-25 Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Senate Committee on<br />
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, to Dr. James C.<br />
Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, October 14, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269<br />
II-26 Walter C. Shupe, Chief, GAO Liaison Activities, NASA,<br />
Memorandum to Distribution, “GAO Report to Congress ‘Crop<br />
Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and Problems,’ B-183184,<br />
April 7, 1978,” April 21, 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272<br />
II-27 Charles J. Robinove, Director, EROS Program <strong>Office</strong>, Geological<br />
Survey, U.S. Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, Memorandum to Staff<br />
of <strong>the</strong> EROS Program, “Optimism vs. pessimism or where do<br />
we go from here? (some personal views),” December 10, 1975 . . . . . . 275<br />
II-28 James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Mr. John C. Sawhill,<br />
Associate Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget,<br />
October 19, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277<br />
II-29 Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Director, Johnson Space Center, to<br />
Associate Administrator for Applications, NASA Headquarters,<br />
“Private Sector Operation of Landsat Satellites,” March 12, 1976 . . . . 281<br />
II-30 Bruno Augenstein, Willis H. Shapley, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff,<br />
“Earth Information From Space by Remote Sensing,” report<br />
prepared for Dr. Frank Press, Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and<br />
Technology Policy, June 2, 1978, pp. ii–iv, 1–14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282<br />
II-31 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The White House, Presidential Directive/<br />
NSC-54, “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” November 16, 1979 . . . 294<br />
II-32 David S. Johnson, Chairman, Satellite Task Force, Planning for a<br />
Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System: A Discussion of<br />
Issues and Options (Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Commerce,<br />
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, June 20, 1980),<br />
pp. 1–16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296<br />
xii
II-33 Ed Harper, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, Memorandum to<br />
Craig Fuller/Martin Anderson, “Resolution of Issues Related to<br />
Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,”<br />
July 13, 1981. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306<br />
II-34 Government Technical Review Panel, “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
Technical Review Panel on Industry Responses on<br />
Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems,”<br />
November 10, 1982, pp. 1–25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309<br />
II-35 “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,” House Concurrent<br />
Resolution 168, November 14, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321<br />
II-36 “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,”<br />
Public Law 98–365, 365, 98 Stat. 451, July 17, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329<br />
II-37 <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The White House, “Statement by <strong>the</strong><br />
Press Secretary,” June 1, 1989. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344<br />
II-38 <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The Vice President’s <strong>Office</strong>,<br />
“Vice President Announces Landsat Policy,” February 13, 1992,<br />
with attached: “Landsat Remote Sensing Policy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345<br />
II-39 Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration, “Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program,”<br />
March 10, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347<br />
II-40 “Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” Public Law 102–555,<br />
106 Stat. 4163, October 28, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352<br />
II-41–II-44 George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science,<br />
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to John H.<br />
Gibbons, Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology<br />
Policy, August 9, 1993; John Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense, to<br />
George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and<br />
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, December 9, 1993;<br />
John H. Gibbons, Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy,<br />
to George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space,<br />
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, December 10, 1993;<br />
and George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science,<br />
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to John H.<br />
Gibbons, Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and<br />
Technology Policy, December 14, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368<br />
II-45 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-3, “Landsat<br />
Remote Sensing Strategy,” May 5, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372<br />
xiii
II-46–II-48 Gregory W. Wi<strong>the</strong>e, Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite<br />
and Information Services, NOAA, to Walter S. Scott, President<br />
and Chief Executive <strong>Office</strong>r, World View Imaging Corporation,<br />
January 4, 1993; Duane P. Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense,<br />
to Gregory W. Wi<strong>the</strong>e, Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite<br />
and Information Services, NOAA, December 24, 1992; and Ralph<br />
Braibanti, Deputy Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Advanced Technology,<br />
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific<br />
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Michael Mignogno, Chief,<br />
Landsat Commercialization Division, NOAA, October 19, 1992. . . . . . 375<br />
II-49 <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The White House, “U.S. Policy on<br />
Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems,”<br />
March 10, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379<br />
II-50 Robert S. Winokur, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and<br />
Information Services, NOAA, to Albert E. Smith, Vice President,<br />
Advanced Government and Commercial Systems, Lockheed<br />
Missile and Space Company, Inc., April 22, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381<br />
Chapter Three<br />
Essay: “Space as an Investment in Economic Growth,” by Henry R. Hertzfeld. . . . . . 385<br />
Documents<br />
III-1 Jack G. Faucett, President, Jack Faucett Associates, Inc., to<br />
Willis H. Shapley, Associate Deputy Administrator, NASA,<br />
November 22, 1965, with attachment omitted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401<br />
III-2 Roger W. Hough, “Some Major Impacts of <strong>the</strong> National Space<br />
Program,” Stanford Research Institute, Contract NASW-1722,<br />
June, 1968, pp. 1–2, 19–22, 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402<br />
III-3 “Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,”<br />
Final Report, Midwest Research Institute, Contract<br />
NASW-2030, October 15, 1971, pp. 1–11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408<br />
III-4 Michael K. Evans, “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,”<br />
Executive Summary, Chase Econometric Associates, Inc.,<br />
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, Contract NASW-2741, April 1976,<br />
pp. i–iii, 1–18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414<br />
III-5 Robert D. Shriner, Director of Washington Operations,<br />
Chase Econometrics, to Henry Hertzfeld, NASA, April 15, 1980 . . . . . 426<br />
xiv
III-6 “Economic Impact and Technological Progress of NASA<br />
Research and Development Expenditures,” Executive Summary,<br />
Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Missouri, for <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Academy of Public Administration, September 20, 1988, pp. 1–4 . . . . 427<br />
III-7 “NASA Report May Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Research<br />
and Development Spending,” Report of <strong>the</strong> Comptroller General<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States, PAD-78-18, October 18, 1977, pp. i–iii . . . . . . . . . 430<br />
III-8 Martin D. Robbins, John A. Kelley, and Linda Elliott, “Mission-<br />
Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology: The Impact<br />
of NASA Contributions,” Final Report, Industrial Economics<br />
Division, Denver Research Institute, University of Denver,<br />
Contract NSR 06-004-063, May 1972, pp. iii–iv, 25–39, 59 . . . . . . . . . . . 432<br />
III-9 “Quantifying <strong>the</strong> Benefits to <strong>the</strong> National Economy from<br />
Secondary Applications of NASA Technology—Executive Summary,”<br />
NASA CR-2674, Ma<strong>the</strong>matica, Inc., March 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445<br />
III-10 “Economic Effects of a Space Station: Preliminary Results,”<br />
NASA, June 16, 1983, pp. 1–2, 20–21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450<br />
III-11 “The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program: A Macro and<br />
Industrial Perspective,” prepared for Rockwell International<br />
by The WEFA Group, Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, May 1994,<br />
pp. 1–4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451<br />
III-12 <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The White House, “The President’s<br />
Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiative to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century,”<br />
Fact Sheet, February 11, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455<br />
III-13 National Space Policy Directive 3, “U.S. Commercial Space Policy<br />
Guidelines,” The White House, February 12, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460<br />
III-14 “Fact Sheet, National Space Policy,” The White House, National<br />
Science and Technology Council, September 19, 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463<br />
III-15 “Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000: A Market<br />
Forecast,” The Center for Space Policy (CSP), Inc., Cambridge,<br />
Massachusetts, June 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473<br />
III-16 William M. Brown and Herman Kahn, “Long-Term Prospects for<br />
Developments in Space (A Scenario Approach),” Hudson<br />
Institute, Inc., Croton-on-Hudson, New York, Contract<br />
NASW-2924, October 30, 1977, pp. 257–274. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480<br />
III-17 Robert Dunn, “NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial Investment<br />
in Space,” internal NASA document, September 13, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . 488<br />
xv
III-18 “Space Commercialization Meeting,” memo with agenda,<br />
participants, and outline of policy issues, The White House,<br />
August 3, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498<br />
III-19 Craig L. Fuller, The White House, Memorandum for <strong>the</strong><br />
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade, “Commercial Space<br />
Initiatives,” April 10, 1984, with attached: “Private Enterprise in<br />
Space—An Industry View,” pp. iv–v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501<br />
III-20 “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing, Phase II<br />
Final Report,” Volume I: Executive Summary, MDC E1625,<br />
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, East St. Louis, Missouri,<br />
January 15, 1977, pp. 1–2, 8–20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504<br />
III-21 “Space Industrialization: Final Report,” Volume 1. Executive<br />
Summary, SD 78-AP-0055-1, Rockwell International Space<br />
Division, Contract NAS8-32198, April 14, 1978, pp. 1–8 . . . . . . . . . . . . 517<br />
III-22 “Space Industrialization: An Overview,” Final Report, Volume 1,<br />
SAI-79-662-HU, Science Applications, Inc., April 15, 1978,<br />
pp. 1–5, 10–12, 15–17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527<br />
III-23 “Feasibility of Commercial Space Manufacturing: Production<br />
of Pharmaceuticals,” Final Report, Volume I, Executive Summary,<br />
MDC E2104, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company,<br />
St. Louis Division, Contract NAS8-31353, November 9, 1978,<br />
pp. 1–3, 26–30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534<br />
III-24 James Beggs, Administrator, NASA, to William Clark, Assistant<br />
to <strong>the</strong> President for National Security Affairs, August 26, 1983,<br />
with attached: John F. Yardley, President, McDonnell Douglas<br />
Astronautics Company, to James Beggs, Administrator, NASA,<br />
August 23, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539<br />
III-25 L. Smith, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, “Electrophoresis<br />
Operations in Space,” briefing charts, September 1983,<br />
pp. 6–7, 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541<br />
III-26 U.S. General Accounting <strong>Office</strong>, “Commercial Use of Space:<br />
Many Grantees Making Progress, but NASA Oversight Could<br />
be Improved,” Executive Summary, GAO/NSIAD-91-142,<br />
May 1991, pp. 2–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543<br />
III-27 Leo S. Packer, Special Assistant to Associate Administrator,<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Advanced Research and Technology, NASA, “Proposal<br />
for Enhancing NASA Technology Transfer to Civil Systems,”<br />
September 26, 1969, pp. 1–9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546<br />
xvi
III-28 F. Douglas Johnson, Panayes Gastseos, and Emily Miller, with<br />
assistance from Charles F. Mourning, Thomas Basinger, Nancy<br />
Gundersen, and Martin Kokus, “NASA Tech Brief Program: A Cost<br />
Benefit Evaluation,” Executive Summary, University of Denver<br />
Research Institute, Contract NASW-2892, May 1977, pp. i–iii . . . . . . . . 553<br />
III-29 Robert J. Anderson, Jr., William N. Lanen, and Carson E. Agnew,<br />
with Faye Duchin and E. Patrick Marfisi, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of<br />
Selected Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong> Programs,” Executive<br />
Summary, MathTech, Contract NASW-2731,<br />
November 7, 1977, pp. 1–6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555<br />
III-30 Richard L. Chapman, Loretta C. Lohman, and Marilyn J.<br />
Chapman, “An Exploration of Benefits from NASA ‘Spinoff,’”<br />
Chapman Research Group, Contract 88-01 with NERAC, Inc.,<br />
June 1989, pp. 1–5, 23–28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559<br />
III-31 H.R. Hertzfeld, “Technology Transfer White Paper,” internal<br />
NASA document, June 23, 1978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563<br />
III-32 “NASA Technology Transfer: Report of <strong>the</strong> Technology<br />
Transfer Team,” December 21, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574<br />
Biographical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579<br />
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591<br />
The NASA <strong>History</strong> Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605<br />
xvii
Acknowledgments<br />
This volume is <strong>the</strong> third in a series that had its origins almost a decade ago. The individuals<br />
involved in initiating <strong>the</strong> series and producing <strong>the</strong> first two volumes have been acknowledged<br />
in those volumes [Volume I—Organizing for Space (1995); Volume II—External<br />
Relationships (1996)]; those acknowledgments will not be repeated here. An exception must<br />
be made for NASA Chief Historian Roger D. Launius, who has become not only a strong<br />
supporter of this series but also an essential collaborator in its implementation.<br />
We owe thanks to <strong>the</strong> individuals and organizations that have searched <strong>the</strong>ir files for<br />
potentially useful materials, and for <strong>the</strong> staffs at various archives and collections who have<br />
helped us locate documents. Without question, first among <strong>the</strong>m is Lee D. Saegesser of<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong> at NASA Headquarters, who has helped compile <strong>the</strong> NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection that contains many of <strong>the</strong> documents selected for inclusion in this<br />
work. All those in <strong>the</strong> future who will write on <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> U.S. space program will<br />
owe a debt of thanks to Lee; those who have already worked in this area realize his tireless<br />
contributions.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute, research associate David H. Onkst made so many contributions<br />
to <strong>the</strong> organization of material for this volume that he deservedly has been listed as<br />
co-editor. Graduate students Erin Hatch, Becky Dodder, Garth Henning, and David<br />
Vaughn also helped in <strong>the</strong> preparation of <strong>the</strong> volume, and research Dwayne A. Day has continued<br />
his involvement with <strong>the</strong> series while concentrating on his own research. The<br />
overview essays for <strong>the</strong> satellite communications and remote-sensing sections were written<br />
several years ago, before <strong>the</strong> decision to expand <strong>the</strong> series beyond <strong>the</strong> originally planned<br />
two volumes. (The total is now up to six.) Ray A. Williamson helped update and expand<br />
Pamela E. Mack’s discussion of remote sensing, and he has been added as <strong>the</strong> second<br />
author of <strong>the</strong> essay. I made far fewer modifications to Joseph N. Pelton’s original essay on<br />
satellite communications. When it became clear that a focus on economic issues would be<br />
valuable, Henry Hertzfeld graciously agreed to oversee <strong>the</strong> collection of documents for that<br />
section and to write <strong>the</strong> overview essay. Trish Mastrobuono and Julie Hudson of <strong>the</strong><br />
Institute staff have supported <strong>the</strong> effort throughout and, with graduate student Irena Slage,<br />
helped create <strong>the</strong> document-scanning capability used in <strong>the</strong> final stages of <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
My thanks go to all those mentioned above, and again to those who helped get this effort<br />
started almost a decade ago.<br />
John M. Logsdon, George Washington University<br />
*********<br />
xix
There are numerous people at NASA associated with historical study, technical information,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> mechanics of publishing who helped in myriad ways in <strong>the</strong> preparation of<br />
this documentary history. Stephen J. Garber prepared <strong>the</strong> biographical appendix, helped<br />
in <strong>the</strong> final proofing, and prepared <strong>the</strong> index of <strong>the</strong> work and deservedly is listed as a coeditor.<br />
Nadine J. Andreassen of <strong>the</strong> NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong> performed editorial and proofreading<br />
work on <strong>the</strong> project; and <strong>the</strong> staffs of <strong>the</strong> NASA Headquarters Library, <strong>the</strong><br />
Scientific and Technical Information Program, and <strong>the</strong> NASA Document Services Center<br />
provided assistance in locating and preparing for publication <strong>the</strong> documentary materials<br />
in this work. The NASA Headquarters Printing and Design <strong>Office</strong> developed <strong>the</strong> layout<br />
and handled printing. Specifically, we wish to acknowledge <strong>the</strong> work of Jane E. Penn,<br />
Patricia M. Talbert, Jonathan L. Friedman, and Kathleen Gasparin for <strong>the</strong>ir design and<br />
editorial work. In addition, Michael Crnkovic and Stanley Artis saw <strong>the</strong> book through <strong>the</strong><br />
publication process. Thanks are due to all of <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Roger D. Launius, NASA<br />
xx
Introduction<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> most important developments of <strong>the</strong> twentieth century has been <strong>the</strong> movement<br />
of humanity into space with machines and people. The underpinnings of that movement—why<br />
it took <strong>the</strong> shape it did; which individuals and organizations were involved;<br />
what factors drove a particular choice of scientific objectives and technologies to be used;<br />
and <strong>the</strong> political, economic, managerial, and international contexts in which <strong>the</strong> events of<br />
<strong>the</strong> space age unfolded—are all important ingredients of this epoch transition from an<br />
Earthbound to a spacefaring people. This desire to understand <strong>the</strong> development of spaceflight<br />
in <strong>the</strong> United States sparked this documentary history series.<br />
The extension of human activity into outer space has been accompanied by a high degree<br />
of self-awareness of its historical significance. Few large-scale activities have been as extensively<br />
chronicled so closely to <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong>y actually occurred. Many of those who were<br />
directly involved were quite conscious that <strong>the</strong>y were making history, and <strong>the</strong>y kept full<br />
records of <strong>the</strong>ir activities. Because most of <strong>the</strong> activity in outer space was carried out under<br />
government sponsorship, it was accompanied by <strong>the</strong> documentary record required of<br />
public institutions, and <strong>the</strong>re has been a spate of official and privately written histories of<br />
most major aspects of space achievement to date. When top leaders considered what<br />
course of action to pursue in space, <strong>the</strong>ir deliberations and decisions often were carefully<br />
put on <strong>the</strong> record. There is, accordingly, no lack of material for those who aspire to understand<br />
<strong>the</strong> origins and evolution of U.S. space policies and programs.<br />
This reality forms <strong>the</strong> rationale for this series. Precisely because <strong>the</strong>re is so much historical<br />
material available on space matters, <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration (NASA) decided in 1988 that it would be extremely useful to have a selective<br />
collection of many of <strong>the</strong> seminal documents related to <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> U.S. civilian<br />
space program that was easily available to scholars and <strong>the</strong> interested public. While<br />
recognizing that much space activity has taken place under <strong>the</strong> sponsorship of <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense and o<strong>the</strong>r national security organizations, <strong>the</strong> U.S. private sector,<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r countries around <strong>the</strong> world, NASA felt that <strong>the</strong>re would be lasting value in a collection<br />
of documentary material primarily focused on <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> U.S. government’s<br />
civilian space program, most of which has been carried out under <strong>the</strong> agency’s<br />
auspices since 1958. As a result, <strong>the</strong> NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong> contracted with <strong>the</strong> Space Policy<br />
Institute of George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs to prepare<br />
such a collection. This is <strong>the</strong> third volume in <strong>the</strong> documentary history series; three<br />
additional ones detailing programmatic developments with respect to space transportation,<br />
space science, and human spaceflight will follow.<br />
The documents collected during this research project were assembled from a diverse<br />
number of both public and private sources. A major repository of primary source materials<br />
relative to <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> civil space program is <strong>the</strong> NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection of <strong>the</strong> NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, located at <strong>the</strong> agency’s headquarters in<br />
Washington, D.C. Project assistants combed this collection for <strong>the</strong> “cream” of <strong>the</strong> wealth<br />
of material housed <strong>the</strong>re. Indeed, one purpose of this series from <strong>the</strong> start was to capture<br />
some of <strong>the</strong> highlights of <strong>the</strong> holdings at headquarters. Historical materials housed at <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r NASA installations, institutions of higher learning, and presidential libraries were<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r sources of documents considered for inclusion, as were papers in <strong>the</strong> archives of<br />
individuals and firms involved in opening up space for exploration.<br />
xxi
Copies of more than 2,500 documents in <strong>the</strong>ir original form collected during this project<br />
(not just <strong>the</strong> documents selected for inclusion), as well as a database that provides a guide<br />
to <strong>the</strong>ir contents, will be deposited in <strong>the</strong> NASA Historical Reference Collection. Ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
complete set of project materials is located at <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute at George<br />
Washington University. These materials in <strong>the</strong>ir original form are available for use by<br />
researchers seeking additional information about <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> U.S. civilian space<br />
program or wishing to consult <strong>the</strong> documents reprinted herein in <strong>the</strong>ir original form.<br />
The documents selected for inclusion in this volume are presented in three major chapters,<br />
each covering a particular aspect of <strong>the</strong> utilization of space capabilities and <strong>the</strong><br />
unique characteristics of <strong>the</strong> space environment. These chapters address: (1) communicating<br />
via satellite; (2) observing <strong>the</strong> Earth from space for practical purposes (Earth science<br />
will be covered in a later volume); and (3) <strong>the</strong> various ways in which space activities<br />
have had economic impacts. Volume I in this series covered <strong>the</strong> antecedents to <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
space program, as well as <strong>the</strong> origins and evolution of U.S. space policy and of NASA as<br />
an organizational institution. Volume II addressed <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> civilian<br />
space program of <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> space activities of o<strong>the</strong>r countries, <strong>the</strong> relationship<br />
between <strong>the</strong> U.S. civilian and national security space and military efforts, and<br />
NASA’s relationship with industry and academic institutions. As mentioned above, future<br />
volumes will cover space transportation, space science, and human spaceflight.<br />
Each section in this volume is introduced by an overview essay, prepared by individuals<br />
particularly well-qualified to write on <strong>the</strong> topic. In <strong>the</strong> main, <strong>the</strong>se essays are intended to<br />
introduce and complement <strong>the</strong> documents in <strong>the</strong> section and to place <strong>the</strong>m in a chronological<br />
and/or substantive context. Each essay contains references to <strong>the</strong> documents in<br />
<strong>the</strong> section it introduces, and many also contain references to documents in o<strong>the</strong>r sections<br />
of <strong>the</strong> collection. These introductory essays were <strong>the</strong> responsibility of <strong>the</strong>ir individual<br />
authors, and <strong>the</strong> views and conclusions contained <strong>the</strong>rein do not necessarily represent <strong>the</strong><br />
opinions of ei<strong>the</strong>r George Washington University or NASA.<br />
The documents included in each section were chosen by <strong>the</strong> project team in concert with<br />
<strong>the</strong> essay writer from those assembled by <strong>the</strong> research staff for <strong>the</strong> overall project. The contents<br />
of this volume emphasize primary documents or long-out-of-print essays or articles<br />
and material from <strong>the</strong> private recollections of important actors in shaping space affairs.<br />
Key legislation and policy statements are also included. The contents of this volume thus<br />
do not comprise in <strong>the</strong>mselves a comprehensive historical account; <strong>the</strong>y must be supplemented<br />
by o<strong>the</strong>r sources, those both already available and to become available in <strong>the</strong><br />
future. Indeed, a few of <strong>the</strong> documents included in this collection are not complete; some<br />
portions of <strong>the</strong>m were still subject to security classification as this volume went to print.<br />
Each document is assigned its own number in terms of <strong>the</strong> chapter in which it is placed.<br />
As a result, <strong>the</strong> first document in <strong>the</strong> third section of this volume is designated “Document<br />
III-l.” Each document is accompanied by a headnote setting out its context and providing<br />
a background narrative. These headnotes also provide specific information about people<br />
and events discussed. We have avoided <strong>the</strong> inclusion of explanatory notes in <strong>the</strong> documents<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves and have confined such material to <strong>the</strong> headnotes.<br />
xxii
The editorial method we adopted for publishing <strong>the</strong>se documents seeks to preserve<br />
spelling, grammar, paragraphing, and use of language as in <strong>the</strong> original. We have sometimes<br />
changed punctuation where it enhances readability. We have used ellipses (“. . .”) to<br />
note where sections of a document have not been included in this publication, and we<br />
have avoided including words and phrases that had been deleted in <strong>the</strong> original document<br />
unless <strong>the</strong>y contribute to an understanding of what was going on in <strong>the</strong> mind of <strong>the</strong><br />
writer in making <strong>the</strong> record. Marginal notations on <strong>the</strong> original documents are inserted<br />
into <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> documents in brackets, each clearly marked as a marginal comment.<br />
When deletions to <strong>the</strong> original document have been made in <strong>the</strong> process of declassification,<br />
we have noted this with a paren<strong>the</strong>tical statement in brackets. Except insofar as illustrations<br />
and figures are necessary to understanding <strong>the</strong> text, those items have been<br />
omitted from this printed version. Page numbers in <strong>the</strong> original document are noted in<br />
brackets internal to <strong>the</strong> document text. Copies of all documents in <strong>the</strong>ir original form,<br />
however, are available for research by anyone interested at <strong>the</strong> NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong> or <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Policy Institute of George Washington University.<br />
We recognize that <strong>the</strong>re are certain to be quite significant documents left out of this compilation.<br />
No two individuals would totally agree on all documents to be included from <strong>the</strong><br />
more than 2,500 that we collected, and surely we have not been totally successful in locating<br />
all relevant records. As a result, this documentary history can raise an immediate question<br />
from its users: Why were some documents included while o<strong>the</strong>rs of seemingly equal<br />
importance were omitted? There can never be a fully satisfactory answer to this question.<br />
Our own criteria for choosing particular documents and omitting o<strong>the</strong>rs rested on three<br />
interrelated factors:<br />
• Is <strong>the</strong> document <strong>the</strong> best available, most expressive, most representative reflection of<br />
a particular event or development important to <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> space program?<br />
• Is <strong>the</strong> document not easily accessible except in one or a few locations, or is it included<br />
(for example, in published compilations of presidential statements) in reference sources<br />
that are widely available and thus not a candidate for inclusion in this collection?<br />
• Is <strong>the</strong> document protected by copyright, security classification, or some o<strong>the</strong>r form of<br />
proprietary right and thus unavailable for publication?<br />
As general editor of this volume, I was ultimately responsible for <strong>the</strong> decisions about which<br />
documents to include and for <strong>the</strong> accuracy of <strong>the</strong> headnotes accompanying <strong>the</strong>m. It has<br />
been an occasionally frustrating but consistently exciting experience to be involved with<br />
this undertaking. My associates and I hope that those who consult it in <strong>the</strong> future find our<br />
efforts worthwhile.<br />
John M. Logsdon<br />
Director<br />
Space Policy Institute<br />
Elliott School of International Affairs<br />
George Washington University<br />
xxiii
Biographies of Volume III Essay Authors and Editors<br />
Stephen J. Garber is a policy analyst in <strong>the</strong> NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, Washington, D.C. He is<br />
<strong>the</strong> author of numerous articles on aerospace history and space policy.<br />
Henry R. Hertzfeld, Senior Research Scientist at <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute, George<br />
Washington University, is an expert in <strong>the</strong> economic, legal, and policy issues of space and<br />
advanced technological development. He has served as a Senior Economist and Policy<br />
Analyst at both NASA and <strong>the</strong> National Science Foundation, and he has been a consultant<br />
to many agencies and organizations. He is <strong>the</strong> co-editor of Space Economics (AIAA, 1992), as<br />
well as many articles on space economic issues. Dr. Hertzfeld holds a Ph.D. in economics<br />
from Temple University and a J.D. from George Washington University.<br />
Roger D. Launius is Chief Historian of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration, Washington, D.C. He has produced several books and articles on aerospace<br />
history, including Frontiers of Space Exploration (Greenwood Press, 1998); Organizing<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Use of Space: Historical Perspectives on a Persistent Issue (Univelt, Inc., AAS <strong>History</strong><br />
Series, Volume 18, 1995), editor; NASA: A <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Civil Space Program (Krieger<br />
Publishing Co., 1994); <strong>History</strong> of Rocketry and Astronautics: Proceedings of <strong>the</strong> Fifteenth and<br />
Sixteenth <strong>History</strong> Symposia of <strong>the</strong> International Academy of Astronautics (Univelt, Inc., AAS<br />
<strong>History</strong> Series, Volume 11, 1994), editor; Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis (Monographs in<br />
Aerospace <strong>History</strong>, Volume 3, 1994); and Apollo 11 at Twenty-Five, an electronic picture<br />
book issued on computer disk (Space Telescope Science Institute, Baltimore, MD, 1994).<br />
John M. Logsdon is Director of <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute of George Washington<br />
University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he is also a professor of political<br />
science and international affairs and Director of <strong>the</strong> Center for International Science and<br />
Technology Policy. He holds a B.S. in physics from Xavier University and a Ph.D. in political<br />
science from New York University. He has been at George Washington University since<br />
1970, and he previously taught at The Catholic University of America. He is also a faculty<br />
member of <strong>the</strong> International Space University and Director of <strong>the</strong> District of Columbia<br />
Space Grant Consortium. Dr. Logsdon is an elected member of <strong>the</strong> International<br />
Academy of Astronautics and <strong>the</strong> Board of Trustees of <strong>the</strong> International Space University<br />
and Chair of <strong>the</strong> Advisory Council of <strong>the</strong> Planetary Society. He has lectured and spoken<br />
to a wide variety of audiences at professional meetings, colleges and universities, international<br />
conferences, and o<strong>the</strong>r settings, and he has testified before Congress on numerous<br />
occasions. He is frequently consulted by <strong>the</strong> electronic and print media for his views on<br />
various space issues. Dr. Logsdon has been a Fellow at <strong>the</strong> Woodrow Wilson International<br />
Center for Scholars and was <strong>the</strong> first holder of <strong>the</strong> Chair in Space <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Air and Space Museum. He is a Fellow of <strong>the</strong> American Association for <strong>the</strong> Advancement<br />
of Science and an Associate Fellow of <strong>the</strong> American Institute of Aeronautics and<br />
Astronautics. In addition, he is North American editor for <strong>the</strong> journal Space Policy.<br />
David H. Onkst is a Research Associate at <strong>the</strong> George Washington University Space Policy<br />
Institute and a member of <strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> Department at American University, both located<br />
in Washington, D.C. He has won numerous scholarly awards, including <strong>the</strong> 1998 Robert<br />
H. Goddard Historical Essay Award, a George Meany Memorial Archives Fellowship, and<br />
several teaching fellowships at American University. Onkst has written articles on subjects<br />
ranging from <strong>the</strong> possibility of life on Mars and Europa to a history of sou<strong>the</strong>rn African-<br />
American World War II veterans and <strong>the</strong>ir use of <strong>the</strong> G.I. Bill of Rights for such periodicals<br />
as Space Times and <strong>the</strong> Journal of Social <strong>History</strong>. He also served as a behind-<strong>the</strong>-scenes<br />
editor for Eye in <strong>the</strong> Sky: The Story of <strong>the</strong> CORONA Spy Satellites (Smithsonian Institution<br />
Press, 1998). Onkst is a specialist in U.S. social and cultural history since 1941.<br />
xxv
Joseph N. Pelton is a professor of telecommunications at <strong>the</strong> University of Colorado at<br />
Boulder, having returned from <strong>the</strong> post of Vice President of Academic Programs and<br />
Dean of <strong>the</strong> International Space University (ISU). Prior to going to ISU, Dr. Pelton held<br />
a dual appointment as Director of <strong>the</strong> Interdisciplinary Telecommunications Program at<br />
<strong>the</strong> University of Colorado, as well as Director of <strong>the</strong> Center for Advanced Research in<br />
Telecommunications and Training. He has worked in a variety of positions at INTELSAT<br />
for <strong>the</strong> past two decades, and he has been involved with satellite applications since 1965,<br />
in positions with Rockwell International, NASA, Communications Satellite Corporation<br />
(COMSAT), and George Washington University. He also taught at American University in<br />
Washington, D.C. After receiving an undergraduate degree in physics, Dr. Pelton went on<br />
to receive a master’s degree from New York University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown<br />
University.<br />
Ray A. Williamson is a Senior Research Scientist in <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute, focusing on<br />
<strong>the</strong> history, programs, and policy of Earth observations, space transportation, and space<br />
commercialization. He joined <strong>the</strong> Institute in 1995. Previously, he was a Senior Associate<br />
and Project Director in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Technology Assessment (OTA) of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Congress.<br />
He joined OTA in 1979. While at OTA, Dr. Williamson was project director for more than<br />
a dozen reports on space policy, including: Russian Cooperation in Space (1995); Civilian<br />
Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach (1994); Remotely Sensed Data: Technology,<br />
Management, and Markets (1994); Global Change Research and NASA’s Earth Observing System<br />
(1994); and The Future of Remote Sensing from Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications<br />
(1993). Dr. Williamson has written extensively about <strong>the</strong> U.S. space program. He holds a<br />
B.A. in physics from Johns Hopkins University and a Ph.D. in astronomy from <strong>the</strong><br />
University of Maryland. He spent two years on <strong>the</strong> faculty of <strong>the</strong> University of Hawaii studying<br />
diffuse emission nebulae and ten years on <strong>the</strong> faculty of St. John’s College in<br />
Annapolis, Maryland. He is a member of <strong>the</strong> faculty of <strong>the</strong> International Space University<br />
and is a member of <strong>the</strong> editorial board for <strong>the</strong> journal Space Policy.<br />
xxvi
Glossary<br />
ABMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Army Ballistic Missile Agency<br />
ACDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<br />
AFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Air Force Base<br />
AID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Agency for International Development (State Department)<br />
ARPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Advanced Research Projects Agency<br />
ASTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Apollo-Soyuz Test Project<br />
ASVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Application System Verification and Test<br />
ATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Applications Technology Satellite<br />
AVHRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer<br />
BSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Broadcast Satellite Service<br />
CBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Commerce Business Daily<br />
CFR/C.F.R. . . . . . . . . . . .Code of Federal Regulations<br />
CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Central Intelligence Agency<br />
COSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Committee on Satellite Communications<br />
COSMIC . . . . . . . . . . . . .Computer Software Management Information Center<br />
CSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Center for Space Policy<br />
CSTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Civil Space Technology Initiative<br />
db/dB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Decibel<br />
DBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Direct Broadcast Satellite<br />
DCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Director of Central Intelligence<br />
DCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Data collection system<br />
DDR&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Director, Defense Research and Engineering<br />
DDT&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Design, Development, Test and Engineering<br />
DMSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Defense Meteorological Satellite Program<br />
DOC/DoC . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Commerce<br />
DOD/DoD . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Defense<br />
DOE/DoE . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Energy<br />
DOI/DoI . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior<br />
ELV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Expendable Launch Vehicle<br />
EOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Earth Observing System or Electrophoresis Operations in Space<br />
(program)<br />
EOSAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Earth Observation Satellite Company<br />
EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Protection Agency<br />
EROS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Earth Resources Observational Satellites (later Systems)<br />
ERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Earth Resources Survey (program)<br />
ERTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Earth Resources Technology Satellite (later known as Landsat)<br />
ESA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .European Space Agency<br />
ESSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Science Services Administration<br />
ETM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Enhanced Thematic Mapper<br />
EUMETSAT . . . . . . . . . .European Organisation for <strong>the</strong> Exploitation of Meteorological<br />
Satellites<br />
EVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Extravehicular activity<br />
FAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Food and Agriculture Organization (U.N.)<br />
FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Federal Communications Commission<br />
FM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Frequency-modulation<br />
FEDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .For Early Domestic Distribution<br />
FSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fixed Satellite Service<br />
FTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Full-Time Equivalent<br />
FY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fiscal year<br />
xxvii
GAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .General Accounting <strong>Office</strong><br />
GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gross Domestic Product<br />
GE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .General Electric<br />
GHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gigahertz<br />
GIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Geographic Information System<br />
GNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gross National Product<br />
GOES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite<br />
GPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Government Printing <strong>Office</strong><br />
GSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gross Space Product<br />
GWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gross Worldwide Product<br />
HF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .High frequency<br />
HIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .High-Resolution Infrared Sounder<br />
HRMSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager<br />
ICUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Interim Communication Satellite Committee<br />
IGI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Industrial Guest Investigator (agreement)<br />
IPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Integrated Program <strong>Office</strong><br />
IPOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Group<br />
IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Infrared<br />
IRAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee<br />
ITOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Improved TIROS Operational Satellite<br />
ITU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Telecommunications Union<br />
JEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Joint Endeavor Agreement<br />
JSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Johnson Space Center<br />
KC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kilocycle<br />
KW/kW . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kilowatt<br />
LACIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment<br />
LCG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Landsat Coordinating Group<br />
LDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Less Developed Country<br />
LEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Low Earth Orbit<br />
LSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Large Scale Integrated (circuit)<br />
MDAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company<br />
MIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Massachusetts Institute of Technology<br />
MOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ministry of Defense<br />
MPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Materials Processing in Space<br />
MRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Midwest Research Institute<br />
MSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Manned Space Center (later known as Johnson Space Center)<br />
MSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Multispectral Scanner or Mobile Satellite Service<br />
MTCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Missile Technology Control Regime<br />
MTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Man-Tended Facility<br />
MTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Message toll telephone<br />
NACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics<br />
NAPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Academy of Public Administration<br />
NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
NESDIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information<br />
Service<br />
NIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Institutes of Health<br />
NMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NASA Management Instruction<br />
NOAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration<br />
NOMSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Operational Meteorological Satellite System<br />
NPOESS . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System<br />
NRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Research Council<br />
NRO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Reconnaissance <strong>Office</strong><br />
NSAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Security Action Memorandum<br />
xxviii
NSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Security Council<br />
NSDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Security Decision Directive<br />
NSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Science Foundation<br />
NSTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Science and Technology Council<br />
OCDM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<strong>Office</strong> of Civil and Defense Mobilization<br />
OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Operational Linescan System<br />
OMB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget (formerly <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong><br />
Budget)<br />
OMV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle<br />
OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Organization of <strong>the</strong> Petroleum Exporting Countries<br />
OSSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<strong>Office</strong> of Space Science and Applications (NASA)<br />
OSTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy (White House)<br />
PAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Payload Assist Module<br />
PDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Presidential Decision Directive<br />
POES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite<br />
R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Research and development<br />
RCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Radio Corporation of America<br />
RDSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Radio Determination Satellite Service<br />
RFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Request for information<br />
RFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Request for proposals<br />
ROI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Return on Investment<br />
SBIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Small Business Innovation Research (program)<br />
SI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space Industrialization<br />
SIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Senior Interagency Group<br />
SLAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Side Looking Airborne Radar<br />
SOCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Satellite Operations Control Center<br />
SPOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre<br />
SSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space Services, Inc.<br />
SSM/I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Special Sensor Microwave/Imager<br />
START . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty<br />
STS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space Transportation System<br />
TCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Telecommunication Coordinating Committee<br />
TDRSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tracking Data and Relay Satellite System<br />
TEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technical Exchange Agreement<br />
TIROS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Television and Infrared Operational Satellite<br />
TM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Thematic Mapper<br />
TOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Transfer Orbit Stage or TIROS Operational Satellite<br />
TOVS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TIROS Operational Vertical Sounder<br />
TSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technical Support Package<br />
TUO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong><br />
UHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ultrahigh frequency<br />
U.N./UN . . . . . . . . . . . .United Nations<br />
UNGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.N. General Assembly<br />
U.S./US . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States<br />
USC/U.S.C. . . . . . . . . . .United States Code<br />
USDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Department of Agriculture<br />
USGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Geological Survey<br />
USG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Government<br />
UV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ultraviolet<br />
VHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Very high frequency<br />
xxix
Chapter One<br />
The <strong>History</strong> of Satellite<br />
Communications<br />
by Joseph N. Pelton<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> idea of using artificial Earth satellites to relay messages from one point<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Earth to ano<strong>the</strong>r had been discussed in several places prior to 1945, 1 most accounts<br />
of <strong>the</strong> development of satellite communications begin by discussing Arthur Clarke’s landmark<br />
works on <strong>the</strong> topic during that year. In two 1945 papers—one privately circulated<br />
and one published in Wireless World—Clarke discussed <strong>the</strong> special characteristics of geosynchronous<br />
orbit that would enable three satellites in that orbit to provide global communications.<br />
2 [I-1, I-2] Clarke noted that in an orbit of 22,300 miles above <strong>the</strong> Earth, <strong>the</strong><br />
velocity of a satellite exactly matched <strong>the</strong> velocity of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface as <strong>the</strong> planet rotated<br />
about its axis; thus from <strong>the</strong> Earth, a satellite would appear to remain in a fixed position<br />
in <strong>the</strong> sky. In such an orbit, a satellite could “see” 40 percent of <strong>the</strong> equatorial plane.<br />
Clarke noted <strong>the</strong> benefits of such an orbital perspective, especially for telecommunications,<br />
because <strong>the</strong> curvature of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface and atmospheric interference placed<br />
limits on ground-based transmissions. In addition, <strong>the</strong> use of satellites in geosynchronous<br />
orbit would make <strong>the</strong> design of a ground antenna simpler in terms of tracking and pointing<br />
mechanisms.<br />
For <strong>the</strong>se insights, Arthur C. Clarke is frequently called <strong>the</strong> “Fa<strong>the</strong>r of Satellite<br />
Communications,” and <strong>the</strong>re have been ongoing efforts to officially designate <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous<br />
orbit as <strong>the</strong> “Clarke Orbit.” Ironically, however, while a visionary in many<br />
respects, Clarke did not foresee how quickly communications satellites would become a<br />
reality. This is because he did not anticipate <strong>the</strong> invention of <strong>the</strong> transistor, which greatly<br />
reduced <strong>the</strong> necessary weight of a communications satellite and dramatically increased its<br />
reliability and lifetime. From <strong>the</strong> pre-transistor perspective of 1945, Clarke envisioned that<br />
communicating via satellite would in effect require a space station—an orbital platform<br />
weighing many tons with an on-board crew to replace burned-out vacuum tubes. 3 And<br />
while Clarke may not have been totally prescient, he can be credited with identifying a line<br />
of technological development that bore fruit in less than twenty years.<br />
1. Delbert D. Smith, Communication via Satellite: A Vision in Retrospect (Boston: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976),<br />
pp. 15–19.<br />
2. The more frequently cited of Clarke’s semi-annual papers is Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-Terrestrial<br />
Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?,” Wireless World 51 (October 1945): 305–08. A May<br />
25, 1945, typed paper about geosynchronous satellites, “The Space Station: Its Radio Applications,” was sent to<br />
members of <strong>the</strong> British Interplanetary Society and o<strong>the</strong>r addressees some five months before <strong>the</strong> more famous<br />
Wireless World article. This earlier paper was finally published in Spaceflight 10 (March 3, 1968): 85–86.<br />
3. Personal interview by <strong>the</strong> author with Arthur C. Clarke, Sri Lanka, May 1984.<br />
1
2<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
The Early Years of Concept and Experimentation<br />
(1945–1963)<br />
In <strong>the</strong> decade that followed Clarke’s article, increasingly powerful rockets were developed,<br />
largely in <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> Cold War competition between <strong>the</strong> United States and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. The launch of Sputnik 1 by <strong>the</strong> Soviets in October 1957 triggered a<br />
number of U.S. space initiatives. The creation of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration (NASA) from <strong>the</strong> National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)<br />
and <strong>the</strong> surge of funding for U.S. rocket programs, such as Vanguard, Thor, Atlas, and<br />
Titan, were immediate results. In <strong>the</strong> 1960 U.S. presidential election, <strong>the</strong> “Missile Gap”<br />
debates between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon set <strong>the</strong> stage for a strong U.S.<br />
space program for <strong>the</strong> 1960s, perhaps regardless of <strong>the</strong> election’s outcome. 4 One issue<br />
under discussion at <strong>the</strong> time was whe<strong>the</strong>r space development would be almost exclusively<br />
a result of government activities or whe<strong>the</strong>r private enterprise would play a significant role.<br />
The creation of communications satellite research and development programs within<br />
NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense in <strong>the</strong> late 1950s and early 1960s proved to be a<br />
highly effective means of establishing U.S. capability in this field; however, <strong>the</strong>se government<br />
efforts were paralleled by private-sector communications satellite research and<br />
development activities. These communications satellite initiatives came at a key time in<br />
terms of <strong>the</strong> overall development of international communications. American Telephone<br />
and Telegraph (AT&T) and o<strong>the</strong>rs kept private-enterprise interests alive with parallel<br />
research and development efforts of <strong>the</strong>ir own.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of new submarine telephone cables were<br />
being laid across <strong>the</strong> Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These new cables replaced outmoded<br />
telegraph cables and stimulated <strong>the</strong> rapid growth of international telecommunications. The<br />
leaders of NASA, aerospace manufacturers, and telecommunications organizations all recognized<br />
that high-capacity communications satellites could also support <strong>the</strong> rapid growth<br />
of global communications. Only several years later did <strong>the</strong> idea emerge that communications<br />
satellites could also support regional or domestic telecommunications needs. 5<br />
Because of <strong>the</strong> U.S. lead in micro-electronics, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Signal Corps was able to launch<br />
<strong>the</strong> world’s first communications satellite on an Atlas rocket soon after Sputnik. The first<br />
U.S. communications project was known as SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbital<br />
Relay Equipment), a broadcast-only satellite launched on December 18, 1958. SCORE<br />
lasted only twelve days and could only send to Earth a pre-recorded message from<br />
President Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Peace on earth, good will toward men.” 6<br />
The first artificial satellite that actually relayed a real-time voice message from <strong>the</strong><br />
Earth to orbit and back was Echo 1, launched on August 12, 1960. The Echo program was<br />
a successor to an International Geophysical Year effort to measure <strong>the</strong> density of <strong>the</strong><br />
upper atmosphere by observing <strong>the</strong> orbit of a twelve-foot-diameter balloon-like satellite.<br />
In 1959 John Pierce, an AT&T scientist and one of <strong>the</strong> pioneers of <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
4. See John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to <strong>the</strong> Moon: Project Apollo and <strong>the</strong> National Interest (Cambridge,<br />
MA: MIT Press, 1970), and Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens and <strong>the</strong> Earth: A Political <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Space Age<br />
(New York: Basic Books, 1985), for discussions of early U.S. space policy.<br />
5. Joseph N. Pelton, Global Communications Satellite Policy: Intelsat, Politics and Functionalism (Mt. Airy,<br />
WA: Lomond Systems, 1974), pp. 44–102. The Soviet Union with its vast size and nor<strong>the</strong>rn latitudes had to use<br />
a highly elliptical orbit for its communications satellites. This orbit required less rocket power to reach from<br />
Soviet launch sites than did geosynchronous orbit. The combination of internal need and ease of orbital access<br />
led <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union to initiate domestic communications satellite service much sooner than o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
6. Ibid., pp. 46–48.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 3<br />
satellite field, suggested using <strong>the</strong> larger 100-foot-diameter Echo satellite to test transatlantic<br />
radio communications. [I-3] NASA accepted Pierce’s suggestion, and <strong>the</strong> orbiting<br />
satellite was successfully used as a passive reflector (that is, <strong>the</strong>re were no electronic systems<br />
to amplify <strong>the</strong> signal aboard <strong>the</strong> satellite) of an August 18 message from New Jersey<br />
to France. (Similar experiments had been conducted earlier using <strong>the</strong> Earth’s Moon as a<br />
passive reflector.)<br />
Although this and many o<strong>the</strong>r experiments using <strong>the</strong> passive Echo 1 and Echo 2 satellites<br />
(Echo 2 was launched in January 1964) were successful, in <strong>the</strong> late 1950s and early<br />
1960s, industry and government attention increasingly focused on active communications<br />
satellites carrying on-board electronics that received a signal from <strong>the</strong> Earth, amplified it,<br />
and sent it back to <strong>the</strong> Earth. Such satellites had more predictable orbits than passive satellites;<br />
fewer were required to create a communications network; and signals relayed<br />
through active satellites required less expensive ground stations and had much higher<br />
capacity. 7<br />
The first artificial communications satellite that foreshadowed today’s active satellite<br />
technology, Courier 1B, was designed and launched by <strong>the</strong> U.S. military in October 1960.<br />
It featured solar and battery power, an active antenna for transmission and reception, and<br />
electronic repeaters capable of frequency conversion from uplink to downlink signals.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> technological gains that Courier 1B represented, it still had a capability of<br />
only sixteen teletype channels. In short, it was little more than an experimental device.<br />
Submarine cables still had 100 times this capacity.<br />
NASA, AT&T, and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense, however, were by this time moving<br />
ahead with tremendous energy and quickly achieved impressive results. On July 10, 1962,<br />
only a year and a half after Courier 1B, a quantum leap in capability was achieved with <strong>the</strong><br />
launch of Telstar, an AT&T-designed and -built experimental satellite with sufficient capacity<br />
to relay a television signal. Telstar was launched into a medium orbit with a<br />
570-mile perigee; at this orbit, a number of satellites (about twelve to fifteen) would be<br />
required for an operational system. The success of <strong>the</strong> Telstar experiment immediately<br />
changed <strong>the</strong> world’s view of <strong>the</strong> potential of this new technology. [I-20] 8 Recognition grew<br />
that communications satellites could have three to four times <strong>the</strong> capacity of <strong>the</strong>n-current<br />
submarine cables. Almost overnight, <strong>the</strong>ir commercial viability was advanced from remote<br />
to highly likely. Quickly <strong>the</strong>reafter, on December 14, 1962, <strong>the</strong> NASA-funded Relay 1 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was launched into an orbit with a 660-mile<br />
perigee, demonstrating many of <strong>the</strong> same features as Telstar but with a longer lifetime in<br />
orbit. The technical feasibility of active communications satellites was thus clearly demonstrated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> second half of 1962. 9 The development of <strong>the</strong>se early communications satellites<br />
represented <strong>the</strong> first steps toward <strong>the</strong> practical use of space and began a debate about<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r such an enterprise should be public or private in nature.<br />
Then, a satellite built by Hughes Aircraft, developed with both company and NASA<br />
funding and launched on December 14, 1963, demonstrated <strong>the</strong> final technical feature<br />
required for communications satellites to become commercially viable—stable and continuous<br />
operation in geosynchronous orbit. Beginning in 1959, Hughes had been work-<br />
7. John R. Pierce, The Beginnings of Space Communications (San Francisco, CA: San Francisco Press,<br />
1968), p. 103; Arthur C. Clarke, The Promise of Space (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 100–101; Smith,<br />
Communications via Satellite, pp. 51–55.<br />
8. It should be noted here that because <strong>the</strong> document about Project Telstar was produced in <strong>the</strong> second<br />
half of 1962, it appears in chronological order after this essay but is referenced out of order within <strong>the</strong> essay.<br />
Also note that <strong>the</strong> references to Documents I-14, I-22, and I-26 are out of order.<br />
9. Leonard Jaffe, Communications in Space (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966), p. 86; Orrin<br />
E. Dunlap, Jr., Communications in Space (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 151.
4<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
ing on such a satellite, first with <strong>the</strong> company’s own funds and since 1961 under contract<br />
to NASA. [I-4, I-5] This satellite, Syncom 2 (Syncom 1 suffered a system failure), was<br />
followed by a Syncom 3 mission that was even more successful in demonstrating <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
of high-capacity telecommunications operations in geosynchronous orbit. 10<br />
This lightning-like development was paralleled by progress with military satellites, particularly<br />
<strong>the</strong> Lincoln Experimental Satellite (LES) series from Lincoln Laboratory, which<br />
tested secure transponders for strategic communications from <strong>the</strong> National Command<br />
Authority. Toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se accomplishments set <strong>the</strong> stage for <strong>the</strong> practical exploitation of<br />
this exciting new technology.<br />
The Creation of Comsat and INTELSAT (1962–1965)<br />
The international civilian communications program soon evolved toward a global network<br />
of “stabilized” satellites in geosynchronous orbits a tenth of <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> Moon.<br />
The civilian system began with an initial satellite over <strong>the</strong> Atlantic Ocean (1965), <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
Pacific Ocean obtained service (1967), and finally global coverage was completed with<br />
Indian Ocean service (1969), just as Arthur C. Clarke had envisioned it twenty-four years<br />
earlier.<br />
Although most critical technical choices had been made by 1965, <strong>the</strong> issue of how to<br />
institutionalize <strong>the</strong> civilian communications satellite system was far from clear-cut or easily<br />
decided. During 1961 and 1962, <strong>the</strong>re was intense debate in <strong>the</strong> United States about<br />
public versus private ownership and operations. Political control and financing were also<br />
items of disagreement. Not surprisingly, <strong>the</strong>se issues led to a major political debate in <strong>the</strong><br />
United States.<br />
The Eisenhower administration supported <strong>the</strong> development of satellite communications,<br />
but only if that development was based on private-sector initiatives. 11 [I-6, I-7] When<br />
John F. Kennedy took office in early 1961, however, he expressed a strong support for a<br />
leading government role in communications satellite development. 12 Achieving his objective,<br />
however, meant sorting out within <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration <strong>the</strong> appropriate role<br />
of <strong>the</strong> government in communications satellite research and development, regulation,<br />
and ownership and operation. [I-8, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-12, I-13, I-15]<br />
Once <strong>the</strong> administration had developed its position, it had to gain <strong>the</strong> assent of<br />
Congress. This was not a straightforward task; many in Congress had views on <strong>the</strong> issue<br />
that differed from <strong>the</strong> proposed White House policy. [I-14] The net result was that three<br />
10. Dunlap, Communications in Space, pp. 152–55.<br />
11. On December 30, 1960, in one of his last speeches in office, President Eisenhower stated: “This<br />
nation has traditionally followed a policy of conducting international telephone, telegraph and o<strong>the</strong>r communication<br />
services through private enterprise subject to governmental control, licensing, and regulation. We have<br />
achieved communications facilities second to none among nations of <strong>the</strong> world. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> government<br />
should aggressively encourage private enterprise in <strong>the</strong> establishment and operation of satellite relays for revenue<br />
producing services.” Public Papers of <strong>the</strong> Presidents of <strong>the</strong> United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960 (Washington,<br />
DC: U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, 1979), p. 888.<br />
12. The now-famous Kennedy speech of May 25, 1961, that established <strong>the</strong> goal of sending humans to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Moon and returning <strong>the</strong>m to Earth also called for <strong>the</strong> establishment of a global satellite system for communications<br />
that would benefit all countries, promote world peace, and allow nondiscriminating access for all countries<br />
of <strong>the</strong> world. It called for a “constructive role for <strong>the</strong> U.N. in international space communications.” Public<br />
Papers of <strong>the</strong> Presidents of <strong>the</strong> United States, John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>,<br />
1962), pp. 529–31. Kennedy’s position on communications satellites thus set <strong>the</strong> stage for <strong>the</strong> United Nations to<br />
act on this subject as well. In September 1961, <strong>the</strong> United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1721,<br />
Section P, concerning <strong>the</strong> establishment of a global communications satellite system. Section P stated that “communications<br />
by means of satellite should be available to <strong>the</strong> millions of <strong>the</strong> world as soon as possible on a global<br />
and non-discriminating basis.”
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 5<br />
different versions of national legislation to create a framework for satellite communications<br />
emerged during 1961—and especially during 1962—within Congress. The bill of<br />
Senator Robert S. Kerr (D–OK) would have made space communications entirely private.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> opposite perspective, <strong>the</strong> bill of Senator Estes Kefauver (D–TN) would have<br />
made such communications entirely a governmental enterprise. Finally, <strong>the</strong> Kennedy<br />
administration’s bill sought a compromise between private and public ownership and<br />
among various policy objectives. [I-16, I-17]<br />
After months of debate and a filibuster led by liberal Democrats, complete with a cloture<br />
vote, <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962 finally emerged. [I-18] This law called<br />
for <strong>the</strong> creation of a new entity to be known as <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation<br />
(Comsat), with ownership divided fifty-fifty between <strong>the</strong> general public and telecommunications<br />
corporations, such as AT&T, International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT),<br />
RCA, and Western Union International. 13 Comsat’s Board of Directors consisted of six representatives<br />
from <strong>the</strong> public stockholders, six representatives of <strong>the</strong> telecommunications<br />
industry, and three presidential appointees. Comsat was designated as <strong>the</strong> official representative<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States for global satellite communications. Two years later, <strong>the</strong> corporation<br />
became <strong>the</strong> manager of <strong>the</strong> emerging global system known as <strong>the</strong> International<br />
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), which was formed on August 20,<br />
1964. 14 [I-19]<br />
Between <strong>the</strong> creation of Comsat as a new corporation on August 31, 1962, and <strong>the</strong> creation<br />
of INTELSAT, Comsat contracted with <strong>the</strong> Hughes Aircraft Company (<strong>the</strong> designer<br />
of Syncom 1, 2, and 3) to build an upgraded version of <strong>the</strong> Syncom satellite. This satellite<br />
was initially designated HS 303; it later became known officially as INTELSAT I. The<br />
world, however, came to know it by its popular name, “Early Bird.” The satellite, which was<br />
<strong>the</strong> first operational geosynchronous communications satellite, weighed eighty-five<br />
pounds and was launched in April 1965. It had a lifetime of eighteen months and a capacity<br />
of 240 voice circuits or, alternatively, a black-and-white television channel. This transatlantic<br />
satellite, with three times <strong>the</strong> capacity of <strong>the</strong> largest submarine cable <strong>the</strong>n available<br />
and <strong>the</strong> ability to provide real-time television transmission, captured <strong>the</strong> world’s attention.<br />
Early Bird ushered in a new age of international television communications. 15 Also in<br />
1965, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Department of Defense deployed a low-Earth-orbit satellite system known<br />
as <strong>the</strong> Initial Defense Satellite Communication System (IDSCS), while <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />
deployed its first highly elliptical satellite system known as Molniya (“Lightning”).<br />
13. It is interesting to note that John A. Johnson, General Counsel of NASA, was temporarily detailed<br />
to Senator Kerr’s office to write draft legislation for <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act, <strong>the</strong>n later requested by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration to draft <strong>the</strong> version that actually became law (personal interview by <strong>the</strong> author with<br />
John A. Johnson, February 1984, INTELSAT Archives). See also J.O. Pastore, The Story of Communications (New<br />
York: MacFadden-Bertell, 1964), pp. 67–92.<br />
14. Over <strong>the</strong> years, <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was amended to allow telecommunications<br />
organizations to sell off <strong>the</strong>ir Comsat holdings, to restructure <strong>the</strong> Comsat Board of Directors, and to allow<br />
Comsat to be <strong>the</strong> official U.S. participant in <strong>the</strong> International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT),<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r consortium formed over a decade later. In most respects, Comsat’s legislatively defined role has<br />
remained <strong>the</strong> same. Over time, however, through actions of <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission (FCC),<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. executive branch, and <strong>the</strong> courts, Comsat has given up its ownership of Earth stations, entered <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
satellite communications market on a competitive basis with o<strong>the</strong>r corporations, and found its monopoly role in<br />
INTELSAT and INMARSAT questioned. These changes were largely <strong>the</strong> result of a changing regulatory environment<br />
within <strong>the</strong> U.S. government. During <strong>the</strong> Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations, <strong>the</strong>re have been<br />
increasing efforts to move toward a deregulatory and competitive approach to most telecommunications activities<br />
that had traditionally been carried out by monopolies. Despite <strong>the</strong> erosion of <strong>the</strong> legislative and regulatory<br />
framework within which Comsat operated with respect to INTELSAT, which occurred between 1965 and 1990<br />
(especially <strong>the</strong> loss of technical management of <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT global system between 1973 and 1979), Comsat<br />
remains one of <strong>the</strong> few monopolies left in <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
15. ICSC Document, ICSC-7-4E (April 1965), pp. 8–9.
6<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Twenty-Five Years of Communications Satellite<br />
Developments (1965–1990)<br />
As <strong>the</strong> engineering and design of <strong>the</strong> world’s first operational communications satellites<br />
proceeded, <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> institutional arrangements for global satellite communications<br />
became a topic of international discussion and dispute. 16 The United States<br />
initially thought in terms of a series of bilateral agreements between <strong>the</strong> United States and<br />
major users of international telecommunications. However, those on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong><br />
Atlantic, developing a common position through <strong>the</strong> Committee on European Posts and<br />
Telecommunications (<strong>the</strong> association of European communications entities, most of<br />
which were government-owned monopolies), made it clear in February 1964 that a multilateral<br />
agreement was <strong>the</strong> only acceptable approach. The Europeans also were reluctant<br />
to hand all technical, operational, and policy control over to <strong>the</strong> United States, while <strong>the</strong><br />
United States wished to preserve, as long as possible, its technological advantages in this<br />
new commercial sector. [I-21, I-23, I-24] The United States also wanted to ensure that <strong>the</strong><br />
benefits of communicating via satellites were available to all countries, whatever <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
stage of economic development. [I-22]<br />
The United States quickly dropped its insistence on bilateral arrangements and<br />
worked toward an acceptable multinational framework. Negotiations with Australia,<br />
Canada, Japan, and Europe lasted two years; <strong>the</strong>ir outcome hinged on several key issues.<br />
France preferred three separate regional satellite systems—one for Europe, one for <strong>the</strong><br />
Americas, and one for Asia—but finally agreed to a single global system with a capital<br />
ceiling for a space segment investment of $500 million. This was a much higher initial<br />
investment than several o<strong>the</strong>r European countries were willing to accept. Japan and<br />
Australia played important roles in promoting compromise. They also promoted <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of geosynchronous satellites, because medium-altitude systems would have created gaps in<br />
coverage, with <strong>the</strong> largest gaps being in <strong>the</strong> Pacific Ocean region. 17 Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most<br />
important compromise between <strong>the</strong> United States and o<strong>the</strong>r countries was U.S. acceptance<br />
of <strong>the</strong> position that <strong>the</strong> initial agreement was only valid on an interim basis—after<br />
five years of experience with a U.S.-dominated organization, <strong>the</strong> agreement would be<br />
reopened in 1969 for review and potential revision. [I-25]<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> key issues debated and reviewed in <strong>the</strong> 1962–1964 negotiations was what<br />
type of services INTELSAT should provide. Would it furnish all forms of public telecommunications<br />
services for both domestic and international service? The Interim<br />
Arrangements of 1964 and <strong>the</strong> Definitive Arrangements of 1971 that followed both specified<br />
that INTELSAT, with special approval, could provide a wide range of “specialized<br />
services” that included but were not limited to radio navigation services, broadcasting<br />
16. Smith, Communication via Satellite, pp. 135–41.<br />
17. It is a commonly held belief that <strong>the</strong> successful launch and operation of Early Bird in geosynchronous<br />
orbit effectively ended <strong>the</strong> debate about <strong>the</strong> “right orbit.” In fact, ITT was selected to undertake a detailed<br />
study of medium-altitude satellites after <strong>the</strong> launch of Early Bird. Over <strong>the</strong> years, <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> “best” orbit for<br />
communications satellites has arisen again and again. Because of its nor<strong>the</strong>rn latitude, not easily covered by satellites<br />
in geosynchronous orbit over <strong>the</strong> equator, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union used highly elliptical orbits for its Molniya satellites.<br />
Most recently, <strong>the</strong> idea of creating a low-Earth-orbit grid of satellites interconnected by intersatellite links<br />
has been proposed by at least one potential land mobile communications satellite system operator. Despite <strong>the</strong><br />
early nongeosynchronous systems, such as <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union’s Molniya system and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense’s<br />
IDSCS, and despite <strong>the</strong> proposed new low- and medium-altitude communications satellite systems, use of <strong>the</strong><br />
geosynchronous orbit is still predominant. Well over 95 percent of all communications satellites for domestic<br />
and international fixed satellite services, as well as for domestic, regional, and international fixed satellite services,<br />
plus those for military, mobile, and direct-broadcast satellite services, have been launched into geosynchronous<br />
orbit.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 7<br />
satellite services, space research services, meteorological services, and Earth resource<br />
services. Throughout its history, however, INTELSAT has confined its activities to fixed<br />
satellite service public telecommunications for several reasons:<br />
• These public telecommunications services were <strong>the</strong> most well-established, prevalent,<br />
and “desirable” services for its constituent members in terms of revenues.<br />
• The special financial conditions and agreements needed to embark on “specialized”<br />
services posed a barrier to moving into <strong>the</strong>se new areas.<br />
• These o<strong>the</strong>r “new” services were largely unproven in terms of market viability.<br />
• O<strong>the</strong>r national, regional, or global ventures and institutional entities providing such<br />
services as maritime communications, regional communications, direct-broadcasting<br />
to home antennas, and remote sensing grew up over <strong>the</strong> years. Thus it was not easy<br />
for INTELSAT to expand as <strong>the</strong>se organizations developed more specialized markets.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> quarter of a century that followed <strong>the</strong> first commercial satellite operations, a<br />
remarkable array of technical developments has ensued. Key innovations have included:<br />
multidestination services among and between very small aperture antennas; <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
more frequency bands; three-axis stabilization, ra<strong>the</strong>r than satellites rotating about <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
vertical axis; and large, high-performance antennas on board <strong>the</strong> satellites <strong>the</strong>mselves.<br />
The last three decades of satellite technology development can be best shown perhaps<br />
by <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> satellites of <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT system. During this period, many major<br />
technological advances occurred, including <strong>the</strong> seven shown in Table I–1. The cumulative<br />
result of <strong>the</strong>se technological gains has been to produce fixed satellite designs that are overall<br />
approximately 1,000 times more cost-effective than <strong>the</strong> Early Bird satellite. In total, <strong>the</strong><br />
last three decades have produced satellites that are at least eighty times more effective in<br />
terms of power, are 100 times more frequency efficient, and have more than ten times<br />
greater lifetimes. It is perhaps because fiber optic cables have achieved parallel developments<br />
in cost-efficiency on <strong>the</strong> Earth that <strong>the</strong> remarkable and sustained technological breakthroughs<br />
in satellite telecommunications are not more widely recognized or celebrated.<br />
Most advances in communications satellite technology have originated within <strong>the</strong><br />
United States; leading developers have been <strong>the</strong> scientists and engineers of such aerospace<br />
manufacturers as Ball Aerospace, Fairchild, Hughes Aircraft, Lockheed-Martin<br />
(now including General Electric, or GE, and RCA), TRW, and Ford Aerospace (now Space<br />
Systems/Loral). There have been many o<strong>the</strong>r contributors, such as NASA, <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense, <strong>the</strong> National Science Foundation, universities, and research laboratories<br />
such as Lincoln Laboratory, Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Laboratories,<br />
Comsat Laboratories, and <strong>the</strong> Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and o<strong>the</strong>r NASA centers. 18<br />
In <strong>the</strong> last decade in particular, <strong>the</strong> spread of satellite technology has become truly global.<br />
Major capabilities exist in Europe, Russia, Canada, and Japan, and more are emerging<br />
in India, China, Korea, Brazil, Israel, and Australia.<br />
18. See John H. McElroy, ed., Space Science and Applications (New York: IEEE Press, 1986), pp. 183–284.<br />
Although it is difficult to single out precisely and without omission all of <strong>the</strong> individuals who played <strong>the</strong> most<br />
important roles in communications satellite development over this period, some of <strong>the</strong> most important players<br />
were: Wernher von Braun, Richard Marsten, Robert Lovell, and Leonard Jaffe of NASA; Harold Rosen and<br />
Albert “Bud” Wheelon of Hughes Aircraft; Adolph Thiel of TRW; Jack Harrington of Lincoln Laboratory;<br />
Sigfried Rieger, Ernst Dietrich, Martin Votaw, and John Johnson of Comsat and INTELSAT; Joseph Campanella,<br />
Wilbur Pritchard, and Burton Edelson of Comsat Laboratories; Kenneth Rose of Ford Aerospace; Jack Kiegler<br />
of GE/RCA; William Pickering of JPL; J.O. Pastore of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Senate; Edward Welsh of <strong>the</strong> National Space<br />
Council; and John Pierce of AT&T’s Bell Laboratories.
8<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Table I–1<br />
Technological Advances<br />
Area of DevelopmentMeasured Advance Key New Technologies Developed<br />
1. Satellite Power Power increased 80 times • Sun-oriented solar cell array<br />
• High-efficiency solar cells<br />
• High-performance N 2 H 2 batteries<br />
2. Effective Use of Radio Radio frequencies available at • Use of hybrid frequency bands<br />
Frequencies 100 times greater • Frequency reuse by spatial separation<br />
• Spot-beam antennas<br />
• Frequency reuse by polarization<br />
discrimination<br />
3. Satellite Lifetime Increase in lifetime from • Longer life batteries<br />
1.5 to 15 years • Higher performance thrusters and<br />
propellants<br />
• Solid-state electronics<br />
• Enhanced satellite control<br />
techniques (including option for<br />
inclined orbit operation)<br />
4. Digital Communication Up to 1,000-percent increase • Development of 155.5-megabyte<br />
Techniques and Digital through use of TDMA and TDMA<br />
Circuit Multiplication CDMA plus digital compression • Digital speech interpolation<br />
and Compression techniques • 32- and 16-kilobyte-per-second voice<br />
Techniques bringing two- to fourfold gain,<br />
respectively<br />
5. On-Board Satellite Exact gain not easily measured; • Satellite-switched TDMA<br />
Switching expanded use of spot-beam • Hybrid frequency connection<br />
antennas—and thus expanded between uplink and downlink<br />
frequency reuse—optimized by • On-board switching fault detection<br />
on-board interconnection of and diagnostics<br />
beams and cross strapping<br />
6. Earth Station Antennas Decrease in costs of Earth stations • Use of solid state electronics<br />
four- to tenfold while decrease in • Elimination of most cryogenics<br />
size of antennas by factor of ten • Enhanced low-cost construction<br />
materials and improved<br />
construction<br />
7. Launch Vehicle Launch reliability increased to • Enhanced rocket motor design<br />
Technology nearly 90 percent and lift with greater thrust<br />
capability by several thousand • Enhanced guidance systems<br />
percent; cost-efficiency of<br />
launching, however, on a<br />
pre-pound basis, not changed<br />
significantly
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 9<br />
This unique development of new space communications technologies in <strong>the</strong> 1970s<br />
and 1980s did not simply spring up spontaneously. Within NASA, a series of experimental<br />
satellites under <strong>the</strong> Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) program were developed and<br />
tested during <strong>the</strong> 1967–1976 period. These satellites expanded <strong>the</strong> technological reach of<br />
satellite communications in terms of higher frequency bands, new antenna size and<br />
performance, and satellite power and stabilization. The ATS program also helped<br />
demonstrate <strong>the</strong> new technology required to boost overall communications satellite performance.<br />
These experimental satellites not only demonstrated new technology, but provided<br />
valuable educational services to <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, <strong>the</strong> South Pacific, Brazil, and India,<br />
as well as to rural and remote parts of <strong>the</strong> United States. NASA joined with Canada in <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) program; after its launch in 1976, CTS<br />
demonstrated new techniques of space telecommunications that could operate with very<br />
small terminals.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> communications satellite industry matured into <strong>the</strong> only major successful commercial<br />
application of space, controversy arose during <strong>the</strong> 1970s over continuing a government-funded<br />
research and development program in support of that industry. Some in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nixon administration argued that such a program constituted a subsidy to a particular<br />
segment of <strong>the</strong> private sector—a role <strong>the</strong> government should not play. NASA, faced<br />
with this argument and <strong>the</strong> need to adjust to a rapidly declining budget in <strong>the</strong> post-Apollo<br />
period, decided in 1972 to terminate its support of communications-related research and<br />
development. [I-27]<br />
This decision remained controversial for a number of years; by <strong>the</strong> late 1970s, NASA<br />
was being urged to reenter <strong>the</strong> area. [I-28] The program that NASA proposed, <strong>the</strong><br />
Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), had a difficult time getting<br />
White House approval for most of <strong>the</strong> 1980s; congressional and some mixed industrial<br />
pressure finally led to <strong>the</strong> program’s going forward. [I-29] After its launch in 1993,<br />
however, ACTS went on to demonstrate a variety of new techniques for enhancing <strong>the</strong> performance<br />
of communications satellites, especially with regard to operating in <strong>the</strong> new Ka<br />
band (thirty to 200 hertz) and on-board processing of signals so as to interconnect a very<br />
large number of spot beams (narrow, very-high-power beams), which boosted frequency<br />
reuse and increased satellite throughout capacity. However, it is hard to measure <strong>the</strong> significant<br />
impact. By <strong>the</strong> end of September 1996, <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission<br />
(FCC) filing deadline, about fifteen new Ka-band satellite systems with a combined estimated<br />
value of approximately $50 billion have been proposed to provide high-data-rate<br />
multimedia video sources to North America and/or <strong>the</strong> world. If completely displayed,<br />
this would mean more than 1,200 new satellites in geosynchronous, medium, and low-<br />
Earth orbits. 19<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System<br />
(TDRSS) has led <strong>the</strong> way in such areas as intersatellite links and communications between<br />
low and geostationary orbits, satellite-switched time division multiple access techniques<br />
that allow multiple users to employ <strong>the</strong> same transponder, and combined fixed and<br />
mobile satellite communications. Today, <strong>the</strong> Orion Satellite System is operating intersatellite<br />
links, and many of <strong>the</strong> proposed new multimedia satellites will offer intersatellite<br />
link capabilities.<br />
The experimental programs funded by <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense have also been<br />
contributors to technology development. In addition to Lincoln Laboratory’s LES-1 to<br />
LES-9 experimental satellites, <strong>the</strong>re have been numerous missions designed by <strong>the</strong><br />
19. Space 30: Thirty Year Overview of Space Applications and Exploration (Washington, DC: Society of Satellite<br />
Professionals, 1989).
10<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Aerospace Corporation and various tactical communication and Defense Satellite<br />
Communications System (DSCS) spacecraft launched over <strong>the</strong> years. Because many of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se military satellites were built by contractor firms that also constructed commercial<br />
satellites, <strong>the</strong>re was often effective technology transfer within those firms.<br />
Domestic Communications Satellite Systems<br />
The first domestic satellite systems were deployed in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (Molniya in<br />
1965) and Canada (Anik in 1971). A June 1972 decision by <strong>the</strong> FCC opened <strong>the</strong> way to<br />
<strong>the</strong> use of satellites for domestic communications within <strong>the</strong> United States, thus opening<br />
up a large new market for satellite telecommunications. [I-26] The ability of such systems<br />
to provide service to rural and remote areas and to relay television and o<strong>the</strong>r broadcast<br />
services to very small aperture antennas was quickly proven. Over <strong>the</strong> last fifteen years,<br />
<strong>the</strong>se early successes have resulted in seventeen countries developing <strong>the</strong>ir own operational<br />
or experimental domestic satellite systems and placing satellites in <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous<br />
orbit. 20 In addition, approximately fifty countries are obtaining domestic<br />
communications satellite service through <strong>the</strong>ir participation (typically through <strong>the</strong> lease<br />
of transponders) in international and regional satellite systems.<br />
The beginning of <strong>the</strong> evolution toward regional systems can be attributed to EUTEL-<br />
SAT, <strong>the</strong> European Telecommunications Satellite Organization. This organization started<br />
in its provisional form on June 30, 1977. This was followed by ARABSAT, which became<br />
operational in 1985, even though <strong>the</strong> idea was developed eight years earlier. After ARAB-<br />
SAT, <strong>the</strong> trend shifted away from public consortia closely modeled on a scaled-down version<br />
of INTELSAT. Newer systems used a privately owned—and more competitive—<br />
approach. ASTRA was established in <strong>the</strong> 1980s to provide low-power direct-broadcast service<br />
in Europe. PanAmSat began providing private transatlantic services in 1988. In Asia,<br />
Palapa in 1980 and later ASIASAT in 1990 began to offer certain forms of both regional<br />
and domestic service, with APSTAR following suit four years later.<br />
Conclusion<br />
In <strong>the</strong> last quarter century, tremendous progress has been made in space communications.<br />
New and expanded frequency bands have been operationally proven, and various<br />
uses of communications satellites have been successfully demonstrated. Consistent gains<br />
have been made in frequency reuse, spacecraft power, reliability, and lifetime.<br />
Improvements in Earth station delay and performance, digital modulation, and digital<br />
coding help complete a picture of total performance gains of more than 1,000 times in<br />
<strong>the</strong> last three decades. The range of space communications services has evolved from<br />
international and domestic fixed satellite services to mobile satellite services, broadcast<br />
satellite services, and even intersatellite links.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong> distinction was quite clear between <strong>the</strong> satellite servers known as Fixed<br />
Satellite Service (FSS), Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS),<br />
and Radio Determination Satellite Service (RDSS). These designations, as developed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Union (ITU), were used to allocate frequencies.<br />
Ironically, as <strong>the</strong> ITU has gone to more and more precise definitions of frequency allocations,<br />
such as aeronautical mobile, maritime mobile, and land mobile satellite services, <strong>the</strong><br />
20. The seventeen countries that have launched one or more domestic communications satellite systems<br />
are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,<br />
Mexico, Spain, Sweden, <strong>the</strong> United States, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 11<br />
technology has been moving in <strong>the</strong> opposite direction. The satellites’ characteristics have<br />
been moving toge<strong>the</strong>r in terms of satellite power, antenna beams, and on-board processing.<br />
Many of <strong>the</strong> latest Ka-band satellites, such as General Electric’s GE Star. can actually<br />
offer fixed, mobile broadcast, and navigational services.<br />
Equally significant is that <strong>the</strong>se new satellite systems, because <strong>the</strong>y can work to<br />
microterminals (fifty to sixty-five centimeters in diameter) and to handheld transceivers,<br />
can “bypass” conventional terrestrial networks. Thus, it can be said that satellite communications<br />
systems are now becoming a truly large, mass consumer business that are starting<br />
to rival terrestrial telecommunications systems.<br />
Innovation has not been limited to <strong>the</strong> technological arena. Beginning with a single<br />
global telecommunications satellite entity, INTELSAT, <strong>the</strong>re has been a proliferation of<br />
organizational forms for bringing <strong>the</strong> promise of communications satellites into reality.<br />
The 1984 decision in <strong>the</strong> United States to modify <strong>the</strong> traditional U.S. position that INTEL-<br />
SAT was <strong>the</strong> only authorized provider of global communications satellite services was a key<br />
to this development. [I-30] Both public and private forms of institutionalizing communications<br />
satellite services have emerged, as have several creative hybrid public-private organizations.<br />
Clearly, today, new private and competitive forms of satellite communications<br />
are becoming predominant as both INTELSAT and INMARSAT are spinning off new<br />
commercial entities to provide new forms of satellite services.<br />
The ability to communicate words, images, and data instantaneously around <strong>the</strong> globe<br />
has fundamentally changed <strong>the</strong> character of international and intercultural relations.<br />
Through this application of space technology, a “global village” has truly come into being.<br />
Document I-1<br />
Document title: Arthur C. Clarke, “The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications,” May 25,<br />
1945.<br />
Source: National Air and Space Museum Archives, Smithsonian Institution, Washington,<br />
D.C.<br />
Document I-2<br />
Document title: Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give<br />
World-Wide Radio Coverage?,” Wireless World, October 1945, pp. 305–308.<br />
The Russian <strong>the</strong>orist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky was <strong>the</strong> first to note that a satellite orbiting 22,300 miles<br />
above <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface would travel at a speed that would make it appear to be stationary from<br />
Earth because its orbital velocity would be <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> speed at which <strong>the</strong> Earth was rotating. In<br />
1928, Herman Potôcnik, an Austrian Imperial Army officer, writing under <strong>the</strong> pseudonym<br />
Noordung, proposed a crewed space station in such a “geosynchronous” orbit, to be used for meteorology,<br />
reconnaissance, and Earth mapping. However, it was Arthur C. Clarke that first called widespread<br />
attention to <strong>the</strong> utility of <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous orbit for communications. In May 1945, Clarke,<br />
a physicist and at that time <strong>the</strong> secretary of <strong>the</strong> British Interplanetary Society, circulated six copies of<br />
his paper “The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications” to his society colleagues. (The paper was not<br />
actually published until 1968, when it appeared in <strong>the</strong> society’s Spaceflight magazine.) A second<br />
paper, written in June 1945, appeared in <strong>the</strong> October 1945 issue of Wireless World.
12<br />
[no page number]<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Document I-1<br />
The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications<br />
Arthur C. Clarke<br />
25 May 1945<br />
[1] 1. The Space-station was originally conceived as a refueling depot for ships leaving<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth. As such it may fill an important though transient role in <strong>the</strong> conquest of space,<br />
during <strong>the</strong> period when chemical fuels are employed. O<strong>the</strong>r uses, some of <strong>the</strong>m ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
fantastic, have been suggested for <strong>the</strong> space-station, notably by Hermann Noordung. 1<br />
However, <strong>the</strong>re is at least one purpose for which <strong>the</strong> station is ideally suited and indeed<br />
has no practical alternative. This is <strong>the</strong> provision of world-wide ultra-high-frequency radio<br />
services, including television.<br />
2. In <strong>the</strong> following discussion <strong>the</strong> word “television” will be used exclusively but it<br />
must be understood to cover all services using <strong>the</strong> u.h.f. spectrum and higher. It is probable<br />
that television may be among <strong>the</strong> least important of <strong>the</strong>se as technical developments<br />
occur. O<strong>the</strong>r examples are frequency modulation, facsimile (capable of transmitting<br />
100,000 pages an hour 2 ), specialized scientific and business services, and navigational aids.<br />
3. Owing to bandwidth considerations television is restricted to <strong>the</strong> frequency range<br />
above 50-Mc/sec [megacycles per second], and <strong>the</strong>re is no doubt that very much higher<br />
frequencies will be used in <strong>the</strong> immediate future. The American Telephone and<br />
Telegraph Company are [sic] already building an experimental network using frequencies<br />
up to 12,000 megacycles. 3 Waves of such frequencies are transmitted along quasioptical<br />
paths and accordingly receiver and transmitter must lie not far from <strong>the</strong> line of<br />
sight. Although refraction increases <strong>the</strong> range, it is fair to say that <strong>the</strong> service radius for a<br />
television station is under 50 miles. (The range of <strong>the</strong> London service was ra<strong>the</strong>r less than<br />
this.) As long as radio continues to be used for communication, this limitation will remain, as it is<br />
a fundamental and not a technical restriction.<br />
4. Wide-band frequency-modulation, one of <strong>the</strong> most important of radio developments,<br />
comes in <strong>the</strong> same category. FM can give much better quality and freedom from<br />
interference than normal amplitude-modulation, and many hundreds of stations are<br />
being planned for <strong>the</strong> post-war years in America alone. The technical requirements of FM<br />
make it essential that only <strong>the</strong> direct signal be used, and ionospheric reflexions cannot be<br />
employed. The range of <strong>the</strong> service is thus limited by <strong>the</strong> curvature of <strong>the</strong> Earth, precisely<br />
as for television.<br />
5. To provide services over a large area it is necessary to build numerous stations on<br />
high ground or with radiators on towers several hundred feet high. These stations have to<br />
be linked by landline or subsidiary radio circuits. Such a system is practicable in a small<br />
country such as Britain, but even here <strong>the</strong> expense will be enormous. It is quite prohibitive<br />
in <strong>the</strong> case of a large continent and it <strong>the</strong>refore seems likely that only highly populated<br />
communities will be able to have television services.<br />
6. An even more serious problem arises when an attempt is made to link television<br />
systems in different parts of <strong>the</strong> globe. Theoretical studies 2 indicate that using a radio relay<br />
system, repeater stations will be necessary at intervals of less than fifty miles. These will<br />
take <strong>the</strong> form of towers several hundred feet high, carrying receivers, amplifiers and transmitters.<br />
To link regions several thousand miles apart will thus cost many millions of<br />
pounds, and <strong>the</strong> problem of trans-oceanic services remains insoluble.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 13<br />
7. In <strong>the</strong> near future, <strong>the</strong> large airliners which will fly great circle routes over oceans<br />
and uninhabited regions of <strong>the</strong> world will require television and allied services and <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is no known [2] manner in which <strong>the</strong>se can be provided.<br />
8. All <strong>the</strong>se problems can be solved by <strong>the</strong> use of a chain of space-stations with an<br />
orbital period of 24 hours, which would require <strong>the</strong>m to be at a distance of 42,000 Km<br />
[kilometers] from <strong>the</strong> centre of <strong>the</strong> earth. (Fig 1.) There are a number of possible arrangements<br />
for such a chain but that shown is <strong>the</strong> simplest. The stations would lie in <strong>the</strong> earth’s<br />
equatorial plane and would thus always remain fixed in <strong>the</strong> same spots in <strong>the</strong> sky, from <strong>the</strong><br />
point of view of terrestrial observers. Unlike all o<strong>the</strong>r heavenly bodies <strong>the</strong>y would never rise<br />
nor set. This would greatly simplify <strong>the</strong> use of directive receivers installed on <strong>the</strong> earth.<br />
Figure 1.<br />
C<br />
A<br />
Beam Links<br />
9. The following longitudes are provisionally suggested for <strong>the</strong> stations to provide<br />
<strong>the</strong> best service to <strong>the</strong> inhabited portions of <strong>the</strong> globe, though all parts of <strong>the</strong> planet will<br />
be covered.<br />
30 E—Africa and Europe.<br />
150 E—China and Oceana.<br />
90 W—The Americas.<br />
10. Each station would broadcast programmes over about a third of <strong>the</strong> planet.<br />
B
14<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Assuming <strong>the</strong> use of a frequency of 3,000 megacycles, a [3] reflector only a few feet across<br />
would give a beam so directive that almost all <strong>the</strong> power would be concentrated on <strong>the</strong><br />
earth. Arrays a metre or so in diameter could be used to illuminate single countries if a<br />
more restricted service was required.<br />
11. The stations would be connected with each o<strong>the</strong>r by very-narrow-beam, low-power<br />
links, probably working in <strong>the</strong> optical spectrum or near it, so that beams less than a degree<br />
wide could be produced.<br />
12. The system would provide <strong>the</strong> following services which cannot be realized in any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r manner:<br />
a) Simultaneous television broadcasts to <strong>the</strong> entire globe, including services to<br />
aircraft.<br />
b) Relaying of programmes between distant parts of <strong>the</strong> planet.<br />
13. In addition <strong>the</strong> stations would make redundant <strong>the</strong> network of relay towers covering<br />
<strong>the</strong> main areas of civilisation and representing investments of hundreds of millions<br />
of pounds. (Work on <strong>the</strong> first of <strong>the</strong>se networks has already started.)<br />
14. Figure II shows diagrammatically some of <strong>the</strong> specialised services that could be<br />
provided by <strong>the</strong> use of differing radiator systems.<br />
Figure II.<br />
Programme from A being relayed to point B and area C.<br />
Programme from D being relayed to whole hemisphere.<br />
[4] 15. The numerous technical problems involved in this communication system cannot<br />
be discussed here but it can be stated that none of <strong>the</strong>m present any difficulties even at<br />
<strong>the</strong> present time, thanks to <strong>the</strong> development of hyperfrequency engineering. It is hoped<br />
to discuss <strong>the</strong>m in a later paper when security conditions permit.<br />
C<br />
B<br />
D<br />
A
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 15<br />
16. The receiving equipment at <strong>the</strong> earth end would consist of small parabolas perhaps<br />
a foot in diameter with dipole pickup. These would be sufficiently directive to prevent<br />
interference in <strong>the</strong> three doubly-illuminated zones. They would be aimed towards <strong>the</strong><br />
station with <strong>the</strong> least zenithal distance and once adjusted need never be touched again.<br />
Mobile equipment would require automatic following which presents slight mechanical<br />
complications (a few valves and a servo motor) but no technical difficulties.<br />
17. The efficiency of <strong>the</strong> system would be nearly 100%, since almost all <strong>the</strong> power<br />
would fall on <strong>the</strong> service area. A preliminary investigation shows that <strong>the</strong> world broadcast<br />
would require about ten kilowatts, while <strong>the</strong> beam relay services would require only fractions<br />
of a kilowatt. These powers are very small compared with present-day broadcasting<br />
stations, some of which radiate hundreds of kilowatts. All <strong>the</strong> power required for a large<br />
number of simultaneous services could be obtained from solar generators with mirrors<br />
about ten metres in radius, assuming an efficiency of about 40%. In addition, <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
of vacuum make it easy to use large and fully demountable valves.<br />
18. No communication development which can be imagined will render <strong>the</strong> chain of<br />
stations obsolete and since it fills what will eventually be an urgent need, its economic<br />
value will be enormous.<br />
19. For completeness, o<strong>the</strong>r major uses of <strong>the</strong> station are listed below:—<br />
a) Research.—Astrophysical, Physical, Electronic.<br />
These applications are obvious. The space-station would be justified on <strong>the</strong>se<br />
grounds alone, as <strong>the</strong>re are many experiments which can only be conducted above <strong>the</strong><br />
atmosphere.<br />
b) Meteorological.<br />
The station would be absolutely invaluable for wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting as <strong>the</strong><br />
movement of fronts, etc. would be visible from space.<br />
c) Traffic.<br />
This is looking a good deal fur<strong>the</strong>r ahead, but ultimately <strong>the</strong> chain will be<br />
used extensively for controlling and checking, possibly by radar, <strong>the</strong> movement of ships<br />
approaching or leaving <strong>the</strong> earth. It will also play an extremely important role as <strong>the</strong> first<br />
link in <strong>the</strong> solar communication system.<br />
References<br />
1. Noordung, Hermann. “Das Problem der Befahrung des Weltraums.”<br />
2. Hansell, C. W. “Radio-Relay-Systems Development.” (Proceedings of <strong>the</strong> Institute of Radio<br />
Engineers, March 1945, pp 156 - 168.)<br />
3. Guy, Raymond F. Address to I.R.E., Philadelphia, December 7th, 1944.
16<br />
[305]<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Document I-2<br />
October 1945<br />
Wireless World<br />
Extra-Terrestrial Relays:<br />
Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?<br />
By Arthur C. Clarke<br />
[original set in three columns of newspaper style text per page]<br />
Although it is possible, by a suitable choice of frequencies and routes, to provide telephony<br />
circuits between any two points or regions of <strong>the</strong> earth for a large part of <strong>the</strong> time,<br />
long-distance communication is greatly hampered by <strong>the</strong> peculiarities of <strong>the</strong> ionosphere,<br />
and <strong>the</strong>re are even occasions when it may be impossible. A true broadcast service, giving<br />
constant field strength at all times over <strong>the</strong> whole globe would be invaluable, not to say<br />
indispensable, in a world society.<br />
Unsatisfactory though <strong>the</strong> telephony and telegraph position is, that of television is far<br />
worse, since ionospheric transmission cannot be employed at all. The service area of a<br />
television station, even on a very good site, is only about a hundred miles across. To cover<br />
a small country such as Great Britain would require a network of transmitters, connected<br />
by coaxial lines, waveguides or VHF relay links. A recent <strong>the</strong>oretical study 1 has shown that<br />
such a system would require repeaters at intervals of fifty miles or less. A system of this<br />
kind could provide television coverage, at a very considerable cost, over <strong>the</strong> whole of a<br />
small country. It would be out of <strong>the</strong> question to provide a large continent with such a service,<br />
and only <strong>the</strong> main centres of population could be included in <strong>the</strong> network.<br />
The problem is equally serious when an attempt is made to link television services in<br />
different parts of <strong>the</strong> globe. A relay chain several thousand miles long would cost millions,<br />
and transoceanic services would still be impossible. Similar considerations apply to <strong>the</strong><br />
provision of wide-band frequency modulation and o<strong>the</strong>r services, such as high-speed facsimile[,]<br />
which are by <strong>the</strong>ir nature restricted to <strong>the</strong> ultra-high-frequencies.<br />
Many may consider <strong>the</strong> solution proposed in this discussion too far-fetched to be<br />
taken very seriously. Such an altitude is unreasonable, as everything envisaged here is a<br />
logical extension of developments in <strong>the</strong> last ten years—in particular <strong>the</strong> perfection of <strong>the</strong><br />
long-range rocket of which V2 was <strong>the</strong> prototype. While this article was being written, it<br />
was announced that <strong>the</strong> Germans were considering a similar project, which <strong>the</strong>y believed<br />
possible within fifty to a hundred years.<br />
Before proceeding fur<strong>the</strong>r, it is necessary to discuss briefly certain fundamental laws<br />
of rocket propulsion and “astronautics.” A rocket which achieved a sufficiently great speed<br />
in flight outside <strong>the</strong> earth’s atmosphere would never return. This “orbital” velocity is 8 km<br />
per sec. (5 miles per sec.), and a rocket which attained it would become an artificial satellite,<br />
circling <strong>the</strong> world for ever with no expenditure of power—a second moon, in fact.<br />
The German transatlantic rocket A10 would have reached more than half this velocity.<br />
It will be possible in a few more years to build radio controlled rockets which can be<br />
steered into such orbits beyond <strong>the</strong> limits of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere and left to broadcast scientific<br />
information back to <strong>the</strong> earth. A little later, manned rockets will be able to make similar<br />
flights with sufficient excess power to break <strong>the</strong> orbit and return to earth.<br />
There are an infinite number of possible stable orbits, circular and elliptical, in which<br />
a rocket would remain if <strong>the</strong> initial conditions were correct. The velocity of 8 km/sec.
applies only to <strong>the</strong> closest possible orbit, one just outside <strong>the</strong> atmosphere, and <strong>the</strong> period<br />
of revolution would be about 90 minutes. As <strong>the</strong> radius of <strong>the</strong> orbit increases <strong>the</strong> velocity<br />
decreases, since gravity is diminishing and less centrifugal force is needed to balance it.<br />
Fig. 1 shows this graphically. The moon, of course, is a particular case and would lie on<br />
<strong>the</strong> curves of Fig. 1 if <strong>the</strong>y were produced. The proposed German space-stations [Figure<br />
1] would have a period of about four and a half hours.<br />
Orbital Period (Hours)<br />
24<br />
20<br />
16<br />
12<br />
8<br />
4<br />
0<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 17<br />
Orbital Period<br />
Orbital Velocity<br />
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000<br />
Distance from Centre of Earth (Kilometers)<br />
Figure 1. Variation of orbital period and velocity with distance from <strong>the</strong> center of <strong>the</strong> earth.<br />
It will be observed that one orbit, with a radius of 42,000 km, has a period of exactly<br />
24 hours. A body in such an orbit, if its plane coincide with that of <strong>the</strong> [306] earth’s equator,<br />
would revolve with <strong>the</strong> earth and would thus be stationary above <strong>the</strong> same spot on <strong>the</strong> planet.<br />
It would remain fixed in <strong>the</strong> sky of a whole hemisphere and unlike all o<strong>the</strong>r heavenly bodies<br />
would nei<strong>the</strong>r rise nor set. A body in a smaller orbit would revolve more quickly than <strong>the</strong><br />
earth and so would rise in <strong>the</strong> west, as indeed happens with <strong>the</strong> inner moon of Mars.<br />
Using material ferried up by rockets, it would be possible to construct a “spacestation”<br />
in such an orbit. The station could be provided with living quarters, laboratories<br />
and everything needed for <strong>the</strong> comfort of its crew, who would be relieved and provisioned<br />
by a regular rocket service. This project might be undertaken for purely scientific reasons<br />
as it would contribute enormously to our knowledge of astronomy, physics and meteorology.<br />
A good deal of literature has already been written on <strong>the</strong> subject. 2<br />
Although such an undertaking may seem fantastic, it requires for its fulfillment rockets<br />
only twice as fast as those already in <strong>the</strong> design stage. Since <strong>the</strong> gravitational stresses<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> structure are negligible, only <strong>the</strong> very lightest materials would be necessary<br />
and <strong>the</strong> station could be as large as required.<br />
Let us now suppose that such a station were built in this orbit. It could be provided<br />
with receiving and transmitting equipment (<strong>the</strong> problem of power will be discussed later)<br />
and could act as a repeater to relay transmissions between any two points on <strong>the</strong> hemisphere<br />
beneath, using any frequency which will penetrate <strong>the</strong> ionosphere. If directive<br />
Orbital Velocity (km/sec.)
18<br />
arrays were used, <strong>the</strong> power requirements would be very small, as direct line of sight transmission<br />
would be used. There is <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r important point that arrays on <strong>the</strong> earth, once<br />
set up, could remain fixed indefinitely.<br />
Moreover, a transmission received<br />
from any point on <strong>the</strong> hemisphere<br />
could be broadcast to <strong>the</strong><br />
whole of <strong>the</strong> visible face of <strong>the</strong> globe,<br />
and thus <strong>the</strong> requirements of all possible<br />
services would be met (Fig. 2).<br />
It may be argued that we have as<br />
yet no direct evidence of radio waves<br />
passing between <strong>the</strong> surface [Figure<br />
2] of <strong>the</strong> earth and outer space; all<br />
we can say with certainty is that <strong>the</strong><br />
shorter wavelengths are not reflected<br />
back to earth. Direct evidence of<br />
field strength above <strong>the</strong> earth’s<br />
atmosphere could be obtained by V2<br />
rocket technique, and it is to be<br />
hoped that someone will do something<br />
about this soon as <strong>the</strong>re must<br />
be quite a surplus stock somewhere!<br />
Alternatively, given sufficient transmitting<br />
power, we might obtain <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary evidence by exploring for<br />
echoes from <strong>the</strong> moon. In <strong>the</strong> mean-<br />
time we have visual evidence that frequencies at <strong>the</strong> optical end of <strong>the</strong> spectrum pass<br />
through with little absorption except at certain frequencies at which resonance effects<br />
occur. Medium high frequencies go through <strong>the</strong> E layer twice to be reflected from <strong>the</strong> F<br />
[Figure 3] layer and echoes have been received from meteors in or above <strong>the</strong> F layer. It<br />
seems fairly certain that frequencies from, say, 50 Mc/s to 100,000 Mc/s could be used<br />
without undue absorption in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere or <strong>the</strong> ionosphere.<br />
Station 1<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Cone of Beam and<br />
Broadcast Services<br />
Figure 3. Three satellite stations would ensure complete coverage of <strong>the</strong> globe.<br />
Figure 2. Typical extra-terrestrial relay services. Transmission from A<br />
being relayed to points B and area C; transmission from D being relayed<br />
to whole hemisphere.<br />
Radio Links<br />
Station 3<br />
Station 2<br />
A single station could only provide coverage to half <strong>the</strong> globe, and for a world service<br />
three would be required, though more could be readily utilized. Fig. 3 shows <strong>the</strong> simplest<br />
B<br />
Orbit of Earth<br />
D<br />
C<br />
A
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 19<br />
arrangement. The stations would be arranged approximately equidistantly around <strong>the</strong><br />
earth, and <strong>the</strong> following longitudes appear to be suitable:—<br />
30 E—Africa and Europe.<br />
150 E—China and Oceana.<br />
90 W—The Americas.<br />
The stations in <strong>the</strong> chain would be linked by radio or optical beams, and thus any conceivable<br />
beam or broadcast service could be provided.<br />
The technical problems involved in <strong>the</strong> design of such stations are extremely interesting,<br />
3 but only a few can be gone into here. Batteries of parabolic reflectors would be<br />
provided, of apertures depending on <strong>the</strong> frequencies employed. Assuming <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
3,000 Mc/s waves, mirrors about a metre across would beam almost all <strong>the</strong> power on to<br />
<strong>the</strong> earth. Larger reflectors could be used to illuminate single countries or regions for <strong>the</strong><br />
more restricted services, with [307] consequent economy of power. On <strong>the</strong> higher frequencies<br />
it is not difficult to produce beams less than a degree in width, and, as mentioned<br />
before, <strong>the</strong>re would be no physical limitations on <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> mirrors. (From <strong>the</strong><br />
space station, <strong>the</strong> disc of <strong>the</strong> earth would be a little over 17 degrees across). The same mirrors<br />
could be used for many different transmissions if precautions were taken to avoid<br />
cross modulation.<br />
It is clear from <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> system that <strong>the</strong> power needed will be much less than<br />
that required for any o<strong>the</strong>r arrangement, since all <strong>the</strong> energy radiated can be uniformly<br />
distributed over <strong>the</strong> service area, and none is wasted. An approximate estimate of <strong>the</strong><br />
power required for <strong>the</strong> broadcast service from a single station can be made as follows:—<br />
The field strength in <strong>the</strong> equatorial plane of a λ/2 dipole in free space at a distance<br />
of d metres is<br />
e=6.85 P volts/metre, where P is <strong>the</strong> power radiated in watts.<br />
d<br />
Taking d as 42,000 km (effectively it would be less), we have P=37.6 e 2 watts. (e now in<br />
µV/metre.)<br />
If we assume e to be 50 microvolts/metre, which is <strong>the</strong> F.C.C. standard for frequency<br />
modulation, P will be 94 kW [kilowatts]. This is <strong>the</strong> power required for a single dipole,<br />
and not an array which would concentrate all <strong>the</strong> power on <strong>the</strong> earth. Such an array would<br />
have a gain over a simple dipole of about 80. The power required for <strong>the</strong> broadcast service<br />
would thus be about 1.2 kW. 4<br />
Ridiculously small though it is, this figure is probably much too generous. Small<br />
parabolas about a foot in diameter would be used for receiving at <strong>the</strong> earth end and would<br />
give a very good signal/noise ratio. There would be very little interference, partly because<br />
of <strong>the</strong> frequency used and partly because <strong>the</strong> mirrors would be pointing towards <strong>the</strong> sky<br />
which could contain no o<strong>the</strong>r source of signal. A field strength of 10 microvolts/metre<br />
might well be ample, and this would require a transmitter output of only 50 watts.<br />
When it is remembered that <strong>the</strong>se figure relate to <strong>the</strong> broadcast service, <strong>the</strong> efficiency<br />
of <strong>the</strong> system will be realised. The point-to-point beam transmissions might need powers<br />
of only 10 watts or so. These figures, of course, would need correction for ionospheric<br />
and atmospheric absorption, but that would be quite small over most of <strong>the</strong> band. The<br />
slight falling off in field strength due to this cause towards <strong>the</strong> edge of <strong>the</strong> service area<br />
could be readily corrected by a non-uniform radiator.<br />
The efficiency of <strong>the</strong> system is strikingly revealed when we consider that <strong>the</strong> London<br />
Television service required about 3 kW average power for an area less than fifty miles in<br />
radius. 5<br />
A second fundamental problem is <strong>the</strong> provision of electrical energy to run <strong>the</strong> large<br />
number of transmitters required for <strong>the</strong> different services. In space beyond <strong>the</strong> atmos-
20<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
phere, a square metre normal to <strong>the</strong> solar radiation intercepts 1.35 kW of energy. 6 Solar<br />
engines have already been devised for terrestrial use and are an economic proposition in<br />
tropical countries. They employ mirrors to concentrate sunlight on <strong>the</strong> boiler of a lowpressure<br />
steam engine. Although this arrangement is not very efficient it could be made<br />
much more so in space where <strong>the</strong> operating components are in a vacuum, <strong>the</strong> radiation<br />
is intense and continuous, and <strong>the</strong> low-temperature end of <strong>the</strong> cycle could be not far from<br />
absolute zero. Thermo-electric and photo-electric developments may make it possible to<br />
utilize <strong>the</strong> solar energy more directly.<br />
Though <strong>the</strong>re is no limit to <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> mirrors that could be built, one fifty metres<br />
in radius would intercept over 10,000 kW and at least a quarter of this energy should be<br />
available for use.<br />
The station would be in continuous sunlight except for some weeks around <strong>the</strong><br />
equinoxes, when it would enter <strong>the</strong> earth’s shadow for a few minutes every day. Fig. 4<br />
shows <strong>the</strong> state of affairs during <strong>the</strong> eclipse period. For [308] this calculation, it is legitimate<br />
to consider <strong>the</strong> earth as fixed and <strong>the</strong> sun as moving round it. The station would gaze<br />
<strong>the</strong> earth’s shadow at A, on <strong>the</strong> last day in February. Every day, as it made its diurnal revolution,<br />
it would cut more deeply into <strong>the</strong> shadow, undergoing its period of maximum<br />
[Figure 4] eclipse on March 21st. On that day it would only be in darkness for 1 hour<br />
9 minutes. From <strong>the</strong>n onwards <strong>the</strong> period of eclipse would shorten, and after April 11th<br />
(B) <strong>the</strong> station would be in continuous sunlight again until <strong>the</strong> same thing happened six<br />
months later at <strong>the</strong> autumn equinox, between September 12th and October 14th. The<br />
total period of darkness would be about two days per year, and as <strong>the</strong> longest period of<br />
eclipse would be little more than an hour <strong>the</strong>re should be no difficulty in storing enough<br />
power for an uninterrupted service. 7<br />
Ecliptic<br />
Orbit of Station<br />
Shadow<br />
A B<br />
1<br />
23 2 °<br />
To Sun<br />
Apr. 11<br />
Earth<br />
Figure 4. Solar radiation would be cut off for a short period each day at <strong>the</strong> equinoxes.<br />
To Sun<br />
Mar. 21<br />
To Sun<br />
Feb. 28/29
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 21<br />
Conclusion<br />
Briefly summarized, <strong>the</strong> advantages of <strong>the</strong> space station are as follows:—<br />
(1) It is <strong>the</strong> only way in which true world coverage can be achieved for all possible<br />
types of service.<br />
(2) It permits unrestricted use of a band at least 100,000 Mc/s wide, and with <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of beams an almost unlimited number of channels would be available.<br />
(3) The power requirements are extremely small since <strong>the</strong> efficiency of “illumination”<br />
will be almost 100 percent. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> power would be very low.<br />
(4) However great <strong>the</strong> initial expense, it would only be a fraction of that required for<br />
<strong>the</strong> world networks replaced, and <strong>the</strong> running costs would be incomparably less.<br />
Appendix—Rocket Design<br />
The development of rockets sufficiently powerful to reach “orbital” and even “escape”<br />
velocity is not only a matter of years. The following figures may be of interest in this connection.<br />
The rocket has to acquire a final velocity of 8 km/sec. Allowing 2 km/sec. for navigational<br />
corrections and air resistance loss (this is legitimate as all space-rockets will be<br />
launched from very high country) gives a total velocity needed of 10 km/sec. The fundamental<br />
equation of rocket motion is 2<br />
V = v log e R<br />
where V is <strong>the</strong> final velocity of <strong>the</strong> rocket, v <strong>the</strong> exhaust velocity and R <strong>the</strong> ratio of initial<br />
mass to final mass (payload plus structure). So far v has been about 2–2.5 km/sec for<br />
liquid fuel rockets but new designs and fuels will permit of considerably higher figures.<br />
(Oxy-hydrogen fuel has a <strong>the</strong>oretical exhaust velocity of 5.2 km/sec and more powerful<br />
combinations are known.) If we assume v to be 3.3 km/sec, R will be 20 to 1. However,<br />
owing to its finite acceleration, <strong>the</strong> rocket loses velocity as a result of gravitational retardation.<br />
If its acceleration (assumed constant) is a metres/sec. 2 , <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> necessary ratio R g<br />
is increased to<br />
α + g<br />
R g = R α<br />
For an automatically controlled rocket a would be about 5g and so <strong>the</strong> necessary R<br />
would be 37 to 1. Such ratios cannot be realised with a single rocket but can be attained<br />
by “step-rockets,” 2 while very much higher ratios (up to 1,000 to 1) can be achieved by <strong>the</strong><br />
principle of “cellular construction.” 3<br />
Epilogue—Atomic Power<br />
The advent of atomic power has at one bound brought space travel half a century<br />
nearer. It seems unlikely that we will have to wait as much as twenty years before atomicpowered<br />
rockets are developed, and such rockets could reach even <strong>the</strong> remoter planets<br />
with a fantastically small fuel/mass ratio—only a few percent. The equations developed in<br />
<strong>the</strong> appendix still hold, but v will be increased by a factor of about a thousand.<br />
In view of <strong>the</strong>se facts, it appears hardly worth while to expend much effort on <strong>the</strong><br />
building of long-distance relay chains. Even <strong>the</strong> local networks which will soon be under<br />
construction may have a working life of only 20–30 years.
22<br />
References<br />
1. “Radio-Relay Systems,” C. W. Hansell, Proc. I.R.E., Vol 33, March, 1945.<br />
2. “Rockets,” Willy Ley. (Viking Press, N.Y.)<br />
3. “Das Problem der Befahrung des Weltraums,” Hermann Noordung.<br />
4. “Frequency Modulation,” A. Hund. (McGraw Hill.)<br />
5. “London Television Service,” MacNamara and Birkinshaw. J.I.E.E., Dec., 1938.<br />
6. “The Sun,” C. G. Abbott. (Appleton-Century Co.)<br />
7. Journal of <strong>the</strong> British Interplanetary Society, Jan., 1939.<br />
Document I-3<br />
Document title: John R. Pierce, “Exotic Radio Communications,” Bell Laboratories<br />
Records, September 1959, pp. 323–329 (reprinted with permission).<br />
Source: AT&T Archives, Warren, New Jersey.<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1950s, John R. Pierce and his research team at AT&T’s Bell Laboratories began exploring <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of communicating via satellites. This review article, his second major one on <strong>the</strong> subject,<br />
examines <strong>the</strong> potential for using satellites in ei<strong>the</strong>r geosynchronous orbit or in lower orbits to receive signals<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Earth and retransmit <strong>the</strong>m to ano<strong>the</strong>r location. Similar to his April 1955 article for Jet<br />
Propulsion, which discussed in more technical terms some of <strong>the</strong> initial concepts for different types of<br />
communications satellites and orbital radio relays, this article describes some of <strong>the</strong> “state of <strong>the</strong> art”<br />
experiments that he and his team proposed to carry out using <strong>the</strong> large Echo 1 satellite to be orbited by<br />
NASA as a passive reflector of signals originating from <strong>the</strong> Earth. By 1960, Bell Labs had decided that<br />
<strong>the</strong> technical obstacles to a medium-altitude active repeater communications satellite could be solved,<br />
and AT&T consequently proposed <strong>the</strong> experimental Telstar program to <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
[323] J. R. Pierce<br />
Exotic Radio Communications<br />
[original set in two columns of newspaper style text per page]<br />
Pioneering work often seems exotic in its inception. Only a very few years ago, <strong>the</strong><br />
idea of launching an artificial satellite seemed exotic, if not scatterbrained. But satellites<br />
have become almost commonplace. Today’s exoticism is space flight by human beings,<br />
and we do not know what tomorrow’s might be.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> early part of this century, it would have taken an incorrigible visionary to foresee<br />
<strong>the</strong> present Bell System direct distance dialing network, undersea telephone cables,<br />
coaxial cable systems, and transcontinental microwave radio-relay routes. These all grew<br />
out of work which in its inception seemed far from any practical reality. It is an important<br />
part of Bell Laboratories activities to look far ahead—to study possible future communications<br />
services and thus build a fund of knowledge to draw upon if <strong>the</strong>se services should<br />
become economically attractive.<br />
In this article I shall deal primarily with some of <strong>the</strong> pioneering work at Bell<br />
Laboratories which may someday be important to <strong>the</strong> Bell System in providing broadband<br />
transoceanic radio communication. And to introduce this subject, I shall first briefly<br />
review some of our past accomplishments. My purpose is not merely to present a list of<br />
important radio research projects. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, I hope to illustrate <strong>the</strong> importance of good sci-
entific and engineering work and to show <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> Bell System pattern of careful<br />
study, measurement and design.<br />
Radio itself seemed exotic in an earlier day. Before <strong>the</strong> founding of Bell<br />
Laboratories in 1925, <strong>the</strong> A.T.&T. Co. and Western Electric contributed heavily to <strong>the</strong><br />
technology of radio broadcasting. Even earlier, in 1915, A.T.&T. and Western made use of<br />
newly developed power vacuum tubes in demonstrating radio communication between<br />
Arlington, Virginia, and both Hawaii and Paris. This showed a potentiality for transoceanic<br />
communication which could not be overlooked. One result was <strong>the</strong> first use of radio for<br />
commercial telephone service, from <strong>the</strong> mainland in California to Catalina Island in 1920.<br />
The work also led directly to experiments in transatlantic telephony as early as 1923, and<br />
to <strong>the</strong> inauguration of commercial transatlantic telephone service in 1927.<br />
[324]<br />
Temperature in Degrees Kelvin<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
1<br />
COSMIC NOISE<br />
MINIMUM<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 23<br />
MAXIMUM<br />
Angle of Antenna<br />
with Horizon<br />
in Degrees<br />
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 2 4 6 8 10 20 40<br />
Frequency in Kilomegacycles Per Second<br />
Theoretical atmospheric noise (in degrees K) versus frequency as an ideal antenna points at various angles to <strong>the</strong> horizon. The<br />
color region indicates <strong>the</strong> expected range of cosmic noise.<br />
In this early long-wave work, accurate measurements of field strengths were made. A<br />
form of modulation was adopted—in this case <strong>the</strong> first use on radio of <strong>the</strong> single-sideband<br />
technique—which was best suited to <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> medium and <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
The value of this type of approach was again illustrated with short-wave radio, put into<br />
commercial service in 1928. A tricky sort of communication, short-wave propagation<br />
shows both long-term variations of signal strength and rapid fading. Careful measurements<br />
by Bell Laboratories workers showed that such fading has a multipath nature—that<br />
is, radio waves in bouncing different numbers of times between <strong>the</strong> earth and <strong>the</strong> ionosphere<br />
alternately add and subtract in <strong>the</strong> radio receiver. These measurements also showed<br />
0<br />
5<br />
10<br />
30<br />
90<br />
290°
24<br />
a rapid variation in <strong>the</strong> direction from which signal components arrive at a receiving<br />
antenna and especially in <strong>the</strong> vertical angle of arrival.<br />
Such extensive and accurate measurements made it clear that operating frequencies<br />
should be changed from time to time to suit <strong>the</strong> condition of <strong>the</strong> ionosphere. As a replacement<br />
for <strong>the</strong> early narrow-band antenna arrays, <strong>the</strong> simple rhombic antenna invented at<br />
Bell Laboratories permitted effective operation over <strong>the</strong> required wider band of frequencies.<br />
In following <strong>the</strong> more rapid variations in angle of arrival, <strong>the</strong> MUSA system—an array<br />
of rhombic antennas interconnected with phase-changing networks—made it possible for<br />
a receiver to track <strong>the</strong> observed changes in <strong>the</strong> vertical angle of arrival of <strong>the</strong> radio signal.<br />
As a part of <strong>the</strong> careful studies of short-wave phenomena at Bell Laboratories from<br />
1929 through 1931, K. G. Jansky investigated noise in <strong>the</strong> short-wave bands at <strong>the</strong> Holmdel<br />
Laboratory. In <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong>se studies, he detected radio noise of extra-terrestrial origin—work<br />
which laid <strong>the</strong> basis of radio astronomy. In recognition of Mr. Jansky’s discovery,<br />
<strong>the</strong> laboratory at <strong>the</strong> new National Radio Observatory at Green Bank, West Virginia,<br />
is to be named <strong>the</strong> Karl G. Jansky Laboratory.<br />
Besides this short-wave work, higher frequencies were also explored, and much fundamental<br />
knowledge was gained. This was applied in providing a number of over-water circuits<br />
and in mobile radio. However, <strong>the</strong> next large-scale Bell System application of radio<br />
was found in <strong>the</strong> field of microwaves, which have frequencies of thousands of megacycles.<br />
G. C. Southworth started his microwave work as early as 1932, long before any use for such<br />
frequencies could be assured. H. T. Friis and his associates took up this work in 1938.<br />
Here again we see how early scientific and exploratory work led to extensive measurements<br />
and studies, and to <strong>the</strong> development of a sound technical art. The knowledge<br />
so gained was invaluable to radar during World War II, and later made possible <strong>the</strong> experimental<br />
New York-Boston System in 1947 and <strong>the</strong> Transcontinental TD-2 Radio-Relay<br />
System in 1951.<br />
Reliable Microwave Service<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
As in previous cases, <strong>the</strong>re was a lot to learn. Studies of microwave paths proved <strong>the</strong><br />
value of using highly directive antennas. These studies set a pattern in <strong>the</strong> Bell System of<br />
using very good, narrow-beam antennas that allow <strong>the</strong> use of low power and that minimize<br />
interference. All of this work showed that microwaves could provide very reliable service<br />
indeed.<br />
We now approach more contemporary developments, and it is time to remind ourselves<br />
again that it is largely an illusion to think of such past achievements as commonplace.<br />
They were, and certain aspects of <strong>the</strong>m still are, as challenging as anything we have<br />
in mind for <strong>the</strong> future.<br />
Current thinking in radio communications [325] still emphasizes <strong>the</strong> use of higher<br />
and higher frequencies, but direction of propagation is ano<strong>the</strong>r important factor. Many<br />
intriguing problems and possibilities arise when we direct antennas toward <strong>the</strong> troposphere<br />
and <strong>the</strong> ionosphere, and toward satellites. Some of <strong>the</strong>se problems were foreshadowed<br />
at Bell Laboratories as early as 1934 when A. M. Skellett and W. M. Goodall, in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
studies of <strong>the</strong> ionosphere, looked for reflections from ionized meteor trails. The frequencies<br />
of 2 to 6 mc [megacycles] used in <strong>the</strong>se studies were too low to give a strong signal,<br />
but statistical analysis of <strong>the</strong> data seemed to yield evidence for such reflections.<br />
In o<strong>the</strong>r studies of <strong>the</strong> ionosphere, workers outside <strong>the</strong> Laboratories proposed in<br />
1951 to use <strong>the</strong> turbulence of <strong>the</strong> ionosphere to achieve beyond-<strong>the</strong>-horizon scatter propagation.<br />
At a frequency of 50 mc, a 776-mile circuit was established between Cedar Rapids,<br />
Iowa, and Sterling, Virginia. Bell Laboratories monitored <strong>the</strong>se signals, and with carefully<br />
designed antennas was able to receive teletypewriter messages during 1951 to 1954. In <strong>the</strong><br />
course of this work, very high signal strengths were detected for very short periods. These
observations indicated strong reflections from meteor trails, a verification of Skellett’s and<br />
Goodall’s early ideas.<br />
However, ionospheric scattering proved disappointing for long-distance telephone<br />
circuits. For both turbulence scatter and meteor-trail scatter, <strong>the</strong> bandwidth is too narrow<br />
and transmission is too erratic. The more important region for <strong>the</strong> scatter technique<br />
proved to be <strong>the</strong> lower-altitude troposphere.<br />
Kenneth Bullington did <strong>the</strong> pioneering work in this field. During 1950–1951, he collected<br />
data on and tested what we now know to be tropospheric scatter propagation, over<br />
paths 200 to 300 miles long. He pointed out <strong>the</strong> possibilities of this mode of transmission<br />
in historic papers published in <strong>the</strong> Proceedings of <strong>the</strong> I.R.E. in 1950 and 1953.<br />
Beginning in 1955, fur<strong>the</strong>r studies of scatter propagation were carried out over a path<br />
between a 60-foot scanning antenna at <strong>the</strong> Holmdel Laboratory and a transmitter on a<br />
farm in Pharsalia, New York, 171 miles away. The effects of antenna size, signal strength,<br />
depth and speed of fading, and angles of arrival were investigated. These data were compared<br />
with <strong>the</strong> predictions of a <strong>the</strong>ory worked out by H. T. Friis, A. B. Crawford and D. C.<br />
Hogg. This <strong>the</strong>ory supposes that <strong>the</strong> scattering is caused by a large number of randomly<br />
positioned but nearly horizontal discontinuities in dielectric constant in <strong>the</strong> first few miles<br />
above <strong>the</strong> earth’s surface. The measurements fit <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical predictions very well in<br />
many respects. The knowledge acquired in <strong>the</strong>se studies of tropospheric scatter is now<br />
widely used in designing scatter circuits.<br />
Scatter Circuits in Operation<br />
Scatter circuits designed by Bell Laboratories and installed by Western Electric are<br />
currently in operation over <strong>the</strong> DEW [Defense Early Warning] line in <strong>the</strong> far north and<br />
over <strong>the</strong> “White Alice” system in Alaska. In addition, a broad-band scatter system for commercial<br />
telephone and television service was established between Florida City and Havana<br />
in 1957. This Florida-Cuba circuit handles 36 telephone channels and has <strong>the</strong> capability<br />
of handling 120 or more.<br />
If we now turn our attention to <strong>the</strong><br />
problem of future broad-band radio transmission<br />
between North America and<br />
Europe, scatter circuits are an obvious suggestion.<br />
It might be possible, for example,<br />
to set up a series of relay stations via [326]<br />
Greenland, various North Atlantic islands,<br />
and Scotland. Our studies indicate, however,<br />
that this type of communications would<br />
be very expensive. Large antennas and<br />
high-power transmitters would have to be<br />
built and maintained at remote arctic locations.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> multipath nature of<br />
scatter transmission would probably result<br />
in a poor broad-band circuit by television<br />
standards, although several dozen telephone<br />
channels might be provided.<br />
What, <strong>the</strong>n, is ano<strong>the</strong>r type of possible<br />
intercontinental radio communications?<br />
As early as 1954, we considered <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
artificial earth satellites as relays, and I<br />
published a technical paper on <strong>the</strong> sub-<br />
ject. At that time, however, problems of<br />
launching such satellites were unexplored.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 25<br />
The geometry of a passive-reflector satellite in a polar orbit at<br />
an altitude of 3,000 miles, with terminals located in<br />
Newfoundland and Scotland.
26<br />
The first Sputnik in October 1957 changed <strong>the</strong> picture radically, and we began to look at<br />
<strong>the</strong>se possibilities much more seriously.<br />
If satellite communication ever becomes a reality, it will be no exception to past Bell<br />
System experience. That is, it will necessarily be preceded by <strong>the</strong> established pattern of<br />
meticulous study and experimental work. At <strong>the</strong> moment, we do not have enough knowledge<br />
or experience to describe in detail a practicable system or to state exactly how it<br />
might be used. We can do little more than speculate on <strong>the</strong> various possibilities.<br />
One proposal is to place satellites 22,400 miles above <strong>the</strong> equator. At this height, a<br />
satellite would rotate in step with <strong>the</strong> earth and seem always to hang in <strong>the</strong> same position<br />
in <strong>the</strong> sky. Such satellites would be “active” relay stations—that is, <strong>the</strong>y would be equipped<br />
with receivers and transmitters, and probably with accurately pointed directive antennas.<br />
This is an apparently attractive proposal, but for <strong>the</strong> present it raises at least two serious<br />
questions: <strong>the</strong> problems of accurate rocketry to launch and orient such satellites are<br />
indeed formidable, and <strong>the</strong> problems of equipment life in such relay stations are, to put<br />
it mildly, severe.<br />
A second proposal is to place active satellites in orbit only a few thousand miles above<br />
<strong>the</strong> earth. These would not be stationary in relation to <strong>the</strong> earth, but with a sufficient number<br />
of <strong>the</strong>m, signals could be relayed from each whenever it is in a usable section of its<br />
orbit. With this second proposal, rocket accuracy is somewhat eased, but equipment life in<br />
a low-altitude relay station is as serious a question as in <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> 22,400 mile satellite.<br />
With low-altitude satellites, however, a transmitter and receiver on <strong>the</strong> satellite are not<br />
essential. Instead, one may put in orbit a group of passive reflectors. Large, high-power<br />
transmitters would <strong>the</strong>n transmit to a satellite reflector, and signals would bounce from it<br />
and thus reach a distant receiver. The satellites would be aluminized plastic spheres—<br />
“balloons” perhaps 100 feet in diameter—with a high reflectivity to microwaves.<br />
As an exercise to explore possibilities and problems, we have studied in some detail a<br />
<strong>the</strong>oretical system using passive satellites for transatlantic broad-band transmission. As<br />
shown in <strong>the</strong> illustration [of <strong>the</strong> passive-reflector satellite], <strong>the</strong> terminals were considered<br />
to be in Newfoundland and on an island in <strong>the</strong> Hebrides off Scotland. The satellites are<br />
to be imagined as traveling in polar orbits.<br />
Regions of Visibility<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
On <strong>the</strong> polar projection shown below, closed contour lines are drawn for various<br />
heights of orbit. These define areas in which a single satellite would be simultaneously visible<br />
to both <strong>the</strong> Newfoundland and Scotland terminals. At a height of 2,000-miles, for<br />
example, a satellite would be visible to both terminals anywhere within <strong>the</strong> 2,000-mile contour,<br />
even along <strong>the</strong> outer edges of <strong>the</strong> area.<br />
The first of <strong>the</strong> accompanying tables (see below) shows calculations relating to <strong>the</strong> orbit<br />
[327] heights. The shortest and longest visibility times in <strong>the</strong> second and third horizontal<br />
rows are of particular interest. For <strong>the</strong> l,000-mile height, as an example, <strong>the</strong> zero for shortest<br />
visibility time indicates that for some passes, a satellite would not be visible at all at both<br />
of <strong>the</strong> two terminals. A 3,000-mile satellite, however, would be visible at least 31.4 minutes,<br />
and as long as 55.4 minutes, for every revolution around <strong>the</strong> earth. On <strong>the</strong> average it<br />
would be visible 22 percent of <strong>the</strong> time. Thus, even with only one satellite, one might get<br />
quite long stretches of broadband communication.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 27<br />
Oval-shaped areas define regions in which polar-orbit satellites at various heights would be simultaneously visible to both terminals<br />
at Newfoundland and Scotland. The usable areas would be somewhat smaller, however, since transmission is difficult<br />
when [<strong>the</strong>] satellite is near <strong>the</strong> horizon.<br />
Visibility Times at Various Heights of Orbit<br />
Height of Satellite Above Surface of Earth in Miles<br />
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000<br />
Time of one<br />
revolution<br />
(minutes) 100.4 118.0 136.6 155.0 175.2 195.2<br />
Shortest<br />
visibility<br />
(minutes) 0 0 8.0 12.5 23.8 31.4<br />
Longest<br />
visibility<br />
(minutes) 14.7 20.0 29.6 36.6 46.2 55.4<br />
Average<br />
visibility<br />
(percent) 3.5 6.9 12.9 17.7 19.6 22.0<br />
Assumptions: Terminals in Newfoundland and Hebrides; polar orbits; refraction effects<br />
ignored; and visibility from horizon to horizon.
28<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
This view is somewhat optimistic, however, since we have so far ignored three sources<br />
of noise that could restrict <strong>the</strong> range of this type of communications: (l) The noise added<br />
by <strong>the</strong> receiving amplifier, (2) Cosmic noise, and (3) Atmospheric noise. Fortunately, <strong>the</strong><br />
maser (RECORD, July, 1958) provides us with a microwave receiver that adds practically<br />
no noise to <strong>the</strong> received signal. Thus we can largely neglect <strong>the</strong> first of <strong>the</strong>se three noise<br />
sources.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r illustration [<strong>the</strong> graph at <strong>the</strong> beginning of this document] gives some pertinent<br />
data on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two sources. In this graph, noise is described in terms of absolute<br />
temperature, ranging upward from 1˚ Kelvin on <strong>the</strong> ordinate, as related to frequency on<br />
<strong>the</strong> abscissa. The color region describes <strong>the</strong> range of <strong>the</strong> cosmic noise discovered by<br />
Jansky, and as we see from <strong>the</strong> graph, it becomes negligible at <strong>the</strong> higher frequencies.<br />
The third source—atmospheric noise—is a more serious limitation. Even cold air at<br />
high altitudes is hot compared to absolute zero, so it radiates electromagnetic noise just<br />
as hot iron radiates light and heat. The radiation is small because <strong>the</strong> atmosphere is<br />
almost transparent. To evaluate <strong>the</strong> noise, we must consider how transparent <strong>the</strong> atmosphere<br />
is at a given frequency and also how much atmosphere an antenna “sees” as it follows<br />
a satellite.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> graph, <strong>the</strong> bottom curve labeled 90 degrees illustrates that an antenna pointed<br />
straight up sees a minimum of atmosphere and <strong>the</strong>refore receives a minimum of<br />
atmospheric noise. From about 2 to 10 kilomegacycles this noise is fairly constant and corresponds<br />
to only about 2.5˚ K. As <strong>the</strong> antenna is rotated far<strong>the</strong>r and far<strong>the</strong>r toward <strong>the</strong><br />
horizon, however, it must look through more and more atmosphere and receive correspondingly<br />
more noise. The zero curve at <strong>the</strong> top is <strong>the</strong> case where <strong>the</strong> antenna points<br />
horizontally; here it sees a very long atmospheric path, and <strong>the</strong> noise actually approaches<br />
<strong>the</strong> assumed atmospheric temperature (290˚ K) at very short wavelengths for which air is<br />
not very transparent to microwaves.<br />
[328] Note, however, that <strong>the</strong> curves for <strong>the</strong> various angles are displaced downward<br />
toward <strong>the</strong> lower noise values as <strong>the</strong> angle above <strong>the</strong> horizon is increased. Even as close as<br />
10 degrees above <strong>the</strong> horizon, an antenna will see only about 13˚ K of atmospheric noise.<br />
These curves make us feel that we can realize <strong>the</strong> advantages of <strong>the</strong> maser if we use signals<br />
from a satellite reflector only when it is 7 degrees or more above <strong>the</strong> horizon. This limitation<br />
in effect contracts <strong>the</strong> contour areas in <strong>the</strong> polar-projection map, which were drawn<br />
with <strong>the</strong> assumption that signals would be received right down to <strong>the</strong> horizon.<br />
How serious is this limitation? Suppose we consider satellites 3,000 miles high and use<br />
<strong>the</strong>m only when <strong>the</strong>y are at least 7 degrees above <strong>the</strong> horizon. Average visibility per rotation<br />
will thus be less than <strong>the</strong> 22 percent listed in <strong>the</strong> first table, but if we put more and<br />
more satellites up, <strong>the</strong> result is an increase in <strong>the</strong> percentage of time that at least one satellite<br />
is visible. For 24 satellites, at least one satellite would be available to both<br />
Newfoundland and Scotland for 99 percent of <strong>the</strong> time. The interruptions would occur at<br />
predictable intervals, and would <strong>the</strong>refore be less serious than if <strong>the</strong>y were random in<br />
time. The second table (see below) lists some o<strong>the</strong>r possibilities for different minimum<br />
angles and percentages of service interruptions.
Number of Randomly Spaced Satellites Needed for Various<br />
Minimum Elevation Angles and Percentages of Interruption<br />
Minimum Elevation Percentage of Interruption<br />
Angle in Degrees 10% 5% 1%<br />
0 9 12 19<br />
3.25 11 14 21<br />
7.25 12 15 24<br />
12.60 17 22 33<br />
Assumptions: Terminals in Newfoundland and Hebrides; Polar Orbits at 3000-mile height<br />
The next obvious question is whe<strong>the</strong>r transmitters and antennas are available for such<br />
communication. Assuming an operating frequency of 2 kilomegacycles, a 40 db [decibel]<br />
signal-to-noise ratio, and 100-foot spherical reflectors at 3,000 miles, we have calculated<br />
that we would need antennas 150 feet in diameter and transmitter power of 100 kilowatts.<br />
Antennas of this size have been used, and <strong>the</strong> required power could be obtained by paralleling<br />
ten commercially available tubes. At present, however, we cannot be sure that <strong>the</strong><br />
required type of satellite reflector would withstand <strong>the</strong> conditions of space and maintain<br />
its shape in orbit.<br />
Need for Knowledge<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 29<br />
At this stage <strong>the</strong> reader may feel that this is exoticism with a vengeance. We have perhaps<br />
raised more questions than those we have tried to answer. Aside from <strong>the</strong> problem<br />
of costs, which can hardly be handled definitively at this early date, <strong>the</strong> technical problems<br />
are extensive. But herein lies <strong>the</strong> point of this discussion—we need more fundamental<br />
knowledge of <strong>the</strong> possibilities before we can begin to think realistically of actual systems.<br />
And <strong>the</strong> only way we know of to get this knowledge is to continue our traditions of careful<br />
search, study of <strong>the</strong> problems, and measurement.<br />
On March 19, T. Keith Glennan, Administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration (NASA), announced plans to launch several satellite spheres next year.<br />
These experimental spheres, fabricated from an aluminized plastic, are to be 100 feet in<br />
diameter. The announcement also mentioned <strong>the</strong> plan to establish communications<br />
between an 85-foot tracking antenna at Goldstone, California, and communications facilities<br />
on <strong>the</strong> East Coast, including [329] Bell Laboratories equipment at Holmdel. The<br />
Goldstone antenna is operated by <strong>the</strong> Jet Propulsion Laboratory of Pasadena, California,<br />
which is owned by NASA and operated under contract to <strong>the</strong> NASA by <strong>the</strong> California<br />
Institute of Technology.
30<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Plastic sphere, 100 feet in diameter, of [<strong>the</strong>] type to be used in satellite transmission experiments. In orbit, thin plastic with aluminized<br />
surface will reflect microwaves.<br />
In connection with this type of work, <strong>the</strong>n, what are some of <strong>the</strong> specific problems on<br />
which we have worked, and what are some of <strong>the</strong> problems concerning which we need<br />
additional knowledge?<br />
While we have a very good maser in <strong>the</strong> 6,000 mc range, <strong>the</strong>re is still some room for<br />
improvement, and we need masers for o<strong>the</strong>r frequencies. A related problem is that some<br />
types of antennas tend to pick up noise from all directions, so we are adapting <strong>the</strong> hornreflector<br />
type antenna, which does not have this defect. With such equipment, we have<br />
already made measurements of sky temperatures which check <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical curves<br />
shown on page 324. We believe that <strong>the</strong>se antennas may also have many uses in radio<br />
astronomy.<br />
We have made some studies of <strong>the</strong> effect of ultraviolet light on <strong>the</strong> properties of aluminized<br />
Mylar, and for this material we have investigated absorption at various wavelengths<br />
to tell us <strong>the</strong> temperature a satellite might attain in space.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r obvious fields for additional work are those of propagation measurements,<br />
guidance, and <strong>the</strong> many components besides masers and antennas that must go into any<br />
experimental system. A very important need is highly reliable components for experiments<br />
with active satellite repeaters. We have inaugurated work on such components.<br />
This need for fur<strong>the</strong>r study should emphasize that today we have no proven answers<br />
to <strong>the</strong> problem of overseas broad-band radio communications. If we ever turn on our television<br />
sets and view a European event beamed by radio across <strong>the</strong> Atlantic, it may come to<br />
us over a system no one has even thought of yet. But in <strong>the</strong> meantime, to assure <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
we must continue to pursue a vigorous and effective research program.
Document I-4<br />
Document Title: Memorandum from S.G. Lutz to A.V. Haeff, “Commercial Satellite<br />
Communication Project; Preliminary Report of Study Task Force,” October 22, 1959.<br />
Source: Hughes Space and Communications Company, Los Angeles, California (used with<br />
permission).<br />
By 1959, work on communications satellite research and development was going on in several industrial<br />
firms besides Bell Laboratories. The Department of Defense had taken <strong>the</strong> lead in sponsoring<br />
research on active repeater satellites, while NASA concentrated its initial efforts on passive reflectors.<br />
In particular, <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense was supporting research on a complex satellite project called<br />
Advent, which intended to develop a satellite for use in geosynchronous orbit. An engineering team at<br />
Hughes Aircraft in mid-1959, led by Harold Rosen, devised a proposal for a much simpler geosynchronous<br />
satellite and asked <strong>the</strong> company to support its development. This memorandum reports to<br />
Hughes vice president for research, A.V. Haeff, <strong>the</strong> conclusions of an internal task force set up to assess<br />
<strong>the</strong> proposal of Rosen and his team, which also included Donald Williams and Thomas Hudspeth.<br />
(The appendices referred to in this memo are not included.) Over <strong>the</strong> following months, Hughes managers<br />
debated whe<strong>the</strong>r to provide support for <strong>the</strong> proposal from company funds or to seek government support<br />
for <strong>the</strong> project. Enough corporate funds were made available to keep <strong>the</strong> project going, but it was not until<br />
NASA contracted with Hughes to develop and demonstrate what became known as Syncom that <strong>the</strong> project<br />
became <strong>the</strong> foundation for <strong>the</strong> many geosynchronous satellites to follow.<br />
[1]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 31<br />
Hughes Aircraft Company<br />
Interdepartmental Correspondence<br />
To: A. V. Haeff cc: See Distribution Date: 22 October 1959<br />
Subject: Commercial Satellite Communication Project; From: S. G. Lutz<br />
Preliminary Report of Study Task Force<br />
1. It is <strong>the</strong> unanimous opinion of <strong>the</strong> Task Force working members* that <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
communication system proposed by Dr. H. A. Rosen is technically feasible, is possible<br />
of realization within close to <strong>the</strong> estimated price and schedule, has great potential economic<br />
attractiveness and should not encounter too serious legal or political obstacles.<br />
2. The Task Force has, of necessity, concentrated on technical aspects of <strong>the</strong> program<br />
and has not been able to make an adequate market survey. The phraseology, “great<br />
potential economic attractiveness[,]” is justified by <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
a. A rapidly increasing demand for new long-distance communication facilities<br />
is being created by: (1) Population increase, (2) Shrinkage of travel time via<br />
commercial jet aircraft, (3) Increasing foreign industrialization and international<br />
commerce, (4) Increasing military communication loads, and (5)<br />
Forthcoming decrease in HF [high-frequency] communication capability<br />
because of <strong>the</strong> declining sunspot cycle. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than being able to open more<br />
HF radio circuits to carry <strong>the</strong> increasing traffic, new circuits (cable, scatter or<br />
satellite) will be needed to pick up perhaps a third of <strong>the</strong> traffic now carried<br />
by HF circuits.<br />
* Task Force working members are: E. D. Felkel, S. G. Lutz, D. E. Miller, H. A. Rosen and J. H. Striebel.
32<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
b. The Bell System, which formerly depended on radio for intercontinental<br />
phone circuits, has been investing heavily and profitably in long submarine<br />
cables; four in <strong>the</strong> past few years. The first trans-Atlantic phone cable provided<br />
thirty-six circuits (about 140 kc [kilocycle] bandwidth), cost about<br />
$30,000,000.00, and reportedly paid out in its first two years. A second trans-<br />
Atlantic cable soon will be placed in service at a reported cost of<br />
$40,000,000.00, presumably for a similar number of circuits. Tropospheric<br />
scatter radio chains are comparable in cost and are geographically constrained.<br />
c. Comparing <strong>the</strong> proposed satellite system ($5,000,000.00 for 4500 kc bandwidth)<br />
with submarine cable, it could carry up to thirty times as much traffic<br />
at one-sixth <strong>the</strong> investment!<br />
[2] 3. Converting “potential” into “actual” economic attractiveness will depend on<br />
acquiring communication traffic, most probably via cooperative agreement with one or<br />
more communication common carriers. General Telephone may be <strong>the</strong> best prospect<br />
(certainly a better one than <strong>the</strong> complacent Bell System) because it is trying to gain stature<br />
despite Bell’s long-distance monopoly. The proposed satellite system could bypass Bell<br />
land-lines in linking General’s east-coast and west-coast systems, in addition to giving it<br />
non-Bell circuits to Europe and o<strong>the</strong>r continents. General Telephone also could negotiate<br />
more efficiently with <strong>the</strong> communication services of o<strong>the</strong>r countries and even o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
domestic companies (Western Union, etc.) than [Hughes Aircraft] could; not being a<br />
common carrier. This and related market survey problems seemed too sensitive to be<br />
explored adequately by <strong>the</strong> engineers of this task force, even if time and suitable contracts<br />
had been available. General Telephone need not be <strong>the</strong> only potential partner, of course,<br />
for even a smaller common carrier might supply enough traffic to get started. As few as six<br />
circuits (30 kc out of <strong>the</strong> available 4500 kc) to Europe should justify a five-million-dollar<br />
investment in proportion to submarine telephone cables.<br />
4. . . . (15 October [Interdepartmental Correspondence] from Lutz to Haeff,<br />
Jerrems) lists three questions which define <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> market survey believed to be<br />
desirable. To this list should be added a study of <strong>the</strong> relative costs and outage times for<br />
splicing a broken cable vs replacing a dead satellite repeater. As a preliminary estimate,<br />
keeping a launching in readiness on Jarvis Island should be less expensive than keeping a<br />
cable ship in readiness and a new satellite could be put up in hours, instead of <strong>the</strong> weeks<br />
required to locate and repair a cable-break.<br />
5. Technical aspects of <strong>the</strong> proposed program have been evaluated in more detail,<br />
and with higher confidence in <strong>the</strong> conclusions, than was possible with <strong>the</strong> preceeding<br />
[sic] economic aspects. The crux of <strong>the</strong> technical attractiveness of this program (and an<br />
important economic consideration as well) lies in quick-reaction capability at low cost. By<br />
being able to keep <strong>the</strong> weight of a simple broad-band repeater payload below 25 lbs, it can<br />
be put in stationary orbit by an inexpensive (one-third million dollars) solid-fuel Scout<br />
booster. Everyone else (NASA, RCA, Space Electronics, Signal Corps) has viewed a stationary<br />
orbit repeater as a more sophisticated, hence heavier device, with attitude control<br />
to use high gain antenna beams on <strong>the</strong> satellite. More payload weight requires a larger<br />
liquid-fueled rocket and severe logistic problems in transporting or making liquid oxygen<br />
for an equatorial launch. The alternative of launching from <strong>the</strong> U.S. and “dog-legging”<br />
into an equatorial orbit increases guidance problems and requires Saturn thrusts. Thus,<br />
NASA and o<strong>the</strong>rs consider <strong>the</strong> stationary orbit communications repeater as a high-cost<br />
program for 1965-70. This Task Force has convinced itself of <strong>the</strong> feasibility of puttin [sic]<br />
25 lbs, or possibly 30 lbs, into a useful quasi-stationary orbit with a Scout booster, of achieving<br />
a 4500 kc bandwidth repeater within this weight and of doing this within a year of <strong>the</strong><br />
date that full funding is provided.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 33<br />
6. How can Hughes expect to do so much better than o<strong>the</strong>rs? The answer does not<br />
lie in any startling but questionable innovations, inventions or break-throughs. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong><br />
answer lies chiefly in application of <strong>the</strong> Hughes brand of System Engineering, plus exploiting<br />
Hughes competence in low-noise reception and traveling-wave-tube development.<br />
The starting point was to assume a quasi-stationary orbit (satellites held within about<br />
5˚ angular limits of desired point on <strong>the</strong> stationary orbit), to be put <strong>the</strong>re by a Scout booster.<br />
The limited payload weight to 30 lbs on <strong>the</strong> basis of Chance-Vought performance predictions,<br />
or to 25 lbs on derating <strong>the</strong> predicted velocity by 800 fps. This obviously limits<br />
<strong>the</strong> satellite transmitting power, energized from solar cells, to a watt or so. [3]<br />
Transmission at or near 2 kmc (<strong>the</strong> accepted optimum frequency for space communication)<br />
favors high antenna gain and use of traveling-wave-tubes. The nearest to a breakthrough<br />
was <strong>the</strong> assurance by Dr. J. T. Mandel of <strong>the</strong> feasibility of developing a 2.5 watt<br />
periodic PM focused 2 kmc high efficiency traveling-wave-tube of one pound, including<br />
its INDOX VI focusing magnets. The low satellite power is handled at <strong>the</strong> earth terminals<br />
by low noise (cooled maser or parametric) reception and very high antenn [sic] gain<br />
(58 db). In achieving <strong>the</strong> latter at reasonable costs, <strong>the</strong> quasi-stationary position of <strong>the</strong><br />
satellite avoids <strong>the</strong> need for full azimuth and elevation control which has been made even<br />
80 ft steerable parabolas so expensive. At similar cost, <strong>the</strong> beam from a 150 ft truncated<br />
parabola can be steered through a +5˚ range. Thus, <strong>the</strong> burden is put on <strong>the</strong> earthterminals,<br />
where it belongs. The satellite antenna design is a compromise between using<br />
an omni-directional antenna for maximum simplicity and using a 17˚ beam for maximum<br />
gain. While ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong>se extremes could be fatal, <strong>the</strong> compromise of a spin-stabilized<br />
doughnut pattern provides 6 to 9 db gain, with simplicity. Finally, with adequate design for<br />
a 14 db S/N ratio, <strong>the</strong> addition of frequency modulation raises <strong>the</strong> S/N ration to a commercial<br />
32 db.<br />
7. Because of <strong>the</strong> importance of assessing feasibility of staying within <strong>the</strong> weight<br />
capability of <strong>the</strong> Scout booster, Ed Felkel was named to <strong>the</strong> Task Force to analyze <strong>the</strong><br />
weight of <strong>the</strong> payload package. His report (attached in Appendix B) shows confidence of<br />
keeping it safely within weight.<br />
8. Putting <strong>the</strong> satellite in orbit and keeping it in position entails a sequence of individually-practicable<br />
operations within today’s state of <strong>the</strong> art. Cumulatively, however, <strong>the</strong><br />
multiplicity of stages plus operations of velocity adjustment, de-spinning, re-spinning and<br />
incremental orbit adjustment present a currently-indeterminable hazard to <strong>the</strong> success of<br />
any one firing. It is believed that a combination of (a) careful and conservative engineering<br />
with step-by-step pre-testing, (b) adequate training on analog simulators, (c) study of<br />
any troubles in earlier NASA Scout firings, and (d) adequate determination of <strong>the</strong> cause<br />
of any initial Hughes failure, will result in adequate probability of success within <strong>the</strong> programmed<br />
three tries. Admittedly, <strong>the</strong>re can never be certainty of success in only three<br />
attempts. However, a fourth or subsequent firings should not increase <strong>the</strong> program cost<br />
proportionately.<br />
9. As might be expected, <strong>the</strong> Task Force study has resulted in significant system<br />
improvements, by Dr. Rosen as well as by Task Force members and o<strong>the</strong>rs. For example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> payload configuration has been broadened to improve spin-stability and has been stiffened<br />
by a central column. More important, perhaps, has been <strong>the</strong> swing away from design<br />
primarily for television relaying, with additional narrower i-f channels for o<strong>the</strong>r communication<br />
services, toward <strong>the</strong> simpler and more flexible and potentially rewarding<br />
approach of coordinated use of a broad-band single-channel repeater simultaneously by<br />
several earth-terminals. This mode of operation requires that earth-terminals equalize<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir transmitting powers by monitoring <strong>the</strong> spectrum from <strong>the</strong> satellite, ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
depending on AGC of separate i-f channels in <strong>the</strong> satellite to prevent a too-strong earthsignal<br />
from weakening o<strong>the</strong>r retransmissions. Also, this mode of operation provides flexi-
34<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
bility of bandwidth reapportionment between earth-terminals in accordance with shifting<br />
relative traffic loads. In short, this approach overcomes <strong>the</strong> “two at a time” limitation of<br />
most prior proposals and thus approached more closely <strong>the</strong> eventual many-user<br />
“exchange in orbit” concept. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it accomplishes this without sacrificing television<br />
capability, requiring only that o<strong>the</strong>r traffic be limited during a television program and<br />
be kept out of <strong>the</strong> television band.<br />
[4] 10. Determination and resolution of possible legal and political problems and governmental<br />
restrictions obviously is beyond <strong>the</strong> scope of this Task Force. A few of <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
problems will be mentioned. The usual difficulties with <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications<br />
Commission can be expected in obtaining a license for a new type radio service for frequencies<br />
have not yet been allocated. Similar, or worse, difficulties can be expected with<br />
<strong>the</strong> corresponding regulatory bodies of o<strong>the</strong>r nations where earth-terminals are located.<br />
Characteristically, <strong>the</strong> FCC makes no precedent-setting decisions without holding industry-wide<br />
hearings and <strong>the</strong>se could be competitively detrimental. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> State<br />
Department might become involved because of <strong>the</strong> international nature of this venture.<br />
Next, some governmental agency probably has control of Jarvis Island and would insist on<br />
approving its use. Finally, NASA probably would have to sanction <strong>the</strong> commercial sale and<br />
use of Scout boosters and could impose o<strong>the</strong>r controls on <strong>the</strong> program, such as requiring<br />
provision for removing dead repeaters from orbit, or provision for disabling <strong>the</strong>ir electronics<br />
in event that <strong>the</strong> project is abandoned with repeaters still in orbit. As a ray of sunshine,<br />
NASA’s mission is non-military space technology. They have expressed<br />
encouragement toward commercial projects which would not require NASA funds. If<br />
NASA becomes “sold” on <strong>the</strong> proposed project, <strong>the</strong>y might provide inestimable assistance<br />
in surmounting <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r governmental obstacles. One recognizes that exploration by a<br />
Hughes representative of <strong>the</strong> above governmental restrictions could readily “leak” to competitors,<br />
or even to <strong>the</strong> press, and be highly detrimental. This danger can be avoided, it is<br />
believed, by retaining a consultant to make this preliminary investigation without disclosing<br />
his client or <strong>the</strong> details of <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
11. The impact of <strong>the</strong> proposed program on <strong>the</strong> military services could be both good<br />
and bad. It would be conclusive proof of Hughes’ competence to execute a major space<br />
program and in Hughes’ confidence and initiative in undertaking it without governmental<br />
funds. Thus, it should put us in better competitive position for managing future governmental<br />
space projects. It could have a bad impact, however, in “showing up” <strong>the</strong><br />
inefficiency of military satellite programs.<br />
12. It is known that Bell, RCA and probably o<strong>the</strong>r large companies recognize <strong>the</strong><br />
potential attractions of satellite communication and probably have program plans. It is<br />
reasonable to assume that Bell would plan to invest several times <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> trans-<br />
Atlantic cable in a big stationary orbit project, timed to <strong>the</strong> availability of big boosters, five<br />
or ten years hence. Pressure for additional international circuits may lead <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
re-examine <strong>the</strong> feasibility of moving faster by using a smaller booster and lighter payload,<br />
much as we propose. Certainly <strong>the</strong>y could be expected to do this if <strong>the</strong>y learned that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
chief competitor, General Telephone, planned such a program in cooperation with<br />
Hughes. Most of <strong>the</strong> prestige value and a portion of <strong>the</strong> economic value would be sacrificed<br />
if our communication satellite were not <strong>the</strong> first. This indicates <strong>the</strong> need for a quick<br />
decision and a fast program under tight security.<br />
* * * * * *
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 35<br />
RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
I. If ano<strong>the</strong>r company gets into orbit first, much of <strong>the</strong> publicity and prestige value<br />
will be lost and we would have to compete for traffic. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, this must be a low-cost<br />
program and delays increase costs. Consequently, <strong>the</strong> program should be planned to start<br />
development now. The expensive commitments (for rockets, ground installations, etc.)<br />
can be deferred for a few months without delaying <strong>the</strong> launching date.<br />
[5] II. Fund <strong>the</strong> traveling-wave-tube development separately as a commercial product. A<br />
one-pound tube of this capability should find application in Signal Corps portable<br />
microwave relay repeaters, possibly in field television transmitters, as well as in o<strong>the</strong>r programs.<br />
A quarter-million for its development seems a normally good product development<br />
risk. This tube is <strong>the</strong> heart of <strong>the</strong> proposed satellite electronic system and will be its<br />
longest lead-time component.<br />
III. Fund <strong>the</strong> remainder of <strong>the</strong> payload development and earth-terminal (antenna<br />
and low-noise receiver), in an amount of about $850,000.00. Also, take an option three<br />
Scout boosters, plus necessary real-estate, etc. If this is too large a commitment in advance<br />
of completion of <strong>the</strong> comprehensive market survey and negotiations with potential customers,<br />
fund a sufficient fraction to carry <strong>the</strong> development program this long. Delaying<br />
<strong>the</strong> start of development would delay completion of <strong>the</strong> program correspondingly.<br />
IV. Explore with General Telephone Company, at top management level, <strong>the</strong>ir interest<br />
in a non-Bell long-distance and overseas capability and <strong>the</strong>ir willingness to cooperate<br />
as <strong>the</strong> common carrier in <strong>the</strong> proposed program. Avoid disclosing details which might<br />
permit General’s electronic subsidiary, Sylvania, to attempt to replace us. Reach a working<br />
agreement which will permit prompt working-level discussions of General’s cooperation<br />
in <strong>the</strong> program. If negotiations with General fail, try <strong>the</strong> next best company.<br />
V. A task force, or project team, consisting of key personnel loaned as required from<br />
several organizations—Communications Division, Research Laboratories, Systems<br />
Development Laboratories—should be set up to carry out <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
Document I-5<br />
Document title: H.A. Rosen and D.D. Williams, Commercial Communications Satellite,<br />
Report RDL/B-1, Engineering Division, Hughes Aircraft Company, January 1960.<br />
Source: Hughes Space and Communications Company, Los Angeles, California (used with<br />
permission).<br />
By <strong>the</strong> end of 1959, Harold A. Rosen and his team had reworked <strong>the</strong>ir initial mid-1959 design for a<br />
geosynchronous communications satellite into a form that was very close to what was actually first<br />
launched as Syncom 1 in 1963. This report describes that design; only relevant excerpts appear here.<br />
The report anticipated a NASA program for communications satellite research and development that<br />
might provide a source of funding to Hughes for developing <strong>the</strong> satellite; however, NASA first chose to<br />
support a lower orbit satellite proposed by RCA called Relay. During discussions with NASA in 1960,<br />
<strong>the</strong> space agency suggested to Hughes <strong>the</strong> use of a larger Thor Delta booster ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> Scout booster<br />
specified in this report. This would allow <strong>the</strong> satellite to be launched from Cape Canaveral in<br />
Florida ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> Jarvis Island launch site discussed in <strong>the</strong> report.
36<br />
[i]<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Commercial Communications Satellite<br />
[1] 1. INTRODUCTION - PROGRAM OBJECTIVES<br />
This document describes an inexpensive communication satellite system for intercontinental<br />
transmission of television, telephonic, and teletype messages on a commercial<br />
basis.<br />
The system proposed uses an active repeater in a satellite having a circular orbit in <strong>the</strong><br />
plane of <strong>the</strong> earth’s equator with a period of 24 hours. Such a satellite is generally recognized<br />
as <strong>the</strong> ultimate communication satellite because it remains stationary to <strong>the</strong> earth.<br />
The NASA has a program which is expected to lead eventually to such a satellite. The<br />
schedule for <strong>the</strong> program is not firm, but NASA testimony to Congress* indicates that <strong>the</strong><br />
goal is four to five years away. This conclusion is reached from <strong>the</strong> technical specifications<br />
that NASA has until now believed are necessary, involving heavy (800 to 3000 pounds),<br />
complex payloads with two to three years’ life as an objective. As a more immediate program,<br />
NASA will put a number of 100-foot diameter passive balloon reflectors into orbit<br />
during this year. These balloons will be tracked by several organizations, and will provide<br />
valuable scientific information. However, such reflectors are not of any real commercial<br />
value because [of] large amounts of power per unit bandwidth and immense tracking<br />
antennas required to give even <strong>the</strong> intermittent coverage afforded by low-altitude orbits.<br />
There are several military communication satellite programs now under way. None of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se conflict with <strong>the</strong> commercial program proposed here; <strong>the</strong> military programs use<br />
high power active repeaters in low-altitude orbits in order to avoid any requirements for<br />
large antennas at <strong>the</strong> terminals.<br />
The presently proposed commercial system can be put into operation within one year.<br />
This radical improvement in schedule is achieved primarily through <strong>the</strong> design of a very<br />
light (25 pound) satellite repeater, a design based on realistic objectives for satisfactory<br />
commercial [2] application. The light payload required with <strong>the</strong> present concept permits<br />
use of an inexpensive solid-propellant booster, <strong>the</strong> Scout. This results in a program cost of<br />
5 million dollars.<br />
The advantages of such a program would be severalfold. Financially, it is believed that<br />
<strong>the</strong> initial development, terminal installations, and launching costs could be recovered in<br />
a fraction of <strong>the</strong> first year’s operation. It is expected that <strong>the</strong> useful life of a repeater will<br />
be about one year, and that <strong>the</strong> cost of replacing <strong>the</strong> repeater in orbit will be about<br />
0.5 million dollars.<br />
The suggested communication system is capable of large growth. The first repeater<br />
will cover most of <strong>the</strong> continental United States, all of Europe, all of South America, and<br />
much of Africa. An additional repeater would cover Hawaii, Australia, Japan, and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
parts of <strong>the</strong> Orient. In addition to extension of geographic coverage, <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong><br />
communication link will result in an increase in foreign business which in turn will result<br />
in greater use of <strong>the</strong> facility. Extrapolation of recent trends in overseas messages shows<br />
that <strong>the</strong> present cable capacity between <strong>the</strong> U.S. and Europe will be exceeded within <strong>the</strong><br />
next two years. Since <strong>the</strong> proposed facility is much less expensive than a cable, it is logical<br />
to expect this overflow to be handled by <strong>the</strong> proposed facility.<br />
In addition to its commercial value, <strong>the</strong> proposed communication satellite should<br />
contribute greatly to national prestige and friendly foreign relations.<br />
* “Hearings before <strong>the</strong> NASA Authorization Subcommittee of <strong>the</strong> Committee on Aeronautical and Space<br />
Sciences, United States Senate,” U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, 1959.
[3] 2. SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL FEATURES<br />
The proposed communication system consists of a satellite repeater in a synchronous,<br />
equatorial orbit operating in conjunction with two or more ground terminals, each of<br />
which is linked by land lines or microwave relays to <strong>the</strong> appropriate domestic communication<br />
systems.<br />
The repeater consists of a transistorized UHF receiver and an L-band (2 KMC) transmitter<br />
having a power output of 2.5 watts. Since <strong>the</strong> electrical power is supplied by solar<br />
cells, <strong>the</strong> useful life of <strong>the</strong> repeater is expected to be limited only by <strong>the</strong> life of <strong>the</strong> transmitting<br />
tube to about one year. Besides serving as <strong>the</strong> communication repeater, <strong>the</strong> receiver-transmitter<br />
is also used as a guidance signal repeater, and <strong>the</strong> receiver additionally acts<br />
as a command receiver.<br />
The payload also contains a compressed nitrogen attitude and vernier velocity control<br />
system, which provides for proper illumination of <strong>the</strong> solar cells, correct aiming of <strong>the</strong><br />
directional antenna, and precise adjustments of <strong>the</strong> orbit.<br />
The ground terminals consist of a large aperture antenna shared by <strong>the</strong> 25-KW [kilowatt]<br />
UHF transmitter and <strong>the</strong> low noise L-band receiver. The antenna reflector will be<br />
fixed, and <strong>the</strong> small departures of <strong>the</strong> payload from an exactly stationary orbit will be followed<br />
by moving <strong>the</strong> antenna feed.<br />
The satellite is launched using <strong>the</strong> NASA Scout, and two additional solid-propellant<br />
rockets are used to establish <strong>the</strong> desired orbit. The launching site will be Jarvis Island, an<br />
equatorial island approximately 1300 nautical miles south of Hawaii. The use of this suitably<br />
located equatorial site results in a large decrease in required propulsion system performance<br />
and guidance complexity.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r technical detail is furnished by <strong>the</strong> following sections of this proposal. . . .<br />
[25] 6. PROGRAM COST<br />
An estimate of <strong>the</strong> development cost of <strong>the</strong> communication system is given in Table<br />
6-1, and an estimate of <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> entire program is given in Table 6-2.<br />
The amount of confidence which can be placed in <strong>the</strong>se figures is worth some discussion.<br />
The costs of <strong>the</strong> Scout rocket, attitude guidance, launcher, and ground support<br />
equipment were obtained from <strong>the</strong> Vought Astronautics brochure, “Space Research<br />
Vehicle Systems Developed from NASA Scout,” published in August, 1959. The UHF TV<br />
transmitter is a production item and its cost is firm. The cost of <strong>the</strong> ground antenna was<br />
estimated by an experienced supplier of such devices. Island construction costs were estimated<br />
by an overseas construction company which has had considerable experience with<br />
[Atomic Energy Commission] projects in <strong>the</strong> Marshall Islands.<br />
The development cost estimates were obtained from <strong>the</strong> individuals who would be<br />
responsible for <strong>the</strong> various items. Although some variation in cost of particular items is to<br />
be expected, <strong>the</strong> chances that <strong>the</strong> total will remain under <strong>the</strong> 1.2 million dollar figure<br />
seems quite good, because of <strong>the</strong> strong appeal of <strong>the</strong> project to creative engineers and<br />
<strong>the</strong> subsequent high degree of enthusiasm with which <strong>the</strong> job will be performed.<br />
[26]<br />
Payload<br />
TWT $0.15 M<br />
Electronics 0.15 M<br />
Structure 0.05 M<br />
5th and 6th Stages 0.25 M<br />
Environmental Testing 0.10 M<br />
Total $0.70 M<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 37
38<br />
Terminal<br />
Antenna Design 0.05 M<br />
Transmitter Modifications 0.05 M<br />
Low Noise Receiver Design 0.10 M<br />
Total 0.20 M<br />
Guidance - Perigee<br />
Transmitter Design 0.05 M<br />
Receiver Design 0.09 M<br />
Antennas 0.02 M<br />
Computer 0.04 M<br />
Total 0.20 M<br />
Guidance - Apogee<br />
Auxiliary Antennas 0.05 M<br />
Computer 0.05 M<br />
Total 0.10 M<br />
Total Development Cost $1.20 M<br />
[27]<br />
Development Cost<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Table 6-1<br />
Development Cost<br />
Terminal Cost<br />
Antenna $0.30 M<br />
Transmitter 0.12 M<br />
Receiver 0.03 M<br />
Building and Land 0.10 M<br />
$0.55 M x 2 $1.10 M (2)<br />
Jarvis Island Installation<br />
Construction of Buildings $0.25 M<br />
Construction of Airstrips 0.25 M<br />
Launcher 0.25 M<br />
Ground Support Equipment 0.70 M<br />
Transportation 0.25 M<br />
$1.70 M x 2 $3.40 M (2)<br />
Launchings<br />
Scout with Attitude Guidance $0.361 M<br />
Payload 0.072 M<br />
$0.433 M x 3 $1.30 M (3)<br />
Miscellaneous<br />
Salaries of Field Personnel $0.200 M<br />
Reserve 0.200 M<br />
$0.400 M $0.40 M<br />
Total Program Cost $5.00 M<br />
Table 6-2<br />
Program Cost
[28] 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
It is concluded that it is technically feasible, within <strong>the</strong> present state of <strong>the</strong> art of rocket<br />
and electronic technology, to establish a commercial 24-hour communication satellite<br />
using <strong>the</strong> Scout rocket vehicle. It is recommended that NASA encourage such a program<br />
and recognize it as an important new application of <strong>the</strong> Scout. This program can be<br />
accomplished by <strong>the</strong> Hughes Aircraft Company within a year at a cost of 5 million dollars.<br />
Document I-6<br />
Document title: “Memorandum for Conference on Communications Satellite<br />
Development,” December 7, 1960.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> closing months of <strong>the</strong> Eisenhower administration, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan and<br />
his associates paid much attention to <strong>the</strong> appropriate relationship between government and <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector in <strong>the</strong> development of communications satellites. AT&T’s active interest in trying to establish<br />
a leading position in this new technology stimulated Glennan and his colleagues to focus on this<br />
issue. This memorandum, with no credited author, but almost certainly prepared by Robert Nunn,<br />
Glennan’s special assistant for communications satellites, summarizes <strong>the</strong> situation as of December<br />
1960.<br />
[1]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 39<br />
Memorandum for Conference on<br />
Communications Satellite Development<br />
December 7, 1960<br />
1. Basic Mutual Recognition<br />
a. AT&T uniquely has <strong>the</strong> greatest and most obvious private business interest in<br />
satellites because of its overseas telephone business.<br />
b. O<strong>the</strong>r companies have expressed varying degrees of interest in and shown<br />
varying degrees of initiative with respect to participation in <strong>the</strong> development<br />
of elements of a communication satellite system, although none has given evidence<br />
of desiring to spend company funds in substantial amounts as has<br />
AT&T.<br />
c. NASA alone has <strong>the</strong> statutory responsibility to <strong>the</strong> nation for developing<br />
space technology and facilitating its civil application to communications.<br />
d. It follows that all <strong>the</strong>se respective interests must be harmonized on a common<br />
ground.<br />
[handwritten notes in margin: “1) May - June 1961 - firm up our coop. utilization of A’s,”<br />
“2) Obtain assurance of A-participation in comm.,” and “3) NASA must preserve bid n<br />
(and) competition.”]<br />
2. Common Ground<br />
a. Nei<strong>the</strong>r AT&T nor NASA should pre-empt <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s central area of responsibility<br />
and competence.
40<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
b. Both AT&T and NASA should avoid duplication and waste, from <strong>the</strong> total<br />
national point of view, including manpower, time, and money.<br />
c. Both AT&T and NASA favor private ownership and operation of communication<br />
satellites.<br />
d. Both AT&T and NASA must consider <strong>the</strong> national interest, which includes all<br />
of <strong>the</strong> various competitive interests, in communication satellite system operation.<br />
[2] e. Nei<strong>the</strong>r AT&T nor NASA can afford to let <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> utilization<br />
of <strong>the</strong> commercial satellite systems become a “political” issue.<br />
f. It follows that a common objective and a disciplined common approach to it<br />
must be mutually understood.<br />
3. AT&T’s Position As Presently Understood<br />
a. AT&T’s approach may give o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>the</strong> impression that AT&T is seeking to preempt<br />
responsibility for <strong>the</strong> nation’s non-military, satellite-based, communications<br />
program.<br />
b. This can not be allowed to occur ei<strong>the</strong>r in reality or in appearance for <strong>the</strong> following<br />
reasons:<br />
1. It would seem to constitute an abandonment by NASA of its responsibility<br />
under <strong>the</strong> law.<br />
2. It would seem to constitute a “give away” by NASA, impliedly [sic]<br />
sanctioning AT&T as <strong>the</strong> chosen owner and operator, which is beyond<br />
NASA’s legal authority.<br />
3. It would contribute fuel to <strong>the</strong> fire of <strong>the</strong> arguments by those who favor<br />
Government ownership and operation of all satellites.<br />
4. It would stimulate debate instead of action and <strong>the</strong>reby engender delay<br />
and diversion from <strong>the</strong> main technological task ahead of us.<br />
5. The nation can be assured of continued development only by<br />
Government activity and control of R&D [research and development]<br />
programs, since AT&T does not and probably can not provide assurance<br />
of continuity of effort should unforeseen obstacles arise.<br />
[3] 4. NASA’s Approach<br />
a. AT&T must fit its activities, even when using its own funds, into <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
program of NASA as a part of it. Present here is <strong>the</strong> implication that<br />
<strong>the</strong> interests and technical approaches of AT&T and NASA will be substantially<br />
<strong>the</strong> same.<br />
b. This does not involve NASA’s pre-empting AT&T because NASA is in <strong>the</strong> forefront<br />
of <strong>the</strong> proponents of private ownership and operation.<br />
c. This is o<strong>the</strong>rwise essential for <strong>the</strong> following reasons:<br />
1. It assures <strong>the</strong> avoidance of wasteful duplication.<br />
2. It supports NASA in its affirmation of private ownership and its belief in<br />
<strong>the</strong> feasibility of an industry-Government “partnership” for developmental<br />
purposes.<br />
3. It assures <strong>the</strong> Congress of <strong>the</strong> Government control of R&D and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
improves <strong>the</strong> possibility of getting on with <strong>the</strong> job with <strong>the</strong> minimum of<br />
legislative delay which might be caused if <strong>the</strong> Congress gets <strong>the</strong> impression<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch is not giving adequate direction to <strong>the</strong><br />
total national effort.<br />
4. It takes account of <strong>the</strong> fact that vehicles and launch facilities are scarce<br />
national assets and must be utilized under Governmental control.<br />
5. The only way <strong>the</strong> Government can enter into a “partnership” is to reserve<br />
unto itself <strong>the</strong> authority to identify and <strong>the</strong> authority to protect valid public<br />
interests.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 41<br />
d. NASA’s approach includes competitive hardware acquisition for at least two<br />
Thor-based flights at Government expense and competitive launchings<br />
(including satellite, vehicle and launch costs) at [4] private or Government<br />
expense using at least two Atlas-based vehicles.<br />
1. The key to this approach is “competition” because it is <strong>the</strong> only way in<br />
which NASA can assure <strong>the</strong> Congress that its approach is not preferential.<br />
2. Competition may also result in a better system.<br />
5. Special Problems<br />
a. Reimbursement depends upon a ruling by <strong>the</strong> Comptroller General. If favorable,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n NASA can develop a relationship with industry which is not dependent<br />
upon <strong>the</strong> budget-authorization-appropriation cycle. If not favorable,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n NASA would have to seek legislation to authorize it to credit such reimbursements<br />
to its own appropriations.<br />
b. Patents depend upon <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> present law, unless NASA is successful<br />
in getting its statute amended. This means that AT&T’s case for waiver<br />
under <strong>the</strong> present law is one way <strong>the</strong> ownership of inventions might be<br />
determined and <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> law to a “cooperative agreement” is a<br />
less preferred way of determining ownership. NASA intends to seek a legislative<br />
amendment of its statute in <strong>the</strong> same terms as were proposed to <strong>the</strong> last<br />
Congress.<br />
c. Follow-on R&D and prototype launchings must be planned since it is hardly<br />
likely that a four-shot program will be adequate to develop an operational<br />
prototype satellite and an operational system. Back-up vehicles should be<br />
available for repetitive shots within three months of any failure.<br />
d. Participation by AT&T in all satellite communications experiments under<br />
NASA programs in a manner similar to that employed in <strong>the</strong> Echo program<br />
seems desirable from <strong>the</strong> standpoint of all concerned.<br />
[ 5] e. Publicity by AT&T should avoid “predictions” involving launchings and avoid<br />
<strong>the</strong> impression that AT&T can “go it alone” in <strong>the</strong> R&D phase. There should<br />
be closer cooperation between [public information] offices in AT&T and<br />
NASA so that AT&T releases are available to NASA in a timely manner.<br />
Document I-7<br />
Document title: White House Press Secretary, “Statement by <strong>the</strong> President,” December<br />
30, 1960.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Shortly before he left office, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a number of policy statements in<br />
an attempt to set <strong>the</strong> future agenda on various issues, including communications satellite policy. In<br />
a statement released to <strong>the</strong> press on December 30, 1960, Eisenhower reiterated his position that private<br />
industry should establish and operate communications satellite systems.
42<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Statement by <strong>the</strong> President<br />
The commercial application of communication satellites, hopefully within <strong>the</strong> next<br />
several years, will bring all <strong>the</strong> nations of <strong>the</strong> world closer toge<strong>the</strong>r in peaceful relationships<br />
as a product of this nation’s program of space exploration.<br />
The world’s requirements for communication facilities will increase several fold during<br />
<strong>the</strong> next decade and communication satellites promise <strong>the</strong> most economical and<br />
effective means of satisfying <strong>the</strong>se requirements.<br />
Increased facilities for overseas telephone, international telegraph, and o<strong>the</strong>r forms<br />
of long-distance person-to-person communications, as well as new facilities for transoceanic<br />
television broadcasts, through <strong>the</strong> use of man-made satellites, will constitute a very real<br />
benefit to all <strong>the</strong> peoples of <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
This nation has traditionally followed a policy of conducting international telephone,<br />
telegraph and o<strong>the</strong>r communications services through private enterprise subject to<br />
Governmental licensing and regulation. We have achieved communications facilities second<br />
to none among <strong>the</strong> nations of <strong>the</strong> world. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> government should aggressively<br />
encourage private enterprise in <strong>the</strong> establishment and operation of satellite relays<br />
for revenue-producing purposes.<br />
To achieve <strong>the</strong> early establishment of a communication satellite system which can<br />
be used on a commercial basis is a national objective which will require <strong>the</strong> concerted<br />
capabilities and funds of both Government and private enterprise and <strong>the</strong> cooperative<br />
participation of communications organizations in foreign countries.<br />
Various agencies of Government, including <strong>the</strong> Department of State, <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of Defense and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Civil and Defense Mobilization, have important interests and<br />
responsibilities in <strong>the</strong> field of communications.<br />
With regard to communication satellites, I have directed <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics<br />
and Space Administration to take <strong>the</strong> lead within <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch both to advance<br />
<strong>the</strong> needed research and development and to encourage private industry to apply its<br />
resources toward <strong>the</strong> earliest practicable utilization of space technology for commercial<br />
civil communications requirements. In carrying out this task NASA will cooperate closely<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission to make certain that <strong>the</strong> high standards of<br />
this nation for communications services will be maintained in <strong>the</strong> utilization of communication<br />
satellites.<br />
[handwritten note—“Drafted Dec 23, 1960”]<br />
[handwritten note—“Released Dec 30, 1960”]<br />
Document I-8<br />
Document title: Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Relation to Space<br />
Communication,” Public Notice-G, 1627, March 14, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
The question of authority over determining space communications policy was unclear at first. NASA<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense had both been assigned responsibility for technology development, but<br />
<strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had a say in <strong>the</strong> allocation of frequencies for satellite<br />
communications. In addition, several o<strong>the</strong>r committees and organizations, both international and<br />
within <strong>the</strong> U.S. government, were responsible for different aspects of <strong>the</strong> subject.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 43<br />
[1]<br />
PUBLIC-G, 1627 March 14, 1961<br />
FCC Relation to Space Communication<br />
GENERAL<br />
The Federal Communications Commission activities in connection with space communication<br />
have increased greatly because of <strong>the</strong> many new and unique problems posed<br />
by rapid technological and scientific developments in this field.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Commission is not responsible for any over-all space program or any<br />
particular space vehicle launching project, <strong>the</strong> mounting activity in space communication<br />
has an impact on its regulation of non-Government radio users. This stems from its obligations<br />
under <strong>the</strong> Communications Act which, among o<strong>the</strong>r things, requires <strong>the</strong> FCC to<br />
“study new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally<br />
encourage <strong>the</strong> larger and more effective use of radio in <strong>the</strong> public interest” as well as to<br />
“make available, so far as possible, to all <strong>the</strong> people of <strong>the</strong> United States a rapid, efficient,<br />
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service.”<br />
This involves <strong>the</strong> allocation and assignment of frequencies for space communication<br />
and <strong>the</strong> authorization of privately conducted research and experimentation looking<br />
toward <strong>the</strong> use of natural or man-made satellites to provide civil communication services<br />
on a regular basis. Radio signals “bounced” or relayed from such satellites would permit<br />
<strong>the</strong> transmission of large amounts of telephone, telegraph and o<strong>the</strong>r traffic, including<br />
television, over great distances. Such developments present a new and complex array of<br />
technical problems. Not <strong>the</strong> least of <strong>the</strong>se is finding suitable and sufficient frequencies<br />
and insuring compatibility between space communication systems and surface systems so<br />
that <strong>the</strong> public interest will best be served. Many regulatory problems will flow from<br />
adding space communication to radio’s already manifold uses.<br />
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION<br />
The achievement of <strong>the</strong>se purposes involves both national and international considerations.<br />
Consequently, <strong>the</strong> Commission is working closely with <strong>the</strong> interests involved.<br />
This coordination and cooperation requires particularly close relationship by <strong>the</strong> FCC<br />
with <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which directs <strong>the</strong><br />
Nation’s non-military space effort. On February 28, 1961, <strong>the</strong> FCC and NASA announced<br />
a joint “memorandum of understanding” for delineating and coordinating <strong>the</strong>ir respective<br />
responsibilities in civil communication space activities.<br />
[2] O<strong>the</strong>r interagency activities include FCC participation in <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
The Telecommunication Coordinating Committee (TCC) [all underlining is<br />
handwritten] of <strong>the</strong> Department of State, which has an ad hoc working group<br />
under <strong>the</strong> chairmanship of FCC Commissioner T.A.M. Craven to draft foreign<br />
policy recommendations on space communication systems;<br />
The Telecommunication Planning Committee (TPC) which advises <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), with FCC representation on<br />
space study panels;<br />
The FCC and <strong>the</strong> OCDM have joint responsibility for national frequency allocations,<br />
with staff work through joint meetings of FCC representatives with <strong>the</strong><br />
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) and its Subcommittee on<br />
Frequency Allocations (SFA);
44<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
The U.S. Committee for Study Groups IV and VIII of <strong>the</strong> International Radio<br />
Consultative Committee (CCIR) of <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunication Union<br />
(ITU), with which <strong>the</strong> FCC participates through subgroups;<br />
The Space Science Board (SSB), of which <strong>the</strong> FCC’s Chief Engineer is a<br />
member of <strong>the</strong> International Relations Committee concerned with international<br />
basic space research activities, working internationally through <strong>the</strong> Committee<br />
on Space Research (COSPAR);<br />
The International Radio Scientific Union (URSI), which has FCC participation<br />
and, in turn, is a member of <strong>the</strong> International Council of Scientific Unions<br />
(ICSU); and<br />
The National Bureau of Standards Central Radio Propagation Laboratory,<br />
with which <strong>the</strong> FCC maintains liaison through membership on <strong>the</strong><br />
Interdepartment Council on Radio Propagation and Standards.<br />
INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS<br />
The International Administrative Radio Conference, held at Geneva in 1959 under<br />
<strong>the</strong> auspices of <strong>the</strong> ITU, adopted an international table of frequency allocations which, for<br />
<strong>the</strong> first time, provided bands of frequencies for space and earth-space services. These<br />
bands, however, are for research purposes only and are useful principally for tracking,<br />
control and telemetry functions. Although no bands were allocated internationally for<br />
space satellite relay communication, a special ITU Administrative Radio Conference was<br />
scheduled tentatively for late 1963 to deal specifically with space problems on <strong>the</strong> basis of<br />
developments as of that time. At <strong>the</strong> request of <strong>the</strong> Department of State, preparatory work<br />
toward formulating <strong>the</strong> United States position at that conference has been initiated jointly<br />
by <strong>the</strong> FCC and <strong>the</strong> IRAC.<br />
[3] Domestically, steps have been taken by <strong>the</strong> FCC to implement <strong>the</strong> 1959 Geneva Radio<br />
Regulations nationally pending ratification of that treaty by <strong>the</strong> President upon <strong>the</strong> advice<br />
and consent of <strong>the</strong> Senate.<br />
FCC PROCEEDINGS<br />
As a result of developments in space communication during 1960, <strong>the</strong> Commission<br />
reopened its proceeding in <strong>the</strong> general inquiry relative to <strong>the</strong> allocation of frequencies<br />
above 890 Megacycles (Docket 11866) to determine, in <strong>the</strong> light of evidence <strong>the</strong>n available,<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> frequency requirements for communication via space satellites would<br />
require modification of <strong>the</strong> Commission’s decision to permit some additional classes of<br />
users to establish communications systems on frequencies between 1,000 and 10,000 Mc.<br />
After a careful analysis of all <strong>the</strong> evidence <strong>the</strong>n on hand, <strong>the</strong> Commission concluded that<br />
its earlier decision need not be modified at that time.<br />
However, in view of rapid developments in space communication, <strong>the</strong> Commission<br />
instituted an inquiry (Docket 13522) as to space frequency needs on a longer-range basis.<br />
This information will assist <strong>the</strong> Commission in its preparatory work leading to a United<br />
States position for [a] future international conference on space needs and usage. The<br />
inquiry was augmented to consider conditions for sharing space bands with o<strong>the</strong>r radio<br />
services and whe<strong>the</strong>r protected areas might be established and held in reserve for future<br />
earth terminals for civil communication systems using space relays.
EXPERIMENTATION<br />
The Commission is encouraging experimentation in this new field in <strong>the</strong> hope that<br />
private industry can develop considerable additional technical information which will<br />
serve to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> country’s over-all space program.<br />
In this regard, an experimental authorization was granted in January of this year to<br />
<strong>the</strong> ITT Laboratories, Nutley, N.J., to bounce signals off <strong>the</strong> moon and passive (non-radioequipped)<br />
earth satellites for basic research and study.<br />
Also in January of this year, an experimental authorization was granted to <strong>the</strong><br />
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. to permit it to go forward with plans to develop<br />
an experimental program wherein earth terminal facilities at Holmdel, N.J., would transmit<br />
to and receive from active (radio-equipped) earth satellites which also are undergoing<br />
development by AT&T.<br />
MONITORING<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r FCC activity is <strong>the</strong> continued monitoring of channels being used for space<br />
communication. This started with its long range direction finding work in tracing Sputnik<br />
I, before <strong>the</strong> Government established special installations to track space objects.<br />
Commission monitoring is to prevent unauthorized use by o<strong>the</strong>r stations of channels<br />
employed for space communication, and to identify and locate sources of interference on<br />
those channels. At a number of FCC monitoring stations, special equipment includes sensitive<br />
receivers, high gain directional antennas and automatic frequency scanning devices.<br />
[4] RADIO ASTRONOMY<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 45<br />
Related to space communication is <strong>the</strong> use of radio in astronomy. The Geneva 1959<br />
conference, for <strong>the</strong> first time in history, provided for protecting specific frequencies utilized<br />
in radio astronomy. The FCC has completed <strong>the</strong> groundwork for putting <strong>the</strong>se provisions<br />
into effect domestically when <strong>the</strong> Geneva agreement is ratified by <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> Commission has adopted rules to minimize interference to frequencies<br />
used for radio astronomy observations in this country, particularly at <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Radio Astronomy Observatory at Green Bank and <strong>the</strong> Naval Radio Research Observatory<br />
at Sugar Grove, both in West Virginia.<br />
Document I-9<br />
Document title: F.R. Kappel, President, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Honorable James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, April 5, 1961 (with several attachments).<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Document I-10<br />
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, to F.R. Kappel, President, American<br />
Telephone and Telegraph Company, April 8, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.
46<br />
The new Democratic administration of President John F. Kennedy was less sympa<strong>the</strong>tic than its<br />
Republican predecessor to AT&T’s plans to establish <strong>the</strong> leading position in <strong>the</strong> development of communications<br />
satellites. This exchange of letters reflects <strong>the</strong> position taken by new NASA Administrator<br />
James E. Webb—that it was desirable to re-examine <strong>the</strong> government role in communications satellite<br />
development before deciding that <strong>the</strong> government should take a secondary position in that development<br />
to AT&T and possibly o<strong>the</strong>r U.S. communications carriers. The position of AT&T President Fred R.<br />
Kappel to that stance, as reflected in his letter to Webb, is supported by a series of attachments indicating<br />
AT&T’s plans as <strong>the</strong>y had developed in <strong>the</strong> preceding months.<br />
[1]<br />
Document I-9<br />
THE HONORABLE JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
1520 H Street Northwest<br />
Washington 25, D.C.<br />
Dear Mr. Webb:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
April 5, 1961<br />
It has come to my attention that <strong>the</strong> Wall Street Journal on March 29, 1961 carried an<br />
article stating that invitations were issued last year to companies such as American<br />
Telephone and Telegraph Company to come forward with partnership proposals with <strong>the</strong><br />
Government (on communications satellites), but that NASA has yet to receive a firm proposal<br />
from any company.<br />
In view of events which have taken place during <strong>the</strong> past few months, this statement,<br />
which we understand grew out of a press conference which you held with respect to NASA’s<br />
budget, is of deep concern to me. The specific events to which I refer are as follows.<br />
On September 15, 1960, Mr. G. L. Best of this Company, wrote to Dr. Glennan<br />
(Attachment No. 1) saying that we had under way <strong>the</strong> development of an active communications<br />
satellite and associated ground radio facilities and would hope that NASA would<br />
be willing to launch trial satellites for us at our expense if this proved to be <strong>the</strong> most practicable<br />
arrangement.<br />
This letter was followed by several informal discussions after which Dr. E. I. Green of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bell Telephone Laboratories wrote Dr. Glennan on October 20, 1960 (Attachment No.<br />
2) and enclosed a statement of <strong>the</strong> objectives and principal features of <strong>the</strong> experiment<br />
which <strong>the</strong> Bell System proposed to make.<br />
[2] Subsequently, <strong>the</strong>re were several discussions during which Dr. Glennan and his people<br />
outlined some of <strong>the</strong> problems which NASA felt were involved in accepting our original<br />
proposal. During <strong>the</strong>se conversations, various possibilities of a joint NASA-Bell System<br />
project were discussed, and on December 14, 1960 I wrote to Dr. Glennan outlining in<br />
some detail several specific proposals as to how a joint undertaking might be accomplished<br />
(Attachment No. 3).<br />
Shortly after, NASA decided to ask for bids covering <strong>the</strong> construction of an active satellite<br />
of its own design and to seek <strong>the</strong> cooperation of private industry here and of <strong>the</strong> telephone<br />
administrations of Great Britain and France in trials using such a satellite. We were<br />
offered an opportunity to bid on such a project and did so, making substantial allowance<br />
in our bids for <strong>the</strong> value which we thought <strong>the</strong> telephone industry might get from such an<br />
experiment. A copy of <strong>the</strong> transmittal letter which accompanied <strong>the</strong>se bids is also enclosed<br />
(Attachment No. 4).
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 47<br />
During discussions which preceded our bid, we pointed out that whe<strong>the</strong>r such a project<br />
would take <strong>the</strong> place of one step in <strong>the</strong> Bell System’s proposed program would depend<br />
on <strong>the</strong> type of satellite which was placed in orbit. At that time we expressed <strong>the</strong> hope that<br />
if our requirements were not met by NASA’s project, NASA would launch a Bell System<br />
satellite later at our expense.<br />
In our studies of satellite communications, while paying primary attention to <strong>the</strong><br />
needs of international common carriers, we have also considered certain specific Defense<br />
Department needs—for example, mobility and <strong>the</strong> provision by <strong>the</strong> Defense Department<br />
of a few reliable voice channels to remote locations. The early experiments and tests of<br />
satellite relays can be made to serve both civilian and defense objectives and we have discussed<br />
such matters of common interest with agencies of <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense. I<br />
believe Dr. Fisk and Mr. Dingman of this Company discussed this briefly with you and Dr.<br />
Dryden a few weeks ago.<br />
Summing up <strong>the</strong>se events, I think it is clear that we have made every effort to find a<br />
way of getting this very vital experimental work done promptly and that, contrary to our<br />
not having made any specific proposals, we have actually made three specific proposals to<br />
NASA. Mr. Best has gone over this matter by telephone with Dr. Dryden but I thought that<br />
you might like to have this statement of <strong>the</strong> situation from me.<br />
[3] We are extremely anxious to avoid any fur<strong>the</strong>r delay in getting trials under way for a<br />
number of reasons, <strong>the</strong> most important of which can be summarized as follows:<br />
1. There is a need for point-to-point space communications systems—to help meet<br />
<strong>the</strong> growing demand for overseas communications.<br />
2. Such systems would be a natural means of augmenting existing connecting links<br />
between <strong>the</strong> common carrier networks of this country and those of foreign countries<br />
and would also provide alternate routes for reliability.<br />
3. Our estimates of costs and traffic volumes lead us to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that a satellite<br />
system such as we propose is economically feasible.<br />
4. Trials of active communications satellites are needed to determine <strong>the</strong> basic facts<br />
upon which a commercial communications satellite system may be designed.<br />
5. We are prepared to move ahead rapidly if permitted to do so.<br />
6. If this country does not maintain <strong>the</strong> leading position in space communications<br />
for peaceful purposes, which is now within its grasp, o<strong>the</strong>rs will take <strong>the</strong> lead.<br />
7. The severity and frequency with which sunspot disturbances are occurring threaten<br />
to disrupt existing forms of overseas radio communication seriously during <strong>the</strong><br />
next several years. This is of great importance to military as well as to civilian communications.<br />
There need be no fear that this Company is seeking a monopoly in international communications<br />
through <strong>the</strong> use of satellites. Our only interest in satellites is <strong>the</strong>ir use as<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r means of connecting <strong>the</strong> Bell System’s communications network in this country<br />
with similar networks in foreign countries.<br />
We have stated both to <strong>the</strong> Government and publicly that any satellite system which<br />
we sponsor will be available to all United States international communications common<br />
[4] carriers—ei<strong>the</strong>r through lease or ownership arrangements—for any services authorized<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission. We have also stated that rockets and<br />
launching facilities will be provided by private suppliers under appropriate arrangements<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Government. (See Mr. Dingman’s letter of March 21, 1961 to <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission—Attachment No. 5.) Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong><br />
satellite system we propose, to do our public service job, will not preclude in any way <strong>the</strong><br />
development of o<strong>the</strong>r space communications systems for o<strong>the</strong>r purposes.<br />
In view of <strong>the</strong> urgency of this whole matter, I should like very much to drop in and<br />
[handwritten underlining] discuss some of its aspects with you in more detail. I am sure
48<br />
<strong>the</strong>re can be no important differences between us as to ultimate objectives, and perhaps<br />
we can by discussion at this time advance <strong>the</strong> attainment of those objectives. Will you<br />
please call me at your convenience.<br />
Attachments<br />
[1]<br />
**********<br />
Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
1520 H Street, N.W.<br />
Washington 25, D.C.<br />
Dear Dr. Glennan:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
[hand-signed: “F.R. Kappel”]<br />
President<br />
Attachment No. 1<br />
September 15, 1960<br />
During <strong>the</strong> discussion which Messrs. Botkin, Pierce and I had with you and your people<br />
several weeks ago, we expressed <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> commercial satellite communication<br />
systems of <strong>the</strong> future should be owned and operated in this country by communications<br />
carriers. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, we believe that existing national policy and practice in <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
field should be extended to embrace <strong>the</strong> new medium.<br />
By so doing, it will be possible to achieve efficient integration of <strong>the</strong> planning, construction,<br />
and operation of overseas cable systems, satellite systems, and o<strong>the</strong>r radio facilities,<br />
and also assure <strong>the</strong> integration of domestic and overseas operations that is so<br />
necessary to <strong>the</strong> orderly planning and development of telephone service in particular.<br />
Communication with o<strong>the</strong>r countries by any medium, of course, requires <strong>the</strong> cooperation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> organizations or administrations responsible for furnishing external communication<br />
services in those countries.<br />
It is assumed that <strong>the</strong>re will be some form of Government supervision of <strong>the</strong> launching<br />
and orbiting of satellites, as well as, of course, regulation of <strong>the</strong> communication services<br />
rendered and <strong>the</strong> radio frequencies used. It also seems to us that any international<br />
action which our Government may feel desirable in order to adequately coordinate with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r governments <strong>the</strong> use of satellites may be taken without Governmental ownership or<br />
management of <strong>the</strong> facilities required to furnish commercial communications.<br />
During our conversation <strong>the</strong>re was also considerable discussion as to what part of <strong>the</strong><br />
work of developing a practical satellite communication system might be undertaken by<br />
commercial communications carriers, and what part of <strong>the</strong> expense of such work should<br />
be borne by <strong>the</strong>m. At <strong>the</strong> close of this discussion you asked that we set down our thoughts<br />
on [2] <strong>the</strong>se matters, or, more specifically, state what <strong>the</strong> Bell System companies’ plans are<br />
for <strong>the</strong> future and what part <strong>the</strong>y were looking to <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration to do. Our present views on this subject are outlined below.<br />
The Bell System now has under way <strong>the</strong> development of an active satellite and associated<br />
ground radio facilities and would like to proceed with an experimental trial of <strong>the</strong>se
facilities in intercontinental communications as soon as possible. The telephone administrations<br />
of England, France, and Germany have all indicated a desire to participate in such<br />
a project. We hope to be ready for a transatlantic trial in eighteen to twenty months, or<br />
less. The experimental satellite, or satellites, would be placed at an orbital altitude of perhaps<br />
2,200 miles and would carry a repeater designed to make initial use of a 5-megacycle<br />
radio-frequency bandwidth. We are willing to assume <strong>the</strong> cost involved in this experiment,<br />
except that we would expect <strong>the</strong> participating foreign administrations to pay at least <strong>the</strong><br />
cost of <strong>the</strong>ir own ground stations.<br />
Our present thinking is that we would design and construct <strong>the</strong> trial satellites for our<br />
own use, making sure that <strong>the</strong> mechanical design would be compatible with <strong>the</strong> design<br />
and capability of whatever launching vehicle was used. While it is probably too early to<br />
know just what facilities for launching could be made available, we would hope that <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration would be willing to launch <strong>the</strong>se trial<br />
satellites for us, at our expense, if this proved to be <strong>the</strong> most practicable arrangement.<br />
Although our primary interest is in proceeding with a trial of active satellites, we shall<br />
be glad to cooperate with your organization in any fur<strong>the</strong>r tests of passive satellites that<br />
you may wish to conduct, using not only <strong>the</strong> ground equipment now available but also <strong>the</strong><br />
equipment that would be developed for active satellite trials.<br />
I am sure you understand that <strong>the</strong>se thoughts may be subject to some modification as<br />
<strong>the</strong> program develops, but I believe <strong>the</strong>y will hold basically. We would, of course, seek <strong>the</strong><br />
advice of your organization in all phases of <strong>the</strong> work and keep you informed of our<br />
progress.<br />
We would welcome any comments you may care to make about any part of this proposed<br />
program.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
**********<br />
DR. T. KEITH GLENNAN, Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
1520 H Street, N.W.<br />
Washington, DC<br />
Dear Dr. Glennan:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 49<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
G. L. BEST<br />
Vice President<br />
Attachment No. 2<br />
October 20, 1960<br />
Dr. Fisk agreed to provide you with a brief statement of <strong>the</strong> objectives and principal<br />
features of <strong>the</strong> experiment <strong>the</strong> Bell System proposes to conduct on long distance communication<br />
via an active satellite.<br />
As indicated in <strong>the</strong> statement, <strong>the</strong> experiment is an important part of a continuing<br />
Bell System development program directed toward large scale application of radio satellites<br />
for broad-band communications.
50<br />
Enc.<br />
[1]<br />
Since Dr. Fisk is out of town, I am enclosing <strong>the</strong> statement, which has his agreement.<br />
OBJECTIVE<br />
***<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
E. I. GREEN<br />
Executive Vice President<br />
PROPOSED BELL SYSTEM EXPERIMENT ON<br />
ACTIVE SATELLITE COMMUNICATION<br />
To carry out an experiment in transoceanic communications with a satellite carrying<br />
an active repeater suitable for multichannel telephony and for television. The experiment<br />
is an important part of a continuing Bell System development program directed toward<br />
large scale application of radio satellites for broad-band communications. The program<br />
includes extensive laboratory research and development work leading to long life and reliable<br />
operation of such a system.<br />
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS<br />
Proposed Operating Frequencies: 6775-6875 mc [megacycle] ground to satellite.<br />
6425-6525 mc satellite to ground.<br />
Baseband Width: 2 mc.<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Modulation: FM with ± 10 mc swing.<br />
Transmission Path: Europe to U.S.A. and reverse.<br />
Satellite: Microwave receiver; 2-watt microwave transmitter; circularly polarized reception<br />
and radiation; solar cells for primary power; nickel-cadmium storage battery. Separate<br />
beacon transmitter, 150 milliwatts at about 136 mc for tracking. Satellite essentially spherical,<br />
about 4’ diameter, weight 175 lbs. or less. The initial satellite will not be engineered<br />
primarily for <strong>the</strong> long life needed for commercial operation. Orbit of satellite should be<br />
as nearly polar as possible, at an altitude of 2,000 to 5,000 miles. (Note: This experiment<br />
is directed particularly toward normal telephone communication in which one way transmission<br />
delay of 1/4 second, such as would be encountered with a 24-hour satellite, would<br />
be intolerable.)<br />
Ground Receiving Station at Holmdel: Existing 20’ x 20’ horn reflector antenna, used<br />
in Echo I. Improved antenna control system. (Construction of a larger 60’ x 60’ horn<br />
reflector antenna is to be started immediately, [2] but this may not be in operation until<br />
a few months after <strong>the</strong> first active satellite experiment.) Maser for operation at 6475 mc.<br />
Wideband FM feedback receiver.
Ground Transmitting Station at Holmdel: Existing 60’ dish, used in Echo I, modified<br />
for 6875 mc operation, or a new similar dish. Improved antenna control system. 1 kw<br />
transmitter, using ei<strong>the</strong>r a commercially available klystron or a traveling wave tube under<br />
development by Bell Laboratories, choice to be determined by engineering considerations.<br />
Ground Station or Stations in Europe: Same as at Holmdel, possibly with variations in<br />
detail required to satisfy foreign partners.<br />
Antenna Pointing: Use Minitrack data. Have Goddard Space Flight Center compute<br />
orbit parameters to be transmitted to BTL. Track computation and antenna control<br />
orders by Bell Laboratories.<br />
Estimated Performance: With satellite 7.5˚ above horizon, and assuming total noise<br />
temperature of 34˚ K, 2 db [decibels] satellite antenna gain and achievable accuracy in<br />
antenna pointing, system would provide peak-to-peak signal-to-rms noise ratio of 47 db.<br />
Such performance will provide a path for about 450 one-way, high-grade telephone channels,<br />
or in <strong>the</strong> order of 100 two-way channels. Alternatively, <strong>the</strong> experimental system will<br />
provide one-way-at-a-time transmission of a black-and-white television picture of a quality<br />
only slightly inferior to American commercial standards, and not noticeable on <strong>the</strong> average<br />
home receiver.<br />
Schedule: The system is expected to be operational in 12 months, assuming no undue<br />
delays are encountered in: (1) assignment of <strong>the</strong> necessary experimental radio frequencies,<br />
(2) availability of a suitable satellite launching vehicle, and (3) agreements with <strong>the</strong><br />
foreign partner(s) and execution of <strong>the</strong>ir agreed-upon technical tasks.<br />
October 20, 1960<br />
[no pagination]<br />
***<br />
Mr. G. L. Best, Vice President<br />
American Telephone and Telegraph Company<br />
195 Broadway<br />
New York 7, New York<br />
Dear Mr. Best:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 51<br />
28 September 1960<br />
Thank you for your letter dated September 15, 1960, which you handed me on that<br />
date. It was a pleasure to see you and Dr. Baker again.<br />
The proposal of <strong>the</strong> Bell System to integrate satellite systems into its commercial operations<br />
is of considerable interest to NASA.<br />
From a broad point of view, as you no doubt appreciate, your request that NASA<br />
launch trial satellites for <strong>the</strong> Bell System raises issues of national policy which we are currently<br />
studying. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong>re is no simple or ready-made response that I can give you<br />
at this time.<br />
It is helpful to me to know <strong>the</strong> position of your company and its particular plans for<br />
<strong>the</strong> future. If you are able to be more specific about any facet of your program at any time<br />
in <strong>the</strong> future, please be assured that I would appreciate being informed.<br />
**********<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
T. Keith Glennan<br />
Administrator
52<br />
[1]<br />
DR. T. KEITH GLENNAN, Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
1520 H Street, N.W.<br />
Washington 25, D.C.<br />
Dear Dr. Glennan:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Attachment No. 3<br />
December 14, 1960<br />
Our discussion of December 7 regarding satellites for communication purposes raised<br />
a number of questions relative to <strong>the</strong> respective efforts of NASA and A.T.&T. Co. in this<br />
area of scientific exploration. I believe <strong>the</strong>re was no disagreement on <strong>the</strong> need for advancing<br />
scientific knowledge as fast as possible to <strong>the</strong> point where commercial communications<br />
by satellites can be undertaken by <strong>the</strong> common carrier communications companies<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir international counterparts, each in <strong>the</strong>ir respective areas of service.<br />
In our conversation, we indicated we are proceeding at our own expense with <strong>the</strong><br />
development and construction of experimental active satellites which will be ready for<br />
launching within a year, this to be an initial step toward <strong>the</strong> establishment in a few years<br />
of a commercial satellite system. You in turn advised that NASA is also planning experimentation<br />
in <strong>the</strong> field of active communications satellites, with <strong>the</strong> view to developing fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
scientific information in this area.<br />
It was agreed that our objectives, stemming as <strong>the</strong>y do from our respective areas of<br />
responsibility and competence, have much in common. Moreover, I believe we were in<br />
accord that <strong>the</strong> national interest could be best served if our efforts were combined in this<br />
field so as to avoid wasteful duplication and delay in <strong>the</strong> development of a final system.<br />
[2] It is recognized that NASA has broad responsibilities to advance “<strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States as a leader in aeronautical and space technology and in <strong>the</strong> application<br />
<strong>the</strong>reof to <strong>the</strong> conduct of peaceful activities within and outside <strong>the</strong> atmosphere.” This<br />
charges your organization with a broad obligation to assure that <strong>the</strong> activities necessary to<br />
achieve this result are being carried out. It does not, however, seem to require that NASA<br />
itself duplicate work now being done or planned by private industry but only that it<br />
encourage industry in its efforts and be prepared to move in should industry be unable or<br />
unwilling to take full advantage of its opportunities.<br />
The common carriers of <strong>the</strong> United States have <strong>the</strong> responsibility to <strong>the</strong> American<br />
public to furnish <strong>the</strong> best possible communications service not only within this country<br />
but also internationally. In <strong>the</strong> course of discharging A.T.&T.’s responsibilities, we have<br />
developed overseas radiotelephone service and overseas telephone cables and have established<br />
telephone communications with nearly every country in <strong>the</strong> world. The technical<br />
problems which were solved in bringing <strong>the</strong>se facilities into service are comparable to<br />
those which are faced in satellite communication systems.<br />
We are also constantly seeking to improve <strong>the</strong> communications art and find better and<br />
more economical means of doing <strong>the</strong> job to which we are dedicated. In so doing we maintain<br />
<strong>the</strong> most extensive communications research and development laboratories in <strong>the</strong><br />
world, Bell Telephone Laboratories, whose responsibility is to explore every possible way<br />
of improving communication. The exploration of <strong>the</strong> use of satellites as a means of radio<br />
communication is a natural part of <strong>the</strong> Bell Laboratories overall program and it has been<br />
devoting substantial effort to activities in this area for a number of years. In this connection,<br />
our Bell System technology has already been <strong>the</strong> source of <strong>the</strong> essential components<br />
which enable a satellite to act as a communications relay. These include transistors,
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 53<br />
diodes, solar cells, and reliable traveling wave tubes. Out of <strong>the</strong> work which <strong>the</strong> Bell<br />
Laboratories has done in <strong>the</strong> Echo experiment, and from its long and extensive participation<br />
in radar have come a series of developments directly applicable to satellite communications,<br />
such as high-quality antennas of <strong>the</strong> horn and Casegranian types, microwave<br />
masers as low noise receivers, FM circuits with feedback, also for low noise, and various<br />
techniques for precision tracking.<br />
[3] The achievement of a communications satellite system will depend not only on effective<br />
satellite relays and expert communications systems engineering. These must be joined<br />
in a unique fashion with space technology where NASA’s primary responsibility lies.<br />
Moreover, space relaying of signals, like o<strong>the</strong>r isolated communications techniques, can<br />
provide useful communications service only when combined with existing land facilities.<br />
It is this joining of <strong>the</strong> communications and space arts and facilities which indicates <strong>the</strong><br />
desirability for <strong>the</strong> joint efforts of our organizations.<br />
It is our thought that such joint efforts would have as <strong>the</strong>ir objectives both demonstrating<br />
transatlantic TV (which we understand to be one of NASA’s primary objectives)<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r experiments which will represent <strong>the</strong> first step in an orderly developmental program<br />
for an operating communications system.* Concurrently we would have extensive<br />
effort on ground stations for transmitting and receiving, as well as tracking facilities for<br />
controlling <strong>the</strong> antennas. The problems of <strong>the</strong> entire communication system, including<br />
economic problems as well as such important matters as optimum bandwidth, operating<br />
margins, systems balance and reliability of components would receive prime attention.<br />
This experiment in its public communications aspects would, we believe, provide<br />
information and an opportunity for experimentation not only to us but also to o<strong>the</strong>r interested<br />
common carrier communication companies. This can be accomplished by inviting<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r international common carriers to use <strong>the</strong> satellite circuits experimentally for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own forms of communication.<br />
With this as background, we would like to offer <strong>the</strong> following specific proposals:<br />
a. That NASA and we join in <strong>the</strong> setting of performance specifications for <strong>the</strong> first<br />
experimental active satellite.<br />
b. That we develop and build <strong>the</strong> first satellite taking advantage of research already<br />
done and developments well under way. We are prepared to pay for this work in<br />
its entirety, or for such part of <strong>the</strong> expense as would reflect our respective interests<br />
in <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
[4] c. That NASA launch <strong>the</strong> first satellite and provide tracking data from its Minitrack<br />
stations. In this connection, we are willing to bear <strong>the</strong> whole cost of launching and<br />
tracking or to share <strong>the</strong>se costs with NASA in any way you feel will properly reflect<br />
our respective interests in <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
d. That <strong>the</strong> existing ground station at Holmdel be made available and modified at<br />
our expense for <strong>the</strong> purpose of making <strong>the</strong> necessary communications tests. (This<br />
station is, of course, compatible with <strong>the</strong> communications network of this<br />
Company.)<br />
e. That, taking advantage of our long established working relations with overseas<br />
communications operating agencies, arrangements be made with at least one of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m for one or more overseas ground stations.<br />
f. That o<strong>the</strong>r common carriers be invited to use <strong>the</strong> satellite circuits experimentally<br />
when such circuits are operational.<br />
g. That full information on satellite performance be made available to NASA.<br />
* A program for <strong>the</strong> Development of an Active Satellite Communication System has been prepared by<br />
Bell Telephone Laboratories and is available for detailed discussion.
54<br />
As is common practice, we would expect that much of <strong>the</strong> work on <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
system would be contracted to o<strong>the</strong>r private companies as was done in <strong>the</strong> Echo<br />
experiment, for example, on <strong>the</strong> transmitting antenna. NASA may also wish to contract<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>rs for many of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r items involved, such as mechanisms for multiple launching,<br />
satellite orientation arrangements, etc.<br />
If, as we are confident, this experiment is successful, it is our plan to move as promptly<br />
as possible toward <strong>the</strong> establishment of a commercial satellite communications system<br />
which will be integrated with existing common carrier communications facilities, both<br />
here and abroad. When this system is operational circuits will be made available to o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
communications common carriers for use in <strong>the</strong>ir business, just as circuits are now available<br />
in overseas telephone cables. The proposals that we are making should [5] be of substantial<br />
value to <strong>the</strong> military and o<strong>the</strong>r government departments as well as to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
users of our services and those of o<strong>the</strong>r communications carriers.<br />
I hope that this outline will offer a useful basis for approaching <strong>the</strong> problems which<br />
we discussed last week.<br />
**********<br />
Sincerely,<br />
F. R. KAPPEL<br />
[1] Attachment No. 4<br />
Western Electric Company<br />
INCORPORATED<br />
Defense Activities Division<br />
120 Broadway, New York 5, N.Y.<br />
Area Code 212 571-5761<br />
C. R. SMITH<br />
VICE PRESIDENT<br />
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Goddard Space Flight Center<br />
Greenbelt, Maryland<br />
Attention: Procurement and Supply Division<br />
JDC:241:mj<br />
Gentlemen:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
March 20, 1961<br />
The attached proposal is submitted in response to your Request for Proposal No.<br />
GS-1861, Low Altitude Active Communications Satellite, dated January 4, 1961 and <strong>the</strong><br />
Telegraphic Amendment <strong>the</strong>reto dated February 24, 1961.<br />
This response contains three separate and complete proposals. Proposal 1 is based on<br />
<strong>the</strong> use of frequencies in <strong>the</strong> 400-500 and 2,200-2,300 mc bands. Proposals 2 and 3 are<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> use of frequencies in <strong>the</strong> 5,925-6,425 and 3,800-4,200 mc bands, as requested<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Telegraphic Amendment of February 24, 1961. Proposal 3 differs from<br />
Proposal 2 in that it includes a contractor-furnished radiation experiment package.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 55<br />
Bell Telephone Laboratories has been actively pursuing a program of research and<br />
development in satellite communications. This work has been undertaken because of <strong>the</strong><br />
Bell System’s position as a major U.S. international communications carrier and <strong>the</strong> obligation<br />
this imposes upon it to develop and provide any new means of communications that<br />
hold promise of improving its services to <strong>the</strong> general public and <strong>the</strong> government. The Bell<br />
System’s program, for developing a satellite communications system and for placing such<br />
a system in commercial service in collaboration with <strong>the</strong> telecommunications agencies of<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r countries, is expected to parallel in many respects <strong>the</strong> System’s achievements in <strong>the</strong><br />
development and establishment of transoceanic submarine telephone cable systems. As<br />
was done with <strong>the</strong> cables, <strong>the</strong> Bell System will under- [2] take to work out mutually satisfactory<br />
arrangements with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r United States international carriers whereby <strong>the</strong>y can<br />
obtain facilities for <strong>the</strong> services furnished by <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
We believe that NASA and <strong>the</strong> Bell System have a common interest in pointing experimental<br />
work in <strong>the</strong> field of satellite communications toward <strong>the</strong> realization of a commercial<br />
system as quickly as possible with a minimum of cost and without duplication of<br />
effort. For this reason, we strongly favor Proposal 2 or Proposal 3, since <strong>the</strong> 6 kmc and<br />
4 kmc frequencies are already being used in common carrier communications systems in<br />
both <strong>the</strong> United States and Europe. The Bell Telephone Laboratories’ program, which is<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong>se frequencies, is well under way and maximum progress toward<br />
our mutual goal will, we believe, be achieved with <strong>the</strong> experimental satellite contemplated<br />
under Proposal 2 or 3. Not only will this permit <strong>the</strong> testing, in <strong>the</strong> experimental satellite,<br />
of components of <strong>the</strong> kind that will be used in later prototypes of commercial<br />
satellites, but valuable information will he obtained on <strong>the</strong> problems of sharing <strong>the</strong> proposed<br />
frequencies by terrestrial and satellite common carrier systems.<br />
In response to a specific NASA request, an offer to undertake this program on a costplus-fixed-fee<br />
basis is associated with each of <strong>the</strong> proposals. In view of <strong>the</strong> Bell System<br />
interest expressed above, however, each proposal also contains an offer to undertake <strong>the</strong><br />
program on a cost-sharing basis. These offers involve billing NASA an amount equal to<br />
about one-fourth of <strong>the</strong> expense associated with Proposal 1 or a considerably smaller part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> expense associated with Proposals 2 or 3, since <strong>the</strong> work to be undertaken under<br />
<strong>the</strong>se latter proposals will make a larger contribution to our own research and development<br />
program than <strong>the</strong> work under Proposal 1. All of <strong>the</strong>se cost-sharing offers are on a<br />
cost reimbursement basis. Each offer, however, includes a maximum dollar limit of cost to<br />
be billed to NASA.<br />
The A. T. & T. Company has offered to provide ground station equipment and operation<br />
in <strong>the</strong> United States and to undertake to arrange for related ground station equipment<br />
and operation overseas. NASA has been assured that <strong>the</strong> United States ground<br />
station will be operational in time to meet <strong>the</strong> planned launching schedule and that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
facilities will be made available to NASA for this experiment.<br />
[3] Every attempt has been made to include in <strong>the</strong> three parts of our response, General<br />
Evaluation Information, Scientific and Technical Proposal, and Cost Proposal, all of <strong>the</strong><br />
information requested in connection with this procurement. The representation relating<br />
to small business is attached as a separate item.<br />
This quotation, in response to NASA Request for Proposal GS-1861, is firm for a period<br />
of ninety days from <strong>the</strong> date of this letter. Questions in connection with this quotation<br />
should be directed to Mr. R. P. Wilson of this office on Extension 5735.<br />
Sincerely<br />
“C. R. Smith” [hand-signed]
56<br />
Att.<br />
Proposal<br />
Exhibit “A”<br />
[1]<br />
Mr. Ben F. Waple, Acting Secretary<br />
Federal Communications Commission<br />
Washington 25, D.C.<br />
Dear Sir:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
**********<br />
Attachment No. 5<br />
March 21, 1961<br />
Re: Docket No. 13522<br />
The comments filed by A. T. & T. Co. in Docket No. 13522 were directed to <strong>the</strong> specific<br />
questions posed in <strong>the</strong> Notice of Inquiry and Supplement. It is our understanding<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Commission was seeking technical information concerning frequency requirements<br />
for space communications without discussion at this time of legal or economic<br />
question. However, in view of <strong>the</strong> comments of this character in some of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
responses and <strong>the</strong> publicity <strong>the</strong>y have been given, we believe a brief statement should be<br />
made to forestall any misunderstanding of <strong>the</strong> Bell System position and bring <strong>the</strong> comments<br />
into a better perspective.<br />
Our interest in satellite communications is simply stated. There is a need for point-topoint<br />
space communications system—to help meet <strong>the</strong> growing demand for international<br />
communications of all kinds, and to provide alternate routes from a reliability<br />
standpoint. Such space communications systems are a natural supplement to and extension<br />
of existing common carrier networks.<br />
The traditional communications policy in this country has been to have common carriers<br />
serve both domestic and international needs for public communications. This policy<br />
was recently restated in FCC Public Notice G1271 dated February 28, 1961 that “. . .<br />
overseas public communications are provided by private enterprise, subject to<br />
Government regulation. . . .” This notice also included <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
“(1) The earliest practicable realization of a commercially operable communication<br />
satellite system is a national objective.<br />
[2] “(2) The attainment of this urgent national objective in <strong>the</strong> field of communications<br />
may be accomplished through concerted action by existing agencies of<br />
Government and private enterprise.<br />
“(3) In accordance with <strong>the</strong> traditional policy of conducting international communications<br />
service through private enterprise subject to Government regulation,<br />
private enterprise should be encouraged to undertake development and utilization<br />
of satellite systems for public communication services.”<br />
We do not seek a monopoly in satellite communications. We do not wish to exclude<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r international carriers ei<strong>the</strong>r from establishing such systems or from sharing <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of <strong>the</strong> system we propose. We seek only <strong>the</strong> opportunity to employ private initiative, management<br />
and capital in <strong>the</strong> public interest and under public regulation in a manner wholly<br />
consistent with traditional public policy with respect to international communications.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 57<br />
Our estimates of costs and traffic volumes lead us to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that a satellite system<br />
such as we propose is economically feasible. We are prepared to move ahead as rapidly<br />
as possible and it is important that we be permitted to do so, not only to meet <strong>the</strong> service<br />
requirements for <strong>the</strong> near future but also to make sure that this country will lead <strong>the</strong> way<br />
in international space communications for peaceful purposes.<br />
Ownership of <strong>the</strong> facilities involved could be handled in <strong>the</strong> traditional way. The foreign<br />
terminals would be owned by <strong>the</strong> foreign telecommunication agencies. We have had<br />
many years of mutually satisfactory operating experience with <strong>the</strong>se agencies all over <strong>the</strong><br />
world and are completely confident that we can come to an equitable arrangement with<br />
<strong>the</strong>m concerning <strong>the</strong> ownership and use of <strong>the</strong> satellites.<br />
Use of <strong>the</strong> United States portion of <strong>the</strong> satellite system would be made available, of<br />
course, to all international communications carriers serving <strong>the</strong> United States for any services<br />
<strong>the</strong>y now are, or may in <strong>the</strong> future be, authorized to provide by <strong>the</strong> FCC under <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Act. Here, too, <strong>the</strong> facilities would be made available on an equitable<br />
basis ei<strong>the</strong>r by ownership participation through pro rata payment of capital investment<br />
and operating expenses or by lease arrangements. These arrangements would preserve<br />
competition in <strong>the</strong> international communications field to <strong>the</strong> extent that it is determined<br />
by <strong>the</strong> FCC to be in <strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
We believe <strong>the</strong> low-orbit system proposed by AT&T is <strong>the</strong> preferred system at this time.<br />
The technology is well advanced for <strong>the</strong> low-orbit satellite. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
drawbacks [3] to <strong>the</strong> synchronous high-altitude satellite. To begin with, <strong>the</strong>re is a .6 second<br />
round-trip delay which would be a very serious degradation of telephone service.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>re are <strong>the</strong> very difficult problems of placing <strong>the</strong> high-altitude satellite in proper<br />
orbit, maintaining it on <strong>the</strong> station, stabilizing and accurately pointing its directional<br />
antenna. The solution to <strong>the</strong>se latter problems is at a minimum several years away and it’s<br />
imperative to get on with <strong>the</strong> job now—not years hence.<br />
The producers of electronic gear and o<strong>the</strong>r products and services would benefit from<br />
<strong>the</strong> introduction of this new mode of communications which will broaden <strong>the</strong>ir markets.<br />
A substantial part of <strong>the</strong> ground station equipment and many of <strong>the</strong> components of <strong>the</strong><br />
satellites <strong>the</strong>mselves will be obtained on a competitive basis from industrial suppliers.<br />
Rockets and launching facilities will be provided by private suppliers under appropriate<br />
arrangements with <strong>the</strong> Government.<br />
As stated at <strong>the</strong> outset, we believe that <strong>the</strong> questions to which <strong>the</strong> Commission is seeking<br />
<strong>the</strong> answers in this proceeding are essentially technical in character, and <strong>the</strong>y must be<br />
answered promptly if <strong>the</strong> United States is to maintain its leadership in <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
field. The purpose of this letter is to provide information which may be helpful to<br />
<strong>the</strong> FCC as it considers policy decision vital to <strong>the</strong> vigorous advancement of <strong>the</strong> nation’s<br />
space communications program.<br />
Very truly yours,<br />
“J.E. Dingman” [hand-signed]
58<br />
[1]<br />
Document I-10<br />
Mr. F. R. Kappel<br />
President<br />
American Telephone and Telegraph Company<br />
195 Broadway<br />
New York 7, New York<br />
Dear Mr. Kappel:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
April 8, 1961<br />
Thank you for your letter of April 5th. I will be happy to see you whenever you plan<br />
to be in Washington. I am appearing before <strong>the</strong> House Committee on Science and<br />
Astronautics on Monday morning, April 10th, and am engaged all day on Tuesday, <strong>the</strong><br />
11th, with <strong>the</strong> President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which is having<br />
its first meeting. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, I will be glad to reschedule my appointments so we can meet<br />
at your convenience.<br />
In order that you may understand, perhaps more fully than a report in <strong>the</strong> Wall Street<br />
Journal, <strong>the</strong> questions and answers at my press conference on <strong>the</strong> budget, I am enclosing<br />
<strong>the</strong> release. You will note, on page 3, my statement is as follows:<br />
“In order to take full advantage of <strong>the</strong> potentialities of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite<br />
for both industry and governmental uses, industry financing of research and<br />
development costs is postponed and full governmental financing is provided.<br />
Ten million dollars is added for this purpose.”<br />
[2] On page 8, you will note my statement that:<br />
“The basic change is simply to postpone, until we know more than we know<br />
today, <strong>the</strong> real decision as to how this new result of space sciences and technology<br />
can be most usefully applied.”<br />
Again, on page 9, you will note Dr. Dryden’s statement that:<br />
“. . . <strong>the</strong> program is <strong>the</strong> same, John (Finney), <strong>the</strong> program of four flights that you<br />
have heard outlined in great detail. This is merely an estimate as to whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />
Treasury would recover money. It seems to be such an uncertain thing at this time<br />
that we prefer to have <strong>the</strong> money in hand, to carry it forward to <strong>the</strong> test program.”<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, in answer to <strong>the</strong> question as to whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> addition of <strong>the</strong> ten million dollars<br />
to <strong>the</strong> budget represented any modification of policy, I stated:<br />
“It represents a policy decision to have a good hard look at this before making<br />
commitments.”<br />
Since you have referred to <strong>the</strong> discussion in my office with Dr. Fisk and Mr. Dingman<br />
of your company, I suggest you ask <strong>the</strong>m if <strong>the</strong> above does not represent what I told <strong>the</strong>m<br />
was going through my mind as <strong>the</strong> only sensible way to approach a decision of such magnitude<br />
and significance far beyond <strong>the</strong> communications industry, as well as long-range
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 59<br />
implications and importance to many segments of <strong>the</strong> communication industry over and<br />
above its great significance to your own company.<br />
Last night I took your letter home and read <strong>the</strong> attachments. Your letter of December<br />
14th to Dr. Glennan does state, on page 3, that you would<br />
“. . . like to offer <strong>the</strong> following specific proposals:<br />
[3] “a. That NASA and we join in <strong>the</strong> setting of performance specifications for <strong>the</strong><br />
first experimental active satellite.<br />
“b. That we develop and build <strong>the</strong> first satellite taking advantage of research<br />
already done and developments well under way. We are prepared to pay for<br />
this work in its entirety, or for such part of <strong>the</strong> expense as would reflect our<br />
respective interests in <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
“c. That NASA launch its first satellite and provide tracking data from its<br />
Minitrack stations. In this connection, we are willing to bear <strong>the</strong> whole cost<br />
of launching and tracking or to share <strong>the</strong>se costs with NASA in any way you<br />
feel will properly reflect our respective interests in <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
“d. That <strong>the</strong> existing ground station at Holmdel be made available and modified<br />
at our expense for <strong>the</strong> purpose of making <strong>the</strong> necessary communications<br />
tests. (This station is, of course, compatible with <strong>the</strong> communications network<br />
of this Company.)<br />
“e. That, taking advantage of our long established working relations with overseas<br />
communications operating agencies, arrangements be made with at least<br />
one of <strong>the</strong>m for more overseas ground stations.<br />
“f. That o<strong>the</strong>r common carriers be invited to use <strong>the</strong> satellite circuits experimentally<br />
when such circuits are operational.<br />
“g. That full information on satellite performance be made available to NASA.<br />
[4] I am told that your letter of December 14th was delivered by a number of your associates,<br />
that an extended conference ensued, and that it was made clear that NASA would<br />
not permit your company, or any o<strong>the</strong>r, to pre-empt <strong>the</strong> program of <strong>the</strong> United States in<br />
this area. [handwritten highlighting in margin] Later, in a letter dated January 17th, 1961,<br />
your proposal (e) as amplified in your telegram of January 12th, to undertake negotiations<br />
for overseas land stations on behalf of NASA was not accepted, but instead negotiations<br />
were initiated and completed by NASA, with <strong>the</strong> technical advice of your company.<br />
On January 4, 1961, as indicated in your attachment No. 4, March 26, 1961, <strong>the</strong> letter<br />
from your Mr. C. R. Smith to our Procurement and Supply Division, we requested proposals<br />
in accordance with our own performance specifications for an experimental lowaltitude,<br />
active communication satellite. With <strong>the</strong> letter of Mr. Smith, you submitted a<br />
proposal to meet our performance specifications.<br />
I believe you will agree that our request for proposals was not an acceptance of your proposal<br />
of December 14th, but was instead <strong>the</strong> first step toward a policy of permitting all companies<br />
interested in this project to furnish competitive proposals ra<strong>the</strong>r than limiting <strong>the</strong><br />
development of <strong>the</strong> satellite to arrangements that would be made only with your company.<br />
You will recognize that all of <strong>the</strong> above ei<strong>the</strong>r took place before or was underway at<br />
<strong>the</strong> time I took <strong>the</strong> oath of office on February 14th. It is background for <strong>the</strong> position I have<br />
taken publicly, and mentioned above, “to have a good hard look at this before making<br />
commitments.” I assume part or all of this falls into <strong>the</strong> category you have called “events<br />
which have taken place during <strong>the</strong> past few months,” and needs to be considered in addition<br />
to <strong>the</strong> “specific events” to which you refer in your letter.<br />
With fur<strong>the</strong>r reference to <strong>the</strong> record of my press conference, you will note on page 12<br />
that <strong>the</strong> question which Dr. Dryden answered related to a presentation by your com-
60<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
pany before <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission in connection with, as <strong>the</strong> questioner<br />
put it, your “being interested in <strong>the</strong> $170 million program to put up <strong>the</strong>ir (your)<br />
own satellites.” The direct question was whe<strong>the</strong>r I “had any indication that AT&T has<br />
taken a new look at <strong>the</strong> desirability of this.”<br />
[5] Although <strong>the</strong> conversation Dr. Dryden and I had with Dr. Fisk and Mr. Dingman was<br />
of quite a general and exploratory nature and was in no way a negotiation or even delineation<br />
of official positions, I did get <strong>the</strong> impression that your company was making a very<br />
thorough examination, doing some real soul-searching, and I so stated in my remarks at<br />
<strong>the</strong> bottom of page 12. If this is not correct, I will appreciate your advice.<br />
I agree completely that we should sit down and straighten out any misunderstandings<br />
that may have arisen. If you believe our public statements do not fairly represent <strong>the</strong> position<br />
of your company, I will be more than happy to take any steps necessary to make <strong>the</strong><br />
real facts clear.<br />
Enclosure<br />
A:Webb:ns<br />
N<br />
cc: Dr. Dryden<br />
Mr. Nunn<br />
Mr. Phillips<br />
BAC<br />
Document I-11<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
James E. Webb<br />
Administrator<br />
Document title: John F. Kennedy to Honorable Newton Minow, Chairman, Federal<br />
Communications Commission, May 15, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
During his first State of <strong>the</strong> Union address on January 30, 1961, President Kennedy had called for<br />
an international effort to develop communications satellites. Four months later, he reiterated this position<br />
while considering a sweeping acceleration of <strong>the</strong> U.S. space program.<br />
Dear Mr. Chairman:<br />
May 15, 1961<br />
I am most interested in having facilitated early development of communication satellites<br />
and will appreciate prompt determination by <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission,<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate agencies of<br />
<strong>the</strong> conditions and safeguards under which that can go forward. Subject to establishing<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessary precautions, I am hopeful that <strong>the</strong> public and private resources of our free<br />
society can be brought to bear for significant and early research progress in this field, and,
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 61<br />
as quickly as possible, for actual operation of satellite telephones, television, and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
communication systems that will bring <strong>the</strong> world closer toge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
I will appreciate your keeping me informed of <strong>the</strong> steps being taken toward that goal and<br />
of tangible progress that is made.<br />
Honorable Newton Minow<br />
Chairman<br />
Federal Communications Commission<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Document I-12<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[signed] John F. Kennedy<br />
Document title: Ben F. Waple, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,<br />
“An Inquiry Into <strong>the</strong> Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong><br />
Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems: First Report,”<br />
FCC Report 61-676, 4774, Docket No. 14024, May 24, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
On May 24, 1961, <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission (FCC), tasked with outlining <strong>the</strong> initial<br />
policy to determine how <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system would operate, issued its “First<br />
Report.” The FCC limited participation in <strong>the</strong> system to international communications carriers—<br />
AT&T, ITT, RCA, and Western Union. This policy excluded aerospace and communications equipment<br />
manufacturers and consequently provoked numerous complaints. Forced to respond to <strong>the</strong><br />
aerospace and communications equipment manufacturers’ objections, <strong>the</strong> FCC stated that such companies’<br />
participation in <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> system would be nei<strong>the</strong>r “necessary nor beneficial.”<br />
This issue would later play a major role in <strong>the</strong> controversy over <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act.<br />
[475/1] Before <strong>the</strong> FCC 61-676<br />
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 4774<br />
Washington 25, D.C.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Matter of )<br />
) Docket No. 14024<br />
An Inquiry Into <strong>the</strong> Administrative and )<br />
Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong> )<br />
Authorization of Commercially Operable )<br />
Space Communications Systems )<br />
By <strong>the</strong> Commission:<br />
FIRST REPORT<br />
1. On March 29, 1961, <strong>the</strong> Commission adopted a Notice of Inquiry (released on<br />
April 3, 1961) designed to facilitate an early solution to <strong>the</strong> administrative and regulatory
62<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
problems relating to <strong>the</strong> future authorization of commercially operable space communication<br />
systems. It was stated in <strong>the</strong> Notice that it may not be feasible to have more than<br />
one or a limited number of commercial satellite communication systems due to <strong>the</strong> substantial<br />
capital investment required and limitation of radio spectrum space; and that this<br />
raises a problem as to <strong>the</strong> manner in which such a system or limited number of systems<br />
could be accommodated within <strong>the</strong> Commission’s policy of fostering beneficial competition<br />
in <strong>the</strong> international communication field and within <strong>the</strong> anti-trust laws. Accordingly,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Notice solicited views from all interested parties as to <strong>the</strong> best plan of [e]nsuring that<br />
international communications common carriers, and o<strong>the</strong>rs, participate on an equitable<br />
and non-discriminatory basis in a single or limited number of satellite systems. Views were<br />
also solicited as to <strong>the</strong> legality of <strong>the</strong> suggested plan; <strong>the</strong> Commission’s authority to prescribe<br />
such plan; and <strong>the</strong> extent to which participants in <strong>the</strong> plan would be subject to <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission’s jurisdiction. The Notice directed that responses <strong>the</strong>reto be filed on or<br />
before May 1961 and that replies to such responses be filed on or before May 15, 1961.<br />
2. Responses have been filed by twelve parties, viz., American Rocket Society;<br />
American Securities Corporation (for <strong>the</strong> future Western Union International, Inc.);<br />
American Telephone and Telegraph Company; General Electric Company; General<br />
Telephone & Electronics Corporation; Hawaiian Telephone Company; International<br />
Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (and American Cable & Radio Corporation);<br />
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation; Press Wireless, Inc.; Radio Corporation of America (and<br />
RCA Communications, Inc.); The Western Union Telegraph Company; and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Justice (commenting only on anti-trust matters).<br />
3. Replies to such responses were filed by American Telephone and Telegraph<br />
Company, General Electric Company, and Lockheed Aircraft [476/2] Corporation.<br />
4. In general, <strong>the</strong> respondents were in agreement that for economic and o<strong>the</strong>r reasons<br />
a single satellite communications system or a limited number of systems, financed<br />
and owned by private enterprise, would best serve <strong>the</strong> public interest. To <strong>the</strong> extent that<br />
<strong>the</strong> respondents addressed <strong>the</strong>mselves to a specific type of plan, <strong>the</strong>y generally favor a<br />
joint venture for <strong>the</strong> ownership and operation of a system. The principal difference<br />
among respondents in this respect related to <strong>the</strong> composition of such a joint venture.<br />
Thus, American Telephone and Telegraph Company and International Telephone and<br />
Telegraph Corporation favor ownership in such a system being limited to international<br />
communications common carriers, such entities participating in ownership to a degree<br />
consistent with <strong>the</strong>ir use of <strong>the</strong> system; General Telephone & Electronics Corporation<br />
would limit <strong>the</strong> ownership to both domestic and international communications common<br />
carriers; while Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 1 General Electric Company, and The<br />
Western Union Telegraph Company favor ownership by common carriers, <strong>the</strong> manufacturing<br />
companies, and possibly <strong>the</strong> public.<br />
5. Upon consideration of <strong>the</strong> responses and <strong>the</strong> replies filed herein <strong>the</strong> Commission<br />
has arrived at certain conclusions, <strong>the</strong> application of which will serve to foster and accelerate<br />
<strong>the</strong> ultimate establishment of a commercially operable space satellite communication<br />
system in <strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
6. We have concluded that <strong>the</strong> recommendations made herein with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />
formation or arrangement of a joint venture (or joint undertaking) composed only of<br />
existing common carriers engaged in international telephone and telegraph communication<br />
is deserving of consideration and exploration as an effective means of promoting <strong>the</strong><br />
orderly development and effectuation of such a system. We believe that, under<br />
1. Lockheed in its reply comments withdrew its proposal that ownership in a satellite system include<br />
private interests o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> international carriers.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 63<br />
Commission regulatory jurisdiction and subject to <strong>the</strong> conditions and safeguards hereinafter<br />
set forth, some form of joint venture by <strong>the</strong> international common carriers is clearly<br />
indicated as best serving <strong>the</strong> public interest for <strong>the</strong> following reasons:<br />
(a) It appears to be generally accepted that because of considerations of practical<br />
economics and technical limitations, it will not be feasible for some time to come<br />
to accommodate more than one commercial satellite system.<br />
(b) Communication via satellite will be a supplement to, ra<strong>the</strong>r than a substitute<br />
for, existing communication systems operated by <strong>the</strong> international common carriers,<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby becoming an integral part of <strong>the</strong> total communication system of each such carrier.<br />
[477/3] (c) The responses filed by <strong>the</strong> international carriers express a willingness and<br />
indicate a capability to marshal <strong>the</strong>ir respective resources for <strong>the</strong> purpose of developing<br />
a satellite communication facility.<br />
(d) By reason of <strong>the</strong>ir experience in and responsibility for furnishing international<br />
communications service, <strong>the</strong> international carriers <strong>the</strong>mselves are logically <strong>the</strong><br />
ones best qualified to determine <strong>the</strong> nature and extent of <strong>the</strong> facilities best suited to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir needs and those of <strong>the</strong>ir foreign correspondents, with whom <strong>the</strong>y have long[-<br />
]standing and effective commercial relationships and who necessarily will have a substantial<br />
interest in <strong>the</strong> operations of any satellite system.<br />
(e) Under <strong>the</strong> Communications Act, <strong>the</strong> international carriers are obligated to<br />
furnish <strong>the</strong> public with adequate, efficient service at reasonable charges, and this<br />
obligation can best be discharged by those carriers maintaining, as far as possible, <strong>the</strong><br />
greatest degree of direct control and responsibility over <strong>the</strong> facilities employed in this<br />
service. 2<br />
7. These considerations, in our opinion, demonstrate <strong>the</strong> desirability of exploring at<br />
this time <strong>the</strong> means whereby <strong>the</strong> international common carriers may, collectively, but subject<br />
to appropriate regulation and safeguards, take such steps as are necessary to plan and<br />
effect <strong>the</strong> ultimate integration of satellite communication techniques into <strong>the</strong> fabric of<br />
international common carrier service. At <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong>se considerations would<br />
appear to militate against <strong>the</strong> suggestions which have been made by certain of <strong>the</strong> respondents<br />
that any joint venture with respect to <strong>the</strong> ownership of satellite communication systems<br />
should include participation by <strong>the</strong> public or by companies in <strong>the</strong> aerospace and<br />
communications equipment manufacturing industries.<br />
8. We are not unmindful of <strong>the</strong> substantial interests that <strong>the</strong>se industries have made<br />
in <strong>the</strong> field of space science and <strong>the</strong> important contributions <strong>the</strong>y have to make to this<br />
field. Nor are we unmindful of <strong>the</strong> potential market that satellite systems represent for <strong>the</strong><br />
sale of communications and related equipment. However, it appears that <strong>the</strong> adaptation<br />
and integration of satellite communication techniques to international common carrier<br />
operations is within <strong>the</strong> economic means of <strong>the</strong> existing carriers, although [478/4] requiring<br />
cooperative arrangements among <strong>the</strong>m. We fail to see why ownership participation by<br />
<strong>the</strong> aerospace and communications equipment industries will be beneficial or necessary<br />
to <strong>the</strong> establishment of a satellite communication system to be used by <strong>the</strong> common carrier<br />
industry. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, such participation may well result in encumbering <strong>the</strong><br />
system with complicated and costly corporate relationships, disrupting operational patterns<br />
that have been established in <strong>the</strong> international common carrier industry, and impeding<br />
effective regulation of <strong>the</strong> rates and services of <strong>the</strong> industry.<br />
2. It is recognized that this new technology of communication may present numerous, unique and difficult<br />
problems which may involve several approaches and solutions of a type and nature different from those<br />
which have been used heretofore in <strong>the</strong> field of international communications. However, we are satisfied that<br />
any such new problems can best be resolved by working within <strong>the</strong> existing framework of our international common<br />
carrier industry.
64<br />
9. Insofar as <strong>the</strong> proposal for such participation may have been motivated by concern<br />
that without participation <strong>the</strong> manufacturers of communications equipment will be<br />
excluded from this market by <strong>the</strong> manufacturing companies affiliated with <strong>the</strong> participating<br />
common carriers, <strong>the</strong> Commission is well aware of this danger. Accordingly, it is <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission’s intention to require that any joint venture that may evolve shall make adequate<br />
and effective provision, such as competitive bidding, to [e]nsure that <strong>the</strong>re will be<br />
no favoritism in <strong>the</strong> procurement of communications equipment required for <strong>the</strong> construction,<br />
operation and maintenance of <strong>the</strong> satellite system. We want to stress that we<br />
shall also take all necessary measures and establish regularized procedures to [e]nsure<br />
that such a policy is faithfully and conscientiously administered. In this connection, and<br />
also to promote <strong>the</strong> maximum degree of standardization, <strong>the</strong> Commission will also<br />
require that its approval be obtained with respect to <strong>the</strong> specifications for all equipment<br />
used by <strong>the</strong> common carriers in <strong>the</strong> satellite system, including <strong>the</strong> ground terminals. At<br />
<strong>the</strong> same time, before approving any specifications, we shall examine closely into <strong>the</strong> relevant<br />
patent situation to [e]nsure that an undesirable or dominant patent position will<br />
not hamper or frustrate <strong>the</strong> Commission’s objectives in this regard.<br />
10. It is nei<strong>the</strong>r possible nor feasible for <strong>the</strong> Commission here to indicate all <strong>the</strong> specific<br />
features which it believes should be incorporated in any joint venture of international<br />
common carriers. These matters will, of course, require careful, extended study and formulation<br />
by <strong>the</strong> interested carriers acting under <strong>the</strong> aegis of <strong>the</strong> Commission and in accordance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> procedures and policies hereafter to be provided for. However, regardless<br />
of organization or type of entity that may subsequently evolve, it must contain clear and<br />
definite provisions which will [e]nsure that existing and future international common carriers,<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or not any such carrier participates through ownership in <strong>the</strong> joint venture,<br />
shall have equitable access to, and non-discriminatory use of, <strong>the</strong> satellite system, under<br />
fair and reasonable terms, so as to obtain communication facilities in <strong>the</strong> system to serve<br />
overseas points with <strong>the</strong> types of services for which <strong>the</strong>y are licensed or authorized by this<br />
Commission. The Commission, in issuing licenses or authorizations that may be required<br />
to effectuate such joint venture, will take all appropriate measures to implement this policy<br />
and to effect such o<strong>the</strong>r safeguards as may be required in <strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
11. We are making no determination at this time as to <strong>the</strong> desirability or need for participation<br />
in any such joint venture by domestic common carriers.<br />
[479/5] 12. In view of <strong>the</strong> foregoing, <strong>the</strong> Commission hereby announces that it will invite<br />
all United States international common carriers and certain United States government<br />
agencies to attend a conference with <strong>the</strong> Commission at an early date to explore plans and<br />
procedures whereunder consideration of <strong>the</strong> matters dealt with herein may go forward. A<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r order will be issued upon conclusion of such consideration.<br />
Adopted: May 24, 1961<br />
Released: May 24, 1961<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION<br />
Document I-13<br />
Ben F. Waple<br />
Acting Secretary
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 65<br />
Document title: National Aeronautics and Space Council, “Communication Satellites,”<br />
July 14, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
This policy statement outlines <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration’s approach to <strong>the</strong> development of communications<br />
satellites. It places a much greater emphasis than <strong>the</strong> Eisenhower administration on <strong>the</strong> government's<br />
role in ensuring that <strong>the</strong> public and national interests would be served as this new<br />
technological capability was brought into being. It also emphasizes <strong>the</strong> need to develop a truly global<br />
system for satellite communications.<br />
[1] NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL<br />
Policy Document Approved—July 14, 1961<br />
Communication Satellites<br />
National Purpose<br />
Science and technology have progressed to such degree that communication through<br />
use of space satellites has become possible.<br />
The President has recognized this potentiality and has requested that it be translated<br />
into an actuality. In his Message on <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Union, <strong>the</strong> President invited all<br />
nations to join with us in a new communication satellite program. On May 25, <strong>the</strong><br />
President asked <strong>the</strong> Congress for $50 million of additional funds to accelerate “<strong>the</strong> use of<br />
space satellites for world-wide communications.” Again, on June 15, <strong>the</strong> President requested<br />
<strong>the</strong> Space Council “to make <strong>the</strong> necessary studies and government-wide policy recommendations<br />
for bringing into optimum use at <strong>the</strong> earliest practicable time, operational<br />
communications satellites.”<br />
Hence, <strong>the</strong> national purpose and intent have been made clear.<br />
Program Status<br />
Research and development in <strong>the</strong> communications satellite field have been conducted<br />
over <strong>the</strong> past few years. This activity has been [2] under government auspices and guidance<br />
and has employed primarily <strong>the</strong> competence and facilities of private industry,<br />
through <strong>the</strong> use of public funds. From <strong>the</strong>se efforts have come prospects for several different<br />
types of communication systems, employing passive and active satellites, in ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
high or low orbit. Much more scientific and technical work needs to be done before an<br />
initial system can be selected for commercial operation.<br />
Agencies of <strong>the</strong> government have been developing a U. S, position with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />
international allocation of frequencies, in anticipation of an International<br />
Telecommunication Union space conference in 1963.<br />
There is a widespread private industry interest in communication satellites, with <strong>the</strong><br />
anticipation that <strong>the</strong>y can be utilized to meet increased demands for service and for commercial<br />
benefit. Also, foreign countries have indicated <strong>the</strong>ir interest in communication<br />
satellites.<br />
The FCC has instituted proceedings in which problems concerning communication
66<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
satellite systems are being examined.<br />
The present status of <strong>the</strong> communication satellite programs, both military and civil, is<br />
that of research and development. Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> arrangements between government and<br />
industry for research and development [3] nor <strong>the</strong> government participation as to preparation<br />
of a plan or plans for ownership and operation of a commercial system have contained<br />
any commitments as to <strong>the</strong> operational system.<br />
A communications system using satellites is made up of a number of interconnected<br />
parts, of which <strong>the</strong> satellites are but one part. The full system includes message origination<br />
facilities, ground sending stations, ground receiving stations, and message delivery facilities—in<br />
addition to <strong>the</strong> satellites used for continuous receipt and relay of messages. We<br />
already have an elaborate communications system between <strong>the</strong> United States and some<br />
parts of <strong>the</strong> world. Communication satellites must be integrated into <strong>the</strong> existing system.<br />
Adding communication satellites to this system would permit substantially increasing <strong>the</strong><br />
coverage, increasing <strong>the</strong> capacity for communication, and enabling television and high<br />
speed data, as well as voice and record, to be transmitted and received over great distances.<br />
Problems<br />
As a matter of progressive action, <strong>the</strong> central question is how to move from a research<br />
and development status to an operational status in which <strong>the</strong> newly emerging technology<br />
may be utilized in <strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
[4] There are two principal problem areas: one having to do with continuing to advance<br />
<strong>the</strong> state of <strong>the</strong> art on an accelerated basis and <strong>the</strong> technical selection of <strong>the</strong> specifications<br />
of an initial operational system; <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r having to do with organization and <strong>the</strong> mode of<br />
operation best suited to accommodate <strong>the</strong> wide range of public interests involved.<br />
Policy<br />
Following are major objectives and policy guidelines for <strong>the</strong> proper handling of those<br />
problems:<br />
1. Time: Operational satellites should become a part of <strong>the</strong> means of long distance<br />
communication at <strong>the</strong> earliest practicable time and this should be achieved through <strong>the</strong><br />
leadership of <strong>the</strong> United States. This means acceleration of effort in research and development,<br />
in plans for operation and management, and in cooperative negotiations with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
2. Ownership: There is a wide variety of types, methods, and procedures for <strong>the</strong> ownership<br />
of <strong>the</strong> U.S. portion of <strong>the</strong> system. The type of ownership should be that which gives<br />
<strong>the</strong> greatest assurance that <strong>the</strong> public interest will be best served. Any ownership plan<br />
which promises less would be contrary to policy. [5] The type and nature of ownership<br />
should not be decided, however, until recommendations submitted by private enterprise<br />
have been evaluated by <strong>the</strong> appropriate agencies of <strong>the</strong> government to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong>y meet <strong>the</strong> policy requirements. If <strong>the</strong>se policy requirements are met, <strong>the</strong> government<br />
will encourage private enterprise to establish and operate a system. This should be decided<br />
as soon as practicable in order to maximize <strong>the</strong> level of national effort.<br />
In addition to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r policy statements in this document, <strong>the</strong> following criteria and<br />
principles should be employed in evaluating recommendations for private ownership of<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. portion of <strong>the</strong> system:<br />
a. non-discriminatory use of and equitable access to <strong>the</strong> system by present and<br />
future communications carriers;<br />
b. effective competition, such as competitive bidding, in furnishing equipment<br />
purchased, leased, or o<strong>the</strong>rwise acquired from non-U.S. government sources;<br />
c. full compliance with antitrust legislation and with <strong>the</strong> regulation of rates,
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 67<br />
licenses, frequencies, etc.[,] by <strong>the</strong> appropriate government agencies.<br />
[6] 3. Government Responsibilities: In addition to its regulatory responsibilities, <strong>the</strong><br />
government should:<br />
a. conduct or maintain supervision over international agreements and negotiations;<br />
b. conduct and encourage research and development to facilitate accomplishment<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se policy objectives and to give maximum assurance of rapid and<br />
continuous and technological progress;<br />
c. control all launching of U.S. spacecraft;<br />
d. make use of <strong>the</strong> commercial system and avoid competition with it;<br />
e. establish separate communication satellite systems, when required to meet<br />
unique government needs which cannot, in <strong>the</strong> national interest, be met by<br />
<strong>the</strong> commercial system;<br />
f. assure <strong>the</strong> effective use of <strong>the</strong> radio frequency spectrum;<br />
g. assure that provision exists for <strong>the</strong> discontinuance of satellite transmissions<br />
when required in <strong>the</strong> interest of communication efficiency and effectiveness;<br />
h. provide technical assistance to newly developing countries in order to attain<br />
an effective global system as soon as practicable.<br />
[7] 4. New Uses and Reduced Rates: It is an objective that satellites make available for<br />
general use new and expanded international communications services. Transmission of<br />
records, voice, and television over great distances should facilitate <strong>the</strong> exchange of information<br />
and ideas throughout <strong>the</strong> world. These new and expanded uses should, at <strong>the</strong> earliest<br />
possible time, be made available through an economical system, <strong>the</strong> lower costs of<br />
which will be reflected in overseas communication rates. Anticipated greater use and<br />
lower costs per channel in a communication satellite system may make lower rates practicable.<br />
5. Global Coverage: A system of communications designed for “global” coverage is<br />
to be contrasted with a system limited to connecting heavy traffic markets and subject to<br />
expansion only in response to added demands of sufficient volume as to be profitable per<br />
se. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, a “global” system is one with <strong>the</strong> potential and <strong>the</strong> objective to provide efficient<br />
communication service throughout <strong>the</strong> whole world as soon as technically feasible, including<br />
service where individual portions of <strong>the</strong> coverage are not profitable or even have no<br />
expectation of future profit. It is a national objective to have such a global system operable<br />
as soon as possible within <strong>the</strong> limits of technology.<br />
[8] 6. Foreign Participation: It is axiomatic that <strong>the</strong>re be foreign participation in any<br />
international commercial communication system. In addition to participation through<br />
use, <strong>the</strong>re would be foreign ownership or control of ground facilities outside <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States; international agreements as to frequencies and operating practices; arrangements<br />
for connections with o<strong>the</strong>r systems; and opportunities through foreign ownership or o<strong>the</strong>rwise<br />
in <strong>the</strong> satellites in <strong>the</strong> system. The U.S. hopes that practical measures for such foreign<br />
participation can be developed.<br />
7. Relationship with United Nations: The U.S. should examine with o<strong>the</strong>r countries<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> most constructive role for <strong>the</strong> United Nations, including <strong>the</strong><br />
[International Telecommunication Union], in international space communications.<br />
Document I-14<br />
Document title: Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on <strong>the</strong> Judiciary, House of<br />
Representatives, et al., to <strong>the</strong> President, August 24, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
The form of ownership of an operational communications satellite system became a controversial issue
68<br />
in 1961 and 1962, as it became clear that such a system would be established within a few years. The<br />
Kennedy administration’s policy statement on communications satellites (Document I-13 in this volume)<br />
was released on July 24, 1961 (approved on July 14), and provoked this response from thirtyfive<br />
members of Congress who feared AT&T’s dominance of an operational system. They urged<br />
President Kennedy to wait until any system was fully operational before he made a final decision on<br />
<strong>the</strong> form of ownership. Kennedy did not follow this suggestion; several of <strong>the</strong> signers of this letter were<br />
among those leading <strong>the</strong> push for public ownership of a communications satellite system during <strong>the</strong><br />
1962 congressional debate on <strong>the</strong> issue.<br />
[1] CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES<br />
House of Representatives<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Emanuel Celler<br />
11th District New York<br />
Chairman<br />
Committee on <strong>the</strong> Judiciary<br />
The President<br />
The White House<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
My dear Mr. President:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
August 24, 1961<br />
Early development of a space satellite communications system is of fundamental<br />
national importance. Such a system gives promise of revolutionizing international communications<br />
and communications within <strong>the</strong> United States. It has potentiality for an<br />
unprecedented increase in worldwide telephone and telegraph communications and for<br />
providing transoceanic television and radio transmission.<br />
We undersigned members of Congress <strong>the</strong>refore believe that it is crucial that <strong>the</strong><br />
United States be <strong>the</strong> first to develop <strong>the</strong> system. We fur<strong>the</strong>r believe that <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Government should by contract carry out extensive research, experimentation, and development<br />
of a satellite communications system. Not a minute should be wasted. After such<br />
a system has become fully operational, but not until <strong>the</strong>n, we believe, can decisions be<br />
intelligently made as to whe<strong>the</strong>r such a system should be publicly or privately owned and<br />
under what circumstances.<br />
As you have pointed out, “<strong>the</strong> present status of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite programs,<br />
both civil and military, is that of research and development. To date, no arrangements<br />
between <strong>the</strong> government and private industry contain any commitments as to an<br />
operational system.” We believe this is as it should be. Present commitments of any kind<br />
as to <strong>the</strong> control of this system may hinder its rapid development and prejudge vital questions<br />
of public interest and international relations.<br />
The course of research and development for this new system have [sic] demonstrated<br />
one overwhelming fact: We do not at present know which system can be put into use first,<br />
nor which system will be most efficient once in orbit. Given this technological uncertainty,<br />
<strong>the</strong> complicated question of ownership and control of this system must necessarily be<br />
covered with an even greater haze of uncertainty. In order to [e]nsure that <strong>the</strong> rapid devel-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 69<br />
opment of this new system is not [2] impeded by a premature decision as to ownership, we<br />
are of <strong>the</strong> opinion that prudence requires a fur<strong>the</strong>r investigation of <strong>the</strong> broadest aspects of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ownership question. Specifically, we believe that <strong>the</strong> debate over ownership should be<br />
separated from <strong>the</strong> developmental question until <strong>the</strong> entire system becomes fully operational.<br />
During this period development should proceed with all possible speed while careful<br />
study is given to <strong>the</strong> decision as to <strong>the</strong> control of <strong>the</strong>se unripened fruits of science.<br />
While we believe that <strong>the</strong> final question of ownership should not be decided at a time<br />
when we have insufficient knowledge, we wish to make it clear that should private concerns<br />
be authorized to own and operate <strong>the</strong> system, <strong>the</strong> government agencies entrusted<br />
with responsibility must, consistent with <strong>the</strong> antitrust laws, prevent any concern from<br />
attaining a monopolistic, dominant, or preferential advantage. O<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong> national<br />
interest would be frustrated for generations to come in a historic achievement which,<br />
according to a responsible prediction, may well constitute a multi-billion dollar a year<br />
business in ten to fifteen years.<br />
On July 24 you issued a policy statement that essential conditions to private ownership<br />
of a space satellite communications system are a “structure of ownership and control<br />
which will assure maximum possible competition” and “full compliance with antitrust legislation.”<br />
We are in complete agreement with <strong>the</strong>se conditions and it is for this reason that<br />
we are deeply concerned about orders issued by <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications<br />
Commission on May 24 and July 25, 1961 which clearly contemplate limiting ownership to<br />
a specified group of so-called “international carriers” which does not even include all<br />
<strong>the</strong>se carriers. These orders are contrary to <strong>the</strong> policy established by you; <strong>the</strong>y are contrary<br />
to <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> antitrust laws.<br />
The FCC orders appear for all practical purposes to determine that <strong>the</strong> satellite communications<br />
system is to be owned and operated by this group of ten “international carriers.”<br />
This would mean that only four concerns would participate in <strong>the</strong> system’s<br />
ownership since <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r six companies in this group have professed no interest whatsoever<br />
in space communications. More important, it would mean that one of <strong>the</strong>se four<br />
companies, AT&T, would have a dominant and very probably a monopoly position in ownership<br />
of <strong>the</strong> space communications system. In effect, AT&T would be <strong>the</strong> chosen instrument<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States Government to own and control civilian space communications.<br />
This would be intolerable from <strong>the</strong> standpoint of <strong>the</strong> public interest. As <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Justice has stated, “<strong>the</strong> continuing opportunity (for AT&T) to favor its own<br />
facilities would always be present and would inevitably result in discrimination or suspicion<br />
of discrimination no matter how strict might be <strong>the</strong> policy of (AT&T) to provide [3]<br />
equal service to its competitors.” Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, “<strong>the</strong> opportunity to favor <strong>the</strong> purchase of<br />
equipment produced by (AT&T’s subsidiary, Western Electric Co.) would be irresistible.”<br />
The head of <strong>the</strong> Justice Department’s Antitrust Division has testified that “<strong>the</strong> degree of<br />
concentration in this field may very well be one of <strong>the</strong> reasons why America is not fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
advanced in <strong>the</strong> field today than it is . . . . Our system has not produced as it should, and <strong>the</strong><br />
public interest has suffered because <strong>the</strong>re has been undue concentration in this field.”<br />
We believe that to safeguard <strong>the</strong> public interest it is essential that any plan permitting<br />
private ownership if, indeed, such is preferred to public, of <strong>the</strong> space satellite system must:<br />
(1) afford all interested United States communications common carriers, domestic<br />
as well as international, opportunity to participate in ownership of <strong>the</strong> system;<br />
and<br />
(2) afford all interested communications and aerospace manufacturers opportunity<br />
to participate in ownership of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
We have seen from past experience how <strong>the</strong> American Telephone & Telegraph<br />
Company has been able to expand its monopoly position and streng<strong>the</strong>n its hold on <strong>the</strong><br />
American economy by combining, under <strong>the</strong> aegis of one holding company, its equipment<br />
manufacturing concern, <strong>the</strong> Western Electric Company, and <strong>the</strong> operating divisions
70<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Bell Telephone System. Only by insisting upon <strong>the</strong> widest participant by all interested<br />
communications and aerospace manufacturers and operators can <strong>the</strong>re by any hope<br />
that such a monopoly can be forestalled in this new and vital field.<br />
The antitrust laws prohibit monopolization of any part of <strong>the</strong> domestic or foreign<br />
commerce of <strong>the</strong> United States. They also prohibit <strong>the</strong> acquisition, ownership, control, or<br />
operation by an interstate or foreign wire carrier of any station or any system for radio<br />
communications or signals between any place in any state in <strong>the</strong> United States and any<br />
place in any foreign country, if <strong>the</strong> purpose is, and/or <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>the</strong>reof may be, to substantially<br />
lessen competition or to restrain commerce between any place in any state in <strong>the</strong><br />
United States and any place in any foreign country, or unlawfully to create monopoly in<br />
any line of commerce. In <strong>the</strong>se circumstances, any plan which does not meet both <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
we have specified would, in our considered judgment, be in direct violation of <strong>the</strong><br />
antitrust laws and would require special legislation by <strong>the</strong> Congress. No executive order<br />
or decree of any agency can override <strong>the</strong> antitrust laws.<br />
[4] Nor is <strong>the</strong>re any logical or rational basis for excluding U.S. domestic communications<br />
common carriers from ownership in <strong>the</strong> system while granting companies which have no<br />
interest and virtually no investment in international communications service opportunity<br />
to participate in <strong>the</strong> system’s ownership, particularly since <strong>the</strong> space satellite could provide<br />
domestic as well as international communications services.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it is clear that <strong>the</strong> space satellite communications system will be vastly<br />
different from <strong>the</strong> conventional common carrier type of operation. Thus <strong>the</strong>re is no justification<br />
for excluding communications and aerospace manufacturers, particularly when<br />
<strong>the</strong> record clearly demonstrates that a number of <strong>the</strong>se organizations have a far greater<br />
contribution to make in expert technology than any of <strong>the</strong> ten “communications carriers.”<br />
The question of monopoly is only one of many complicated questions involved in <strong>the</strong><br />
decision as to what kind of an ownership system will best meet <strong>the</strong> public interest. The<br />
ramifications of this remarkable system are likely to be truly revolutionary. And, as with all<br />
revolutions, it is clear that our understanding of <strong>the</strong> implications of a new technology is<br />
likely to lag behind developments <strong>the</strong>mselves. Because we believe time and study are<br />
essential to wise decision-making, and because we do not want to prejudice <strong>the</strong> ultimate<br />
question of control and ownership during <strong>the</strong> period of study, we urge that:<br />
1. No decisions concerning ultimate control be made until <strong>the</strong> entire system<br />
becomes fully operational.<br />
2. No contracts, decisions, or acts which may prejudice <strong>the</strong> ultimate decision as to<br />
ownership be agreed to until <strong>the</strong> entire system becomes fully operational.<br />
3. During this period, <strong>the</strong> Congress be consulted upon <strong>the</strong> question of ultimate control<br />
and ownership and allowed to exercise its constitutional responsibility to<br />
supervise activities of Federal agencies regulating foreign and domestic commerce.<br />
4. During this period, all o<strong>the</strong>r interested parties be consulted fully upon <strong>the</strong> question<br />
of ownership and control.<br />
5. During this period, all possible questions of international agreement, cooperation,<br />
control and ownership related to o<strong>the</strong>r nations and <strong>the</strong> [United Nations] be<br />
thoroughly explored.<br />
The United States can demonstrate to <strong>the</strong> world what a democratic system can accomplish<br />
in developing a space communications satellite system. But if decisions are taken in<br />
haste and allowed to cramp and prejudice [5] <strong>the</strong> rational development of <strong>the</strong> new gift of<br />
science, it is likely that we may not only prejudice a question of vital national concern, but<br />
we may hinder <strong>the</strong> rapid development of <strong>the</strong> system itself.<br />
Your statement of July 24, 1961 makes it clear that if private ownership is to be<br />
favored, <strong>the</strong> ownership and control system must meet eight stringent conditions. We<br />
would like to emphasize that <strong>the</strong> conditions laid down are a very difficult set of tests for
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 71<br />
any system of ownership to meet. We believe that if careful thought is given to how or,<br />
indeed, whe<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se tests can be met, not only will <strong>the</strong> public interest be served, but <strong>the</strong><br />
rapid development of this new gift of science will mo[v]e ahead unhindered by a premature<br />
struggle over its fruits.<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
Hubert H. Humphrey Leonard Farbstein Joseph M. Montoya<br />
Estes Kefauver Kenneth J. Gray John E. Moss<br />
Wayne Morse Chet Holifield Abraham J. Multer<br />
Elmer J. Holland M. Blaine Peterson<br />
Joseph P. Addabbo Lester Holtzman Henry S. Reuss<br />
Thomas L. Ashley Robert W. Kastenmeier Ralph J. Rivers<br />
Edward P. Boland Eugene J. Keogh James Roosevelt<br />
James A. Burke Frank Kowalski William Fitts Ryan<br />
James A. Byrne Thomas J. Lane John F. Shelley<br />
Emanuel Celler Richard E. Lankford B. F. Sisk<br />
Merwin Coad Roland V. Libonati Herman Toll<br />
Jeffery Cohelan Clem Miller Al Ullman<br />
Document I-15<br />
Document title: Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President, Memorandum for <strong>the</strong><br />
President, November 13, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
In October 1961, <strong>the</strong> FCC Ad Hoc Carrier (or Industry) Committee Report proposed that a nonprofit<br />
corporation be established to develop and operate <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system. This corporation<br />
would lease circuits to authorized carriers, which would own <strong>the</strong> satellites as well as <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
ground stations. The corporation would be run by a board of directors, including representatives of<br />
AT&T, ITT, RCA, and Western Union and three public directors appointed by <strong>the</strong> president. The<br />
committee’s report resulted in immediate controversy, as noted in Frederick Dutton’s memorandum to<br />
President Kennedy. ITT, RCA, and Western Union all expressed concern that AT&T would dominate<br />
such a corporation, while representatives of o<strong>the</strong>r aerospace and electronic manufacturers were<br />
unhappy that <strong>the</strong>y would be excluded from participating in such a revolutionary field. Some members<br />
of Congress expressed concern that such a corporation involving all of <strong>the</strong> international carriers would<br />
constitute a monopoly. The issue was not settled until <strong>the</strong> passage of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act<br />
on August 31, 1962.<br />
November 13, 1961<br />
Memorandum for <strong>the</strong> President<br />
As a matter of information, you should be aware that <strong>the</strong> proper kind of entity to own<br />
and operate communication satellites is becoming an increasing source of controversy. I<br />
have brought toge<strong>the</strong>r a Task Force of representatives from <strong>the</strong> interested Federal agencies<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Chairman, Ed Welsh, as Executive Director of <strong>the</strong> Space Council, to prepare<br />
recommendations consistent with your policy statement in this field. The Executive agen-
72<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
cies are dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong> report of <strong>the</strong> FCC Ad Hoc Industry Committee; and substantial<br />
Congressional and press concern continues over AT&T’s potential stranglehold over<br />
communication satellites. The Task Force will have recommendations ready in December.<br />
Senator Kerr is preparing his own legislative recommendations, so <strong>the</strong> entire matter will<br />
undoubtedly come to a head during <strong>the</strong> coming Congressional session.<br />
Document I-16<br />
Frederick G. Dutton<br />
Document title: Senator Robert S. Kerr, “Amendment to <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Act of 1958, Space Communications,” November 28, 1961.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Document I-17<br />
Document title: E.C. Welsh, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council,<br />
Executive <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> President, Memorandum to <strong>the</strong> President, April 11, 1962.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Document I-18<br />
Document title: “Communications Satellite Act of 1962,” Public Law 87-624, 76 Stat. 419,<br />
signed by <strong>the</strong> President on August 31, 1962.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
By <strong>the</strong> spring of 1962, <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration had decided its preference regarding what kind of<br />
communications satellite organization should be developed. There were some in Congress, however,<br />
who wanted public ownership of any such organization, while o<strong>the</strong>rs argued for totally private control.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> congressional debate was going on, Telstar was launched and successfully operated by<br />
AT&T. This fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> case for private-sector operation of international satellite communications.<br />
In addition to <strong>the</strong> administration bill mentioned in <strong>the</strong> memorandum to President<br />
Kennedy from Edward C. Welsh, Executive Secretary for <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Council,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re were fifteen o<strong>the</strong>r legislative proposals concerning <strong>the</strong> same subject. These advocated alternatives<br />
included government ownership, limited private ownership similar to <strong>the</strong> administration bill, and<br />
open ownership not limited to <strong>the</strong> international carriers.<br />
John Johnson, NASA’s general counsel, was first asked to draft Senator Robert Kerr’s bill for a communications<br />
satellite corporation and <strong>the</strong>n asked to draft <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration’s bill for <strong>the</strong><br />
same proposal. Kerr’s bill provided for an entirely privately run corporation, regulated by <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
It represented <strong>the</strong> more conservative side of <strong>the</strong> argument over ownership and control. Kerr<br />
chaired <strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and served primarily as an advocate<br />
for <strong>the</strong> administration’s bill ra<strong>the</strong>r than his own. Estes Kefauver represented <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong><br />
debate and introduced a bill calling for total government ownership. He led <strong>the</strong> opposition to <strong>the</strong><br />
administration bill on <strong>the</strong> Senate floor, first through <strong>the</strong> addition of a number of amendments and<br />
<strong>the</strong>n by a filibuster. The Senate finally moved for cloture for <strong>the</strong> first time since 1927 to end <strong>the</strong> debate.
In <strong>the</strong> end, <strong>the</strong> administration bill was not significantly altered and eventually became <strong>the</strong> basis for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962.<br />
Document I-16<br />
[1] (AUTOMATIC RELEASE IN A. M.’S OF TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1961)<br />
FROM THE OFFICE OF SENATOR ROBERT S. KERR<br />
DRAFT<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 73<br />
Be it enacted by <strong>the</strong> Senate and House of Representatives of <strong>the</strong> United States of<br />
America in Congress assembled,<br />
That <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (42 USC 2451-<br />
2476), is amended by adding <strong>the</strong>reto a Title IV, to read as follows:<br />
TITLE IV—SPACE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
DECLARATION OF POLICY<br />
Sec. 401. The Congress hereby declares that it is <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States to provide<br />
leadership in <strong>the</strong> establishment of a world-wide communications system involving <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of space satellites at <strong>the</strong> earliest practicable time, to provide for ownership of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States portion of <strong>the</strong> system, and to invite all nations to participate in <strong>the</strong> system in <strong>the</strong><br />
interest of world peace and closer bro<strong>the</strong>rhood among peoples throughout <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
CREATION OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION<br />
Sec. 402. (a) The provisions of this Section shall take effect as provided in Sec. 406 of this<br />
Act.<br />
(b) There is hereby created a corporation, to be known as <strong>the</strong> Satellite<br />
Communications Corporation (hereafter referred to as <strong>the</strong> “Corporation”), whose object<br />
and purposes shall be to develop, construct, operate, manage, and promote <strong>the</strong> use of a<br />
communications satellite system in <strong>the</strong> public interest, and to foster research and development<br />
in <strong>the</strong> field of space telecommunications.<br />
(c) Organization and Operation. The Corporation shall be organized and operated<br />
as a communications common carriers’ carrier, and shall own <strong>the</strong> United States portion<br />
of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system, consisting of <strong>the</strong> satellites, <strong>the</strong> earth terminals,<br />
and associated ground control and tracking facilities. The Corporation. shall make <strong>the</strong><br />
facilities of <strong>the</strong> system available on a nondiscriminatory and equitable basis, at rates to be<br />
established by <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission (hereafter called <strong>the</strong><br />
“Commission”), to all United States carriers authorized by <strong>the</strong> Commission to provide<br />
communications services via satellite.<br />
(d) Foreign Participation. The Corporation shall also provide opportunities for foreign<br />
participation in <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system, through ownership or o<strong>the</strong>rwise,<br />
on an equitable basis and on reasonable terms<br />
(e) Ownership of Corporation. Ownership interests in <strong>the</strong> Corporation shall be limited<br />
to United States communications common carriers who are determined by <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission to be eligible to participate in such ownership.<br />
[2] (f) <strong>Office</strong>rs of Corporation. There shall be a Board of Directors consisting of two
74<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Directors appointed by each carrier or affiliated group of carriers having an ownership<br />
interest in <strong>the</strong> Corporation and two additional Directors designated jointly by United<br />
States carriers who are authorized by <strong>the</strong> Commission to provide communications services<br />
via satellite but who do not acquire an ownership interest in <strong>the</strong> Corporation. The Board<br />
of Directors shall choose, or elect by majority vote, <strong>the</strong> principal officers of <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation. Each Director shall have one vote in all matters determined by <strong>the</strong> Board of<br />
Directors.<br />
(g) Financing of Corporation.<br />
(1) The total authorized capital stock of <strong>the</strong> Corporation shall be 500 million dollars,<br />
consisting of five thousand shares of <strong>the</strong> value of $100,000.00 each. Such<br />
stock shall be of one class, shall be nonassessable, and shall be issued only for<br />
cash fully paid. Stock held by owning carriers shall not be transferable, except<br />
with <strong>the</strong> approval of <strong>the</strong> Commission, and <strong>the</strong>n only to o<strong>the</strong>r communications<br />
common carriers determined by <strong>the</strong> Commission to be eligible to participate<br />
in <strong>the</strong> ownership of <strong>the</strong> Corporation.<br />
(2) The minimum amount of stock which shall be held by an owning carrier shall<br />
be five shares.<br />
POWERS OF CORPORATION<br />
Sec. 403. The Corporation shall have perpetual succession, and shall have power to do any<br />
and all things necessary and proper to carry out <strong>the</strong> object and purposes of <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation, including, without limitation <strong>the</strong>reto, <strong>the</strong> following—<br />
(a) to acquire, hold, own, mortgage, lease, and dispose of real and personal property,<br />
of every class and description and without limitation as to place;<br />
(b) to lease channels to authorized users of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system;<br />
(c) to conduct research and development;<br />
(d) to enter into, make and perform contracts and agreements of every kind and<br />
description with any person, firm, association, corporation, municipality, county, state,<br />
body politic, or government or colony or dependency <strong>the</strong>reof.<br />
(e) to sue and be sued;<br />
(f) to accept unconditional gifts of services, money or property, and legacies and<br />
devises;<br />
(g) to adopt and alter a corporate seal and, subject to prior approval of <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission, by-laws not inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> laws of <strong>the</strong> United States or of any State;<br />
(h) to establish and maintain offices and facilities for <strong>the</strong> conduct of <strong>the</strong> affairs of <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation in <strong>the</strong> District of Columbia and in <strong>the</strong> several states and territories of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States, and in foreign countries; and<br />
(i) to purchase, hold, sell, and transfer <strong>the</strong> shares of its own capital stock.<br />
[3] RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CORPORATION AND<br />
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION<br />
Sec. 404. (a) The Administration shall be responsible for—<br />
(1) furnishing launch vehicles required for <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system<br />
on a schedule which will facilitate <strong>the</strong> economical and efficient development<br />
and operation of <strong>the</strong> system;<br />
(2) launching <strong>the</strong> satellites, and furnishing launch-crew and associated services;<br />
(3) consulting with <strong>the</strong> Corporation on <strong>the</strong> technical specifications for satellites<br />
and earth terminal station, and on <strong>the</strong> number and location of such stations;<br />
and<br />
(4) to <strong>the</strong> greatest extent practicable, coordinating its research and development
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 75<br />
program in <strong>the</strong> field of space telecommunications with that of <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation so as to give maximum assurance of rapid and continuous scientific<br />
and technological progress.<br />
(b) The costs of <strong>the</strong> launch vehicles and launching and related services furnished by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Administration under subparagraphs (a) (1) and (a) (2) above shall be reimbursed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Corporation as a credit to current appropriations of <strong>the</strong> Administration.<br />
(c) The Administration is also authorized to furnish o<strong>the</strong>r services, on a reimbursable<br />
basis, upon <strong>the</strong> request of <strong>the</strong> Corporation and as required for <strong>the</strong> successful development<br />
and operation of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system.<br />
(d) The Corporation shall consult with <strong>the</strong> Administration, and coordinate its<br />
research program, as provided in subparagraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) above.<br />
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CORPORATION AND<br />
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION<br />
Sec. 405. (a) In regulating <strong>the</strong> Corporation as a communications common carrier under<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended, <strong>the</strong> Commission shall [e]nsure—<br />
(1) that <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system established by <strong>the</strong> Corporation is<br />
technically compatible with and operationally interconnected with existing<br />
communications facilities;<br />
(2) that <strong>the</strong> rate structure established for <strong>the</strong> communications services offered by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Corporation will provide a fair return on <strong>the</strong> capital invested in <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation; and<br />
(3) that <strong>the</strong>re will be nondiscriminatory use of and equitable access to <strong>the</strong> system<br />
by present and future authorized communications carriers.<br />
[4] (b) The Commission is also authorized to—<br />
(1) determine which United States communications common carriers shall be<br />
eligible to participate in <strong>the</strong> ownership of <strong>the</strong> Corporation;<br />
(2) approve <strong>the</strong> by-laws of <strong>the</strong> Corporation, or alterations <strong>the</strong>reto;<br />
(3) require <strong>the</strong> Corporation to employ competitive bidding in <strong>the</strong> acquisition of<br />
equipment used in <strong>the</strong> system, to <strong>the</strong> maximum extent feasible, so as to preserve<br />
effective competition;<br />
(4) require <strong>the</strong> Corporation to provide communications services in areas of <strong>the</strong><br />
world where it may be uneconomical, so as to make <strong>the</strong> system global in coverage<br />
as soon as technically feasible; and<br />
(5) require <strong>the</strong> Corporation to provide opportunities for foreign participation,<br />
through ownership or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, in <strong>the</strong> system, on an equitable basis, and on<br />
reasonable terms.<br />
COMPLETION OF ORGANIZATION OF THE CORPORATION<br />
Sec. 406. (a) The President is authorized to take all steps necessary to organize <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation described in Sec. 402 hereof, including but not limited to <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
(1) obtaining a determination by <strong>the</strong> Commission as to which communications<br />
common carriers shall be eligible to participate in <strong>the</strong> ownership of <strong>the</strong><br />
Corporation;<br />
(2) obtaining commitments from such eligible common carriers as to <strong>the</strong><br />
amounts <strong>the</strong>y will invest in <strong>the</strong> Corporation; and<br />
(3) receiving nominations to <strong>the</strong> Board of Directors of <strong>the</strong> Corporation, as provided<br />
for in Sec. 402 (f) hereof.<br />
(b) The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and <strong>the</strong> House
76<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Committee on Science and Astronautics shall be notified when all steps necessary to <strong>the</strong><br />
organization of <strong>the</strong> Corporation have been completed, including approval of <strong>the</strong> proposed<br />
Corporation by-laws by <strong>the</strong> Commission. Sec. 402 will take effect thirty days after <strong>the</strong><br />
date of such notification.<br />
(c) If <strong>the</strong> organization of <strong>the</strong> Corporation has not been completed within three<br />
months after <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of this Act, <strong>the</strong> President shall make an interim report<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and <strong>the</strong> House Committee<br />
on Science and Astronautics on <strong>the</strong> status of such organization.<br />
Document I-17<br />
[1]<br />
Executive Secretary April 11, 1962<br />
Memorandum to <strong>the</strong> President<br />
It is understood that Chairman Oren Harris of <strong>the</strong> House Interstate and Foreign<br />
Commerce Committee is scheduled to see you tomorrow. If so, he may want to discuss <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Satellite legislation, which is before his committee. He has completed<br />
his hearings and is hoping to mark up <strong>the</strong> bill very soon.<br />
Your bill was introduced in <strong>the</strong> Senate as S. 2814. It was introduced by Congressman<br />
Harris in <strong>the</strong> House as H.R. 10115. Harris also introduced your bill as modified by <strong>the</strong><br />
Senate Space Committee. That bill is H.R. 11040, and is currently <strong>the</strong> one primarily being<br />
considered by Chairman Harris.<br />
Harris has been most cooperative in this matter, as illustrated by his invitation to Nick<br />
Katzenbach and me to help iron out various questions with him and his staff yesterday. He<br />
indicated that he wanted to make <strong>the</strong> minimum number of changes in <strong>the</strong> bill and<br />
thought it important to act quickly so that efforts by o<strong>the</strong>rs to obtain Government ownership<br />
of <strong>the</strong> system would not have time to block action this session. This same view is, I<br />
believe, held by Senator Kerr and his Space Committee, and Senator Pastore and <strong>the</strong><br />
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in <strong>the</strong> Senate.<br />
Our meeting with Chairman Harris was also attended by Newt Minow, who stated that<br />
<strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> FCC, including himself, believed <strong>the</strong>y could “live with and make work”<br />
<strong>the</strong> bill as it now stands. Some clarifying language of various minor points is being worked<br />
out by <strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> Commerce Committee and staff of <strong>the</strong> Justice Department.<br />
It is suggested that emphasis might well be made on <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
1. That broad-based ownership is <strong>the</strong> important principle, and that <strong>the</strong> provision in<br />
H.R. 11040 (50% of stock ownership by <strong>the</strong> public, and 50% by authorized carriers)<br />
is satisfactory.<br />
2. That <strong>the</strong> new corporation should be authorized to own ground stations, without<br />
preventing individual carriers from also [2] owning such terminals, and that it<br />
would be best if <strong>the</strong> legislation left <strong>the</strong> decision as to ground station ownership up<br />
to a finding of public interest, convenience, and necessity on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> FCC,<br />
without any language in <strong>the</strong> bill which would prejudice or influence <strong>the</strong> FCC’s<br />
decision in any individual case.<br />
3. That legislation should not be delayed any longer than absolutely necessary.<br />
4. That it makes no difference whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> new legislation becomes a separate<br />
statute (which you had proposed) or takes <strong>the</strong> form of amendment to <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Act or to <strong>the</strong> Space Act, and that this is a matter for <strong>the</strong><br />
Congress to determine.<br />
Attached for possible reference is my recent testimony on <strong>the</strong> major changes made in
your bill and some of <strong>the</strong> major aspects of <strong>the</strong> proposed legislation.<br />
Attachment<br />
Document I-18<br />
[1] Public Law 87-624<br />
87th Congress, H.R. 11040<br />
August 31, 1962<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 77<br />
An Act<br />
76 STAT. 419<br />
[hand-signed] E.C. Welsh<br />
To provide for <strong>the</strong> establishment, ownership, operation, and regulation of a<br />
commercial communications satellite system, and for o<strong>the</strong>r purposes.<br />
Be it enacted by <strong>the</strong> Senate and House of Representatives of <strong>the</strong> United States of America in<br />
Congress assembled,<br />
TITLE I—SHORT TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND DEFINITIONS<br />
SHORT TITLE<br />
SEC. 101. This act may be cited as <strong>the</strong> “Communications Satellite Communications Act of<br />
1962” [citation in margin: “Communication Satellite Act of 1962”].<br />
DECLARATION OF POLICY AND PURPOSE<br />
SEC. 102. (a) The Congress hereby declares that it is <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States to<br />
establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with o<strong>the</strong>r countries, as expeditiously practicable<br />
a commercial communications satellite system, as part of an improved global communications<br />
network, which will be responsive to public needs and national objectives,<br />
which will serve <strong>the</strong> communication needs of <strong>the</strong> United States and o<strong>the</strong>r countries, and<br />
which will contribute to world peace and understanding.<br />
(b) The new and expanded telecommunication services are to be made available as<br />
promptly as possible and are to be extended to provide global coverage at <strong>the</strong> earliest<br />
practicable date. In effectuating this program, care and attention will be directed toward<br />
providing such services to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those<br />
more highly developed, toward efficient and economical use of <strong>the</strong> electromagnetic frequency<br />
spectrum, and toward <strong>the</strong> reflection of <strong>the</strong> benefits of this new technology in both<br />
quality of services and charges for such services.<br />
(c) In order to facilitate this development and to provide for <strong>the</strong> widest possible participation<br />
by private enterprises United States participation in <strong>the</strong> global system shall be<br />
in <strong>the</strong> form of a private corporation, subject to appropriate governmental regulation. It is<br />
<strong>the</strong> intent of Congress that all authorized users shall have nondiscriminatory access to <strong>the</strong><br />
system; that maximum competition be maintained in <strong>the</strong> provision of equipment and ser-
78<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
vices utilized by <strong>the</strong> system; that <strong>the</strong> corporation created under this Act be so organized<br />
and operated as to maintain and streng<strong>the</strong>n competition in <strong>the</strong> provision of communications<br />
services to <strong>the</strong> public; and that <strong>the</strong> activities of <strong>the</strong> corporation created under this<br />
Act and or <strong>the</strong> persons or companies participating in <strong>the</strong> ownership of <strong>the</strong> corporation<br />
shall be consistent with <strong>the</strong> Federal antitrust laws.<br />
(d) It is not <strong>the</strong> intent of Congress by this Act to preclude <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
satellite system for domestic communication services where consistent with <strong>the</strong><br />
provisions of this Act nor to preclude <strong>the</strong> creation of additional communications satellite<br />
systems, if required to meet unique governmental needs or if o<strong>the</strong>rwise required in <strong>the</strong><br />
national interest.<br />
DEFINITIONS<br />
SEC. 103. As used in this Act, and unless <strong>the</strong> context o<strong>the</strong>rwise requires-<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> term “communications satellite system” refers to a system of communications<br />
satellites in space whose purpose is to relay telecommunication information<br />
between satellite terminal stations, [2] toge<strong>the</strong>r with such associated<br />
equipment and facilities for tracking, guidance, control, and command functions<br />
as are not part of <strong>the</strong> generalized launching, tracking, control, and command<br />
facilities for all space purposes;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> term “satellite terminal station” refers to a complex of communication<br />
equipment located on <strong>the</strong> earth’s surface, operationally connected with one<br />
or more terrestrial communication systems, and capable of transmitting<br />
telecommunications to or receiving telecommunications from a communications<br />
satellite system.<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> term “communications satellite” means an earth satellite which is intentionally<br />
used to relay telecommunication information;<br />
(4) <strong>the</strong> term “associated equipment and facilities” refers to facilities o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
satellite terminal stations and communications satellites, to be constructed<br />
and operated for <strong>the</strong> primary purpose of a communications satellite system,<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r for administration and management, for research and development,<br />
or for direct support of space operations;<br />
(5) <strong>the</strong> term “research and development” refers to <strong>the</strong> conception, design, and<br />
first creation of experimental or prototype operational devices for <strong>the</strong> operation<br />
of a communications satellite system, including <strong>the</strong> assembly of separate<br />
components into a working whole, as distinguished from <strong>the</strong> term “production,”<br />
which relates to <strong>the</strong> construction of such devices to fixed specifications<br />
compatible with repetitive duplication for operational applications;<br />
(6) <strong>the</strong> term “telecommunication” means any transmission emission or reception<br />
of signs, signals, writings, images, and sounds or intelligence of any nature by<br />
wire, radio, optical, or o<strong>the</strong>r electromagnetic systems;<br />
(7) <strong>the</strong> term “communications common carrier” has <strong>the</strong> same meaning as <strong>the</strong><br />
term “common carrier” has when used in <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934,<br />
as amended, and in addition includes, but only for purposes of sections 303<br />
and 304 [citation in margin: “48 Stat. 1064; 47 USC 609”], any individual,<br />
partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, corporation, or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
entity which owns or controls, directly or indirectly, or is under direct or indirect<br />
common control with, any such carrier; and <strong>the</strong> term “authorized carrier,”<br />
except o<strong>the</strong>rwise provided for purposes of section 304 by section 304 (b)<br />
(1), means a communications common carrier which has been authorized by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission under <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 79<br />
1934, as amended, to provide services by means of communications satellites;<br />
(8) <strong>the</strong> term “corporation” means <strong>the</strong> corporation authorized by title III of this<br />
Act.<br />
(9) <strong>the</strong> term “Administration” means <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration; and<br />
(10) <strong>the</strong> term “Commission” means <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission.<br />
[3] TITLE II—FEDERAL COORDINATION, PLANNING, AND REGULATION<br />
IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY<br />
SEC. 201. In order to achieve <strong>the</strong> objectives and to carry out <strong>the</strong> purposes of this Act—<br />
(a) <strong>the</strong> President shall—<br />
(1) aid in <strong>the</strong> planning and development and foster <strong>the</strong> execution of a national<br />
program for <strong>the</strong> establishment and operation, as expeditiously as possible, of<br />
a commercial communications satellite system;<br />
(2) provide for continuous review of all phases of <strong>the</strong> development and operation<br />
of such a system, including <strong>the</strong> activities of a communications satellite corporation<br />
authorized under title III of this Act;<br />
(3) coordinate <strong>the</strong> activities of governmental agencies with responsibilities in <strong>the</strong><br />
field of telecommunication, so as to [e]nsure that <strong>the</strong>re is full and effective<br />
compliance at all times with <strong>the</strong> policies set forth in this Act;<br />
(4) exercise such supervision over relationships of <strong>the</strong> corporation with foreign<br />
governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to<br />
assure that such relationships shall be consistent with <strong>the</strong> national interest<br />
and foreign policy of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(5) [e]nsure that timely arrangements are made under which <strong>the</strong>re can be foreign<br />
participation in <strong>the</strong> establishment and use of a communications satellite<br />
system;<br />
(6) take all necessary steps to [e]nsure <strong>the</strong> availability and appropriate utilization<br />
of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system for general governmental purposes<br />
except where a separate communications satellite system is required to meet<br />
unique governmental needs, or is o<strong>the</strong>rwise required in <strong>the</strong> national interest;<br />
and<br />
(7) so exercise his authority as to help attain coordinated and efficient use of <strong>the</strong><br />
electromagnetic spectrum and <strong>the</strong> technical compatibility of <strong>the</strong> system with<br />
existing communications facilities both in <strong>the</strong> United States and abroad.<br />
(b) <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall—<br />
(1) advise <strong>the</strong> Commission on technical characteristics of <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
satellite system;<br />
(2) cooperate with <strong>the</strong> corporation in research and development to <strong>the</strong> extent<br />
deemed appropriate by <strong>the</strong> Administration in <strong>the</strong> public interest;<br />
(3) assist <strong>the</strong> corporation in <strong>the</strong> conduct of its research and development program<br />
by furnishing to <strong>the</strong> corporation, when requested, on a reimbursable<br />
basis, such satellite launching and associated services as <strong>the</strong> Administration<br />
deems necessary for <strong>the</strong> most expeditious and economical development of<br />
<strong>the</strong> communications satellite system;<br />
(4) consult with <strong>the</strong> corporation with respect to <strong>the</strong> technical characteristics of<br />
<strong>the</strong> communications satellite system;<br />
(5) furnish to <strong>the</strong> corporation, on request and on a reimbursable basis, satellite<br />
launching and associated services required for <strong>the</strong> establishment operation,<br />
and maintenance of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system approved by <strong>the</strong>
80<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Commission; and<br />
[4] (6) to <strong>the</strong> extent feasible, furnish o<strong>the</strong>r services, on a reimbursable basis, to <strong>the</strong> corporation<br />
in connection with <strong>the</strong> establishment and operation of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
(c) <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission, in its administration of <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and as supplemented by this Act, shall<br />
[citation in margin: “48 Stat. 1064; 47 USC 609”]—<br />
(1) [e]nsure effective competition, including <strong>the</strong> use of competitive bidding<br />
where appropriate, in <strong>the</strong> procurement by <strong>the</strong> corporation and communications<br />
common carriers of apparatus, equipment, and services required for <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment and operation of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system and<br />
satellite terminal stations; and <strong>the</strong> Commission shall consult with <strong>the</strong> Small<br />
Business Administration and solicit its recommendations on measures and<br />
procedures which will [e]nsure that small business concerns are given an<br />
equitable opportunity to share in <strong>the</strong> procurement program of <strong>the</strong> corporation<br />
for property and services, including but not limited to research, development,<br />
construction, maintenance, and repair;<br />
(2) [e]nsure that all present and future authorized carriers shall have nondiscriminatory<br />
use of, and equitable access to, <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system<br />
and satellite terminal stations under just and reasonable charges,<br />
classifications, practices, regulations, and o<strong>the</strong>r terms and conditions and regulate<br />
<strong>the</strong> manner in which available facilities of <strong>the</strong> system and stations are<br />
allocated among such users <strong>the</strong>reof;<br />
(3) in any case where <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State, after obtaining <strong>the</strong> advice of <strong>the</strong><br />
Administration as to technical feasibility, has advised that commercial communication<br />
to a particular foreign point by means of <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
satellite system and satellite terminal stations should be established in <strong>the</strong><br />
national interest, institute forthwith appropriate proceedings under section<br />
214 (d) of <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended [citation in margin:<br />
“57 Stat. 12; 47 USC 214”], to require <strong>the</strong> establishment of such communication<br />
by <strong>the</strong> corporation and <strong>the</strong> appropriate common carrier or carriers;<br />
(4) [e]nsure that facilities of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system and satellite<br />
terminal stations are technically compatible and interconnected operationally<br />
with each o<strong>the</strong>r and with existing communications facilities;<br />
(5) prescribe such accounting regulations and systems and engage in such<br />
ratemaking procedures as will [e]nsure that any economies made possible by<br />
a communications satellite system are appropriately reflected in rates for public<br />
communication services;<br />
(6) approve technical characteristics of <strong>the</strong> operational communications satellite<br />
system to be employed by <strong>the</strong> corporation and of <strong>the</strong> satellite terminal stations;<br />
(7) grant appropriate authorizations for <strong>the</strong> construction and operation of each<br />
satellite terminal station, ei<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> corporation or to one or more authorized<br />
carriers or to <strong>the</strong> corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as<br />
will best serve <strong>the</strong> public interest, convenience, and necessity. In determining<br />
<strong>the</strong> public interest, convenience, and necessity <strong>the</strong> Commission shall authorize<br />
<strong>the</strong> construction and operation of such stations by communications common<br />
carriers or <strong>the</strong> corporation, without preference to ei<strong>the</strong>r;<br />
(8) authorize <strong>the</strong> corporation to issue any shares of capital stock, except <strong>the</strong> initial<br />
issue of capital stock referred to in section 304 (a), or to borrow any moneys,<br />
or to assume any [5] obligation in respect of <strong>the</strong> securities of any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
person, upon a finding that such issuance, borrowing, or assumption is compatible<br />
with <strong>the</strong> public interest, convenience, and necessity and is necessary
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 81<br />
or appropriate for or consistent with carrying out <strong>the</strong> purposes and objectives<br />
of this Act by <strong>the</strong> corporation;<br />
(9) [e]nsure that no substantial additions are made by <strong>the</strong> corporation or carriers<br />
with respect to facilities of <strong>the</strong> system or satellite terminal stations unless such<br />
additions are required by <strong>the</strong> public interest, convenience, and necessity;<br />
(10) require, in accordance with <strong>the</strong> procedural requirements of section 214 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended [citation in margin: “57 Stat.<br />
11; 47 USC 214”], that additions be made by <strong>the</strong> corporation or carriers with<br />
respect to facilities of <strong>the</strong> system or satellite terminal stations where such<br />
additions would serve <strong>the</strong> public interest, convenience, and necessity; and<br />
(11) make rules and regulations to carry out <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act.<br />
TITLE III—CREATION OF A COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION<br />
CREATION OF CORPORATION<br />
SEC. 301. There is hereby authorized to be created a communications satellite corporation<br />
for profit which will not be an agency or establishment of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government. The corporation shall be subject to <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act and, to <strong>the</strong><br />
extent consistent with this Act, to <strong>the</strong> District of Columbia Business Corporation Act. The<br />
right to repeal, alter, or amend this Act at any time is expressly reserved [citation in margin:<br />
“68 Stat. 177; D.C. Code 29-901”].<br />
PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION<br />
SEC 302. The President of <strong>the</strong> United States shall appoint incorporators, by and with <strong>the</strong><br />
advice and consent of <strong>the</strong> Senate, who shall serve as <strong>the</strong> initial board of directors until <strong>the</strong><br />
first annual meeting of stockholders or until <strong>the</strong>ir successors are elected and qualified.<br />
Such incorporators shall arrange for an initial stock offering and take whatever o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
actions are necessary to establish <strong>the</strong> corporation, including <strong>the</strong> filing of articles of incorporation,<br />
as approved by <strong>the</strong> President.<br />
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS<br />
SEC. 303. (a) The corporation shall have a board of directors consisting of individuals<br />
who are citizens of <strong>the</strong> United States, of whom one shall be elected annually by <strong>the</strong> board<br />
to serve as chairman. Three members of <strong>the</strong> board shall be appointed by <strong>the</strong> President of<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States, by and with <strong>the</strong> advice and consent of <strong>the</strong> Senate, effective <strong>the</strong> date on<br />
which <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r members are elected, and for terms of three years or until <strong>the</strong>ir successors<br />
have been appointed and qualified, except that <strong>the</strong> first three members of <strong>the</strong> board<br />
so appointed shall continue in office for terms of one, two, and three years, respectively,<br />
and any member so appointed to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for <strong>the</strong> unexpired<br />
term of <strong>the</strong> director whom he succeeds. Six members of <strong>the</strong> board shall be elected annually<br />
by those stockholders who are communications common carriers and six shall be<br />
elected annually by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r stockholders of <strong>the</strong> corporation. No stockholder who is a<br />
communications common carrier and no trustee for such a stockholder shall vote, ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
directly or indirectly, through <strong>the</strong> votes of subsidiaries or affiliated companies, nominees,<br />
or any persons subject to [6] his direction or control, for more than three candidates for<br />
membership on <strong>the</strong> board. Subject to such limitation, <strong>the</strong> articles of incorporation to be<br />
filed by <strong>the</strong> incorporators designated under section 302 shall provide for cumulative voting<br />
under section 27 (d) of <strong>the</strong> District of Columbia Business Corporation Act (D.C.
82<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Code, sec. 29-911 (d)) [citation in margin: “68 Stat. 191”].<br />
(b) The corporation shall have a president, and such o<strong>the</strong>r officers as may be named<br />
and appointed by <strong>the</strong> board, at rates of compensation fixed by <strong>the</strong> board, and serving at<br />
<strong>the</strong> pleasure of <strong>the</strong> board. No individual o<strong>the</strong>r than a citizen of <strong>the</strong> United States may be<br />
an officer of <strong>the</strong> corporation. No officer of <strong>the</strong> corporation shall receive any salary from<br />
any source o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> corporation during <strong>the</strong> period of his employment by <strong>the</strong> corporation.<br />
FINANCING OF THE CORPORATION<br />
SEC 304. (a) The corporation is authorized to issue and have outstanding, in such<br />
amounts as it shall determine, shares of capital stock, without par value, which shall carry<br />
voting rights and be eligible for dividends. The shares of such stock initially offered shall<br />
be sold at a price not in excess of $100 for each share and in a manner to encourage <strong>the</strong><br />
widest distribution to <strong>the</strong> American public. Subject to <strong>the</strong> provisions of subsections (b)<br />
and (d) of this section, shares of stock offered under this subsection may be issued to and<br />
held by any person.<br />
(b) (1) For <strong>the</strong> purposes of this section <strong>the</strong> term “authorized carrier” [note in margin:<br />
“Authorized carrier”] shall mean a communications common carrier<br />
which is specifically authorized or which is a member of a class of carriers<br />
authorized by <strong>the</strong> Commission to own shares of stock in <strong>the</strong> corporation<br />
upon a finding that such ownership will be consistent with <strong>the</strong> public interest,<br />
convenience, and necessity.<br />
(2) Only those communications common carriers which are authorized carriers<br />
shall own shares of stock in <strong>the</strong> corporation at any time, and no o<strong>the</strong>r communications<br />
common carrier shall own shares ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or indirectly<br />
through subsidiaries or affiliated companies, nominees, or any persons subject<br />
to its direction or control. Fifty per centum of <strong>the</strong> shares of stock authorized<br />
for issuance at any time by <strong>the</strong> corporation shall be reserved for<br />
purchase by authorized carriers and such carriers shall in <strong>the</strong> aggregate be<br />
entitled to make purchases of <strong>the</strong> reserved shares in a total number not<br />
exceeding <strong>the</strong> total number of <strong>the</strong> nonreserved shares of any issue purchased<br />
by o<strong>the</strong>r persons. At no time after <strong>the</strong> initial issue is completed shall <strong>the</strong><br />
aggregate of <strong>the</strong> shares of voting stock of <strong>the</strong> corporation owned by authorized<br />
carriers directly or indirectly through subsidiaries or affiliated companies,<br />
nominees, or any persons subject to <strong>the</strong>ir direction or control exceed 50<br />
per centum of such shares issued and outstanding.<br />
(3) At no time shall any stockholder who is not an authorized carrier, or any syndicate<br />
or affiliated group of such stockholders, own more than 10 per centum<br />
of <strong>the</strong> shares of voting stock of <strong>the</strong> corporation issued and outstanding.<br />
(c) The corporation is authorized to issue, in addition to <strong>the</strong> stock authorized by subsection<br />
(a) of this section, nonvoting securities, bonds, debentures, and o<strong>the</strong>r certificates<br />
of indebtedness as it may determine. Such nonvoting securities, bonds, debentures, or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r certificates of indebtedness of <strong>the</strong> corporation as a communications common carrier<br />
may own shall be eligible for inclusion in <strong>the</strong> rate base of <strong>the</strong> carrier to <strong>the</strong> extent<br />
allowed by <strong>the</strong> Commission. The voting [7] stock of <strong>the</strong> corporation shall not be eligible<br />
for inclusion in <strong>the</strong> rate base of <strong>the</strong> carrier.<br />
(d) Not more than an aggregate of 20 per centum of <strong>the</strong> shares of stock of <strong>the</strong> corporation<br />
authorized by subsection (a) of this section which are held by holders o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
authorized carriers may be held by persons of <strong>the</strong> classes described in paragraphs (1), (2),<br />
(3), (4), and (5) of section 310 (a) of <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47
U.S.C. 310) [citation in margin: “48 Stat. 108”].<br />
(e) The requirement of section 45 (b) of <strong>the</strong> District of Columbia Business<br />
Corporation Act (D.C. Code, sec. 29-920 (b)) as to <strong>the</strong> percentage of stock which a stockholder<br />
must hold in order to have <strong>the</strong> rights of inspection and copying set forth in that<br />
subsection shall not be applicable in <strong>the</strong> case of holders of <strong>the</strong> stock of <strong>the</strong> corporation,<br />
and <strong>the</strong>y may exercise such rights without regard to <strong>the</strong> percentage of stock <strong>the</strong>y hold.<br />
(f) Upon application to <strong>the</strong> Commission by any authorized carrier and after notice<br />
and hearing, <strong>the</strong> Commission may compel any o<strong>the</strong>r authorized carrier which owns shares<br />
of stock in <strong>the</strong> corporation to transfer to <strong>the</strong> applicant, for a fair and reasonable consideration,<br />
a number of such shares as <strong>the</strong> Commission determines will advance <strong>the</strong> public interest<br />
and <strong>the</strong> purposes of this Act. In its determination with respect to ownership of shares<br />
of stock in <strong>the</strong> corporation, <strong>the</strong> Commission, whenever consistent with <strong>the</strong> public interest,<br />
shall promote <strong>the</strong> widest possible distribution of stock among <strong>the</strong> authorized carriers.<br />
PURPOSES AND POWERS OF THE CORPORATION<br />
SEC. 305. (a) In order to achieve <strong>the</strong> objectives and to carry out <strong>the</strong> purposes of this Act,<br />
<strong>the</strong> corporation is authorized to—<br />
(1) plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and operate itself or in conjunction<br />
with foreign governments or business entities a commercial communications<br />
satellite system;<br />
(2) furnish, for hire, channels of communication to United States communications<br />
common carriers and to o<strong>the</strong>r authorized entities, foreign and domestic;<br />
and<br />
(3) own and operate satellite terminal stations when licensed by <strong>the</strong> Commission<br />
under section 201 (c) (7).<br />
(b) Included in <strong>the</strong> activities authorized to <strong>the</strong> corporation for accomplishment of<br />
<strong>the</strong> purposes indicated in subsection (a) of this section, are, among o<strong>the</strong>rs not specifically<br />
named—<br />
(1) to conduct or contract for research and development related to its mission;<br />
(2) to acquire <strong>the</strong> physical facilities, equipment and devices necessary to its operations,<br />
including communications satellites and associated equipment and<br />
facilities, whe<strong>the</strong>r by construction, purchase, or gift;<br />
(3) to purchase satellite launching and related services from <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government;<br />
(4) to contract with authorized users, including <strong>the</strong> United States Government,<br />
for <strong>the</strong> services of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system; and<br />
(5) to develop plans for <strong>the</strong> technical specifications of all elements of <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
satellite system.<br />
(c) To carry out <strong>the</strong> foregoing purposes, <strong>the</strong> corporation shall have <strong>the</strong> usual powers<br />
conferred upon a stock corporation by <strong>the</strong> District of Columbia Business Corporation Act<br />
[citation in margin: “68 Stat. 17; D.C. Code 29-901”].<br />
[8] TITLE IV—MlSCELLANEOUS<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 83<br />
APPLICABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934<br />
SEC. 401. The corporation shall be deemed to be a common carrier within <strong>the</strong> meaning<br />
of section 3 (h) of <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and as such shall be fully<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> provisions of title II and title III of that Act [citation in margin: “48 Stat.<br />
1066; 47 USC 153; 48 Stat. 1070; Ante, p. 64; 47 USC 201-222, 301-397”]. The provision of<br />
satellite terminal station facilities by one communication common carrier to one or more
84<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r communications common carriers shall be deemed to be a common carrier activity<br />
fully subject to <strong>the</strong> Communications Act. Whenever <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> provisions of<br />
this Act shall be inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> provisions of <strong>the</strong> Communications<br />
Act, <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act shall govern.<br />
NOTICE OF FOREIGN BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS<br />
SEC. 402. Whenever <strong>the</strong> corporation shall enter into business negotiations with respect to<br />
facilities, operations, or services authorized by this Act with any international or foreign<br />
entity, it shall notify <strong>the</strong> Department of State of <strong>the</strong> negotiations, and <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
State shall advise <strong>the</strong> corporation of relevant foreign policy considerations. Throughout<br />
such negotiations <strong>the</strong> corporation shall keep <strong>the</strong> Department of State informed with<br />
respect to such considerations. The corporation may request <strong>the</strong> Department of State to<br />
assist in <strong>the</strong> negotiations, and that Department shall render such assistance as may be<br />
appropriate.<br />
SANCTIONS<br />
SEC. 403. (a) If <strong>the</strong> corporation created pursuant to this Act shall engage in or adhere to<br />
any action, practices, or policies inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> policy and purposes declared in section<br />
102 of this Act, or if <strong>the</strong> corporation or any o<strong>the</strong>r person shall violate any provision<br />
of this Act, or shall obstruct or interfere with any activities authorized by this Act, or shall<br />
refuse, fail, or neglect to discharge his duties and responsibilities under this Act, or shall<br />
threaten any such violation, obstruction, interference, refusal, failure, or neglect, <strong>the</strong> district<br />
court of <strong>the</strong> United States for any district in which such corporation or o<strong>the</strong>r person<br />
resides, or may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as o<strong>the</strong>rwise prohibited by law,<br />
upon petition of <strong>the</strong> Attorney General of <strong>the</strong> United States, to grant such equitable relief<br />
as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate such conduct or threat.<br />
(b) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving any person of<br />
any punishment, liability, or sanction which may be imposed o<strong>the</strong>rwise than under this<br />
Act.<br />
(c) It shall be <strong>the</strong> duty of <strong>the</strong> corporation and all communications common carriers<br />
to comply, insofar as applicable, with all provisions of this Act and all rules and regulations<br />
promulgated <strong>the</strong>reunder.<br />
REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS<br />
SEC. 404. (a) The President shall transmit to <strong>the</strong> Congress in January of each year a report<br />
which shall include a comprehensive description of <strong>the</strong> activities and accomplishments<br />
during <strong>the</strong> preceding calendar year under <strong>the</strong> national program referred to in section 201<br />
(a) (1), toge<strong>the</strong>r with an evaluation of such activities and accomplishments in terms of <strong>the</strong><br />
attainment of <strong>the</strong> objectives of this Act and any recommendations for additional legislative<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>r action which <strong>the</strong> President may consider necessary or desirable for <strong>the</strong> attainment<br />
of such objectives.<br />
[9] (b) The corporation shall transmit to <strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> Congress, annually and<br />
at such o<strong>the</strong>r times as it deems desirable, a comprehensive and detailed report of its operations,<br />
activities, and accomplishments under this Act.<br />
(c) The Commission shall transmit to <strong>the</strong> Congress, annually and at such o<strong>the</strong>r times<br />
as it deems desirable, (i) a report of its activities and actions on anticompetitive practices<br />
as <strong>the</strong>y apply to <strong>the</strong> communications satellite programs; (ii) an evaluation of such activities<br />
and actions taken by it within <strong>the</strong> scope of its authority with a view to recommending<br />
such additional legislation which <strong>the</strong> Commission may consider necessary in <strong>the</strong> public
interest; and (iii) an evaluation of <strong>the</strong> capital structure of <strong>the</strong> corporation so as to assure<br />
<strong>the</strong> Congress that such structure is consistent with <strong>the</strong> most efficient and economical operation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> corporation.<br />
Approved August 31, 1962, 9:51 a.m.<br />
Document I-19<br />
Document title: Edward A. Bolster, Department of State, to Mr. Johnson, Memorandum,<br />
“Space Communication,” May 3, 1962, with attached: “Role of <strong>the</strong> Department of State in<br />
Space Communication Development.”<br />
Source: Record Group 59, General Records of <strong>the</strong> Department of State, Archives II,<br />
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> debate over <strong>the</strong> organization and ownership of <strong>the</strong> U.S. communications satellite system heated<br />
up in mid-1962, <strong>the</strong> question of <strong>the</strong> relationship of that system to <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> world’s communications<br />
entities was also beginning to be addressed. This internal State Department memorandum<br />
summarizes, for an official of <strong>the</strong> Department’s Economic Bureau (organizational code “E”), <strong>the</strong> state<br />
of affairs in May 1962.<br />
Memorandum<br />
TO: E - Mr. Johnson DATE: May 3, 1962<br />
FROM: TRC - Edward A. Bolster<br />
SUBJECT: Space Communication<br />
The attached material summarizes <strong>the</strong> Department’s interest and responsibilities in<br />
<strong>the</strong> space communications field. As you know, Phil Farley’s office (Special Assistant for<br />
Atomic Energy and Outer Space) is to be abolished soon; responsibility within <strong>the</strong><br />
Department for communication satellite matters will probably be transferred to E. I suggest<br />
that you obtain Mr. Farley’s comments on this subject within <strong>the</strong> next few days, since<br />
he will be leaving in <strong>the</strong> near future for his assignment in Paris.<br />
Dr. Irvin Stewart, Director of Telecommunications Management, wishes to meet with<br />
you as soon as possible to discuss your mutual interest in certain aspects of communications<br />
policy. I suggest that you arrange such a meeting soon and that we brief you orally<br />
in advance.<br />
You will recall that Senator Pastore told Under Secretary McGhee that he would like<br />
to meet with you at your convenience to discuss <strong>the</strong> Department’s handling of communications<br />
policy matters.<br />
[attachment, page 1]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 85<br />
**********
86<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Role of <strong>the</strong> Department of State in Space<br />
Communication Development<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> earliest instances of <strong>the</strong> Department’s participation in space communication<br />
problems was in <strong>the</strong> preparation for and participation in <strong>the</strong> 1958 Los Angeles<br />
Assembly of <strong>the</strong> International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) at which significant<br />
technical recommendations were formulated, particularly with regard to problems of<br />
radio frequency selection and use by such systems. During this time and immediately following<br />
that meeting, those concerned with regulatory problems also assisted <strong>the</strong><br />
Department in formulating U.S. proposals for <strong>the</strong> 1959 Geneva International Radio<br />
Conference. These proposals were substantially non-controversial, although <strong>the</strong>y did elicit<br />
lively discussions at <strong>the</strong> Conference and required some special meetings in Washington<br />
during <strong>the</strong> Conference in order to resolve certain differences involving radio astronomy.<br />
These were of such concern that <strong>the</strong> Science Advisor to <strong>the</strong> President became involved at<br />
one point. The issue related to <strong>the</strong> recognition of space research as compared with radio<br />
astronomy in <strong>the</strong> international table of frequency allocations. A reasonably satisfactory<br />
solution was developed in which <strong>the</strong> Department played a major role in bringing <strong>the</strong><br />
opposing views toge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Following <strong>the</strong> Geneva Conference <strong>the</strong> Department was immediately involved in policy<br />
development plans with various agencies. It worked with NASA in clearing frequencies<br />
with foreign countries in connection with tracking satellites, with <strong>the</strong> FCC and<br />
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) in space frequency use planning, and<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences in <strong>the</strong> issuance on March<br />
19, 1960 of a study of “Radio Frequency Control in Space Telecommunications” by Dr.<br />
Edward Wenk, Jr. The private companies, especially AT&T, were becoming interested in<br />
<strong>the</strong> potentialities of relay by satellite. [handwritten underlining] In fact, <strong>the</strong> pace became<br />
so rapid that it was necessary on September 30, 1960 for <strong>the</strong> Telecommunication<br />
Coordinating Committee (TCC), advisory to <strong>the</strong> Department, to request those companies<br />
known to be active not to “make any commitments to foreign entities pending fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
advice as to <strong>the</strong> promulgation of relevant policies which will guide and govern such activities.”<br />
It [handwritten underlining] <strong>the</strong>n set up a committee to develop such policies<br />
under <strong>the</strong> chairmanship of FCC Commissioner T.A.M. Craven. Membership on this committee<br />
included those involved in o<strong>the</strong>r groups also developing various aspects of space<br />
communication policy nor necessarily directly related to international affairs. For example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> IRAC/FCC began developing coordinated views on <strong>the</strong> radio frequencies needed<br />
for operational (as distinct from research) use of space. On December 4, 1960, <strong>the</strong><br />
[page 2, handwritten underlining] Senate Space Committee issued a second report on<br />
“Policy Planning for Space Telecommunications” largely based on replies from Executive<br />
Branch Agencies to inquiries from <strong>the</strong> Committee based on questions posed in <strong>the</strong> March<br />
report.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> AT&T had replied on October 21, 1960 to <strong>the</strong> FCC for authority to<br />
operate a communications satellite system.<br />
On December 31, 1960, President Eisenhower issued a communication satellite policy<br />
statement urging that <strong>the</strong> Government aggressively encourage private enterprise in <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment and operation of a revenue producing system and directing <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration to cooperate closely with <strong>the</strong> FCC in facilitating<br />
this objective. In January 1961 <strong>the</strong> FCC licensed ITT and AT&T for communication satellite<br />
experiments.<br />
The National Aeronautics and Space Council was reactivated as a result of an amend-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 87<br />
ment on April 25, 1961 to <strong>the</strong> 1958 Space Act which, among o<strong>the</strong>r things, made <strong>the</strong> Vice<br />
President Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council. On July 24, 1961, President Kennedy issued a new<br />
communication satellite policy prepared by <strong>the</strong> Council. It is <strong>the</strong> current basic policy in<br />
<strong>the</strong> field and will be found on pages 45 and 46 of . . . “Communication Satellites:<br />
Technical, Economic and International Developments.”* It confirmed <strong>the</strong> policy of ownership<br />
and operations to be in private hands and Government responsibility to encourage<br />
research developments, provide launching facilities and exercise regulatory functions<br />
including <strong>the</strong> obligation to “examine with o<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>the</strong> most constructive role for<br />
<strong>the</strong> United Nations, including <strong>the</strong> ITU (International Telecommunications Union) in<br />
international space communications. Foreign participation in <strong>the</strong> system would be provided<br />
“through ownership or o<strong>the</strong>rwise.” The Space Council has <strong>the</strong> responsibility for policy<br />
coordination and for making recommendations to <strong>the</strong> President concerning actions<br />
needed “to achieve full and prompt compliance with <strong>the</strong> policy.”<br />
The TCC Space Communication Subcommittee had, in April, formulated an initial<br />
draft statement of policy and on June 1, 1961, this was circulated on an Official Use Only<br />
basis to <strong>the</strong> TCC Members noting that, because related studies were being conducted in<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r areas of <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch, <strong>the</strong> Department did not propose fur<strong>the</strong>r consideration<br />
of <strong>the</strong> matter at <strong>the</strong> time. It is, however, desirable to summarize its conclusions:<br />
[page 3] 1. The development of communication satellites should be a national objective<br />
and immediate action was required.<br />
2. It should be accomplished by joint efforts of Government and private enterprise.<br />
3. The new system should supplement, not replace, existing systems.<br />
4. It should be privately owned and Government regulated.<br />
5. Existing and future common carriers should have non-discriminatory access to<br />
<strong>the</strong> system.<br />
6. O<strong>the</strong>r nations should participate in <strong>the</strong> civil system.<br />
7. The civil system should meet all Government needs normally provided by privately<br />
owned communication systems.<br />
8. They should not be subject to special space law.<br />
9. The International Telecommunication Union should serve as <strong>the</strong> principal international<br />
organization in this field.<br />
10. Interim installation of key message centers is desirable pending establishment of<br />
direct circuits.<br />
11. The possibility of global TV and radio relay via communication satellites should<br />
be emphasized.<br />
Also on June 5, 1961 <strong>the</strong> FCC met with <strong>the</strong> commercial communications carriers in<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>rance of its Docket 14024 regarding <strong>the</strong> form of ownership which might be appropriate<br />
to an international communication satellite system. An Ad Hoc Committee was<br />
formed which reported in October . . . in favor of a joint venture non-profit corporation<br />
with ownership limited to <strong>the</strong> carriers, access by all carriers needing <strong>the</strong> service, and participation<br />
by foreign carriers “by ownership or o<strong>the</strong>rwise” as provided in <strong>the</strong> President’s<br />
policy of July 24.<br />
On January 11, 1962 Senator Robert Kerr, Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Senate Space Committee,<br />
introduced a bill, S.2650 . . . in <strong>the</strong> Senate providing for private ownership and leaving to<br />
<strong>the</strong> FCC (which had stated its preference for ownership limited to <strong>the</strong> carriers) <strong>the</strong><br />
approval of <strong>the</strong> owners.<br />
[page 4] Considerable opposition had been expressed by <strong>the</strong> Department of Justice and<br />
* It may be of interest to note that this document was prepared under <strong>the</strong> direction of Mr. MacQuivery<br />
of TD who was detailed from <strong>the</strong> Department to <strong>the</strong> Senate Space Committee [rest of <strong>the</strong> sentence is illegible].
88<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
some non-carriers to <strong>the</strong> restriction in ownership on <strong>the</strong> basis that this would form an<br />
undesirable monopoly and this view prevailed in <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch during <strong>the</strong> fall of<br />
1961. The Space Council coordinated a draft bill which was forwarded by <strong>the</strong> President to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Congress and introduced as S.2814 on February 7, 1962. . . . It would have provided<br />
for two classes of stock, one of which could be purchased by <strong>the</strong> general public and <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> carriers. A third point of view was expressed by a ra<strong>the</strong>r small group of<br />
Congressmen in favor of Government ownership of <strong>the</strong> system. Congressman William Fitts<br />
Ryan represented this group and introduced H.R. 9907 in support of this view.<br />
Although specific legislation was not introduced until January 1962, hearings had<br />
been held before various Congressional committees beginning with that before <strong>the</strong> House<br />
Committee on Science and Astronautics in May 1961. The Department testified before<br />
this Committee and since <strong>the</strong>n has testified before <strong>the</strong> Senate Commerce Subcommittee<br />
on Communications, <strong>the</strong> Senate Small Business Subcommittee on Monopoly, <strong>the</strong> Senate<br />
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, <strong>the</strong> Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on<br />
Anti-trust and Monopoly, <strong>the</strong> Senate Commerce Committee and <strong>the</strong> Subcommittee on<br />
Communications of <strong>the</strong> House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The<br />
principal witnesses for <strong>the</strong> Department were Under Secretary George McGhee and Philip<br />
Farley, Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> Secretary for Atomic Energy and Outer Space (S/AE).<br />
Primary responsibility in <strong>the</strong> Department for space communications had been delegated<br />
to S/AE although representatives of E usually accompanied <strong>the</strong> witnesses from <strong>the</strong><br />
Department when <strong>the</strong>y testified, and S/AE consulted TRC when ITU matters were<br />
involved. It is understood, however, that with <strong>the</strong> planned dissolution of S/AE, primary<br />
responsibility will be transferred to E.<br />
The foregoing discussion has related primarily to domestic developments. They are<br />
basic to, and influence greatly, international developments, however. In addition to preparation<br />
of positions for <strong>the</strong> CCIR Los Angeles and ITU Geneva Conferences, <strong>the</strong><br />
Department is actively concerned now with preparation for <strong>the</strong> projected ITU<br />
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Radiocommunications expected<br />
to be held in Geneva in <strong>the</strong> fall of 1963. Frequency proposals have tentatively been<br />
agreed in <strong>the</strong> FCC/IRAC and circulated by <strong>the</strong> Department to missions in all ITU<br />
Member countries as “Preliminary Views of <strong>the</strong> U.S. on <strong>the</strong> Allocation of Radio<br />
Frequencies for Space Radiocommunication.” . . . Response to this effect is just beginning<br />
to be significant.<br />
[page 5] The U.S. was host to an international meeting of Study Group IV (on Space) of<br />
<strong>the</strong> CCIR in Washington in March 1962. In review and amplification of <strong>the</strong> Los Angeles<br />
actions, fur<strong>the</strong>r scientific and technical recommendations were adopted on various space<br />
communication problems.<br />
On March 7, 1962, <strong>the</strong> President sent a letter to Mr. Khrushchev to which <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
replied on March 20 concerning cooperation in outer space. Related talks were initiated<br />
in New York on March 27 between Deputy Director Hugh Dryden of NASA and Mr.<br />
Blagonravov of <strong>the</strong> USSR. Communication satellite cooperation was specifically considered<br />
and it is expected that this will lead to fur<strong>the</strong>r contact between <strong>the</strong> two administrations<br />
in this particular area.<br />
Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most significant and current international problem in this area is <strong>the</strong> relation<br />
of space communications to o<strong>the</strong>r space questions before <strong>the</strong> United Nations, particularly<br />
involving <strong>the</strong> U.N. Committee on <strong>the</strong> Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After nearly<br />
two years of dormancy, at least partially due to <strong>the</strong> refusal of <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R. to participate,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee was reactivated and given a new lease on life in November 1961. On<br />
December 20, 1961 <strong>the</strong> General Assembly adopted unanimously U.N. Res. 1721 (XVI)<br />
dealing with space. . . . Section D of that resolution involves communication satellites and<br />
designates <strong>the</strong> ITU as <strong>the</strong> responsible agency in this area. After noting plans for <strong>the</strong> 1963<br />
extraordinary conference it recommends “that <strong>the</strong> ITU consider at this conference those
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 89<br />
aspects of space communication in which international cooperation will be required. . . .”<br />
[T]his implied invitation to expand <strong>the</strong> agenda of <strong>the</strong> EARC beyond consideration of<br />
radio frequency allocations and is currently a controversial issue in <strong>the</strong> U.S. The Bureau<br />
of International Organization Affairs (IO) has had <strong>the</strong> primary responsibility for preparation<br />
and coordination of positions for <strong>the</strong> U.N. discussions and is currently very interested<br />
in implementation of U.N. Res. 1721 as regards <strong>the</strong> ITU. Deputy Assistant Secretary<br />
Gardner of IO plans to participate in current meetings of <strong>the</strong> Administrative Council of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ITU at Geneva at which Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf of TRC represents <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
In summary, <strong>the</strong> principal issues involving <strong>the</strong> Department as regards space communications<br />
at present are (1) development of <strong>the</strong> U.S. position as regards <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
role of <strong>the</strong> ITU in this area in relation to our obligations under <strong>the</strong> U.N. Resolution; (2)<br />
development of <strong>the</strong> U.S. positions to be taken at <strong>the</strong> ITU Extraordinary Administrative<br />
Radio Conference planned for 1963, in Geneva; [page 6] (3) determination of <strong>the</strong> manner<br />
in which to approach o<strong>the</strong>r interested administrations in <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong><br />
international communication satellite system (as distinct from <strong>the</strong> U.S. position itself) and<br />
(4) how US/USSR joint efforts in <strong>the</strong> development of communication satellites could be<br />
moved forward in accordance with <strong>the</strong> Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters.<br />
In addition to <strong>the</strong> communication satellite report, attached also is a statement of <strong>the</strong><br />
Department’s position presented by Under Secretary McGhee before <strong>the</strong> Subcommittee<br />
on Anti-trust and Monopoly of <strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on <strong>the</strong> Judiciary on March 30, 1962.<br />
Document I-20<br />
Document title: Project Telstar, “Preliminary Report, Telstar I, July–September 1962,”<br />
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 1962.<br />
Source: AT&T Archives, Warren, New Jersey (used with permission).<br />
Telstar I was built and paid for by American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which wanted to<br />
investigate <strong>the</strong> viability of a communications system that used a constellation of medium-altitude satellites.<br />
When Telstar I was launched on July 10, 1962, it became <strong>the</strong> first real-time active communications<br />
satellite and broadcast live television between <strong>the</strong> United States and England and France. This<br />
was a considerable advance over previous experiments, which had involved only voice and data communications<br />
using store and forward satellites such as Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay<br />
Equipment (SCORE) and Courier. It demonstrated <strong>the</strong> attractiveness of satellites compared to undersea<br />
cables for transatlantic communications. But it also demonstrated <strong>the</strong> limitations of a medium-altitude<br />
satellite, which only stayed in view of a ground station for a brief amount of time. Telstar I had a fourmonth<br />
life span. The following are excerpts of two of <strong>the</strong> sections of Telstar I’s preliminary report.<br />
PROJECT TELSTAR<br />
Preliminary Report<br />
Telstar I<br />
JULY – SEPTEMBER 1962<br />
PREPARED BY<br />
BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, INC.<br />
[3] SECTION 1—OBJECTIVES AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN
90<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The feasibility of communicating by satellites was demonstrated by NASA’s Project<br />
Echo in 1960 and also by Projects Courier and Score. In March 1959, Messrs. J. R. Pierce<br />
and R. Kompfner of Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated wrote a paper showing<br />
<strong>the</strong> feasibility of an active broadband satellite communications repeater. This started<br />
Project Telstar.<br />
Objectives<br />
In general terms, <strong>the</strong> Telstar Communications Experiment is intended to advance <strong>the</strong><br />
entire area of communications by satellite. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> experiment is intended to do<br />
five things.<br />
1. The first objective is to test an actual broadband communications satellite. The<br />
Telstar satellite was originally intended for experiments in telephony, data transmission,<br />
and single-channel television. While not primarily designed for two-way<br />
telephony, <strong>the</strong> system could provide 60 simultaneous conversations.<br />
2. A second objective is to test <strong>the</strong> reliability of electronics equipment in <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
under <strong>the</strong> stress of launch and <strong>the</strong> environment of space.<br />
3. A third objective is to provide measurements of radiation levels in space; this function<br />
is completely separate from <strong>the</strong> communications experiments.<br />
4. A fourth objective is to provide additional knowledge about <strong>the</strong> best technique<br />
for tracking accurately a moving satellite.<br />
5. A fifth objective is to provide a real-life test for <strong>the</strong> ground-station equipment. . . .<br />
[117] SECTION 5—CONCLUSIONS<br />
FUTURE TELSTAR PROGRAM<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
The results which have been discussed represent <strong>the</strong> current picture of what we have<br />
learned in <strong>the</strong> field of satellite communications. A considerable amount of data has been<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>red on transmission phenomena and propagation. In this area it has been most gratifying<br />
to find that transmission at 4 and 6 kmc is exactly according to <strong>the</strong>ory, and <strong>the</strong>re<br />
has been no fading or multipath effects that have been observed. The transmission of a<br />
variety of signals has indicated that <strong>the</strong> performance of <strong>the</strong> link can be completely specified<br />
by <strong>the</strong> standard transmission parameters.<br />
The area where fur<strong>the</strong>r information would be helpful is that of environment. Here, it<br />
is important that we be able to characterize <strong>the</strong> levels and types of radiation, <strong>the</strong> incidence<br />
and distribution of micrometeoroids and <strong>the</strong> behavior of <strong>the</strong> earth’s magnetic field. The<br />
reliability of components in a space environment will have an important bearing on <strong>the</strong><br />
economics of satellite communications.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> ground station, continued effort is being expended to simplify and minimize<br />
<strong>the</strong> equipment required. This is especially true in <strong>the</strong> area of satellite tracking. The tracking<br />
at Andover has been excellent—with no loss of signal level being attributable to tracking<br />
error. However, in future systems, it would appear that greater advantage can be<br />
derived from autotrack and that programmed tracking can be considerably simplified.<br />
To summarize: The future Telstar Program will consist of:<br />
1. Fur<strong>the</strong>r transmission tests to confirm and refine <strong>the</strong> data already ga<strong>the</strong>red.<br />
2. Continued observation of radiation effects, temperature and spin axis orientation.<br />
3. Evaluation of satellite performance to obtain a measure of component reliability.<br />
Document I-21
Document title: Memorandum from J. D. O’Connell, Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for<br />
Telecommunications and Director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Telecommunications Management, to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, Administrator,<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Chairman, Federal Communications<br />
Commission, “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign<br />
Communications Satellite Capabilities,” September 17, 1965, with attached: National<br />
Security Action Memorandum 338.<br />
Source: Record Group 273, Records of <strong>the</strong> National Security Council, Archives II,<br />
National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland.<br />
An interim International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) was created in<br />
1964 with <strong>the</strong> understanding that after five years <strong>the</strong>re would be negotiations to create a more permanent<br />
organizational structure for international telecommunications via satellite. Comsat was <strong>the</strong><br />
manager of <strong>the</strong> interim INTELSAT system, and its structure institutionalized U.S. dominance of <strong>the</strong><br />
organization’s operations and hardware procurement. The United States hoped to maintain that dominant<br />
position for as long as possible. The White House appointed a Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President,<br />
General James O’Connell, to fur<strong>the</strong>r that objective. This national security directive reflects O’Connell’s<br />
efforts to restrict U.S. assistance to o<strong>the</strong>r countries that desired to develop <strong>the</strong>ir own communications<br />
satellite capability.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
September 17, 1965<br />
MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State<br />
Secretary of Defense<br />
Secretary of Commerce<br />
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission<br />
SUBJECT: Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of<br />
Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities<br />
The attached policy statement concerning U.S. assistance in <strong>the</strong> development of foreign<br />
communications satellite capabilities is promulgated in accordance with <strong>the</strong> approval<br />
of <strong>the</strong> President, as noted in [handwritten underlining] National Security Action<br />
Memorandum 338, dated September 15, 1965. This statement was transmitted to <strong>the</strong><br />
President by my memorandum dated August 25, 1965.<br />
As noted in NSAM 338, my office will keep <strong>the</strong> subject policy under constant review.<br />
The cooperation and suggestions of <strong>the</strong> departments and agencies concerned are invited.<br />
Information copies:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 91<br />
[hand-signed “J. D. O’Connell”]<br />
Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President<br />
for Telecommunications and<br />
Director of Telecommunications Management
92<br />
Director, Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget<br />
Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council<br />
Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Science and Technology<br />
President, Communications Satellite Corporation<br />
**********<br />
[attachment, no page number] August 25, 1965<br />
GENERAL:<br />
POLICY CONCERNING U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE<br />
DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS<br />
SATELLITE CAPABILITIES<br />
_______________________________________________<br />
It is <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States to support <strong>the</strong> development of a [handwritten<br />
underlining] single global commercial communications satellite system to provide common<br />
carrier and public service communications. The intent of <strong>the</strong> United States to<br />
exploit space technology for <strong>the</strong> service of all mankind, and to promote its use in support<br />
of peace, understanding and world order has been stated clearly in legislation and in<br />
Administration speeches and official releases. The U.S. Government is committed to use<br />
global commercial communications facilities for general governmental communications<br />
purposes wherever commercial circuits of <strong>the</strong> type and quality needed to meet government<br />
requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable<br />
tariff or, in <strong>the</strong> absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at<br />
reasonable cost. Separate satellite communications facilities including surface terminals<br />
may be established and maintained by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government to meet those unique and<br />
vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities. The capacity of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se separate facilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique<br />
needs. These policies underlie <strong>the</strong> spirit and <strong>the</strong> letter of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite<br />
Act of 1962, its legislative history and <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> United States in <strong>the</strong> negotiations<br />
leading to <strong>the</strong> signing of agreements establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial<br />
communications satellite system.<br />
Provisions for <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> global commercial communications satellite<br />
system and a U.S. national defense communications satellite system consistent with <strong>the</strong>se<br />
policies have now advanced to <strong>the</strong> point where it is desirable to amplify and interpret<br />
<strong>the</strong>se policies [page 2] in order to guide United States relations with o<strong>the</strong>r countries in<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of communications satellite capabilities, particularly with respect to providing<br />
technology and assistance <strong>the</strong>refor.<br />
DISCUSSION:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
No Foreign Dissemination<br />
Most major countries of <strong>the</strong> world o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> United States provide international<br />
public communications services through governmental agencies or chartered chosen<br />
instrument corporations partially or wholly owned by <strong>the</strong> government. Assistance to any<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se foreign governments in <strong>the</strong> development of communications satellite systems can<br />
potentially develop competitors seeking to divert traffic from <strong>the</strong> single global system<br />
being developed by <strong>the</strong> international consortium established as a result of U.S. actions ini-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 93<br />
tiated by <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and now joined by forty-six nations.<br />
The communications satellite activities of U.S. Government agencies, including <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration, have an<br />
important bearing on <strong>the</strong> U.S. support of <strong>the</strong> objectives of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite<br />
Act of 1962. These activities may contribute to <strong>the</strong> dissemination of scientific and technical<br />
knowledge of <strong>the</strong> subject to foreign countries which might be used to <strong>the</strong> detriment<br />
of U.S. policy in this field.<br />
A policy to guide government agencies in <strong>the</strong> dissemination of satellite technology<br />
and in <strong>the</strong> provision of assistance which is consistent with <strong>the</strong> overall policies enunciated<br />
above is necessary. Such policy should be sufficiently comprehensive to give due regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> specific requirements of national security.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> purposes of this policy statement it is intended that restrictions upon transfer<br />
of technology and provision of assistance [handwritten underlining] refer to detailed<br />
engineering drawings, production techniques and equipment, and manufacturing or fabrication<br />
process pertaining to complete communications satellites or a significant portion<br />
<strong>the</strong>reof, and to provision of launching services or launch vehicles for communications<br />
satellites. It is not intended that this policy statement apply to surface terminals or limit<br />
dissemination of information concerning [page 3] systems concepts, description of spacecraft<br />
and normal scientific and technical publications of a professional character.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it is not intended that this statement shall limit <strong>the</strong> dissemination of information<br />
required to be disclosed under <strong>the</strong> provisions of <strong>the</strong> Special Agreement of August<br />
20, 1964, pertaining to <strong>the</strong> establishment of a global commercial communications satellite<br />
system.<br />
Specific principles to guide United States arrangements for assistance to o<strong>the</strong>r countries<br />
in <strong>the</strong> development of communications satellite capabilities are:<br />
1. The United States should conform fully with <strong>the</strong> 1964 Agreements Establishing<br />
Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System.<br />
2. The United States should refrain from providing assistance to o<strong>the</strong>r countries<br />
which would significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications<br />
satellite systems.<br />
3. The United States should not consider requests for launch services or o<strong>the</strong>r assistance<br />
in <strong>the</strong> development of communications satellites for commercial purposes except<br />
for [handwritten underlining] use in connection with <strong>the</strong> single global system established<br />
under <strong>the</strong> 1964 Agreements.<br />
4. The United States should recognize <strong>the</strong> vital national security needs of o<strong>the</strong>r allied<br />
nations which can be met by satellite communications and which cannot be met by <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
system. For example, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom has indicated its need for highly reliable<br />
satellite communications from England to Australia and to o<strong>the</strong>r Far East terminals.<br />
5. The United States aim is to encourage selected allied nations to use <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
national defense communications satellite system ra<strong>the</strong>r than to develop independent systems<br />
and to accommodate allied needs within <strong>the</strong> U.S. system (with additional costs normally<br />
to be borne by <strong>the</strong> participants). Recognized needs should be restricted to those,<br />
similar to ours, which are vital to <strong>the</strong> national security of <strong>the</strong> selected allied nations and<br />
which cannot be met by commercial facilities. To accommodate <strong>the</strong> needs within <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
national defense system it may prove necessary to include one or more satellites, synchronous<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, [page 4] whe<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> same or different design. In this case,<br />
such satellite(s) should be designed to be electronically interoperable with <strong>the</strong> satellites<br />
of <strong>the</strong> basic U.S. national defense communications satellite system in order to permit<br />
mutual usage.<br />
6. Agreements for direct assistance to allies which may significantly promote <strong>the</strong>ir
94<br />
communications satellite capability should require satisfactory assurance that <strong>the</strong> assistance<br />
furnished will be used only within <strong>the</strong> framework of agreements and arrangements<br />
to which <strong>the</strong> United States is a participant and will not be transmitted or transferred to a<br />
third nation without prior U.S. authorization. No agreement [handwritten highlighting in<br />
<strong>the</strong> margin through <strong>the</strong> end of this paragraph] should be concluded with any nation until<br />
information has been made known to o<strong>the</strong>r allied nations concerning <strong>the</strong> U.S. willingness<br />
to cooperate in meeting o<strong>the</strong>r nations’ national security needs which are similar to ours.<br />
7. U.S. firms are required to comply with Munitions Control licensing procedure<br />
prior to communication satellite or related technology, transferring equipment or components<br />
as embraced by <strong>the</strong> United States Munitions List, [handwritten underlining]<br />
including booster technology and launch services, to foreign nations or firms.<br />
8. U.S. firms are also required to comply with <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce’s<br />
export licensing requirements prior to communicating or transferring to foreign nations<br />
or firms certain o<strong>the</strong>r relevant technology, equipment or components, not covered by <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Munitions List.<br />
9. All transactions approved under paragraphs 7 and 8 involving technology and<br />
assistance pertaining to complete communications satellites or a significant portion <strong>the</strong>reof,<br />
and to provision of launching services or launch vehicles for communications satellites<br />
should be conditioned upon express (written) assurances to this government by <strong>the</strong> foreign<br />
nation(s). The assurances should be that technology and assistance obtained will be<br />
used only within <strong>the</strong> framework of <strong>the</strong> existing international consortium agreements for<br />
a single global system or <strong>the</strong> framework of such special agreements as are referred to in<br />
paragraph 6 above and will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without<br />
prior U.S. authorization.<br />
[page 5] 10.The principles and policy set forth in this document should be reviewed and<br />
updated as communications satellite system developments progress and definitive requirements<br />
are determined and after <strong>the</strong> global commercial communications satellite system<br />
has been established and is in substantial use.<br />
POLICY:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Therefore, in keeping with <strong>the</strong> above, it is <strong>the</strong> United States policy to:<br />
1. Promote <strong>the</strong> prompt establishment and successful operation of a single global<br />
common carrier and public service communications satellite system in cooperation with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r nations as part of an improved global communications network which will provide<br />
expanded telecommunications services and which will contribute to world peace and<br />
understanding.<br />
2. Avoid measures which would adversely affect ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> continued expansion of<br />
participation in <strong>the</strong> existing international agreement for a single global commercial communications<br />
satellite system or acceptability of <strong>the</strong> basic premises of <strong>the</strong> present agreements<br />
on a permanent basis.<br />
3. Make use of commercial communications facilities for general governmental purposes<br />
wherever commercial circuits of <strong>the</strong> type and quality needed to meet government<br />
requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable<br />
tariff or, in <strong>the</strong> absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable<br />
cost. Establish and maintain separate satellite communications facilities including<br />
ground terminals with capacity limited to that necessary to meet those unique and vital<br />
national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities. The capacity of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se separate facilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique<br />
needs.<br />
[page 6] 4. Encourage selected allied nations to use <strong>the</strong> U.S. national defense communi-
cations satellite system ra<strong>the</strong>r than to develop independent systems and accommodate<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir needs within <strong>the</strong> U.S. system (with additional costs normally to be borne by <strong>the</strong> participants).<br />
Recognized needs should be restricted to those, similar to ours, which are vital<br />
to <strong>the</strong> national security of selected allied nations and which cannot be met by commercial<br />
facilities.<br />
5. Withhold provision of assistance to any foreign nation in <strong>the</strong> field of communications<br />
satellites which could significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation<br />
of communications satellite systems.<br />
6. Provide technology and assistance in <strong>the</strong> field of communications satellites to foreign<br />
nations: (a) only if such nations are to participate in <strong>the</strong> U.S. national defense communications<br />
satellite system and <strong>the</strong>n only to <strong>the</strong> extent required for that participant to<br />
be effective; or (b) only for use in connection with <strong>the</strong> single global commercial communications<br />
satellite system in accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions of <strong>the</strong> Interim Agreement and<br />
Special Agreement of August 20, 1964; and only if <strong>the</strong>re exist appropriate assurances that<br />
such technology or assistance will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without<br />
prior U.S. authorization.<br />
The policies expressed above will be kept under review by <strong>the</strong> Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong><br />
President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management and<br />
<strong>the</strong> agencies and departments concerned.<br />
Document I-22<br />
Document title: National Security Action Memorandum No. 342, “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong><br />
Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service for Less-Developed Nations,”<br />
March 4, 1966.<br />
Source: Record Group 273, Records of <strong>the</strong> National Security Council, Archives II,<br />
National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland.<br />
One of President Kennedy’s objectives from <strong>the</strong> start of his involvement with communications satellites<br />
was to make sure that any system developed was truly global, served poorer countries, and linked centers<br />
of economic activity. Lyndon Johnson’s administration continued this policy and issued this directive<br />
to emphasize its importance.<br />
[1] March 4, 1966<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 95<br />
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 342<br />
TO: The Secretary of State<br />
The Secretary of Defense<br />
The Secretary of Commerce<br />
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare<br />
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
The Chairman, Federal Communications Commission<br />
The Administrator, Agency for International Development<br />
The Director, United States Information Agency<br />
The Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Telecommunications and Director<br />
of Telecommunications Management<br />
SUBJECT: U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of Communications Satellite
96<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Service for Less-Developed Nations<br />
In carrying out his responsibilities under <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962,<br />
<strong>the</strong> President has directed that <strong>the</strong> United States Government take active steps to encourage<br />
<strong>the</strong> construction of earth-station links to <strong>the</strong> worldwide communications satellite system<br />
in selected less-developed countries. Emphasis in this effort is to be on encouraging<br />
<strong>the</strong> selected countries to construct <strong>the</strong>se stations out of <strong>the</strong>ir own resources, stressing <strong>the</strong><br />
many benefits of direct access to <strong>the</strong> global communications satellites.<br />
The Special Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Telecommunications/Director of<br />
Telecommunications Management has been designated by <strong>the</strong> President as <strong>the</strong> agent for<br />
coordinating this project.<br />
The State Department and AID are to determine (a) <strong>the</strong> countries to be included in<br />
this program and (b) U.S. Government actions, if any, for encouraging <strong>the</strong> accelerated<br />
construction of earth stations and related facilities in <strong>the</strong>se countries. In cases involving<br />
possible U.S. technical or financial assistance, <strong>the</strong> President has directed that no special<br />
funds should be requested. All funding of such projects is to be handled out of current<br />
AID FY 1966 appropriations or out of <strong>the</strong> regular FY 1967 funds.<br />
[2] The Department of State is to report its findings to <strong>the</strong> President, through <strong>the</strong> Special<br />
Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications<br />
Management, by July 1, 1966.<br />
The President has directed that <strong>the</strong> Executive Agent and Manager of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Communications System [NCS] and U.S. Government agencies operating facilities outside<br />
<strong>the</strong> NCS utilize <strong>the</strong> global communications satellite system in handling traffic whenever<br />
possible and where national security requirements will not be compromised,<br />
consistent with sound cost-efficiency and o<strong>the</strong>r management considerations.<br />
A Working Group is to be established, in accordance with <strong>the</strong> President’s instruction,<br />
to study <strong>the</strong> possibilities of using <strong>the</strong> communications satellite system to advance information<br />
exchange and educational purposes, in line with his desire that <strong>the</strong> United States play<br />
a greater role in international education efforts, particularly in less-developed countries.<br />
Document I-23<br />
[hand-signed: “Bromley Smith”]<br />
Document title: David Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, to <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
of State, “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,” Telegraphic Message,<br />
November 9, 1966.<br />
Source: Record Group 59, General Records of <strong>the</strong> Department of State, Archives II,<br />
National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland.<br />
European governments and industry knew that <strong>the</strong> United States was following a restrictive policy<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> transfer of technology; this became a source of irritation as <strong>the</strong> United States attempted<br />
to increase <strong>the</strong> intensity of its space cooperation with Europe and as <strong>the</strong> 1969 negotiations for definitive<br />
INTELSAT arrangements approached. This diplomatic cable from <strong>the</strong> U.S. embassy in London<br />
reflects a foreign policy perspective—that <strong>the</strong> restrictive policy outlined in NSAM 338 (Document<br />
I-21) was not in <strong>the</strong> best overall interest of <strong>the</strong> nation. O<strong>the</strong>rs in Washington and overseas, concerned<br />
with international space policy, shared this perspective and urged that <strong>the</strong> 1965 policy directive be<br />
revised. Their arguments were partially successful, and a slightly less restrictive version of NSAM 338<br />
was issued in mid-1967.<br />
[1] INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State
________________________________________________________________________<br />
[rubber stamped: “1966 NOV 9 AM 11 28”]<br />
Action<br />
R 0913182 NOV 66<br />
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON<br />
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC<br />
Info INFO RUFIVC/AMEMBASSY BERN<br />
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN<br />
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS<br />
RUFHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS<br />
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME<br />
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM<br />
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE<br />
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO<br />
STATE GRNC<br />
BT<br />
[Abbreviations in margin: “E, SS, G, SP, SC, L H, EUR, EA, P, USIA, NSC, INR, CIA, NSA,<br />
DOD, ACDA, SCI STR, MC, GDP, OC, COM, DTM, FCC, NSF, OST, RSR”]<br />
CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 3872<br />
Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology<br />
REF: STATE 76929, LONDON’S A-1084 OF NOV. 4, 1966<br />
NSA<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 97<br />
1. US policy on <strong>the</strong> dissemination of information on communications satellite technology<br />
has an impact not only on US objectives regarding a permanent single global communications<br />
satellite system but also on technology as it relates to European well being. It<br />
is <strong>the</strong> Embassy’s premise that an economically strong, technologically advanced and politically<br />
cohesive Europe is in <strong>the</strong> US national interest. Economic strength and technological<br />
competence go hand in hand. This is not to say that technological parity in every field<br />
is necessary for strong economies but reasonable competence in most advanced sectors<br />
appears to be a sine qua non for long term competitiveness even though comparative<br />
advantage may lie with one country or ano<strong>the</strong>r from time to time. This is particularly true<br />
in an environment of reduced trade barriers which exposes <strong>the</strong> industrial sector to keen<br />
international competition.<br />
2. In this context it is clear that communications satellite technology encompasses a<br />
very narrow slice of technology. The acquisition of greater competence in this field is likely<br />
to have only a marginal impact, in practical terms, on narrowing <strong>the</strong> over-all technological<br />
gap. By <strong>the</strong> same token US initiatives in o<strong>the</strong>r single sectors of technology, treated<br />
individually, will have minimal effect on <strong>the</strong> over-all position. However, concentrated<br />
cooperative efforts by <strong>the</strong> US across <strong>the</strong> board in all possible areas might lead to a significant<br />
improvement in Europe’s position vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> US (and <strong>the</strong> USSR). But, given <strong>the</strong><br />
extent of us investment in R&D in <strong>the</strong> advanced sectors, it is unlikely that Europe under<br />
any circumstances could [2] eliminate <strong>the</strong> gap in <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future. Any substantial<br />
narrowing of <strong>the</strong> gap will require a major increase in European investment in R&D which
98<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
under current circumstances is improbable.<br />
3. Therefore, on a cost benefit analysis <strong>the</strong> costs to <strong>the</strong> US of sharing technology<br />
with Europe in terms of Western leadership, markets, etc., are not likely to be great. On<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> benefits could be considerable. The principal gain would be psychological.<br />
US initiatives would be regarded as an act of good will—a cooperative gesture<br />
from a friend and ally—which would fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>n Atlantic bonds. It would encourage<br />
US/Europe scientific and industrial cooperation and neutralize any tendency to turn<br />
to <strong>the</strong> USSR in frustration. It would tend to still those voices which charge that US policies<br />
are directed to establishing and maintaining absolute domination in all advanced<br />
areas of technology.<br />
4. To a lesser degree US technological cooperation, to <strong>the</strong> extent that it would assist<br />
Europe to maintain a reasonably competitive position, will increase specialization and<br />
trade for <strong>the</strong> benegit [sic] of both sides.<br />
5. Turning now to <strong>the</strong> specific case of communication satellite technology, much of<br />
<strong>the</strong> above reasoning applies. The advantages to <strong>the</strong> US of relaxing its objectives is for a<br />
substantial US share in a single global communications satellite system. Such psychological<br />
factors could well be important. The ambitions of European industry in obtaining a<br />
larger share of <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT contracts are well known. Both industry and government<br />
regard communications satellites as <strong>the</strong> one sector of space investment which promises an<br />
early commercial return. Informed Europeans are aware that current US policies prevent<br />
European industry from obtaining <strong>the</strong> know-how which <strong>the</strong>y feel would permit <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
compete for and obtain such contracts. Much of <strong>the</strong> recent publicity in Europe released<br />
by industry supporting <strong>the</strong> concept of regional communications satellite systems, allegedly<br />
complementary with <strong>the</strong> global system, is believed primarily designed to provide Europe<br />
a greater share of <strong>the</strong> market for satellites and o<strong>the</strong>r elements of <strong>the</strong> commercial system.<br />
The European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS) is meeting in The<br />
Hague later this month with <strong>the</strong> specific objective of improving European capabilities in<br />
satellite technology. Certainly regional systems will be examined as one means of achieving<br />
this objective. While France may favor regional systems as an end in <strong>the</strong>mselves, it is<br />
believed most countries are basically concerned with industrial aspects and are [3] quite<br />
content with [a] single system concept so long as <strong>the</strong>y obtain [a] fair slice of <strong>the</strong> equipment<br />
cake. Thus, if Europeans feel that <strong>the</strong> US policies and predominance in a single<br />
global system will continue to frustrate what <strong>the</strong>y feel to be <strong>the</strong>ir quite legitimate aspirations<br />
on production, <strong>the</strong>y may well seek to negotiate an agreement at <strong>the</strong> 1969<br />
Conference which would permit <strong>the</strong> establishment of regional systems.<br />
6. It is recognized that <strong>the</strong>re is fear that <strong>the</strong> relaxation of restrictions on transfer of<br />
satellite technology will give Europeans <strong>the</strong> tools to establish separate systems. In our view<br />
this fear is exaggerated. First of all, as mentioned above, <strong>the</strong> general European objective<br />
is to achieve adequate competence to bid for INTELSAT and possibly IDCSP [Initial<br />
Defense Communications Satellite Program] contracts, and not to establish independent<br />
systems per se. This is particularly true of <strong>the</strong> British. Second, <strong>the</strong> possibility appears<br />
remote that <strong>the</strong> Europeans could launch an independent system by 1969. Aside from <strong>the</strong><br />
question of satellite development, Europe will not have launch capability until well into<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1970’s.<br />
7. To conclude on this point, an offer to share communications technology with<br />
Europe would gain a measure of good will and serve to alleviate European suspicions of<br />
US intentions. This should improve <strong>the</strong> US negotiating posture in 1969. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hand <strong>the</strong> danger to US objectives in such a move would, in practical terms, be negligible<br />
since <strong>the</strong> Europeans would be unable to use such technology over <strong>the</strong> short term to<br />
launch an independent system.<br />
8. Answers to <strong>the</strong> specific questions posed in <strong>the</strong> final paragraph of reference
telegram are as follows:<br />
(A) Policy directive has not hindered desirable scientific and technological cooperation<br />
in any practical way except in <strong>the</strong> area of communications satellite<br />
technology. However, <strong>the</strong> existence of this policy has undoubtedly colored<br />
European views as to <strong>the</strong> disinterested nature of US offers of cooperation.<br />
(B) Scientific or industry dissatisfaction has not been reflected as irritant on political<br />
lines since 1964 negotiations. Political interest may reappear prior to<br />
1969 negotiations.<br />
(C) The divergencies of view among British interests on communications satellite<br />
technology were analyzed in Embassy’s A-1084 of Nov. 4. To summarize<br />
briefly, <strong>the</strong> GPO is fundamentally concerned with efficient economic communications<br />
and less involved in political and industrial considerations. The<br />
GPO strongly supports <strong>the</strong> concept of a single global system. The foreign<br />
office is anxious to abtain [sic] political cohesion in Europe and will seek<br />
European consensus even [4] at some compromise of domestic ambitions.<br />
Industry primary interest is to secure larger share of INTELSAT procurement<br />
and will support vigorously any proposal, ei<strong>the</strong>r for a single system or an independent<br />
system, which will improve its competitive position, vis-à-vis US<br />
industry. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is not taking a more active role in<br />
<strong>the</strong> communications satellite question due to participation in IDCSP and possibly<br />
ADCSP. Any MOD support for independent European initiative will<br />
depend largely on its experience with joint US/UK military projects.<br />
(D) If British are assured of US commitment to genuine cooperative effort in<br />
communications satellite technology, we believe <strong>the</strong>y would be prepared to<br />
give <strong>the</strong> required assurances. Clarification on <strong>the</strong> role of regional and national<br />
systems (e.g. ABC proposal for US national TV relay system) would be<br />
required. Also Europeans may wish to launch experimental satellites using<br />
US launchers. Embassy judgement here is not based on specific comments<br />
from industry or government but from <strong>the</strong> interpretation of expressions of<br />
opinion by <strong>the</strong> Foreign <strong>Office</strong>, GPO and industry contacts over <strong>the</strong> past year<br />
or so. Bruce<br />
BT<br />
Document I-24<br />
Document title: Memorandum from J.D. O’Connell for <strong>the</strong> President, February 8, 1967,<br />
with attached: “A Global System of Satellite Communications: The Hazards Ahead,”<br />
February 8, 1967.<br />
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (used with permission).<br />
General James D. O’Connell, <strong>the</strong> individual responsible for promoting <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy objective of creating<br />
a single global system of satellite communications based on INTELSAT, saw many hazards<br />
ahead. This memorandum sketches his perceptions of <strong>the</strong> challenges to achieving this policy objective.<br />
[1] MEMORANDUM<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 99
100<br />
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
The White House<br />
Washington<br />
February 8, 1967<br />
I submit a proposed draft of <strong>the</strong> President’s 1966 report to <strong>the</strong> Congress as required<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962. This report emphasizes positive accomplishments.<br />
It does not describe <strong>the</strong> hazards which INTELSAT and ComSat face. Some of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se hazards are:<br />
a. Actions of certain international record carriers indicate that <strong>the</strong>y consider it to be<br />
in <strong>the</strong>ir corporate interest to emasculate INTELSAT, <strong>the</strong> single global system, and<br />
ComSat.<br />
b. Certain major aerospace manufacturers both here and abroad deprecate <strong>the</strong><br />
value of INTELSAT and <strong>the</strong> single global system. They favor many proliferating domestic<br />
and regional systems. Obviously <strong>the</strong>se would provide a larger market for <strong>the</strong>ir products.<br />
c. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] France has been<br />
promoting within Europe a regional communications satellite system which will compete<br />
with INTELSAT, and will probably join <strong>the</strong> Soviet Molnya [sic: Molniya] system.<br />
d. ComSat’s studies conclude that <strong>the</strong>re is more business and earnings in <strong>the</strong> domestic<br />
communications field than can be derived from international traffic. This conflict of<br />
interest has been demonstrated in recent FCC filings where ComSat has failed to take a<br />
clear-cut position as <strong>the</strong> servant of <strong>the</strong> international INTELSAT joint venture.<br />
e. Certain members of INTELSAT who derive a favorable balance of payments<br />
under present arrangements are not supporting <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy of actively encouraging<br />
<strong>the</strong> establishment of satellite communications facilities for <strong>the</strong> developing nations. This<br />
has resulted in inadequate progress toward <strong>the</strong> design of low cost earth terminals and<br />
satellite systems—concepts which are needed to promote early effective and economical<br />
use in <strong>the</strong> developing nations.<br />
f. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] Major continental<br />
European nations are critical of <strong>the</strong> “excessively dominant” position of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States in <strong>the</strong> decisions of <strong>the</strong> International Consortium. Actions to reduce U.S. dominance<br />
and to obtain a manager o<strong>the</strong>r than ComSat are expected during <strong>the</strong> 1969 negotiations to<br />
extend <strong>the</strong> existing Interim Agreement or consummate a more permanent one.<br />
[2] g. Action by <strong>the</strong> United States to embark upon separate domestic or regional enterprises<br />
prior to 1969 will have a serious negative impact on <strong>the</strong> single global system, <strong>the</strong><br />
International Consortium, <strong>the</strong> 1969 renegotiations, and ComSat’s future as Manager for<br />
INTELSAT.<br />
h. The recent FCC action to adopt a 50-50 shared ground station ownership formula<br />
between ComSat and <strong>the</strong> communications common carriers has not reduced conflict as<br />
had been hoped. ComSat’s investment capital potential has been cut in half but <strong>the</strong><br />
record carriers still want more. A merger of ComSat with <strong>the</strong> six o<strong>the</strong>r U.S. international<br />
carriers is becoming increasingly vital.<br />
i. The general disorder of U.S. international telecommunications has been and is a<br />
serious obstacle to progress in commercial communication satellites and is a threat to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir future. It is also creating increasing pressure to reverse <strong>the</strong> trend toward greater<br />
Government use of <strong>the</strong> international common carriers and causing serious consideration<br />
of programs to step up <strong>the</strong> capacity of <strong>the</strong> Government’s own communication satellite sys-
tems. Diversion of Government traffic from <strong>the</strong> carriers will fur<strong>the</strong>r jeopardize <strong>the</strong> future<br />
viability of ComSat and <strong>the</strong> global system.<br />
j. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] Communication<br />
satellites are in such an early stage of <strong>the</strong>ir technological and systems development that<br />
present systems should soon be made obsolete by <strong>the</strong> new developments. But research and<br />
development efforts by ComSat and NASA are inadequate to push progress fast enough.<br />
I am increasing <strong>the</strong> efforts of my office to push for faster progress.<br />
The national policy established by <strong>the</strong> President and Congress is to give first priority<br />
to <strong>the</strong> successful achievement of a single international global system at <strong>the</strong> earliest time.<br />
It is a sound policy which makes paramount <strong>the</strong> objectives of world peace and understanding.<br />
The importance of <strong>the</strong> single global system to achieve <strong>the</strong>se objectives cannot<br />
be overemphasized. Executive Branch departments are working diligently to reduce <strong>the</strong><br />
hazards and obtain <strong>the</strong> objectives sought by <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act, but success<br />
is far from certain yet. The trend appears to be toward progressively more serious obstacles.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion of <strong>the</strong>se obstacles is contained in <strong>the</strong> attachment.<br />
In a subsequent report I will set forth <strong>the</strong> steps being taken by my office and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
government agencies to cope with <strong>the</strong>se hazards. Some of my proposals for Government<br />
actions are included in <strong>the</strong> attached summary.<br />
[i]<br />
SUMMARY<br />
**********<br />
J. D. O’Connell<br />
A Global System of Satellite Communications<br />
— The Hazards Ahead —<br />
The hazards to <strong>the</strong> future success of <strong>the</strong> International Consortium (INTELSAT) and<br />
ComSat appear to be increasing and becoming more serious. Knowledgeable students of<br />
<strong>the</strong> situation are privately expressing <strong>the</strong> thought that [bolded passages were highlighted<br />
with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] it is entirely possible that INTELSAT may fall apart in favor<br />
of a series of regional systems.<br />
If this were to occur it would mean:<br />
• A massive setback in future growth and easy access in international telecommunications.<br />
• The loss of <strong>the</strong> soundest, simplest, lowest cost system of international telecommunication<br />
which can make <strong>the</strong> largest contribution to world peace and understanding.<br />
• A reversion to reactionary concepts of rich nation domination of zones of communication<br />
influence, increased length and lower quality of transmission paths,<br />
and higher consumer costs.<br />
• A very serious prestige loss to <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
• Financial loss to <strong>the</strong> shareholders of ComSat.<br />
The most serious threats to INTELSAT and ComSat which are described in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
pages have not yet reached critical or unmanageable stage. But over optimism, lack<br />
of vigorous action, or actions which aggravate <strong>the</strong>se trends can cause <strong>the</strong>se problems to<br />
rapidly get beyond control.<br />
ACTIONS UNDER WAY<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 101
102<br />
I am bending every effort to clarify this situation and achieve unified government<br />
action to overcome <strong>the</strong> growing obstacles. Among my proposals are <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
a. Give first priority to development of INTELSAT and <strong>the</strong> international system. This<br />
is in conformance with U.S. policy and statute.<br />
b. Emphasize <strong>the</strong> great advantages of <strong>the</strong> single global system. [bolded passages<br />
were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] (There is no regional need which<br />
<strong>the</strong> single global system cannot meet with better service at lower cost, with better<br />
spectrum conservation.)<br />
[ii] c. Provide greater U.S. aid to developing nations in getting earth stations.<br />
d. Develop as rapidly as possible <strong>the</strong> practical use of <strong>the</strong> higher (and less used) frequency<br />
bands for exclusive use of large domestic satellite systems. Service to be<br />
available in 4–5 years.<br />
e. Use <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT system for early U.S. domestic service growth and ETV [educational<br />
television] experiments.<br />
f. Avoid FCC or Congressional action to constitute a separate U.S. domestic satellite<br />
system for <strong>the</strong> immediate future.<br />
g. Accelerate <strong>the</strong> development of low cost earth stations.<br />
h. Accelerate <strong>the</strong> development of more efficient multiple access systems to reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> cost of communication to both rich and poor nations.<br />
[1] A GLOBAL SYSTEM OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
— THE HAZARDS AHEAD —<br />
THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A SINGLE GLOBAL SYSTEM<br />
BACKGROUND<br />
The foundation of our communications satellite policy has been embodied in <strong>the</strong><br />
concept of a single global system to which all nations could have equal access, and<br />
through which international communications could flow free of artificial constraints held<br />
over from <strong>the</strong> colonial traditions of past centuries. The concept stems both from <strong>the</strong> policy<br />
objectives established by <strong>the</strong> Congress and from our international agreements.<br />
THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962<br />
Declaration of Policy and Purpose<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Sec. 102. (a) The Congress hereby declares that it is <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States to<br />
establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with o<strong>the</strong>r countries, as expeditiously as practicable<br />
a commercial communications satellite system, as part of an improved global communications<br />
network, which will be responsive to public needs and national objectives,<br />
which will serve <strong>the</strong> communication needs of <strong>the</strong> United States and o<strong>the</strong>r countries, and<br />
which will contribute to world peace and understanding.<br />
(b) The new and expanded telecommunications services are to be made available as<br />
promptly as possible and are to be extended to provide global coverage at <strong>the</strong> earliest<br />
practicable date. In effectuating this program, care and attention will be directed toward<br />
providing such services to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those<br />
more highly developed, toward efficient and economical use of <strong>the</strong> electromagnetic frequency<br />
spectrum, and toward <strong>the</strong> reflection of <strong>the</strong> benefits of this new technology in both
quality of services and charges for such services.<br />
THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 20, 1964—55 NATIONS<br />
Desiring to establish a single global commercial communication satellite system as<br />
part of an improved global communications network which will provide expanded<br />
telecommunications services to all areas of <strong>the</strong> world and which will contribute to world<br />
peace and understanding;<br />
[2] Determined, to this end, to provide, through <strong>the</strong> most advanced technology available,<br />
for <strong>the</strong> benefit of all nations of <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>the</strong> most efficient and economical service possible<br />
consistent with <strong>the</strong> best and most equitable use of <strong>the</strong> radio spectrum.<br />
BASIS<br />
The single global system is truly a revolutionary concept. It is also intrinsically sound<br />
from <strong>the</strong> viewpoint of supporting <strong>the</strong> policy objectives established by <strong>the</strong> Congress and<br />
confirmed in our international agreements.<br />
USE OF COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY TO CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD<br />
PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING, IMPROVED WORLD TRADE, AND COMMERCE<br />
The integrity of <strong>the</strong> global system is vital to our primary goal of using satellite technology<br />
to promote world peace and understanding, and to our corollary goals of<br />
improved world trade, commerce, and better understanding between nations. We must<br />
nurture this global system concept, [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in<br />
<strong>the</strong> original] for if we allow it to deteriorate into a series of isolated regional networks we<br />
may forever lose <strong>the</strong> golden opportunity which satellite technology provides for creating<br />
a world community in which communications flow freely between nations.<br />
SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE COMMUNICATIONS NEEDS OF LESS DEVELOPED<br />
COUNTRIES<br />
The single commercial communications satellite system provides <strong>the</strong> broadly based<br />
structure to meeting <strong>the</strong> demands of <strong>the</strong> smaller nations. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, it provides a framework<br />
in which <strong>the</strong> United States can work effectively to promote communications satellite technology<br />
designed to aid <strong>the</strong> developing nations.<br />
EFFECTIVE USE OF THE FREQUENCY SPECTRUM<br />
The demands for communications satellite service already promise to overtax <strong>the</strong><br />
capability of <strong>the</strong> frequency spectrum. Only through <strong>the</strong> economies of scale and engineering<br />
efficiency of a truly global system will all of <strong>the</strong> nations of <strong>the</strong> world be able to<br />
gain equal benefits from communications satellite technology.<br />
[3] THE HAZARDS AHEAD<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 103<br />
These are fundamental problems in <strong>the</strong> field of satellite communications which have<br />
national importance and which can profoundly affect <strong>the</strong> economic, social, and political<br />
objectives of this Nation. These problems arise from many sources but may be generally<br />
categorized as follows:<br />
1. Interests that conflict with <strong>the</strong> global system;
104<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
2. The impact of U.S. domestic communications issues;<br />
3. The “limited objectives” syndrome;<br />
4. Fear of U.S. domination;<br />
5. The general disorder of U.S. international communications.<br />
INTERESTS THAT CONFLICT WITH THE GLOBAL SYSTEM<br />
A. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] International<br />
Carriers<br />
These organizations, including both <strong>the</strong> United States and foreign carriers, view <strong>the</strong><br />
INTELSAT system as a direct competitor to <strong>the</strong> established cable and high frequency<br />
radio routes. Long established spheres of influence and methods of operation are also<br />
threatened. With a single global communication satellite system, opportunity for national<br />
control of international communications routing, ability to charge transit fees and<br />
apply o<strong>the</strong>r restrictive practices will be lost. Many of <strong>the</strong> foreign carriers feel that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
earnings would be greater and <strong>the</strong>ir control maintained if traffic is transmitted over cable<br />
and high frequency radio systems where <strong>the</strong>ir ownership may be as high as 50 percent in<br />
contrast to <strong>the</strong>ir 1 to 5 percent ownership which is typical in INTELSAT. Some<br />
Administrations in Europe frankly admit using <strong>the</strong> profits of <strong>the</strong>ir international telecommunications<br />
traffic to subsidize <strong>the</strong>ir domestic costs for both telecommunications and<br />
postal services. Some Administrations also feel that where cable and high frequency radio<br />
are no longer viable, <strong>the</strong>ir interests would be better served through <strong>the</strong> creation of regionally<br />
oriented satellite systems where <strong>the</strong>ir ownership share could be increased.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r arrangement preferred by U.S. record carriers and some foreign<br />
Administrations over <strong>the</strong> present COMSAT-INTELSAT arrangement would be a completely<br />
non-profit space segment structure which would be [4] supported by <strong>the</strong> various<br />
nations on <strong>the</strong> basis of use. Administrations would derive income from earth station<br />
charges which could be handled much like cable charges without <strong>the</strong> added complication<br />
of providing income and profits to <strong>the</strong> space segment owners. The only major impediment<br />
in <strong>the</strong> way of this arrangement is COMSAT. O<strong>the</strong>r nations are not faced with this<br />
dilemma. All sophisticated Administrations can be assumed to be thoroughly aware that<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. poses <strong>the</strong> only impediment to this kind of structuring.<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> international record carriers are also concerned that <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT<br />
organization will spawn greater sophistication in <strong>the</strong> less developed nations and encourage<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to assume a more prominent role in <strong>the</strong>ir internal communications systems as<br />
well as <strong>the</strong> satellite earth terminals used as gateways for international traffic.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> past, international carriers have often dominated completely communications<br />
within a developing nation through control of international communication facilities.<br />
B. Domestic Common Carriers<br />
While our domestic common carriers recognize <strong>the</strong> need for single ownership and<br />
management of international communications systems and for compatibility between<br />
international and domestic systems, <strong>the</strong>y are in conflict with certain of COMSAT’s proposals<br />
for early domestic communications satellite service. A key question affecting<br />
domestic service stems from <strong>the</strong> present international agreements which provide for<br />
shared frequencies between terrestrial microwave systems and space services.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> frequency bands assigned to satellite communications, we also operate a profusion<br />
of domestic terrestrial microwave relay systems which involve a capital investment<br />
over $2 billion. This is over twice <strong>the</strong> total capital invested in international telecommunications<br />
by all <strong>the</strong> nations of <strong>the</strong> world. These terrestrial microwave systems are continuing<br />
to expand rapidly. It is clear that <strong>the</strong> installation of numbers of domestic satellite earth sta-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 105<br />
tions is certain to impede <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong>se terrestrial microwave services. It is also clear<br />
that <strong>the</strong> unrestricted installation of earth stations for domestic purposes will preempt<br />
space required to expand <strong>the</strong> international system. Despite technological advances <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is an ultimate limitation to <strong>the</strong> amount of communication which can be carried in this frequency<br />
band.<br />
[5] The solution to this problem lies in <strong>the</strong> development of new exclusive frequency<br />
bands for satellite communications. The course of action is feasible but will require additional<br />
research and development and a few years of time—but it will make it possible to<br />
exploit satellite communications to its fullest potential.<br />
C. U.S. Space Systems Manufacturers<br />
At present <strong>the</strong> aerospace industries of <strong>the</strong> U.S. enjoy a significant technological lead<br />
over all foreign competitors in <strong>the</strong> field of communications satellites. The concept of a single<br />
global system prevents rapid, albeit wasteful, proliferation of <strong>the</strong> space segment hardware<br />
and restricts <strong>the</strong> market to supplying <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT organization. [bolded passages<br />
were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] A greater market potential could be created<br />
more rapidly through <strong>the</strong> development of independent national systems or proliferation<br />
of regional systems. The aerospace industry thus seeks a proliferation of systems.<br />
While this approach may produce a short run profit for <strong>the</strong> aerospace industry, it will<br />
produce a long run harvest of international telecommunications chaos and ill will. We<br />
cannot afford to be cast in <strong>the</strong> role of sponsoring <strong>the</strong>se misguided attempts to implement<br />
inefficient and unnecessary communications satellite systems that do not have <strong>the</strong> traffic<br />
base to make <strong>the</strong>ir operations viable or to achieve <strong>the</strong> economies of scale possible in a single<br />
global system. In this case, <strong>the</strong> short term commercial interests of our aerospace manufacturers<br />
are in conflict with <strong>the</strong> national and international objectives of creating an<br />
effective global system to introduce a new era in world telecommunications and better<br />
serve all mankind.<br />
D. National Ambitions of Foreign Governments<br />
Several foreign nations, [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original]<br />
notably France, feel that <strong>the</strong>y must develop <strong>the</strong>ir own communications satellite capability<br />
as rapidly as possible to reinforce national prestige.<br />
An important motive for individual nationalistic control of communications satellites<br />
stems from a desire [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original, note<br />
in margin: “#1”] to continue to exercise cultural and political leadership in traditional<br />
areas of influence without intervention by an international body such as INTELSAT. [note<br />
in margin: “#2”] Equally important is <strong>the</strong>ir desire to create a viable option which can be<br />
used as a negotiating point in <strong>the</strong> 1969 discussions. [ note in margin: “Symphonie”]<br />
[6] THE IMPACT OF U.S. DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES<br />
A. The Ownership of International Earth Stations<br />
The recent FCC decision to share ground station ownership 50-50 between COMSAT<br />
and <strong>the</strong> communications common carriers has not yet reduced conflict or speeded<br />
progress as had been hoped. COMSAT’s investment capital potential has been cut in half<br />
but <strong>the</strong> record carriers still want more.<br />
As more and more international traffic shifts communications to satellites, <strong>the</strong> rate<br />
base position of <strong>the</strong> international carriers will become progressively worse. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, dividing<br />
ownership among COMSAT and <strong>the</strong> five international carriers seriously jeopardizes<br />
<strong>the</strong> profit position of COMSAT as well. So long as we have <strong>the</strong> present irrational arrangement<br />
of international common carriers, <strong>the</strong> situation is certain to continue to get worse.
106<br />
A merger of <strong>the</strong> five U.S. international carriers is becoming increasingly vital. If it does not<br />
take place soon some of <strong>the</strong> wiser heads in <strong>the</strong> industry see no way of preventing<br />
Government ownership as a way of bringing order out of chaos.<br />
B. Patent Problems<br />
The INTELSAT organization’s patent provisions are already a problem that promises<br />
to become increasingly acute. Some U.S. aerospace firms are balking at a requirement<br />
that INTELSAT be given patent rights to all patents used on INTELSAT contracts.<br />
C. TV and Educational TV Interests<br />
The proposals of <strong>the</strong> Ford Foundation, American Broadcasting Company, and o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
to create a domestic TV distribution system via communications satellites have confronted<br />
<strong>the</strong> FCC with problems that are fraught with economic, policy, legal, and technical<br />
issues which overlap and impact upon our international agreements.<br />
These domestic issues are raising serious apprehensions among our foreign partners<br />
that <strong>the</strong> U.S. intends to place domestic interests and pressures ahead of better world communications.<br />
And, of course, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union has repeatedly criticized INTELSAT as a<br />
rich man’s club being run for <strong>the</strong> primary benefit of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
[7] THE “LIMITED OBJECTIVES” SYNDROME<br />
A. Inadequate Research and Development<br />
Communications satellites are still in a very early stage of development from <strong>the</strong> viewpoint<br />
of both technology and utilization. In order to achieve <strong>the</strong> goals established by <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, a substantial acceleration of research and development<br />
program is needed.<br />
A primary task is to produce advanced multiple access capabilities to serve low traffic<br />
density terminals of <strong>the</strong> developing nations. We also need more stable space platforms,<br />
better pointing accuracy in our antennas, and improved primary power sources for <strong>the</strong><br />
space vehicles.<br />
[bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in <strong>the</strong> original] Although COMSAT<br />
is seeking to construct a major research and development facility, <strong>the</strong>y are encountering<br />
strong opposition from our European partners. Such a research center would tend to be<br />
competitive to foreign manufacturing interests. Certain U.S. aerospace firms have<br />
opposed <strong>the</strong> COMSAT research and development center for <strong>the</strong> same reason. COMSAT<br />
is certain to run into serious trouble unless <strong>the</strong>y adopt a carefully planned philosophy<br />
acceptable to <strong>the</strong>ir foreign partners and U.S. industry.<br />
B. Conflict as to <strong>the</strong> Proper Pace of System Implementation<br />
COMSAT has pushed ahead faster than desired by some of <strong>the</strong> European partners in<br />
order to create an operating system with worldwide coverage prior to 1969. A successful<br />
system will be <strong>the</strong> best possible insurance of our continuing <strong>the</strong> present favorable pattern<br />
of international agreements. Within INTELSAT, however, <strong>the</strong>re is an element which feels<br />
that <strong>the</strong> global system should proceed more slowly so that <strong>the</strong> gap in aerospace technology<br />
between <strong>the</strong> U.S. and o<strong>the</strong>r countries can be closed prior to major deployment of <strong>the</strong><br />
system. There is also a reluctance among those nations who are large owners of telephone<br />
cable systems to divert traffic to satellites so long as channels are available in <strong>the</strong> cables.<br />
FEAR OF U.S. DOMINATION<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 107<br />
A. Technology Gap<br />
Many foreign nations feel that <strong>the</strong>y were forced to accept <strong>the</strong> 1964 communications<br />
satellite agreements on U.S. terms as a result of deficiencies in <strong>the</strong>ir own space research<br />
and development capabilities.<br />
[8] These nations are working as hard as [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker<br />
in <strong>the</strong> original] possible to improve <strong>the</strong>ir technical position to give <strong>the</strong>m options to<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>ir position and insure more equitable participation in <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT organization<br />
after 1969. [note in margin, arrow pointing to, and emphasizing, <strong>the</strong> following<br />
sentence] The manner in which <strong>the</strong> U.S. shares its technology impacts directly on this<br />
issue. We are eager to share technology with those nations firmly committed to INTEL-<br />
SAT. We do not, however, find it in <strong>the</strong> U.S. interest to provide <strong>the</strong> tools with which a foreign<br />
nation can circumvent <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT agreements by contributing to <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment of competing regional systems.<br />
B. Leadership in INTELSAT Administration and Management<br />
At present <strong>the</strong> U.S., through <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation, serves as<br />
Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Interim Communications Satellite Committee, provides <strong>the</strong> Manager for<br />
all technical operations of INTELSAT, and has [bolded passages were highlighted with a<br />
marker in <strong>the</strong> original] a controlling voting interest of 54 percent in most decisions of <strong>the</strong><br />
Consortium. Many foreign nations feel that this is an unacceptable domination of INTEL-<br />
SAT by <strong>the</strong> U.S. We are already experiencing pressure within <strong>the</strong> Consortium to reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> U.S. and to strip COMSAT of its administrative and technical control.<br />
This will undoubtedly be an important point in <strong>the</strong> 1969 renegotiations.<br />
A GENERAL DISORDER OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS<br />
A. Inadequate Responsiveness to Communications Needs of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government<br />
The serious conflicts of interest that have existed in recent years among U.S. international<br />
communications common carriers have been greatly increased by <strong>the</strong> advent of<br />
communications satellites. This situation has resulted in increased controversy and delay<br />
in meeting new Government requirements. A recent Department of Defense requirement<br />
for communication service to Japan, Thailand, and <strong>the</strong> Philippines to provide support for<br />
operations in Vietnam has resulted in many conflicting filings with <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission. This conflict and o<strong>the</strong>rs like it have raised serious doubts<br />
within Government agencies concerning <strong>the</strong> ability of <strong>the</strong> U.S. international common carriers,<br />
placed as <strong>the</strong>y are in a constant conflict of interest, to provide assured and rapid<br />
response to new or emergency communications requirements of <strong>the</strong> Government.<br />
Such uncertainties create a growing incentive for <strong>the</strong> Government to reverse previous<br />
trends toward increased use of international common carriers and to turn instead to<br />
greater dependency upon and use of [9] Government owned communications satellite<br />
systems. Since <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government is by far <strong>the</strong> largest single user of international commercial<br />
communications channels, loss of any portion of this business by <strong>the</strong> carriers<br />
could have a serious adverse effect on all <strong>the</strong> international carriers, but particularly on <strong>the</strong><br />
viability of international satellite communications.<br />
B. Delays in U.S. Earth Station Construction<br />
The continual controversy and divided system responsibility in U.S. international<br />
communications have also adversely affected and delayed construction of an adequate<br />
U.S. earth terminal complex to keep pace with <strong>the</strong> growing communications capacity of<br />
<strong>the</strong> space segment. On <strong>the</strong> East Coast of <strong>the</strong> U.S. <strong>the</strong> system needs two full scale operating<br />
terminals. One terminal is in operation but <strong>the</strong> authorization to construct <strong>the</strong> second
108<br />
terminal has now been delayed for over a year in an attempt to compromise <strong>the</strong> conflicting<br />
interests between <strong>the</strong> international telegraph carriers, <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite<br />
Corporation, and our domestic common carriers. By 1968 a second communications satellite<br />
terminal will be needed in Hawaii and ano<strong>the</strong>r one on <strong>the</strong> West Coast. Both of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
stations should be under construction now. They are not. A major factor in <strong>the</strong> delay has<br />
been <strong>the</strong> general disorder in <strong>the</strong> U.S. international communications structure and <strong>the</strong><br />
continuing pattern of conflict between <strong>the</strong> carriers.<br />
C. Confusion and Conflict Resulting from <strong>the</strong> Foreign Interests of U.S. International<br />
Common Carriers<br />
The need for communications satellite earth stations in foreign countries where U.S.<br />
international common carriers have business interests has created dissension among <strong>the</strong>se<br />
carriers and had a very serious impact on <strong>the</strong> U.S. image overseas. In <strong>the</strong> Philippines, controversy<br />
between U.S. common carriers concerning responsibility for assisting in <strong>the</strong> organization<br />
of communications satellite activities and <strong>the</strong> construction of an earth terminal<br />
resulted in a long period of stalemate and confusion. The ultimate decision on <strong>the</strong> part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Philippine Government was to sharply reduce <strong>the</strong> activity of U.S. carriers within <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines.<br />
A similar situation has developed in Central and South America where certain of our<br />
international carriers are fighting a rear guard action against loss of <strong>the</strong>ir operating franchises.<br />
These conflicts and controversies are delaying <strong>the</strong> construction of satellite earth terminals<br />
in direct opposition to <strong>the</strong> announced United States policy to promote a rapid growth<br />
of satellite communications capability so as to streng<strong>the</strong>n bonds within this hemisphere.<br />
Document I-25<br />
Document title: Leonard H. Marks, Ambassador, Chairman, “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Delegation to <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (First Session), Washington,<br />
D.C., February 24–March 21, 1969,” April 10, 1969.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
The 1964 Interim Agreement that created INTELSAT specified that after five years a conference would<br />
be called to develop a definitive agreement for <strong>the</strong> organization. Accordingly, a Plenipotentiary<br />
Conference on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite<br />
Consortium convened in Washington, D.C., on February 24, 1969. The report of <strong>the</strong> U.S. delegation<br />
on <strong>the</strong> first session of that conference detailed <strong>the</strong> many areas of disagreement that would have to be<br />
resolved before a definitive agreement was possible. It took several years of difficult negotiations before<br />
that objective was achieved. The definitive agreements for INTELSAT went into effect on May 21,<br />
1971.<br />
[1]<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Conference<br />
on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium<br />
Summary<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 109<br />
(First Session)<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
February 24–March 21, 1969<br />
Submitted to <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State:<br />
Leonard H. Marks, Ambassador<br />
Chairman, United States Delegation<br />
April 10, 1969<br />
The purpose of <strong>the</strong> Conference is to establish definitive arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT). During <strong>the</strong> period<br />
February 24 to March 21, 1969, 96 interested member and non-member countries<br />
exchanged views on general aspects and specific details of proposed definitive arrangements.<br />
No final decisions were taken by <strong>the</strong> Conference, which stands recessed until<br />
November 18, 1969, at which time it is expected that draft definitive arrangements will be<br />
considered by <strong>the</strong> reconvened Conference. In <strong>the</strong> interim, an intersessional Preparatory<br />
Committee is being formed to develop <strong>the</strong> draft definitive arrangements.<br />
The Conference provided <strong>the</strong> first occasion since <strong>the</strong> interim arrangements were<br />
signed in 1964 for governments in <strong>the</strong>ir sovereign capacity to examine <strong>the</strong> organization<br />
collectively. Hence it is not surprising that political factors influenced <strong>the</strong> positions taken<br />
by many delegations. However, <strong>the</strong> avoidance of <strong>the</strong> extraneous political issues often<br />
raised at international conferences is notable. There have been no challenges to credentials<br />
and no polemics on issues outside <strong>the</strong> business of <strong>the</strong> Conference.<br />
The Conference worked in its first session through four working committees and in<br />
plenary session. The various Committee reports produced have been referred to <strong>the</strong> intersessional<br />
Preparatory Committee and will provide a basis for that Committee’s work.<br />
I. Background<br />
Following a series of successful communication satellite experiments by Government<br />
and industry in <strong>the</strong> United States in <strong>the</strong> period 1958–1963, <strong>the</strong> United States undertook,<br />
pursuant to <strong>the</strong> terms and mandates of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962, to establish,<br />
in conjunction and in cooperation with o<strong>the</strong>r countries, a single global commercial<br />
communication satellite system. After several months of international bilateral and multilateral<br />
negotiation [2] in 1963–64, <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> United States convened a<br />
Plenipotentiary Conference at Washington, D.C. in July 1964, at which texts of two agreements<br />
were initialed by 19 participating Governments. The first is <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental<br />
Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial<br />
Communications Satellite System, in which <strong>the</strong> parties agreed to establish a global communication<br />
satellite system in cooperation with one ano<strong>the</strong>r. A related Special<br />
Agreement, signed by Governments or telecommunications entities designated by member<br />
Governments, contains details relating to operation, financial aspects, procurement,<br />
control and maintenance of <strong>the</strong> global satellite system. The U.S. Government is a party to
110<br />
<strong>the</strong> first Agreement and <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation (ComSat), <strong>the</strong><br />
telecommunications entity designated by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government, is a signatory of <strong>the</strong> second<br />
(Special) Agreement. Pursuant to <strong>the</strong>se two Agreements, opened for signature on<br />
August 20, 1964, <strong>the</strong> cooperating member countries brought into existence <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), which now has<br />
68 member countries.<br />
Pursuant to Article IX of <strong>the</strong> Interim Agreement, <strong>the</strong> governing body of INTELSAT—<br />
<strong>the</strong> Interim Communications Satellite Committee (ICUS)—produced a report containing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee’s recommendations, and o<strong>the</strong>r shades of opinion, on definitive arrangements<br />
for <strong>the</strong> organization. This report was issued to all INTELSAT member Governments<br />
on December 31, 1968.<br />
Under o<strong>the</strong>r terms of Article IX <strong>the</strong> United States was obligated to convene a plenipotentiary<br />
conference to consider <strong>the</strong> ICUS Report within 90 days of <strong>the</strong> date it was issued.<br />
In compliance with this obligation, <strong>the</strong> United States convened <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary<br />
Conference on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications<br />
Satellite Consortium in Washington on February 24, 1969. After four weeks of work, <strong>the</strong><br />
Conference recessed its first session on March 21, 1969. This report covers that session.<br />
II. Agenda of <strong>the</strong> Conference<br />
As adopted, <strong>the</strong> agenda provided for:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
1. Election of <strong>the</strong> Chairman<br />
2. Adoption of <strong>the</strong> Agenda<br />
[3] 3. Adoption of Conference Rules of Procedure<br />
4. Election of o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Office</strong>rs<br />
5. Organization of <strong>the</strong> Conference<br />
A. Credentials Committee<br />
B. Editorial Committee<br />
C. Working Committees<br />
6. Report of <strong>the</strong> Credentials Committee<br />
7. Consideration of <strong>the</strong> report and recommendations of <strong>the</strong> Interim<br />
Communications Satellite Committee and of definitive arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium<br />
8. Signing of definitive arrangements<br />
The Conference followed this agenda, completing items 1–6, including adoption<br />
unanimously of <strong>the</strong> rules of procedure, established its work program, and proceeded in<br />
working committees to consider <strong>the</strong> wide variety of proposals contained in <strong>the</strong> ICUS<br />
report, as well as o<strong>the</strong>r proposals introduced during <strong>the</strong> Conference. It did not complete<br />
consideration of item 7, <strong>the</strong> substantive business of <strong>the</strong> Conference, and, of course, did<br />
not reach item 8, signing of agreements.<br />
III. Participation<br />
Sixty-seven of <strong>the</strong> sixty-eight members of INTELSAT registered at <strong>the</strong> Conference.<br />
They were Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile,<br />
China, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,<br />
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,<br />
Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco,<br />
Morocco, Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,<br />
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Republic of South Africa, Spain,<br />
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania,<br />
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United
States, Vatican City State, Venezuela, Republic of Viet Nam, Yemen Arab Republic. Only<br />
Iraq was not represented.<br />
Observers were sent from <strong>the</strong> following twenty-nine non-member countries:<br />
Afghanistan, Barbados, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo (K), Costa Rica,<br />
[4] Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Maldive<br />
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia<br />
Republic, Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Yemen, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia,<br />
Zambia. In addition, observers attended from <strong>the</strong> United Nations and <strong>the</strong> International<br />
Telecommunication[s] Union. Thus a total of ninety[-]eight delegations attended <strong>the</strong> first<br />
session of <strong>the</strong> Conference.<br />
A complete list of participants is attached as Annex A, including a list of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Delegation.<br />
Among <strong>the</strong> non-member observer countries, a substantial number spoke during various<br />
meetings of <strong>the</strong> Conference. Particularly <strong>the</strong> USSR, Poland, Romania and some of <strong>the</strong><br />
African observer delegations presented substantive comments and views on questions<br />
being considered by <strong>the</strong> Working Committees of <strong>the</strong> Conference.<br />
IV. Organization of <strong>the</strong> Conference<br />
The United States, as host Government, provided <strong>the</strong> secretariat and physical facilities<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Conference. The conference facilities in <strong>the</strong> State Department Building were<br />
used. In addition, <strong>the</strong> main auditorium of <strong>the</strong> Pan American Health Organization<br />
Building was used for several committee meetings. Administrative and secretariat support<br />
from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of International Conferences was outstanding throughout <strong>the</strong><br />
Conference and won deserved praise from many delegations at <strong>the</strong> final plenary session.<br />
In addition, <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Director of<br />
Telecommunications Management, and <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation made<br />
available secretarial and administrative support staff and equipment which contributed<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> efficiency of <strong>the</strong> overall operation.<br />
The Conference was formally opened by <strong>the</strong> Acting Secretary of State, Elliot L.<br />
Richardson. The names of <strong>the</strong> elected Conference officers and Committee Chairmen and<br />
Vice Chairmen are set forth in Annex B. All Conference officers and Committee<br />
Chairmen and Vice Chairmen were unanimously elected and <strong>the</strong>re were no objections to<br />
<strong>the</strong> [5] composition of any of <strong>the</strong> Conference Committees. The established Working<br />
Committees of <strong>the</strong> Conference and <strong>the</strong>ir subject matter were <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
Committee I Structure and Functions of INTELSAT Consortium, with<br />
particular regard to questions of membership, scope of services,<br />
organizational structure including structure of major<br />
organs, <strong>the</strong>ir functions and voting.<br />
Committee II Legal and Procedural Questions, including definitions, legal<br />
status, entry into force, duration, amendment, withdrawal,<br />
settlement of disputes.<br />
Committee III Financial Arrangements.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 111<br />
Committee IV O<strong>the</strong>r Operational Arrangements, including procurement<br />
policy, inventions and data, technical and operational matters.<br />
All four of <strong>the</strong>se Committees were constituted as committees of <strong>the</strong> whole, i.e. open<br />
to participation by all member country delegations, and all committee sessions, though<br />
not <strong>the</strong> sessions of working groups, were open to observers. Most of <strong>the</strong> work of <strong>the</strong>
112<br />
Conference was done in <strong>the</strong> Committees, with plenary meetings held only at <strong>the</strong> beginning<br />
and near <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> session.<br />
V. Work of <strong>the</strong> Committees<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Committee I—Structure and Functions<br />
Committee I’s work program, including nine specific topics, is set forth in Annex C.<br />
To facilitate its work, <strong>the</strong> Committee formed three working groups, each of which prepared<br />
a report, which was reviewed and accepted by <strong>the</strong> Committee and forwarded to a<br />
plenary meeting for consideration.<br />
Working Group A—The report of Working Group A (Com. I/84, Rev. 1) deals with<br />
<strong>the</strong> purposes and objectives of INTELSAT and <strong>the</strong> scope of INTELSAT’s activities. The<br />
Working Group developed a draft Preamble for <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements, a draft [6]<br />
article on “Objectives and Purposes” and a draft article on “Scope of Activities.” These<br />
draft articles were adopted unanimously by <strong>the</strong> ten-country Working Group, subject to<br />
notes and reservations set forth in <strong>the</strong> report.<br />
The Preamble is substantially similar to <strong>the</strong> Preamble of <strong>the</strong> 1964 intergovernmental<br />
Agreement and represents, in substance, <strong>the</strong> points which <strong>the</strong> U.S. Delegation sought to<br />
have included. France, supported by Syria, Switzerland, Belgium, and Sweden, reserved<br />
on <strong>the</strong> question of <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> word “single” in <strong>the</strong> phrase “single global system,” arguing<br />
that <strong>the</strong> term is ambiguous, ignores <strong>the</strong> presence of o<strong>the</strong>r communication satellite systems<br />
in <strong>the</strong> world, and, <strong>the</strong>refore, should be eliminated.<br />
The objectives and purposes of <strong>the</strong> organization as proposed in <strong>the</strong> draft article<br />
include <strong>the</strong> creation of a global organization to establish a single global commercial communication<br />
satellite system (France reserving again on “single”) “intended primarily to<br />
provide international public telecommunication services on a commercial basis of high<br />
quality and reliability, and sufficient to provide such services to all areas of <strong>the</strong> world.” This<br />
statement of objectives and purposes is consistent with U.S. views.<br />
The Working Group submitted a proposed article on <strong>the</strong> organization’s authorized<br />
scope of activities. The draft article states that INTELSAT: shall provide <strong>the</strong> space segment<br />
for international public telecommunications services; shall make its global satellite facilities<br />
available for domestic public telecommunications services on a non-discriminatory<br />
basis if this would not affect adversely <strong>the</strong> provision of facilities for international public<br />
services; may provide facilities in <strong>the</strong> global space segment for specialized service, presumably<br />
domestic or international in scope, if this would be both technically and economically<br />
acceptable and does not affect adversely <strong>the</strong> provision of international public<br />
services; may provide separate satellites for domestic public telecommunications services;<br />
and may provide separate satellites for specialized telecommunications services, presumably<br />
both domestic and international in scope, if this would [7] be both technically and<br />
economically acceptable and does not affect adversely <strong>the</strong> provision of international public<br />
services.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Working Group agreed on this text, <strong>the</strong>re are still several areas of less<br />
than complete agreement. The status and relative priority of domestic traffic is a matter<br />
of particular concern to Denmark, Pakistan, Portugal, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom and <strong>the</strong><br />
United States, all of which have geographically separated areas between which communication<br />
satellite traffic is or may be contemplated. (The U.S. concern, however, relates to<br />
all domestic traffic.) In connection with “specialized” telecommunication services, France,<br />
among o<strong>the</strong>rs, expressed concern that INTELSAT may be entering into areas or types of<br />
service better left to o<strong>the</strong>r organizations or to national governments to provide. As drafted,<br />
<strong>the</strong> article was acceptable to <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
Working Group B—The report of Working Group B (Com. I/111) deals with <strong>the</strong>
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 113<br />
structure of <strong>the</strong> organization. The Working Group discussed and reported on <strong>the</strong> nature,<br />
composition and functions of <strong>the</strong> major organs of <strong>the</strong> organization including an assembly<br />
of members, a governing body and a manager. No draft articles were prepared although<br />
a number of proposed drafts were submitted to <strong>the</strong> group and are reflected in <strong>the</strong> report.<br />
The eighteen-country group attempted to identify and record alternative views on structure<br />
of <strong>the</strong> organization but did not attempt to negotiate or reconcile inconsistent or<br />
incompatible proposals.<br />
There was unanimous support for creating an assembly, but <strong>the</strong> question arose as to<br />
its composition. Some thought <strong>the</strong> assembly should be exclusively a governmental body<br />
(i.e. participants would be under direct government control), and o<strong>the</strong>rs suggested it be<br />
an assembly of telecommunication operating agencies or entities which are <strong>the</strong> signatories<br />
to <strong>the</strong> operating or special agreement. The United States, India and <strong>the</strong> United<br />
Kingdom, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, proposed that <strong>the</strong> designation of delegations to <strong>the</strong> assembly be<br />
reserved as a matter of discretion of <strong>the</strong> individual member countries. An alternative solution<br />
proposed was to divide <strong>the</strong> assembly into [8] two assemblies, (1) an assembly of governments,<br />
meeting less regularly and concerning itself only with review of programs and<br />
progress and possible amendment of <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement, and (2) an<br />
assembly of telecommunication operating entities, meeting more regularly, perhaps,<br />
annually, to oversee and consider <strong>the</strong> management and progress of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
There was considerable discussion on <strong>the</strong> powers of <strong>the</strong> assembly, and proposals<br />
range, in substance, from treating <strong>the</strong> assembly as <strong>the</strong> equivalent of a stockholders’ meeting<br />
to giving <strong>the</strong> assembly direct responsibility and decision-making powers relating to<br />
operation of <strong>the</strong> system. The broadest support probably is for <strong>the</strong> relatively less operationally<br />
responsible assembly, and proponents of increased assembly powers are fewer as<br />
<strong>the</strong> powers assigned increase. There are two schools of thought on voting in <strong>the</strong> assembly.<br />
Nearly all of those speaking on <strong>the</strong> point favored one nation-one vote, in many cases, however,<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> assumption that <strong>the</strong> assembly will have relatively limited powers. The<br />
United States position was to combine one nation-one vote with a weighted vote reflecting<br />
relative levels of investment of <strong>the</strong> members.<br />
There was unanimous opinion in <strong>the</strong> Committee favoring establishment of a governing<br />
body equivalent to <strong>the</strong> present Interim Communications Satellite Committee (ICUS)<br />
of INTELSAT. It was unanimously agreed that representatives to this body should be from<br />
<strong>the</strong> telecommunication operating entities involved. There was a consensus that <strong>the</strong> size of<br />
<strong>the</strong> body should be limited in <strong>the</strong> interest of efficiency and effectiveness, although all<br />
agreed that equitable arrangements should be made for representation from smaller<br />
member countries and all geographical areas. There was no consensus on how to achieve<br />
<strong>the</strong>se goals. There also was no specific agreement on functions of <strong>the</strong> governing body, but<br />
it appeared to be intended by most delegations that its functions would be similar in<br />
nature and scope to those now performed by <strong>the</strong> ICUS. Voting in <strong>the</strong> governing body was<br />
discussed without [9] conclusions. There is general agreement that voting should be<br />
weighted to reflect relative investment in or use of <strong>the</strong> system, but <strong>the</strong>re appears to be substantial<br />
support for <strong>the</strong> view that no single country or small group of countries (2 or 3)<br />
should be able to impose or block (veto) a decision of <strong>the</strong> governing body. (The U.S. currently<br />
has an effective veto power under <strong>the</strong> interim arrangements.)<br />
The Working Group reported three principal views on <strong>the</strong> management arrangements<br />
for <strong>the</strong> future organization and <strong>the</strong> proponents and supporters of each view proclaimed<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir desire to ensure efficient, competent management.<br />
The proponents of <strong>the</strong> first view maintained that <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements should<br />
establish a firm goal of full internationalization of <strong>the</strong> management, under a director general,<br />
within a specific period of time. This view was supported by Belgium, France, India,<br />
Switzerland, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, among o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
The proponents of <strong>the</strong> second view, while not excluding <strong>the</strong> possibility of partial or
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THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
complete internationalization of <strong>the</strong> Manager under a director general, felt that fixing a<br />
rigid time period in which this goal must be realized might interfere with <strong>the</strong> necessity of<br />
[e]nsuring efficient and effective management. Australia, Chile, Nigeria and Venezuela<br />
favored this approach. Some members of <strong>the</strong> Working Group who supported this view<br />
wanted it made clear that staff should be recruited on <strong>the</strong> basis of competence ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
on <strong>the</strong> basis of investment or geographical representation of countries.<br />
A third view, expressed by <strong>the</strong> United States, specifically rejected <strong>the</strong> view that internationalization<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Manager should, in itself, be a primary goal or common aim.<br />
Efficient management should be <strong>the</strong> only goal of <strong>the</strong> organization regarding <strong>the</strong> structure<br />
of its management body. Internationalization of <strong>the</strong> organization should be addressed in<br />
<strong>the</strong> assembly and <strong>the</strong> governing body. Subsequently, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Delegation indicated that we<br />
could consider dividing <strong>the</strong> management function and creating an international administrative<br />
[10] management body to handle administrative, financial, and legal functions,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> operational manager continuing to handle o<strong>the</strong>r functions. The United States<br />
made it clear, however, that <strong>the</strong> concept of a director general interpositioned between <strong>the</strong><br />
manager and <strong>the</strong> governing body was unacceptable.<br />
Working Group C—The report of Working Group C (Com. I/94) deals with eligibility<br />
for INTELSAT membership and <strong>the</strong> question of relationships with non-member countries.<br />
The Working Group produced two draft articles, one on membership, which<br />
stipulates that only International Telecommunication[s] Union members are eligible for<br />
INTELSAT membership; and one setting forth principles of access to <strong>the</strong> system, which<br />
would make direct access to <strong>the</strong> space segment of <strong>the</strong> global system available to all signatories<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r states, countries or areas not members of <strong>the</strong> organization. The Group<br />
unanimously supported <strong>the</strong> draft articles, with Tunisia, however, recording <strong>the</strong> view that<br />
<strong>the</strong> possibility of admitting non-ITU members to membership in INTELSAT should not<br />
be excluded. A few o<strong>the</strong>r members and several observers also spoke in favor of this view<br />
in meetings of <strong>the</strong> parent Committee, though a considerably larger number of members<br />
spoke in favor of ITU membership as a condition.<br />
Committee I discussed <strong>the</strong> topics considered by its Working Groups before and after<br />
<strong>the</strong> Groups met. In addition, <strong>the</strong> topics of <strong>the</strong> rights and obligations of members and<br />
INTELSAT relationship with <strong>the</strong> ITU were discussed in <strong>the</strong> Committee, but <strong>the</strong>se discussions<br />
did not go beyond a few expressions of views and <strong>the</strong>se topics were not assigned to<br />
a Working Group. The Secretariat prepared and distributed a summary of <strong>the</strong> main points<br />
touched upon in <strong>the</strong>se discussions (Com. I/107, Rev. 1).<br />
Committee II—Legal and Procedural Questions<br />
Committee II established three Working Groups. Its agenda is set forth in Annex D.<br />
[11] Working Group on Legal Status—Legal status was examined at some length in both<br />
<strong>the</strong> Working Group and <strong>the</strong> full Committee. All of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r members of <strong>the</strong> Working<br />
Group (Brazil, Chile, Germany, <strong>the</strong> Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, and <strong>the</strong> U.K.)<br />
opposed <strong>the</strong> U.S. position that INTELSAT should continue as a joint venture without legal<br />
personality. Instead <strong>the</strong>y favored establishing INTELSAT as a legal entity distinct from <strong>the</strong><br />
participants. The joint venture was described by <strong>the</strong> U.S. as a viable means of carrying out<br />
<strong>the</strong> activities and purposes of INTELSAT. The majority view urges that INTELSAT will be<br />
better able to contract, own property, sue or be sued, obtain privileges and immunities,<br />
and incur and dispose of liabilities appropriately if it is a separate legal personality. The<br />
United States position is that all <strong>the</strong>se functions have been performed and can continue<br />
to be performed through a joint venture.<br />
The report of <strong>the</strong> Working Group contains separate statements of <strong>the</strong> majority and
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 115<br />
U.S. positions and, with <strong>the</strong> summary record of <strong>the</strong> Committee’s discussion of <strong>the</strong> report,<br />
was transmitted to Committee I for consideration. However, <strong>the</strong> matter was not discussed<br />
in Committee I.<br />
Com. II/9 (and 11) contains <strong>the</strong> report of this Working Group.<br />
Working Group on Accession, Supersession and Buy-Out—<br />
Entry Into Force—The U.S. position was that <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements should<br />
enter into force upon final adherence by two-thirds of <strong>the</strong> present members who hold, or<br />
whose signatories to <strong>the</strong> Special Agreement hold, a substantial proportion (80% was suggested)<br />
of <strong>the</strong> investment quota under <strong>the</strong> Special Agreement. This position was adopted<br />
as <strong>the</strong> majority position by <strong>the</strong> Committee, but <strong>the</strong> exact percentage was left to be decided<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Plenary. The major point of contention concerned <strong>the</strong> financial criterion. Some<br />
delegates (Chile and Switzerland) strongly objected to a requirement which would enable<br />
<strong>the</strong> largest “shareholder” to block <strong>the</strong> entry into force of <strong>the</strong> new agreements. Only a small<br />
minority of delegations (Sweden, [12] France and Mexico) asserted that <strong>the</strong>re must, as a<br />
matter of international law, be unanimous adherence by all prior members. The remainder<br />
appeared to accept adherence by a substantial majority as legally sufficient.<br />
Transfer of Rights and Obligations—The Working Group produced two alternative<br />
draft articles. The first of <strong>the</strong>se would transfer <strong>the</strong> rights and obligations of signatories to<br />
<strong>the</strong> interim Special Agreement to <strong>the</strong> signatories of <strong>the</strong> comparable part of <strong>the</strong> definitive<br />
arrangements, including transfer of ownership in undivided shares. The second approach<br />
transfers all rights and obligations of interim signatories to INTELSAT under <strong>the</strong> definitive<br />
arrangements. The two approaches are contrasted as appropriate, respectively, for a<br />
continued joint venture or <strong>the</strong> establishment of an organization with a legal personality.<br />
Buy-Out—Committee II in its report formulated <strong>the</strong> following general legal principles<br />
for <strong>the</strong> buy-out of non-continuing members, leaving <strong>the</strong> mechanics to Committee III: (1)<br />
fair compensation with reasonable expedition; (2) for patents and data, ei<strong>the</strong>r fair compensation<br />
or continued enjoyment; and (3) <strong>the</strong> amount of compensation to be settled by<br />
negotiation between <strong>the</strong> non-continuing member and INTELSAT. Failing an agreement,<br />
<strong>the</strong> non-continuing member could challenge any determination by <strong>the</strong> governing body<br />
before a neutral arbitral tribunal. Although <strong>the</strong>re appeared to be no opposition to <strong>the</strong><br />
principle of equitable compensation for non-continuing members, Chile and Sweden<br />
argued that a non-continuing member’s share cannot be bought out without its consent.<br />
Com. II/10 contains this Group’s report.<br />
Working Group on O<strong>the</strong>r Matters—Com. II/15 and 16 are <strong>the</strong> reports of this Group.<br />
Privileges and Immunities—This item was considered at some length in <strong>the</strong> full<br />
Committee as well as in <strong>the</strong> Working Group. The report of Committee II on this subject<br />
noted that a majority of <strong>the</strong> delegates favored including in <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement<br />
two general provisions: <strong>the</strong> first would commit <strong>the</strong> host [13] state to conclude a<br />
headquarters agreement providing for appropriate privileges and immunities within <strong>the</strong><br />
jurisdiction where <strong>the</strong> headquarters were located; <strong>the</strong> second would authorize <strong>the</strong> board<br />
of governors to negotiate with member states on an ad hoc basis those privileges and<br />
immunities appropriate for <strong>the</strong> proper functioning of INTELSAT. It was generally recognized<br />
that INTELSAT would obtain tax immunities where necessary, although provision<br />
for such immunities should not be specifically made in <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement.<br />
Some delegates expressed <strong>the</strong> view that INTELSAT would have to have legal personality<br />
in order to be granted privileges and immunities under <strong>the</strong>ir domestic laws.<br />
Settlement of Disputes—There were three major points of controversy: <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
parties to arbitration; <strong>the</strong> selection of <strong>the</strong> panel from which <strong>the</strong> third member (<strong>the</strong> president)<br />
of an arbitral tribunal is chosen; and, <strong>the</strong> scope of arbitrable disputes. The U.S.<br />
position was that <strong>the</strong> signatories to <strong>the</strong> operating agreement, <strong>the</strong> board of governors, and
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THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
<strong>the</strong> assembly should be <strong>the</strong> only competent parties to an arbitration proceeding. The<br />
majority of <strong>the</strong> delegations wanted to include in <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement some<br />
mechanism for settling disputes among <strong>the</strong> governments[’] parties to that agreement.<br />
With respect to <strong>the</strong> selection of <strong>the</strong> panel members, <strong>the</strong> Working Group’s report, which<br />
was adopted by Committee II, stated that a majority favored selection of <strong>the</strong> panel by <strong>the</strong><br />
Assembly without weighted voting. This was inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> U.S. position that <strong>the</strong><br />
selection should be made by <strong>the</strong> board of governors. As for <strong>the</strong> scope of arbitrable disputes,<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. position that <strong>the</strong> scope should be confined to legal disputes received<br />
majority support, although some delegations favored a broader scope. The majority<br />
favored limiting <strong>the</strong> scope to legal disputes but using a different formulation from that<br />
proposed by <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Amendment Processes—The U.S. position that a proposed amendment to <strong>the</strong> operating<br />
agreement be approved by <strong>the</strong> board of governors was opposed by several delegates.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong>re was general agreement that no amendment to <strong>the</strong> operating agreement<br />
should be made [14] without <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> parties to <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement,<br />
differing views were expressed as to <strong>the</strong> manner in which that consent should be<br />
manifested.<br />
Liability of <strong>the</strong> Signatories—This matter was discussed only in <strong>the</strong> full Committee. A<br />
significant issue was whe<strong>the</strong>r, if INTELSAT is given separate legal status, <strong>the</strong> signatories<br />
would or should enjoy limited liability for INTELSAT obligations. There was significant<br />
opinion that limited liability automatically followed from establishing INTELSAT with<br />
legal personality. The U.S., along with Australia and Sweden, felt that it would not.<br />
However, Sweden and a number of o<strong>the</strong>r delegations expressed <strong>the</strong> view that limited liability<br />
is an advantage which should be afforded <strong>the</strong> signatories. A second issue was<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r exemption of <strong>the</strong> signatories to <strong>the</strong> operating agreement from inter se liability<br />
should extend beyond consequential damages arising from a breakdown in service. There<br />
was general agreement that <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements should not impair member states’<br />
responsibilities under <strong>the</strong> Treaty on Outer Space.<br />
Withdrawal, Reservations, Definitions and Number of Agreements—Withdrawal was<br />
discussed only briefly in Committee II. No general agreement was discernible.<br />
The matters of reservations and definitions were deferred until <strong>the</strong> final text of <strong>the</strong><br />
agreement has been generally established. There appeared to be no opposition at this<br />
time to <strong>the</strong> U.S. position prohibiting reservations.<br />
An overwhelming majority supported <strong>the</strong> U.S. position for two agreements, with some<br />
delegates reserving until more is known of <strong>the</strong> final text.<br />
Committee III—Financial Arrangements<br />
Committee III’s work program is shown in Annex E. Its report is Doc. 16.<br />
[15] There was general agreement in <strong>the</strong> Committee that investment in <strong>the</strong> system should<br />
be related to use, as <strong>the</strong> U.S. had proposed, though some countries, principally <strong>the</strong> Arab<br />
group, favored applying <strong>the</strong> investment/use system only after allocating a base share of<br />
investment to each member. There was near agreement on a minimum share for each<br />
member, regardless of its use of <strong>the</strong> system, most delegations favoring 0.05%. However,<br />
many delegations thought members with lower use should not be required to accept this<br />
minimum.<br />
The Committee divided three ways on <strong>the</strong> question of what types of use of <strong>the</strong> system<br />
should be counted in determining investment shares, about one-third of those countries<br />
that expressed views (including <strong>the</strong> U.S.) favoring all use of INTELSAT-financed facilities,<br />
one-third favoring international traffic only, and ano<strong>the</strong>r group proposing to count international<br />
traffic and that domestic traffic that crosses international boundaries (or would<br />
do so if projected on <strong>the</strong> surface of <strong>the</strong> earth). The ideas of several delegations on this<br />
question clearly were related to <strong>the</strong> question of voting strength in <strong>the</strong> organization. It was
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 117<br />
agreed that shares should be adjusted periodically, but left open whe<strong>the</strong>r adjustments<br />
would be based on past (U.S.) or projected use or some combination of <strong>the</strong> two. There<br />
was also a division of views on <strong>the</strong> question of circumstances under which a signatory<br />
could decline to accept an increased or decreased share.<br />
It was agreed by all but a few members that <strong>the</strong>re should be a utilization charge, partly<br />
as a means of compensating owners whose share is larger than <strong>the</strong>ir use prior to adjustment<br />
of shares. Working Group 1, which handled most of <strong>the</strong> Committee’s work,<br />
recommended <strong>the</strong> cost of money plus about 2% as <strong>the</strong> basis of compensation for use of<br />
capital in determining utilization charges.<br />
Committee III’s second Working Group considered financial provisions relating to<br />
transition from <strong>the</strong> present agreements and possible withdrawals from [16] <strong>the</strong> organization.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> Working Group did not, and did not attempt to, reach final agreement,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was general agreement on <strong>the</strong> principles that should be applicable. It should not be<br />
too difficult to reach agreement in this area.<br />
Working Group 3 agreed, with respect to financial access to <strong>the</strong> system by non-members,<br />
that <strong>the</strong> organization, in establishing space segment utilization charges for nonmembers[,]<br />
should take account of <strong>the</strong> fact that non-members have not borne any of <strong>the</strong><br />
risks and obligations of membership. This would mean that a rate charged to non-members<br />
should take account of both <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> members’ capital and <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
taken in investing in <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
Committee IV—O<strong>the</strong>r Operational Arrangements<br />
Committee IV, which had two Working Groups, considered only procurement policy<br />
(Working Group A) and patent and data policy (Working Group B).<br />
On procurement policies <strong>the</strong>re developed three alternative approaches: (1) a relatively<br />
simple provision calling for international tenders and contractor selection on <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of <strong>the</strong> best combination of price, quality and timely delivery; (2) retention of <strong>the</strong><br />
existing interim arrangement provisions, which have allowed international spreading of<br />
contracts; and (3) <strong>the</strong> amplification of (1) above by addition of specific language encouraging<br />
international spreading of contracts with distribution roughly proportionate to relative<br />
investment percentages of members. There is, in fact, little actual difference in <strong>the</strong><br />
probable practical effect of alternatives (2) and (3). The United States, and apparently a<br />
majority of those countries expressing <strong>the</strong>mselves on this issue, favored alternative (1).<br />
The United Kingdom and Japan supported alternative (2) and France supported alternative<br />
(3). The proposed specific wording is set forth in <strong>the</strong> Committee’s report (Doc. 12).<br />
[17] With regard to patent and data policy, two alternatives emerged. The United States,<br />
<strong>the</strong> United Kingdom and o<strong>the</strong>rs favored a provision which would leave to <strong>the</strong> discretion<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Governing Body <strong>the</strong> particular patent policies to be applied in each contract negotiation.<br />
Canada, Germany, India, France and o<strong>the</strong>rs proposed a patent provision which<br />
would establish in <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements a fixed non-exclusive license policy pursuant<br />
to which any INTELSAT contractor would get title to inventions and data developed<br />
under INTELSAT contracts, and <strong>the</strong> organization would take a non-exclusive license to<br />
use <strong>the</strong> information only in connection with space segments and would thus forego control<br />
over <strong>the</strong> contractor’s use of <strong>the</strong> information. There was virtually unanimous agreement<br />
that to <strong>the</strong> extent INTELSAT obtains rights in inventions and data, <strong>the</strong>y should be<br />
made available on a royalty-free basis for use in <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT space segment and on a<br />
reasonable royalty basis for o<strong>the</strong>r uses. The alternative patent and data policies are set<br />
forth in Com. IV/10 and 11.<br />
The Credentials Committee<br />
The Credentials Committee was nominated by <strong>the</strong> Conference Chairman and
118<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
approved during <strong>the</strong> initial plenary meeting. Its members were Ireland, Norway, Panama,<br />
Philippines and Turkey. The Committee elected <strong>the</strong> representative of Turkey Chairman.<br />
The Committee found all credentials to be in order and its report was accepted without<br />
discussion by <strong>the</strong> Conference.<br />
The Editorial Committee<br />
The Editorial Committee was nominated by <strong>the</strong> Conference Chairman and approved<br />
by <strong>the</strong> plenary. Its members are Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Jamaica, Mexico,<br />
Spain, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, and <strong>the</strong> United States. There being no work to be done on<br />
final texts, <strong>the</strong> Editorial Committee did not meet or function at <strong>the</strong> first session of <strong>the</strong><br />
Conference.<br />
[18] The Steering Committee<br />
Composition of <strong>the</strong> Steering Committee was provided for in <strong>the</strong> Conference Rules of<br />
Procedure as follows: Chairman—Conference Chairman (USA); members—<strong>the</strong> four<br />
regional Vice Chairmen (Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, Venezuela, India and Algeria; but <strong>the</strong><br />
Representative of The Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands left and was replaced by <strong>the</strong> Swiss Representative in<br />
<strong>the</strong> fourth week) and <strong>the</strong> Chairmen of <strong>the</strong> four Working Committees (Argentina, Japan,<br />
Australia and Italy). The Steering Committee met regularly throughout <strong>the</strong> first session,<br />
coordinating <strong>the</strong> program of <strong>the</strong> Conference. This Committee prepared <strong>the</strong> proposal<br />
adopted by <strong>the</strong> Conference to establish an intersessional Preparatory Committee (Annex<br />
G) which is discussed in detail in Section VII below.<br />
VI. Plenary Session of <strong>the</strong> Conference<br />
The Conference met in five plenary sessions. At <strong>the</strong> initial plenary <strong>the</strong> agenda was<br />
adopted, committees were formed, and conference officers were elected. There were four<br />
plenary sessions during <strong>the</strong> final week to receive and consider <strong>the</strong> Working Committee<br />
reports.<br />
The opening session proceeded thorough <strong>the</strong> agenda as planned without any difficulties.<br />
Prior to adoption of <strong>the</strong> Conference Rules of Procedure, representatives from<br />
Italy, Nigeria and India sought assurances, which were given by <strong>the</strong> Conference Chairman,<br />
that <strong>the</strong> rules with regard to statements of observers would be interpreted liberally to<br />
ensure <strong>the</strong> fullest possible exchange of views. The United Kingdom suggested and was<br />
assured that maximum opportunity would be made available to achieve consensus on all<br />
matters.<br />
Sweden introduced a comprehensive and novel set of draft definitive arrangements<br />
(Doc. 8). This draft was not given much direct attention by <strong>the</strong> Conference. The only<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r comprehensive draft agreements submitted were tabled by <strong>the</strong> United States at <strong>the</strong><br />
end of <strong>the</strong> first week of <strong>the</strong> Conference (Doc. 10). These drafts were not discussed as such,<br />
but various articles were considered by <strong>the</strong> Conference Committees.<br />
[19] At <strong>the</strong> four plenary sessions held during <strong>the</strong> final week, reports were received from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Working Committees and were discussed. Because of <strong>the</strong> number of unresolved issues<br />
and <strong>the</strong> general complexity of definitive arrangements, it became obvious that substantially<br />
more time would be required to develop final texts. It was decided, on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Steering Committee, to recess <strong>the</strong> Conference March 21, 1969 and to<br />
refer <strong>the</strong> Committee reports and all o<strong>the</strong>r relevant Conference documents to an intersessional<br />
Preparatory Committee for study and work. A proposal to provide for interim work<br />
was discussed at some length during <strong>the</strong> fourth plenary session and <strong>the</strong> Steering<br />
Committee was requested to revise <strong>the</strong> proposal to reflect <strong>the</strong> views expressed. A revised<br />
paper was submitted to <strong>the</strong> fifth and final plenary and was adopted unanimously without<br />
discussion (Annex G).
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 119<br />
VII. Future Meetings<br />
The Conference provided for two types of future meetings. First, member and observer<br />
countries are to notify <strong>the</strong> Conference Secretariat if <strong>the</strong>y intend to participate in or<br />
observe meetings of <strong>the</strong> intersessional Preparatory Committee, which is to convene in<br />
Washington as soon as possible after May 20, on a date to be notified by <strong>the</strong> Conference<br />
Secretariat. The Committee is <strong>the</strong>n to meet again <strong>the</strong>reafter at such times as it may decide<br />
as necessary to complete its work.<br />
A second plenipotentiary session of <strong>the</strong> Conference is scheduled to convene in<br />
Washington on November 18, 1969.<br />
The Preparatory Committee is intended to be broadly representative of all areas and<br />
attitudes. It is encouraged to resolve in an objective manner differences of views presented<br />
during <strong>the</strong> Conference, although it is not empowered to negotiate definitive arrangements.<br />
No country will be bound by <strong>the</strong> views and positions of <strong>the</strong> Committee’s report,<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or not it is represented on <strong>the</strong> Committee.<br />
The Committee is instructed to elect its own Chairman and to establish its own procedures<br />
and methods of work. Its report is to be circulated through <strong>the</strong> Secretary General<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Conference at least sixty days prior to <strong>the</strong> reconvening of <strong>the</strong> Conference. The<br />
report will be in [20] <strong>the</strong> form of draft agreements, with such alternate drafts of specific<br />
articles as may be necessary to reflect differences of significant views. However, degrees of<br />
support are not to be reflected in <strong>the</strong> report.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> Committee should be unable to complete its work in time, it may postpone <strong>the</strong><br />
reconvening of <strong>the</strong> Conference and request <strong>the</strong> host Government (U.S.) to reconvene <strong>the</strong><br />
Conference at <strong>the</strong> earliest convenient date.<br />
VIII. Conclusions<br />
From <strong>the</strong> outset it was known that <strong>the</strong> task of establishing definitive arrangements for<br />
a global commercial communication satellite system would be demanding, complex and<br />
time consuming. During <strong>the</strong> four weeks of this session, <strong>the</strong> Conference collected, considered<br />
and condensed a great many views. This was an essential and desirable first step.<br />
Machinery has now been established for fur<strong>the</strong>r significant steps, i.e. preparation of<br />
drafts and, hopefully, resolving of differences of views. This work is to be done in <strong>the</strong> intersessional<br />
Preparatory Committee. The Committee’s work product will be draft agreements,<br />
including alternative provisions where appropriate, which all interested countries<br />
can consider prior to and at a reconvened session of <strong>the</strong> Conference, now scheduled for<br />
November 1969.<br />
One overriding value of <strong>the</strong> first session was <strong>the</strong> educational benefit it offered to all<br />
participating countries. Many countries, particularly those not represented on <strong>the</strong> ICUS,<br />
expressed <strong>the</strong>ir views at this session for <strong>the</strong> first time. Many of <strong>the</strong> earlier published positions<br />
of o<strong>the</strong>r countries were explained, elaborated and documented. In <strong>the</strong> increased<br />
international understanding it produced, and in <strong>the</strong> high level of international cooperation<br />
it evidenced, this first session was undoubtedly successful. The individual and joint<br />
efforts of all <strong>the</strong> participating representatives and observers, particularly those of <strong>the</strong><br />
Conference officers and Committee and Working Group Chairmen, have advanced <strong>the</strong><br />
prospects of successful conclusion of <strong>the</strong>se considerations immeasurably.<br />
The first session appropriately concluded on a note of constructive optimism and<br />
cooperation. The provisions for fur<strong>the</strong>r work and deliberations should make possible [21]<br />
a continued valuable exchange of views and timely conclusion of definitive arrangements<br />
for <strong>the</strong> presently operating global commercial communications satellite system established<br />
by INTELSAT.<br />
The Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Delegation wishes to thank <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r members of <strong>the</strong><br />
Delegation for <strong>the</strong>ir very able assistance and sound advice.
120<br />
[hand-signed: “Leonard H. Marks”]<br />
Leonard H. Marks, Ambassador<br />
Chairman, United States Delegation<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Document I-26<br />
Document title: “Second Report and Order in <strong>the</strong> Matter of Establishment of Domestic<br />
Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” Docket No. 16495,<br />
June 16, 1972.<br />
Source: Federal Communications Commission Reports: Decisions and Reports of <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission of <strong>the</strong> United States, June 9, 1972 to August 4, 1972, Volume 35,<br />
Second Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, 1974), pp. 844–851,<br />
860–867.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> original institutional arrangements for communicating via satellite were discussed during<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1962–1964 period, <strong>the</strong> White House and Congress focused on setting up a system for international<br />
communications as quickly as possible. Little attention was given to issues related to using communications<br />
satellites for domestic services within <strong>the</strong> United States. Beginning in 1966, however,<br />
various companies began to apply to <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission for authorization to<br />
develop and operate such domestic satellite systems. This order and accompanying report represent <strong>the</strong><br />
Federal Communications Commission’s decision on <strong>the</strong> matter, opening <strong>the</strong> U.S. domestic market to<br />
interested multiple providers of various communications services via satellite.<br />
[844]<br />
Federal Communications Commission Report<br />
BEFORE THE<br />
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION<br />
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554<br />
F.C.C. 72-531<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Matter of<br />
ESTABLISHMENT OF DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS- }<br />
SATELLITE FACILITIES BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL } Docket No. 16495<br />
ENTITIES }<br />
SECOND REPORT AND ORDER<br />
(Adopted June 16, 1972; Released June 16, 1972)<br />
BY THE COMMISSION: CHAIRMAN BURCH DISSENTING AND ISSUING A STATE<br />
MENT IN WHICH COMMISSIONERS REID AND WILEY JOIN; COMMISSIONER<br />
JOHNSON CONCURRING AND ISSUING A STATEMENT.<br />
I. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION<br />
1. This proceeding was instituted by <strong>the</strong> Commission on March 2, 1966 (Notice of<br />
Inquiry, 31 F.R. 3507; Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, October 20, 1966, 31 F.R. 13763)
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 121<br />
to explore various legal, technical and policy questions associated with <strong>the</strong> possible authorization<br />
of domestic communications satellite facilities to nongovernmental entities. On<br />
March 24, 1970, <strong>the</strong> Commission issued a first Report and Order (1970 Report) inviting <strong>the</strong><br />
submission of applications to assist our determinations (22 FCC 2d 86, 35 F.R. 5356), and<br />
consolidated a concurrently issued Notice of Proposal Rule Making (22 FCC 2d 810). In<br />
response to <strong>the</strong> 1970 Report, system applications were filed by <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
The Western Union Telegraph Company (Western Union)<br />
Hughes Aircraft Company and various telephone operating companies of GTE<br />
Service Corporation (Hughes/GTE)<br />
Western Tele-Communications, Inc. (WTCI)<br />
RCA Global Communications Inc. and RCA Alaska Communications, Inc. (RCA<br />
Globcom/RCA Alascom or “<strong>the</strong> RCA applicants”)<br />
Communications Satellite Corporation and American Telephone and Telegraph<br />
Company (Comsat/AT&T)<br />
Comsat<br />
MCI Lockheed Satellite Corporation (MCI Lockheed)<br />
Fairchild Industries, Inc. (Fairchild)<br />
In addition, applications for earth stations only were filed by:<br />
Hawaiian Telephone Company<br />
Twin County Trans-Video, Inc.<br />
TelePrompTer Corporation<br />
LVO Cable, Inc., and United Video, Inc.<br />
Phoenix Satellite Corporation<br />
[845] 2. Comments and reply comments on <strong>the</strong> applications and rule making issues were<br />
received from <strong>the</strong> applicants and o<strong>the</strong>r interested parties. By a Memorandum Opinion<br />
and Order issued on March 17, 1972 (34 FCC 2d 1), <strong>the</strong> Commission afforded <strong>the</strong> parties<br />
an opportunity to file written comments and to be heard orally on a proposed Second<br />
Report and Order (34 FCC 2d 9) recommended by <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong> Common Carrier<br />
Bureau (staff recommendation). Written comments were received and oral argument<br />
before <strong>the</strong> Commission en banc was held on May 1–2, 1972. 1<br />
3. Upon consideration of <strong>the</strong> entire record, we are of <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> staff recommendation<br />
adequately describes <strong>the</strong> background of this proceeding, <strong>the</strong> general nature of<br />
<strong>the</strong> pending applications, and <strong>the</strong> previously filed comments and reply comments of <strong>the</strong><br />
parties on <strong>the</strong> applications and rule making issues. Accordingly, we will adopt <strong>the</strong> descriptive<br />
portions of <strong>the</strong> staff recommendation without reiterating such material here.<br />
However, as stated in <strong>the</strong> Memorandum Opinion and Order of March 17, 1972, our action<br />
in designating <strong>the</strong> staff recommendation for written and oral comment was taken “before<br />
reaching any determinations in this matter” and “<strong>the</strong>refore does not reflect any predisposition<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Commission with respect to <strong>the</strong> resolution of <strong>the</strong> issues involved” (34 FCC<br />
2d at 2). The Commission’s determinations, which are set forth below, incorporate <strong>the</strong><br />
staff’s reasoning and conclusions on <strong>the</strong> issues only as expressly indicated herein or to <strong>the</strong><br />
extent that <strong>the</strong>y are clearly consistent with our statements of policy and conclusions.<br />
1. The two entities who had not previously participated in this proceeding were granted leave to be<br />
heard orally: <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense and <strong>the</strong> Network Project (FCC 72-314).The motions of various parties<br />
to correct <strong>the</strong> transcript of oral argument are hereby granted. Some applicants have submitted statements, without<br />
leave from <strong>the</strong> Commission, purportedly in fur<strong>the</strong>r response to questions from individual Commissioners at<br />
<strong>the</strong> oral argument. While such statements have been placed in <strong>the</strong> record, we do not rely on <strong>the</strong>m.
122<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
II. INTRODUCTORY POLICY STATEMENT<br />
4. As <strong>the</strong> Commission recognized in <strong>the</strong> 1970 Report (22 FCC 2d at 88, 95–96), and<br />
as confirmed by <strong>the</strong> applications and responses filed pursuant to that Report, <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
technology has <strong>the</strong> potential of making significant contributions to <strong>the</strong> nation’s domestic<br />
communications structure by providing a better means of serving certain of <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
markets and developing new markets not now being served. There are concrete proposals<br />
before us for <strong>the</strong> use of communications satellites to augment <strong>the</strong> long-haul terrestrial<br />
facilities of existing carriers for point-to-point switched transmissions services, and to connect<br />
off-shore distant domestic points (i.e., Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico) to <strong>the</strong> contiguous<br />
states. There are also proposals for <strong>the</strong> use of satellites as a means of providing point-tomultipoint<br />
services, such as program transmission, although plans for such use are now<br />
most tentative and uncertain. O<strong>the</strong>r proposals reflect <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> most important<br />
value of domestic satellites at <strong>the</strong> present time lies in <strong>the</strong>ir potential for developing new<br />
markets and for expanding existing markets for specialized communications services.<br />
5. Notwithstanding <strong>the</strong> specific proposals that have been submitted, <strong>the</strong> true extent<br />
and nature of <strong>the</strong> public benefit that satellites [846] may produce in <strong>the</strong> domestic field<br />
remains [sic] to be demonstrated. The United States has a well-developed and rapidly<br />
expanding complex of terrestrial facilities, and advances in terrestrial technology and<br />
operations can be expected to continue <strong>the</strong> present trend toward reduced transmission<br />
costs and more efficient services. Although pointing to some increased operational flexibility<br />
in <strong>the</strong> routing of its traffic, <strong>the</strong> predominant terrestrial carrier, AT&T, disclaims that<br />
<strong>the</strong> satellite technology presently offers any cost savings or o<strong>the</strong>r marked advantages over<br />
terrestrial facilities in <strong>the</strong> provision of <strong>the</strong> switched services that constitute <strong>the</strong> bulk of its<br />
traffic, message toll telephone (MTT) and wide area telephone service (WATS). At <strong>the</strong><br />
same time, <strong>the</strong>re is an uncertainty, that can only be resolved by actual operating experience,<br />
as to whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> time delay inherent in voice communications via synchronous<br />
satellites will provide an acceptable quality of service to <strong>the</strong> general public when domestic<br />
telephone traffic is routed indiscriminately and on a large scale basis via satellite and terrestrial<br />
facilities.<br />
6. Although <strong>the</strong> satellite technology appears to have great promise of immediate<br />
public benefit in <strong>the</strong> specialized communications market, here too <strong>the</strong>re are uncertainties<br />
as to how effectively and readily satellite services can develop or penetrate that market.<br />
Thus, in <strong>the</strong> area of point-to-multipoint transmission, <strong>the</strong> commercial broadcast networks<br />
are as yet undecided as <strong>the</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r to use this technology in whole or in part. We do have<br />
a concrete proposal for a CATV network from Hughes, expressions of interest by public<br />
broadcasting and o<strong>the</strong>r educational entities, and <strong>the</strong> possibility of interest by independent<br />
supplies of program material to CATV and broadcast outlets. Moreover, several system<br />
applicants, in addition to seeking to attract program transmission business, have premised<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir proposals on <strong>the</strong> sale of o<strong>the</strong>r specialized services—in part as a complement to existing<br />
or proposed terrestrial offerings, but in <strong>the</strong> main with <strong>the</strong> expectation of expanding<br />
existing special service markets and developing new markets. To be sure, <strong>the</strong> applications<br />
generally do not identify specific services that are new or innovative. However, in our judgment,<br />
<strong>the</strong> uncertain ties as to <strong>the</strong> nature and scope of <strong>the</strong> special markets and innovative<br />
services that might be stimulated will only be resolved by <strong>the</strong> experience with operational<br />
facilities.<br />
7. Under <strong>the</strong> circumstances, we will be guided by <strong>the</strong> following objectives in formulating<br />
<strong>the</strong> policies to govern our licensing and regulation of <strong>the</strong> construction and use of<br />
satellite systems for domestic communications purposes, namely:<br />
(a) to maximize <strong>the</strong> opportunities for <strong>the</strong> early acquisition of technical, operational,<br />
and marketing data and experience in <strong>the</strong> use of this technology as a<br />
new communications resource for all types of services;
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 123<br />
(b) to afford a reasonable opportunity for multiple entities to demonstrate how<br />
any operational and economic characteristics peculiar to <strong>the</strong> satellite technology<br />
can be used to provide existing and new specialized services more economically<br />
and efficiently than can be done by terrestrial facilities;<br />
[847] (c) to facilitate <strong>the</strong> efficient development of this new resource by removing or<br />
neutralizing existing institutional restraints or inhibitions; and<br />
(d) to retain leeway and flexibility in our policy making with respect to <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
satellite technology for domestic communications so as to make such adjustments<br />
<strong>the</strong>rein as future experience and circumstances may dictate.<br />
8. We are fur<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> view that multiple entry is most likely to produce a fruitful<br />
demonstration of <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> satellite technology may be used to provide<br />
existing and new specialized services more economically and efficiently than can be done<br />
by terrestrial facilities. Though specialized services constitute a relatively small percentage<br />
of AT&T’s total traffic, it is presently <strong>the</strong> predominant terrestrial supplier of specialized<br />
services. There is some existing and potential competition from Western Union and any<br />
new specialized carriers authorized pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Commission’s decision in Specialized<br />
Common Carrier Services (29 FCC 2d 870). But <strong>the</strong> capacity of <strong>the</strong>ir terrestrial facilities is<br />
small compared to those of AT&T or <strong>the</strong> high capacity facilities proposed by <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
system applicants. 2 The presence of competitive sources of supply of specialized services,<br />
both among satellite system licensees and between satellite and terrestrial systems, should<br />
encourage service and technical innovation and provide an impetus for efforts to minimize<br />
costs and charges to <strong>the</strong> public.<br />
9. Of course, <strong>the</strong> incentive for competitive entry by financially responsible satellite<br />
system entrepreneurs to develop specialized markets must be meaningful and not just<br />
token. This requires that we take appropriate measures toward <strong>the</strong> end that a reasonable<br />
opportunity for effective entry is not defeated or weakened by AT&T, ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or<br />
through its existing or future relationships with Comsat. In this regard, we cannot ignore<br />
<strong>the</strong> effects upon achievement of our objectives that might result from AT&T’s existing<br />
economic strength and dominance stemming from its permeating presence and influence<br />
in all domestic communications markets. Nor can we ignore <strong>the</strong> ability of AT&T—an ability<br />
not possessed by o<strong>the</strong>r applicants—to load a high capacity satellite system with MTT<br />
and WATS traffic and <strong>the</strong>reby control <strong>the</strong> cost of specialized services furnished via that system.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r applicants, lacking a similar initial traffic nucleus, would be operating—at<br />
least initially—with lightly loaded, costly facilities until such time as <strong>the</strong>y might succeed in<br />
reducing <strong>the</strong>ir unit costs by a substantial specialized traffic fill.<br />
10. In addition, where AT&T combines its monopoly and competitive services on <strong>the</strong><br />
same facilities, it is difficult to identify AT&T relevant costs associated with specialized services<br />
to insure that revenues from <strong>the</strong> monopoly services are not being used to subsidize<br />
any part of its competitive services. Thus, if AT&T were permitted unrestricted use of satellites<br />
for both monopoly and specialized services, this might obscure any meaningful comparison<br />
of operating costs between satellite and terrestrial facilities for <strong>the</strong> provision of<br />
specialized services as [848] well as curtail any realistic opportunity for entry by o<strong>the</strong>rs to<br />
serve <strong>the</strong> specialized markets via satellite.<br />
11. We recognize that <strong>the</strong> problem of cross-subsidy now exists with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment of rates and identification of relevant costs for specialized services<br />
furnished by AT&T terrestrially. However, this longstanding problem would be exacerbated<br />
by permitting <strong>the</strong> troublesome monopoly and competitive service combinations to be<br />
2. The Commission has also authorized terrestrial facilities to various miscellaneous carriers providing<br />
program transmission service to CATV systems and broadcasters.
124<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
carried over into this new arena. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> cross-subsidy aspect is only part of <strong>the</strong><br />
deterrent to a reasonable opportunity for competitive satellite entry in <strong>the</strong> specialized<br />
field and, even if resolved, would not overcome AT&T’s unique advantage of being able<br />
to control satellite circuit costs by <strong>the</strong> extent to which it chooses to load <strong>the</strong> high capacity<br />
satellite facilities with telephone traffic while <strong>the</strong> specialized field is being developed. 2a<br />
12. All of <strong>the</strong> foregoing factors and concerns with respect to AT&T, in our judgment,<br />
might well result in discouraging or deterring o<strong>the</strong>rs from attempting to penetrate <strong>the</strong><br />
markets for specialized services. As a fur<strong>the</strong>r consequence, AT&T’s dominance in <strong>the</strong><br />
communications field would be extended ra<strong>the</strong>r than lessened in <strong>the</strong> domestic area. This<br />
would derogate from our policy of seeking to promote an environment in which new suppliers<br />
of communications services would have a bona fide opportunity for competitive<br />
entry. This policy was <strong>the</strong> basis for our decision in <strong>the</strong> Specialized Common Carrier Services<br />
proceeding (29 FCC 2d 870). While this policy explicitly accommodates an opportunity<br />
for AT&T and o<strong>the</strong>r existing carriers to compete “fully and fairly” with new entrants, it<br />
does not preclude <strong>the</strong> Commission from taking reasonable measures to assure that competitive<br />
entry would be a meaningful reality in <strong>the</strong> high capacity satellite field. Paragraph<br />
104 of <strong>the</strong> Specialized Carrier decision states: “We fur<strong>the</strong>r stress that our policy determination<br />
as to new specialized carrier entry terrestrially, does not afford any measure of protection<br />
against domestic communications satellite entry or o<strong>the</strong>rwise prejudge our<br />
determination in Docket No. 16495 as to what course would best serve <strong>the</strong> public interest<br />
in <strong>the</strong> domestic satellite field” (29 FCC 2d at 920).<br />
13. The same considerations lead us to conclude that <strong>the</strong> achievement of our objectives<br />
would be prejudiced by authorizing <strong>the</strong> Comsat/AT&T proposal based on <strong>the</strong>ir contractual<br />
arrangement. First, since AT&T is a principal source of <strong>the</strong> domestic service<br />
revenue that Comsat would seek to obtain, it is not realistic to expect Comsat to compete<br />
vigorously in <strong>the</strong> provision of specialized services on an end-to-end or “retail” basis and<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby challenge AT&T’s terrestrial domination in this field. Secondly, if Comsat should<br />
proceed in <strong>the</strong> dual capacities proposed in its two pending system applications, <strong>the</strong> revenues<br />
that would be guaranteed to Comsat from <strong>the</strong> AT&T contractual arrangement<br />
would give it an extraordinary advantage and head start over all o<strong>the</strong>r potential domestic<br />
satellite entrants seeking to develop specialized services in competition with Comsat as<br />
well as with AT&T’s [849] terrestrial services. If Comsat were given <strong>the</strong> option of serving<br />
AT&T soley [sic] and accepted it, such a course would unnecessarily deprive o<strong>the</strong>rs of <strong>the</strong><br />
benefit of Comsat’s expertise in <strong>the</strong> communications satellite field. If Comsat were to elect<br />
to serve only entities o<strong>the</strong>r than AT&T, its expertise and facilities would be available to <strong>the</strong><br />
public and carriers o<strong>the</strong>r than AT&T. But if Comsat is to be authorized to provide satellite<br />
services to AT&T, it should operate exclusively as a carrier’s carrier—not engaged in retailing<br />
communications services to <strong>the</strong> public—and provide such service under a tariff offering<br />
which would afford an opportunity for o<strong>the</strong>r carriers to have non-discriminatory<br />
access to <strong>the</strong> same system.<br />
14. Finally, our consideration of <strong>the</strong> conditions under which AT&T and Comsat<br />
should be permitted to enter <strong>the</strong> domestic satellite field is necessarily affected by AT&T’s<br />
ownership of 29 percent of Comsat’s stock and its ability to elect three of <strong>the</strong> 15 Comsat<br />
directors. Such ownership was contemplated and encouraged by <strong>the</strong> Congress in enacting<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (see Section 394(b)(2)). Thus, this is not a matter<br />
over which Comsat has any control. However, that Act, which was formulated to meet<br />
2a. We recognize that AT&T, in its offerings of specialized services, may not, for rate purposes, distinguish<br />
between specialized services provided via satellite on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and terrestrial facilities on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hand, and thus somewhat alleviate <strong>the</strong> competitive problem. However, we believe that it will from a regulatory<br />
standpoint complicate a definitive comparison between <strong>the</strong> relative cost and o<strong>the</strong>r advantages of satellite and<br />
terrestrial facilities in serving <strong>the</strong> competitive market for specialized services.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 125<br />
<strong>the</strong> nation’s policies and objectives with respect to <strong>the</strong> earliest possible establishment of a<br />
global communications satellite system, does not preclude authorized carriers from voluntarily<br />
disposing of <strong>the</strong>ir shares of Comsat stock. 3 All of <strong>the</strong> major carriers who originally<br />
owned Comsat stock, except AT&T, have since divested <strong>the</strong>ir interests. While <strong>the</strong><br />
participation of experienced carriers had a useful function when Comsat was newly organized<br />
and gaining communications experience, this relationship warrants reassessment in<br />
light of current conditions.<br />
15. Aside from <strong>the</strong> foregoing basic considerations of fairness and equity we reaffirm<br />
<strong>the</strong> staff recommendation in favor of multiple entry. In this connection it is important also<br />
to take cognizance of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> initial implementation of domestic satellites does<br />
not confront us with a normal or routine situation. Some departures from conventional<br />
standards may be required if <strong>the</strong> public is to realize <strong>the</strong> potential benefits of this high<br />
capacity technology and we are to pursue our objective of competitive entry. This is true<br />
not only in <strong>the</strong> case of AT&T, but also for o<strong>the</strong>r applicants because of different factors. For<br />
example, as <strong>the</strong> staff points out, <strong>the</strong> capacity proposed by most system applicants substantially<br />
exceeds <strong>the</strong> traffic under <strong>the</strong>ir control or firm customer commitments. They are relying<br />
primarily on speculative business which <strong>the</strong>y hope will materialize after <strong>the</strong> facilities<br />
become operational. We must, of course, make <strong>the</strong> requisite statutory findings as to an<br />
applicant’s financial qualification and ability to implement its proposal, and we can<br />
require a reasonable showing that <strong>the</strong>re will be no adverse impact on rates or services to<br />
customers of carrier applicants now engaged in providing essential communications services<br />
to <strong>the</strong> public. But if we adhere too strictly to conventional standards in this unconventional<br />
situation, such as requiring a persuasive showing by new entrants that<br />
competition is reasonably feasible and that <strong>the</strong> anticipated market can economically support<br />
its proposed [850] facilities, most such new applicants may in effect be denied any<br />
opportunity to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> merits of <strong>the</strong>ir proposals at <strong>the</strong>ir own risk and without<br />
potential dangers to existing services—<strong>the</strong>reby depriving <strong>the</strong> public of <strong>the</strong> potential benefits<br />
to be derived from diverse approaches by multiple entrants. It is our judgment that<br />
<strong>the</strong> potential benefits to <strong>the</strong> public warrant <strong>the</strong> application of rules and policies which will<br />
afford a reasonable opportunity for domestic satellite facilities to be established initially<br />
on a competitive basis. It is also necessary to retain flexibility to alter our initial determination<br />
in <strong>the</strong> light of evolving circumstances.<br />
III. DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUES<br />
A. Number of systems to be authorized initially<br />
16. In light of <strong>the</strong> foregoing policy objectives, we have concluded that <strong>the</strong> public<br />
interest would be best served at this initial stage by affording a reasonable opportunity for<br />
entry by qualified applicants both pending and new, subject to <strong>the</strong> showings and conditions<br />
described below which we believe to be necessary to implement our objectives and<br />
to protect <strong>the</strong> public. We have reached this decision after consideration of <strong>the</strong> various<br />
alternatives discussed in <strong>the</strong> staff recommendation (paragraphs 45–78) and <strong>the</strong> views<br />
expressed by <strong>the</strong> parties.<br />
3. Indeed, in 1969 Congress amended <strong>the</strong> 1962 Act to provide for fewer common carrier elected directors<br />
in proportion to <strong>the</strong>ir decrease in stock ownership in Comsat (47 U.S.C. 733). This schedule contemplates<br />
that <strong>the</strong> percentage of common carrier stock ownership may fall below eight percent, in which event <strong>the</strong>re would<br />
be no directors elected by common carriers.
126<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
17. Like <strong>the</strong> staff and most parties, we think it unwise to attempt to select or prescribe<br />
one system (ei<strong>the</strong>r a consortium of all <strong>the</strong> applicants or selection of one applicant) or to<br />
choose one or more systems through comparative hearings. In addition to <strong>the</strong> reasons<br />
given by <strong>the</strong> staff (staff recommendation, paragraphs 50-–61), which we adopt, such a<br />
course would not promote our policy objectives discussed above. However, we are not<br />
accepting <strong>the</strong> alternative recommended by <strong>the</strong> staff (paragraphs 71–78) or requiring of<br />
encouraging consolidations of applicants along guidelines prescribed by <strong>the</strong> Commission.<br />
While we recognize that <strong>the</strong>re may well be advantages to and need for voluntary consolidations<br />
or sharing arrangements (such as “launch risk pools”) undertaken at <strong>the</strong> applicants’<br />
initiative as a matter of prudent business judgment, we do not deem it advisable to<br />
structure <strong>the</strong> architecture of any joint space segment operations. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, we will permit<br />
and encourage such arrangements so long as <strong>the</strong>y are consistent with <strong>the</strong> policy conditions<br />
set forth herein. Accordingly, we will accord <strong>the</strong> system applicants a 30-day period<br />
within which to apprise <strong>the</strong> Commission as to whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y intend to pursue <strong>the</strong>ir pending<br />
applications, as modified to achieve compliance with this Second Report and Order, or<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y desire fur<strong>the</strong>r time to reframe <strong>the</strong>ir proposals.<br />
18. Our decision in favor of multiple entry does not mean that we have opted for a<br />
policy of “unlimited or unrestricted open entry.” Our aim, as outlined above, is to afford<br />
qualified applicants a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> public advantages in use<br />
of <strong>the</strong> satellite technology as a means of communications. But such entry cannot be<br />
“open” in <strong>the</strong> sense that it is without any restrictions or limitations. Pursuant to statute we<br />
must require showings of financial, technical and o<strong>the</strong>r qualification and make <strong>the</strong> requisite<br />
finding that a grant of <strong>the</strong> particular proposal will serve <strong>the</strong> public interest, con-<br />
[851] venience and necessity. Although, as discussed in paragraph 15 above, it is our<br />
intention to make such determinations with due regard for <strong>the</strong> unique circumstances<br />
involved here, each applicant must make a sufficient showing of potential public benefit<br />
to justify <strong>the</strong> assignment of orbital locations and frequencies. Moreover, we believe it necessary<br />
to impose certain conditions to protect <strong>the</strong> public from possible detriment and to<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> implementation of our policy objectives. In addition to <strong>the</strong> conditions discussed<br />
below, we will require a reasonable showing by any common carrier applicant now<br />
engaged in providing essential communications services that revenue requirements related<br />
to <strong>the</strong> proposed domestic satellite venture will not be a burden or detriment to customers<br />
for such essential services. . . .<br />
IV. ORDER<br />
[860] 44a. Authority for <strong>the</strong> policies and conditions adopted herein is contained in<br />
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(i) and (j), 201, 202, 212, 213, 214, 218, 219, 220, 301, 303, 307–309,<br />
310(b), 319, 396, 403 and 605 of <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934 and Section 102 and<br />
201(c)(8) of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962.<br />
45. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, That:<br />
a. The policies and conditions set forth herein, and such portions of <strong>the</strong> staff<br />
recommendation (34 FCC 2d 9) as are expressly approved or clearly consistent<br />
with <strong>the</strong> policies and conditions herein, ARE ADOPTED, effective July<br />
25, 1972.<br />
b. Each of <strong>the</strong> applicants for domestic communications satellite systems named<br />
in paragraph 1 above, SHALL APPRISE THE COMMISSION on or before<br />
July 25, 1972, as to whe<strong>the</strong>r it intends to pursue its pending system applications,<br />
in whole or in part, with such modifications as are required to achieve<br />
compliance with <strong>the</strong> policies and conditions specified in this Second Report
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 127<br />
and Order; or whe<strong>the</strong>r it desires additional time for <strong>the</strong> purpose of reframing<br />
its proposal consistently with such policies and conditions. 11<br />
c. The Commission retains full jurisdiction over all aspects of this proceeding.<br />
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION<br />
Ben F. Waple, Secretary<br />
DISSENTING STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN BURCH<br />
In this proceeding, <strong>the</strong> Commission is dealing with matters of extraordinary complexity<br />
and even subtlety. We are called on to establish ground rules for an industrial technology<br />
that does not yet exist, to serve some present markets and some that are at best<br />
speculative—and most difficult of all, <strong>the</strong> interrelationships between <strong>the</strong> two. The policy<br />
decisions thus arrived at are not in <strong>the</strong> usual sense definitive: ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>y represent “signals”<br />
to <strong>the</strong> applicants that will cause <strong>the</strong>m to reformulate <strong>the</strong>ir proposals, and <strong>the</strong>se in<br />
turn will almost surely not be <strong>the</strong> same as those with which <strong>the</strong> Commission is here ostensibly<br />
dealing. Our objective is to engraft a new and untested technology onto an existing<br />
domestic communications complex, whose characteristic problems are essentially independent<br />
of satellite technology per se.<br />
In approaching such a maze of unpredictables and potential pitfalls, <strong>the</strong> Commission<br />
would have been well advised to adopt a posture of “least is best” (thus making only those<br />
decisions necessary to elicit <strong>the</strong> applicants’ genuine intentions), to build from <strong>the</strong> base of<br />
irreducible marketplace realities (namely, AT&T traffic), to discipline itself [861] against<br />
<strong>the</strong> temptation to piggyback on this already complex policy finding its favorite regulatory<br />
schemes and hangups (for example, <strong>the</strong> desire to “get a handle on AT&T”), and to offer<br />
all applicants a maximum of options (which might well lead to <strong>the</strong> evolution of a competitive<br />
marketplace in which <strong>the</strong> consumer will benefit). As a general proposition, I<br />
believe <strong>the</strong> Commission has violated every one of <strong>the</strong>se counsels of caution.<br />
And to whose real benefit? That is most difficult to say. For, although <strong>the</strong> thread runs<br />
through <strong>the</strong> majority document that its key findings have been made in <strong>the</strong> interest of<br />
“competition,” somewhere along <strong>the</strong> line <strong>the</strong> overriding purpose of <strong>the</strong> competitive marketplace<br />
seems to have gotten lost: namely, benefit to <strong>the</strong> consumer in <strong>the</strong> form of better<br />
and/or cheaper goods and services than would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be available. Instead, <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission has gone off in pursuit of a peculiar and novel form of competition—measured,<br />
so far as one can tell, by how many satellite systems go aloft in how many “space segments”<br />
(a benchmark that I strongly suspect would strike <strong>the</strong> typical consumer as<br />
irrelevant even if he could grasp its meaning). “Space segment” competition may, of<br />
course, translate into consumer benefit one day. Then again it may not. It all depends—<br />
and it is here that <strong>the</strong> majority document leaves pragmatic reality behind and takes off<br />
into <strong>the</strong> blue sky of academic abstraction. For example:<br />
(a) There is repeated reference (see in particular par. 10 and fn. 2a) to “meaningful”<br />
and “definitive comparison” between <strong>the</strong> relative costs “and o<strong>the</strong>r advantages” of satellite<br />
technology as against terrestrial facilities in providing communications services to <strong>the</strong><br />
public—most of which services are not unique to satellite technology anyway. This is used<br />
as a principal rationale for imposing inhibitions on AT&T, for example. I agree that such<br />
“basing point” comparisons are desirable. But this proceeding is not mere academic exercise.<br />
Tens of millions of investment dollars are involved, and so are services to <strong>the</strong> consuming<br />
public—present and near-term as well as future. In my judgment, <strong>the</strong>re is an<br />
11. Upon considerations of such responses, <strong>the</strong> Commission will issue a public notice concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
procedures we will follow in processing applications.
128<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
excessive trade-off of present and near-term benefits for mostly speculative long[-]range<br />
developments that, in any case, may be a wash from <strong>the</strong> consumers’ perspective.<br />
(b) O<strong>the</strong>r inhibitions and restrictions are rationalized (see in particular pars. 9 and<br />
11) on <strong>the</strong> ground that AT&T’s “unique advantage” of being able to fill satellite capacity<br />
with existing and predictable future traffic will inevitably produce “unfair” competition<br />
and somehow disserve <strong>the</strong> public. I find this an ironic twist indeed—that “success” is to be<br />
penalized ra<strong>the</strong>r than rewarded and that economies of scale must be foresworn as inconsistent<br />
with a <strong>the</strong>oretical model of pure competition (for traffic that is mostly a gleam in<br />
some speculators’ eyes). The Commission would have been better advised, in my view, to<br />
take existing traffic as a “given” and <strong>the</strong>n attempt to build from <strong>the</strong>re—with safeguards,<br />
as specified in <strong>the</strong> earlier Specialized Common Carrier decision, against undue dominance<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se specialized markets by existing carriers. This might have redounded to <strong>the</strong><br />
immediate benefit of <strong>the</strong> consuming public, available alike to AT&T’s customers and to its<br />
competitors’, in <strong>the</strong> form of lowest unit costs.<br />
(c) The Commission majority, by contrast, stands <strong>the</strong> usual norms of [862] competition<br />
on <strong>the</strong>ir head. In its attempt to “structure” <strong>the</strong> marketplace ra<strong>the</strong>r than permit full<br />
and fair competition between new and existing carriers, <strong>the</strong> Commission in effect ignores<br />
its sound commitment in <strong>the</strong> Specialized Common Carrier decision not to create any<br />
“protective umbrella” for new entrants or “any artificial bolstering of operations that cannot<br />
succeed on <strong>the</strong>ir own merits.” Thus, AT&T is precluded from providing point-to-point<br />
private-line services via satellite—even though, as <strong>the</strong> majority acknowledges, “o<strong>the</strong>r applicants,<br />
lacking a[n] initial traffic nucleus, would be operating with lightly loaded, costly<br />
facilities.” All of which presumably means that <strong>the</strong> consumer will have to pay artificially<br />
inflated rates for specialized services during an initial three-year developmental period<br />
(unless by terrestrial facilities alone, wholly in line with <strong>the</strong> “full and fair” competitive<br />
entry formula of <strong>the</strong> earlier decision, AT&T is able to undersell its competitors anyway).<br />
And fur<strong>the</strong>r, because <strong>the</strong> majority document is open-ended (see par. 21), this initial period<br />
could be extended ad infinitum at <strong>the</strong> Commission’s sole discretion. Again, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong><br />
question “who benefits”—except possibly <strong>the</strong> stockholders of a few specialized carriers<br />
operating in a protected marketplace, and all in <strong>the</strong> much abused name of “competition”!<br />
My overriding concern is not so much that this decision will lead to irrational results<br />
as that it may lead to no results at all that will be of substantial public benefit. It is doubly<br />
ironic, in view of <strong>the</strong> majority’s determination to inhibit AT&T and that company’s own<br />
downbeat projections as to <strong>the</strong> cost/benefits of satellite technology, that AT&T may in <strong>the</strong><br />
end simply apply for a satellite system of its own. And because its monopoly services—<br />
MTT, WATS, AUTOVON—constitute <strong>the</strong> vast preponderance of present traffic, an AT&T<br />
system is <strong>the</strong> only one that could conceivably achieve an immediate fill and thus conclusively<br />
demonstrate its economic viability.<br />
The big loser seems to be <strong>the</strong> one applicant with genuine experience in space-segment<br />
management—namely, Comsat. By rejecting <strong>the</strong> AT&T/Comsat contractual arrangement<br />
out of hand, ra<strong>the</strong>r than attaching conditions that might encourage <strong>the</strong> evolution of real competition,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Commission majority has reduced Comsat’s effective choice to one: that is, electing to<br />
become an end-to-end retail carrier. But even here, <strong>the</strong> option is more apparent than real.<br />
Because of a seemingly innocuous sentence at <strong>the</strong> end of par. 26 (“In <strong>the</strong> event that Comsat<br />
elects to proceed o<strong>the</strong>r than as a carrier’s carrier, it will be prohibited from owning or operating<br />
domestic satellite facilities at any overseas point served by INTELSAT facilities (staff<br />
recommendation, paragraph 114).”), Comsat would be barred from serving any noncontiguous<br />
state or territory, would lose its present traffic to <strong>the</strong>se points (almost all of which<br />
is traffic to <strong>the</strong> mainland), and would be left with virtually unutilized “white elephant” earth<br />
stations in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Some option.<br />
The o<strong>the</strong>r option—becoming a carrier’s carrier and leasing transponders on tariff to<br />
all comers, including AT&T—is in <strong>the</strong> end AT&T’s choice and not Comsat’s at all. And my
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 129<br />
own strong conviction, in view of <strong>the</strong> decision as here formulated, is that AT&T will not so<br />
choose. Why should it, in effect, subsidize its own competition—and competition operating<br />
under a protective umbrella at that—by [863] filling idle satellite capacity with <strong>the</strong><br />
only substantial traffic now available?<br />
There is, in all candor, no ideal solution to this problem. Our job is to come up with<br />
<strong>the</strong> best alternative available—and I make no apologies for thus relying on marketplace<br />
realities in an effort to bring to <strong>the</strong> consuming public some immediate benefits of a new<br />
technology. In my view, <strong>the</strong> answer is to be found in an approach that affirms in essence<br />
<strong>the</strong> AT&T/Comsat contractual arrangement but <strong>the</strong>n attaches to it one critical condition:<br />
namely, that Comsat, with its unique technical and managerial expertise, also provide<br />
satellite service to those entities who, lacking <strong>the</strong> initial nucleus of assured traffic, might<br />
be unwilling or unable to risk <strong>the</strong> huge investment necessary to launch satellite facilities<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir own. As an alternative, Comsat should be free to elect <strong>the</strong> route of an end-to-end<br />
retailer.<br />
The majority attempts to “structure” behavior largely by recourse to penalties and<br />
blue-sky “models” of pure competition. But <strong>the</strong> proposal before use, in my judgment, suffers<br />
from two fatal flaws: it may retard <strong>the</strong> evolution of satellite technology, not get it<br />
going, and it may thus withhold realistic benefits to <strong>the</strong> public. The Commission can and<br />
must do better than that.<br />
(Commissioners Reid and Wiley join with Chairman Burch in this Dissenting<br />
Statement.)<br />
CONCURRING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER NICHOLAS JOHNSON<br />
The Commission now arrives at <strong>the</strong> denouncement of this seven year old proceeding.<br />
An examination of <strong>the</strong> plot of this story, and its several acts, gives a revealing insight to <strong>the</strong><br />
policymaking process at <strong>the</strong> FCC.<br />
Domestic satellites became a policy question at <strong>the</strong> FCC, not because of Commission<br />
action, but with <strong>the</strong> filing of a proposal for domestic satellite television network interconnection<br />
by ABC in September 1965. To examine <strong>the</strong> important policy questions before<br />
taking definitive action, <strong>the</strong> Commission returned <strong>the</strong> ABC application and instituted an<br />
inquiry. 31 F.R. 3507 (March 2, 1966).<br />
In response to <strong>the</strong> inquiry, <strong>the</strong> Ford Foundation filed a proposal in August 1966 linking<br />
<strong>the</strong> financing of public broadcasting to <strong>the</strong> institution of domestic satellite service.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Ford plan, <strong>the</strong> savings in interconnection costs would be used to finance public<br />
broadcasting as a “people dividend” from <strong>the</strong> $40 billion of public expenditures to<br />
develop <strong>the</strong> space technology that made <strong>the</strong> satellite system possible. This was a proposed<br />
alternative use of <strong>the</strong> savings—ra<strong>the</strong>r than flowing <strong>the</strong>m through to networks’ profits, or<br />
lower costs to users and <strong>the</strong>ir customers. J. Dirlan and A. Kahn, “The Merits of Reserving<br />
<strong>the</strong> Cost-Savings from Domestic Communications Satellites for Support of Educational<br />
Television,” 77 Yale L.J. 494 (1968).<br />
The FCC responded with a fur<strong>the</strong>r notice of inquiry. 31 F.R. 13763 (October 20,<br />
1966). In February 1967 President Lyndon Johnson proposed <strong>the</strong> legislation that later<br />
became <strong>the</strong> Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. And in April 1967 Comsat proposed a pilot<br />
domestic satellite system to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> potential and benefits of satellites, including<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir use for public broadcasting.<br />
[864] On August 14, 1967, President Johnson announced <strong>the</strong> formation of a Task Force<br />
to review a variety of telecommunications policy questions, including domestic satellites.<br />
This began what was to become a three year review by <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch of important<br />
policy questions before <strong>the</strong> FCC in this area. By late 1968 <strong>the</strong> Johnson Task Force had<br />
completed its work with a recommendation that a Comsat-directed pilot program be<br />
authorized. In early 1969 <strong>the</strong> FCC was prepared to authorize such a pilot program. A
130<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
report and order had been drafted, and tentative expressions of <strong>the</strong> position of each<br />
Commissioner had been made.<br />
Before issuing it, however, <strong>the</strong>n-Chairman Hyde took <strong>the</strong> document to <strong>the</strong> White<br />
House to inform <strong>the</strong> White House staff of <strong>the</strong> action <strong>the</strong> Commission was to take. In <strong>the</strong><br />
interim <strong>the</strong>re had been a change in Administration, and <strong>the</strong> information-providing trip<br />
resulted in a request that <strong>the</strong> Commission hold any action while <strong>the</strong> White House once<br />
again examined <strong>the</strong> policy questions.<br />
The White House recommendations, for an “open-entry” policy, came in a January<br />
1970 memorandum from Peter Flanigan to Chairman Dean Burch. In March 1970 an FCC<br />
Report and Order, 22 F.C.C. 2d 86, concluded that no decision could be made on <strong>the</strong><br />
appropriate policy for domestic satellite entry and specific proposals from potential<br />
entrants were requested. The next Commission order, and <strong>the</strong> staff’s recommended decision<br />
came in March 1972.<br />
Today’s action seems to signal <strong>the</strong> end. Open entry is adopted with certain modifications.<br />
The benefits to be realized by public broadcasting are, at this point, speculative.<br />
There are several interesting conclusions to be drawn about <strong>the</strong> Commission’s role in<br />
policymaking at least for domestic satellites.<br />
(1) The Commission has relied heavily on <strong>the</strong> parties appearing before it for <strong>the</strong><br />
analyses and proposals it has considered. Although <strong>the</strong>re is no readily available way to<br />
make an exact calculation, I suspect that most of <strong>the</strong> important parties appearing before<br />
<strong>the</strong> Commission have invested significantly more resources, each, on <strong>the</strong>se policy questions<br />
than has <strong>the</strong> Commission in total. This seems particularly true for <strong>the</strong> Executive<br />
Branch. The Commission has been a “captive,” responding to and arbitrating between <strong>the</strong><br />
variety of forces which have attempted to move it.<br />
(2) The relative congruence between Commission action and White House recommendation,<br />
occurring over periods of significant shifts in policy, is striking. The ability of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Commission to move in variance with White House positions on important policy<br />
questions (regardless of who is President) is very questionable.<br />
(3) The effects, benefits and costs, of both regulation and delay would be worthy of a<br />
detailed analysis. Suppose any entrant, including ABC, had been able to launch a satellite<br />
system in 1965 by merely “purchasing” <strong>the</strong> needed resources, including spectrum.<br />
Suppose <strong>the</strong> Commission had gone ahead with a pilot program authorization in early<br />
1969. What would have been <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong>se—or o<strong>the</strong>r alternatives—on services, technology<br />
development, and so forth? Are we better off, or worse today? Should <strong>the</strong> domestic<br />
satellite question have been handled differently, and if so, what can we learn about<br />
[865] handling o<strong>the</strong>r policy questions before this and o<strong>the</strong>r governmental agencies that<br />
engage in an economic planning function?<br />
(4) Over and over again <strong>the</strong> Commission meets <strong>the</strong> question of melding competitive<br />
and monopoly portions of <strong>the</strong> telecommunications common carrier industry. The issues<br />
were joined in <strong>the</strong> Telpak and o<strong>the</strong>r bulk offering and private line proceedings, and are<br />
still unresolved. They are met again in <strong>the</strong> relationships between monopoly landline telephone<br />
companies and miscellaneous carriers who offer a variety of land mobile services<br />
in competition and monopoly in communications equipment and interconnection. They<br />
are met in <strong>the</strong> pricing questions surrounding <strong>the</strong> entry of specialized competitive carriers.<br />
And <strong>the</strong>y are met here in <strong>the</strong> treatment, particularly of AT&T and Comsat, of certain<br />
entrants for domestic satellite services. The issues remain unresolved.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong>se limitations, I believe <strong>the</strong> staff work and ultimate Commission position put<br />
forward today is much better than anyone had a right to expect. Accordingly, as a realist,<br />
I concur.<br />
Because of <strong>the</strong> significance of <strong>the</strong> policy, however, perhaps a few more words regarding<br />
my own preferred approach to decision would be appropriate.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 131<br />
We are entering into a new area of communications. The next few years will be years<br />
of experimentation and ga<strong>the</strong>ring of experience. It’s not that we don’t know how to<br />
launch and operate a satellite. Comsat, NASA, <strong>the</strong> military, and numerous American companies<br />
have a great deal of expertise in this field.<br />
But we have no experience with <strong>the</strong> non-technical aspects of this operation. Will <strong>the</strong><br />
public tolerate <strong>the</strong> short delay, or echo effect, in voice communications by satellite? What<br />
new institutional (and possibly personal) uses of communications will evolve to use <strong>the</strong><br />
peculiar qualities of satellite distribution systems (cheaper long-haul costs, possibility of<br />
multiple distribution points, and so forth)? What problems will arise in joint operations of<br />
satellites, or of earth stations? What new ratemaking or regulatory concepts and procedures<br />
will be needed?<br />
(1) Accordingly, I still believe <strong>the</strong>re is some merit to <strong>the</strong> idea of a pilot project at this<br />
stage. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than have it operated by a chosen company (Comsat, AT&T, some o<strong>the</strong>r present<br />
company, or a new entity), however, I would have it operated by NASA or some o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
entity of government. This is not such a radical idea. It is <strong>the</strong> way every o<strong>the</strong>r nation in <strong>the</strong><br />
world has dealt with <strong>the</strong> problem. And most have resolved <strong>the</strong> issue long before us. It is<br />
<strong>the</strong> way, in fact, that we run our space program. It is <strong>the</strong> way we evolve new technology in<br />
many areas of <strong>the</strong> economy. And, even as to space communications satellites, <strong>the</strong> military<br />
and NASA have already operated such systems.<br />
All I would propose is that for <strong>the</strong> first generation of experience (3 to 7 years) a public<br />
entity undertake <strong>the</strong> operation of America’s first domestic communications satellite system<br />
for <strong>the</strong> benefit of all potential users and operators. Every effort would be made to test,<br />
at cost, any reasonable proposal from any American company, institution, or individual.<br />
The results of all tests would be made fully open to any interested party. Training opportunities<br />
would be made avail- [866] able to as many interested persons as possible. This<br />
would save a tremendous amount of money for American business, as well as <strong>the</strong> public,<br />
and open up <strong>the</strong> possibility of a great deal more use (and competition—if that’s what<br />
we’re really interested in) when <strong>the</strong> system or systems are finally established on a commercial<br />
basis.<br />
I have made this proposal throughout my six year term at <strong>the</strong> Commission. It has<br />
never received <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> White House or a majority of <strong>the</strong> Commissioners. There<br />
is little doubt in my mind that we would be much fur<strong>the</strong>r down <strong>the</strong> road today if it had<br />
been adopted in 1966.<br />
(2) If <strong>the</strong>re is not to be an experimental system, <strong>the</strong>re is much to be said for a chosen<br />
instrument. A single system operator can insure economies of scale, fair and open access<br />
to all comers, <strong>the</strong> lowest possible rates, and <strong>the</strong> most geographically disbursed system<br />
(including, for example, <strong>the</strong> best service to Alaska, Hawaii and so forth).<br />
My preference would be to create a new entity—a Domsat—for domestic satellite services<br />
only, that would have every incentive to compete fully with AT&T. No carrier would<br />
be permitted to hold stock in <strong>the</strong> company or sit on <strong>the</strong> board (although, of course, individual<br />
shareholders could hold stock in AT&T and Domsat).<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r alternative would be to give AT&T a monopoly over domestic satellite service.<br />
AT&T is now having some growing pains even keeping up with expanding service on<br />
earth. But AT&T exclusive operation in space would have <strong>the</strong> advantage that all users—<br />
including <strong>the</strong> homeowner—would get some benefit from <strong>the</strong> new technology, which will<br />
now flow almost exclusively to large corporate users of satellites. If this were done, AT&T<br />
should probably want to be required to provide such service through a separate corporate<br />
entity for purposes of bookkeeping (as its current corporate practices would indicate it<br />
would probably want to do anyway).<br />
Comsat could also be <strong>the</strong> chosen instrument. It does have <strong>the</strong> expertise. But it would<br />
not have <strong>the</strong> advantage just described that AT&T would have—virtually monopoly control
132<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
of all U.S. communications on <strong>the</strong> ground for purposes of rate averaging. Moreover,<br />
Comsat has additional problems as an international operative. At one time I urged that<br />
Intelsat be encouraged to become a truly international communications carrier, supplying<br />
domestic communications services for <strong>the</strong> world as well as internationally. It seemed to me<br />
an appropriate, and symbolic, peaceful venture for nations in need of one. But that idea<br />
never caught on ei<strong>the</strong>r. So now, it seems, we are doomed to a world in which every nation<br />
must have not only its own airline, merchant marine, and steel mill, but its own domestic<br />
satellite system as well. Given such a world, however, it seems to me inappropriate for<br />
Comsat—already carrying <strong>the</strong> burdens of Big Bro<strong>the</strong>rism into its international meetings—<br />
to have to confront its world partners with <strong>the</strong> potential conflicts of interest (and division<br />
of managerial energies) involved in operating <strong>the</strong> world’s most lucrative domestic satellite<br />
system.<br />
(3) If we are not to have an experimental system or a chosen instrument, because of<br />
a deistic reverence for competition, <strong>the</strong>n we ought to really have competition. I’m reminded<br />
of <strong>the</strong> children’s riddle: [867] “Where does an 800-pound gorilla sleep?” And <strong>the</strong><br />
answer: “Any place he chooses.” True competition is one of <strong>the</strong> most highly regulated<br />
states of economic operation possible. That’s what <strong>the</strong> antitrust laws are all about—when<br />
<strong>the</strong>y’re enforced. You ei<strong>the</strong>r keep <strong>the</strong> 800-pound gorilla (in this case <strong>the</strong> $18 billion Bell)<br />
out of <strong>the</strong> canary cage entirely, or you tell him where to sleep.<br />
If we’re really serious about experimenting with <strong>the</strong> radical notion of free private<br />
enterprise, I’m all for it. But <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re have to be some very meaningful restraints on<br />
AT&T and Comsat—at <strong>the</strong> very least in <strong>the</strong> initial stages. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, we’re just kidding<br />
ourselves—though very likely nobody else.<br />
If we want a competitive arena I would keep out AT&T and Comsat entirely. (AT&T<br />
has never been consistently enthusiastic about using space anyway.) Let anyone else in<br />
who wants in. Let <strong>the</strong>m experiment with equipment and <strong>the</strong> search for services and markets.<br />
Try to maintain some conditions of fair competition. If after a few years <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission wants to reassess this decision, and let AT&T into <strong>the</strong> business in ways consistent<br />
with maintaining this newly burgeoning industry, fine. But not until <strong>the</strong>n.<br />
(4) Finally, I cannot but bemoan our failure to provide expressly for—at least—free<br />
interconnection for <strong>the</strong> Public Broadcasting Corporation and o<strong>the</strong>r educational users. I<br />
always felt that <strong>the</strong> Ford Foundation had made a fairly persuasive case that more was called<br />
for. The American people, having invested more than $40 billion in <strong>the</strong> soaring growth<br />
stock called civilian space, are entitled, someday, to a little bit of a dividend. One has yet<br />
to be declared. Ford proposed that a proportion of <strong>the</strong> savings to <strong>the</strong> commercial networks<br />
from <strong>the</strong> use of space be passed on to <strong>the</strong> public in terms of a funding source for<br />
public broadcasting. It seemed to me a fair idea.<br />
But all this is history. We’re now in countdown. It’s no time to dissent. I’m on board.<br />
Document I-27<br />
Document title: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, “Personal Notes,”<br />
December 23, 1972.<br />
Source: George M. Low Papers, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York (used<br />
with permission).<br />
George Low was NASA’s deputy administrator from <strong>the</strong> fall of 1970 until 1976. During that period,<br />
he dictated “personal notes” on a regular basis to record his actions and thoughts. These notes provide<br />
a fascinating record of <strong>the</strong> events of <strong>the</strong> time. As <strong>the</strong> Apollo 17 astronauts explored <strong>the</strong> Moon during<br />
<strong>the</strong> last Apollo mission in December 1972, Low, NASA Administrator James Fletcher, and o<strong>the</strong>r top<br />
NASA officials had to divide <strong>the</strong>ir time between monitoring <strong>the</strong> lunar surface activity from Houston
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 133<br />
and meeting on NASA’s fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1974 budgets with officials of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of<br />
Management and Budget (OMB) in Washington. To meet <strong>the</strong> stringent budget cuts proposed by <strong>the</strong><br />
Nixon administration’s OMB, it was Low’s idea to take NASA out of communications satellite<br />
research and development (R&D). NASA had had an Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) program<br />
since 1963 to follow up its support of <strong>the</strong> initial Relay and Syncom projects, and that program<br />
had helped develop many new technologies and capabilities in <strong>the</strong> communications satellite area. The<br />
NASA decision to withdraw from communications satellite R&D meant that <strong>the</strong> final ATS mission,<br />
<strong>the</strong> ATS-G, was canceled.<br />
[1] December 23, 1972<br />
PERSONAL NOTES NO. 83<br />
[2] Fiscal Year 1973 and 1974 Budget<br />
Meanwhile back on earth, things weren’t going quite as well. On Monday, December<br />
11, approximately at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> lunar landing, we received a call from Bill Morrill asking<br />
Fletcher, Lilly, and me to meet with him to discuss <strong>the</strong> FY 1973 and 1974 budgets. We<br />
tried to get him to give us our mark by telephone, but he was unable to do so. As a result,<br />
Fletcher, McCurdy, Shapley, Lilly, and I traveled back to Washington on Wednesday,<br />
December 13, roughly between EVAs 2 and 3. (We were in Houston for <strong>the</strong> full period of<br />
both of <strong>the</strong>se EVAs.)<br />
We met in Bill Morrill’s office with Morrill, Young, and Taft. (We had left Houston at<br />
5:15 in <strong>the</strong> morning on a Jet Star for Andrews [Air Force Base] and arrived in Morrill’s<br />
office at precisely 9:30, <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> appointment.) Morrill informed us that <strong>the</strong><br />
President was determined to bring <strong>the</strong> FY 1973 budget down to a $250 billion ceiling in<br />
outlays, and to have a not too much higher number for FY 1974. As a result, all departments<br />
and agencies had to take major cuts, both in FY 1973 and in FY 1974. The 1973 cuts<br />
were particularly difficult to sustain, since only one-half year was left for money savings. In<br />
effect <strong>the</strong>n, any cut made in 1973 would have double <strong>the</strong> normal effect. In NASA’s case,<br />
OMB had accepted <strong>the</strong> “submarginal submission” and made drastic cuts below that level.<br />
Within <strong>the</strong> submarginal budget, we had already cut out <strong>the</strong> aircraft engine retrofit work,<br />
most of <strong>the</strong> new starts, almost all of <strong>the</strong> nuclear work, and had cut back in many o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
areas. The OMB mark, in addition, canceled Viking, canceled QUESTOL, delayed <strong>the</strong><br />
Shuttle, delayed ERTS-B [Earth Resources Technology Satellite or Landsat] (did not allow<br />
ERTS-C in <strong>the</strong> Interior budget), and made fur<strong>the</strong>r across-<strong>the</strong>-board cuts. (I should [3]<br />
have mentioned that OSO-I was also cancelled in our submarginal submission.) The net<br />
result was a budget at approximately <strong>the</strong> $3 billion level in outlays for both FY 1973 and<br />
FY 1974. We were also told that <strong>the</strong> number of cuts were policy decisions approved by <strong>the</strong><br />
President and not ours to change. These were particularly <strong>the</strong> major ones such as Viking,<br />
OSO [Orbiting Solar Observatory], nuclear work, QUESTOL, etc. In <strong>the</strong> area of minor<br />
cuts, we would be allowed to make adjustments. The President <strong>the</strong>n also asked, we were<br />
told personally, that a fairly substantial number of dollars be included in <strong>the</strong> NASA budget<br />
on <strong>the</strong> supersonic transport, with <strong>the</strong> words that he felt that this was a mandatory<br />
development for <strong>the</strong> country and that NASA should take on <strong>the</strong> fight with <strong>the</strong> Congress.<br />
Our meeting lasted for about an hour, and following that meeting, Lilly continued to<br />
meet with Young and Taft for approximately one more hour. We <strong>the</strong>n got back on our airplane<br />
and returned to Houston. We held additional meetings on <strong>the</strong> plane on <strong>the</strong> way<br />
back to Houston, in Houston <strong>the</strong> next morning, and <strong>the</strong>n returned to Washington immediately<br />
after <strong>the</strong> lunar rendezvous and docking for meetings on <strong>the</strong> following Friday,<br />
Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. By Sunday noon we had firmed up our position and<br />
Monday was spent in writing <strong>the</strong> position for a reclama submission to OMB.
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THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Within NASA we were fairly unanimous in deciding that a Viking cut would be unacceptable.<br />
First of all, Viking is <strong>the</strong> only highly visible sign of space exploration in <strong>the</strong> middle<br />
70’s. Secondly, more than half of <strong>the</strong> $800 to $900 million on Viking has already been<br />
spent. Third, it would be almost impossible to sustain <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> scientific community<br />
for <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> NASA program if Viking were cancelled. For all of <strong>the</strong>se reasons<br />
and many more, we decided to do our best to try to get Viking back into <strong>the</strong> budget. My<br />
first inclination was to try to cancel <strong>the</strong> ASTP [Apollo-Soyuz Test Project] mission, since<br />
from NASA’s point of view it contributed least to our overall program. However, after<br />
some discussion and after some G-2ing by Fletcher, it became very clear that <strong>the</strong> President<br />
considers ASTP <strong>the</strong> highest priority NASA mission, and that any suggestion on our part to<br />
cancel this flight would be totally unacceptable. The President also considers <strong>the</strong> Shuttle<br />
<strong>the</strong> second priority NASA mission, and, we were told, would not consider cancelling [4]<br />
that project. From NASA’s point of view, of course, it was clear that at a $3 billion level we<br />
would not have started ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Shuttle or ASTP. Thus, we were in a major bind.<br />
I <strong>the</strong>n suggested that it might be time to phase out of <strong>the</strong> communications business.<br />
The reasoning here goes something like this: NASA has been a catalyst for space communications<br />
development in <strong>the</strong> early phase of <strong>the</strong> space program and until now. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re now has developed a significant communications satellite capability in private industry.<br />
For example, COMSAT/INTELSAT is spending $14 million a year on advanced R&D.<br />
It is clear, <strong>the</strong>refore, that communications work will go on whe<strong>the</strong>r or not NASA participates.<br />
Of course, <strong>the</strong>re are some areas, such as direct broadcasting, which will take much<br />
longer without federal government participation. In o<strong>the</strong>r areas of applications, such as<br />
earth resources, environmental work, etc., <strong>the</strong>re exists no commercial/industrial capability<br />
that will carry on if <strong>the</strong> federal government gets out of it. I, <strong>the</strong>refore, reasoned that it<br />
would be best to do one applications area well instead of doing two major areas not nearly<br />
so well. Fletcher at first was quite reluctant to accept this reasoning, but after a day or<br />
so of thinking about it, enthusiastically supported it. As a result, we decided to propose<br />
cancellation of ATS-G, to carry out ATS-F because most of <strong>the</strong> money on it was already<br />
spent, but at <strong>the</strong> same time to phase down all in-house communications R&D so that by<br />
<strong>the</strong> time ATS-F flies we will completely phase out of this business. Incidentally, this may be<br />
a major first for a government agency to get out of an R&D business of its own volition.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Space Science we decided to keep Viking, but suspend HEAO [High<br />
Energy Astronomy Observatory]. Suspending a program is something else that has never<br />
happened in NASA before. Basically, we would keep a skeleton team toge<strong>the</strong>r, both in<br />
NASA and in industry, for a year or more while we reviewed HEAO to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
we can meet its objectives at, for example, half <strong>the</strong> costs. Naugle was in favor of outright<br />
cancellation, if this were <strong>the</strong> case, but my view was that through suspension we might be<br />
able to pick <strong>the</strong> project up again without again seeking a “new start.” In space science also,<br />
OSO is no longer in [5] <strong>the</strong> program as we submitted it (I will come back to that later),<br />
and <strong>the</strong>re were many across-<strong>the</strong>-board cuts.<br />
In OAST [<strong>Office</strong> of Aeronautics and Space Technology], in our basic and first submission,<br />
QUESTOL and <strong>the</strong> engine refanning were out, almost all nuclear work was canceled,<br />
and <strong>the</strong>re were additional cuts in SRT/ART. In <strong>the</strong> overall SRT/ART program, I<br />
established guidelines that 90% of this work should have a promise of being relevant within<br />
a period of seven years; and that only 10% of our SRT/ART work should be in <strong>the</strong><br />
future beyond <strong>the</strong> seven-year period.<br />
In Manned Space Flight, Skylab and ASTP were left as <strong>the</strong>y were, and <strong>the</strong> Shuttle was<br />
cut back somewhat in costs and <strong>the</strong>reby delayed by a total of one year, considering <strong>the</strong><br />
schedule changes already made by previous 1973 expenditure cuts on top of <strong>the</strong> present<br />
cuts.<br />
OMB also suggested major cuts in personnel totaling 1880 with <strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong>se coming<br />
at Marshall and at Lewis/Plumbrook. We have, in effect, accepted <strong>the</strong> Lewis/
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 135<br />
Plumbrook cut because this is where all <strong>the</strong> nuclear work was going on. However, we have<br />
indicated that until we can get things sorted out, we would not accept a cut at Marshall or<br />
elsewhere at this time. We stated, instead, that a number roughly approximating <strong>the</strong> 1880<br />
would be coming out of NASA’s budget, but exactly where <strong>the</strong>se cuts would be made we<br />
will determine later. In <strong>the</strong> meantime, I want to make a major effort to see whe<strong>the</strong>r we can<br />
“sell” <strong>the</strong> excess NASA capabilities to agencies such as EPA [Environmental Protection<br />
Agency] (for Lewis) and <strong>the</strong> DOT [Department of Transportation] (for Marshall). This is<br />
different from what we attempted last year when indicated that we would make NASA<br />
capability available as a service to <strong>the</strong>se o<strong>the</strong>r agencies. After trying for a year to make that<br />
work, it just is clear that it won’t. Instead, our intention now is to “spin off” some of <strong>the</strong><br />
capabilities directly to o<strong>the</strong>r agencies so that <strong>the</strong>y can develop an in-house capability.<br />
As I mentioned before, I spent Monday, December 18, writing our reclama letter to<br />
Weinberger, and, in addition, writing a letter to Kissinger soliciting his support on Viking.<br />
Copies of <strong>the</strong> drafts of <strong>the</strong>se letters are attached. In <strong>the</strong> [6] meantime, Fletcher had been<br />
working with Whitehead, Anders, and Jon Rose to get <strong>the</strong>ir G-2 on what was really going<br />
on in <strong>the</strong> White House, and, at <strong>the</strong> same time, he also received <strong>the</strong>ir free advice. Jon, who<br />
is used to dealing within <strong>the</strong> White House, felt that <strong>the</strong> letters that I had written might<br />
make <strong>the</strong>ir mark with OMB but he really felt that <strong>the</strong>y were needed with Erlichman and<br />
Flanigan and were not suitable for that purpose. Accordingly, he rewrote both letters just<br />
before Fletcher had a meeting with Weinberger and Morrill on December 19 (I was back<br />
in Houston at that time). A copy of <strong>the</strong>ir rewrite is also attached. There were no changes<br />
in substance with one exception: <strong>the</strong> engine refan program was back in <strong>the</strong> words but not<br />
back in <strong>the</strong> budget. This is a program where a great deal of pressure has been applied to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Vice President’s office and Bill Anders would, <strong>the</strong>refore, like to see it back in <strong>the</strong> budget.<br />
We indicated to OMB that we would certainly undertake <strong>the</strong> project if additional<br />
money were added over and above <strong>the</strong> mark for this purpose. At <strong>the</strong> time of this writing,<br />
it is quite probable that this money will be added. I forgot to mention that Bill Anders met<br />
with us on <strong>the</strong> 18th, and that we engaged in a very significant philosophical argument with<br />
him. It is Bill’s opinion (shared apparently by all White House staffers) that NASA’s main<br />
objectives should be to explore and to provide launch services. Subjects such as applications<br />
and science we should only do as a service for o<strong>the</strong>rs, and, <strong>the</strong>refore, should seek<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir funding, e.g., user agencies or NSF [National Science Foundation], for this purpose.<br />
Both Fletcher and I engaged in a fairly vehement argument with Anders on this point.<br />
Although I don’t think we persuaded Anders, at least he knows where we stand.<br />
Our budget submission as revised, was only approximately $50 million over <strong>the</strong> OMB<br />
mark for both FY 1973 and FY 1974. Weinberger was apparently quite pleased with our<br />
proposals, and it is quite probable that <strong>the</strong>y will be accepted. However, at <strong>the</strong> time of<br />
Christmas weekend we have not yet heard positively that our proposals have been accepted<br />
or that <strong>the</strong> NASA budget is locked up. As a final afterthought, Fletcher went back to<br />
Weinberger and asked him whe<strong>the</strong>r it wouldn’t be possible to reinstate OSO. The reasoning<br />
is that this might be a minor concession to make to <strong>the</strong> scientific community. [7]<br />
This reinstatement, of course, we could only make with additional funding. This, too, is<br />
an open item at <strong>the</strong> time of this writing.<br />
Document I-28<br />
Document title: Committee on Satellite Communications, Space Applications Board,<br />
Assembly of Engineering, National Research Council, “Federal Research and<br />
Development for Satellite Communications,” 1977.<br />
Source: National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
136<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
By 1975, critics were beginning to call into question NASA’s decision to withdraw its support from<br />
<strong>the</strong> research and development (R&D) of communications satellites. Such critics argued that <strong>the</strong><br />
nation needed a government program to investigate related technologies in <strong>the</strong>ir early stages of development,<br />
as well as to explore technologies and applications that were not clearly linked to private-sector<br />
objectives. In response, NASA contracted with <strong>the</strong> independent National Research Council to<br />
conduct a study on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re was a justifiable federal role in communications satellite R&D. The<br />
study concluded that <strong>the</strong>re was definitely a need for such a program (excerpts of <strong>the</strong> study report are<br />
included here). This conclusion formed one of <strong>the</strong> bases for NASA going ahead with <strong>the</strong> controversial<br />
Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program; ACTS was finally launched in<br />
September 1993.<br />
[i] Report of <strong>the</strong><br />
COMMITTEE ON SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
of <strong>the</strong><br />
SPACE APPLICATIONS BOARD<br />
ASSEMBLY OF ENGINEERING<br />
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL<br />
Federal Research and Development<br />
for Satellite Communications<br />
Published by<br />
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES<br />
WASHINGTON, D.C.<br />
1977 . . .<br />
[no page number] PREFACE<br />
In January 1973, <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), faced<br />
with <strong>the</strong> necessity of reducing expenditures, examined its programs to determine what<br />
could be eliminated. While NASA made a number of reductions, one of interest to this<br />
study was <strong>the</strong> decision to essentially eliminate its satellite communications activities<br />
because this was felt to be a relatively mature field and NASA believed that R&D in support<br />
of future activities could be provided by <strong>the</strong> communications industry. Since January<br />
1973, several organizations have assessed <strong>the</strong> consequences of that decision and have<br />
urged that <strong>the</strong> decision be re-examined. 1<br />
In late 1975, NASA asked and <strong>the</strong> National Research Council agreed to study fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong> question “Should federal research and development on satellite communications be<br />
resumed and, if so, what is <strong>the</strong> proper federal role in this field?” To undertake <strong>the</strong> study,<br />
a Committee on Satellite Communications (COSC) was formed under <strong>the</strong> auspices of <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Applications Board (SAB). This report presents <strong>the</strong> Committee’s findings; signifi-<br />
1. “The Federal Role in Communications Satellite R&D,” American Institute of Aeronautics and<br />
Astronautics, New York City, 1975; “The NASA R&D Program on Satellite Communications,” A Position Paper of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Satellite Telecommunications Section, Communications and Industrial Electronics Division, Electronic<br />
Industries Association and <strong>the</strong> Government Products Division, Electronics Industries Association, Washington,<br />
D.C., 1974; untitled paper, Aerospace and Electronic Systems Group, The Institute of Electrical and Electronic<br />
Engineers, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1976.
cant background information and working papers assembled by <strong>the</strong> Committee during its<br />
deliberations will be published separately. 2<br />
[1] INTRODUCTION<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 137<br />
In <strong>the</strong> one hundred years since <strong>the</strong> invention of <strong>the</strong> telephone, telecommunications<br />
has become a pervasive part of <strong>the</strong> developed world. The telephone is in nearly every<br />
home and in every office in <strong>the</strong> United States, and <strong>the</strong>re is about one telephone for every<br />
ten persons on earth. Radio broadcasting and o<strong>the</strong>r radio links have become commonplace<br />
tools for providing both entertainment and services. Television provides entertainment,<br />
news, and educational services to most homes in <strong>the</strong> technologically developed<br />
countries of <strong>the</strong> world. There remain, however, some troubling limitations to fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
improvements in communications services. For example, <strong>the</strong> cost of providing telephone<br />
or TV service by conventional means is high in remote and sparsely populated regions.<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong> Rural Electrification Administration has made and guaranteed about $650 million<br />
in federal loans annually to stimulate an extensive rural telephone service now serving<br />
3.1 million subscribers in 47 states.<br />
High frequency radio is widely used to span great distances but suffers from outages<br />
caused by solar disturbances of <strong>the</strong> ionosphere. As a result, ships and aircraft are frequently<br />
out of communication with <strong>the</strong>ir bases for long periods or during critical phases<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir journeys. High frequency radio is also severely spectrum-limited and its use is<br />
largely confined to <strong>the</strong> provision of voice and low-speed data services. First steps in<br />
improving ship communications began in 1976 with <strong>the</strong> launch of COMSAT General’s<br />
MARISAT satellites which now provide urgently needed, reliable services to U.S. Navy and<br />
commercial ships in <strong>the</strong> Atlantic and Pacific Ocean basins.<br />
Nineteen years ago when <strong>the</strong> first satellites were launched, it was clear that <strong>the</strong>y could<br />
serve as high-altitude relay stations and thus overcome some of <strong>the</strong> limitations of terrestrial<br />
communications systems. First efforts involved bouncing radio signals from orbiting<br />
balloons and even from earth’s natural satellite, <strong>the</strong> moon. Ano<strong>the</strong>r approach involved<br />
<strong>the</strong> use of a receiver-transmitter, called a transponder, in a satellite to relay signals from<br />
one distant point on earth to ano<strong>the</strong>r. Early efforts using low-altitude satellites showed <strong>the</strong><br />
feasibility of <strong>the</strong> transponder technique, but such satellites had short orbital periods, did<br />
not remain within sight of <strong>the</strong> earth stations at all times, and required that earth stations<br />
continuously track those satellites in view.<br />
The promise of communications via satellite was realized with <strong>the</strong> use of satellites in<br />
geostationary orbits at an altitude of 36,000 km [kilometers]. At that height, <strong>the</strong> orbit<br />
period, synchronized with <strong>the</strong> earth’s rotation, places <strong>the</strong> satellite in an essentially stationary<br />
position above a selected point on <strong>the</strong> equator and within line-of-sight of about<br />
one-third of <strong>the</strong> earth’s surface. This possibility [2] for providing continuity of service and<br />
solving <strong>the</strong> tracking problem was pointed out by Arthur Clarke 3 in 1945 and first achieved<br />
by NASA’s SYNCOM in 1963.<br />
In 1963, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Congress established <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation<br />
(COMSAT) to bring about a commercial international satellite communications system as<br />
quickly as possible and to represent <strong>the</strong> U.S. in <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications<br />
Satellite Organization. International satellite communications service began in 1965 with<br />
2. Federal Research and Development for Satellite Communications: Working Papers. Committee on Satellite<br />
Communications of <strong>the</strong> Space Applications Board, National Research Council. National Academy of Sciences,<br />
Washington, D.C., 1977.<br />
3. Clark, A.C. “Extraterrestrial Relays,” Wireless World. October, 1945, pp. 305–308.
138<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
INTELSAT I which could carry 240 telephone channels or one TV channel. INTELSAT II,<br />
III, IV, and IVA satellites were added in subsequent years. As of January 1977, <strong>the</strong> system<br />
provides telephone and TV links between <strong>the</strong> 94 countries that share in ownership of <strong>the</strong><br />
system. There are also 13 non-owner countries that use <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT system.<br />
Use of satellites for domestic communications within <strong>the</strong> U.S. was delayed by political<br />
and regulatory processes until 1974 when policy decisions were made about who would<br />
provide such services. Meanwhile, Canada’s ANIK satellite system had become operational<br />
in early 1973, supplying some U.S. domestic services. Since <strong>the</strong>n, a number of companies<br />
have entered <strong>the</strong> field and today satellites are being used to provide domestic telephone or<br />
TV services. Additional domestic satellites are planned for <strong>the</strong> U.S. and for o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
Since 1963, <strong>the</strong> United States has led <strong>the</strong> world in satellite communications. Initial<br />
experiments were conducted by <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Department of Defense. Transition from experimental to practical use of satellites was<br />
rapid for transoceanic telephone and TV services because <strong>the</strong>re existed an infrastructure<br />
ready to exploit this new medium and because <strong>the</strong> number of new undersea cables was<br />
unable to keep pace with <strong>the</strong> demand. U.S. aerospace and electronic industries were able<br />
to capitalize on <strong>the</strong>ir own work as well as on <strong>the</strong> research and development funded in<br />
<strong>the</strong>se industries by <strong>the</strong> federal government to develop a competitive advantage in <strong>the</strong><br />
world market.<br />
The private sector has continued to make advances in <strong>the</strong> technology for providing<br />
conventional telephone and TV services. The industry has taken some risks; for example,<br />
one company paid for launch vehicle improvements and incorporated much advanced<br />
technology, not previously proven in flight, in its satellite to improve performance.<br />
However, it became clear that <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>the</strong> private sector was willing (or could permit itself)<br />
to take was limited and that most private initiatives were being channelled to existing markets<br />
and to where technical risks were not perceived as unacceptably high. It is clear that<br />
even in <strong>the</strong> largest companies, prudent management requires that large investments in<br />
R&D not be made unless <strong>the</strong>re is reasonable assurance that relatively short term payoffs<br />
will result. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> risk of violating federal anti-trust and trade regulation<br />
statutes has led companies to refrain from entering into joint efforts that might permit<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to share risk. As a result, following <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of <strong>the</strong> federal government from<br />
satellite communication R&D, <strong>the</strong>re have been no commercial experimental satellites to<br />
test new techniques and concepts or to permit users to experiment with new services.<br />
There are a number of potential communications services, such as for health care<br />
delivery, educational services, search and rescue, electronic mail, teleconferencing, and<br />
environmental data collection, which apparently cannot readily [3] or economically be<br />
provided using <strong>the</strong> technology available to <strong>the</strong> common carriers for producing conventional<br />
telephone and television services. If <strong>the</strong> option to initiate some of <strong>the</strong>se services is<br />
to remain open in <strong>the</strong> future, <strong>the</strong>n advances must be made in needed technology by<br />
undertaking research and development programs now.<br />
There are examples of work which must be undertaken if new services are to be contemplated.<br />
These include technology for utilizing new portions of <strong>the</strong> radio frequency<br />
spectrum, employing larger and more sophisticated spacecraft antennas, utilizing a satellite<br />
as a switchboard in space, and advancing technology to drive down <strong>the</strong> cost of communications.<br />
As time passed, many concerned with <strong>the</strong> development and <strong>the</strong> future of satellite<br />
communications came to realize that NASA’s 1973 decision to reduce R&D in <strong>the</strong> field<br />
might indeed close options if advancements in technology such as those just cited did not<br />
become available. Mindful of this, NASA, in <strong>the</strong> fall of 1975, asked <strong>the</strong> NRC to conduct a<br />
study of <strong>the</strong> federal role in satellite communications research and development. The NRC<br />
agreed on October 7, 1975, to undertake <strong>the</strong> study and decided that <strong>the</strong> work should be<br />
done by a new Committee on Satellite Communications (COSC) under <strong>the</strong> NRC’s Space
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 139<br />
Applications Board. It was also agreed that <strong>the</strong> Committee should be constituted of technologists,<br />
communications system operators, satellite communications users, a communications<br />
policy specialist, and a regulatory economist. The members were selected with<br />
due regard for a balance in viewpoints. . . .<br />
In its work, <strong>the</strong> Committee considered whe<strong>the</strong>r it is likely that satellites in geostationary<br />
orbits could make voice, video, and data communications attractive for a variety of<br />
public uses not presently provided. Such satellite systems should be able to provide new<br />
services to remote and distant places and to sparsely distributed users. For example, using<br />
<strong>the</strong> ATS-6 satellite, Brazil has experimented with delivering television broadcasts to some<br />
of its isolated populace. The U.S. has experimented with providing health care information<br />
and educational services to inhabitants of remote villages in Alaska, Appalachia, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Rocky Mountain West. When <strong>the</strong> ATS-6 was withdrawn from such experiments to keep<br />
an international commitment to conduct similar demonstrations in India, a number of<br />
user groups testified to <strong>the</strong>ir need for <strong>the</strong> replacement satellite which NASA had planned<br />
to launch. 4 However, funds to complete and launch <strong>the</strong> replacement satellite were not<br />
appropriated and no individual user or combination of users was able to afford <strong>the</strong> estimated<br />
$45 million to $50 million to launch and operate it. While <strong>the</strong> cost-effectiveness of<br />
any single application of this type by a satellite may be questionable, 5 <strong>the</strong> use of multi-purpose<br />
satellites may open an increasing number of opportunities for public service, government,<br />
and commercial uses.<br />
[4] Among <strong>the</strong> non-technical questions confronting <strong>the</strong> Committee, <strong>the</strong>refore, were<br />
<strong>the</strong>se: Are <strong>the</strong>re a large number of disaggregated, mainly public service users in remote<br />
places likely to need and want <strong>the</strong> capabilities of satellite communications? Is an experimental<br />
program, building on <strong>the</strong> experience of <strong>the</strong> curtailed ATS-6 experiments, warranted<br />
to permit users to evaluate <strong>the</strong> worth of such services and to demonstrate <strong>the</strong><br />
market and <strong>the</strong> costs? If so, what should such a program comprise and what should be <strong>the</strong><br />
respective roles of <strong>the</strong> government, <strong>the</strong> communications industry and <strong>the</strong> potential public<br />
service sector users?<br />
Collectively in Committee meetings and individually outside of those meetings, <strong>the</strong><br />
members of COSC: (1) reviewed <strong>the</strong> history and present status of satellite communications,<br />
(2) considered a number of important communications service needs expressed by<br />
potential users, (3) identified advances in technology required for meeting those needs,<br />
(4) judged which of those advances probably would, and which probably would not, be<br />
met by <strong>the</strong> private sector, (5) structured and evaluated several possible NASA roles in <strong>the</strong><br />
advancement of technology, and (6) decided upon recommendations.<br />
[5] PERCEIVED NEEDS AND REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY<br />
PERCEIVED NEEDS<br />
The government investment in research and development on multi-channel point-topoint<br />
satellite communications, which began with <strong>the</strong> space age and culminated in <strong>the</strong><br />
formation of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation, clearly has borne rich dividends<br />
for <strong>the</strong> country. The revenues from this new industry currently exceed $200 million per<br />
year and are expanding rapidly. It was only after <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DOD) and<br />
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Hearings on S.3542, A Bill to<br />
Authorize Appropriations to <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Research and Development<br />
Relating to <strong>the</strong> Seventh Applications Technology Satellite, July 23, 1974.<br />
5. See Educational Policy Center, Instructional Television: A Comparative Study of Satellite and O<strong>the</strong>r Delivery<br />
Systems. Syracuse Research Corporation, Syracuse, New York, 1976.
140<br />
NASA had developed <strong>the</strong> technology and demonstrated its practical use, however, that<br />
commercial firms were able to risk operational systems. Today <strong>the</strong> price of multi-channel<br />
point-to-point voice service has dropped to several thousand dollars per channel-year.<br />
Both transoceanic and domestic systems are in operation or planned in a large number of<br />
countries.<br />
The situation for o<strong>the</strong>r classes of long-range satellite communications—for example,<br />
service to mobile platforms (ships and aircraft) or to widely distributed or remote ground<br />
locations—is much less favorable. Most users of such communication terminal installations<br />
feel <strong>the</strong>y can afford only modest sized and low-cost antennas. The services so provided<br />
might include public activities such as education, mail, environmental monitoring,<br />
geophysical exploration, hazard warning, health care delivery, navigation aids, time and<br />
frequency dissemination, public safety, search and rescue, or wildlife monitoring.<br />
The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and NASA have recently conducted<br />
experiments in Appalachia, <strong>the</strong> Rocky Mountain States, Alaska, and Washington<br />
State. 6 These experiments were designed to assess <strong>the</strong> value of service to remote locations<br />
and to assess <strong>the</strong> communications satellite as a means for providing it. For example, using<br />
television, voice, and a variety of data signals relayed by ATS-6 (Applications Technology<br />
Satellite 6), <strong>the</strong> experiments delivered health care and education services to thousands of<br />
Alaskans living in [6] areas too remote to reach readily in person or through ground-<br />
based communications.<br />
7 8<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
These experiments successfully demonstrated <strong>the</strong> capability to provide diagnostic<br />
consultative services between medical professionals and paraprofessionals, transmit and<br />
provide consultations on x-rays, and transmit and up-date medical records, all in real-time<br />
via satellites. As a result, <strong>the</strong> Alaska Native Health Board now assigns highest priority to<br />
development of <strong>the</strong> community health aide program and to improving <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
that provide <strong>the</strong> aides with professional back-up. 9<br />
The Public Service Satellite Consortium 10 has compiled <strong>the</strong> needs of numerous current<br />
and potential users similar to those portrayed in <strong>the</strong> Alaska example, but <strong>the</strong> fact is<br />
that most potential users cannot afford current communication service prices, much as<br />
<strong>the</strong> transoceanic point-to-point users could not afford early satellite communications systems<br />
before technology advances brought lower prices. If prices could be reduced, an<br />
increased market for such services might well develop.<br />
REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY<br />
The technical challenge in reducing costs for satellite service to small terminals is difficult,<br />
but it is no greater than that faced in originating satellite communications in 1958.<br />
The basic approach already can be envisioned. 11 To enable small antennas to be used at<br />
6. Marion H. Johnson, “ATS-6 Impact: A View from <strong>the</strong> Control Room,” National Library of Medicine<br />
News. Vol. XXX, No. 10-11, October-November, 1975, pp. 3–7.<br />
7. Charles Brady, “Telemedicine Moves North to Alaska," National Library of Medicine News. Vol. XXX,<br />
No. 10-11, October-November, 1975, pp. 7–10.<br />
8. Martha R. Wilson and Charles Brady, “Health Care in Alaska Via Satellite,” AIAA Conference on<br />
Communication Satellites for Health/Education Applications, AIAA Paper 75-898, New York, 1975.<br />
9. Subcommittee on Appropriations for <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior and Related Agencies, U.S.<br />
House of Representatives. Testimony on behalf of <strong>the</strong> Alaska Native Health Board by Lillie H. McGarvey, May 13,<br />
1975.<br />
10. The Public Service Satellite Consortium is a private organization dedicated to aggregating <strong>the</strong> public<br />
services satellite market. Its subscribers number more than 65 state, local and regional organizations currently<br />
conducting over 20 public service satellite communications experiments with <strong>the</strong> NASA ATS-series satellites and<br />
<strong>the</strong> NASA/Canadian Communications Technology Satellite.<br />
11. Walter E. Morrow, “Current and Future Communications Satellite Technology,” Presentation to <strong>the</strong><br />
International Astronautical Federation 26th Congress, Lisbon, September 1975.
earth terminals, high-gain satellite antennas must be employed. To be economical, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
must be shared by large numbers of users at many locations. Many antenna beams from a<br />
single satellite will [7] be required, along with methods for accurately aiming <strong>the</strong> antenna<br />
and a means for switching signals from one beam to ano<strong>the</strong>r by means of a switching<br />
system aboard <strong>the</strong> satellite.<br />
High Gain Spacecraft Antennas<br />
The possibility of high gain (large) spacecraft antennas seems anti<strong>the</strong>tical to <strong>the</strong><br />
notion of spacecraft weighing, at most, a few thousand kilograms. (The standard 25-meter<br />
ground antennas weigh hundreds of thousands of kilograms.) There is one large difference,<br />
however, between <strong>the</strong> surface of <strong>the</strong> earth and space; namely, in <strong>the</strong> absence of gravity<br />
and wind forces, large space antennas can be built using very light structures.<br />
The NASA ATS-6 spacecraft incorporates a 10-meter parabolic antenna that weighs<br />
less than 100 kg [kilograms] and is operable to 10 GHz [gigahertz]. This antenna consists<br />
of a series of sheet aluminum ribs on which is stretched a metallized net. During launch,<br />
<strong>the</strong> antenna is packed into a small container by wrapping <strong>the</strong> ribs and mesh around a central<br />
hub. Upon reaching orbit, <strong>the</strong> ribs are released whereupon <strong>the</strong>y unwind into <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
deployed position. 12 O<strong>the</strong>r designs need investigation with <strong>the</strong> objectives of fur<strong>the</strong>r reducing<br />
weight, increasing performance, and increasing size.<br />
Multiple Beams<br />
One difficulty with high gain spacecraft antennas is that <strong>the</strong>y produce very narrow<br />
beams and <strong>the</strong>refore have limited coverage on <strong>the</strong> earth’s surface. For instance, <strong>the</strong><br />
ATS-6 10-meter antenna has a beamwidth of about 1˚ at one of <strong>the</strong> operating frequencies,<br />
2.6 GHz. If such an antenna is to be usefully employed over <strong>the</strong> earth’s surface visible to<br />
<strong>the</strong> satellite, it will be necessary to generate a total of about seventy-five beams and to share<br />
<strong>the</strong> spacecraft antenna aperture among <strong>the</strong>se many beams.<br />
As an example, <strong>the</strong> Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory developed<br />
a 10 GHz lens antenna about 0.75 meter in diameter, illuminated by 19 feed horns<br />
and producing 19 beams—which in <strong>the</strong> case of this antenna will just cover that part of <strong>the</strong><br />
earth visible from geostationary orbit. The satellite transmitter can be connected by command<br />
to any combination of <strong>the</strong> feed horns. The entire antenna system weighs less than<br />
20 kg. Similar arrangements might be made for large parabolic reflector antennas. In that<br />
case, a cluster of antenna feeds would be located at <strong>the</strong> focus of <strong>the</strong> parabola. Fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
development of <strong>the</strong>se concepts is needed both to achieve <strong>the</strong> proper performance over<br />
<strong>the</strong> required bandwidth and to minimize effects of <strong>the</strong> space environment such as<br />
extremes of temperature.<br />
[8] Precision Antenna Aiming<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 141<br />
With today’s technology, aiming an antenna in space to a precision of 0.1˚ is relatively<br />
easy. However, <strong>the</strong> high gain antennas of anticipated future spacecraft will have<br />
beamwidths of 0.1˚ to 0.5˚ and will require a pointing precision of 0.01˚ or better. It is<br />
advantageous to attach <strong>the</strong> antenna rigidly to <strong>the</strong> spacecraft and aim <strong>the</strong> structure as a<br />
12. Computer Sciences Corporation. NASA Compendium of Satellite Communications Programs. Report of<br />
Work on Contracts NAS 5-24011 and NAS 5-24012. Computer Sciences Corporation, Silver Spring, Maryland,<br />
1975, pp. 13-59 to 13-81.
142<br />
whole. To point <strong>the</strong> beam accurately, <strong>the</strong> satellite’s location in space must be known, <strong>the</strong><br />
directional vector to <strong>the</strong> earth determined, and <strong>the</strong>n pitch, roll and yaw maneuvers performed.<br />
The spacecraft location can be determined by means of a series of ground-based<br />
observations of satellite range and range rate or by means of an on-board sensor system.<br />
One on-board system, in a Lincoln Experimental Satellite, used a precision chronometer<br />
and visual and/or infrared sightings of <strong>the</strong> sun and <strong>the</strong> earth’s edge. The satellite location<br />
was determined by noting <strong>the</strong> time at which <strong>the</strong> observed angle between <strong>the</strong> sun and earth<br />
reached a given value.<br />
A spacecraft with a large antenna can be turned in space by means of an onboard<br />
momentum wheel or wheels. By speeding up or slowing down <strong>the</strong> wheel, pitch maneuvers<br />
can be made. Pivoting of <strong>the</strong> wheel axis can produce roll and yaw motions. The spacecraft<br />
must also be kept in proper orbital position. This is often accomplished by hydrazinefueled<br />
thrusters. Ammonia thruster systems can also be used and electronically powered<br />
thrusters have been considered. Current aiming techniques need to be improved and<br />
additional research and development initiated to provide simple and accurate systems.<br />
On-Board Message Switching<br />
The use of multiple beam high-gain satellite antennas will permit <strong>the</strong> use of small terminals.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> problem remains of how to interconnect users on different<br />
beams. One solution would be to collect <strong>the</strong> signals from <strong>the</strong> various beams and<br />
transmit <strong>the</strong>m on a very wide-band downlink to a large ground terminal. The interconnection<br />
could <strong>the</strong>n be made by conventional switching equipment and <strong>the</strong> signals<br />
returned to <strong>the</strong> spacecraft on a wide-band link with each signal addressed to <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
downlink beam. This solution, while permitting <strong>the</strong> complex switching equipment to be<br />
located on <strong>the</strong> ground, would require additional very wide-band channels in <strong>the</strong> already<br />
crowded radio frequency spectrum. Much more power would be required in <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
and <strong>the</strong> existing 0.25 second time delay would be doubled.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r solution would be to perform <strong>the</strong> switching in <strong>the</strong> satellite. On[-]board<br />
switching can be done in several ways. While switching at radio frequency would avoid <strong>the</strong><br />
complexity of demodulation, time sharing in <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> downlink transmitter would<br />
be very difficult.<br />
An alternative is demodulation of <strong>the</strong> up-coming signals to identify on which beam<br />
<strong>the</strong> down-going signals must be placed to reach <strong>the</strong> intended recipients. Recent advances<br />
in high-speed digital signal processors offer encouragement that on-board switching is<br />
possible. Much research and development is needed to arrive at practical solutions and<br />
experimental verification in flight will be necessary before <strong>the</strong> communications industry<br />
can risk operational use.<br />
[9] Higher Satellite Power<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
A way to increase satellite capacity or achieve a given capacity with low cost ground stations<br />
is to increase <strong>the</strong> satellite transmitter power. The transmitter power output is <strong>the</strong><br />
product of <strong>the</strong> available prime power and <strong>the</strong> efficiency of <strong>the</strong> transmitters.<br />
There is relatively little possibility of increasing <strong>the</strong> 60% efficiency of current satellite<br />
solid-state transmitters operating at frequencies up to 2.0 GHz. At frequencies above<br />
2.0 GHz, travelling wave tubes with efficiencies of up to 40% are commonly used and<br />
improvements in efficiency should be possible.<br />
Significant advances in <strong>the</strong> performance of prime power systems should be possible.<br />
Most current satellites employ silicon solar cell power systems having efficiencies as low as<br />
10%. The lightest weight arrangement involves solar-oriented planar arrays having about
20 watts of power per kilogram. New designs having more efficient cells on lightweight<br />
flexible substrates should be able to produce 50 watts per kilogram.<br />
It may also be possible to develop even higher power per unit weight by means of larger<br />
solar array structures or deployed parabolic solar concentrators which could be used<br />
with ei<strong>the</strong>r solar cells or perhaps Brayton closed-cycle turboalternators. These means for<br />
achieving larger satellite capacities and thus lower earth station costs require new technology<br />
in prime power devices, in structural efficiency, and in <strong>the</strong> high power transmitter<br />
devices <strong>the</strong>mselves.<br />
Modulation Systems<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 143<br />
Most contemporary systems employ analog frequency modulation voice and TV transmission.<br />
For FM voice systems, a 50 dB [decibel] power signal-to-noise ratio in a one-cycle<br />
band is required. Digital speech transmission systems operating at 2400 bits per second<br />
with very efficient modulation systems have been demonstrated to operate at power signal-to-noise<br />
ratios of about 40 dB. While currently <strong>the</strong>se digital systems are far too costly<br />
to be used in inexpensive mobile terminals, recent advances in <strong>the</strong> reduction of <strong>the</strong> cost<br />
of digital equipment indicate <strong>the</strong> possibility of low-cost voice systems operating at significantly<br />
lower signal-to-noise ratios.<br />
OTHER TECHNOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r improvements are needed in satellite support systems. Typical of <strong>the</strong>se needs<br />
are those for lighter, longer life (nickel-hydrogen) batteries and station-keeping engines<br />
(ion engines). Better understanding is also needed of certain space phenomena such as<br />
static discharges at geostationary orbit and <strong>the</strong> effects of rain on <strong>the</strong> polarization of radio<br />
signals. It should be noted that AT&T’s COMSTAR satellite carries radio propagation<br />
experiments at 18 GHz and 30 GHz. These experiments, although singular, are typical<br />
of <strong>the</strong> many experiments needed to better understand potentially limiting natural<br />
phenomena. . . .<br />
[29] CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
The Committee, in its deliberations, reviewed a number of future communications<br />
needs which potentially could be satisfied by satellite systems. These included needs in<br />
fields such as education, health care delivery, hazard warning, navigation aids, search and<br />
rescue, electronic mail delivery, time and frequency dissemination, and geophysical exploration.<br />
Many of <strong>the</strong>se are public service needs which might be satisfied by satellite communications<br />
systems using high power and a high-gain antenna in <strong>the</strong> space segment,<br />
permitting low-gain, low-cost earth stations. To make such systems possible, technological<br />
advances in multibeam spacecraft antennas, low-cost earth stations, large satellite power<br />
systems, high-speed spacecraft communications switches, and spacecraft supporting technology<br />
may be required. If costs can be reduced by <strong>the</strong> application of new technology, many<br />
potential public service users may benefit from new satellite communications services.<br />
The Committee concludes that <strong>the</strong> technology to meet such needs is often not provided<br />
by <strong>the</strong> private sector because of <strong>the</strong> technical and cost risks involved. The<br />
Committee <strong>the</strong>refore concludes that <strong>the</strong>re is an appropriate federal role and that NASA<br />
should resume <strong>the</strong> research and development activities needed to provide <strong>the</strong> new technology.<br />
. . .<br />
As discussed earlier in this report, it became clear as <strong>the</strong> Committee progressed<br />
through its deliberations that it would be nei<strong>the</strong>r possible, nor appropriate, for a parttime,<br />
short-duration committee to undertake an exhaustive study of <strong>the</strong> future needs of
144<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
<strong>the</strong> country in satellite communications and <strong>the</strong>n to make detailed recommendations on<br />
<strong>the</strong> basis of such a comprehensive study. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Committee focused upon classes of<br />
possible NASA programs (called “options” in this report) and, accordingly, <strong>the</strong><br />
Committee’s conclusions and recommendations are focused on <strong>the</strong> options considered.<br />
The Committee concludes that <strong>the</strong> current NASA satellite communications program<br />
(Option 1) is inadequate, both in terms of meeting NASA’s statutory advisory obligations<br />
and in terms of meeting <strong>the</strong> country’s needs in satellite communications research and<br />
development. Some members, but not all, felt that if this option were <strong>the</strong> only one that<br />
<strong>the</strong> nation was willing to support, NASA should drop out entirely of <strong>the</strong> satellite communications<br />
research and development business, and that legislation should be sought which<br />
would terminate NASA’s statutorily mandated advisory responsibilities in satellite communications.<br />
The Committee believes that <strong>the</strong> extra funding required to support an expanded<br />
NASA satellite communications technology program (Option 2) is not likely [30] to produce<br />
enough returns of value to <strong>the</strong> country to make it worthwhile pursuing, and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
recommends against it.<br />
Option 3, a satellite communications technology flight-test support program, has considerable<br />
appeal in that it is directed at removing a major roadblock in <strong>the</strong> way of<br />
increased private sector investment in satellite communications research and development.<br />
Such a program would face many difficulties in deciding fairly who should be provided<br />
such opportunities and in resolving questions of access to results, patent protection,<br />
government rights, and proprietary rights, to name a few. The Committee <strong>the</strong>refore is<br />
skeptical of <strong>the</strong> likely efficacy of such a program and recommends against pursuing it—<br />
even if undertaken in conjunction with Option 1.<br />
The Committee recommends that NASA implement an experimental satellite communications<br />
technology flight program (Option 4) using <strong>the</strong> safeguards provided by <strong>the</strong> first two<br />
phases of <strong>the</strong> decision process discussed in <strong>the</strong> preceding section.<br />
That procedure is intended to ensure that <strong>the</strong> communications technology program<br />
is responsive to <strong>the</strong> perceived needs of <strong>the</strong> entire satellite communications community,<br />
including, in particular, potential users of <strong>the</strong> services. In addition, it is believed that following<br />
this procedure will help foster better transition of <strong>the</strong> experimental results into<br />
subsequent operational systems.<br />
It seems clear to <strong>the</strong> Committee that <strong>the</strong>re are a number of potential public service<br />
satellite communications systems which should be investigated in detail for possible implementation.<br />
However, as discussed in <strong>the</strong> preceding chapter, <strong>the</strong> Committee also believes<br />
firmly that NASA should pursue such a program only if one or more potential user groups<br />
are involved from <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> program through its finish, and only if <strong>the</strong> estimated<br />
costs and benefits are thoroughly investigated and <strong>the</strong> balance indicates <strong>the</strong> pursuit of <strong>the</strong><br />
program is worthwhile.<br />
The Committee recommends that NASA implement an experimental public service satellite<br />
communications system program (Option 5), provided that <strong>the</strong> program is carried out using<br />
<strong>the</strong> entire four-phase decision process discussed in <strong>the</strong> preceding section.<br />
The Committee concludes that <strong>the</strong> arguments against an operational public service<br />
satellite communications system program (Option 6) are compelling, that such an option<br />
is inappropriate for NASA, and recommends against it.<br />
In summary, <strong>the</strong> Committee on Satellite Communications concludes that <strong>the</strong>re might<br />
well be a number of public service communications needs which satellite communications<br />
systems of <strong>the</strong> future could help satisfy. Some of <strong>the</strong>se services and systems may require
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 145<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of technology such as multi-beam spacecraft antennas, low-cost earth stations<br />
and on-board signal switching—technologies which do not readily derive from current<br />
or anticipated future activities of <strong>the</strong> private communications common carriers. In<br />
addition, because of <strong>the</strong> disaggregated nature of those who need <strong>the</strong>se services, <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector often cannot find a ready market which justifies <strong>the</strong> risk of expansion into <strong>the</strong><br />
provision of <strong>the</strong>se new services. There is, <strong>the</strong>n, an appropriate federal role in [31] assisting<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of needed technology and in demonstrating new public services for<br />
a sufficient period that <strong>the</strong>ir users may be perceived as a viable market by <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
The most appropriate supplier of <strong>the</strong> needed technology is NASA.<br />
The Committee recommends that as soon as possible, NASA, with <strong>the</strong> participation of appropriate<br />
user groups, begin conceptual definition of both <strong>the</strong> needed technology (Option 4) and<br />
<strong>the</strong> public service experiments <strong>the</strong>mselves (Option 5).<br />
These initiatives are <strong>the</strong> first steps in <strong>the</strong> implementation of <strong>the</strong> Committee’s Options<br />
4 and 5 which have been described earlier in this report. The report also describes a<br />
process of checks and balances which <strong>the</strong> Committee believes are essential to channel <strong>the</strong><br />
expanded NASA role in <strong>the</strong> needed direction.<br />
Document I-29<br />
Document title: John J. Madison, Legislative Affairs Specialist, NASA, Memorandum for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Record, “Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program meeting,<br />
October 13, 1983.”<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Beginning in 1980, NASA reentered <strong>the</strong> communications satellite research and development area,<br />
first with a technology development effort and <strong>the</strong>n with a proposal for a satellite mission that would<br />
demonstrate various new technologies and <strong>the</strong>ir ability to work toge<strong>the</strong>r as a system. This mission,<br />
known as <strong>the</strong> Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), was controversial within <strong>the</strong><br />
government. The Reagan administration believed that it was <strong>the</strong> private sector’s responsibility to<br />
invest in technology and demonstrate its capabilities in areas where <strong>the</strong> primary payoffs would be commercial.<br />
For several years during <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s, President Reagan refused to approve funding for<br />
NASA to develop ACTS. Hughes, <strong>the</strong> world’s leading builder of communications satellites, also<br />
opposed <strong>the</strong> program on <strong>the</strong> grounds that it represented inappropriate government competition with <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector. Congress, with a Democratic majority, believed in a partnership between <strong>the</strong> public and<br />
private sectors would assure <strong>the</strong> nation’s continued leadership in <strong>the</strong> communications satellite sector.<br />
Each year, for several years, Congress restored funding for <strong>the</strong> mission to NASA’s budget. It was not<br />
until early 1987 that <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration reversed its opposition to <strong>the</strong> program, allowing it<br />
to move forward. ACTS was finally launched in 1993. This memorandum captures <strong>the</strong> early NASA<br />
justification for <strong>the</strong> program, as presented in a meeting of two staff members of <strong>the</strong> space subcommittee<br />
of <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives (Rad Byerly and Tim Clark), head of <strong>the</strong> ACTS program at NASA<br />
Headquarters (Robert Lovell), and NASA’s legislative affairs specialist (John Madison). The program’s<br />
rationale and design underwent continual change until a program concept acceptable to both<br />
<strong>the</strong> executive branch and Congress was developed.
146<br />
[no pagination]<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Memorandum for <strong>the</strong> Record<br />
SUBJECT: Advanced Communication Technology Satellite (ACTS) program meeting,<br />
October 13, 1983<br />
PRESENT: Committee staff: R. Byerly, T. Clark;<br />
NASA: R. Lovell and J. Madison<br />
The purpose of <strong>the</strong> meeting was to review <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> NASA ACTS program.<br />
Dr. Byerly started <strong>the</strong> meeting by asking a number of questions about <strong>the</strong> rational for<br />
NASA’s recommitment to develop a second generation satellite communications technology<br />
base for industry. The following points were established by <strong>the</strong> ensuing discussions:<br />
• The current global shift form [sic] an industrial to an information-based economy<br />
is creating a rapidly increasing demand for capacity that cannot be met by <strong>the</strong><br />
satellite communication technology base developed by NASA and industry during<br />
<strong>the</strong> period of 1962 to 1973.<br />
• The satellite communications industry is not monolithic; individual sectors like<br />
<strong>the</strong> hardware manufacturers, <strong>the</strong> common carriers, <strong>the</strong> antenna manufacturers,<br />
<strong>the</strong> entrepreneurs who buy transponders one-at-a-time and resell <strong>the</strong>m and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r[s] have had little interest in maintaining an advanced technology base.<br />
• The U.S. competitive edge in <strong>the</strong> world market has been substantially eroded by<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer of technology to foreign manufacturers; in <strong>the</strong> U.S., only two out of<br />
five former leaders in <strong>the</strong> world market remain competitive.<br />
• To provide <strong>the</strong> capacity to meet <strong>the</strong> forecasted demand, NASA and industry over<br />
<strong>the</strong> past five years focused research on <strong>the</strong> precursor technologies to an experimental<br />
system like ACTS; <strong>the</strong> technologies include frequency reuse through spot<br />
beams, on-board switching and regeneration, data compression, modulation and<br />
demodulation and beam hopping; <strong>the</strong>re is now a good understanding of <strong>the</strong> technical<br />
risks related to most of <strong>the</strong> technologies.<br />
• The ACTS program provides for <strong>the</strong> testing of many of <strong>the</strong>se technologies in an<br />
experimental network that could be applied to <strong>the</strong> next generation of geostationary<br />
communications satellites. It’s [sic] objective is to restore <strong>the</strong> preeminence<br />
of <strong>the</strong> U.S. industry in satellite communications.<br />
Dr. Byerly and Mr. Lovell discussed <strong>the</strong> NASA effort that supports <strong>the</strong> ACTS program.<br />
It consists of two activities. One involves fundamental research aimed at developing <strong>the</strong><br />
devices and processes that support an advanced components development activity and<br />
some highly sophisticated components which are beyond <strong>the</strong> technical level of ACTS. The<br />
second is directed toward developing components that will reduce some of <strong>the</strong> technical<br />
risk related to <strong>the</strong> ACTS experimental flight systems.<br />
Dr. Byerly inquired into <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> ACTS program. Mr. Lovell indicated that<br />
NASA was still involved in <strong>the</strong> source selection process. One proposal was submitted in<br />
response to <strong>the</strong> RFP [request for proposals] which was issued in March 1983. The proposed<br />
industry team is composed of RCA, TRW, COMSAT, Hughes and Motorola. RCA<br />
would act as <strong>the</strong> prime contractor responsible for <strong>the</strong> satellite bus and <strong>the</strong> integration of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ACTS payload. The total estimated cost of <strong>the</strong> ACTS program is $354.0 million.<br />
Industry will contribute to <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
Some discussion about <strong>the</strong> incentives for industry to participate in <strong>the</strong> ACTS program<br />
followed. The principal motivators are: a $10-$15 billion per year commercial communications<br />
market in <strong>the</strong> 1990’s, an opportunity to be <strong>the</strong> beneficiary of a good technology<br />
transfer mechanism and good protection of proprietary data amid an activity including a<br />
number of competitors.
No additional items were reviewed. Dr. Byerly requested a two page programmatic<br />
description of <strong>the</strong> ACTS program.<br />
Document I-30<br />
John J. Madison<br />
Legislative Affairs Specialist<br />
Document title: William Schneider, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,<br />
Science, and Technology, and David J. Markey, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for<br />
Communications and Information, “A White Paper on New International Satellite<br />
Systems,” Senior Interagency Group on International Communication and Information<br />
Policy, February 1985.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This report sets forth <strong>the</strong> reasoning behind <strong>the</strong> November 28, 1984, determination by President<br />
Ronald Reagan that “separate international communications satellite systems are required in <strong>the</strong><br />
national interest.” (A copy of <strong>the</strong> determination is included in <strong>the</strong> excerpts from this report.) This decision<br />
marked <strong>the</strong> end of an era during which it was U.S. policy to protect <strong>the</strong> position of INTELSAT<br />
as <strong>the</strong> only provider of global point-to-point communications via satellite.<br />
A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems<br />
Senior Interagency Group<br />
on International Communication<br />
and Information Policy<br />
William Schneider, Jr. David J. Markey<br />
Under Secretary for Security Assistant Secretary for<br />
Assistance, Science, and Technology Communications and Information<br />
U.S. Department of State U.S. Department of Commerce<br />
February 1985<br />
[1] Introduction<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 147<br />
Since 1983, several U.S. firms have filed applications with <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission (FCC) to establish international communications satellite<br />
systems in addition to <strong>the</strong> global system owned by <strong>the</strong> [International] Telecommunications<br />
Satellite Organization (INTELSAT). Orion Satellite Corporation, International<br />
Satellite, Inc. (ISI), and Cygnus Corporation propose new transatlantic communications<br />
systems, and RCA American Communications, Inc. (RCA) has applied to use capacity on<br />
a U.S. domestic satellite to provide international service. Pan American Satellite<br />
Corporation (PanAmSat) proposes to establish a system which would serve Latin America.<br />
In addition to existing and planned regional satellite systems independent of INTELSAT,<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r transoceanic satellite systems are under consideration abroad. Approved and proposed<br />
transatlantic submarine cable communications facilities, many of which are actually<br />
or potentially competitive with INTELSAT, are pending as well.
148<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Focus of Report<br />
The filing of U.S.-based satellite system applications with <strong>the</strong> FCC prompted action by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Executive branch, which has special responsibilities in this field under <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, as amended (47 U.S.C. 701 et seq.) including <strong>the</strong><br />
responsibility to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r additional U.S. international satellite systems are<br />
“required in <strong>the</strong> national interest.” The Senior Interagency Group on International<br />
Communication and Information Policy (SIG) reviewed U.S. international satellite policy<br />
to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r, and under what conditions, authorizing satellite systems and services<br />
in addition to INTELSAT would be: (a) consistent with prevailing U.S. law, practice,<br />
and international treaty obligations; (b) compatible with sound foreign policy and<br />
telecommunications policy goals; and, (c) in <strong>the</strong> U.S. national interest. 1<br />
[2] The Executive agencies represented on <strong>the</strong> SIG undertook a study and reached a<br />
unanimous position in favor of new entry, subject to certain limitations. A recommendation<br />
subsequently was made to <strong>the</strong> President by <strong>the</strong> Secretaries of State and Commerce.<br />
The President determined on November 29, 1984, that international satellite systems separate<br />
from INTELSAT were required in <strong>the</strong> U.S. national interest, subject to certain conditions.<br />
Specific criteria relating to <strong>the</strong> President’s determination were <strong>the</strong>n forwarded to<br />
<strong>the</strong> FCC by <strong>the</strong> Secretaries of Commerce and State jointly. See Appendixes A and B.<br />
This report provides background information regarding <strong>the</strong> President’s determination,<br />
and it also provides information on important regulatory and o<strong>the</strong>r parallel measures<br />
which are desirable to ensure that <strong>the</strong> Executive branch’s fundamental policy<br />
goal—an efficient and responsive international communications environment—is<br />
achieved. The discussion here focuses on <strong>the</strong> major communications and information policy<br />
issues raised by <strong>the</strong> applications before <strong>the</strong> FCC. It addresses commercial, trade, and<br />
legal matters, and also examines major U.S. foreign policy interests and concerns.<br />
This report does not seek to resolve all of <strong>the</strong> questions that have been raised regarding<br />
new international satellite systems nor to direct action by <strong>the</strong> FCC on specific pending<br />
applications. It does, however, consolidate much of <strong>the</strong> extensive analysis that has been<br />
undertaken by <strong>the</strong> Executive branch and sets forth <strong>the</strong> requirements applicable to any system<br />
<strong>the</strong> FCC may eventually authorize.<br />
The Executive branch has concluded, in brief, that it is technically feasible, economically<br />
desirable, and in <strong>the</strong> national interest to allow new entry by U.S. firms into <strong>the</strong> international<br />
satellite field. Customers should be afforded both <strong>the</strong> new service options and<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefits of competition among customized service providers that new entry promises.<br />
This can be accomplished, moreover, while maintaining <strong>the</strong> technical integrity of <strong>the</strong><br />
INTELSAT global system and avoiding significant economic harm to that system. U.S. foreign<br />
policy, and international communications and information policy, require a continued<br />
strong national commitment to INTELSAT as “a single global commercial<br />
telecommunications satellite [3] system as part of an improved global telecommunications<br />
network.” 2 But our national commitment to INTELSAT and o<strong>the</strong>r important goals<br />
can be accommodated, provided that new international satellite systems and services are<br />
authorized and regulated along <strong>the</strong> lines discussed in this report.<br />
1. The SIG is composed of representatives of <strong>the</strong> Departments of State, Justice, Defense, and<br />
Commerce; <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong>s of Management and Budget, Science and Technology Policy, Policy Development, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. Trade Representative; <strong>the</strong> National Security Council; <strong>the</strong> Central Intelligence Agency; <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Information Agency (USIA); <strong>the</strong> Board for International Broadcasting; <strong>the</strong> Agency for International<br />
Development; and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Commerce and State co-chair <strong>the</strong> SIG<br />
and USIA serves as vice chair.<br />
2. Preamble, Agreement Relating to <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite Organization<br />
“INTELSAT,” TIAS 7532, 23 UST 3813, 3814 (1973).
Specifically, this report concludes that—<br />
(a) Additional international satellite facilities should be permitted by <strong>the</strong> FCC, provided<br />
<strong>the</strong>y satisfy conventional regulatory requirements, but <strong>the</strong> new entrants must be<br />
restricted to providing customized services, as defined in this report. When one or more<br />
authorities abroad authorizes use of such new systems, <strong>the</strong> United States with those<br />
authorities will enter into consultation procedures with INTELSAT under Article XIV(d)<br />
of <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT Agreement. Construction permits may be issued at <strong>the</strong> conclusion of<br />
regulatory proceedings to those applicants meeting <strong>the</strong> public interest requirements of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communications Act. Final licenses and authorizations should not be issued, however,<br />
until after INTELSAT consultation is completed.<br />
(b) The FCC should examine allowing U.S. carriers and users in addition to <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) to have cost-based access to <strong>the</strong><br />
INTELSAT space segment for customized services. This matter can be pursued on a parallel<br />
track, as <strong>the</strong> pending applications are being processed, however, and does not constitute<br />
a condition to FCC action on <strong>the</strong>se applications.<br />
(c) The United States should, and will, maintain its full commitment to INTELSAT,<br />
while permitting technology-driven competition in this important sector to evolve. . . .<br />
[50] Conclusion<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 149<br />
The applications to establish additional international satellite systems now pending<br />
before <strong>the</strong> FCC presented four options. The Executive [branch] could have recommended<br />
(1) approval, (2) denial of <strong>the</strong> applications outright, (3) approval of <strong>the</strong> applications<br />
subject to specific qualifications, or (4) fur<strong>the</strong>r study, with postponement of any decision<br />
for an indefinite period. The unanimous view among <strong>the</strong> member agencies represented<br />
on <strong>the</strong> SIG is that it would be in <strong>the</strong> U.S. national interest to allow new providers of international<br />
satellite facilities, provided INTELSAT were not exposed to significant economic<br />
harm. The President’s determination reflects this view.<br />
There is sufficient risk of significant adverse economic impact on INTELSAT to make<br />
blanket approval of unrestricted competition unwise. It would also be premature to take<br />
such a step until <strong>the</strong> results of cost-based access, new fiber optic cables, and new<br />
INTELSAT services are fully evaluated. Unrestricted entry could ultimately undermine<br />
<strong>the</strong> economic integrity of this important international enterprise, which would be inconsistent<br />
with <strong>the</strong> U.S. national interest.<br />
[51] The case has not been made for flatly disapproving <strong>the</strong> existing applications. The<br />
new entrants have made a threshold showing that services <strong>the</strong>y propose are not now available<br />
on comparable terms. Limited entry along <strong>the</strong> lines recommended would fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
U.S. international trade interests, promote technological progress, and be consistent with<br />
national defense and security interests as well. Given <strong>the</strong>se limitations, and <strong>the</strong> restrictions<br />
likely to be placed on any new satellite system by telecommunications authorities abroad,<br />
<strong>the</strong> risk of any significant adverse impact on INTELSAT is exceedingly small.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r study and resulting delay [are] unlikely to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> national interest. Over<br />
a year of extensive study and review by <strong>the</strong> Executive branch has already taken place. This<br />
review has not resulted in <strong>the</strong> submission of credible information supplied by anyone,<br />
including INTELSAT and Comsat, which demonstrates plausible adverse effects. There is<br />
no basis to assume such information will be forthcoming.<br />
Satellite systems entail significant lead time. Time is required to secure <strong>the</strong> requisite<br />
spacecraft, to reach launch agreements, and to secure operating arrangements. U.S. regulatory<br />
procedures are generally more time consuming than those abroad, where decisions<br />
can sometimes be reached and implemented without <strong>the</strong> regulatory proceedings<br />
and protracted court appeals characteristic of U.S. regulation. Consultation with<br />
INTELSAT is also required. Even were <strong>the</strong> pending applications approved by <strong>the</strong> FCC<br />
immediately, service would not be available for some time.
150<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Government should not stifle private entrepreneurial initiatives absent sound and<br />
compelling public policy reasons. Such initiatives should not be discouraged when <strong>the</strong> services<br />
proposed could prove of value to customers, improve <strong>the</strong>ir productivity and efficiency,<br />
and thus enable American firms to compete more effectively both at home and<br />
abroad. The public policy case for continuing <strong>the</strong> status quo and flatly prohibiting additional<br />
international satellite systems is weak. Simply <strong>the</strong> pendency of U.S. applications has<br />
caused INTELSAT to accelerate plans for special business-oriented services and has precipitated<br />
a beneficial review of competitive conditions in <strong>the</strong> international satellite field<br />
generally. Fur<strong>the</strong>r study and inevitable delay are unlikely to yield public dividends commensurate<br />
with <strong>the</strong> economic costs imposed.<br />
[52] It is <strong>the</strong> view of <strong>the</strong> Executive branch that <strong>the</strong> national interest will be fur<strong>the</strong>red by<br />
approving additional international communications satellite systems subject to limitations<br />
designed to minimize adverse effects on INTELSAT. Specifically, additional systems<br />
should be restricted to providing services through <strong>the</strong> sale or long-term lease of transponders<br />
or space segment capacity for communications not interconnected with publicswitched<br />
message networks (except for emergency restoration service). Consultation must<br />
be undertaken with INTELSAT pursuant to Article XIV(d) of <strong>the</strong> Definitive Agreement.<br />
[53] Appendix A<br />
[54] THE WHITE HOUSE<br />
WASHINGTON<br />
November 28, 1984<br />
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE<br />
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE<br />
Presidential Determination<br />
No. 85-2<br />
By virtue of <strong>the</strong> authority vested in me by <strong>the</strong> Constitution and statutes of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States, including Sections 102(d) and 201(a) of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962,<br />
as amended (47 U.S.C. 701(d), 721 (a)), I hereby determine that separate international<br />
communications satellite systems are required in <strong>the</strong> national interest. The United States,<br />
in order to meet its obligations under <strong>the</strong> Agreement Establishing <strong>the</strong> International<br />
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) (TIAS 7532), shall consult with<br />
INTELSAT regarding such separate systems as are authorized by <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission. You are directed jointly to inform <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission of criteria necessary to ensure <strong>the</strong> United States meets its<br />
international obligations and to fur<strong>the</strong>r its telecommunications and foreign policy interests.<br />
This determination shall be published in <strong>the</strong> Federal Register.<br />
[hand-signed: “Ronald Reagan”]
[55] THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE<br />
Washington, D.C. 20230<br />
Honorable George P. Shultz<br />
Secretary of State<br />
Washington, D.C. 20520<br />
Dear George,<br />
November 30, 1984<br />
There are two matters regarding <strong>the</strong> President’s determination on new international<br />
satellite systems that need to be clarified. First, <strong>the</strong> White House has directed our departments<br />
to examine <strong>the</strong> scope of INTELSAT’s pricing flexibility. Second, our position on <strong>the</strong><br />
related issue of direct access to INTELSAT should be made clear.<br />
The executive agreement establishing INTELSAT generally requires uniform pricing<br />
for each service. Prices on heavily trafficked routes may now exceed costs while those on<br />
thin routes may be below costs. It is not clear whe<strong>the</strong>r INTELSAT could vary its prices<br />
under <strong>the</strong> agreement. If INTELSAT’s prices on busy routes are artificially inflated, inefficient<br />
entry by new systems may be induced. INTELSAT should have pricing flexibility<br />
when confronted with actual or potential competition as long as <strong>the</strong> prices it charges<br />
cover its costs.<br />
A related issue is direct, cost-based access to <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT space segment. Allowing<br />
users and carriers in addition to Comsat <strong>the</strong> option to deal with INTELSAT directly for<br />
competitive services would foster competition based on superior efficiency and foresight<br />
and tend to deter entry by inefficient systems.<br />
We should express clear positions on <strong>the</strong>se two important points in <strong>the</strong> filing we will<br />
soon be submitting jointly to <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission. I have asked<br />
Dave Markey to work with Bill Schneider to ensure this is done.<br />
cc: Chairman Mark Fowler<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[56] THE SECRETARY OF STATE<br />
WASHINGTON<br />
Dear Mac:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 151<br />
[hand-signed: “Mac”]<br />
Secretary of Commerce<br />
December 20, 1984<br />
Thank you for your letter of November 30 relating to <strong>the</strong> President’s determination<br />
on international satellite systems separate from INTELSAT. Your understanding conforms<br />
with ours that <strong>the</strong> White House is interested in having us examine <strong>the</strong> issues of pricing<br />
flexibility in INTELSAT and direct access to INTELSAT by users o<strong>the</strong>r than COMSAT.<br />
We have received, and are reviewing, <strong>the</strong> draft paper prepared by NTIA [National<br />
Telecommunications and Information Administration] which might be sent jointly to<br />
<strong>the</strong> FCC.
152<br />
The <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Coordinator for International Communication and Information<br />
Policy, toge<strong>the</strong>r with o<strong>the</strong>rs concerned with <strong>the</strong> issue, are working with your staff on <strong>the</strong>se<br />
and additional issues emanating from <strong>the</strong> Presidential determination.<br />
The Honorable<br />
Malcolm Baldridge,<br />
Secretary of Commerce.<br />
cc: Chairman Mark Fowler<br />
[57] Appendix B<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
[hand-signed: “George”]<br />
George P. Shultz<br />
[58] THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE<br />
Washington, D.C. 20230<br />
Honorable Mark S. Fowler<br />
Chairman<br />
Federal Communications Commission<br />
Washington, D.C. 20554<br />
Dear Mr. Chairman:<br />
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
November 28, 1984<br />
The President has determined that separate international communications satellite<br />
systems are required in <strong>the</strong> national interest. He has also directed that we inform <strong>the</strong><br />
Federal Communications Commission of criteria necessary to ensure <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
meets its international obligations and to fur<strong>the</strong>r its telecommunications and foreign policy<br />
interests. Prior to final authorization by <strong>the</strong> Commission of any systems, to assure that<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States meets its obligations as a Party to <strong>the</strong> Agreement Establishing <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) (TIAS 7532):<br />
(1) each system is to be restricted to providing services through <strong>the</strong> sale or long-term<br />
lease of transponders or space segment capacity for communications not interconnected<br />
with public-switched message networks (except for emergency restoration<br />
service); and,<br />
(2) one or more foreign authorities are to authorize use of each system and enter into<br />
consultation procedures with <strong>the</strong> United States Party under Article XIV(d) of <strong>the</strong><br />
INTELSAT Agreement to ensure technical compatibility and to avoid significant<br />
economic harm.<br />
The President’s determination, its conditions, and <strong>the</strong>se criteria are premised on our<br />
review of <strong>the</strong> issues prompted by <strong>the</strong> applications now before <strong>the</strong> Commission. If proposals<br />
substantially different are forthcoming, fur<strong>the</strong>r Executive Branch review may be<br />
required.<br />
The Commission should afford interested parties an opportunity to submit timely comments<br />
on <strong>the</strong> pending applications in view of <strong>the</strong>se Executive Branch recommendations.
A memorandum of law concerning Article XIV of <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT Agreement is<br />
enclosed.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “George P. Shultz”] [hand-signed: “Malcolm Baldridge”]<br />
Secretary of State Secretary of Commerce<br />
Enclosure . . .<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 153
Chapter Two<br />
Observing <strong>the</strong> Earth From Space<br />
by Pamela E. Mack and Ray A. Williamson 1<br />
Programs that apply <strong>the</strong> capabilities of space technology to needs such as telecommunications<br />
and Earth observation have brought society many concrete benefits.<br />
However, developing projects to realize those benefits has not been easy, particularly for<br />
Earth observations. Applications programs have nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> glamor and high-profile political<br />
impact of human spaceflight nor <strong>the</strong> well-organized advocacy community of <strong>the</strong> space<br />
scientists. NASA, which is primarily a research and development agency, has had an<br />
ambivalent relationship with <strong>the</strong> application of space technology to Earth-bound needs.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> space agency welcomes opportunities to prove its value in concrete ways, it recognizes<br />
that an applications program that has completed development and entered <strong>the</strong><br />
operational phase must usually be transferred from NASA to ano<strong>the</strong>r agency or to a private<br />
sector user; not surprisingly, NASA staff have often preferred to work on those programs<br />
that do not have to be “given away.”<br />
Although scientific and technological feasibility and accomplishment are essential to<br />
space applications, <strong>the</strong>y are only part of <strong>the</strong> story. Tensions between NASA, as developer<br />
of space capabilities, and <strong>the</strong> organizations or experts who actually distribute or use <strong>the</strong><br />
services or data provided by applications satellites also play an important part in <strong>the</strong> success<br />
or failure of applications programs. To give a few examples, some scientists were excited<br />
about <strong>the</strong> data that meteorological satellites could provide, but <strong>the</strong>ir enthusiasm<br />
played a smaller role in <strong>the</strong> origin of <strong>the</strong> Television Infrared Operational Satellite<br />
(TIROS), <strong>the</strong> first meteorological satellite project, than did military needs. The Kennedy<br />
administration created <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) as an innovative<br />
way of bringing a new form of international telecommunications into being, but traditional<br />
communications corporations steadily increased <strong>the</strong>ir role in satellite<br />
communications. 2 NASA predicted large benefits from crop surveys using data from Earth<br />
resource satellites, but agricultural scientists took a different approach to using <strong>the</strong> data<br />
than <strong>the</strong> one NASA had developed.<br />
This broad <strong>the</strong>me—that different players have different goals and expectations—also<br />
has been played out in specific controversies in different applications projects. Usually at<br />
about <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> launch of an initial satellite, programs have often experienced disputes<br />
over whe<strong>the</strong>r to conduct fur<strong>the</strong>r research or to develop an operational program<br />
immediately. Knowing that <strong>the</strong> research satellite would set much of <strong>the</strong> pattern for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
operational program, users have often sought more control over <strong>the</strong> initial development<br />
of an applications satellite than NASA wanted <strong>the</strong>m to have. Finally, programs have suffered<br />
from major controversies over <strong>the</strong> proper role of <strong>the</strong> government in <strong>the</strong>ir development<br />
and operations. Communications satellite systems became <strong>the</strong> province of private<br />
industry, but only after a bitter debate concerning whe<strong>the</strong>r or not to turn <strong>the</strong> fruits of government<br />
research over to private profit. Congress in <strong>the</strong> early 1980s rejected in no<br />
1. The authors thank Don Blersch, Russ Koffler, Rob Masters, and Brent Smith for providing information<br />
and Frank Eden for his review of a draft of this essay.<br />
2. Communications satellites are discussed in Chapter One; <strong>the</strong>y are mentioned in this chapter only in<br />
terms of <strong>the</strong>ir relationship to Earth observation satellite programs.<br />
155
156<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
uncertain terms proposals that meteorological satellites be commercialized. The debate<br />
about turning Earth resource satellites over to private industry has been long and controversial,<br />
and by <strong>the</strong> time privatization occurred, <strong>the</strong> U.S. system had fallen behind <strong>the</strong> state<br />
of <strong>the</strong> art in important aspects. This debate also contributed to <strong>the</strong> slow development of<br />
commercial remote-sensing satellite systems. (The “value-added” business for data from<br />
meteorological and land remote-sensing satellites has been more commercially successful.)<br />
Meteorological Satellites<br />
Today’s widespread familiarity with satellite images used by television wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasters<br />
encourages <strong>the</strong> assumption that meteorological satellites were an eagerly awaited<br />
breakthrough in <strong>the</strong> technology underpinning wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts. In fact, at <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong><br />
space age, meteorologists were not certain satellite data would prove useful. One of <strong>the</strong><br />
pioneers of meteorological satellites, Harry Wexler, wrote in 1954:<br />
To predict <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere, <strong>the</strong> meteorologist must know its present state—as<br />
defined by <strong>the</strong> three-dimensional distribution of pressure, temperature, wind, humidity. . . .<br />
Knowing <strong>the</strong> present state of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere and past motions of <strong>the</strong> storms enables a prediction<br />
to be made by extrapolation and o<strong>the</strong>r techniques. 3<br />
Wexler pointed out that a satellite could provide only a “bird’s eye” view, not <strong>the</strong> threedimensional<br />
data meteorologists needed. Therefore, a satellite would “serve principally as<br />
a ‘storm patrol.’” 4 [II-1] A warning of a severe storm obviously would be of great practical<br />
value, but most of <strong>the</strong> practice of meteorology addressed more routine situations. A meteorologist’s<br />
desire for three-dimensional measurements of many variables was one of <strong>the</strong><br />
arguments for developing more sophisticated wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites in <strong>the</strong> 1960s and 1970s.<br />
Because <strong>the</strong> value of ga<strong>the</strong>ring wea<strong>the</strong>r data from satellites was not immediately obvious<br />
to civilian meteorologists, early meteorological satellite proposals emphasized military<br />
uses. Ground stations and hurricane patrol airplanes provided acceptable storm warnings<br />
for <strong>the</strong> continental United States and nearby waters, but <strong>the</strong> Navy needed storm warnings<br />
in whatever remote areas ships might be operating, and <strong>the</strong> Air Force had similar needs<br />
for worldwide forecasts.<br />
Planning for a U.S. space program began with a 1946 Project RAND report titled<br />
“Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship.” 5 This report emphasized<br />
various military applications of a satellite; it noted that “perhaps <strong>the</strong> two most important<br />
classes of observation which can be made from such a satellite are <strong>the</strong> spotting of <strong>the</strong><br />
points of impacts of bombs launched by us, and <strong>the</strong> observation of wea<strong>the</strong>r conditions<br />
over enemy territory.” 6 In <strong>the</strong> section of <strong>the</strong> report discussing <strong>the</strong> scientific uses of a satellite,<br />
<strong>the</strong> authors commented that observations of cloud patterns “should be of extreme<br />
value in connection with short-range wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting, and tabulation of such data over<br />
a period of time might prove extremely valuable to long-range wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting.” 7<br />
Later RAND studies sought to tackle <strong>the</strong> problem of whe<strong>the</strong>r cloud images alone<br />
3. Dr. Harry Wexler, “Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,” Journal of <strong>the</strong> British Interplanetary<br />
Society 7 (September 1954) 269–76; see Document II-1.<br />
4. Ibid.<br />
5. For <strong>the</strong> history of Rand’s role in early space planning, see Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris,<br />
RAND’s Role in <strong>the</strong> Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology (Santa<br />
Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1988).<br />
6. Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., “Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling<br />
Spaceship,” Report No. SM-11827, May 2, 1946, p. 11, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection,<br />
Washington, DC.<br />
7. Ibid., p. 13.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 157<br />
would be of much benefit to meteorologists. An April 1951 RAND report titled “Inquiry<br />
into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle” considered<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> data meteorologists wanted could be derived from cloud images. [II-2] The<br />
report stated <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
It is obvious that in observing <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r through <strong>the</strong> “eye” of a high-altitude robot almost<br />
all of <strong>the</strong> regular quantitative measurements usually associated with meteorology must fall by<br />
<strong>the</strong> wayside. It is impossible to make more than an intelligent guess at <strong>the</strong> values of temperature,<br />
pressure, humidity, and <strong>the</strong> remaining quantitative meteorological parameters. . . .<br />
Clouds, being <strong>the</strong> objects most easily discernable [sic] from extremely high altitudes, become<br />
<strong>the</strong> important item and must be utilized to <strong>the</strong> utmost in forming a synoptic picture. It is<br />
apparent that from clouds alone it will be impossible to tell everything about <strong>the</strong> current synoptic<br />
situation. Combined, however, with both <strong>the</strong>oretical knowledge and that gained<br />
through experience, accurate cloud analysis can produce surprisingly good results. 8<br />
Starting in 1947 with imagery taken from V-2 rockets fired at White Sands, New<br />
Mexico, scientists sought to classify clouds and to deduce wea<strong>the</strong>r parameters from historical<br />
data and cloud patterns. They judged <strong>the</strong>ir results to be quite successful, but <strong>the</strong>y<br />
argued that new approaches would be needed to make <strong>the</strong> best use of <strong>the</strong> data. For example,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y wanted a new method of classifying clouds, ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> traditional classification<br />
method based solely on appearance. 9<br />
An analysis of similar images by <strong>the</strong> Naval Research Laboratory a few years later provided<br />
more evidence of <strong>the</strong> value of wea<strong>the</strong>r-related observations from space. For example,<br />
Otto Berg discovered that images taken by a Navy Aerobee rocket in October 1954<br />
had shown a major hurricane in <strong>the</strong> Gulf of Mexico—a storm that <strong>the</strong>n hit <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States with no advance warning from wea<strong>the</strong>r stations. He argued that satellites would be<br />
immediately useful for providing storm warnings. Berg suggested that “in <strong>the</strong> more distant<br />
future, <strong>the</strong>se techniques of rocket reconnaissance will be applied to investigation of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
meteorological phenomena.” 10<br />
The first wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite project, TIROS, resulted not just from <strong>the</strong> perceived usefulness<br />
of storm warnings but also from <strong>the</strong> existence of many different groups in <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense (DOD) that wanted a hand in space. The Air Force sponsored a<br />
number of studies to explore technology for reconnaissance satellites, leading eventually<br />
to a development contract with Lockheed for what eventually became <strong>the</strong> Satellite Military<br />
Observation System (SAMOS) reconnaissance satellite. The RCA Corporation, one of <strong>the</strong><br />
unsuccessful bidders, <strong>the</strong>n approached <strong>the</strong> Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) with a<br />
proposal to develop a satellite with a television camera for ei<strong>the</strong>r meteorology or surveillance.<br />
11 The ABMA initiated Project Janus to test <strong>the</strong> television concept for <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
reconnaissance, but in mid-April 1958, DOD assigned <strong>the</strong> satellite reconnaissance mission<br />
exclusively to <strong>the</strong> Air Force. The ABMA <strong>the</strong>n changed <strong>the</strong> mission of what had become<br />
<strong>the</strong> Janus II project from reconnaissance to meteorology. 12<br />
In May 1958, Janus II was transferred within DOD from <strong>the</strong> ABMA to <strong>the</strong> Advanced<br />
8. S.M. Greenfield and W.W. Kellog, “Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a<br />
Satellite Vehicle,” The RAND Corporation, R-365, August, 1960, p. 1; see Document II-2. This is <strong>the</strong> unclassified<br />
version of RAND Report R-218, April 1951.<br />
9. Ibid., p. 22.<br />
10. Otto E. Berg, “High-Altitude Portrait of Storm Clouds,” <strong>Office</strong> of Naval Research Reviews, September<br />
1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
11. Richard LeRoy Chapman, “A Case Study of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellite Program: The Interaction of<br />
Science and Politics,” Ph.D. Diss., Syracuse University, 1967, pp. 20–24.<br />
12. Ibid., pp. 30–33.
158<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a new organization established a few months earlier<br />
and intended to centralize military (and, temporarily, civilian) space research under<br />
tighter control by <strong>the</strong> secretary of defense. After ano<strong>the</strong>r reconfiguration to take advantage<br />
of a larger booster, ARPA changed <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> project from Janus II to TIROS<br />
(for Television Infrared Observation Satellite) and committed funds to final design and<br />
construction for a planned launch in <strong>the</strong> summer of 1959. 13 The U.S. Signal Research and<br />
Development Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, managed a contract with RCA<br />
for construction of <strong>the</strong> satellite.<br />
The Civilian Program<br />
NASA took over <strong>the</strong> TIROS project, upon its creation later in 1958, with <strong>the</strong> understanding<br />
that <strong>the</strong> space agency would cooperate with <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau. However, DOD<br />
interest in wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite data continued, complicating <strong>the</strong> process of planning an operational<br />
program. Later in <strong>the</strong> 1960s, <strong>the</strong> Air Force began developing a separate Defense<br />
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) to meet specific military needs for data to support<br />
its operations. 14 Early satellites in <strong>the</strong> DMSP differed little from TIROS, but later satellites<br />
in <strong>the</strong> program provided quantitative radiometric data designed specifically to<br />
support DOD requirements. Civilian meteorological satellites continued to be used by<br />
both civilian and military meteorologists; <strong>the</strong> eventual convergence of <strong>the</strong> two programs<br />
is discussed in <strong>the</strong> next section.<br />
In July 1958, after President Dwight D. Eisenhower had decided that all space programs<br />
that were not clearly military should be transferred to <strong>the</strong> new civilian space agency,<br />
<strong>the</strong> White House assigned TIROS to NASA. Arranging <strong>the</strong> actual transfer posed difficulties<br />
because <strong>the</strong> program was so far along in its development, but a number of scientists<br />
and engineers agreed to move from DOD to NASA along with <strong>the</strong> project, and NASA<br />
arranged for <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau to provide research support in meteorology. 15 A transfer<br />
agreement was signed in April 1959. [II-3]<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> difficulties of <strong>the</strong> transfer, NASA launched <strong>the</strong> experimental TIROS I on<br />
April 1, 1960—a spin-stabilized satellite carrying two television cameras. The results generated<br />
so much excitement among meteorologists that NASA soon set up a system to<br />
transfer <strong>the</strong> resulting cloud cover information onto standard wea<strong>the</strong>r maps and to send<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to wea<strong>the</strong>r stations and to <strong>the</strong> military services. 16 Although meteorologists found<br />
satellite data difficult to integrate into <strong>the</strong> forecasting process, because <strong>the</strong>ir models<br />
required data on temperature, pressure, and wind speed and direction, <strong>the</strong>y found that<br />
satellite images showed large-scale wea<strong>the</strong>r patterns so clearly that <strong>the</strong>y were immediately<br />
useful. 17 Satellites also demonstrated <strong>the</strong>ir value for storm warning. In September 1961, a<br />
TIROS satellite helped track an extremely dangerous hurricane, Carla, bearing down on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Gulf Coast. Warnings led to <strong>the</strong> evacuation of more than 350,000 people. 18 Also in<br />
September 1961, a fully developed hurricane, Es<strong>the</strong>r, was located through satellite images.<br />
13. Ibid., pp. 36–54, 61–62.<br />
14. In addition, <strong>the</strong> highly classified CORONA photoreconnaissance program was jointly managed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Air Force and <strong>the</strong> Central Intelligence Agency.<br />
15. Chapman, “A Case Study,” pp. 60–64.<br />
16. Janice Hill, Wea<strong>the</strong>r from Above: America’s Meteorological Satellites (Washington, DC: Smithsonian<br />
Institution Press, 1991), pp. 9–16.<br />
17. For a discussion of <strong>the</strong> resistance of meteorologists to <strong>the</strong> use of satellite data, see Margaret Eileen<br />
Courain, “Technology Reconciliation in <strong>the</strong> Remote-Sensing Era of <strong>the</strong> United States Civilian Wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Forecasting, 1957–1958,” Ph.D. Diss., Rutgers University, 1991.<br />
18. Patrick Hughes, “Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellites Come of Age,” Wea<strong>the</strong>rwise 37 (April 1984): 68–75.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 159<br />
This was <strong>the</strong> first hurricane to be identified by a satellite before being observed by <strong>the</strong>nconventional<br />
means.<br />
Even before <strong>the</strong>se successes, <strong>the</strong> usefulness of <strong>the</strong> TIROS satellites led to pressure to<br />
transform <strong>the</strong> experimental project into an operational system. To address this issue,<br />
NASA called toge<strong>the</strong>r an interagency Panel on Operational Meteorological Satellites in<br />
October 1960. Disagreements over <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> program quickly appeared. The<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau sought more control than NASA wanted to give up; it asked for complete<br />
authority over <strong>the</strong> operational system, including launching, data retrieval, and final decisions<br />
on <strong>the</strong> design of new operational satellites. [II-4]<br />
The panel issued a compromise plan in April 1961 calling for a national operational<br />
meteorological satellite system (based on a second-generation satellite already under<br />
development by NASA) to be managed by <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau. 19 This plan did not go as<br />
far as <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau had originally proposed; NASA would maintain control of<br />
launch services and ground support and would develop and procure spacecraft under<br />
contract to <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce (of which <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau was a part).<br />
President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961, speech to Congress titled “Urgent National Needs,” in<br />
which he urged funding a program to land an American on <strong>the</strong> Moon before <strong>the</strong> end of<br />
<strong>the</strong> decade, also requested funds to put <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite plan into operation. Congress<br />
approved <strong>the</strong> funding Kennedy had requested, despite continuing controversy over what<br />
would be <strong>the</strong> best division of responsibility between NASA and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau for<br />
operating <strong>the</strong> system. 20<br />
Meanwhile, NASA was working on <strong>the</strong> second-generation meteorological satellite,<br />
Nimbus, as a prototype for <strong>the</strong> operational system. Nimbus was a more sophisticated<br />
spacecraft than TIROS—stabilized so that it always pointed toward <strong>the</strong> Earth ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
continuously rotating. It was to be launched into a Sun-synchronous polar orbit so that it<br />
could collect data from <strong>the</strong> whole Earth at <strong>the</strong> same local time each day. The satellite<br />
would carry not only more sophisticated television cameras, but also a high-resolution<br />
infrared radiometer that used <strong>the</strong>rmal infrared sensors to map temperature. (A simpler<br />
experimental sensor of <strong>the</strong> same type had been carried on later TIROS flights.) Plans for<br />
Nimbus also included a variety of more sophisticated sensors—most significantly, sounding<br />
instruments providing data that could be used to determine temperatures at various<br />
levels in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere. 21 These new instruments reflected <strong>the</strong> efforts of NASA scientists<br />
to meet <strong>the</strong> continuing demand from research meteorologists for basic numerical data in<br />
addition to cloud images. 22<br />
While researchers wanted <strong>the</strong> more sophisticated data Nimbus would provide, <strong>the</strong><br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau became concerned about its increasing cost and delays in launch. NASA<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau also had differing perspectives on what decisions should be made<br />
about <strong>the</strong> operational system and on which agency should make <strong>the</strong>m. 23 This became a<br />
19. U.S. National Coordinating Committee for Aviation Meteorology, Panel of Operational<br />
Meteorological Satellites, Plan for a National Operational Meteorological Satellite System (Washington, DC: U.S.<br />
Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, 1961).<br />
20. These issues are discussed in “The National Meteorological Program,” preliminary staff report of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 1961. For a discussion of <strong>the</strong> process<br />
of approving <strong>the</strong> plan, see Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, United States<br />
Civilian Space Programs: Volume II, Applications Satellites, report prepared for <strong>the</strong> Subcommittee on Space Science<br />
and Applications, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st sess., May 1983, pp. 198–99; Chapman, “A Case<br />
Study,” pp. 107–27.<br />
21. Chapman, “A Case Study,” p. 161.<br />
22. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> Nimbus series continued through Nimbus 7 and provided <strong>the</strong> basic information needed<br />
to develop later research satellite systems, including <strong>the</strong> Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite and <strong>the</strong> Earth<br />
Observing System. H.F. Eden, B.P. Elero, and J.N. Perkins, “Nimbus Satellites: Setting <strong>the</strong> Stage for Mission to<br />
Planet Earth,” EOS, Transactions, American Geophysical Union 74 (June 29, 1993): 281, 285.
160<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
serious problem as NASA’s plans for Nimbus increasingly diverged from Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau<br />
priorities. NASA had agreed to extend <strong>the</strong> TIROS program from <strong>the</strong> original two satellites<br />
to ten so as to provide continuous data for those users who already depended on <strong>the</strong> data,<br />
but delays in <strong>the</strong> Nimbus program still created <strong>the</strong> likelihood of gaps in coverage. The possibility<br />
of experiencing a period of months with no meteorological satellite data available<br />
particularly worried DOD. 24 Critics also raised questions about <strong>the</strong> reliability of Nimbus<br />
because it constituted such a large leap in sophistication over TIROS. 25 In addition, <strong>the</strong><br />
predicted annual cost of an operational system based on Nimbus had nearly doubled since<br />
<strong>the</strong> original plan had been submitted to Congress. 26 The Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau would be<br />
responsible for funding <strong>the</strong> operational system, but it was a small agency with a limited<br />
budget and with little chance of getting that budget expanded substantially. 27<br />
By <strong>the</strong> late summer of 1963, differences between NASA and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau had<br />
hardened into an impasse. 28 On September 27, 1963, <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau notified NASA<br />
that it was pulling out of existing interagency agreements and pursuing an interim operational<br />
satellite system based on TIROS technology. The Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau was able to make<br />
such a stand only because it had found a partner; DOD had agreed to provide launch services<br />
for <strong>the</strong> operational TIROS system <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau wanted. 29<br />
As a result, NASA found itself in a weak position. The space agency could not justify<br />
developing advanced satellites for a user that did not want <strong>the</strong>m, and it could not afford<br />
to have DOD as a competitor in providing launch services for civilian satellites. NASA<br />
compromised and agreed to give <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau a larger voice in shaping <strong>the</strong> nextgeneration<br />
meteorological satellite system. The compromise resulted in decisions to build<br />
a TIROS Operational System with funding provided by <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, to continue<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nimbus program on a purely experimental basis, and to sign a new formal agreement<br />
for cooperation between <strong>the</strong> two agencies. [II-5]<br />
The agreement called for NASA to develop and launch <strong>the</strong> initial version of any new<br />
instrument or spacecraft and for <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau to provide funding for operational<br />
versions. This agreement remained in force until 1982, when NASA decided to withdraw<br />
from providing operational improvements as a continuing obligation. At that time, <strong>the</strong><br />
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), <strong>the</strong> successor agency to <strong>the</strong><br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, assumed responsibility for development, as well as operation, of all civilian<br />
meteorological satellites. The agency lacked <strong>the</strong> capability and funding necessary for<br />
such development, and eventually it returned to informal and <strong>the</strong>n formal cooperation<br />
with NASA.<br />
The satellites of <strong>the</strong> TIROS Operational System (renamed ESSA 1 through 9 30 after<br />
launch) were less capable than Nimbus, but <strong>the</strong>y did involve significant improvements<br />
over <strong>the</strong> original TIROS satellites. Some of <strong>the</strong>se spacecraft used a higher resolution camera<br />
first tested on Nimbus. O<strong>the</strong>rs provided real-time data to users around <strong>the</strong> world<br />
through <strong>the</strong> Automatic Picture Transmission system developed for Nimbus, but first tested<br />
on TIROS-VIII in 1964.<br />
Once <strong>the</strong>y had made decisions about <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> initial operating system, NASA<br />
23. James E. Webb to J. Herbert Hollomon, June 28, 1962, with attached memo: Abraham Hyatt to <strong>the</strong><br />
Administrator, “Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau Plan,” June 25, 1962, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection,<br />
Washington, DC.<br />
24. Chapman, “A Case Study,” pp. 155–71.<br />
25. Ibid., pp. 210–11.<br />
26. Ibid., p. 192.<br />
27. Ibid., pp. 217–29.<br />
28. Ibid., pp. 229–42.<br />
29. Ibid., pp. 244–59.<br />
30. The Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau had become part of a new organization, <strong>the</strong> Environmental Science Services<br />
Administration (ESSA), established on July 13, 1965.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 161<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau were more free to think about experimental satellites to test out<br />
new instruments that might be incorporated into future generations of operational satellites.<br />
Nimbus 1, launched April 28, 1964, experienced a number of problems and operated<br />
for only a month; Nimbus 2, launched May 15, 1966, was much more successful, testing<br />
out improved cameras. NASA also tested meteorological satellite technology as part of <strong>the</strong><br />
Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) project to orbit experimental geosynchronous<br />
satellites (used for communications experiments as well as meteorological ones). In<br />
December 1966 and November 1967, ATS-1 and -3 explored <strong>the</strong> possibility of observing<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r with line scan imagers, a possibility conceived by Vernon Soumi, a professor at <strong>the</strong><br />
University of Wisconsin; <strong>the</strong> resulting continuous coverage (images of <strong>the</strong> full Earth disc<br />
every thirty minutes) proved extremely valuable for tracking storms and even showed<br />
short-lived cloud patterns correlated to tornadoes. 31 Continuous coverage from geosynchronous<br />
orbit made it possible to observe <strong>the</strong> motion of clouds and deduce wind speed<br />
at <strong>the</strong> level of <strong>the</strong> clouds—a significant step toward <strong>the</strong> three-dimensional quantitative<br />
data meteorologists wanted. Three o<strong>the</strong>r satellites in <strong>the</strong> series, ATS-2, -4, and -5, also carried<br />
meteorological experiments, but all suffered launch problems. 32 ATS-6, launched in<br />
May 1974, carried a new cloud-imaging radiometer along with a more powerful transmitter<br />
that made it possible for anyone with an easy-to-build ground station to receive <strong>the</strong><br />
images. 33<br />
While <strong>the</strong> ATS program tested ideas for wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites in geosynchronous orbit,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nimbus program continued to test advanced instruments in low-Earth orbit, with five<br />
launches between 1969 and 1978. Nimbus 3, launched April 1969, carried five new sensors.<br />
These included <strong>the</strong> first sounding instruments using remote sensing to furnish measurements<br />
of temperature and o<strong>the</strong>r variables at different levels of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere for<br />
providing numerical data for climate models. The sounding instruments on Nimbus 3<br />
measured temperature, water vapor, and ozone content of various atmospheric levels;<br />
later Nimbus satellites carried sounding instruments to measure o<strong>the</strong>r variables. The sensors<br />
worked well, but <strong>the</strong> data proved much less useful for wea<strong>the</strong>r prediction than scientists<br />
had expected. Meteorologists had hoped that data on temperature, wind speed, and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r factors could be plugged into a model of how <strong>the</strong> atmosphere worked to provide<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r predictions. Satellite sounding instruments provided much of <strong>the</strong> data needed<br />
with reasonable accuracy, but existing climate models were not designed to assimilate<br />
<strong>the</strong>se data easily. Meteorologists discovered that <strong>the</strong>y needed to perform much more<br />
research before <strong>the</strong>y could use data acquired by satellite to improve <strong>the</strong> accuracy of wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
predictions. 34<br />
In August 1966, <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau stated <strong>the</strong> following as its objectives for an operational<br />
satellite system: “(1) [t]he establishment and maintenance of a satellite system to<br />
obtain global observations on a regular basis, (2) meteorological observations from synchronous<br />
altitude, and (3) global observations of atmospheric structure needed for<br />
numerical wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting.” [II-6] The first objective was met by continuing improvements<br />
in <strong>the</strong> TIROS series of low-altitude satellites, which were flown from 1966 to 1969.<br />
NASA launched an Improved TIROS Operational Satellite (ITOS) in January 1970. 35<br />
31. The ATS cameras provided pictures every thirty minutes, compared to once or twice a day from <strong>the</strong><br />
TIROS Operational System. For a discussion of <strong>the</strong> usefulness of continuous coverage, see W.L. Smith et al., “The<br />
Meteorological Satellite: Overview of 25 Years of Operation,” Science 231 (January 31, 1986): 455–62.<br />
32. Hill, Wea<strong>the</strong>r from Above, pp. 23–26, 29–32.<br />
33. Ibid., pp. 33–35.<br />
34. James C. Fletcher to Stuart Eizenstat, “Possible Initiatives,” February 16, 1977, suggests that NASA<br />
hoped that sounding instruments would lead to a major new research initiative. Pamela E. Mack, “Cloudy Seeing:<br />
Developing New Sensors for Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellites,” paper presented at <strong>the</strong> Society for <strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> of Technology’s<br />
annual meeting, London, England, August 1996.
162<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Starting in 1972 with <strong>the</strong> third satellite in <strong>the</strong> ITOS series, NASA replaced <strong>the</strong> television<br />
cameras that had been carried on all earlier flights with a two-channel scanning radiometer<br />
providing visible and infrared imagery. 36 This infrared imagery was used to monitor<br />
nighttime cloud cover and to produce sea-surface temperature maps. This same satellite<br />
(designated NOAA-2) carried <strong>the</strong> first operational sounding instruments, which provided<br />
vertical temperature profiles through <strong>the</strong> atmosphere. These instruments provided <strong>the</strong><br />
data needed to meet <strong>the</strong> third of <strong>the</strong> objectives established in 1966. Additional improvements<br />
to <strong>the</strong> low-altitude satellites made in <strong>the</strong> late 1970s resulted in <strong>the</strong> TIROS-N design,<br />
carrying a finer resolution radiometer and sounder as well as a data collection platform<br />
and a solar energetic particle monitor. 37<br />
ATS-1 and -3 provided data to meet <strong>the</strong> second of <strong>the</strong> 1966 objectives, but budgetary<br />
constraints delayed <strong>the</strong> operation of a geosynchronous meteorological satellite system<br />
until <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s. In <strong>the</strong> interim, NASA funded two prototype Synchronous<br />
Meteorological Satellites, launched in May 1974 and February 1975. The space agency<br />
<strong>the</strong>n launched <strong>the</strong> first Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) on<br />
October 16, 1975. Sounding instruments were also included in improved GOES satellites,<br />
starting with GOES-4 in September 1980.<br />
While NASA developed new capabilities for meteorological satellites and <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service integrated <strong>the</strong> resulting data into <strong>the</strong> operational wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting system,<br />
budgetary pressures continued to grow. The Reagan administration wanted to transfer<br />
operational space systems to private industry to cut <strong>the</strong> federal budget. In early 1981,<br />
Comsat proposed taking over both <strong>the</strong> Landsat (see below) and <strong>the</strong> meteorological satellite<br />
systems; officials in <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration responded with enthusiasm. Congress,<br />
however, disagreed strongly with <strong>the</strong> idea of privatizing meteorological satellites; members<br />
argued that <strong>the</strong> government properly provided wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts as a public good and<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore should retain control of <strong>the</strong> production of meteorological satellite data. 38 Late<br />
in 1983, Congress passed and President Reagan signed an appropriations bill that included<br />
a specific prohibition against <strong>the</strong> sale of <strong>the</strong> meteorological satellite system to private<br />
industry. 39 However, <strong>the</strong> issue of charging users for wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite data arose again in <strong>the</strong><br />
1990s as a result of cooperative programs with o<strong>the</strong>r countries that took such an approach.<br />
Clearly, <strong>the</strong> balance among technological possibilities, user needs, and financial limitations<br />
shaped not only <strong>the</strong> origins but also <strong>the</strong> continuing development of <strong>the</strong> meteorological<br />
satellite system. Wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts improved, although not as much as<br />
meteorologists had predicted when <strong>the</strong>y looked forward to <strong>the</strong> new capabilities various<br />
satellite technologies would provide. Part of <strong>the</strong> problem was that <strong>the</strong> path from a good<br />
idea to its incorporation into <strong>the</strong> operational system was inevitably slow and rocky.<br />
Probably, however, <strong>the</strong> more important factor was that predicting wea<strong>the</strong>r was, and continues<br />
to be, a problem of much greater complexity than scientists had anticipated.<br />
Converged Polar-Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Systems<br />
35. The first TIROS satellite was an operational prototype; subsequent satellites in <strong>the</strong> series were to be<br />
renamed ESSA 10, 11, and so on, after launch. However, <strong>the</strong> new National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration replaced ESSA, and <strong>the</strong> satellites were named NOAA. It is at this point that <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau<br />
was renamed <strong>the</strong> National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service.<br />
36. Hill, Wea<strong>the</strong>r from Above, pp. 37–38.<br />
37. Ibid., pp. 49–51.<br />
38. Press Release, Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, September 20, 1983;<br />
“Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellites,” Congressional Record, S. 14367, October 20, 1983; “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,”<br />
Congressional Record, H.R. 9812-9822, November 14, 1983. See also Hill, Wea<strong>the</strong>r from Above, p. 60.<br />
39. <strong>Office</strong> of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, “Remote Sensing and <strong>the</strong> Private Sector: Issues for<br />
Discussion,” Technological Memorandum (March 1984): 22.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 163<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> civilian and military polar-orbiting meteorological satellite programs<br />
have followed separate paths, <strong>the</strong>re have been several attempts to bring <strong>the</strong>m toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
over <strong>the</strong> years. Officials within several administrations kept hoping that a merged system<br />
could meet <strong>the</strong> requirements of both NOAA and DOD (because each had a need to<br />
acquire imagery of clouds) while providing an overall savings to <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
However, NOAA and DOD wea<strong>the</strong>r systems acquire varying kinds of data at different times<br />
of <strong>the</strong> day to support distinct types of uses. For example, DOD is interested in cloud image<br />
data acquired in <strong>the</strong> early morning to support tactical and strategic operations; NOAA is<br />
more interested in atmospheric soundings in <strong>the</strong> early afternoon, which <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service feeds into its predictive wea<strong>the</strong>r models. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, until <strong>the</strong> 1980s,<br />
DMSP data were not shared with civilian users.<br />
In 1973, a national space policy study led by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget<br />
and <strong>the</strong> National Security Council 40 examined <strong>the</strong> fiscal and policy implications of conducting<br />
separate DOD and NOAA operational wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems. This study based<br />
its assessment of <strong>the</strong> technical feasibility and costs of a converged system on NOAA, NASA,<br />
and DOD analyses, concluding that no option could maintain performance levels and also<br />
reduce costs significantly. In addition, policy concerns regarding <strong>the</strong> open distribution of<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r data useful to potential adversaries argued for separate programs. 41 The 1973<br />
review did, however, result in <strong>the</strong> Nixon administration directing NOAA to use <strong>the</strong> DMSP<br />
Block SD spacecraft bus, <strong>the</strong>n under development by <strong>the</strong> Air Force, as <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong><br />
next-generation series of polar-orbiting satellites. In addition, NOAA and DOD were<br />
instructed to coordinate more closely <strong>the</strong> management of <strong>the</strong> separate programs.<br />
On seven o<strong>the</strong>r occasions since 1972, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce and DOD studied<br />
<strong>the</strong> potential for integrating <strong>the</strong>ir programs. These studies did not lead to merged programs,<br />
but <strong>the</strong>y did result in a number of modest economies, including <strong>the</strong> use of similar<br />
spacecraft with numerous common subsystems and components. In addition, both programs<br />
have used a common launch vehicle and have shared responsibility for creating<br />
products derived from <strong>the</strong> data. The two programs have also worked toge<strong>the</strong>r closely on<br />
research and development efforts and provided complementary environmental information.<br />
Most of <strong>the</strong> sensors, however, remained under <strong>the</strong> design and control of each agency<br />
(see Table II–1).<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong>se efforts, until <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, foreign policy and national security concerns<br />
precluded full program integration. By that time, <strong>the</strong> drive to reduce <strong>the</strong> federal<br />
budget and increase government efficiency led a number of observers to suggest again<br />
consolidating <strong>the</strong> two systems. In addition, in October 1992, NASA and NOAA had begun<br />
to explore <strong>the</strong> potential for consolidating aspects of NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational<br />
Environmental Satellite (POES) system and NASA’s Earth Observing System satellite,<br />
EOS-PM. The latter is an afternoon equator-crossing satellite that will ga<strong>the</strong>r data similar<br />
to <strong>the</strong> POES afternoon satellite, but of much higher quality and complexity.<br />
Table II–1<br />
40. “The Meteorological Satellite Analysis Study (MSAS),” <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, 1973.<br />
This study was begun in 1972.<br />
41. The United States had pledged to maintain an open civilian wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite system. Also, NOAA’s<br />
environmental satellites demonstrated <strong>the</strong> U.S. “open skies” policy and satisfied long-standing U.S. obligations<br />
to exchange Earth data with <strong>the</strong> meteorological agencies and scientific organizations of o<strong>the</strong>r nations.
164<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Key Sensors and Priorities for NOAA’s and DOD’s Polar Meteorological Programs<br />
Agency and Data Acquired Sensor Attributes<br />
NOAA<br />
Multispectral imagery Advanced Very High Calibrated, multispectral imagery<br />
(cloud, vegetation) Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR)<br />
Temperature and humidity TIROS Operational Vertical High spatial resolution, cross-<br />
(initialize numerical wea<strong>the</strong>r Sounder (TOVS) track scanning (PM equator<br />
prediction model) crossing)<br />
DOD<br />
Visible and infrared cloud Operational Linescan System Constant field of view; low-light<br />
imagery (cloud-detection (OLS) (early AM crossing)<br />
forecast, tactical imagery<br />
dissemination)<br />
Microwave imagery (ocean Special Sensor Microwave/Imager Conical scan<br />
winds, precipitation) (SSM/I)<br />
Temperature and humidity Special Sensor Microwave/ Low spatial resolution, cross-track<br />
(electro-optical propagation, Temperature Sounder (SSM/T-1); scanning<br />
initialize numerical wea<strong>the</strong>r Special Sensor Microwave/<br />
prediction models) Water Vapor Sounder (SSM/T-2)<br />
Source: <strong>Office</strong> of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A<br />
Strategic Approach, OTA-ISS-607 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>,<br />
September 1994), p. 79.<br />
In February 1993, Representative George Brown, <strong>the</strong>n chair of <strong>the</strong> House Committee<br />
on Science, Space, and Technology, sent a letter to NOAA Administrator D. James Baker,<br />
requesting a review of <strong>the</strong> NOAA and DOD polar-orbiting programs to explore possible<br />
cost savings. [II-7] As a result of this initiative and similar interest within <strong>the</strong> Clinton<br />
administration, <strong>the</strong> two agencies began to examine <strong>the</strong> two programs once again. A few<br />
months later, Senator James Exon, chair of <strong>the</strong> Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear<br />
Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, sent a similar request to Commerce<br />
Secretary Ron Brown. [II-8] A report of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Congress <strong>Office</strong> of Technology<br />
Assessment also offered consolidation of <strong>the</strong> two programs as an option for reducing federal<br />
spending. 42<br />
By July 1993, <strong>the</strong> two major convergence studies were consolidated into a single triagency<br />
study involving DOD, NASA, and NOAA. With input from this study, by September<br />
1993, Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review made a firm proposal to integrate<br />
<strong>the</strong> two systems. [II-9] This proposal estimated that <strong>the</strong> government would save $300<br />
42. Ray A. Williamson, “NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth,” Statement before <strong>the</strong> Space Subcommittee of<br />
<strong>the</strong> House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, May 6, 1993; U.S. Congress, <strong>Office</strong> of Technology<br />
Assessment, The Future of Remote Sensing: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications, OTA-ISC-548 (Washington, DC:<br />
U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, July 1993), p. 16.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 165<br />
million through <strong>the</strong> year 2000 and $1 billion over a decade by creating a converged environmental<br />
satellite system. The National Performance Review also recommended that<br />
NASA<br />
assist in ongoing efforts to converge U.S. operational wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, given <strong>the</strong> benefits of<br />
streamlining <strong>the</strong> collection of wea<strong>the</strong>r data across <strong>the</strong> government... By considering<br />
[Mission to Planet Earth] research activities in context with operational wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite<br />
programs, cost savings are possible through convergence of <strong>the</strong> current operational satellite<br />
fleets. Convergence of <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)<br />
Polar Metsat and NASA’s EOS-PM (Earth Observing System Afternoon Crossing<br />
[Descending] Mission) will eliminate redundancy of measurements, enhance <strong>the</strong> capability<br />
of NOAA’s data set and potentially result in cost savings. 43<br />
After fur<strong>the</strong>r study, Vice President Gore’s initial proposition resulted in a plan<br />
detailed in a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (also known as NSTC-2) on <strong>the</strong><br />
“Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems.”<br />
[II-10] This decision directive called for an Integrated Program <strong>Office</strong> (IPO) that will “be<br />
responsible for <strong>the</strong> management, planning, development, fabrication, and operations of<br />
<strong>the</strong> converged system.” The IPO was set up in October 1994. NOAA gained <strong>the</strong> lead<br />
responsibility for operations, with DOD leading systems acquisition and NASA leading<br />
new development and <strong>the</strong> insertion of new technologies.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> important considerations in exploring <strong>the</strong> exact terms of convergence was<br />
prior interest at NOAA in cooperating more closely with Europe in NOAA’s polarorbiting<br />
program. Europe had been contributing instruments to NOAA’s POES spacecraft<br />
since 1978. During <strong>the</strong> early 1980s, <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration attempted to reduce <strong>the</strong><br />
two-satellite constellation (one morning-crossing, one afternoon-crossing) to a single afternoon-crossing<br />
spacecraft. NOAA officials became extremely concerned that maintaining<br />
only a single orbiter would greatly reduce <strong>the</strong> reliability of data delivery. Hence, <strong>the</strong> agency<br />
began discussions with o<strong>the</strong>r countries, forming <strong>the</strong> International Polar Orbiting<br />
Meteorological Satellite Group (IPOMS) to promote a more equitable sharing of <strong>the</strong> burden<br />
of maintaining polar-orbiting meteorological satellites. Membership in IPOMS included<br />
most of <strong>the</strong> major remote-sensing satellite operators. Within IPOMS, <strong>the</strong> European<br />
Space Agency (ESA) toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> newly created European Organisation for <strong>the</strong><br />
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) expressed interest in providing a<br />
European polar orbiter that could replace one of NOAA’s spacecraft. 44<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> strategy developed during <strong>the</strong> 1980s, NOAA planned to provide several<br />
instruments for a European orbiter, which would replace <strong>the</strong> morning-crossing NOAA<br />
satellite. Originally, this satellite was to be a large ESA spacecraft carrying both global<br />
change research instruments and operational meteorological instruments. 45 By 1992, this<br />
plan had evolved into one in which Europe would orbit two spacecraft: an ESA global<br />
change research satellite, Envisat, and a EUMETSAT meteorological operational satellite,<br />
43. <strong>Office</strong> of Vice President, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA05: Clarify <strong>the</strong> Objectives<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Mission to Planet Earth Program, in Accompanying Report of <strong>the</strong> National Performance Review (Washington, DC:<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Vice President, September 1993).<br />
44. Minutes of <strong>the</strong> Fourth IPOMS Plenary and First Administrative Working Group Tokyo, Japan,<br />
November 12–13, 1987, IPOMS Reports, National Environmental Data and Information System, National<br />
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1987, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection,<br />
Washington, DC.<br />
45. This spacecraft was originally conceived to be one of an international fleet of large research and<br />
operational polar orbiters, launched and serviced by <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle. With <strong>the</strong> loss of Challenger in January<br />
1986 and <strong>the</strong> subsequent change of U.S. policy toward <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle, <strong>the</strong>se plans were abandoned.
166<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
METOP. NOAA and EUMETSAT began to develop explicit plans to operate <strong>the</strong> METOP<br />
satellite series as morning-crossing spacecraft carrying three U.S. instruments: <strong>the</strong><br />
Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR), <strong>the</strong> High-Resolution Infrared<br />
Sounder (HIRS), and <strong>the</strong> Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit. On May 6, 1994, NOAA<br />
formally invited EUMETSAT to participate in <strong>the</strong> converged U.S. system. [II-11, II-12]<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> convergence plan, by about 2005 or 2007, <strong>the</strong> United States will keep two<br />
satellites in orbit at all times: a polar orbiter that will cross <strong>the</strong> equator early in <strong>the</strong> morning<br />
to obtain early cloud data of particular interest to DOD and an afternoon-crossing<br />
orbiter that will provide <strong>the</strong> atmospheric soundings that <strong>the</strong> National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service<br />
needs to support data inputs to its predictive models. METOP-1 will cross <strong>the</strong> equator in<br />
<strong>the</strong> late morning to collect data of particular interest to EUMETSAT’s European data<br />
users.<br />
One important issue that had to be decided was <strong>the</strong> data policy for METOP. In keeping<br />
with its long-standing U.S. data policies articulated in <strong>Office</strong> of Management and<br />
Budget Circular A-130, <strong>the</strong> United States has insisted that data from its sensors not be controlled<br />
even if <strong>the</strong>y fly on <strong>the</strong> spacecraft of o<strong>the</strong>r nations. 46 In keeping with its data policy,<br />
EUMETSAT wishes to control <strong>the</strong> data from <strong>the</strong> satellite to assure that <strong>the</strong> countries benefitting<br />
from <strong>the</strong> system contribute to its funding. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> United States wants<br />
<strong>the</strong> power to deny data delivery to an adversary in times of crisis or war.<br />
The three U.S. agencies will need <strong>the</strong> long period between <strong>the</strong> convergence decision<br />
and operational status of <strong>the</strong> system to resolve several technical, programmatic, and institutional<br />
issues:<br />
1. Developing new sensors and spacecraft. Because DOD and NOAA have different data<br />
requirements, it will be challenging to meet all <strong>the</strong> primary data requirements and<br />
still reduce program costs. The IPO, for example, may find it difficult to satisfy DOD’s<br />
need for images of constant resolution across <strong>the</strong> field and maintain <strong>the</strong> radiometric<br />
quality that NOAA desires. NOAA also has a requirement for sounding data of higher<br />
quality than DOD’s.<br />
2. Incorporating new capabilities in operational sensors. NASA’s involvement in <strong>the</strong> integrated<br />
program could lead to interesting opportunities to incorporate improved sensors<br />
or new data types in DOD’s and NOAA’s operational programs, derived from experience<br />
with NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth research efforts. However, <strong>the</strong> sensors<br />
designed to tackle research problems are generally much more expensive and capable<br />
than those designed for routine data collection. Hence, making <strong>the</strong> transition to<br />
operational status also presents special challenges to designers in making cheaper<br />
instruments capable of meeting operational requirements. Data users will also have to<br />
adjust <strong>the</strong>ir operations to make efficient use of more complex, but more useful data.<br />
3. Maintaining institutional collaboration among U.S. agencies. The three agencies in <strong>the</strong><br />
IPO have worked diligently to establish a collaborative working relationship. However,<br />
each agency’s budget is subject to radically different priorities and is overseen within<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget by different examiners. In addition, each<br />
receives oversight and its appropriation from different congressional committees and<br />
subcommittees. Hence, continued progress in maintaining <strong>the</strong> IPO will depend on<br />
46. International Space University, Toward an Integrated International Data Policy Framework for Earth<br />
Observations: A Workshop Report, ISU/REP/97/1 (Illkirch, France: International Space University, January 1997).
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 167<br />
<strong>the</strong> determination of several elements of <strong>the</strong> administration and Congress to follow<br />
through on <strong>the</strong>ir program commitments.<br />
4. Maintaining close international cooperation. Cooperating with EUMETSAT and in time<br />
possibly o<strong>the</strong>r nations in operating a fleet of operational environmental satellites<br />
poses additional challenges for <strong>the</strong> three agencies. EUMETSAT policies and funding<br />
mechanisms will continue to be driven by <strong>the</strong> needs, philosophies, and funding mechanisms<br />
of its member wea<strong>the</strong>r organizations, which are likely to be different than<br />
those of <strong>the</strong> IPO. Maintaining <strong>the</strong> system and high-quality data delivery over time will<br />
require continued flexibility on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> IPO in negotiating system upgrades.<br />
Adding additional organizations to <strong>the</strong> system will fur<strong>the</strong>r complicate such negotiations,<br />
although this could increase system capability and fur<strong>the</strong>r reduce U.S. costs.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong>se challenges, <strong>the</strong> attempt to consolidate NOAA’s and DOD’s meteorological<br />
programs is more likely to succeed than past efforts because of <strong>the</strong> confluence of<br />
several factors. First, continuing pressures to maintain reduced agency budgets will<br />
encourage agency officials to continue to seek program efficiencies. Cost savings are also<br />
an important factor in resolving possible frictions among congressional oversight and<br />
appropriations committees over programmatic aspects of <strong>the</strong> converged system. Second,<br />
earlier plans by NOAA and DOD to upgrade both <strong>the</strong> DMSP and POES instruments and<br />
spacecraft shortly after <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> century will support technical convergence. Third,<br />
<strong>the</strong> changed international security environment will cause DOD analysts and managers to<br />
continue to moderate <strong>the</strong>ir historical objection to shared military-civilian systems. In addition,<br />
<strong>the</strong> opportunity to involve EUMETSAT and perhaps o<strong>the</strong>r nations or organizations<br />
in providing environmental data could fur<strong>the</strong>r reduce overall program costs. Finally,<br />
including NASA explicitly in <strong>the</strong> partnership provides <strong>the</strong> opportunity to plan ongoing<br />
innovation and <strong>the</strong> transition of research instruments built in support of NASA’s Earth<br />
Science activities to operational status for <strong>the</strong> converged system.<br />
Earth Resource Satellites<br />
Earth resource satellites suffered many of <strong>the</strong> same kinds of controversies in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
transition from research to operations as meteorological satellites, with worse results. Part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> tension over this transition resulted from worries about whe<strong>the</strong>r a program to collect<br />
images of <strong>the</strong> Earth for civilian purposes would threaten <strong>the</strong> secrecy surrounding<br />
DOD’s reconnaissance satellite programs. Ano<strong>the</strong>r more important source of difficulty<br />
was a fragmented data user community; <strong>the</strong> images taken from Earth resource satellites<br />
were useful for geologists, hydrologists, agricultural scientists, city and regional planners,<br />
geographers, and people from o<strong>the</strong>r disciplines. Yet, a system serving all <strong>the</strong>se disciplines<br />
was unable to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of any one extremely well. Even within <strong>the</strong> federal government,<br />
two agencies with different interests, <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Agriculture, sought to shape <strong>the</strong> program. Ano<strong>the</strong>r problem was that<br />
Earth resource satellite projects started later than meteorological satellites. With a first<br />
launch in 1972, <strong>the</strong> Earth resource satellite program began only after enthusiasm for<br />
Apollo had waned; at this point, NASA’s budget was subject to much more intense scrutiny<br />
from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget and Congress.<br />
Research Program
168<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The idea for a civilian Earth resource satellite had two sources. DOD had an active<br />
reconnaissance satellite program growing out of experience with reconnaissance aircraft<br />
dating back to World War I. Scientists who investigated new technology for <strong>the</strong> classified<br />
reconnaissance program often had training in geology or geography, and <strong>the</strong>y saw much<br />
potential for civilian use of <strong>the</strong> classified data <strong>the</strong>y studied. In addition, NASA hired significant<br />
numbers of geologists to prepare <strong>the</strong> scientific program for Apollo, and some of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m became interested in looking at <strong>the</strong> Earth as well as <strong>the</strong> Moon from space. 47 In 1965,<br />
NASA started to investigate <strong>the</strong> potential of studying Earth resources from space using<br />
instruments flown in its own aircraft. [II-13] The space agency wanted to involve <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Geological Survey (a branch of <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior) and <strong>the</strong> Army Corps of<br />
Engineers in remote-sensing research.<br />
NASA proceeded slowly, testing a variety of sensors from aircraft before planning an<br />
experimental satellite. In a pattern similar to <strong>the</strong> debate over Nimbus, <strong>the</strong> space agency’s<br />
initial plans for Earth resource satellites called for a large, sophisticated experimental<br />
satellite. [II-14] Meanwhile, scientists at <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior had become convinced<br />
of <strong>the</strong> value of satellite data for applications and wanted an early operational satellite<br />
instead of elaborate experiments. [II-15] Impatient with NASA’s lack of action, a<br />
group of scientists at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey persuaded Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior<br />
Stewart L. Udall to announce in September 1966 that <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior<br />
would start its own operational satellite program. 48 [II-16] When <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau<br />
pulled out of its meteorological satellite agreement with NASA, it made an alternative<br />
alliance with DOD. The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, was unable to find<br />
a partner with space expertise; thus its announcement was more a bureaucratic maneuver<br />
than a realistic plan. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> resultant publicity forced NASA to commit to faster<br />
action on an experimental project to build <strong>the</strong> kind of small satellite <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Interior wanted. 49 [II-17] NASA initially called <strong>the</strong> project <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources<br />
Technology Satellite (ERTS), but it changed <strong>the</strong> name to Landsat in 1975. General<br />
Electric won <strong>the</strong> prime contract for both <strong>the</strong> Nimbus and Landsat programs, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Nimbus platform that had been developed and flown by NASA was also used for Landsat.<br />
Many problems remained after <strong>the</strong> agreement on what kind of satellite NASA would<br />
build. The interested agencies continued to disagree over a variety of management and<br />
technical issues and over <strong>the</strong> proper balance between an experimental and an operational<br />
program. 50 The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior and <strong>the</strong> Department of Agriculture wanted different<br />
kinds of sensors; Interior preferred a return-beam vidicon (a type of television camera),<br />
while Agriculture desired a multispectral scanner. Both sensors involved relatively<br />
47. Pamela E. Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth: The Social Construction of <strong>the</strong> Landsat Satellite System (Cambridge,<br />
MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 31–42. To see how an Earth observation program grew out of research on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
planets, see Peter C. Badgley, “The Applications of Remote Sensors in Planetary Exploration,” paper presented<br />
at <strong>the</strong> Third Annual Remote Sensing Conference, Ann Arbor, Michigan, October 14, 1964.<br />
48. The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior called its program Earth Resources Observation Satellites (later<br />
Systems), or EROS.<br />
49. W.T. Pecora, Director, Geological Survey, to Under Secretary, Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, “Status of<br />
EROS Program,” draft, June 15, 1967, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
For more details, see Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 56–65.<br />
50. Peter C. Badgley, Program Chief, Earth Resources Survey, to Distribution, “Meeting of Earth<br />
Resources User Agency Representatives with Space Applications Staff Members and Advanced Manned Missions<br />
Staff Members, April 20, 1967,” May 4, 1967; Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Administrator for Policy, NASA, to Dr.<br />
Seamans, “Meeting with Representatives of Department of Agriculture and Interior Earth Resources,”<br />
September 11, 1967, with a confidential second memo of same subject and date; Jacob E. Smart, Assistant<br />
Administrator for Policy, NASA, to Dr. Mueller, et al., “Earth Resources Survey Program,” October 3, 1967; Edgar<br />
M. Cortright for George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Memorandum to<br />
Assistant Administrator for Policy, “Earth Resources Study Program,” November 17, 1967; Harry J. Goett to<br />
Daniel G. Mazur, December 3, 1967. All of <strong>the</strong>se documents can be found in <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute<br />
Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 169<br />
untested technology. 51<br />
Data processing and distribution provided even more serious challenges: a satellite<br />
taking pictures of <strong>the</strong> entire Earth, even at a spatial resolution of about 100 meters, would<br />
quickly produce an overwhelming amount of data. Effective use, particularly coverage of<br />
large areas and repeated coverage of <strong>the</strong> same scene to observe changes, would require<br />
analysis by computer ra<strong>the</strong>r than by a human photointerpreter. However, technology for<br />
such large-scale image processing had not yet been developed in <strong>the</strong> civilian world. 52<br />
Budgetary constraints proved even more serious than technical problems. Facing<br />
declining support for <strong>the</strong> space program once NASA reached its Apollo goal, <strong>the</strong> space<br />
agency’s leaders attempted to capitalize on <strong>the</strong> usefulness of space to promote applications<br />
programs. 53 [II-18, II-19, II-20] The strategy did not work; <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget<br />
repeatedly deleted <strong>the</strong> ERTS project from <strong>the</strong> budgets of NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Interior. [II-21] In fact, <strong>the</strong> strategy of promoting usefulness may have backfired: <strong>the</strong><br />
Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget (<strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget after 1970) repeatedly asked<br />
NASA to prove that <strong>the</strong> benefits of Landsat would exceed <strong>the</strong> costs. NASA sponsored <strong>the</strong><br />
required studies and also appealed cuts in <strong>the</strong> project’s budget directly to <strong>the</strong> president. 54<br />
The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior obtained funding to build a data processing and distribution<br />
center only with <strong>the</strong> help of Republican Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota.<br />
Senator Mundt had become a major supporter of <strong>the</strong> project when <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Interior decided to locate its data processing center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. 55 [II-22]<br />
Despite all <strong>the</strong> discord, <strong>the</strong> first satellite proved a technical success. NASA launched<br />
Landsat 1 on July 23, 1972, and scientists quickly found many uses for <strong>the</strong> data. Prior to<br />
<strong>the</strong> satellite’s launch, NASA had received more than 600 proposals from scientists and o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
requesting funding to investigate uses of data from <strong>the</strong> satellites. More than 200 proposals<br />
from U.S. investigators and 100 from overseas were funded; <strong>the</strong>se scientists stood<br />
ready to use Landsat data as soon as <strong>the</strong>y became available.<br />
The use of Landsat data raised a number of issues. Developing countries had initially<br />
worried about <strong>the</strong> misuse of data ga<strong>the</strong>red without <strong>the</strong>ir consent, but when satellite data<br />
began to arrive, <strong>the</strong>y found it of considerable value in providing information on areas that<br />
were inadequately mapped. [II-23] Despite <strong>the</strong>se benefits, debate continued over international<br />
political and legal issues associated with remote sensing. [II-24] Landsat data<br />
proved useful to scientists of many sorts, for everything from searching for oil to mapping<br />
ice. 56 Yet unlike meteorological satellites, whose data proved more useful to wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasters<br />
than to research scientists building models, Landsat data were quickly used by<br />
researchers, and much more slowly such data found widespread operational use. NASA<br />
leaders discovered that if <strong>the</strong> space agency did not find ways to convince potential users<br />
51. Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 66–79. NASA was not allowed to use better tested technology that had<br />
been developed for reconnaissance satellites.<br />
52. Badgley to Distribution, “Meeting of Earth Resources User Agency Representatives, April 20, 1967,”<br />
May 4, 1967; Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 107–18.<br />
53. Leonard Jaffe to <strong>the</strong> Record, “Commentary Delivered by Mr. Leonard Jaffe at <strong>the</strong> Airlie House<br />
Planning Seminar, June 1966,” July 8, 1966, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington,<br />
DC.<br />
54. Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 80–93. This issue continued even after launch. See Paul A. Vander Myde<br />
to George M. Low, February 25, 1975, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
55. Press release from <strong>the</strong> office of Senator Karl E. Mundt, March, 30, 1970, Space Policy Institute<br />
Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC; David L. Stenseth, “EROS—The Local Story,” IDEL Earth Trak<br />
1 (June 1974): 4–5; Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 132–45.<br />
56. Anthony J. Calio to Director, Johnson Space Center, “Earth Resources Briefing for Petroleum<br />
Industry Representatives,” November 12, 1973; Charles D. Centers to Ma<strong>the</strong>ws, February 15, 1973. Both documents<br />
are located in <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.
170<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
to apply <strong>the</strong> data, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> project would not bring <strong>the</strong> benefits promised. 57 [II-25]<br />
NASA <strong>the</strong>refore became involved not only in promoting <strong>the</strong> use of Landsat data, but<br />
also in supporting research to develop approaches to <strong>the</strong>ir use. One major project<br />
involved agricultural surveys, because better prediction of harvests was one use of Landsat<br />
data that <strong>the</strong> space agency had predicted would bring significant benefits. 58 The Large<br />
Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE) involved NASA, <strong>the</strong> National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Department of Agriculture in an attempt to develop and test a crop forecasting<br />
system using Landsat data. The data, it was claimed, could provide two things: information<br />
on how much land had been planted in a given crop (assuming one could differentiate<br />
among crops in <strong>the</strong> data) and information on crop health (because badly stressed<br />
vegetation reflected less infrared light). The project achieved reasonable success, but <strong>the</strong><br />
problem of identifying and differentiating crops from satellite imagery turned out to be<br />
much more difficult than expected. 59 [II-26] Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> Department of Agriculture<br />
chose not to adopt <strong>the</strong> system developed by <strong>the</strong> LACIE project for operational use. 60<br />
Several o<strong>the</strong>r experiments were more successful, but use of Landsat data for operational<br />
applications continued to develop more slowly than its promoters had hoped. 61 A NASAsponsored<br />
technology transfer and utilization program involving universities, state and<br />
local governments, and industry could not reverse this reality.<br />
Operational Landsat Program<br />
The development of an operational program became <strong>the</strong> subject of a series of political<br />
debates. Different groups proposed at least three different alternatives. First, <strong>the</strong> federal<br />
government could develop an operational Earth resources program on <strong>the</strong> model of<br />
<strong>the</strong> operational wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite program, providing satellite data for <strong>the</strong> public good.<br />
Second, a private company might take over <strong>the</strong> existing Landsat system and run it as a<br />
business, an option usually called privatization. Third, a private company might develop<br />
and launch a new and separate Earth observations satellite, an option usually called commercialization.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> somewhat disappointing growth of Landsat data use, <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Interior wanted an early transition to a government-sponsored operational satellite<br />
program, but <strong>the</strong> agency faced a number of obstacles. [II-27] First, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of<br />
Management and Budget questioned whe<strong>the</strong>r Landsat had yielded enough benefits to justify<br />
a continued government-funded program. 62 [II-28] This issue posed a dilemma: poten-<br />
57. James C. Fletcher to Frank E. Moss, February 20, 1973; Hans Mark to Clifford E. Charlesworth, July<br />
31, 1973; William E. Stoney to Distribution, “Summary Thoughts on Earth Resources Transfer Meeting,” June<br />
27, 1975. All of <strong>the</strong>se documents are in <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington,<br />
DC.<br />
58. Carroll G. Grunthaver, U.S. Department of Agriculture, to Leonard Jaffe, Deputy Associate<br />
Administrator, NASA, August 22, 1973, discusses a new research and development study to develop a computerbased<br />
system for spring wheat yield estimation.<br />
59. James L. Mitchell, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, to Richard E. Bell and Don Paarlberg,<br />
Department of Agriculture, “Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment,” October 8, 1976, Space Policy Institute<br />
Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
60. Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 146–58.<br />
61. For a story with a successful outcome see John P. Erlandson, Army Corps of Engineers, to R. B.<br />
MacDonald, Johnson Space Center, March 16, 1976, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection,<br />
Washington, DC; Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, p. 130. For <strong>the</strong> reasons of slow adoption, see letter from Sally Bay<br />
Cornwell, National Conference of State Legislatures, to Allen H. Watkins, EROS Data Center, December 3, 1977,<br />
and letter from Allen H. Watkins to Sally Bay Cornwell, December 22, 1977, Space Policy Institute Documentary<br />
<strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 171<br />
tial users did not want to invest in <strong>the</strong> information systems necessary to process and analyze<br />
Earth resources satellite data until <strong>the</strong>y knew that <strong>the</strong> data would continue to be available<br />
in <strong>the</strong> future, while <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget did not want to fund an operational<br />
program until it was clear that enough users would participate to justify it. 63 As delays<br />
mounted, Landsat technology became increasingly out of date; in 1986 France launched<br />
an Earth resources satellite named SPOT (Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre) that in<br />
some ways was more sophisticated.<br />
Instead of choosing which federal agency would house an operational program, an<br />
alternative approach gained increasing attention: that private industry should take over<br />
Earth resource satellites because it had communications satellites (instead of retaining <strong>the</strong><br />
program as a government function as had been done with meteorological satellites). The<br />
impetus for <strong>the</strong> idea came primarily from those interested in reducing <strong>the</strong> federal budget;<br />
unlike communication satellites, <strong>the</strong> potential profitability of Earth resource satellites was<br />
so uncertain that private industry had only limited interest in taking over <strong>the</strong> whole system.<br />
64 [II-29, II-30] In October 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Presidential Decision<br />
42, which asked NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce to find ways to encourage private<br />
industry participation in civilian remote sensing (including Landsat, wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites,<br />
and ocean observation satellites). 65<br />
Some type of decision about an operational Landsat program had to be made, but privatization<br />
raised many difficult questions. Presidential Decision 42 led to <strong>the</strong> creation of an<br />
interagency task force to study <strong>the</strong> problems of and potential for private-sector participation<br />
in remote sensing, with a particular focus on Landsat. The task force report addressed<br />
issues ranging from cost to potential international sensitivity about private-sector control<br />
of data. It concluded that privatization of <strong>the</strong> whole system or of <strong>the</strong> space segment was premature,<br />
but that private industry should be encouraged to make proposals for investment<br />
in any part of <strong>the</strong> system. 66 This resulted in Presidential Decision 54 in November 1979, giving<br />
NOAA temporary responsibility for managing an operational Landsat system and asking<br />
NOAA to study ways to encourage private participation. Presidential Decision 54’s<br />
long-term goal was eventual operation by <strong>the</strong> private sector. 67 [II-31, II-32]<br />
A lengthy debate followed concerning whe<strong>the</strong>r and how privatization might take<br />
62. James C. Fletcher to James T. Lynn, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, September 15, 1976, Space<br />
Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
63. Bruno Augenstein, Willis H. Shapley, Eugene B. Skolnikoff, “Earth Information from Space by<br />
Remote Sensing,” report prepared for Dr. Frank Press, Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, June<br />
2, 1978; see Document II-30. This document also addresses ano<strong>the</strong>r obstacle: controversy over which agency<br />
would control <strong>the</strong> operational system. See Mack, Viewing <strong>the</strong> Earth, pp. 204–05.<br />
64. Privatization meant <strong>the</strong> development of something similar to Comsat—a private corporation that<br />
would purchase satellites, pay for launch services, manage <strong>the</strong> working spacecraft, and process and sell data, all<br />
at its own risk. This is different from <strong>the</strong> small industry that had developed to sell analysis and special processing<br />
of Landsat data. That industry did not want <strong>the</strong> government providing too many services, but it did want <strong>the</strong><br />
government to provide <strong>the</strong> basic data. See J. Robert Porter, Jr., President, Earth Satellite Corporation, “Statement<br />
before <strong>the</strong> House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications,” June 23, 1977, Space Policy Institute<br />
Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
65. Also in October, Senator Harrison Schmitt introduced a bill calling for <strong>the</strong> creation of an Earth<br />
Resources Information Satellite Corporation modeled on Comsat. No action was taken on <strong>the</strong> bill. Science Policy<br />
Research Division, Congressional Research Service, United States Civilian Space Programs. Volume II, Applications<br />
Satellites, prepared for <strong>the</strong> Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of <strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and<br />
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, May 1983, pp. 249–50.<br />
66. “Private Sector Involvement in Civil Space Remote Sensing,” draft, June 4, 1979, Space Policy<br />
Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
67. United States Civilian Space Programs, Volume I, pp. 238–42. For issues relating to <strong>the</strong> transition to an<br />
operational system, see <strong>the</strong> letter from Richard D. Lamm to George S. Benton, NOAA, April 30, 1980, with<br />
attached: “Recommendations of <strong>the</strong> National Governor’s Association, National Conference of State Legislatures,<br />
Intergovernmental Science, Engineering & Technology Advisory Panel, National Resources & Environment Task<br />
Force, for <strong>the</strong> Final Transition Plan for <strong>the</strong> National Civil Operating Remote Sensing Program (first draft April<br />
10, 1980),” April 30, 1980.
172<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
place. 68 During that time, two additional Landsat satellites were launched to provide continuity<br />
of data delivery, but <strong>the</strong> development of a more advanced operational system was<br />
put on hold. These satellites did carry one new instrument, <strong>the</strong> Thematic Mapper (TM),<br />
which was a significant improvement over <strong>the</strong> Multispectral Scanner that had been carried<br />
on <strong>the</strong> initial satellites. The most provocative proposal to come from private industry was<br />
from Comsat in July 1981 to take on full responsibility for both Earth resource and meteorological<br />
satellites. 69 [II-33] Many observers had doubted that commercialization could<br />
protect <strong>the</strong> public interest in meteorological satellite data; similar concerns were voiced<br />
with respect to Earth resource satellites. 70 [II-34]<br />
President Reagan proved an even stronger supporter of <strong>the</strong> transfer of government<br />
projects to private industry than President Carter had been. In March 1983, Reagan<br />
announced a decision to transfer Landsat, <strong>the</strong> meteorological satellites, and future ocean<br />
observation satellites to private industry. 71 As already mentioned, Congress rejected <strong>the</strong><br />
idea of transferring <strong>the</strong> meteorological satellite program to private industry. [II-35]<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce proceeded with a request for proposals from private<br />
industry for operational control of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system. 72 Congress passed a bill setting<br />
<strong>the</strong> terms for transfer in 1984, and <strong>the</strong> Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT), a<br />
joint venture of Hughes and RCA, won <strong>the</strong> competition. [II-36]<br />
This 1984 legislation supported <strong>the</strong> concept of providing sufficient subsidy to continue<br />
Landsat operations while EOSAT built a market for data. Department of Commerce<br />
officials envisioned that with government help, EOSAT would build Landsats 6 and 7.<br />
Eventually, administration and congressional supporters believed, <strong>the</strong> data market would<br />
grow large enough to support entirely private ownership and operation of future Landsat<br />
systems. NOAA’s 1985 Commercialization Plan called for continued government funding<br />
of $250 million to build Landsats 6 and 7. 73 To assist in this process, EOSAT began building<br />
its own operations control and receiving station in Norman, Oklahoma.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> fall of 1985, EOSAT complicated negotiations over <strong>the</strong> amount of subsidy by<br />
proposing to fly <strong>the</strong> TM on a spacecraft designed to be launched by <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle. 74<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> loss of <strong>the</strong> orbiter Challenger in January 1986, NOAA agreed to <strong>the</strong> proposal in<br />
March 1986; in August of <strong>the</strong> same year, <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration issued a decision lim-<br />
68. William H. Gregory, “Free Enterprise and Landsat,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 113 (July 14,<br />
1980): 13; Ed Harper to Craig Fuller and Martin Anderson, “Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector<br />
Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” July 13, 1981; National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration, “Transfer of <strong>the</strong> Civil Operational Earth Observation Satellites to <strong>the</strong> Private Sector,” draft,<br />
January 19, 1983. The last two documents are located in <strong>the</strong> Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong><br />
Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
69. Communications Satellite Corporation News Release, “Comsat President Proposes Bold<br />
Restructuring of Earth Sensing Satellite Systems,” July 23, 1981, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong><br />
Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
70. David A. Stockman, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, to Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of<br />
Commerce, May 9, 1983. See Pamela E. Mack, “Commercialization, International Cooperation, and <strong>the</strong> Public<br />
Good,” in Daniel S. Papp and John R. McIntyre, eds., International Space Policy: Legal, Economic, and Strategic<br />
Options for <strong>the</strong> Twentieth Century and Beyond (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1987), pp. 195–202.<br />
71. “Statement by Dr. John V. Byrne, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce,” March 8, 1983, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection,<br />
Washington, DC.<br />
72. U.S. Department of Commerce, “Request for Proposals for Transfer of <strong>the</strong> United States Land<br />
Remote Sensing Program to <strong>the</strong> Private Sector,” January 3, 1984.<br />
73. Landsat proponents argued that nearly double this amount was necessary to ensure adequate support<br />
for <strong>the</strong> commercialization process, but David Stockman, director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget<br />
under President Reagan, would agree only to <strong>the</strong> $250 million.<br />
74. At <strong>the</strong> time, NASA envisioned being able to launch <strong>the</strong> Shuttle into polar orbit from Vandenberg<br />
Air Force Base in California. Landsat satellites <strong>the</strong>n would have been serviced in orbit by Shuttle crews.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 173<br />
iting Shuttle payloads to those requiring <strong>the</strong> unique characteristics of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle. 75 This<br />
caused NOAA to direct EOSAT to prepare for launch on an expendable launch vehicle.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r disagreements between <strong>the</strong> administration and Congress delayed a decision to fund<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat system until <strong>the</strong> spring of 1988. 76 By that time, it had become fully apparent<br />
that <strong>the</strong> subsidy ($219 million) would cover only <strong>the</strong> development and construction of one<br />
spacecraft. The Reagan administration and Congress nearly terminated EOSAT’s operation<br />
of Landsats 4 and 5 several times for lack of a few million dollars of operating funds. 77<br />
Part of <strong>the</strong> difficulty arose because, in <strong>the</strong> 1980s, proponents of land remote sensing<br />
faced <strong>the</strong> same problem <strong>the</strong>y had experienced in <strong>the</strong> 1960s. No single agency was willing<br />
to commit funding ($15–30 million per year beyond EOSAT’s revenue from data sales) to<br />
continue system operations. Unlike <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, which NOAA operated to provide<br />
data for its own National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce had no<br />
internal constituency for collecting remotely sensed land data. The Carter administration<br />
had selected NOAA because of <strong>the</strong> agency’s experience in operating <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite<br />
systems. Congress expressed only lukewarm interest in supporting NOAA’s long-term<br />
operation of Landsat. This lack of commitment to a continuously operated remote-sensing<br />
system undermined what little confidence data customers had in <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />
Relatively few customers were willing to develop <strong>the</strong> necessary processing infrastructure<br />
and training programs or make o<strong>the</strong>r investments that depended on <strong>the</strong> routine delivery<br />
of Landsat data.<br />
NOAA and EOSAT expected to launch Landsat 6 in 1992, with <strong>the</strong> federal government<br />
providing most of <strong>the</strong> funding for building and launching <strong>the</strong> satellite. However,<br />
even if Landsat 6 successfully reached orbit and operated as designed for five years, this<br />
plan still left <strong>the</strong> United States with <strong>the</strong> prospect of entering <strong>the</strong> late 1990s with no capability<br />
to collect Landsat data. It soon became clear that even if <strong>the</strong> data market doubled<br />
or tripled, EOSAT would not earn sufficient revenue to build Landsat 7. To resolve growing<br />
concerns over <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, President Bush “directed <strong>the</strong><br />
National Space Council and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget to review options with<br />
<strong>the</strong> intention of continuing Landsat-type data collections after Landsat 6.” [II-37]<br />
The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992<br />
By <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, several circumstances led to <strong>the</strong> decision to return Landsat system<br />
operation to <strong>the</strong> government. First, <strong>the</strong> U.S. military made extensive use of Landsat and<br />
SPOT data to create maps used in planning and executing U.S. maneuvers during <strong>the</strong><br />
1991 Gulf War. 78 Second, Landsat proponents worried that failing to develop Landsat 7<br />
would give SPOT full control of <strong>the</strong> international market for multispectral satellite data.<br />
Third, global change researchers began to appreciate that <strong>the</strong> twenty-year Landsat data<br />
archive would allow <strong>the</strong>m to follow environmental change on parts of Earth’s surface.<br />
Fourth, <strong>the</strong> attempt to commercialize <strong>the</strong> Landsat system had faltered badly, and policy<br />
makers began to feel that no private company was soon likely to be able to provide equiv-<br />
75. The White House, “Statement on <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle,” August 15, 1986, Space Policy Institute<br />
Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
76. U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, “Future of Land Remote Sensing System<br />
(Landsat),” 91-685-SPR, pp. 6–7, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
77. M. Mitchell Waldrop, “Landsat Commercialization Stumbles Again,” Science 246 (January 9,<br />
1987):155–56; Eliot Marshall, “Landsat: Cliff-hanging, Again,” Science (October 20, 1989): 321–22.<br />
78. B. Gordon, Statement before <strong>the</strong> U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Hearing of <strong>the</strong> Committee on<br />
Science, Space, and Technology and <strong>the</strong> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Scientific,<br />
Military, and Commercial Applications of <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program, Hearing Report 102-61, June 26, 1991.
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OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
alent data on <strong>the</strong> scale needed by federal agencies. 79 Finally, <strong>the</strong> advent of <strong>the</strong> geographic<br />
information system (GIS) and <strong>the</strong> development of o<strong>the</strong>r information technologies, such<br />
as high-powered computers, inexpensive storage devices, and <strong>the</strong> Internet, promised to<br />
reduce <strong>the</strong> costs and complexities of processing Landsat data. 80<br />
As a result of <strong>the</strong>se and o<strong>the</strong>r pressures to continue collecting Landsat data, in 1992<br />
<strong>the</strong> administration, with <strong>the</strong> strong support of Congress, moved to place operational control<br />
of Landsat 7 and beyond to DOD and NASA. [II-38] Under <strong>the</strong> Landsat management<br />
plan negotiated between DOD and NASA, DOD agreed to fund <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong><br />
spacecraft and its instruments, while NASA agreed to fund <strong>the</strong> construction of <strong>the</strong> ground<br />
data processing and operations systems, to operate <strong>the</strong> satellite, and to provide for<br />
Landsat data distribution. [II-39] The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, signed<br />
into law in October, codified <strong>the</strong> management plan and authorized approximately equal<br />
funding from each agency for <strong>the</strong> operational life of Landsat 7. [II-40]<br />
Landsat 6 was to carry an Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM) having better radiometric<br />
calibration than previous TM sensors, along with an additional “sharpening”<br />
panchromatic band of fifteen-meter resolution, allowing it to deliver data with resolution<br />
nearly equivalent to SPOT data. NASA had studied this capability in <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s but<br />
dropped any plans to build higher resolution instruments as a result of national security<br />
restrictions on <strong>the</strong> sharpness of data from civilian satellites. By <strong>the</strong> 1990s, o<strong>the</strong>r countries<br />
had started selling fine-resolution data, so those national security concerns had become<br />
moot (see below).<br />
Initial NASA and DOD plans called for Landsat 7 to include an ETM Plus, an<br />
improved version of <strong>the</strong> ETM under development for Landsat 6. Later, DOD began to<br />
consider adding a new multispectral sensor to <strong>the</strong> satellite, <strong>the</strong> High Resolution<br />
Multispectral Stereo Imager (HRMSI), capable of collecting five-meter resolution data<br />
particularly useful for mapping. NASA and DOD analysts estimated that developing,<br />
launching, and operating Landsat 7 for five years would equal $880 million (1992 dollars).<br />
NASA considered <strong>the</strong> additional instrument optional; in <strong>the</strong> course of discussions, DOD<br />
decided that it should be an operational requirement. However, <strong>the</strong> HRMSI sensor and<br />
additional ground operations equipment would have cost an additional $400 million. The<br />
high data rates expected for <strong>the</strong> HRMSI nearly doubled <strong>the</strong> overall required system data<br />
rate and would have added significant costs to NASA’s yearly operations budget for<br />
Landsat 7.<br />
In September 1993, Landsat 6 was launched but failed to reach orbit, raising additional<br />
concerns about <strong>the</strong> loss of data continuity. That same month, NASA officials concluded<br />
that <strong>the</strong> costs of operating Landsat 7 with HRMSI were too large, given o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
strains on <strong>the</strong> space agency’s budget. In December 1993, DOD decided not to fund <strong>the</strong><br />
resulting Landsat 7 budget shortfall. As a result of disagreement over <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7<br />
requirements and budget, DOD decided to drop out of <strong>the</strong> agreement altoge<strong>the</strong>r. [II-41,<br />
II-42, II-43, II-44] That left NASA to fund <strong>the</strong> development of Landsat 7, carrying only <strong>the</strong><br />
planned thirty-meter-resolution ETM Plus. After some discussion, DOD transferred<br />
$90 million to NASA to assist in developing <strong>the</strong> satellite and sensor because DOD would<br />
79. In 1990, John Knauss, Commerce Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, stated: “Our experience<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Landsat program . . . [has] led us to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that commercialization of Landsat, as had<br />
originally been envisioned, is not possible.” J. Knauss, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, Department<br />
of Commerce, Statement before <strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, June 12,<br />
1990, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
80. Ray A. Williamson, “The Landsat Legacy: Remote Sensing Policy and <strong>the</strong> Development of<br />
Commercial Remote Sensing,” Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing 63 (July 1997): 877–85.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 175<br />
be a major customer of data from Landsat 7.<br />
In early 1994, <strong>the</strong> question of which agency would actually operate Landsat 7 had not<br />
yet been resolved. NASA planned to use Landsat data to support its research into land use<br />
and land change as part of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Global Change Research Program. Landsat 7 is formally<br />
now part of NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth. These data will also support many federal<br />
government operational programs and <strong>the</strong> data needs of state and local governments,<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. private sector, and foreign entities.<br />
In May 1994, <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration resolved <strong>the</strong> outstanding issue of procurement<br />
and operational control of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system by assigning it jointly to NASA,<br />
NOAA, and <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior. Under this plan, NASA will procure <strong>the</strong> satellite,<br />
NOAA will manage and operate <strong>the</strong> spacecraft and ground system, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior will archive and distribute <strong>the</strong> data at <strong>the</strong> marginal cost of<br />
reproduction. [II-45] NASA has scheduled <strong>the</strong> launch of Landsat 7 for 1999. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
future of government-funded land remote-sensing satellites beyond Landsat 7 is still<br />
uncertain.<br />
The Beginning of Commercial Remote Sensing<br />
Having failed in successfully transferring <strong>the</strong> Landsat system to private ownership and<br />
operation, government programs and policy were none<strong>the</strong>less in part responsible for<br />
making commercial remote sensing possible. The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of<br />
1992 included Title II, which sets out <strong>the</strong> terms for government licensing of private operators<br />
of remote-sensing satellite systems. Title IV of <strong>the</strong> 1984 act had included identical<br />
wording, requiring that potential private operators of remote-sensing satellites acquire an<br />
operating license from <strong>the</strong> federal government in accordance with international obligations,<br />
but until 1992, no company had taken advantage of that provision. The legislation<br />
assigned to <strong>the</strong> secretary of commerce <strong>the</strong> responsibility for considering and granting<br />
such licenses, requiring that <strong>the</strong> secretary act on such applications within 120 days, “in<br />
consultation with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate United States Government agencies. . . .” 81<br />
In October 1992, shortly after President Bush signed <strong>the</strong> 1992 act, WorldView, Inc.,<br />
applied for a license to operate a commercial remote-sensing system. WorldView’s plans<br />
called for building a system capable of collecting stereo panchromatic data of three-meter<br />
resolution and multispectral data of fifteen-meter resolution in green, red, and nearinfrared<br />
spectral bands, although with a narrow field of view. 82 WorldView’s sensor was<br />
designed to collect stereo pairs along <strong>the</strong> satellite track as well as sideways off track,<br />
enabling a rapid revisit of areas of particular interest. Technology developed as part of<br />
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory’s ballistic missile defense program supplied <strong>the</strong> instrumental<br />
basis for a commercial system. Perhaps <strong>the</strong> greatest innovation, however, was a data<br />
marketing plan based on commercial objectives, ra<strong>the</strong>r than on meeting government<br />
requirements. WorldView’s officials judged that <strong>the</strong> ultimate market for <strong>the</strong>se data was <strong>the</strong><br />
information industry, which was planning to use <strong>the</strong> Internet, CD–ROM, and o<strong>the</strong>r information<br />
technologies to reach customers quickly and efficiently. 83 Such plans depended on<br />
<strong>the</strong> ability of WorldView and o<strong>the</strong>r companies that followed to build and operate a satellite<br />
at much lower cost than Landsat. A commercial data marketing plan involves<br />
collecting data only of sufficient quality and quantity to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of most cus-<br />
81. The Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (15 U.S.C. 5621, Sec. 201 (c)).<br />
82. The Early Bird satellite will be capable of ga<strong>the</strong>ring panchromatic data along a three-kilometer<br />
swath and multispectral data along a fifteen-kilometer swath.<br />
83. Williamson, “The Landsat Legacy,” pp. 883–84.
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tomers. 84 This also reduces costs compared to a system such as Landsat 7, which is<br />
designed to collect as much data as possible to provide a global archive for <strong>the</strong> future<br />
needs of scientists.<br />
Department of Commerce officials coordinated <strong>the</strong> license application with DOD, <strong>the</strong><br />
Central Intelligence Agency, and <strong>the</strong> Department of State. By late 1992, national security<br />
planners were more inclined than ever before to ease earlier restrictions on <strong>the</strong> resolution<br />
limits of civilian data. Their decisions were moved in part by <strong>the</strong> knowledge that <strong>the</strong><br />
French were planning to improve <strong>the</strong> resolution of <strong>the</strong>ir SPOT system, and <strong>the</strong> Indian<br />
Space Agency was also moving to higher resolution instruments. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong><br />
Russian firm Soyuzkarta had begun to market high-resolution multispectral photographic<br />
data (two-meter resolution) from <strong>the</strong> formerly secret Russian KVR-1000 sensor. On<br />
January 4, 1993, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce sent a license to WorldView, allowing it to<br />
operate a three-meter satellite system. [II-46, II-47, II-48].<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r companies soon filed <strong>the</strong>ir own applications for systems that would achieve<br />
even greater sharpness. In June 1993, Lockheed, Inc., filed with <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
Commerce for a license to operate a system capable of achieving one-meter resolution.<br />
Shortly after, Orbital Sciences Corporation, in partnership (later dissolved) with GDE<br />
Systems and Itek, also filed a similar license request. The proposal to collect higher resolution<br />
data caused <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration to reconsider desirable policy for commercial<br />
remote sensing. Although <strong>the</strong> sale of such data abroad posed no threat of <strong>the</strong> transfer<br />
of critical technology, in <strong>the</strong> view of some, one-meter data were too close to <strong>the</strong> reconnaissance<br />
capabilities of high-flying aircraft and classified satellites. 85 O<strong>the</strong>rs, while recognizing<br />
<strong>the</strong> risk of marketing <strong>the</strong>se data worldwide, have argued that data of high<br />
resolution can moderate potential conflict if <strong>the</strong>y are available to all sides. 86<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, one-meter data, delivered in a timely manner, are of significant security<br />
utility for surveillance, military planning, and <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong> up-to-date maps needed<br />
to fight battles effectively. When combined with <strong>the</strong> geolocational capabilities of <strong>the</strong> global<br />
positioning system, <strong>the</strong>se data also make it possible for belligerent nations to target specific<br />
locations for cruise missile and o<strong>the</strong>r precision attacks. Hence, intelligence officials<br />
argued, if <strong>the</strong> data were sold globally, <strong>the</strong>re would have to be some sort of control over distribution.<br />
Ultimately, after several months of discussion, officials decided that <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
of keeping such data under <strong>the</strong> control of U.S. suppliers were greater than <strong>the</strong> risks posed<br />
by possible data misuse.<br />
In March 1994, eight months after receiving <strong>the</strong> license application, <strong>the</strong> White House<br />
released a policy statement concerning licenses for commercial remote-sensing systems.<br />
The policy required <strong>the</strong> satellite operator to maintain satellite tasking records and to<br />
make <strong>the</strong>m available so that <strong>the</strong> federal government could determine who purchased what<br />
data, if necessary. It also authorized <strong>the</strong> government to cut off or restrict <strong>the</strong> flow of data<br />
during times of crisis to protect national security interests. [II-49] The Department of<br />
Commerce has granted several licenses based on this policy, including one to Lockheed,<br />
Inc. [II-50]<br />
84. For EOSAT, <strong>the</strong> operator of Landsats 4 and 5, this meant collecting fewer scenes than government<br />
operators would have collected. NASA and NOAA were interested in ga<strong>the</strong>ring as many scenes as possible to file<br />
<strong>the</strong> archive of Landsat scenes.<br />
85. V. Gupta, “New Satellite Images for Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead,” Center for Security<br />
and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-118140, 1994, Space Policy<br />
Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />
86. B. Gordon, “The Moderating Effects of Higher Resolution Civil Satellite Imaging on International<br />
Relations,” paper presented at <strong>the</strong> 1996 AFCEA Conference, Washington, DC, June 1996.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 177<br />
Conclusion<br />
One might anticipate that space applications programs would have been <strong>the</strong> least controversial<br />
aspects of <strong>the</strong> space program because <strong>the</strong>y would seem to be <strong>the</strong> most obviously<br />
beneficial. An examination of <strong>the</strong>ir history, however, suggests that applications satellites<br />
raised difficult institutional policy issues, resulting particularly from <strong>the</strong> large number of<br />
interested organizations involved. A project such as Apollo served primarily public and<br />
political interests in a space race. For basic space science, NASA had a clear constituency<br />
of scientists. In <strong>the</strong> 1970s, NASA sought to control research and development for satellite<br />
applications in <strong>the</strong> same way it controlled space science, but <strong>the</strong> space agency found that<br />
user agencies expected to direct research to meet <strong>the</strong>ir own perceived needs. In addition,<br />
<strong>the</strong> technological potentials of <strong>the</strong> various applications fields that scientists found most<br />
interesting were not necessarily <strong>the</strong> ones with <strong>the</strong> most short-term practical value.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> 1980s, government-funded applications satellite systems faced an increasingly<br />
difficult budgetary climate. Continuing development of satellite technology made it<br />
possible to offer more and more sophisticated services, but in a time of tremendous pressure<br />
on <strong>the</strong> federal budget, <strong>the</strong> government has been reluctant to fund more expensive<br />
systems, even if <strong>the</strong>y resulted in better services.<br />
Commercial interests in land remote sensing and international cooperation in meteorological<br />
observations have helped invigorate <strong>the</strong>se two applications. As history demonstrates,<br />
land remote-sensing applications have proven more difficult to integrate into<br />
existing systems than meteorological or communications satellites had been. The obstacle<br />
was not primarily a lack of usefulness of <strong>the</strong> data produced by <strong>the</strong> satellites; ra<strong>the</strong>r, proponents<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program faced an intense debate over <strong>the</strong> proper role of government<br />
in developing and operating a system that benefits both public and private data<br />
users. 87 If <strong>the</strong> operation of commercial remote-sensing satellites proves successful, it may<br />
resolve not only <strong>the</strong> long-standing tensions between research and operational uses of<br />
remotely sensed Earth observation data, but also <strong>the</strong> question of <strong>the</strong> proper role of government<br />
and <strong>the</strong> private sector in supplying <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
In contrast to land remote sensing, most observers continue to support <strong>the</strong> public<br />
provision of meteorological data. However, pressure to reduce satellite system costs has<br />
endangered <strong>the</strong> robustness of NOAA’s system. A changed political environment resulting<br />
in a merged civil-military system and increased international cooperation should improve<br />
<strong>the</strong> ability of <strong>the</strong> government to continue to provide high-quality meteorological data<br />
while reducing system costs.<br />
Document II-1<br />
Document title: Dr. Harry Wexler, “Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,”<br />
Journal of <strong>the</strong> British Interplanetary Society 7 (September 1954): 269–276.<br />
This article was originally presented by Harry Wexler, Chief of <strong>the</strong> Scientific Services Division of <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Department of Commerce Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, as a speech at <strong>the</strong> Third Symposium on Space Travel,<br />
held at <strong>the</strong> Hayden Planetarium in New York City on May 4, 1954. It is one of <strong>the</strong> earliest inquiries<br />
into <strong>the</strong> possible uses of satellites in forecasting wea<strong>the</strong>r. While correct in anticipating a satellite’s utility<br />
in observing large-scale wea<strong>the</strong>r patterns, it is interesting that Wexler never<strong>the</strong>less dismisses a satellite’s<br />
potential for what are now routine observations of pressure, temperature, and humidity. The two<br />
87. Philip J. Hilts, “Landsat Satellites Termed Incapable of Profitable Operation This Century:<br />
Substantial Demand Not Enough to Sustain Business, Reports Say,” Washington Post, March 12, 1989, p. A4.
178<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
figures accompanying <strong>the</strong> article are omitted here, but <strong>the</strong>ir captions are included, along with <strong>the</strong><br />
description of Figure 1. Note <strong>the</strong> British-style spellings, such as <strong>the</strong> word “centre.”<br />
[269]<br />
Introduction<br />
Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from<br />
a Satellite Vehicle*<br />
By Dr. Harry Wexler,<br />
Chief Scientific Services Division, U.S. Department of Commerce,<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau<br />
To predict <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere, <strong>the</strong> meteorologist must know its present<br />
state—as defined by <strong>the</strong> three-dimensional distribution of pressure, temperature, wind,<br />
humidity, clouds, precipitation, etc. To do this, at hundreds of stations throughout <strong>the</strong><br />
Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Hemisphere, <strong>the</strong> atmosphere is probed by balloon-borne instruments which<br />
radio back to Earth values of pressure, temperature, humidity, and whose paths can be<br />
translated into wind direction and speed of <strong>the</strong> various layers through which <strong>the</strong> balloon<br />
ascends. These observations expressed as numbers or symbols, plus auxiliary information<br />
of clouds, precipitation, etc., are plotted on wea<strong>the</strong>r charts and syn<strong>the</strong>sized into an instantaneous<br />
picture of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere which, however, is presently incomplete because of<br />
lack of observations in large portions of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere, specially over oceans and<br />
unpopulated areas. Knowing <strong>the</strong> present state of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere and past motions of <strong>the</strong><br />
storms enables a prediction to be made by extrapolation and o<strong>the</strong>r techniques.<br />
A satellite vehicle traveling about <strong>the</strong> Earth outside <strong>the</strong> atmosphere would not assist<br />
in portraying <strong>the</strong> pressure, temperature, humidity, and wind fields by direct measurement.<br />
However, by a “bird’s-eye” view of a good portion of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface and <strong>the</strong><br />
cloud structure, it should be possible by inference to identify, locate, and track storm areas<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r meteorological features. The vehicle would <strong>the</strong>n serve principally as a “storm<br />
patrol.” There exists under normal conditions a characteristic cloud condition for a “typical”<br />
extra-tropical storm.<br />
A plan view of a typical mid-latitude storm shows cold and warm fronts, whose lowpressure<br />
centre is at <strong>the</strong>ir vertex, and <strong>the</strong>ir accompanying cloud systems.<br />
A major cyclonic storm-cloud system visible from above will be <strong>the</strong> warm front cloud<br />
from which <strong>the</strong> major portion of <strong>the</strong> storm’s precipitation usually falls. In west-east vertical<br />
sections, <strong>the</strong> cloud at <strong>the</strong> extreme right is composed of high-level (5–10 miles) tenuous<br />
cirrus or cirrostratus clouds which change to denser altostratus and altocumulus and<br />
finally to thick precipitating nimbostratus as one approaches <strong>the</strong> storm. If <strong>the</strong> ascending<br />
warm air above <strong>the</strong> warm front is unstable enough, cumulonimbus or thunderstorm<br />
clouds will penetrate above <strong>the</strong> top of <strong>the</strong> nimbostratus cloud.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> warm sector, or <strong>the</strong> area between <strong>the</strong> warm front and cold front, <strong>the</strong>re will be<br />
stratus and fog, if <strong>the</strong> surface is colder than <strong>the</strong> air, or cumulus clouds, if it is warmer.<br />
Approaching <strong>the</strong> cold front <strong>the</strong> higher altocumulus clouds will [text continued on page<br />
271 after Figure 2]<br />
* Presented at <strong>the</strong> Third Symposium on Space Travel, American Museum, Hayden Planetarium, New York,<br />
May 4, 1954.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 179<br />
[270] [figure omitted] FIG. 1. The Earth from an altitude of 100 miles.<br />
This picture show <strong>the</strong> Earth’s curvature and more than 200,000 square miles of<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S.A. and Mexico, and was taken from a V2 on March 7, 1947. The view<br />
stretching to <strong>the</strong> horizon is a distance of about 900 miles, and <strong>the</strong> dark body of<br />
water near <strong>the</strong> top of <strong>the</strong> picture is <strong>the</strong> Gulf of California, about 65 miles wide.<br />
The picture also shows rivers, islands in <strong>the</strong> Gulf of California, <strong>the</strong> peninsula of<br />
lower California and part of <strong>the</strong> Pacific Ocean. The two cameras were installed<br />
amidship in <strong>the</strong> rocket as part of 2,000 lb. of scientific instruments. They operated<br />
automatically taking pictures through an infra-red filter, used to cut <strong>the</strong> haze.<br />
The time of flight from launching to <strong>the</strong> break-up of <strong>the</strong> rocket was 6 1/2 minutes.<br />
[271] [figure omitted] FIG. 2. Diagram of area included in fig. 1.<br />
appear, closely followed by a narrow band of cumulonimbus and <strong>the</strong>n scattered fair-wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
cumulus in <strong>the</strong> cold air mass well behind <strong>the</strong> cold front.<br />
The characteristic features of <strong>the</strong> cold and warm front cloud systems plus <strong>the</strong> adjacent<br />
air mass clouds should enable unique identification of a cyclonic storm, ei<strong>the</strong>r in its<br />
maturing or fully developed stages. The incipient, or embryonic storm will be more difficult<br />
to detect because of lack of fully developed cloud systems. However, because of <strong>the</strong><br />
tendency of cyclonic storms to form in “families,” arrayed in a southwest-nor<strong>the</strong>ast line<br />
with <strong>the</strong> older storms located far<strong>the</strong>r nor<strong>the</strong>ast and with a known average spacing between<br />
storms, it may be possible to detect an incipient storm by its position relative to <strong>the</strong> more<br />
noticeable mature storms and possible clues from <strong>the</strong> cloud system.<br />
In Fig. 1 is shown an actual cloud photograph taken from a V2 rocket at a height of<br />
100 miles above White Sands, New Mexico, on March 7, 1947. Unfortunately <strong>the</strong>re was no<br />
mature extra-tropical storm within <strong>the</strong> field of [272] view of <strong>the</strong> camera, and <strong>the</strong> clouds<br />
shown are mostly “fair-wea<strong>the</strong>r” clouds caused mainly by heating of <strong>the</strong> ground and lifting<br />
of <strong>the</strong> air by <strong>the</strong> mountains. The most prominent clouds are thousands of bright cumuli—<br />
arrayed in roughly parallel bands, called “cloud streets,” which usually indicate direction of<br />
<strong>the</strong> wind. These clouds usually occur two to eight miles above <strong>the</strong> surface, <strong>the</strong> higher cloud<br />
tops being associated with thunderstorms. The fuzzy clouds, so transparent that <strong>the</strong> cumulus<br />
clouds are visible through <strong>the</strong>m, are <strong>the</strong> high-level cirrus clouds found at heights eight<br />
to ten miles. Far to <strong>the</strong> west, off <strong>the</strong> California cost, are patches of <strong>the</strong> characteristic low<br />
California stratus clouds (height one to two miles) with parts of <strong>the</strong> ocean surface visible.<br />
The most that a meteorologist could obtain from such a cloud view would be <strong>the</strong> negative<br />
knowledge that no major storm is present plus some indication of <strong>the</strong> wind direction<br />
at cloud height and possibly <strong>the</strong> distribution of thunderstorms.<br />
In order to reconnoitre <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r most effectively, <strong>the</strong> Satellite Wea<strong>the</strong>r Station<br />
should have <strong>the</strong> following properties:—<br />
(a) It should be located far enough away to have an instantaneous field of view comparable<br />
to North America and adjacent ocean areas—similar to <strong>the</strong> area covered<br />
by <strong>the</strong> forecaster’s “working” chart.<br />
(b) It should not be so high that cloud areas and geographical features are not readily<br />
identifiable.<br />
(c) It should move in such a manner as to have <strong>the</strong> same cloud system in <strong>the</strong> field of<br />
view at least twice in a 12-hour period to obtain a track of <strong>the</strong> storm associated<br />
with <strong>the</strong> cloud system.<br />
(d) It should not move so fast that individual cloud systems cannot be located accurately<br />
with respect to known ground features.<br />
(e) It should cover <strong>the</strong> entire Earth in daylight at least once daily.<br />
(f) It should have a westward component of motion relative to <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface so<br />
as to detect quickly new storms which usually move from west to east.
180<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Such a vehicle is one which is located at 2•01 Earth’s radii from <strong>the</strong> Earth’s centre or<br />
about 4,000 miles from <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface and which has a period of rotation about <strong>the</strong><br />
Earth of exactly 4 hours. If <strong>the</strong> Earth were not rotating <strong>the</strong> vehicle would move in <strong>the</strong> same<br />
meridional plane through <strong>the</strong> North and South Poles. But since <strong>the</strong> Earth does rotate as<br />
<strong>the</strong> vehicle moves, its path relative to <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface is a series of curves.<br />
Let us assume that at noon on March 21 <strong>the</strong> vehicle is directed poleward from <strong>the</strong><br />
Equator at <strong>the</strong> 95th meridian west, at “0” hour. Assuming no external perturbations, <strong>the</strong><br />
orbit of <strong>the</strong> vehicle is always maintained in a plane parallel to its initial orbitary plane, but<br />
attached to <strong>the</strong> centre of <strong>the</strong> Earth in its motion through space. The Earth rotates under<br />
<strong>the</strong> vehicle in such a way that as <strong>the</strong> vehicle proceeds northwards, it crosses all latitudes at<br />
exactly noon and after one hour it passes over <strong>the</strong> North Pole; afterwards it <strong>the</strong>n moves<br />
southward at all latitudes at exactly midnight. At 2 hours it is at <strong>the</strong> Equator, at 3 at <strong>the</strong><br />
South Pole, after which it enters into <strong>the</strong> daylight hemisphere again crossing all latitudes<br />
at exactly noon in its northward passage. At 4 hours, it crosses <strong>the</strong> [273] Equator at <strong>the</strong><br />
155th meridian, west, and repeats a similar path on <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface, but displaced westward<br />
from its initial path. In 24 hours it returns to its initial point of departure after having<br />
made both a daylight (noon-time) and night (midnight) surveillance of <strong>the</strong> entire<br />
Earth’s surface.<br />
Twenty minutes after its departure on its first leg, when <strong>the</strong> vehicle has moved over<br />
Amarillo, Texas, its horizon will enclose an area almost identical to <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r chart used<br />
in preparation of wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts for North America and adjacent oceans.<br />
What would be seen from <strong>the</strong> vehicle at some 4,000 miles above Amarillo, Texas, at<br />
exactly noon on June 21? An attempt has been made to portray <strong>the</strong> scene below under <strong>the</strong><br />
assumption that <strong>the</strong> Sun is directly overhead. In drawing a chart before sketching in <strong>the</strong><br />
clouds, an attempt was made to indicate <strong>the</strong> surface features of <strong>the</strong> Earth, taking into<br />
account its normal colour and reflectivity (albedo) of sunlight, and <strong>the</strong> scattering and<br />
depleting effects on <strong>the</strong> passage of light through <strong>the</strong> Earth’s atmosphere in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
way:—<br />
(a) Normal illumination values at <strong>the</strong> surface were first entered in <strong>the</strong> chart according<br />
to zenith distance of <strong>the</strong> Sun.<br />
(b) Next, values of <strong>the</strong> apparent illumination or “brightness” were obtained by taking<br />
<strong>the</strong> product of <strong>the</strong> surface albedoes and <strong>the</strong> illuminations. For simplicity only two<br />
albedo figures were used: 4 per cent. for water and 15 per cent. for land. This<br />
<strong>the</strong>n gives <strong>the</strong> brightness field of <strong>the</strong> Earth before passage of <strong>the</strong> light up through<br />
<strong>the</strong> atmosphere.<br />
(c) Next <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface brightness was computed after depletion by <strong>the</strong> atmosphere,<br />
values for which are known from <strong>the</strong> incoming sunlight.<br />
(d) Next was computed <strong>the</strong> atmospheric contribution to <strong>the</strong> brightness field at <strong>the</strong><br />
vehicle. This was done by estimating from available observations, <strong>the</strong> portion of<br />
radiation coming from <strong>the</strong> sky to <strong>the</strong> ground (i.e. <strong>the</strong> downward radiation or “skylight”)<br />
and by assuming that <strong>the</strong> same fraction of illumination is scattered<br />
upward. This procedure assumes that <strong>the</strong> atmosphere is a “uniform diffuse reflector”<br />
of <strong>the</strong> brightness shown.<br />
(e) The two brightness values—from <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface and from <strong>the</strong> atmosphere—<br />
are added toge<strong>the</strong>r to give a total brightness.<br />
To distinguish <strong>the</strong> over-all brightness contrast between ocean and land, for example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> fractional contrast F = 2_______ BL – BO must be larger than 1/10. The computed values<br />
BL + BO of F (not shown) are considerably larger than this value, except near <strong>the</strong> periphery, indicating<br />
that for most of <strong>the</strong> observed area land can be readily distinguished from ocean.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 181<br />
Colour contrasts of objects on <strong>the</strong> ground tend to be suppressed in at least two ways:<br />
selective scattering of <strong>the</strong> bluer components by atmospheric molecules, and “dilution” of<br />
colours by <strong>the</strong> white diffuse component contributed by <strong>the</strong> non-selective foreign particle<br />
scattering in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere.<br />
The effect of <strong>the</strong> first type of scattering is to deplete <strong>the</strong> blue colours relatively more<br />
than <strong>the</strong> longer wave-lengths. The over-all effect is to emphasize red [274] colour components<br />
of <strong>the</strong> objects on <strong>the</strong> ground, as compared to <strong>the</strong> blue components; and to screen<br />
both with diffuse light consisting of a relatively large blue component mixed with white<br />
light. The over-all result would be to give a bluish tinge to what is seen, since <strong>the</strong> blue scattered<br />
from <strong>the</strong> incident solar beam would more than make up for <strong>the</strong> blue-depletion of<br />
light coming from <strong>the</strong> ground.<br />
As to <strong>the</strong> colour of <strong>the</strong> sky on <strong>the</strong> horizon, we might expect that <strong>the</strong>re would be a grey<br />
layer, corresponding to <strong>the</strong> atmosphere say in <strong>the</strong> lower 10,000 ft., with an upper thin blue<br />
region in <strong>the</strong> region of substantial Rayleigh scattering, and black above that.<br />
Thus, as a result of all <strong>the</strong>se calculations, a reasonable picture was obtained of <strong>the</strong> surface<br />
features of <strong>the</strong> Earth under normal conditions of June 21 ground cover illumination,<br />
albedo and atmospheric effects, but without clouds. Over this chart was sketched a hypo<strong>the</strong>tical<br />
cloud pattern normally associated with certain atmospheric disturbances. Albedo<br />
values were assigned to various cloud types and <strong>the</strong>ir brightness as computed. These “disturbances”<br />
included <strong>the</strong> following:—<br />
(a) A cyclone family of three storms in various stages of development extending from<br />
Hudson Bay south-westward to Texas.<br />
(b) The north-eastern part of ano<strong>the</strong>r such cyclone family whose oldest member is in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Gulf of Alaska, <strong>the</strong> remaining members to <strong>the</strong> southwest being invisible.<br />
(c) A fully developed hurricane embedded in “streets” of trade cumuli in <strong>the</strong> West<br />
Indies.<br />
(d) The Intertropic Convergence Zone (or Equatorial Front)—a zone of interaction<br />
between <strong>the</strong> north-east trades of <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn hemisphere and <strong>the</strong> south-east<br />
trades of <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn hemisphere—extending west of Isthmus of Panama to <strong>the</strong><br />
mid-Pacific.<br />
(e) A “line-squall”—favourite breeding-ground of severe wind storms and tornadoes—in<br />
<strong>the</strong> eastern U.S. moving ahead of <strong>the</strong> cold front and surrounded on<br />
both sides by <strong>the</strong> cauliflowerlike cumulus congestus.<br />
(f) Scattered cumulus clouds of varying thicknesses over <strong>the</strong> heated land areas—<br />
especially in <strong>the</strong> mountains and o<strong>the</strong>r areas where dynamic effects encourage <strong>the</strong><br />
lifting of air in vertical columns.<br />
(g) Altocumulus lenticularis or lens-shaped clouds formed by lifting of layers of moist<br />
air over mountains and usually found where <strong>the</strong> “jetstream” crosses mountains, as<br />
over <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Canadian Rockies.<br />
(h) Low stratus and fog found off <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn and lower California coasts, over <strong>the</strong><br />
Great Lakes, <strong>the</strong> Newfoundland area, formed by passage of warm moist air over<br />
cold surfaces.<br />
The cumulus cloud systems over <strong>the</strong> oceans will tend to fall in fairly regular patterns<br />
or “streets”—even more so than was observed over <strong>the</strong> rough terrain in <strong>the</strong> V2 picture.<br />
The regularity of <strong>the</strong> ocean cloud systems in <strong>the</strong> present sketch is probably exaggerated,<br />
but its breakdown into a more irregular pattern over land is believed to be real. The centres<br />
of <strong>the</strong> anticyclonic or “high pressure” areas are marked by little or no cloud.<br />
[275] This <strong>the</strong>n is <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>tical picture visible from <strong>the</strong> 4,000-mile high vehicle over<br />
Amarillo, Texas. Some of <strong>the</strong>se clouds, such as <strong>the</strong> Trade Cumuli, could undoubtedly be<br />
observed on almost any day and o<strong>the</strong>rs, such as <strong>the</strong> hurricane, seen only rarely. The<br />
cyclone families would be observed daily, but <strong>the</strong>ir location, <strong>the</strong> number of individual
182<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
storms, size and intensity would vary geographically. A meteorologist given a clear picture<br />
of <strong>the</strong> cloud distribution, as here portrayed, could without difficulty sketch in a very useful<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r chart showing location of <strong>the</strong> various stormy and fair wea<strong>the</strong>r areas; in fact, he<br />
would have a much better idea of <strong>the</strong> large-scale wea<strong>the</strong>r distribution than his Earthbound<br />
colleague, who is forced to rely on scattered observations taken at or near <strong>the</strong><br />
Earth’s surface.<br />
As for obtaining two or more “fixes” on storms within 12 hours, this would be possible<br />
as <strong>the</strong> vehicle makes successive passages toward <strong>the</strong> Poles—and <strong>the</strong> closer to <strong>the</strong> Pole<br />
<strong>the</strong> storm is located <strong>the</strong> more such fixes could be made. For example, <strong>the</strong> large fully developed<br />
storm depicted over Hudson Bay would be visible first on one leg of <strong>the</strong> path, again<br />
4 hours later on <strong>the</strong> next leg, and again 4 hours later on a third leg. This would, by reference<br />
to known surface features, enable tracking of <strong>the</strong> storm in <strong>the</strong> 12-hour interval. A<br />
word of caution is necessary since <strong>the</strong> clouds which on one hand make possible <strong>the</strong> visual<br />
identifications of <strong>the</strong> storm will hinder its location with respect to known surface features.<br />
Nor would trying to track <strong>the</strong> storm by observing <strong>the</strong> edge of its cloud shield<br />
necessarily give an accurate track, since <strong>the</strong> changing cloud pattern associated with such<br />
large, usually dissipating storms may give spurious motions, as <strong>the</strong>y form on one side and<br />
dissipate on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Thus, <strong>the</strong>re will not be too good an accuracy for tracking <strong>the</strong>se<br />
large storms, but this is not too important since <strong>the</strong>ir speed of motion is usually slow anyway.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> incipient or developing storm, so important for future wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
developments, is faster moving and has a less extensive cloud system associated with it<br />
so that more accurate fixes should be possible. The hurricane, with its cloud bands, similar<br />
to <strong>the</strong> arms of a spiral nebula, and its open “eye” at <strong>the</strong> centre, will be a much easier<br />
storm to detect and follow accurately. Cloud systems associated with cold fronts and squalllines<br />
will also lend <strong>the</strong>mselves to accurate tracking.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> days pass, however, and <strong>the</strong> Earth moves in its orbital motion about <strong>the</strong> Sun,<br />
<strong>the</strong> vehicle will cross each latitude about 4 minutes earlier than <strong>the</strong> preceding day. Thus,<br />
if motion northward is started at noon on March 21, this will change on June 21 to 6 a.m.<br />
moving north, and 6 p.m. moving south; in this case, <strong>the</strong> field of view in daylight will be<br />
mostly to <strong>the</strong> east (going north) and to <strong>the</strong> west (going south) and <strong>the</strong> efficiency of <strong>the</strong><br />
vehicle as a cloud patrol will have diminished considerably. On September 21 its efficiency<br />
will increase again as it moves south at noon and north at midnight. However, on<br />
December 21 its efficiency will drop again—and to its lowest point as far as <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Hemisphere is concerned. It will move north at 6 p.m. and south at 6 a.m.—but because<br />
of <strong>the</strong> low solar declination at this time and consequent lack of daylight hours, its usefulness<br />
as a cloud and storm detector will be greatly impaired. This is a serious defect because<br />
<strong>the</strong> winter season is <strong>the</strong> busiest period for storms in <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Hemisphere. This suggests<br />
as a better [276] solution that <strong>the</strong> preceding plan, <strong>the</strong> initial movement northward<br />
or southward at noon on December 21. This will <strong>the</strong>n give optimum conditions for winter<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r patrol—excluding <strong>the</strong> Arctic and some distance south where little or no daylight<br />
will prevail.<br />
This visual cloud reconnaissance might be taken automatically by a television camera<br />
in an unmanned vehicle and relayed to Earth to various collection centres for study, analysis<br />
and exchange with o<strong>the</strong>r forecast offices to obtain a truly global wea<strong>the</strong>r picture. If <strong>the</strong><br />
vehicle could be properly manned and equipped, <strong>the</strong>n o<strong>the</strong>r valuable geophysical and<br />
solar data could be obtained as follows:—<br />
(a) Temperature of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface and a rough average temperature of <strong>the</strong> intervening<br />
atmosphere by observing <strong>the</strong> infrared spectrum.<br />
(b) Precipitation Areas (rain, snow, etc.) could be detected by radar as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
heights of <strong>the</strong>ir formation above <strong>the</strong> surface; also <strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> freezing level<br />
which shows as a bright band in <strong>the</strong> radar scope.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 183<br />
(c) Thunderstorm Areas—by location of lightning ei<strong>the</strong>r visually (at night) or electronically<br />
(at day).<br />
(d) Solar Radiation measurements, particularly in <strong>the</strong> ultra-violet, to correlate with<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r changes in an attempt to see if unusual spells of wea<strong>the</strong>r are solar-controlled.<br />
(e) Albedo Measurements—to keep a global account of <strong>the</strong> day-to-day changes in reflectivity<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface to solar radiation from <strong>the</strong> ground and water surfaces<br />
(including snow and ice cover), clouds, atmospheric turbidity. Long-time variations<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Earth’s albedo could be correlated with similar variations in climate.<br />
For example, it has been estimated that a one-point drop in Earth’s albedo from<br />
its average value of 35 per cent. would lead to an average world-wide warming of<br />
1˚ C. The fraction of sky covered by clouds is of such critical importance in albedo<br />
changes that it has been estimated a variation in <strong>the</strong> average world cloudiness<br />
from 0•4 to 0•6 would explain <strong>the</strong> whole range of climatic changes—from ice<br />
ages to <strong>the</strong> intervening warm periods.<br />
(f) Meteoric Dust—samples could be obtained to test a recently proposed <strong>the</strong>ory that<br />
<strong>the</strong>se particles may serve as cloud-seeding agents, thus causing increases in rainfall,<br />
especially after meteoric showers. Samples of <strong>the</strong> dust to test in cold boxes,<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r with measurements of <strong>the</strong>ir natural concentration would shed direct evidence<br />
on a problem which heretofore has only been possible to treat statistically.<br />
In summary, it can be stated without question that a satellite vehicle, moving about<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth at <strong>the</strong> proper height and manner would be of inestimable value as a wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
patrol for short-range forecasting and as a collector of basic research information for solar<br />
and geophysical studies, including long-term wea<strong>the</strong>r changes and climatic variations.<br />
Document II-2<br />
Document title: S.M. Greenfield and W.W. Kellog, “Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle,” The RAND Corporation, R-365, August 1960,<br />
pp. v–vi, 1–23, 31.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> possible uses of an orbital satellite that Project RAND had addressed in its 1945 report<br />
“Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship” was predicting <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r by<br />
observing cloud patterns on a large scale. Recognizing <strong>the</strong> potential of such a capability, but unsure<br />
of how useful cloud images alone would be in predicting <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> Air Force commissioned<br />
Project RAND to conduct a fur<strong>the</strong>r study to determine more precisely what useful information could<br />
be gained from high-altitude observations. The fourteen figures accompanying <strong>the</strong> report are omitted<br />
here, but <strong>the</strong>ir captions are included.
184<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance<br />
from a Satellite Vehicle<br />
S. M. Greenfield and W. W. Kellogg<br />
August, 1960<br />
NOTE<br />
Originally published as classified Report R-218<br />
of <strong>the</strong> same title, dated April, 1951. Amended<br />
and released for open publication, August, 1960.<br />
[v] SUMMARY<br />
The value of observing <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r over inaccessible areas by aerial wea<strong>the</strong>r reconnaissance<br />
has been recognized for many years. An alternative method of obtaining broad<br />
coverage of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r, however, is thought to lie in <strong>the</strong> use of a special satellite vehicle<br />
which could observe cloud patterns. It is obvious that any meteorological reconnaissance<br />
utilizing only observations from such a high-altitude “eye” cannot provide quantitative values<br />
for <strong>the</strong> parameters normally associated with standard wea<strong>the</strong>r observation and forecasting<br />
techniques. In determining <strong>the</strong> feasibility of such a system, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong><br />
questions that must be answered are (1) What extent of coverage can be expected from a<br />
satellite viewing system? (2) In terms of resolution and contrast, what can be seen from<br />
<strong>the</strong> satellite? (3) Given proper coverage and resolution, what can actually be determined<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r situation from this information?<br />
General considerations of ease of satellite launching and photographic coverage suggest<br />
an orbiting altitude of 350 to 500 mi. 1 For <strong>the</strong> purpose of <strong>the</strong> present study, however,<br />
only <strong>the</strong> 350-mi altitude was considered to any extent. At this altitude, a vehicle would<br />
have an orbital velocity of about 24,870 ft/sec and would make one complete circuit of its<br />
orbit in 1.6 hr. Assuming that any regressive motion of <strong>the</strong> satellite’s orbit owing to <strong>the</strong> spatial<br />
motion and oblate shape of <strong>the</strong> earth is corrected for, and that <strong>the</strong> area it is desired to<br />
observe is in daylight during <strong>the</strong> vehicle passage for an extended period, this area will be<br />
covered and televised in a grid fashion once every 24 hr. It is visualized that, by means of<br />
mechanical scanning transverse to <strong>the</strong> path of <strong>the</strong> satellite, a continuous strip whose width<br />
is equal in order of magnitude to <strong>the</strong> altitude of <strong>the</strong> vehicle will be viewed. As an example<br />
of <strong>the</strong> sort of coverage which could be provided at middle latitudes, with a satellite at a<br />
354.6-mi altitude <strong>the</strong> fraction of <strong>the</strong> area between 45˚ and 50˚ latitude which can be covered<br />
grid-fashion with a 100-mi wide scanning path in 24 hr is one-third, and if <strong>the</strong> width<br />
of <strong>the</strong> path is increased to 450 mi, <strong>the</strong> 24-hr coverage is complete.<br />
Utilizing photographs from recent vertically fired rockets (V-2), an estimate of <strong>the</strong><br />
dimensions of <strong>the</strong> smallest increment necessary for proper cloud identification was made.<br />
This was found to be approximately 500 ft and is termed <strong>the</strong> “usable resolution” in this<br />
report: Entering Tables 1, 2, and 3, which give resolution versus contrast for various values<br />
of frame speed, aperture size, and various types of illumination, showed that it was possible<br />
to obtain this value of resolution in sunlight illumination with contrast between<br />
1. Additional information concerning <strong>the</strong> problems of satellite operation is given in <strong>the</strong> RAND Report<br />
R-217, April 1951 (out of print).
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 185<br />
cloud and background of less than 10 per cent. An examination of <strong>the</strong> albedos from typical<br />
background objects, as presented in Fig. 2 . . ., compared with cloud albedos seems to<br />
indicate that 10 per cent contrast is available over a wide range of [vi] possible cloudground<br />
and cloud-cloud combinations. This, <strong>the</strong>refore, appears to establish <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
of cloud identification from high altitudes, at least from <strong>the</strong> standpoint of contrast and<br />
resolution.<br />
Owing to <strong>the</strong> lack of quantitative measurements, <strong>the</strong> clouds must be utilized to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
utmost in determining <strong>the</strong> synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r picture. Experience and statistical climatological<br />
values play <strong>the</strong>ir part in forming this picture, and <strong>the</strong> process involves a “hunting<br />
technique” that oscillates between <strong>the</strong> three main tools at <strong>the</strong> analyst’s command. Some<br />
detailed estimates of various parameters are possible from <strong>the</strong> visual cloud characteristics.<br />
Items, such as moisture content, temperature gradient, stability, magnitude or direction<br />
of vertical pressure gradient, wind shear, and wind direction[,] all show promise of yielding<br />
good estimates of <strong>the</strong> actual values to this type of analysis and of helping to clarify <strong>the</strong><br />
final estimated synoptic picture. For any future operational use, this study has shown that<br />
such things as a cloud atlas of clouds viewed from above, complete climatological material<br />
on <strong>the</strong> area in question (including a possible statistical survey of fluctuations from <strong>the</strong><br />
normal of <strong>the</strong> various parameters as attributed to synoptic systems and broken down into<br />
small regions of similar climate and topography), and perimeter wea<strong>the</strong>r will immeasurably<br />
help <strong>the</strong> job of <strong>the</strong> observer and analyst. An aid to getting a “feel” for <strong>the</strong> problem<br />
involved, photographs from three rocket flights were analyzed and <strong>the</strong> synoptic situation<br />
was estimated. These results and <strong>the</strong> actual wea<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> corresponding times are presented<br />
in <strong>the</strong> section entitled “Results of Three Attempts at Analysis. . . .” In an attempt to<br />
correlate fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> rocket photographs with <strong>the</strong> actual synoptic picture, Dr. J. Bjerknes,<br />
of U.C.L.A., independently made an analysis of photographs taken on a flight on July 26,<br />
1948. In this analysis, all o<strong>the</strong>r synoptic meteorological data available for that date were<br />
utilized. . . .<br />
[1] INTRODUCTION<br />
The foundation of all meteorological forecasting systems is <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r-observing network.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> forecast is “local” or for <strong>the</strong> entire Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Hemisphere, <strong>the</strong> starting<br />
point must be an appraisal of <strong>the</strong> synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r picture. Since storm systems at middle<br />
latitudes generally move from west to east, a meteorologist who does not have good observations<br />
from a ra<strong>the</strong>r wide area (particularly to <strong>the</strong> west) is at a disadvantage; and such is<br />
often <strong>the</strong> case for coastal regions, since wea<strong>the</strong>r reporting over <strong>the</strong> oceans is often inadequate.<br />
Although ship reports and wea<strong>the</strong>r reconnaissance by aircraft help to some extent to<br />
fill <strong>the</strong> gap, <strong>the</strong>re has long been a need for extending wea<strong>the</strong>r observations over <strong>the</strong><br />
oceans and inaccessible areas. A solution to this problem may lie in wea<strong>the</strong>r observations<br />
made by means of a television camera placed in an unmanned satellite vehicle. Such a<br />
method has <strong>the</strong> advantage of providing a means of observation of <strong>the</strong> over-all picture of<br />
<strong>the</strong> wide-scale wea<strong>the</strong>r situation that is lacking in normal daily wea<strong>the</strong>r observations, and<br />
should give new insight into <strong>the</strong> behavior of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere.<br />
It is obvious that in observing <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r through <strong>the</strong> “eye” of a high-altitude robot<br />
almost all of <strong>the</strong> regular quantitative measurements usually associated with meteorology<br />
must fall by <strong>the</strong> wayside. It is impossible to make more than an intelligent guess at <strong>the</strong> values<br />
of temperature, pressure, humidity, and <strong>the</strong> remaining quantitative meteorological<br />
parameters. Because of this, <strong>the</strong> analyst must rely on <strong>the</strong> visible components of meteorology<br />
to ascertain to some usable degree <strong>the</strong> synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r situation.
186<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Clouds, being <strong>the</strong> objects most easily discernible from extreme altitudes, become <strong>the</strong><br />
important item and must be utilized to <strong>the</strong> utmost in forming a synoptic picture. It is<br />
apparent that from clouds alone it will be impossible to tell everything about <strong>the</strong> current<br />
synoptic situation. Combined, however, with both <strong>the</strong>oretical knowledge and that gained<br />
through experience, an accurate cloud analysis can produce surprisingly good results.<br />
The purpose of this report is to present methods of attack on <strong>the</strong> above problem, to<br />
show what may be actually seen from high-altitude photographs (primarily a discussion on<br />
necessary resolution and area coverages), to discuss what may be determined from <strong>the</strong>se<br />
photographs (both directly and indirectly), and to give some results obtained. Although<br />
all <strong>the</strong> present analysis is based on data obtained from vertically fired rockets, <strong>the</strong> experience<br />
gained <strong>the</strong>refrom permits recommendations on possible methods of forming a synoptic<br />
picture from satellite-missile photographs.<br />
[2] THE SATELLITE VEHICLE<br />
Owing to <strong>the</strong> ever-changing pattern of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere, <strong>the</strong> need for almost constant<br />
surveillance must be foremost in any plan to trace synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r situations. Any vehicle<br />
designed for such a purpose must <strong>the</strong>refore have <strong>the</strong> ability to make many trips over <strong>the</strong><br />
area in question. These traverses, moreover, must be made in such a fashion that <strong>the</strong>y not<br />
only cover a representative portion of <strong>the</strong> area, but also complete <strong>the</strong>ir cycle often enough<br />
to enable an observer to notice any significant change or shift in <strong>the</strong> cloud systems.<br />
Such a vehicle is <strong>the</strong> satellite. Flying high above <strong>the</strong> sensible part of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere,<br />
so that atmospheric drag becomes negligible, <strong>the</strong> satellite becomes an unparalleled instrument<br />
for wea<strong>the</strong>r reconnaissance when scope of view is considered. For <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
simplicity, all calculations and performance considerations in this report will be based on<br />
a satellite assumed to be circling <strong>the</strong> earth at an altitude of about 350 mi. 2 At this altitude<br />
such a vehicle 3 would have an orbital velocity equal to 24,870 ft/sec 4 and would make one<br />
complete circuit of its orbit in 1.6 hr. Also, because of <strong>the</strong> fact that this missile is <strong>the</strong>oretically<br />
moving in a stable orbit around <strong>the</strong> earth, <strong>the</strong> globe turning under <strong>the</strong> vehicle causes<br />
<strong>the</strong> trajectory of <strong>the</strong> satellite to appear to “creep” over <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> earth, <strong>the</strong>reby<br />
increasing <strong>the</strong> area observed. 5 Depending on <strong>the</strong> efficiency of <strong>the</strong> power plant, <strong>the</strong> order<br />
of magnitude of <strong>the</strong> time period for which <strong>the</strong> vehicle could be kept operating is thought<br />
to be 1 yr. However, in attempting to decide <strong>the</strong> satellite’s full worth for wea<strong>the</strong>r reconnaissance,<br />
<strong>the</strong> questions that must be considered are as follows: Can enough be seen from<br />
such altitude to enable an intelligent, usable, wea<strong>the</strong>r (cloud) observation to be made,<br />
and what can be determined from <strong>the</strong>se observations?<br />
2. Ibid.<br />
3. The actual altitude to which <strong>the</strong>se figures apply is 354.6 mi.<br />
4. The actual velocity of a projection of <strong>the</strong> satellite’s image over <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> globe is really a variable<br />
resulting from <strong>the</strong> change in angular velocity from latitude circle to latitude circle.<br />
5. It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> concept of “repetitive traverses” is in itself complicated in that, regardless<br />
of <strong>the</strong> stability of <strong>the</strong> satellite orbit, <strong>the</strong> spatial movement and <strong>the</strong> oblate shape of <strong>the</strong> earth impart a regressive<br />
motion to <strong>the</strong> vehicle relative to fixed points on <strong>the</strong> earth. From a satellite at approximately 350-mi altitude<br />
in an orbit set tangent to a latitude of 56˚, 78 days will be required for it to appear twice over <strong>the</strong> same point on<br />
earth at exactly <strong>the</strong> same time. This regressive motion can be partially corrected by an adjustment of <strong>the</strong> speed<br />
(through altitude change) of <strong>the</strong> satellite. It fur<strong>the</strong>r imparts a limitation on successful viewing in that for approximately<br />
half of <strong>the</strong> 78-day period (assuming 12 hr of photographable time out of every 24) <strong>the</strong> desired area will<br />
have night at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> satellite’s passage. For a complete discussion of regression of <strong>the</strong> orbit, <strong>the</strong> interested<br />
reader is referred to RAND Report R-217 (see footnote 1 . . .).
[3] WHAT CAN BE SEEN<br />
Naturally, any estimate of <strong>the</strong> amount that can be seen from an extreme altitude must<br />
be a function of both <strong>the</strong> resolving power of <strong>the</strong> camera system and <strong>the</strong> area that can be<br />
scanned and recorded (or televised) and still retain usable data. Much of <strong>the</strong> discussion<br />
and most of <strong>the</strong> figures in this section are <strong>the</strong> result of previous RAND studies conducted<br />
by Dr. R. S. Wehner.<br />
Using <strong>the</strong> relation (see Fig. 1)<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 187<br />
AREA COVERAGE<br />
Fig. 1—Viewing system<br />
W = w = 2 tan a,<br />
F d 2<br />
where W = sensitive element width, in.<br />
w = width of surface pictured per frame, mi.<br />
F = focal length of camera, in.<br />
d = optical range, mi.<br />
a = angle of view, deg.,<br />
and using Tables 1, 2, and 3, it is possible to compute <strong>the</strong> width of square surface viewed<br />
and <strong>the</strong> angle of view for any given camera and aperture. This has been done and is summarized<br />
in Table 4. As can be seen, if a limiting resolution 6 of 500 ft is [4] set, it is still possible<br />
to obtain this resolving power under sunlight illumination with a contrast as low as<br />
2.5 per cent (with a 5.0-in. aperture). Under moonlight, however, this resolution is possible<br />
only with 100 per cent contrast, a very fast f/1.4 lens, and a minimum exposure time<br />
of 0.25 sec; under light of <strong>the</strong> night sky illumination it is not possible at all. Assuming,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n, that <strong>the</strong> chosen limiting resolution is correct, <strong>the</strong> probability of obtaining identifiable<br />
cloud photographs under any but sunlight illumination appears to be small.<br />
6. The term “limiting resolution,” as used in <strong>the</strong> television field, refers to <strong>the</strong> greatest possible resolution<br />
attainable by a given TV pick-up tube and is wholly dependent on <strong>the</strong> structural make-up of <strong>the</strong> tube itself.<br />
As used in this report, limiting, minimum, or usable resolution is a quantity depending on scene contrast signalto-noise<br />
ratio, aperture, f number of camera, etc., and is chosen to pick up <strong>the</strong> smallest object that it is desired<br />
to view.
188<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Table 1*<br />
RESOLUTION OF CLOUDS BY SUNLIGHT<br />
(Image orthicon f/10 camera operated at 20:1; + signal-to-noise ratio<br />
at rates of 40, 10, and 4 exposure frames/sec; and a satellite height of 350 mi)<br />
Minimum Resolvable Surface Dimension<br />
Contrast Aperture 40 Frames/Sec 10 Frames/Sec 4 Frames/Sec<br />
(%) (in.) (ft) (ft) (ft)<br />
100 0.5 200± 100± 64±<br />
1.0 100± 50± 32±<br />
2.0 50± 25± 16±<br />
5.0 20± 10± 6±<br />
25 0.5 800 400± 250±<br />
1.0 400 200± 125±<br />
2.0 200 100± 64±<br />
5.0 80 40± 25±<br />
10 0.5 2,000 1,000 640<br />
1.0 1,000 500 320<br />
2.0 500 250 160<br />
5.0 200 100 64<br />
2.5 0.5 8,000 4,000 2,500<br />
1.0 4,000 2,000 1,250<br />
2.0 2,000 1,000 640<br />
5.0 800 400 250<br />
1 0.5 20,000 10,000 6,400<br />
1.0 10,000 5,000 3,200<br />
2.0 5,000 2,500 1,000<br />
5.0 2,000 1,000 640<br />
* The material contained in this table was prepared by Dr. R. S. Wehner and is included<br />
in RAND Report R-217 (see footnote 1 . . .).<br />
+ It should be noted that this table (and also Tables 2 and 3) is unrealistic in that <strong>the</strong><br />
20:1 signal-to-noise ratio is applicable only to 25 per cent contrast. For 10 per cent<br />
contrast, a signal-to-noise ratio of 50:1 is required. This would mean a required transmitter<br />
power increase by a factor of 2.5 (assuming a 2-in. aperture 1000 TV lines, and<br />
a frame frequency of 10 sec). This is still not prohibitive but does become so with a<br />
substantial increase in ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> number of TV lines or <strong>the</strong> frame frequency.<br />
± Values of computed resolution smaller than realizable with present commercial image<br />
orthicons.
[5] Table 2*<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 189<br />
RESOLUTION OF CLOUDS BY SECOND- AND THIRD-QUARTER MOONLIGHT<br />
(Image orthicon f/1.4 camera operated at 20:1; signal-to-noise ratio<br />
at rates of 40, 10, and 4 exposure frames/sec; and a satellite height of 350 mi)<br />
Minimum Resolvable Surface Dimension<br />
Contrast Aperture 40 Frames/Sec 10 Frames/Sec 4 Frames/Sec<br />
(%) (in.) (ft) (ft) (ft)<br />
100 5 1.08 0.54 0.34<br />
10 0.54 0.27 0.17<br />
20 0.27 0.14 0.09<br />
25 5 4.32 2.16 1.36<br />
10 2.16 1.08 0.68<br />
20 1.08 0.54 0.34<br />
10 5 10.8 5.4 3.4<br />
10 5.4 2.7 1.7<br />
20 2.7 1.35 0.85<br />
* The material contained in this table is included in RAND Report R-217 (see footnote 1. . .).<br />
Table 3*<br />
RESOLUTION OF CLOUDS BY LIGHT OF THE NIGHT SKY<br />
(Image orthicon f/0.7 camera operated at 20:1; signal-to-noise ratio<br />
at rates of 40, 10, and 4 exposure frames/sec; and a satellite height of 350 mi)<br />
Minimum Resolvable Surface Dimension<br />
Contrast Aperture 40 Frames/Sec 10 Frames/Sec 4 Frames/Sec<br />
(%) (in.) (ft) (ft) (ft)<br />
100 10 4.3 2.15 1.36<br />
20 2.15 1.08 0.68<br />
40 1.08 0.54 0.34<br />
25 10 17.2 8.6 5.4<br />
20 8.6 4.3 2.7<br />
40 4.3 2.15 1.36<br />
10 10 43.0 21.5 13.6<br />
20 21.5 10.8 6.8<br />
40 10.8 5.4 3.4<br />
* The material contained in this table is included in RAND Report R-217 (see footnote 1. . .).
190<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
[6] Table 4<br />
POSSIBLE PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES FOR VARIOUS IMAGE ORTHICON<br />
CAMERAS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ILLUMINATION SOURCES<br />
Ratio of Focal Approx. Minimum Computed Width<br />
Length to Aperture Contrast Necessary Computed Angle of Square Surface<br />
Diameter, and Focal to Give at Least Maximum of View of Viewed in Each<br />
Illumination Aperture Length 500-Ft Resolution Number of Each Frame Frame+<br />
Source* (in.) (in.) (%) Frames/Sec (deg) (mi)<br />
f/10 camera, 0.5 5 25 10 11.44 70<br />
clouds 1.0 10 10 10 5.74 35<br />
illuminated by 2.0 20 10 40 2.86 17.5<br />
sunlight 5.0 50 2.5 10 1.14 7<br />
f/1.4 camera, 5 (‡) (‡) (‡) (‡) (‡)<br />
clouds 10 (‡) (‡) (‡) (‡) (‡)<br />
illuminated by 20 28 100 4 2.05 1.25<br />
2nd- and<br />
3rd-quarter<br />
moons<br />
f/0.7 camera, ... (**) (**) (**) (**) (**)<br />
light of<br />
night sky<br />
illumination<br />
NOTE: For <strong>the</strong> purpose of computation, in <strong>the</strong> relation written on p. 3:<br />
W =width of <strong>the</strong> target in inches, which is taken to be equal to 1 in., <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong><br />
commercial RCA image orthicon target<br />
d = optical range, which is taken to be equal to 350 mi (<strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> satellite).<br />
All computations made assuming a minimum signal-to-noise ratio of 20:1.<br />
* All cameras mentioned here refer to those using an image orthicon tube.<br />
+ Since <strong>the</strong> curvature of <strong>the</strong> earth was not taken into account, <strong>the</strong> figures in this column<br />
are lower than <strong>the</strong> actual figures.<br />
‡ No resolution of <strong>the</strong> order of 500 ft or less.<br />
** No resolution of <strong>the</strong> order of 500 ft or less, regardless of aperture.<br />
[7] Calculations must also be performed to arrive at <strong>the</strong> possible area coverage. Since it<br />
is apparent that cloud observations, to be at all useful, have to be made over a wideenough<br />
strip (at least as wide as <strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> satellite), it should be considered that<br />
<strong>the</strong> camera will be mechanically scanned. This may be accomplished by means of a 45˚<br />
plane mirror rotatable about <strong>the</strong> axis of <strong>the</strong> camera. The mirror actually does <strong>the</strong> “looking”<br />
and scanning for <strong>the</strong> camera, which is mounted horizontally, its axis being parallel to<br />
<strong>the</strong> axis of <strong>the</strong> missile. Taking a sequence of 20 nonoverlapping frames will produce a strip<br />
350 mi long, transverse to <strong>the</strong> trajectory of <strong>the</strong> satellite, and 17.5 mi wide. If <strong>the</strong> camera is<br />
set to take 5 frames/sec and <strong>the</strong> rotatable mirror is fixed with a fast snap-back device, <strong>the</strong><br />
system will <strong>the</strong>n be in position to take a second strip by <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> satellite has moved<br />
ahead approximately 17.5 mi relative to <strong>the</strong> earth. (The speed of <strong>the</strong> missile relative to <strong>the</strong><br />
earth’s surface is about 4.4 mi/sec.) This will produce a continuous 350-mi-wide strip<br />
around <strong>the</strong> earth with each complete traverse of <strong>the</strong> missile.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 191<br />
The daylight camera with an f/10 lens and an image orthicon television tube[,] and<br />
whose performance is summarized in Table 4, should have a 2-in. objective to give <strong>the</strong><br />
proper ground coverage per frame. This combination allows a 500-ft object to be resolved<br />
with only 10 per cent contrast, 7 which is reasonably small. It should be emphasized that<br />
<strong>the</strong>se figures are presented here merely to give some examples of performance of viewing<br />
systems and not as a description of <strong>the</strong> optimum system performance.<br />
Some calculations of <strong>the</strong> efficiency of coverage of an inaccessible area such as an ocean<br />
were also made by direct measurements (assuming different strip widths) on a grid map. On<br />
this map were projected complete cycles 8 of traverses for two proposed satellite trajectories.<br />
Once again, curvature of <strong>the</strong> earth was neglected. The results obtained are as follows:<br />
1. For a satellite with 24-hr complete cycle (354.6-mi altitude, angular velocity 15<br />
times that of earth, and trajectory tangent to lat. 56˚N.)—<br />
Assuming a 100-mi-wide scanning band (50 mi on ei<strong>the</strong>r side of path): In <strong>the</strong> vicinity of<br />
lat. 45˚–50˚N., we find that in 24 hr <strong>the</strong> surface has been covered in a grid fashion<br />
such that about one-third of its area has been scanned and presumably televised.<br />
Assuming a 200-mi-wide scanning band (100 mi on ei<strong>the</strong>r side of path): As may be<br />
expected, doubling <strong>the</strong> scanning band does not quite double <strong>the</strong> area covered.<br />
This is owing to some overlapping of <strong>the</strong> bands. (It can be shown that, [8] to<br />
cover <strong>the</strong> area completely, a scanning band approximately 450 mi in width is<br />
needed.)<br />
As a result of <strong>the</strong> grid-like coverage, <strong>the</strong> 100-mi-wide band, at its worst, should pick<br />
up at least portions of <strong>the</strong> largest, most active wea<strong>the</strong>r disturbances and enough<br />
of <strong>the</strong> remaining cloud coverage to orient <strong>the</strong> system in relation to <strong>the</strong> ground.<br />
2. For a 48-hr complete cycle (altitude 453.3 mi, angular velocity 14.5 times that of<br />
<strong>the</strong> earth, and trajectory tangent to lat. 56˚N.)—<br />
Assuming a 100-mi-wide scanning band (50 on ei<strong>the</strong>r side of path): In <strong>the</strong> vicinity of lat.<br />
45˚–50˚N., we find that in 48 hr it has been covered, grid fashion, so that twothirds<br />
of its area has been scanned and presumably televised. (It can be shown<br />
that to cover <strong>the</strong> area completely in a 48-hr cycle, a scanning band approximately<br />
250–300 mi in width should be required.)<br />
The results so obtained give an idea of <strong>the</strong> areas which can be covered (or scanned)<br />
from a vehicle in an orbit 350 mi above <strong>the</strong> surface of <strong>the</strong> earth. The 350-mi-wide strip discussed<br />
in <strong>the</strong> first part of this section will <strong>the</strong>refore cover in 24 hr a large percentage of <strong>the</strong><br />
area between 45˚N. and 56˚N. 9 with considerable overlapping of scanning, particularly<br />
7. This resolution and contrast represents <strong>the</strong> maximum needs of satellite wea<strong>the</strong>r observation. This is<br />
obtainable with 25 percent contrast when using an f/10 lens with a 2-in. objective in sunlight illumination (see<br />
footnote to Table 1 marked (+).<br />
8. Initially, <strong>the</strong> trajectory of <strong>the</strong> satellite is set tangent to a given latitude. Owing to <strong>the</strong> relative difference<br />
in <strong>the</strong> angular velocities between <strong>the</strong> satellite and <strong>the</strong> earth and to <strong>the</strong> relative stability of <strong>the</strong> orbit of <strong>the</strong><br />
missile, <strong>the</strong> vehicle’s trajectory appears to “creep” over <strong>the</strong> surface of <strong>the</strong> globe. A complete cycle is <strong>the</strong> time it<br />
takes for <strong>the</strong> trajectory of <strong>the</strong> satellite once again to become tangent to <strong>the</strong> original point. (This “creep” causes<br />
<strong>the</strong> traverses to become more widely dispersed as <strong>the</strong> trajectory approaches <strong>the</strong> equator.)<br />
9. A large percentage of <strong>the</strong> area should be covered in <strong>the</strong> 24-hr trajectory, and almost all should be<br />
scanned in <strong>the</strong> 48-hr trajectory.
192<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
around <strong>the</strong> 56th parallel. In any event, <strong>the</strong> coverage, as mentioned here, if achieved with<br />
any measure of success, should produce good wea<strong>the</strong>r reconnaissance results.<br />
RESOLUTION AND LIMITING CONTRASTS<br />
Since it is now obvious that clouds will be <strong>the</strong> chief meteorological element directly<br />
observable from high altitude photographs, it must be ascertained how closely <strong>the</strong>se clouds<br />
may be identified and what may be determined from <strong>the</strong>m, ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or indirectly.<br />
As can be seen from Tables 1, 2, and 3, when a set of conditions such as aperture, illumination,<br />
exposure time, and focal length-aperture diameter ratio of a given camera have<br />
been established, <strong>the</strong> remaining factor for determination of <strong>the</strong> minimum resolution<br />
attainable is <strong>the</strong> contrast value. In cloud photography of <strong>the</strong> type to be attempted from<br />
<strong>the</strong> satellite, one is unable to choose <strong>the</strong> surrounding photographic conditions. Features<br />
such as background, lighting at time of observation, etc., are examples of <strong>the</strong> uncontrolled<br />
variables, and, as a consequence, any system of data ga<strong>the</strong>ring by photographic<br />
means must be flexible enough to give adequate results over a wide range of limiting factors.<br />
The question is: If <strong>the</strong> camera and optical system are chosen, 10 and if <strong>the</strong> various conditions<br />
of lighting, background, etc., are assumed to remain within <strong>the</strong> limits providing<br />
[9] usable resolution, will <strong>the</strong> resulting limiting contrast values still enable one to observe<br />
<strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r under a wide-enough range of actual conditions?<br />
Before endeavoring to answer this question it is desirable to define <strong>the</strong> term “usable<br />
resolution.” It was thought that details of cloud structure as small as several hundred feet<br />
in diameter might possess significance when an attempt was made to form a synoptic picture<br />
by means of cloud analysis. This was borne out when high-altitude rocket photographs<br />
were examined. Fur<strong>the</strong>r reasons for asserting this to be <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
minimum size to be resolved were found when a simple test was conducted on <strong>the</strong>se photographs.<br />
(The heights at which <strong>the</strong>se pictures were taken varied between 50 and 70 mi.)<br />
Using an adjustable viewer, <strong>the</strong> photograph was taken slowly out of focus until it was<br />
impossible to identify definitely <strong>the</strong> forms of clouds o<strong>the</strong>r than by saying that <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
widespread or were in small clusters. For example, beyond this point it was impossible to<br />
distinguish between closely packed cumulus and a deck of altocumulus, and also between<br />
a dense layer of stratus or altostratus and <strong>the</strong> fibrous texture of cirrostratus. A study of<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r parts of <strong>the</strong> photograph, where recognizable or measurable objects were located at<br />
ranges about equal to those of <strong>the</strong> clouds, showed that <strong>the</strong> limiting resolution at which <strong>the</strong><br />
clouds lost <strong>the</strong>ir distinguishability was from 500 to 1000 ft. This is what is meant by “usable<br />
resolution.” As may be imagined, this is at best only a rough approximation, but because<br />
of its apparent agreement with previously estimated values it should serve very well as a<br />
working basis.<br />
It was mentioned above that in order to obtain a known, usable resolution, once <strong>the</strong><br />
camera and lighting conditions are chosen, <strong>the</strong> limiting contrast value must also be spec-<br />
10. Previous studies at RAND have shown that one of <strong>the</strong> best available television cameras for use in <strong>the</strong><br />
satellite would be one employing an image orthicon pick-up tube. The characteristics of this tube approach those of<br />
<strong>the</strong> human eye over part of its operating range, it has a greater sensitivity than earlier types, and it is capable of<br />
stable operation without adjustment over a wide range of illumination intensity. Since it is not <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
this report to delve too deeply into <strong>the</strong> technical aspects of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems of a television viewing system, only<br />
results of resolution computation of <strong>the</strong> image orthicon tube are presented here. These are summed up in<br />
Tables 1, 2, and 3. For technical information and equations involved, see R. B. James, R. E. Johnson, and R. S.<br />
Moore, RCA Review, Vol. 10 July 1949, pp. 191–223; and A. Rose, “Television Pickup Tubes and <strong>the</strong> Problem of<br />
Vision,” Advances in Electronics, Vol. 1, Academic Press, New York, 1948.
ified. It is obvious that if, for various combinations of cloud-ground and cloud-cloud,<br />
albedo differences are such that <strong>the</strong>ir contrast values fall below <strong>the</strong> limiting contrast, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
combinations cannot be observed by high-altitude wea<strong>the</strong>r reconnaissance.<br />
Hewson, in an article in a meteorological journal 11 and in his book (written in collaboration<br />
with Longley) on <strong>the</strong>oretical and applied meteorology, 12 calculated and tabulated<br />
diffuse-reflection coefficients for clouds of various thicknesses. In doing so, as a result of<br />
<strong>the</strong> extensive variation of cloud liquid-water densities and cloud droplet radii, he was<br />
forced to choose one set of values for <strong>the</strong>se two parameters. Those on which his figures<br />
are based are a density of 1.0 gm of liquid water per cubic meter of cloud and a droplet<br />
radius of 5 X 10-4 cm. Owing to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>se values probably apply to a large percentage<br />
of <strong>the</strong> usable clouds observable from extreme altitudes, <strong>the</strong>y may be reasonably<br />
[10] employed in making estimates for this study. These values are plotted in Fig. 2, <strong>the</strong><br />
ordinate and abscissa being contrast and background albedo, respectively. Each curve represents<br />
a particular albedo applicable to a particular cloud thickness. According to <strong>the</strong><br />
definition of contrast,<br />
C= P b - P d<br />
P b<br />
where Pb = brightness (albedo) of <strong>the</strong> brightest thing viewed (ei<strong>the</strong>r object or background)<br />
Pd = brightness of darkest object viewed (albedo)<br />
C = contrast between <strong>the</strong> two.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> above definition, each curve may be represented by <strong>the</strong> following relation:<br />
{1 - A b , for A b < A t<br />
A t<br />
C { = 0, for A b = A t<br />
{1 - A t , for A b > A t<br />
A b<br />
where C = contrast between object and background<br />
A b = albedo of background<br />
A t = albedo of clouds of various thicknesses.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 193<br />
It is <strong>the</strong>refore seen that, except for <strong>the</strong> small range of albedo combinations around<br />
<strong>the</strong> point of discontinuity on <strong>the</strong> curves, a large majority of possible cloud-background<br />
albedo combinations fall within <strong>the</strong> range of at least 10 per cent contrast. As can be seen<br />
from Table 1, assuming at least a 2.0-in. aperture and sunlight illumination, an f/10 camera<br />
will permit at least 10 per cent contrast for approximately 500-ft resolutions. 13 Table 5<br />
11. E. W. Hewson, Quart. J. Roy. Met Soc., Vol. 69 (1943), p. 47.<br />
12. E. W. Hewson and R. W. Longley, Meteorology, Theoretical and Applied, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New<br />
York, 1944, pp. 73–75.<br />
13. Using <strong>the</strong> equation (for altitude of 350 mi)<br />
C = 1600<br />
where C = contrast<br />
a = aperture<br />
ga t<br />
t = exposure time (or time of one frame)<br />
g = minimum resolvable surface dimension,<br />
it is possible to calculate <strong>the</strong> contrast (minimum) needed to obtain at least 500 ft resolution under <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
given in <strong>the</strong> example of ground coverage which assumed full daylight illumination. This value turns out to<br />
be 3.56 per cent. Owing to <strong>the</strong> unrealistic power requirements necessary to transmit 3.56 per cent contrast, this<br />
value has been raised to 10 per cent.
194<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
. . . gives <strong>the</strong> albedos for various ground covers. Applying <strong>the</strong>se values to Fig. 2, it can be<br />
seen that, except for <strong>the</strong> case of newly fallen snow combined with clouds thicker than<br />
600 meters and <strong>the</strong> case in which <strong>the</strong> background albedo approaches very close to cloud<br />
albedo, 500-ft resolutions are obtainable over a wide range of conditions.<br />
There is one o<strong>the</strong>r factor that might limit contrast and, <strong>the</strong>refore, resolution. This is<br />
aerial haze between <strong>the</strong> camera and <strong>the</strong> ground. As has recently been shown in several<br />
[11] [original placement of “Fig 2—Available contrast with varying cloud and background<br />
albedos”] V-2 photographs, this problem is almost completely solved by use of an infrared<br />
filter in <strong>the</strong> optical system.<br />
Fig. 2—Available contrast with varying cloud and background albedos<br />
From <strong>the</strong> foregoing section we may conclude that, from <strong>the</strong> standpoint of area coverage<br />
and resolution, wea<strong>the</strong>r observations from a satellite are a definite possibility.<br />
[12] Table 5*<br />
SURFACE ALBEDO AND SCENE CONTRAST OF CLOUDS<br />
AGAINST VARIOUS BACKGROUND SURFACES<br />
Ground Surface Albedo + References ±<br />
Fresh snow .80-.93 1, 3, 4<br />
Old snow, sea ice .40-.60 3, 4<br />
Brown soil .32 1<br />
Grass .10-.33 4<br />
Green leaves .25 1<br />
Sandy loam .24 2<br />
Sand .13-/18 3<br />
Asphalt paving .15 2<br />
Dry earth .14 4<br />
Rock .12-.15 4<br />
Moist earth .08-.09 2, 4<br />
Cultivated soil, vegetable .07-.09 3<br />
Smooth sea surface<br />
Solar elev 5 deg .40 3<br />
Solar elev 10 deg .25<br />
Solar elev 20 deg .12<br />
Solar elev 30 deg .06<br />
Solar elev 40 deg .04<br />
Solar elev 50-90 deg .03<br />
* This table was prepared by Dr. R. S. Wehner and is included in <strong>the</strong> RAND general<br />
report on <strong>the</strong> satellite (see footnote 1 . . .).<br />
+ Values of albedo apply to illumination by “white” light or sunlight.<br />
± References:<br />
1. International Critical Tables, 1929 ed., Vol. 5, p. 262.<br />
2. Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 1942 ed., pp. 2147–2148.<br />
3. H. Landsberg, Handbook of Meteorology, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New<br />
York, 1945, p. 932.<br />
4. J. Charney, Handbook of Meteorology, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New<br />
York, 1945, p.296.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 195<br />
[13] LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS<br />
It is a known fact that <strong>the</strong> reliability of any form of synoptic meteorological analysis<br />
depends on <strong>the</strong> experience of <strong>the</strong> analyst. An analysis of <strong>the</strong> type dealt with in this report<br />
is no exception. If anything, it is even more dependent on analytical experience because<br />
of <strong>the</strong> sparseness of data and <strong>the</strong> difficulties in interpretation. To date, <strong>the</strong> meteorological<br />
cloud atlas has been built up almost entirely from ground observations. The<br />
changeover to “looking down” upon <strong>the</strong> clouds means that <strong>the</strong> dominant features which<br />
served to identify types of clouds when observed from <strong>the</strong> ground are no longer to be<br />
seen. The halo and corona that served so well to classify cirrostratus and altostratus,<br />
respectively, are absent. Also, <strong>the</strong> upper surface of large scale cloud decks is, for <strong>the</strong> most<br />
part, completely different in appearance from <strong>the</strong> lower surface. Therefore a completely<br />
new concept of cloud-identification features must be formed, and only those experienced<br />
on <strong>the</strong>se new concepts will be able to make an intelligent analysis.<br />
There is also danger of an incorrect interpretation of <strong>the</strong> cause for <strong>the</strong> clouds, which<br />
might lead to a completely erroneous analysis. Take, for example, <strong>the</strong> case in which <strong>the</strong><br />
entire picture under consideration exhibits one complete deck of clouds. In this case <strong>the</strong><br />
deck of clouds might be stratus caused by radiational cooling and so might constitute an<br />
entirely local phenomenon. An analyst looking at this situation might jump to <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
that <strong>the</strong> clouds in question were of frontal origin, possibly altostratus, and might<br />
forecast accordingly. It is evident that a forecast made from such an erroneous assumption<br />
of <strong>the</strong> cause would be completely incorrect. (Methods of attack on this problem of analysis<br />
are treated more fully in a later section of this report.)<br />
There are also many definite advantages to be gained in <strong>the</strong> analysis of wea<strong>the</strong>r by this<br />
method; chief among <strong>the</strong>se is <strong>the</strong> fact that extremely large areas may be visually observed<br />
in a relatively short period of time. The disadvantages of large gaps (between stations) on<br />
<strong>the</strong> usual wea<strong>the</strong>r map and <strong>the</strong> comparatively limited field of view of each ground observer<br />
are eliminated. What is obtained is, in effect, <strong>the</strong> cloud pattern integrated over a wide<br />
area. From many points of view this is highly desirable, owing to <strong>the</strong> fact that, for <strong>the</strong> first<br />
time in <strong>the</strong> history of synoptic meteorology, <strong>the</strong> classical models of various wea<strong>the</strong>r situations<br />
may be examined in toto. 14<br />
[14] WHAT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM HIGH-ALTITUDE OBSERVATIONS<br />
CLOUD IDENTIFICATION<br />
Assuming, from <strong>the</strong> previous section, that cloud shapes of <strong>the</strong> order of 500 ft or more<br />
in diameter are distinguishable from an altitude of 350 mi, <strong>the</strong> problem of identifying<br />
<strong>the</strong>se clouds can be treated. As stated previously, attributes and/or phenomena that<br />
served to establish <strong>the</strong> classification of clouds when viewed from <strong>the</strong> ground are almost<br />
completely different when <strong>the</strong>se same clouds are viewed from above. The question is,<br />
What can actually be done to tell <strong>the</strong> various cloud forms apart?<br />
The solution to this problem may lie in a new classification system formed by means<br />
of close correlation of observations of clouds viewed from above with observations of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
same clouds viewed from below. In this manner, an atlas of identifying cloud features as<br />
14. This idea of “<strong>the</strong> over-all look” was first described by Major D. L. Crowson, USAF, in a recent article<br />
in B. Amer. Meteorol. Soc., Vol. 30, No. 1, January, 1949. His primary object was <strong>the</strong> use of vertically fired rockets<br />
in conjunction with <strong>the</strong> regular meteorological observations as a supplement ra<strong>the</strong>r than as a possible replacement.<br />
In this regard, his analysis of rocket photographs is very similar to that presented by Dr. J. Bjerknes in<br />
Appendix I.
196<br />
scanned from extreme altitudes might be built up. Using this information, a trained<br />
observer should have little trouble in establishing <strong>the</strong> identity of almost any visible cloud.<br />
The importance of such an atlas cannot be over-emphasized, because <strong>the</strong> degree of confidence<br />
in a synoptic picture formed from this type of observation or in <strong>the</strong> subsequent<br />
forecast becomes extremely small if <strong>the</strong> identity of <strong>the</strong> clouds cannot be established. An<br />
attempt along <strong>the</strong>se lines has been made, utilizing several series of photographs taken<br />
from V-2’s fired at White Sands, New Mexico. It should be kept in mind, however, that this<br />
attempt was made using data which were not originally ga<strong>the</strong>red for this purpose, and <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary ground observations are <strong>the</strong>refore not available for positive identification purposes.<br />
Because of this, <strong>the</strong> results presented here are a classification and identification<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> writer’s observational experience.<br />
From a study of <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned photographs it was observed that two general<br />
cloud forms stand out from each o<strong>the</strong>r under <strong>the</strong> usable resolution conditions. Since<br />
<strong>the</strong>se two forms are also two types of cloud formations, most o<strong>the</strong>r clouds can be considered<br />
as being a special form or combination of <strong>the</strong>se and may be so categorized. This is<br />
partially attempted in <strong>the</strong> table [below].<br />
It is noticed that certain formations of clouds very often assemble in over-all patterns<br />
peculiar to <strong>the</strong>se formations. Clouds, <strong>the</strong>refore, may also be partially categorized according<br />
to pattern. In <strong>the</strong> case of clouds formed by globular masses joined toge<strong>the</strong>r to produce<br />
a single layer, <strong>the</strong> pattern is still apparent to an observer on <strong>the</strong> ground as a result of <strong>the</strong><br />
differences in light intensities caused by <strong>the</strong> variations in cloud thickness. It is likely, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
from <strong>the</strong> section on cloud contrast, that <strong>the</strong>se patterns will also be visible to an<br />
observer stationed above <strong>the</strong> layer, owing to <strong>the</strong> difference in albedo values caused by<br />
cloud sections of different thicknesses. These patterns are very useful in cutting down <strong>the</strong><br />
overlap present in <strong>the</strong> following table.<br />
[15] A B<br />
Vertically Developed Remarks Stratiform Remarks<br />
1. Cumulus } Varying degrees of 1. Stratus } In some forms may<br />
2. Cumulonimbus } vertical development 2. Altostratus } be very similar.<br />
3. Cirrostratus May be distinguished<br />
because fibrous texture<br />
is visible even<br />
w h e n<br />
viewed from above.<br />
4. Nimbostratus When <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
vertical development<br />
on top this form may<br />
appear to be very similar<br />
to Nos. 1 and 2.<br />
Combinations of A and B (forms similar in appearance are bracketed)<br />
Cloud Formations Remarks<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
[Altocumulus] Altocumulus cloud elements may exhibit vertical development, or<br />
[Cirrocumulus] <strong>the</strong>re may be just closely packed globular masses. In <strong>the</strong> first case, <strong>the</strong><br />
altocumulus may seem to be very similar to altostratus or nimbostratus<br />
that have vertical development in <strong>the</strong>ir tops, although <strong>the</strong> layer may<br />
retain some semblance of orderly pattern.
[Altostratus] Very often <strong>the</strong>se formations contain considerable vertical development.<br />
[Nimbostratus] This seems to be especially true when <strong>the</strong>se forms are associated with<br />
<strong>the</strong> passage of a front.<br />
It is clear that any attempt to formulate an atlas of cloud appearance as seen from<br />
high altitude is a major undertaking. The work done on <strong>the</strong> subject in this report represents,<br />
at best, <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> work that must be accomplished to make high-altitude<br />
cloud photographs a usable wea<strong>the</strong>r tool.<br />
THE ANALYSIS<br />
Having once established <strong>the</strong> identity of almost all <strong>the</strong> clouds viewed, <strong>the</strong> formation of <strong>the</strong><br />
synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r picture becomes <strong>the</strong> next problem. The following question arises: Given an<br />
over-all cloud picture, what, in fact, can be determined, ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or indirectly?<br />
According to conventional meteorological practice, <strong>the</strong> various parameters, such as<br />
pressure, temperatures, etc., are plotted on a map, and <strong>the</strong> subsequent analysis of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
quantities produce <strong>the</strong> synoptic picture. Almost <strong>the</strong> reverse is true in <strong>the</strong> case at hand.<br />
Here <strong>the</strong> synoptic situation must first be established, and <strong>the</strong> various parameters must be<br />
estimated from it. Actually, it is not quite so straightforward a procedure. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it<br />
becomes a “hunting” technique, in which one makes a first approximation to <strong>the</strong> over-all<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r situation, using <strong>the</strong> clouds, and, from this, a first estimate of <strong>the</strong> value of temperature,<br />
pressure, humidity, etc. This picture of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r is <strong>the</strong>n modified to fit [16]<br />
obvious deviations of <strong>the</strong> estimated values from those indirectly observed. This process<br />
continues until a satisfactory situation is evolved that appears to fit all existing conditions<br />
(an attempt being made to satisfy both physical and <strong>the</strong>oretical considerations); from this,<br />
final estimations of <strong>the</strong> various parameters are made. (Several possible approaches to <strong>the</strong><br />
problem of approximating <strong>the</strong> synoptic picture are discussed in <strong>the</strong> section entitled<br />
“Suggested Methods of Attack on <strong>the</strong> Problem of Determining <strong>the</strong> Synoptic Situation.”. . .)<br />
The normal observable meteorological parameters may be divided into two main categories,<br />
viz., those that may be estimated in some measure directly from observations of<br />
<strong>the</strong> clouds and/or ground, and those that require a knowledge of <strong>the</strong> over-all wea<strong>the</strong>r patterns<br />
before an estimate can be made. In <strong>the</strong> first category may be listed wind, humidity,<br />
precipitation, and a variable not normally considered by itself as such—degree of stability.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> second listing may be found pressure (and pressure tendency) and temperature.<br />
Before an attempt at its analysis can be made, a considerable amount of experience and<br />
general knowledge of <strong>the</strong> workings of <strong>the</strong> atmosphere is required concerning each item,<br />
regardless of which category it comes under. It is found that this estimation method is nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
a quick nor a simple process, regardless of <strong>the</strong> qualifications of <strong>the</strong> analyst. Ra<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
each of <strong>the</strong> items requires a very careful study and <strong>the</strong> weighing of all <strong>the</strong> possible influencing<br />
conditions before approximate values can be assigned.<br />
As a result of this pilot study, several suggested methods of estimating <strong>the</strong> various<br />
meteorological parameters were evolved and are discussed as follows:<br />
Wind<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 197<br />
1. From <strong>the</strong> established meteorological models it is assumed that certain definite<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r situations will produce certain sequences of clouds preceding or following <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
This will <strong>the</strong>refore tend to orient <strong>the</strong> situation with respect to <strong>the</strong> ground. Once this orientation<br />
has been established, <strong>the</strong> wind direction may be approximated through a knowledge<br />
of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical circulation associated with a given synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r situation.<br />
2. It has been noticed in several photographs that, in <strong>the</strong> presence of strong upper
198<br />
winds, cumulus clouds that have formed in mountainous country appear to form to <strong>the</strong><br />
lee of <strong>the</strong> mountains ra<strong>the</strong>r than to <strong>the</strong>ir windward side. In <strong>the</strong> presence of very light<br />
winds, it was noticed that <strong>the</strong> cumulus tended to form on <strong>the</strong> peak of <strong>the</strong> mountain. This<br />
phenomenon requires fur<strong>the</strong>r study before its degree of usefulness as an observational<br />
tool can be determined.<br />
3. Owing to <strong>the</strong> fact that cumulonimbus clouds extend from as low as 1600 ft up to<br />
40,000 ft, <strong>the</strong>ir slope becomes a good indication of <strong>the</strong> vertical shear within <strong>the</strong> layer. It<br />
was first thought that this direction of slope would be an indication of <strong>the</strong> direction of <strong>the</strong><br />
upper winds. However, although <strong>the</strong> wind velocity normally increases with altitude, it is<br />
obvious that for any given case one should not disregard <strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong> wind<br />
velocity might decrease with height or that <strong>the</strong> direction and velocity distribution in <strong>the</strong><br />
vertical might be of such a nature as to cause <strong>the</strong> cumulonimbus to slope into <strong>the</strong> upper<br />
wind. When this slope is combined with o<strong>the</strong>r factors that indicate wind direction [17] at<br />
one particular level, it may be possible to construct a picture of <strong>the</strong> change of wind direction<br />
with height in <strong>the</strong> layer under consideration.<br />
4. A fur<strong>the</strong>r indication of wind direction (in <strong>the</strong> lower levels) was observed when<br />
small, detached clouds were seen to form in line, stretching from a mountain top. These<br />
could be due to moist air being forced upward by <strong>the</strong> mountain and <strong>the</strong>n moving downslope<br />
on <strong>the</strong> lee side, causing <strong>the</strong> formation of small “rotors” or individual cellular eddies<br />
each capped by small cumulus clouds and extending for a considerable distance downwind<br />
from <strong>the</strong> mountain. This phenomenon is known as a “standing wave” and is often<br />
accompanied by o<strong>the</strong>r standing clouds at higher altitudes.<br />
5. It has also been observed in a layer of stratus overlying mountainous terrain that<br />
air funneling down a valley and spreading out in a relatively flat section produced lines<br />
and swirls in <strong>the</strong> top of this cloud layer that closely matched <strong>the</strong> path <strong>the</strong> air must have<br />
taken. This action may be very useful in determining wind direction in sections completely<br />
covered by sheet-type clouds and may be found to be of fur<strong>the</strong>r use over areas that are not<br />
particularly mountainous. Although photographs of large flat areas were not available for<br />
analysis, it is thought that wind-direction determination in <strong>the</strong>se sections may still be<br />
accomplished in <strong>the</strong> lower levels. This may be done by utilizing many of <strong>the</strong> above methods<br />
and several o<strong>the</strong>rs that could be an outgrowth of such an analysis. One such method<br />
might use <strong>the</strong> inherent uniform structure of a stratus sheet. In this case it is thought that<br />
if a sheet passes over flat ground on which <strong>the</strong>re are isolated protuberances projecting<br />
into <strong>the</strong> sheet, a wake will be produced in <strong>the</strong> cloud that may also show up when viewed<br />
from above and that will stretch downwind from <strong>the</strong> object.<br />
Temperature<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The starting point for any determination of temperature must be <strong>the</strong> statistical normal<br />
for that time of <strong>the</strong> year. The first estimation may <strong>the</strong>n be modified by <strong>the</strong> various<br />
affecting conditions. The prevailing wea<strong>the</strong>r situation provides <strong>the</strong> first modifying influence.<br />
This estimation is, of course, dependent on <strong>the</strong> analyst’s ability to estimate <strong>the</strong> synoptic<br />
conditions with a degree of accuracy that will answer <strong>the</strong> question, Is <strong>the</strong> sector<br />
under observation being affected by relatively cold or warm air? Cloud systems, wind<br />
directions, and even forms of ground cover (snow, etc.) will help in deciding this. This is<br />
<strong>the</strong> first indication of <strong>the</strong> over-all complexity of this type of analysis and serves as an actual<br />
illustration of <strong>the</strong> “hunting” technique mentioned above.<br />
Upper air temperatures may be estimated in <strong>the</strong> same manner, clouds indicating <strong>the</strong><br />
boundaries between air masses (fronts). A fur<strong>the</strong>r help in estimating this quantity is <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that, once having decided on a ground temperature, <strong>the</strong> degree of stability (indicated<br />
by vertical development in clouds) and <strong>the</strong> presence or absence of intervening fronts<br />
will enable one to construct an applicable temperature lapse rate. (The degree of stabili-
ty will determine <strong>the</strong> departure from an adiabatic lapse rate, while <strong>the</strong> degree of cloudiness<br />
(moisture) will help an analyst to decide whe<strong>the</strong>r to use <strong>the</strong> moist or <strong>the</strong> dry adiabatic<br />
lapse rate as <strong>the</strong> limiting one.)<br />
Vertically developed cloud will also aid in determining <strong>the</strong> temperature gradient of<br />
<strong>the</strong> surrounding area. This is true because of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> vertical shear, as indicated<br />
[18] by <strong>the</strong> slope of towering cumulus and cumulonimbus clouds, orients <strong>the</strong> direction of<br />
<strong>the</strong> higher and lower temperatures in <strong>the</strong> areas. This method is employed by taking <strong>the</strong><br />
direction of vertical shear as being from <strong>the</strong> low levels toward <strong>the</strong> high levels. If one <strong>the</strong>n<br />
faces in <strong>the</strong> direction of shear in <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn hemisphere, <strong>the</strong> lower temperature will be<br />
on <strong>the</strong> observer’s left and <strong>the</strong> higher on <strong>the</strong> observer’s right (see Fig. 3).<br />
This relationship holds for <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn hemisphere. In <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn hemisphere <strong>the</strong><br />
directions of decreasing and increasing temperature in relations to vertical shear are<br />
reversed.<br />
Pressure<br />
Fig. 3—Vertical wind shear—temperature gradient relationship<br />
It is apparent that no quantitative values of pressure are forthcoming from this analysis.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it is virtually impossible even to make a quantitative estimate o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
to state whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> area is thought to be under <strong>the</strong> influence of a high- or a low-pressure<br />
system. Charts of average pressures for various times of <strong>the</strong> year in different areas of <strong>the</strong><br />
world are available. Using <strong>the</strong>se and <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r situation at <strong>the</strong> time, trends of pressure<br />
may be established. This information when applied in conjunction with known wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
may be a very useful tool for forecasting purposes. Little work has been attempted on this<br />
subject in this pilot study, and <strong>the</strong> above should serve only as a possible starting point for<br />
any detailed research along <strong>the</strong>se lines.<br />
C. F. Brooks 15 points out some fur<strong>the</strong>r pressure information that may be obtained<br />
from clouds. He says, in effect, that, since in <strong>the</strong> presence of any constant vertical shear<br />
<strong>the</strong> cumulus clouds will tend to lean or slope (<strong>the</strong> amount of departure from <strong>the</strong> vertical<br />
being a resultant of <strong>the</strong> vertical velocity and <strong>the</strong> rate of change of wind velocity with<br />
height), any cloud that has a uniform rate of vertical growth and a 90˚ slope throughout<br />
is an indication of <strong>the</strong> “uniformity of wind velocity in all layers pierced.” This indicates a<br />
decrease of horizontal pressure gradient with height. (This can be shown very simply by<br />
an examination of <strong>the</strong> geostrophic wind equation<br />
V g = 1 ( p) 1,<br />
p ( n) λ<br />
where V g = <strong>the</strong> geostrophic wind velocity<br />
p = density o air<br />
p/ n = horizontal pressure gradient<br />
λ = Coriolis parameter.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 199<br />
[19] It can be seen that since λ, which depends on <strong>the</strong> sine of <strong>the</strong> latitude, will remain<br />
constant and p decreases with height, p/ n must also decrease for V g , to remain constant.)<br />
This decrease turns out to be very small when actual values are used. In <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
a uniformly growing cumulus that slopes in its lower layers and <strong>the</strong>n straightens or even<br />
15. C. F. Brooks, “Clouds in Aerology and Forecasting,” B. Amer. Meteorol. Soc., Vol. 22, November, 1941,<br />
pp. 335–345.
200<br />
bends back on itself with increasing height, <strong>the</strong> decrease of <strong>the</strong> horizontal pressure<br />
gradient with height is (as Brooks also points out) much stronger than in <strong>the</strong> previous<br />
case. If one assumes that <strong>the</strong> slope of vertically developed clouds may be observed from<br />
350 mi altitude (at least at <strong>the</strong> edges of scanning strip), fur<strong>the</strong>r pressure data may be ga<strong>the</strong>red.<br />
Degree of Stability<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
As has been mentioned above, <strong>the</strong> degree of stability in a given layer may be estimated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> amount of vertical development present in clouds. In any mechanism of vertical<br />
development, <strong>the</strong> stability of <strong>the</strong> air plays a major part. Convective, orographic, or upslope<br />
lifting may produce clouds in <strong>the</strong> absence of instability, but, for any large-scale vertical<br />
build-up of clouds, a great tendency for <strong>the</strong> atmosphere to “overturn” must be present.<br />
[original placement of Fig. 4] (Absolute instability is taken to mean that <strong>the</strong> decrease of<br />
temperature with height is greater than <strong>the</strong> dry adiabatic lapse rate. In <strong>the</strong> presence of<br />
unsaturated water vapor, <strong>the</strong> dry adiabatic lapse rate is about 9.8˚C/km, whereas, in <strong>the</strong><br />
presence of saturated water vapor, <strong>the</strong> smaller saturated adiabatic lapse rate with a nonlinear<br />
variation of temperature is used.) In <strong>the</strong> presence of water vapor, <strong>the</strong> latent heat<br />
(energy) of condensation that is released when <strong>the</strong> air is forced to rise and its moisture<br />
forced to condense may be sufficient to continue independently <strong>the</strong> upward motion. This<br />
motion indicates a condition of instability where none may have existed at <strong>the</strong> beginning<br />
of <strong>the</strong> process. Continuation of this motion, <strong>the</strong>refore, indicates <strong>the</strong> instability of <strong>the</strong> air<br />
in <strong>the</strong> presence of saturated water vapor and is evidenced in towering cumulus or cumulonimbus.<br />
If, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, condensation occurs but <strong>the</strong> ascending air is not provided<br />
with a sufficiently large amount of heat so as to warm it to a higher temperature<br />
than that of <strong>the</strong> surrounding air, <strong>the</strong> layer is considered absolutely stable and may be characterized<br />
by smooth, flat-topped cloud forms, usually arranged in layers or sheets. This is<br />
also true when a small layer of instability is “capped” by an inversion (increase of temperature<br />
with height). This concept of absolute stability, absolute instability, and conditional<br />
instability (unstable or stable depending on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> water vapor present condenses<br />
or not) is presented graphically in Fig. 4.<br />
Fig. 4—Graphical representation of degrees of stability as given by lapse rate of temperature<br />
It may be said that, in <strong>the</strong> presence of vertically developed clouds, a dry adiabatic lapse<br />
rate (or very close to it) exists below <strong>the</strong> base of <strong>the</strong> cloud, a relatively steep lapse rate<br />
exists within <strong>the</strong> cloud, and a relatively stable lapse rate exists above <strong>the</strong> cloud. In [20] <strong>the</strong><br />
case of flat-topped or sheet-type clouds, it may be that, although instability may exist in a<br />
small layer comprising <strong>the</strong> cloud, an inversion layer of very stable air exists immediately<br />
above, causing <strong>the</strong> cloud to stop its vertical growth.<br />
In his paper on clouds, Brooks 16 suggests <strong>the</strong> following fur<strong>the</strong>r refinements on this:<br />
1. Detached, lumpy cloud with a flat base and rounded top has (a) adiabatic lapse<br />
rate below it, (b) greater than saturated-adiabatic lapse rate (unstable) within <strong>the</strong><br />
cloud, and (c) almost <strong>the</strong> same lapse rate as (b) (unstable) from its top to <strong>the</strong><br />
height that <strong>the</strong> cloud will grow.<br />
2. Towering, sharply-bounded cumuliform cloud: The diameter of cloud at different<br />
levels is an indication of <strong>the</strong> relative steepness of <strong>the</strong> lapse rate (except in <strong>the</strong><br />
presence of large wind shear). “The narrower such a cloud or cloudlet is, relative<br />
16. Ibid.
to its height, <strong>the</strong> greater <strong>the</strong> lapse rate of <strong>the</strong> surrounding air.”<br />
This provides one with very rough criteria for estimating <strong>the</strong> degree of stability of <strong>the</strong> air.<br />
To sum up, water vapor in <strong>the</strong> air is a latent source of heat energy. When moist air is<br />
carried rapidly upward, <strong>the</strong> water vapor condenses in <strong>the</strong> form of liquid droplets and <strong>the</strong><br />
latent heat of condensation is released to <strong>the</strong> surrounding atmosphere. It is this source of<br />
latent heat that feeds thunderstorms and o<strong>the</strong>r types of vertically developed clouds.<br />
Cumulus clouds are an indication of moisture and relative instability, and, conversely,<br />
when <strong>the</strong>re is moisture in <strong>the</strong> air <strong>the</strong>re will be a greater tendency toward convection and<br />
turbulence.<br />
Moisture<br />
Clouds, being composed of water droplets, naturally indicate <strong>the</strong> presence of moisture<br />
in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere (see <strong>the</strong> above section). Resulting from <strong>the</strong> difference in formation<br />
conditions, cloud types can give a fur<strong>the</strong>r breakdown of moisture distribution. For<br />
example, cumulus and cumuliform clouds of vertical development require <strong>the</strong> entrainment<br />
of continuous supplies of moist air to prevent <strong>the</strong>ir complete evaporation shortly<br />
after forming. It can <strong>the</strong>refore be said that with this type of cloud we may associate fairly<br />
moist air near <strong>the</strong> surface. In like manner, positioning of <strong>the</strong> moisture in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere<br />
may be associated with o<strong>the</strong>r cloud forms, and an over-all estimate may be made from visual<br />
observations. Once <strong>the</strong> synoptic picture has been established, closer estimates may be<br />
made utilizing <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r meteorological parameters, and <strong>the</strong> value of moisture content<br />
may be worked into <strong>the</strong> “hunting” technique previously mentioned.<br />
Precipitation<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 201<br />
Although it will not be possible to observe any form of precipitation directly, it is<br />
known that <strong>the</strong> largest amounts usually fall from two main types of clouds: cumulonimbus<br />
(showers—rain, snow, etc.) and nimbostratus (steady precipitation, sleet, etc.).<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> probability of precipitation in one form or ano<strong>the</strong>r, which arises whenever<br />
<strong>the</strong>se types are present, is higher than for any o<strong>the</strong>r types of clouds. Fur<strong>the</strong>r infor-<br />
[21] mation may be obtained from <strong>the</strong> fact that it may be possible to distinguish between<br />
newly fallen snow and old snow, owing to a difference in albedos (see Table 5 . . .), and<br />
<strong>the</strong> new snow may <strong>the</strong>n be connected with <strong>the</strong> proper form of cloud observed downwind<br />
from it.<br />
[22] SUGGESTED METHODS OF ATTACK ON THE PROBLEM OF<br />
DETERMINING THE SYNOPTIC SITUATION<br />
From <strong>the</strong> above discussion it can be seen that <strong>the</strong> analysis is based primarily on cloud<br />
observations. During <strong>the</strong> course of this study several systematic methods of accomplishing<br />
<strong>the</strong>se presented <strong>the</strong>mselves. Although nei<strong>the</strong>r time nor proper data were available for a<br />
complete study of <strong>the</strong>se possibilities, <strong>the</strong> most promising were considered and are presented<br />
herewith as a guide to any more intensive study.<br />
1. It is suggested that a typing of clouds as to cause ra<strong>the</strong>r than appearance will greatly<br />
facilitate <strong>the</strong> identification of <strong>the</strong> synoptic situation. Classification into two main categories<br />
would constitute a possible breakdown, as follows: (a) Regional clouds (those<br />
caused by purely local conditions), and (b) migrating cloud systems (clouds that appear<br />
to move as a unit). The breakdown might <strong>the</strong>n be coupled with a knowledge of <strong>the</strong> clouds<br />
associated with various wea<strong>the</strong>r phenomena to complete <strong>the</strong> synoptic picture.<br />
2. It is a recognized fact that similar synoptic situations occurring under different climatic<br />
and/or topographic conditions may produce radically different wea<strong>the</strong>r. A statisti-
202<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
cal analysis is <strong>the</strong>refore suggested, in which (a) <strong>the</strong> desired area is divided into small<br />
regions of similar climate, geography, etc., and (b) a statistical survey of cloud types and<br />
associated wea<strong>the</strong>r found with various wea<strong>the</strong>r situations (fronts, etc.) in each region is<br />
made.<br />
3. Owing to <strong>the</strong> fact that identification of fronts as fronts may be very difficult, it is<br />
suggested that it may be possible to identify air masses from high-altitude pictures and to<br />
utilize <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> formulation of <strong>the</strong> synoptic picture. Since general classifications of air<br />
masses include as integral identifying features <strong>the</strong> stability of <strong>the</strong> air, <strong>the</strong> moisture, and <strong>the</strong><br />
type of clouds produced in a given air mass, this should not be too difficult, in many cases.<br />
An air-mass identification has <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r advantage of establishing more closely <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
limits of <strong>the</strong> various meteorological parameters.<br />
4. A major advantage of satellite wea<strong>the</strong>r observations is <strong>the</strong> repeated broad spatial<br />
coverage. Such broad coverage provides <strong>the</strong> meteorologist with an essential element for his<br />
analysis, which is generally referred to as continuity. It permits him to follow a given system<br />
as it moves and develops over a period of days. It is a relatively simple matter to identify a<br />
system once it is known that such a system is present. Once a wea<strong>the</strong>r situation is so identified,<br />
it can be earmarked from high-altitude pictures, and not only may it <strong>the</strong>n be tracked<br />
across an inaccessible area like an ocean, but any over-all changes or modifications that<br />
affect <strong>the</strong> visible parameters may be almost immediately noticed. It is also likely that, having<br />
a complete analysis of <strong>the</strong> surrounding territory on land, where observations are plentiful,<br />
and many satellite observations of <strong>the</strong> unknown area (through which it is possible to<br />
get fixes on systems and to examine visually <strong>the</strong> over-all wea<strong>the</strong>r [23] picture), a complete<br />
analysis of <strong>the</strong> desired region will become a much simpler thing to construct.<br />
Each of <strong>the</strong> above suggestions affords excellent possibilities of providing <strong>the</strong> required<br />
information. It should he kept in mind, however, that <strong>the</strong>se suggestions appear to offer<br />
<strong>the</strong> best solution when systematically used toge<strong>the</strong>r. . . .<br />
[31] CONCLUSION<br />
In <strong>the</strong> section entitled “What Can Be Seen,” . . . it was shown that, given at least<br />
500-ft resolution, it was possible to differentiate between <strong>the</strong> various types of clouds.<br />
Under “Limitations of <strong>the</strong> Analysis,” . . . <strong>the</strong> possible limitations to <strong>the</strong> type of analysis to<br />
be studied were indicated. Given <strong>the</strong> identity of virtually all <strong>the</strong> cloud forms viewed, it was<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r shown, in <strong>the</strong> section entitled “What Can Be Determined from High-Altitude<br />
Observations,” . . . that it may be possible to estimate <strong>the</strong> various meteorological parameters<br />
under certain conditions and assumptions. The main assumption was that some estimate<br />
of <strong>the</strong> over-all synoptic situation could be made initially and a “hunting” technique<br />
could be applied. Several suggested methods of estimating <strong>the</strong> synoptic picture were presented<br />
and discussed.<br />
This report has attempted to show what is thought to be necessary in <strong>the</strong> making of<br />
such an analysis. It is obvious, however, that, with <strong>the</strong> limited data available, many important<br />
points may inadvertently have been overlooked. An inquiry of this type can <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
serve only as a guide to a full-scale study of <strong>the</strong> subject, in which every suggestion and<br />
method is put to a full test and is ei<strong>the</strong>r accepted, modified, or discarded.<br />
The development of all <strong>the</strong> suggested methods mentioned in this report appears to<br />
be feasible. As any analysis depends on its integral parts for its accomplishment, from this<br />
standpoint, if from no o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> analysis of synoptic wea<strong>the</strong>r from satellite observations is<br />
also feasible.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 203<br />
Document II-3<br />
Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, for T. Keith Glennan, NASA, and Roy W. Johnson,<br />
Department of Defense, “Agreement Between <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Regarding <strong>the</strong> TIROS Meteorological<br />
Satellite Project,” April 13, 1959.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Among <strong>the</strong> military space projects President Eisenhower transferred in 1958 to <strong>the</strong> newly created<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration was <strong>the</strong> Television and Infrared Operational<br />
Satellite (TIROS) meteorological satellite project, previously controlled by <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense’s<br />
Advanced Research Projects Agency. Although <strong>the</strong> Defense Department continued to participate in <strong>the</strong><br />
TIROS project and made excellent use of <strong>the</strong> information returned from operational satellites, this<br />
agreement marked <strong>the</strong> beginning of a permanent split in military/civilian meteorology that led for<br />
more than three decades to both <strong>the</strong> military and <strong>the</strong> civil sector designing and operating <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
meteorological satellite systems.<br />
[1]<br />
Agreement Between <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense and<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> TIROS Meteorological Satellite Project<br />
l. Effective April 13, 1959, <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
(NASA) shall assume technical and management direction of <strong>the</strong> meteorological satellite<br />
project designated Project TIROS, as set forth in Order No. 10-59, dated July 25,1958, and<br />
Task No. 1 of Order No. 17-59, dated September 4, 1958, of <strong>the</strong> Advanced Research<br />
Projects Agency (ARPA) of <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DOD).<br />
2. In order to insure <strong>the</strong> complete availability to DOD and NASA of all information<br />
developed under Project TIROS and to insure that <strong>the</strong> respective interests of both are<br />
fully recognized in carrying out <strong>the</strong> Project, <strong>the</strong> following arrangements are agreed to:<br />
a. A committee will be established under NASA chairmanship, with representation<br />
from both DOD and NASA, to advise NASA on technical matters related to Project<br />
TIROS, including DOD requirements, and to make any necessary arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
close cooperation and full exchange of information between NASA and DOD.<br />
b. Copies of all NASA directives issued to agencies of DOD in connection with<br />
Project TIROS will be furnished to ARPA for information.<br />
c. Copies of all documents pertinent to <strong>the</strong> conduct of Project TIROS in <strong>the</strong><br />
possession of ARPA will be furnished to NASA.<br />
3. Contracts under Project TIROS to be funded by DOD will continue to be placed<br />
and administered by procuring activities of DOD, subject to <strong>the</strong> technical and management<br />
direction of NASA, and any facilities, equipment and personnel of DOD currently assigned<br />
to Project TIROS will remain available to NASA to carry <strong>the</strong> Project to completion.<br />
[2] 4. ARPA will fund Project TIROS up to a total of $11,649,000. An amount of<br />
$6,711,000 has already been committed under ARPA Order No. 10-59, and $2,000,000<br />
under Task No. 1, ARPA Order No. 17-59, leaving a balance of $2,938,000 which will be<br />
set aside for obligation by DOD on Project TIROS at <strong>the</strong> request of NASA. These funds<br />
are not, however, available for <strong>the</strong> construction of facilities. NASA will provide any funds
204<br />
required for Project TIROS in excess of <strong>the</strong> $11,649,000 provided by ARPA.<br />
5. Equipment acquired for Project TIROS will remain available to <strong>the</strong> Project until<br />
its conclusion. The disposition of any such equipment at <strong>the</strong> conclusion of <strong>the</strong> Project will<br />
be as mutually agreed upon by NASA and DOD.<br />
[hand-signed: “Hugh L. Dryden for”] [hand-signed: “Ray W. Johnson”]<br />
T. Keith Glennan Roy W. Johnson<br />
for NASA for Department of Defense<br />
Document II-4<br />
Document title: U.S. Department of Commerce, Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, “National Plan for a<br />
Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,” Technical Planning Study No.<br />
3, Preliminary Draft, October 1960, pp. 1–3.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
When NASA’s first TIROS satellite proved highly useful in studying large-scale wea<strong>the</strong>r systems, <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau began planning for a fully operational national wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite system. The<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau proposed to remove NASA from its overall lead position to <strong>the</strong> role of performing<br />
research and development in support of <strong>the</strong> operational system. In October 1960, NASA organized <strong>the</strong><br />
first meeting of an interagency panel to discuss <strong>the</strong> issue of an operational system. At <strong>the</strong> meeting, <strong>the</strong><br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau brought forth its plan; <strong>the</strong> foreword and first section of <strong>the</strong> study appears here.<br />
Predictably, NASA objected to giving up as much control over <strong>the</strong> program as <strong>the</strong> U.S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau<br />
desired. The result was a compromise plan issued in April 1961.<br />
[no page number]<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
National Plan for a Common System<br />
of Meteorological Observation Satellites<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
October 1960 . . .<br />
FOREWORD<br />
The present report is a summary of planning that commenced shortly after <strong>the</strong> successful<br />
launching and operation of TIROS I, April–June 1960. The results of this remarkably<br />
successful meteorological satellite clearly show that satellites must be included as an<br />
integral part of a comprehensive, world-wide wea<strong>the</strong>r observing system. Their ability to<br />
give complete global coverage, to look at familiar meteorological phenomena from a new<br />
vantage point and to reveal organized motions and processes over a great range of dimensions<br />
will influence virtually all phases of meteorological development and operations.<br />
Representatives of <strong>the</strong> government departments directly interested met at <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters on October 10, 1960 for<br />
discussions of how to proceed with an operational meteorological satellite program. Need<br />
for a national plan indicated at this meeting prompted issuance of this report at <strong>the</strong> present<br />
time. It represents an effort to utilize results of studies made since 1954, including a<br />
1959 report to <strong>the</strong> World Meteorological Organization, and experience gained from
Explorer VII and TIROS I. This report delineates a first approach to <strong>the</strong> design of <strong>the</strong> system,<br />
<strong>the</strong> required organization and a method of implementation for obtaining and utilizing<br />
meteorological satellite data as soon as possible for daily wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting and<br />
storm warnings.<br />
This plan, although preliminary, represents a starting point in formalizing a program,<br />
portions of which are already in operation. The plan is circulated among meteorological<br />
groups for <strong>the</strong> purpose of inviting comments and cooperation on how best to take advantage<br />
of this epochal new means for observing certain meteorological phenomena and to<br />
assist in planning more effectively for future programs.<br />
November 3, 1960 . . .<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 205<br />
[hand-signed: “F. W. Reichelderfer”]<br />
F. W. Reichelderfer<br />
Chief of Bureau<br />
[1] I. Goals of a National Plan<br />
The TIROS I Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellite has brought <strong>the</strong> objective of meteorologists for a world<br />
wide observational network a long step toward fulfillment. Conceived initially as a<br />
research project, TIROS I demonstrated immediate limited operational value. This monumental<br />
scientific achievement is a manifestation of <strong>the</strong> policy declared by <strong>the</strong> Congress<br />
in <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958—“that activities in space should be<br />
devoted to peaceful purposes for <strong>the</strong> benefit of all mankind.” The President of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States in his address to <strong>the</strong> United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 1960 proposed<br />
that “We press forward with a program of international cooperation for constructive<br />
uses of outer space under <strong>the</strong> United Nations. Better wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting, improved<br />
world wide communications . . . are but a few of <strong>the</strong> benefits of such cooperation.”<br />
Several additional wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite experiments are planned for <strong>the</strong> next two years.<br />
In view of <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> increasing operational aspects of <strong>the</strong> experiments, a national<br />
plan leading to a fully operational system is necessary for making maximum use of meteorological<br />
satellite data at <strong>the</strong> earliest possible time.<br />
It is <strong>the</strong> purpose of this study to formulate a national plan for a common system of<br />
meteorological observation satellites. This plan would have <strong>the</strong> following goals:<br />
1. Complete global coverage.<br />
2. Uninterrupted continuity in time.<br />
3. Design for maximum national and international utilization for <strong>the</strong> benefit of all<br />
mankind.<br />
4. Adequate readout stations to insure timely receipt of all <strong>the</strong> data.<br />
5. Complete communication facilities to transmit data from <strong>the</strong> readout stations to<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Meteorological Center and o<strong>the</strong>r user points.<br />
6. Analysis of <strong>the</strong> data received at <strong>the</strong> National Meteorological Center.<br />
[2] 7. Depiction of <strong>the</strong>se analyses in forms suitable for transmission via adequate<br />
communication facilities.<br />
8. Communication of processed data to all domestic (civil and governmental) and<br />
international users for application to <strong>the</strong>ir particular requirements.<br />
9. Intensive research to improve wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts through <strong>the</strong> application of satellite<br />
data.<br />
For planning purposes it has been assumed that:<br />
1. With respect to <strong>the</strong> Operational System:<br />
a. The U. S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau as <strong>the</strong> National Meteorological Service will have<br />
program responsibility for <strong>the</strong> operational meteorological satellite observing<br />
and data processing system. This would include equipment procurement,
206<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
launching, data retrieval and processing, and dissemination to users.<br />
b. An organization to perform all activities related to <strong>the</strong> operational meteorological<br />
satellite observing system would be established as a self-contained entity<br />
reporting to <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau.<br />
c. Coordination will be accomplished by a “Civil-Military Liaison Committee”<br />
and resident liaison personnel.<br />
d. The operational system will be started by <strong>the</strong> end of Fiscal Year 1962.<br />
(Adequate funding is required to accomplish this.)<br />
2. With respect to Research and Development:<br />
a. NASA has <strong>the</strong> responsibility for <strong>the</strong> equipment design and development,<br />
launching and data retrieval associated with experimental satellites. The<br />
design of <strong>the</strong> operational space craft will be based on <strong>the</strong> results of this work.<br />
b. The Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau has <strong>the</strong> responsibility for <strong>the</strong> data analysis and meteorological<br />
research.<br />
3. In operations and research and development, it is assumed that <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of Defense would be responsible for:<br />
a. Military application of satellite data and National Meteorological Center<br />
products.<br />
[3] b. Specialized communication systems and o<strong>the</strong>r facilities to meet unique needs<br />
not covered by <strong>the</strong> National Satellite Meteorological Program.<br />
4. International participation will be developed by existing international bodies<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> World Meteorological Organization. . . .<br />
Document II-5<br />
Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, for James E. Webb, Administrator,<br />
NASA, and Lu<strong>the</strong>r H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce, “Basic Agreement Between U.S.<br />
Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,” January 30, 1964.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington D.C.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> Interagency Panel on Operational Meteorological Satellites released a plan in April 1961<br />
calling for NASA to develop an operational wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite system to be managed by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Bureau, <strong>the</strong> bureau was concerned by <strong>the</strong> lack of influence it had over <strong>the</strong> developmental stages of this<br />
next generation of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, named Nimbus. Some of <strong>the</strong>se fears were realized as <strong>the</strong> NASAmanaged<br />
Nimbus program suffered numerous delays as well as dramatic costs increases. On<br />
September 27, 1963, frustrated with NASA’s performance, <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau announced that it<br />
would develop its own satellite system based on <strong>the</strong> TIROS design, with <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense providing<br />
launch services. Outmaneuvered, NASA agreed to helping <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau develop its<br />
TIROS-based system, as well as granting it an increased role in developing <strong>the</strong> Nimbus satellite, which<br />
became an experimental ra<strong>the</strong>r than an operational system. This agreement codified <strong>the</strong> NASA-<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau relationship.
[1]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 207<br />
Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of<br />
Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration Concerning Operational<br />
Meteorological Satellite Systems<br />
SECTION 1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE<br />
Recognizing <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
(NASA) research and development (R&D) meteorological satellite program and <strong>the</strong> utilization<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce - Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau (DOC - WB) of satellite data<br />
in wea<strong>the</strong>r analysis and forecasting; and<br />
Taking note that Congress, also recognizing this success, provided in <strong>the</strong><br />
Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1962, and <strong>the</strong>reafter, funds authorizing DOC - WB to<br />
establish and operate a system for <strong>the</strong> continuous observation of world-wide meteorological<br />
conditions from space satellites and for <strong>the</strong> reporting and processing of <strong>the</strong> data<br />
obtained for use in wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting . . .”: and<br />
Recognizing <strong>the</strong> broad responsibilities of NASA under <strong>the</strong> Space Act for continuing a<br />
research and development program for <strong>the</strong> development of spacecraft technology and<br />
meteorological satellite systems for (1) application to operational systems and<br />
(2) research activity in <strong>the</strong> atmospheric sciences; and<br />
Taking note that Congress appropriated separate funds to NASA for <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
supporting such an R&D program of spacecraft technology and meteorological satellite<br />
systems;<br />
[2] It is, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong> purpose of this agreement to define <strong>the</strong> relationship between, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> functions to be performed by <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB and NASA (1) in <strong>the</strong> conduct of operational<br />
meteorological satellite programs, and (2) in <strong>the</strong> development of supporting technology<br />
for operational meteorological satellite programs.<br />
SECTION II. ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE<br />
NATIONAL OPERATIONAL METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE SYSTEM<br />
A. Objective<br />
The primary objectives of <strong>the</strong> National Operational Meteorological Satellite<br />
System (NOMSS) is to provide meteorological information for prompt and effective use<br />
by <strong>the</strong> various national meteorological services in wea<strong>the</strong>r analysis and prediction. The<br />
operation of NOMSS will be based on, but not be limited to, <strong>the</strong> technology produced in<br />
<strong>the</strong> NASA R&D Meteorological Satellite Program and will satisfy <strong>the</strong> meteorological<br />
requirements of user agencies, subject to limitations of budget, resources of law. The<br />
DOC - WB may modify NOMSS as appropriate and in accordance with <strong>the</strong> terms of this<br />
agreement to accommodate changes in meteorological requirements and developments<br />
in technology.<br />
[3] B. Basic Responsibility and Functions<br />
1. The DOC - WB by law has <strong>the</strong> basic responsibility for <strong>the</strong> establishment and<br />
operation of <strong>the</strong> NOMSS, which includes obtaining necessary funds.<br />
2. Each agency agrees to perform <strong>the</strong> functions and follow <strong>the</strong> management<br />
duties and procedures set forth in paragraphs D and E of this section.
208<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
C. Funding<br />
The DOC - WB will submit requests for annual appropriations to carry out<br />
NOMSS. The DOC - WB will develop <strong>the</strong> plans and budget estimates and <strong>the</strong> justification<br />
<strong>the</strong>reof, with <strong>the</strong> assistance and support of NASA and user agencies, as appropriate. At <strong>the</strong><br />
beginning of each fiscal year, or as soon <strong>the</strong>reafter as funds are appropriated, or as program<br />
changes require, <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB will issue a reimbursement order to NASA for <strong>the</strong><br />
full amount of funds required for <strong>the</strong> execution of <strong>the</strong> NASA portion of <strong>the</strong> program in<br />
accordance with <strong>the</strong> approved project proposal prepared under this agreement. NASA<br />
will account to DOC - WB for <strong>the</strong> funds so transferred. NASA also will provide necessary<br />
reports to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB regarding <strong>the</strong> proposed and actual commitments, obligations<br />
and expenditure of <strong>the</strong>se funds, so that DOC - WB [4] may meet its fiscal responsibilities<br />
with respect to <strong>the</strong> funds appropriated to it or o<strong>the</strong>rwise received.<br />
D. Functional Responsibilities<br />
The functions of <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB and NASA in <strong>the</strong> conduct of NOMSS are as follows:<br />
1. The Department of Commerce - Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau shall:<br />
a. Determine overall meteorological program requirements (including cost<br />
and schedule).<br />
b. Specify quantities to be measured by satellite meteorological instruments.<br />
c. Approve Project Development Plan and changes involving schedules,<br />
resources, interfaces, and performance.<br />
d. Monitor <strong>the</strong> performance of <strong>the</strong> system for meeting meteorological<br />
requirements.<br />
e. Determine <strong>the</strong> need for replacing a spacecraft that has experienced marginal<br />
failure in providing meteorological data.<br />
f. Operate <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau Command and Data Acquisition [CDA]<br />
Stations, including control of <strong>the</strong> operational satellite after NASA has<br />
determined that <strong>the</strong> satellite is ready for operational use.<br />
[5] g. Manage meteorological data analysis activities at <strong>the</strong> CDA stations.<br />
h. Communicate operational data from CDA stations to [<strong>the</strong> National<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service Center and <strong>the</strong> Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)]<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>rs, as appropriate.<br />
i. Process data for integration into wea<strong>the</strong>r analyses.<br />
j. Disseminate data, analyses and forecasts.<br />
k. Archive <strong>the</strong> information (processing, storage, retrieval).<br />
l. Use <strong>the</strong> data for research and climatological purposes.<br />
m. Conduct system studies as required to meet its responsibilities.<br />
2. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall:<br />
a. Prepare <strong>the</strong> Project Development Plan.<br />
b. Design, engineer, procure and qualify flight spacecraft.<br />
c. Select and procure launch vehicles.<br />
d. Maintain and operate launch sites.<br />
e. Design, construct, and insure initial operational status of Command and<br />
Data Acquisition stations.<br />
f. Prepare <strong>the</strong> pre-launch of spacecraft and launch vehicle.<br />
g. Conduct launch operations.<br />
[6] h. Track and determine basic orbit during <strong>the</strong> useful life of <strong>the</strong> satellite.<br />
i. Monitor <strong>the</strong> engineering status of <strong>the</strong> satellite and command <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
during initial time in orbit, and, as requested, during periods of<br />
malfunction using <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau Command and Data Acquisition<br />
stations.<br />
j. Consult, as appropriated, on technical matters.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 209<br />
E. Management Responsibilities and Procedures<br />
1. The management of <strong>the</strong> functions of <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce portion<br />
of this agreement is a responsibility of <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau under <strong>the</strong> authority delegated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce to <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau under Department<br />
Order No. 91 of May 23, 1963. The Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau shall provide or obtain <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />
DOC resources for NOMSS and shall serve as <strong>the</strong> official DOC contact for this program.<br />
2. The management of <strong>the</strong> NASA portion of this agreement is <strong>the</strong> responsibility<br />
of Headquarters, <strong>Office</strong> of Space Science and Applications. It shall provide <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />
NASA resources to NOMSS and shall serve as <strong>the</strong> official NASA contact for this program.<br />
3. The following specific management functions and procedures are agreed upon:<br />
[7] a. The DOC - WB will forward mission requirements to NASA for review<br />
and acceptance.<br />
b. NASA will forward <strong>the</strong> basic plan of approach to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB for review<br />
and approval.<br />
c. NASA will forward <strong>the</strong> Project Proposal to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB for review and<br />
approval.<br />
d. NASA will forward requests for proposals to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB for review and<br />
comment.<br />
e. A representative of <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB will be assigned to <strong>the</strong> NASA GSFC<br />
Project <strong>Office</strong> and will participate in review for source evaluation, definitization<br />
of statements of work and project status reviews.<br />
f. NASA will make <strong>the</strong> final source selection, and will negotiate with and be<br />
<strong>the</strong> single interface with <strong>the</strong> contractor.<br />
g. NASA will submit to DOC - WB for review and approval <strong>the</strong> definitized<br />
contract work statement, schedules and cost.<br />
h. NASA will forward <strong>the</strong> final Project Development Plan to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB<br />
for review and approval.<br />
i. Major changes involving schedules, costs and system performance will be<br />
forwarded by NASA to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB for review and approval.<br />
[8] j. All changes affecting <strong>the</strong> interface between NASA provided equipment<br />
and DOC - WB equipment will be forwarded to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB for review<br />
and approval.<br />
F. Interagency Relationships<br />
The DOC - WB will furnish a statement of mission requirements to NASA, and will<br />
ensure that such requirements and <strong>the</strong> resulting project plans meet <strong>the</strong> needs of DOD<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r user agencies.<br />
SECTION III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY<br />
FOR OPERATIONAL METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES<br />
A. Scope<br />
This section deals only with <strong>the</strong> development of space technology which is specifically<br />
identified as applying to NOMSS.<br />
B. Basic Responsibility and Functions<br />
1. NASA has <strong>the</strong> basic responsibility for supporting civilian satellite technology.<br />
2. The DOC - WB will submit to NASA estimates of future meteorological satellite<br />
requirements and <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB estimates of present technological limitations to<br />
meeting <strong>the</strong>m. NASA will draw up its R&D plans with due consideration of <strong>the</strong> stated<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau requirements and will keep DOC fully informed on R&D program plans<br />
and developments.
210<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
[9] 3. The DOC - WB may conduct sensor development but will maintain close liaison<br />
with NASA to ensure compatibility with future spacecraft configurations.<br />
C. Funding<br />
NASA will fund for <strong>the</strong> supporting technology for operational meteorological<br />
satellite development programs.<br />
D. Management Procedures<br />
1. Supporting technology for Operational Meteorological Satellite programs is<br />
<strong>the</strong> responsibility of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Space Science and Applications, in NASA Headquarters.<br />
2. NASA will maintain a coordinating mechanism whereby <strong>the</strong> contributions of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau and o<strong>the</strong>r competent agencies can be considered in <strong>the</strong> development<br />
program. It will consist of five members, two nominated by NASA (Chairman), two by <strong>the</strong><br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, and one representing <strong>the</strong> non-Government meteorological community.<br />
3. The NASA, after considering <strong>the</strong> advice of <strong>the</strong> coordinating mechanism, will<br />
choose, and allocate space in meteorological satellites for flight tests of experimental<br />
meteorological sensors. NASA will fund for <strong>the</strong>se tests, including <strong>the</strong> costs of flight hardware<br />
beyond <strong>the</strong> preprototype stage, but <strong>the</strong> execution will be <strong>the</strong> responsibility of <strong>the</strong><br />
experimenting agency.<br />
[10] E. Data<br />
1. Data from proven meteorological sensors flown in NASA research and development<br />
meteorological satellites, such as TIROS camera data and Nimbus AVCS data, will<br />
be made available at <strong>the</strong> request of <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau for operational use on a cost reimbursable<br />
basis, for such added costs as may result from <strong>the</strong> operational requirement.<br />
2. Data from experimental meteorological sensors flown in NASA R&D meteorological<br />
satellites, such as <strong>the</strong> Nimbus HRIR and o<strong>the</strong>r new sensor developments of<br />
potential operational use, will be made available to <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau as soon as practicable<br />
on a non-interference basis to NASA missions for <strong>the</strong> conduct of operational experiments.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong>se data, <strong>the</strong> experimenting agency retains exclusive publication<br />
rights for a period of eighteen months, but <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau may conduct operational<br />
experiments during this period with <strong>the</strong> proviso that dissemination of <strong>the</strong>se data is<br />
restricted to such purposes and that scientific publication will not result without <strong>the</strong> concurrence<br />
of <strong>the</strong> experimenter. NASA will be reimbursed for all additional costs incurred<br />
in making such data available to <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau.<br />
SECTION IV. METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM REVIEW BOARD<br />
A Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board is hereby established. [11] The<br />
Board is composed of two members each from NASA and DOC - WB with <strong>the</strong> Associate<br />
Administrator for Space Science and Applications of NASA and <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Bureau serving as co-chairmen. The Board will meet quarterly or at <strong>the</strong> request of ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
co-chairman to review <strong>the</strong> program and consider any substantive issues which may arise.<br />
It may make recommendations to <strong>the</strong> DOC - WB on <strong>the</strong> resolution of issues concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> operational programs, and to <strong>the</strong> NASA concerning <strong>the</strong> responsiveness of <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
R&D program to <strong>the</strong> needs of NOMSS. Ei<strong>the</strong>r chairman may refer any issue to <strong>the</strong><br />
Associate Administrator of NASA and to <strong>the</strong> Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science<br />
and Technology for resolution.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 211<br />
SECTION V. AMENDMENTS<br />
This agreement may be amended at any time by <strong>the</strong> mutual consent of <strong>the</strong> Agencies<br />
concerned. The agreement will be reviewed formally for necessary changes at least once<br />
every two years from <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> agreement or as required at <strong>the</strong> request of ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
agency. For particular programs, a Memorandum of Understanding may be used at <strong>the</strong><br />
working level to clarify any of <strong>the</strong> functional responsibilities and procedures.<br />
SECTION VI. RELEASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION<br />
Release of public information on <strong>the</strong> operational and R&D programs may be initiated<br />
by ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau or by NASA. Before any [12] release is issued to <strong>the</strong> public,<br />
however, clearance and final approval must be given by <strong>the</strong> agency having <strong>the</strong> assigned<br />
function listed in Section 2 D or Section 3 B. Coordinated or joint releases should be<br />
issued where appropriate.<br />
SECTION VII. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS<br />
1. Regarding <strong>the</strong> international aspects of meteorology and space satellites, international<br />
negotiations may be carried out by ei<strong>the</strong>r agency according to its basic responsibilities<br />
and functions as defined in this agreement, with due regard to <strong>the</strong> provisions 2 and<br />
3 below and subject to normal State Department policy guidance.<br />
2. Where such negotiations imply obligations or place commitments upon <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
agency, that agency will be consulted in advance of international agreement or commitment.<br />
3. The design of operational meteorological systems will give due consideration to<br />
commitments already expressed or implied by <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
Hugh L. Dryden<br />
Deputy Administrator Lu<strong>the</strong>r H. Hodges<br />
for JAMES E. WEBB LUTHER H. HODGES<br />
ADMINISTRATOR, NASA SECRETARY OF COMMERCE<br />
January 30, 1964 January 30, 1964<br />
Document II-6<br />
Document title: Robert M. White, Administrator, Environmental Science Services<br />
Administration, National Environmental Satellite Center, U.S. Department of Commerce,<br />
to Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications,<br />
NASA, August 15, 1966.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Transcending <strong>the</strong> turf battles that marked its relationship with NASA in <strong>the</strong> early 1960s, <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau made progress during <strong>the</strong> later half of <strong>the</strong> decade in refining its requirements for an<br />
operational meteorological satellite program. Using information ga<strong>the</strong>red from three separate satellite<br />
programs—TIROS, Nimbus, and <strong>the</strong> Advanced Technology Satellite (ATS)—in August 1966, <strong>the</strong><br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau issued to NASA this statement outlining its objectives for an operational meteorological<br />
satellite program.
212<br />
[1] [rubber stamped: “AUG 15 1966’]<br />
Dr. Homer E. Newell<br />
Associate Administrator for Space<br />
Science and Applications<br />
National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546<br />
Dear Homer:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
I would like to thank you for <strong>the</strong> briefing given by NASA on its proposed FY 1968<br />
meteorological research and development program at <strong>the</strong> 1 July 1966 meeting of <strong>the</strong><br />
Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board (MSPRB). As in <strong>the</strong> past two years our<br />
comments are directed toward an evaluation of <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of your program plans in<br />
<strong>the</strong> development and improvement of operational meteorological satellite systems.<br />
In arriving at our comments on <strong>the</strong> NASA R&D program, we have reviewed our letters<br />
of <strong>the</strong> past two years, based on similar briefings. We find that significant progress was<br />
made last year with respect to interagency program development and effective use of available<br />
resources in attempting to attain program objectives. Our primary objectives have not<br />
changed and remain as follows: (1) The establishment and maintenance of a satellite system<br />
to obtain global observations on a regular basis, (2) meteorological observations from<br />
synchronous altitude, and (3) global observations of atmospheric structure needed for<br />
numerical wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting. Following are specific comments with respect to each of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se.<br />
1. Global observations on a regular basis.<br />
The initial deployment of <strong>the</strong> Tiros Operational Satellite (TOS) system, with <strong>the</strong><br />
launch of <strong>the</strong> ESSA 1 and ESSA 2 satellites, has been quite successful and is providing very<br />
useful data to <strong>the</strong> meteorological community throughout <strong>the</strong> world. Launch of ESSA 3 is<br />
now imminent due to a recent camera failure on ESSA 1. We are very pleased with <strong>the</strong><br />
effort, direction and progress being made in <strong>the</strong> “TIROS M” program. We look forward to<br />
this development solving <strong>the</strong> major problem raised under this objective in our letter last<br />
year. The program review showed a line item for “improved HRIR day/night imaging and<br />
higher resolution,” to be accomplished by a two-channel radiometer (visible and 11<br />
microns) of high resolution. Also, funds were shown for development of a [2] multichannel<br />
radiometer under <strong>the</strong> Nimbus B flight program and in <strong>the</strong> TOS improvement program.<br />
[handwritten underlining on original] We would like to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r or not<br />
additional radiometer development activity is needed to meet <strong>the</strong> TOS system requirements.<br />
Also, <strong>the</strong>re is a strong requirement to increase <strong>the</strong> resolution of satellite cloud pictures<br />
to one mile (photo resolution). We would like to examine with you <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
technical approaches to meeting this requirement within <strong>the</strong> framework of <strong>the</strong> TOS system<br />
and <strong>the</strong> probable costs of doing so. If a reasonable approach can be found, from <strong>the</strong><br />
point of view of both cost and technology, we would want to proceed with those steps needed<br />
to provide this improved operational capability. We consider <strong>the</strong>se programs essential<br />
to <strong>the</strong> full attainment of <strong>the</strong> first objective and hope that it will be possible for NASA to<br />
devote additional resources and increased priority in <strong>the</strong> NASA R&D program to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
2. Meteorological observations from synchronous altitude.<br />
The continued progress on meteorological experiments with <strong>the</strong> ATS series is most<br />
gratifying. The data relay experiments being planned jointly by NASA and ESSA, in conjunction<br />
with <strong>the</strong> spinscan camera, will make a major contribution to <strong>the</strong> development of<br />
<strong>the</strong> World Wea<strong>the</strong>r Watch.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 213<br />
We are pleased with <strong>the</strong> promptness and thoroughness with which <strong>the</strong> Goddard Space<br />
Flight Center conducted <strong>the</strong> feasibility study for a Synchronous Operational<br />
Meteorological Satellite which could be built and launched in a short time period should<br />
strong National interest dictate such a move. It now appears likely that <strong>the</strong> earliest we will<br />
obtain funds for such a system will be in our regular FY 1968 budget. Therefore, with <strong>the</strong><br />
extra time available for planning studies, it would seem wise to examine <strong>the</strong> trade-offs of<br />
spacecraft and ground station cost and performance as a function of system design, especially<br />
with regard to frequencies and data format.<br />
We consider <strong>the</strong> continued strong emphasis and support of NASA in this area to be<br />
very important.<br />
3. Global observations of atmospheric structure needed for numerical wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting.<br />
As cited in last year’s letter this goal continues to carry <strong>the</strong> highest priority to ESSA<br />
from a meteorological point of view, because of <strong>the</strong> importance of describing <strong>the</strong> atmosphere<br />
adequately in terms required for numerical wea<strong>the</strong>r prediction. The schedule of<br />
development of <strong>the</strong> World Wea<strong>the</strong>r System is critically dependent upon progress in this<br />
area. Therefore, we support ongoing Nimbus flights and those of o<strong>the</strong>r advanced satellites<br />
in <strong>the</strong> NASA program [3] which are devoted to attaining this objective. Because of <strong>the</strong> critical<br />
importance of this portion of <strong>the</strong> NASA program, we are hopeful that adequate priority<br />
will continue to be supplied in support of this program element with respect to<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs in <strong>the</strong> National budget. We hope NASA will continue, and if possible expand its<br />
support of <strong>the</strong> development and flight test of <strong>the</strong> new sensors and supporting subsystems<br />
in its R&D program in order to provide <strong>the</strong> technology needed to meet this objective.<br />
The Environmental Science Services Administration is now examining how its present<br />
and future operational satellites can satisfy environmental data requirements in o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
areas than meteorology. Undoubtedly <strong>the</strong>re will be a need for R&D support from NASA<br />
in <strong>the</strong>se new areas. I suggest we review this matter after our needs are established and discussions<br />
have been held under <strong>the</strong> leadership of Messrs. Jaffe and D. S. Johnson. We have<br />
been most pleased with <strong>the</strong> joint effort this past year in resolving problems and in allocating<br />
available resources to meet operational and R&D meteorological satellite needs.<br />
We are looking forward to <strong>the</strong> continuation of this excellent cooperation.<br />
Document II-7<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
Robert M. White<br />
Administrator<br />
Document title: George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and<br />
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to D. James Baker, Acting Under Secretary<br />
for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 22, 1993.<br />
Document II-8<br />
Document title: Jim Exon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms<br />
Control and Defense Intelligence, U.S. Senate, to Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce,<br />
June 2, 1993.<br />
Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
214<br />
These two letters, one from Congressman George E. Brown, chair of <strong>the</strong> House Committee on Science,<br />
Space, and Technology, and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r from Nebraskan Senator Jim Exon, chair of <strong>the</strong> Senate<br />
Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, urged National Oceanic<br />
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Administrator D. James Baker and Commerce Secretary<br />
Ron Brown to evaluate <strong>the</strong> concept of converging NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental<br />
Satellite System with <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. These letters<br />
helped establish <strong>the</strong> political basis within Congress for <strong>the</strong> convergence to take place.<br />
Document II-7<br />
Dr. D. James Baker<br />
Acting Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce<br />
Washington, D.C. 20230<br />
Dear Dr. Baker:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
February 22, 1993<br />
I want to congratulate you on your selection to become <strong>the</strong> next National Oceanic<br />
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Administrator. I look forward to working with you<br />
on <strong>the</strong> very important programs NOAA has planned for <strong>the</strong> future. The Committee on<br />
Science, Space, and Technology intends to consider a number of dual-use technology and<br />
defense convergence issues during <strong>the</strong> 103rd Congress. In that regard, we believe that <strong>the</strong><br />
issues related to <strong>the</strong> convergence of <strong>the</strong> NOAA Polar Satellite Program with <strong>the</strong> Defense<br />
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) should be re-examined to look for potential<br />
opportunities for reducing overall costs. As you know, recent significant changes in agency<br />
requirements and policies may be more conducive to a merged system than was <strong>the</strong> case<br />
in <strong>the</strong> past.<br />
In addition, I feel that <strong>the</strong> relationship between NOAA’s continuing operational global<br />
observing system and NASA’s planned 15-year Earth Observing System should also be<br />
examined to determine <strong>the</strong> potential benefits and liabilities of closer cooperation on<br />
<strong>the</strong>se programs.<br />
I believe that it would be prudent to examine <strong>the</strong>se opportunities for convergence<br />
and possible cost savings at <strong>the</strong> same time ra<strong>the</strong>r than separately. Therefore, I ask that<br />
NOAA, and as soon as appropriate, NASA and DOD, jointly study and assess <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
benefits and mechanisms for merging all or parts of <strong>the</strong> three programs and provide a<br />
jointly developed plan to <strong>the</strong> Committee on Science, Space and Technology.<br />
Thank you for your cooperation.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.<br />
Chairman
Document II-8<br />
[1] June 2, 1993<br />
The Honorable Ron Brown<br />
Secretary of Commerce<br />
US Department of Commerce<br />
Herbert C. Hoover Building<br />
14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.<br />
Washington, D.C. 20230<br />
Dear Secretary Brown:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 215<br />
I plan to make a statement on <strong>the</strong> Senate floor soon about <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems<br />
operated by <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DoD) and <strong>the</strong> National Oceanographic<br />
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I do not believe that two separate U.S.<br />
Government wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems can be justified any longer given <strong>the</strong> budget problems<br />
we face.<br />
The DoD operates a constellation of two wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites called <strong>the</strong> Defense<br />
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). These satellites are flown in sun-synchronous<br />
polar orbits (meaning that <strong>the</strong>y cross <strong>the</strong> same point above <strong>the</strong> Earth twice a day at <strong>the</strong><br />
same times every day). They are built by <strong>the</strong> General Electric Corporation. They are<br />
equipped with sensors for imaging clouds, determining moisture and temperature in <strong>the</strong><br />
atmosphere, and for measuring ocean currents. The data from DMSP is broadcast to tactical<br />
users over an encrypted link and at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> data is remotely relayed to<br />
Omaha’s Wea<strong>the</strong>r Central for comprehensive analysis. Historically, <strong>the</strong> DoD system’s primary<br />
customer was a classified intelligence ga<strong>the</strong>ring program.<br />
The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Commerce also operates a constellation of two wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites called<br />
TIROS. These satellites are also flown in sun-synchronous polar orbits, are built by<br />
General Electric, and have sensors for imaging clouds and taking readings of moisture<br />
and temperature in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere. TIROS data also is broadcast directly to users around<br />
<strong>the</strong> world as well as to a central processing location in <strong>the</strong> United States. TIROS data, however,<br />
is completely unclassified.<br />
In terms of capacity, <strong>the</strong> United States does not need four wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites in orbit.<br />
In last year’s defense authorization act, <strong>the</strong> conferees directed <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense to<br />
develop a comprehensive space investment strategy. As [2] part of this effort, <strong>the</strong> conferees<br />
directed DoD to examine anew <strong>the</strong> potential for greater cooperation between civil and<br />
military wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite programs in light of changes in <strong>the</strong> world and budget pressures.<br />
Merging <strong>the</strong> two satellite programs will take time—time to design a common system,<br />
to determine management arrangements between DoD and NOAA, to build new satellites,<br />
and to launch <strong>the</strong>m. Both DoD and NOAA will obviously have to continue to launch<br />
and operate <strong>the</strong>ir own systems until <strong>the</strong> new system can be deployed.<br />
Ideally, DoD and NOAA would run out of <strong>the</strong>ir current satellites at precisely <strong>the</strong> same<br />
time and precisely when <strong>the</strong> new system became operational. It appears that this is possible,<br />
but not without some planning.<br />
Last year Congress directed NOAA to procure two more TIROS satellites. If this happens,<br />
NOAA will have 7 satellites, which could last until 2005, and DoD’s inventory of<br />
9 DMSP satellites will last until 2007 or longer. That would mean waiting 12 to 15 years to<br />
deploy a common, merged satellite system and waiting several years before starting
216<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
development work on a new, common satellite. The Government ought to examine<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r it would make more sense to speed things up.<br />
I propose that DoD consider transferring to NOAA two DMSP buses, which NOAA could<br />
<strong>the</strong>n modify for <strong>the</strong> TIROS configuration and add to it <strong>the</strong> TIROS sensors. This would give<br />
DoD and NOAA 7 satellites each. It would save money in <strong>the</strong> short term, some of which could<br />
be used to fund development of a common satellite system. This is important because budgets<br />
are so tight for both DoD and NOAA that nei<strong>the</strong>r may be able to afford modernization<br />
on <strong>the</strong>ir own. It would also mean that DoD and NOAA would likely use up <strong>the</strong>ir inventories<br />
at about <strong>the</strong> same time, for a smooth transition to a new common system.<br />
I am writing to urge you and Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry to create a formal working<br />
group under appropriate senior officials to attempt to resolve any outstanding issues<br />
standing in <strong>the</strong> way of merging <strong>the</strong> two government polar-orbiting wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems.<br />
What is required is leadership from both agencies to resolve issues of data encryption;<br />
management of a merged system; potential transfer of DoD assets to NOAA; integration<br />
with European meteorological satellite efforts; and cooperation with NASA on <strong>the</strong> Earth<br />
Observing System polar platform.<br />
[3] To take one example, without <strong>the</strong> personal involvement of you and Secretary Perry,<br />
subordinate DoD officials will continue to insist that data must be encrypted and NOAA<br />
will insist that encryption is not acceptable. My suspicion is that <strong>the</strong> case for encryption<br />
rests on weak arguments, given <strong>the</strong> availability of geosynchronous satellites, and<br />
European, Chinese, Russian, and NOAA systems all broadcasting in <strong>the</strong> clear. On <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r hand, NOAA may be shortsighted in disregarding o<strong>the</strong>r national interests that<br />
might justify some form of encryption capability. Resolving this type of problem requires<br />
creativity from top policymakers.<br />
The nation cannot afford to maintain and modernize two satellite wea<strong>the</strong>r constellations.<br />
Working toge<strong>the</strong>r, however, DoD, NOAA and NASA could pool resources, achieve<br />
efficiency and improve capabilities at reduced cost to <strong>the</strong> taxpayer.<br />
I look forward to hearing your views.<br />
cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry<br />
Vice President Al Gore<br />
NASA Administrator Goldin<br />
Document II-9<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Jim Exon<br />
United States Senator<br />
Document title: National Performance Review, Department of Commerce, “Establish a<br />
Single Civilian Operational Environmental Polar Satellite Program,” September 30, 1993.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This document spells out <strong>the</strong> financial advantages of achieving <strong>the</strong> consolidation of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite<br />
System and <strong>the</strong> Defense Department’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. It also points out that<br />
a consolidated or converged system with NASA involvement could make efficient use of NASA’s development<br />
of new Earth observation instruments. This document was part of <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration’s<br />
National Performance Review.
Department of Commerce<br />
Accompanying Report of <strong>the</strong> National Performance Review<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Vice President<br />
Washington, DC<br />
September 1993<br />
DOC12: Establish a Single Civilian Operational Environmental Polar Satellite Program<br />
Background<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 217<br />
The United States is committed to an operational environmental polar satellite program<br />
because of <strong>the</strong> critical value of <strong>the</strong> data <strong>the</strong> satellites collect.(1) Polar satellites collect<br />
temperature and moisture measurements (key inputs to computer wea<strong>the</strong>r prediction<br />
models generating all national three- to five-day wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts); measurements of <strong>the</strong><br />
Antarctic ozone levels; long-term environmental measurements used to support global climate<br />
change studies; sea surface temperature measurements; and global cloud-cover<br />
images. Polar satellites also provide o<strong>the</strong>r valuable support missions, such as monitoring<br />
emergency distress beacons to aid search and rescue missions and worldwide data collection<br />
to support a variety of activities, such as endangered species monitoring.<br />
However, at present, <strong>the</strong> nation maintains two polar-orbiting meteorological satellite<br />
systems: (1) <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Polarorbiting<br />
Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) for civil forecasting and research<br />
purposes; and (2) <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Meteorological Satellite<br />
Program (DMSP) for national security purposes.<br />
In addition to <strong>the</strong>se programs, <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautic and Space Administration<br />
(NASA) has initiated a climate research program called Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE).<br />
A key portion of this effort is <strong>the</strong> Earth Observing System (EOS), a series of six different<br />
satellites measuring various parameters critical to understanding global climate change.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong>se satellites is called <strong>the</strong> EOS-PM (PM indicating that <strong>the</strong> satellite passes over<br />
<strong>the</strong> equator in <strong>the</strong> afternoon). The climate monitoring instruments on EOS-PM are basically<br />
more modern versions of <strong>the</strong> meteorological instruments currently flying on <strong>the</strong><br />
NOAA wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites. In essence, <strong>the</strong> nation will have three different satellite systems<br />
with very similar capabilities.<br />
Over <strong>the</strong> past 20 years, <strong>the</strong> POES and DMSP programs have made numerous attempts<br />
to converge to <strong>the</strong> greatest extent possible.(2) The programs have similar spacecraft, use<br />
a common launch vehicle, share products derived from <strong>the</strong> data, provide complementary<br />
environmental data to <strong>the</strong> nation, and work closely toge<strong>the</strong>r on research and development<br />
efforts. In all, <strong>the</strong> programs achieved substantial commonality, but national security<br />
concerns have precluded full convergence.(3)<br />
DOD has stated it would manage a converged system, but a single program run by<br />
DOD was and still is unacceptable given international concern over <strong>the</strong> militarization of<br />
space.(4) Today, however, with <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War, <strong>the</strong> issues which have precluded<br />
complete convergence seem to have diminished in importance.(5) With both programs<br />
planning a new satellite design, <strong>the</strong> time is appropriate to consolidate <strong>the</strong>ir efforts.<br />
The EOS-PM climate research satellite is being designed with <strong>the</strong> idea that many of<br />
<strong>the</strong> instruments can be used by NOAA within <strong>the</strong> POES program. This continues a historical<br />
NOAA-NASA relationship wherein NASA develops new technology and demonstrates<br />
prototype hardware, and NOAA buys identical units for continued operational<br />
support.(6) However, current plans involve flying EOS-PM for 15 years, during which time
218<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
POES also will have operational satellites.(7) Over most of this period, both programs<br />
would be flying duplicate instruments. The nation would be more efficiently served if<br />
NASA would develop and fly <strong>the</strong> prototypes once and <strong>the</strong>n transfer <strong>the</strong> systems to NOAA’s<br />
operational program for future flights.<br />
Convergence studies began in 1972 and have continued ever since.(8) NOAA recently<br />
performed an internal study of <strong>the</strong> opportunities available through convergence of <strong>the</strong> programs.(9)<br />
Recently, initial talks have begun among <strong>the</strong> three agencies with <strong>the</strong> goal of performing<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r study of convergence opportunities among <strong>the</strong> three programs.(10) What<br />
is needed, however, is a clear decision to create a single, civilian polar satellite program.<br />
Currently, <strong>the</strong> NOAA POES program, <strong>the</strong> DOD DMSP program, and <strong>the</strong> NASA EOS-<br />
PM program all are in various stages of developing new spacecraft and instruments. In <strong>the</strong><br />
next 10 years, <strong>the</strong> estimated total cost for <strong>the</strong>se three efforts exceeds $6 billion in development,<br />
production, and operations costs. However, many policy makers feel that <strong>the</strong><br />
nation cannot afford to develop three separate satellite systems with such similar missions.<br />
For example, Congressman George Brown of California has stated that a converged<br />
system seems more achievable than in <strong>the</strong> past. He <strong>the</strong>refore has directed NOAA to work<br />
with DOD and NASA to “jointly study and assess <strong>the</strong> possible benefits and mechanisms for<br />
merging all or parts of <strong>the</strong> three programs.”(11) Senator James Exon of Nebraska was<br />
more direct in his letters to DOD and Commerce: “The nation cannot afford to maintain<br />
and modernize two satellite wea<strong>the</strong>r constellations.”(12) Recently, at <strong>the</strong> National Space<br />
Outlook Conference, Air Force General Charles Horner, Commander United States<br />
Space Command, stated: “How you do convergence is really <strong>the</strong> question, not if you do<br />
convergence.”(13)<br />
A single operational polar satellite program could meet <strong>the</strong> needs of all users by incorporating<br />
key DOD requirements into <strong>the</strong> NOAA POES program. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> synergy<br />
achieved through DOD and NOAA cooperation could allow both agencies to meet<br />
critical operational requirements (such as collecting oceanographic and global tropospheric<br />
wind data) which nei<strong>the</strong>r agency has been able to afford alone. The converged<br />
operational program could save additional costs by using <strong>the</strong> NASA EOS program’s stateof-<strong>the</strong>-art<br />
spacecraft and instruments instead of forcing NOAA to design and build its own.<br />
The result would be a single development program (compared to <strong>the</strong> three planned<br />
today) and minimal overlap between NASA’s climate research and <strong>the</strong> NOAA-DOD converged<br />
operational meteorological missions.<br />
The difficulty will be to successfully incorporate DOD requirements into <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
Based upon historical studies, key areas requiring consideration are data deniability, orbit<br />
selection, international cooperation, and adequate oversight to ensure DOD concerns are<br />
adequately met.(14) The following summarizes how each of <strong>the</strong>se can be addressed:<br />
Data deniability. The satellite must broadcast data free to everyone but also have <strong>the</strong><br />
capability to deny data to specific adversaries. New technology, such as that used to deny<br />
cable-TV pay channels to non-subscribers, makes this task easier.<br />
Orbit selection. Currently, <strong>the</strong> DOD desires <strong>the</strong> capability to change its satellite orbits<br />
depending on mission requirements. Past studies have identified a three-satellite constellation<br />
as sufficient for meeting all orbit needs.(15) Allowing DOD to influence orbits<br />
selection should alleviate <strong>the</strong>ir concerns.<br />
International cooperation. A NOAA-led system could easily maintain and even<br />
improve international cooperation in environmental data exchange. However, since<br />
NOAA plans to use foreign satellites as part of <strong>the</strong> converged program, DOD may be reluctant<br />
to rely upon foreign satellites for important data. This concern could be alleviated by<br />
maintaining one or more ground spare U.S. satellites at all times that could be launched<br />
if a foreign-controlled satellite ever became unreliable.
Oversight. DOD will require some mechanisms to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir requirements continue<br />
to be met. Possible implementation details could involve including DOD user and<br />
acquisition experts in <strong>the</strong> NOAA program offices and operations facilities, allowing DOD<br />
to fund and manage DOD-unique parts of <strong>the</strong> program, and establishing an interagency<br />
oversight group to which <strong>the</strong> program would have to report periodically to ensure that all<br />
agency requirements were adequately met. Such oversight mechanisms should not be difficult<br />
to achieve. The driving force behind this effort is clearly <strong>the</strong> desire to reduce costs.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r cost reduction could be achieved through greater international participation.<br />
According to Dr. Ray A. Williamson of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Technology Assessment: “Greater<br />
international coordination and collaboration on sensors and systems . . . will eventually be<br />
needed in order to reap <strong>the</strong> greatest benefit from <strong>the</strong> world-wide investment in remote<br />
sensing.”(16)<br />
NOAA is already working on such arrangements in its POES program by asking <strong>the</strong><br />
Europeans to assume a greater role. An agreement in principle has been reached between<br />
NOAA and <strong>the</strong> European Organization for <strong>the</strong> Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites<br />
(EUMETSAT) whereby EUMETSAT will purchase, launch, and operate one of <strong>the</strong> two<br />
current POES missions beginning in <strong>the</strong> year 2000. This will save <strong>the</strong> U.S. more than $100<br />
million for each launch of one of <strong>the</strong>se satellites. Such cooperation with <strong>the</strong> Europeans is<br />
an important component of cost-efficient operations and is <strong>the</strong> first step to a truly international<br />
environmental satellite observing system.<br />
Action<br />
Legislation should be enacted to establish a single environmental polar satellite program<br />
under <strong>the</strong> direction of NOAA.<br />
Congress should enact legislation to establish a single environmental polar satellite<br />
under <strong>the</strong> direction of NOAA. The legislation should direct NOAA, NASA, and DOD to<br />
undertake activities to establish this effort within <strong>the</strong>ir existing programs.<br />
Implications<br />
The proposed changes would allow for a more efficient, less-costly global satellite<br />
observation program. A strong, efficient U.S. polar environmental monitoring program<br />
would be <strong>the</strong> foundation for a cooperative international system. The Europeans already<br />
plan to increase funding for an element of this system. With a solid, unified U.S. national<br />
program in place, o<strong>the</strong>r countries may align <strong>the</strong>ir programs to complement <strong>the</strong> basic system.<br />
The result will be additional environmental data collected at minimal cost to <strong>the</strong><br />
nation. The convergence concept provides a feasible and cost-effective opportunity to<br />
accurately monitor and predict <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> environment on <strong>the</strong> world’s societies.<br />
The greatest difficulty in <strong>the</strong> proposal will be to ensure that a single, national program<br />
under civilian leadership will be responsive to national security needs. However, <strong>the</strong>se concerns<br />
can be met much more easily now than <strong>the</strong>y could have in <strong>the</strong> past.<br />
Fiscal Impact<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 219<br />
Cost savings over ten years would total about $1.3 billion. This is based on a threesatellite<br />
system (with European participation) relying on NASA to develop new hardware.
220<br />
Budget Authority (BA) and Outlays (Dollars in Millions)<br />
Fiscal Year<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total<br />
BA 0.0 0.0 -75.0 -75.0 -75.0 -75.0 -300.0<br />
Outlays 0.0 0.0 -50.0 -70.0 -75.0 -75.0 -270.0<br />
Change<br />
in FTEs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Endnotes<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
1. See Hussey, John W., “Economic Benefits of Operational Environmental Satellites,”<br />
reprinted from A. Schnap (ed.), Monitoring Earth’s Ocean, Land, and Atmosphere from Space-<br />
Sensors, Systems, and Applications, Vol. 97 of Progress in Astronautics series (Washington,<br />
D.C.: American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1985).<br />
2. See Blersch, Donald, DMSP/POES Convergence Materials Handbook, STDN-91-18. 2nd<br />
ed. (Arlington, VA: Analytic Services, Inc., October 1991).<br />
3. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Comparison of <strong>the</strong> Defense Meteorological Satellite<br />
Program (DMSP) and <strong>the</strong> NOAA Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES)<br />
Program, Envirosat-2000 Report (Washington, D.C., October 1985).<br />
4. See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration (NOAA), International Implications of Converging <strong>the</strong> DOD and DOD Polar<br />
Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Systems (Washington, D.C., 1987).<br />
5. See Blersch, Donald, DMSP/POES Convergence: A Post Cold War Assessment (A Re-<br />
Examination of Traditional Concerns in a Changing Environment) (Arlington, VA: Analytic<br />
Services, Inc., June 1993).<br />
6. See U.S. Department of Commerce and National Aeronautic and Space<br />
Administration, “Basic Agreement between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Astronautics Association Concerning Operational<br />
Environmental Satellite Systems of <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce,” 1973.<br />
7. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1993 Earth Observing System<br />
Reference Handbook (Washington, D.C., March 1993).<br />
8. See Blersch, DMSP/POES Convergence Materials Handbook.<br />
9. See U.S. Department of Commerce, “Report of <strong>the</strong> Working Group on NOAA Polar<br />
Satellite Convergence Opportunities” (Washington, D.C., June 1993). (Draft.)<br />
10. See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration, National Aeronautical and Space Administration, “Terms of Reference<br />
for Joint Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), Polar-orbiting Operational<br />
Environmental Satellite (POES) and Earth Observing System (EOS) Program<br />
Assessment,” June 29, 1993.
11. See Letter from George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman of <strong>the</strong> House Committee on Science,<br />
Space and Technology, to Dr. D. James Baker, NOAA Administrator, February 22, 1993.<br />
12. See Letters from Senator James Exon to Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and<br />
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry, June 2, 1993.<br />
13. “Horner Supports Converged System,” Space News (June 27, 1993), p. 4.<br />
14. Blersch, DMSP/POES Convergence Handbook, p. II-2.<br />
15. See U.S. General Accounting <strong>Office</strong>, Economies Available to Converging Government<br />
Meteorological Satellites (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting <strong>Office</strong>, 1986).<br />
16. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on<br />
Space, testimony by Dr. Ray A. Williamson, <strong>Office</strong> of Technology Assessment, May 6, 1993.<br />
Document II-10<br />
Document title: Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, The White House, “Convergence<br />
of U.S. Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” May 5, 1994.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This document, <strong>the</strong> result of a recommendation from <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration’s National<br />
Performance Review, lays out a broad plan for <strong>the</strong> convergence of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Polar-orbiting<br />
Environmental Satellite System, operated by <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration<br />
(NOAA), with <strong>the</strong> Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s polar-orbiting system, operated by <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Air Force. It calls for <strong>the</strong> establishment of an Integrated Program <strong>Office</strong> by October 1, 1994, to<br />
be operated jointly by <strong>the</strong> Departments of Commerce and Defense and by NASA. It gives NOAA <strong>the</strong><br />
lead responsibility for operating <strong>the</strong> converged system. The Department of Defense would be responsible<br />
for major systems acquisition, and NASA would lead in “facilitating <strong>the</strong> development and insertion<br />
of new cost effective technologies” into <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 221<br />
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 5, 1994<br />
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSTC-2<br />
TO: The Vice President<br />
The Secretary of State<br />
The Secretary of Defense<br />
The Secretary of Commerce<br />
The Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget<br />
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for National Security Affairs<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Science and Technology<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Economic Policy<br />
SUBJECT: Convergence of U.S. Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems
222<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
I. Introduction<br />
The United States operates civil and military polar-orbiting environmental satellite<br />
systems which collect, process, and distribute remotely-sensed meteorological, oceanographic,<br />
and space environmental data. The Department of Commerce is responsible for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) program and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense is responsible for <strong>the</strong> Defense Meteorological Satellite Program<br />
(DMSP). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), through its Earth<br />
Observing System (EOS-PM) development efforts, provides new remote sensing and<br />
spacecraft technologies that could potentially improve <strong>the</strong> capabilities of <strong>the</strong> operational<br />
system. While <strong>the</strong> civil and military missions of POES and DMSP remain unchanged,<br />
establishing a single, converged, operational system can reduce duplication of efforts in<br />
meeting common requirements while satisfying <strong>the</strong> unique requirements of <strong>the</strong> civil and<br />
national security communities. A converged system can accommodate international cooperation,<br />
including <strong>the</strong> open distribution of environmental data.<br />
II. Objectives and Principles<br />
The United States will seek to reduce <strong>the</strong> cost of acquiring and operating polarorbiting<br />
environmental satellite systems, while continuing to satisfy U.S. operational<br />
requirements for data from <strong>the</strong>se systems. The Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense will integrate <strong>the</strong>ir programs into a single, converged, national<br />
polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system. Additional savings may be<br />
achieved by incorporating appropriate aspects of NASA’s Earth Observing System.<br />
The converged program shall be conducted in accordance with <strong>the</strong> following principles:<br />
— Operational environmental data from polar-orbiting satellites are important to <strong>the</strong><br />
achievement of U.S. economic, national security, scientific, and foreign policy goals.<br />
— Assured access to operational environmental data will be provided to meet civil and<br />
nation security requirements and international obligations.<br />
— The United States will ensure its ability to selectively deny critical environmental data<br />
to an adversary during crisis or war yet ensure <strong>the</strong> use of such data by U.S. and Allied<br />
military forces. Such data will be made available to o<strong>the</strong>r users when it no longer has<br />
military utility. The implementing actions will be accommodated within <strong>the</strong> overall<br />
resource and policy guidance of <strong>the</strong> President.<br />
III. Implementing Actions<br />
a. Interagency Coordination<br />
1. Integrated Program <strong>Office</strong> (IPO)<br />
The Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA will create an Integrated<br />
Program <strong>Office</strong> (IPO) for <strong>the</strong> national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite<br />
system no later than October 1, 1994. The IPO will be responsible for <strong>the</strong> management,<br />
planning, development, fabrication, and operations of <strong>the</strong> converged system. The IPO will<br />
be under <strong>the</strong> direction of a System Program Director (SPD) who will report to a triagency<br />
Executive Committee via <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce’s Under Secretary for Oceans and<br />
Atmosphere.<br />
2. Executive Committee (EXCOM)<br />
The Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA will form a convergence<br />
EXCOM at <strong>the</strong> Under Secretary level. The members of <strong>the</strong> EXCOM will ensure that both<br />
civil and national security requirements are satisfied in <strong>the</strong> converged program, will coordinate<br />
program plans, budgets, and policies, and will ensure that agency funding commitments<br />
are equitable and sustained. The three member agencies of <strong>the</strong> EXCOM will<br />
develop a process for identifying, validating, and documenting observational and system<br />
requirements for <strong>the</strong> national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system.<br />
Approved operational requirements will define <strong>the</strong> converged system baseline which <strong>the</strong>
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 223<br />
IPO will use to develop agency budgets for research and development, system acquisitions,<br />
and operations.<br />
b. Agency Responsibilities<br />
1. Department of Commerce<br />
The Department of Commerce, through NOAA, will have lead agency responsibility<br />
to <strong>the</strong> EXCOM for <strong>the</strong> converged system. NOAA will have lead agency responsibility<br />
to support <strong>the</strong> IPO for satellite operations. NOAA will nominate <strong>the</strong> System Program<br />
Director who will be approved by <strong>the</strong> EXCOM. NOAA will also have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility<br />
for interfacing with national and international civil user communities, consistent with<br />
national security and foreign policy requirements.<br />
2. Department of Defense<br />
The Department of Defense will have lead agency responsibility to support <strong>the</strong><br />
IPO in major system acquisitions necessary to <strong>the</strong> national polar-orbiting operational environmental<br />
satellite system. DOD will nominate <strong>the</strong> Principal Deputy System Program<br />
Director who will be approved by <strong>the</strong> System Program Director.<br />
3. National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
NASA will have lead agency responsibility to support <strong>the</strong> IPO in facilitating <strong>the</strong><br />
development and insertion of new cost effective technologies that enhance <strong>the</strong> ability of<br />
<strong>the</strong> converged system to meet its operational requirements.<br />
c. International Cooperation<br />
Plans for and implementation of a national polar-orbiting operational environmental<br />
satellite system will be based on U.S. civil and national security requirements. Consistent<br />
with this, <strong>the</strong> United States will seek to implement <strong>the</strong> converged system in a manner that<br />
encourages cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations. This<br />
cooperation will be conducted in support of <strong>the</strong>se requirements in coordination with <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of State and o<strong>the</strong>r interested agencies.<br />
d. Budget Coordination<br />
Budgetary planning estimates, developed by <strong>the</strong> IPO and approved by <strong>the</strong> EXCOM,<br />
will serve as <strong>the</strong> basis for agency annual budget requests to <strong>the</strong> President. The IPO planning<br />
process will be consistent with agencies’ internal budget formulation.<br />
IV. Implementing Documents<br />
a. The “Implementation Plan for a Converged Polar-orbiting Environmental<br />
Satellite System” provides greater definition to <strong>the</strong> guidelines contained within this policy<br />
directive for creating and conducting <strong>the</strong> converged program.<br />
b. By October 1, 1994, <strong>the</strong> Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA will<br />
conclude a triagency memorandum of agreement which will formalize <strong>the</strong> details of <strong>the</strong><br />
agencies’ integrated working relationship, as defined by this directive, specifying each<br />
agency’s responsibilities and commitments to <strong>the</strong> converged system.<br />
V. Reporting Requirements<br />
a. By November 1, 1994, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce, <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense,<br />
and NASA will submit an integrated report to <strong>the</strong> National Science and Technology<br />
Council on <strong>the</strong> implementation status of <strong>the</strong> national polar-orbiting operational environmental<br />
satellite system.<br />
b. For <strong>the</strong> fiscal year 1996 budget process, <strong>the</strong> Departments of Commerce and<br />
Defense and NASA will submit agency budget requests based on <strong>the</strong> converged system, in<br />
accordance with <strong>the</strong> milestones established in <strong>the</strong> Implementation Plan.<br />
c. For fiscal year 1997 and beyond, <strong>the</strong> IPO will provide, prior to <strong>the</strong> submission of<br />
each fiscal year’s budget, an annual report to <strong>the</strong> National Science and Technology<br />
Council on <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite<br />
system.
224<br />
Document II-11<br />
Document title: D. James Baker, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S.<br />
Department of Commerce, to John Morgan, Director, EUMETSAT, May 6, 1994.<br />
Document II-12<br />
Document title: D. James Baker, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S.<br />
Department of Commerce, to Jean-Marie Luton, Director, European Space Agency,<br />
May 6, 1994.<br />
Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
These letters, which follow from <strong>the</strong> Presidential Decision Directive of <strong>the</strong> previous day (May 5, 1994),<br />
respectively invite EUMETSAT to join <strong>the</strong> converged satellite system and formally inform <strong>the</strong><br />
European Space Agency of <strong>the</strong> invitation.<br />
Mr. John Morgan<br />
Director, EUMETSAT<br />
Am Elfengrund 45<br />
D-64242 Darmstadt-Eberstadt<br />
Germany<br />
Dear John:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Document II-11<br />
[rubber stamped: “May 6, 1994”]<br />
I am pleased to invite <strong>the</strong> European Organisation for <strong>the</strong> Exploitation of<br />
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) to consider expanded cooperation as an important<br />
partner in <strong>the</strong> United States converged, polar-orbiting operational environmental<br />
satellites program.<br />
This week, <strong>the</strong> President has directed <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration (NOAA), <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DOD) and <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to work toge<strong>the</strong>r to implement a converged<br />
system which integrates NOAA and DOD systems while capitalizing on NASA technology.<br />
Building on longstanding plans to cooperate with European partners in this area,<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. Government’s preferred option for such cooperation includes <strong>the</strong> METOP satellite<br />
series assuming U.S. missions requirements for such cooperation can be achieved.<br />
Cooperation with <strong>the</strong> METOP satellite series and our EUMETSAT and ESA partners<br />
is critical to our efforts to enhance fur<strong>the</strong>r development of a global operational observing<br />
system. Inclusion of METOP as one of three elements in <strong>the</strong> preferred converged satellite<br />
constellation underscores <strong>the</strong> importance we place on environmental satellite cooperation<br />
with our European partners.
Recognizing <strong>the</strong>se important benefits in cooperation, we propose that EUMETSAT<br />
join us in exploring <strong>the</strong> accommodation of converged system mission requirements in <strong>the</strong><br />
joint polar system planning that is already underway.<br />
cc: Jean-Marie Luton, ESA<br />
Mr. Jean-Marie Luton<br />
Director, European Space Agency<br />
8-10, rue Mario-Nikis<br />
75738 Paris Cedex 15<br />
France<br />
Dear Jean-Marie:<br />
Document II-12<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “Jim”]<br />
D. James Baker<br />
[rubber stamped: “May 6, 1994”]<br />
I am writing to you in recognition of <strong>the</strong> important role of <strong>the</strong> European Space<br />
Agency (ESA), toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> European Organisation for <strong>the</strong> Exploitation of<br />
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), in <strong>the</strong> METOP satellite series.<br />
This week, <strong>the</strong> President directed <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration (NOAA), <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DOD) and <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to work toge<strong>the</strong>r to implement a converged<br />
system which integrates NOAA and DOD systems while capitalizing on NASA technology.<br />
Building on our longstanding plans to cooperate with European partners in this<br />
area, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government’s preferred future satellite constellation includes <strong>the</strong> METOP<br />
satellite series.<br />
Cooperation with <strong>the</strong> METOP satellite series and our EUMETSAT and ESA partners<br />
is critical to our efforts to enhance fur<strong>the</strong>r development of a global operational observing<br />
system. Our long-term understanding is that METOP-related cooperation will be<br />
addressed in a NOAA/EUMETSAT Agreement closely associated with an Agreement<br />
between EUMETSAT and ESA. Our desire to include METOP as one of three elements in<br />
<strong>the</strong> converged satellite constellation underscores <strong>the</strong> importance we place on environmental<br />
satellite cooperation with our European partners.<br />
Recognizing <strong>the</strong> important benefits to cooperation, we are proposing that EUMET-<br />
SAT join NOAA in exploring <strong>the</strong> accommodation of converged system mission requirements<br />
into <strong>the</strong> joint United States/European polar system planning that is already<br />
underway.<br />
cc: John Morgan, EUMETSAT<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 225<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “Jim”]<br />
D. James Baker
226<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Document II-13<br />
Document title: Peter C. Badgley, Program Chief, Natural Resources, NASA, “Current<br />
Status of NASA’s Natural Resources Program,” Proceedings of <strong>the</strong> Fourth Symposium on<br />
Remote Sensing of Environment held 12, 13, 14, April 1966 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of<br />
Michigan, 1966), pp. 547–558.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
NASA began its natural resources program in 1965 with <strong>the</strong> goal of studying <strong>the</strong> Earth from space.<br />
Unsure of what observational technique offered <strong>the</strong> greatest utility, <strong>the</strong> agency conducted a number of<br />
experiments from aircraft in an attempt to determine optimal instrument design for satellites. Peter<br />
Badgley, head of <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources Program at NASA, presented <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> experiments at<br />
a symposium on remote sensing sponsored by <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Navy’s <strong>Office</strong> of Naval Research<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories. The results helped clarify issues about coordination<br />
between NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, which was interested in beginning an Earth<br />
resource survey program of its own.<br />
[547]<br />
Current Status of NASA’s Natural Resources Program<br />
Peter C. Badgley<br />
Program Chief, Natural Resources<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
ABSTRACT<br />
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is supporting research<br />
activities in those areas of remote sensing from Earth-orbiting spacecraft which are related<br />
to <strong>the</strong> study of natural cultural resources. These sensors are believed to possess a number<br />
of unique advantages for <strong>the</strong> discovery, inventory, evaluation, development and<br />
conservation of such resources. Many Government agencies, universities, and research<br />
institutions are cooperating with NASA in this effort. The current status of this program<br />
is described in this paper.<br />
1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES OF NASA’S NATURAL AND<br />
CULTURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM<br />
Natural resources are defined as those naturally occurring materials, such as mineral<br />
deposits, timberstands, and fresh water, which are of value to mankind. Cultural resources<br />
are defined as those items of value to man which result from his own activities and are in<br />
general derived from <strong>the</strong> natural resources.<br />
Since World War I airborne mapping by photographic means has been used extensively<br />
for <strong>the</strong> study of natural and cultural resources. Radar and infrared sensors have<br />
been used to a lesser extent. Historically, <strong>the</strong> development and use of such techniques has<br />
been fostered by <strong>the</strong> military, but in recent years <strong>the</strong>re have been widespread applications<br />
beyond <strong>the</strong> military field. During <strong>the</strong> past three decades civil and commercial interests<br />
have also used airborne imaging devices very successfully. In addition, gravity, magnetic,<br />
and radioactive measuring instruments have been applied to <strong>the</strong> search for mineral and
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 227<br />
petroleum deposits. In <strong>the</strong> past few years imaging sensors in unmanned and manned<br />
spacecraft have been employed to provide <strong>the</strong> first true synoptic coverage of <strong>the</strong> lithosphere,<br />
hydrosphere, and atmosphere.<br />
The objectives of <strong>the</strong> NASA Natural Resources Program are as follows:<br />
1. To determine those natural and cultural resource data which can be acquired best<br />
from spacecraft for <strong>the</strong> benefit of mankind.<br />
2. To test and develop <strong>the</strong> best combination of observational procedures, instruments,<br />
subsystems, and interpretive techniques for <strong>the</strong> acquisition and study of<br />
terrestrial, lunar, and planetary natural and cultural resource data from spacecraft.<br />
3. To determine how <strong>the</strong> increased frequency and synoptic coverage uniquely<br />
afforded by spacecraft observations can aid <strong>the</strong> study of time variant and relatively<br />
unchanging phenomena on <strong>the</strong> surface of <strong>the</strong> Earth.<br />
4. To develop improved methods of displaying and disseminating space-acquired<br />
natural and cultural resource data on a global basis suitable for utilization [548]<br />
by scientific, technical, and commercial interests.<br />
5. To determine which natural and cultural resource data can be most effectively<br />
and economically obtained by manned spacecraft, unmanned satellite, interrogation<br />
of surface sensors, or <strong>the</strong> means currently being used.<br />
6. To discover, by virtue of trained scientists in spacecraft, what unforeseen natural<br />
and cultural resources or geoscience phenomena may be observable from <strong>the</strong><br />
overview available at orbital altitudes.<br />
A large number of potential users having interests in a variety of geoscientific problems<br />
and applications have been identified:<br />
1. Agriculture/Forestry Resources,<br />
2. Geography (Cultural Resources),<br />
3. Geology/Hydrology (Mineral and Water Resources),<br />
4. Oceanography (Marine Resources).<br />
2. POSSIBLE PHENOMENA WHICH MAY BE OBSERVED AND<br />
RECORDED ADVANTAGEOUSLY FROM SPACECRAFT<br />
Figure 1 gives a partial listing of phenomena which can be advantageously “mapped”<br />
from space and those types of sensors that may be used, based on <strong>the</strong> state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art. As<br />
new or better sensors are developed, <strong>the</strong> listings of observable phenomena will undoubtedly<br />
grow. The word “mapped” is used here to mean that certain natural and cultural<br />
resources phenomena are observed from space and recorded on photographs, images,<br />
tapes, or o<strong>the</strong>r data storage media. After <strong>the</strong>se raw data are recovered and analyzed, <strong>the</strong><br />
pertinent information is plotted on appropriate bases which become <strong>the</strong>matic maps.<br />
These <strong>the</strong>matic maps, toge<strong>the</strong>r with written reports, constitute one of <strong>the</strong> principal endproducts<br />
expected of <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources Program.<br />
3. UNIQUE ADVANTAGES OF SPACE FOR NATURAL RESOURCE STUDIES<br />
There are many advantages to obtaining imagery of <strong>the</strong> entire Earth or major parts of<br />
it by means of spaceborne geoscience sensing systems. These systems encompass a number<br />
of instruments and techniques applicable to many disciplines, both cultural and natural,<br />
and of use to scientific and applications users. These systems have <strong>the</strong> unique utility<br />
of complementing one ano<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong>ir results, hence <strong>the</strong>ir broad applications.<br />
For sizable areas within <strong>the</strong> field of view of <strong>the</strong> sensor, spacecraft coverage is truly synoptic<br />
because <strong>the</strong> high altitude and speed of <strong>the</strong> spacecraft permit <strong>the</strong> scientist to obtain<br />
information of large areas at a single instant of time. This is of great advantage to research
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OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
work in <strong>the</strong> Earth sciences and in natural resources, which have been hampered by <strong>the</strong><br />
time and space scales that arise in <strong>the</strong> measurement of <strong>the</strong> variable under investigation.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>re is information in <strong>the</strong> whole pattern of an integrated structure which can<br />
nei<strong>the</strong>r be derived from elements of <strong>the</strong> whole nor considered simply as <strong>the</strong> sum of <strong>the</strong><br />
elements.<br />
An important advantage of satellite photography is <strong>the</strong> aspect of real-time data acquisition.<br />
With this characteristic remote areas of special significance could be canvassed on<br />
short notice, thus providing information on impending disasters such as tsunamis, and<br />
forest fires, and studying disaster areas which result from storms, earthquakes, etc. Many<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se problems such as earthquakes, volcanoes, air-sea interactions, fish migrations,<br />
crop growth, and disease, etc., are global in nature and are consequently best studied by<br />
globe encircling data ga<strong>the</strong>ring systems.<br />
[549] For complete aerial photographic coverage over large areas many technical problems<br />
pertaining to data reduction exist, for example, <strong>the</strong> assembling of broad-scale<br />
mosaics. Here <strong>the</strong> photos must be matched, and corrections in density, scale, or color<br />
reproduction be made, and finally <strong>the</strong> joining lines must be reduced as much as possible.<br />
Using space photography would reduce <strong>the</strong>se tasks to a minimum since one space photograph,<br />
depending on scale, will cover many times <strong>the</strong> area as most aerial photographs.<br />
The long duration of spaceflights and all-wea<strong>the</strong>r operations are highly advantageous<br />
aspects of remote sensing from space. There are many regions of <strong>the</strong> Earth that are covered<br />
with clouds for long periods of time. The cloud cover not only absorbs and reflects<br />
a large part of <strong>the</strong> radiation from <strong>the</strong> Sun to <strong>the</strong> Earth, but also absorbs radiation from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth out into space. In a manned orbiting satellite <strong>the</strong> problem can be partially overcome<br />
since <strong>the</strong> scientist on board <strong>the</strong> craft will be able to see when an area is clear enough<br />
to make observations and to also employ those sensors which can penetrate certain types<br />
of overcast. A less obvious but highly significant advantage results from <strong>the</strong> clearer images<br />
possible when <strong>the</strong> observation is made from far above <strong>the</strong> turbulent refracting and diffusing<br />
layer which often seriously degrades aerial observations.<br />
With orbital sensing, it appears that <strong>the</strong> costs will be considerably less than even a single<br />
synoptic global coverage with aircraft. This is true because of <strong>the</strong> great amount of data<br />
that can be rapidly acquired, of <strong>the</strong> more complete coverage, and of <strong>the</strong> superior quality<br />
of some of <strong>the</strong> data which greatly reduces <strong>the</strong> effort needed for processing and analyzing.<br />
Low-altitude photography applied to natural resource surveys and exploration has<br />
proven to be of great value. However, up-to-date and comprehensive data require frequent<br />
overflights and near blanket coverage; thus extensive aircraft acquisition is prohibitively<br />
costly. Since <strong>the</strong> resolving power of remote-imaging instruments from satellite altitudes<br />
will be sufficient to permit identification of many different parameters of Earth resources,<br />
a potential means of economically acquiring such data on a world basis is offered.<br />
A fur<strong>the</strong>r advantage of orbital sensing is that global coverage can be obtained by uniform<br />
types of equipment and methods of calibration and measurements. This will insure<br />
that data will be collected under controlled conditions and will not be subjected to <strong>the</strong>se<br />
uncertainties. Obvious technical and operational advantages result from <strong>the</strong> precise regularity<br />
of spacecraft motion, from <strong>the</strong> lack of vibration, and from <strong>the</strong> high rate of speed.<br />
The Earth-orbital missions are also of great value for <strong>the</strong> experience gained and <strong>the</strong><br />
testing of sensors and techniques prior to <strong>the</strong> conducting of lunar and planetary orbital<br />
missions.<br />
World-wide resource management through <strong>the</strong> use of operational spacecraft will provide<br />
a combination of scientific, sociological, political, and economic benefits. Through<br />
resource management, man is able to monitor <strong>the</strong> total resource availability, make efficient<br />
use of existing resources, protect existing resources against damage or loss, and<br />
uncover new resources. To be effective, action must be taken well in advance of <strong>the</strong> depletion<br />
of available resources. Thus accurate data on current inventory and rate of depletion
furnishes <strong>the</strong> basic information required to anticipate forthcoming pressures on resources<br />
and to indicate appropriate steps to be taken.<br />
4. ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE<br />
With <strong>the</strong> assistance of disciplinary groups in several Federal agencies and institutions,<br />
program definition activities have been initiated in <strong>the</strong> four disciplinary areas. Many of <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomena which each natural resource discipline wishes to observe and record from<br />
space have been identified (Figure 1). The instruments and <strong>the</strong>ir frequencies needed to<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se data have also been [550] identified as closely as possible (Figure 1).<br />
The coordinated requirements of <strong>the</strong> several natural resource disciplines for photography<br />
and radar on initial flights have been compiled in document form. A document of<br />
infrared instrument requirements is being prepared. Albums of imagery acquired by this<br />
aircraft program toge<strong>the</strong>r with spacecraft-acquired imagery (from Gemini, Nimbus, etc.)<br />
of value to natural resource scientists are being compiled. An atlas which analyzes <strong>the</strong><br />
potential of this data for natural resource scientists is in preparation.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> principal tasks of this Program is <strong>the</strong> determination of <strong>the</strong> best combination<br />
of instruments and <strong>the</strong> best resolutions for observing natural resource phenomena.<br />
These are currently being identified. However, until several generations of instruments<br />
have been flown in space and <strong>the</strong> data analyzed, it will be impossible to be completely precise<br />
on such instrument specifications.<br />
The various remote sensing instruments recommended by <strong>the</strong> disciplinary groups are<br />
being flown over carefully selected test sites with aircraft. The data obtained from such test<br />
site overflights are <strong>the</strong>n studied to determine <strong>the</strong> best combination of instruments for<br />
spaceflight and <strong>the</strong> best analytical processes for acquiring <strong>the</strong> maximum amount of information<br />
from <strong>the</strong> data. Accomplishments in <strong>the</strong>se areas are described in detail below.<br />
4.1 AIRCRAFT DATA GATHERING SYSTEM<br />
The Natural Resources Program toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> MSC [Manned Space Center]<br />
Engineering and Development Directorate is presently engaged in ga<strong>the</strong>ring data over<br />
test sites with a number of airborne electronic and electro-optical remote sensors for a<br />
number of user agencies and cooperating scientists.<br />
This program has been set up to obtain precursor data for <strong>the</strong> calibration of instruments<br />
over known features and for <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> best observational and interpretive<br />
techniques in <strong>the</strong> period 1965–1968 preceding <strong>the</strong> earliest (1968) natural<br />
resource spaceflight missions. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> costs of developing such a data ga<strong>the</strong>ring system<br />
initially with airborne instruments is substantially less than proceeding directly to a<br />
spaceborne system. The experience gained in this aircraft phase (1965–1968) is already<br />
providing a solid basis for planning of <strong>the</strong> spaceflight testing phase.<br />
It is expected that aircraft-acquired data will also be obtained over a number of key<br />
test sites simultaneously with <strong>the</strong> initial spaceflight data in order that <strong>the</strong> spaceflight<br />
instruments may be calibrated and in order that <strong>the</strong> aircraft and spacecraft data may complement<br />
each o<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> maximum extent.<br />
4.2 STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT PROGRAM<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 229<br />
It can be seen from Figure 1 that each sensor has multiple uses, and in most cases a<br />
combination of sensors is desirable to provide complete data on any particular observed<br />
feature.<br />
To carry out <strong>the</strong> remote sensing program in a satisfactory manner, it is necessary to<br />
conduct aircraft testing from several altitudes (low, intermediate, and high) over a period
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OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
of several years. The low-altitude phase, altitudes up to 20,000 feet, is presently being conducted<br />
using <strong>the</strong> NASA-MSC Convair 240A (NASA 926) over sites in <strong>the</strong> Continental<br />
United States. It is planned to conduct <strong>the</strong> second phase at altitudes up to 40,000 feet over<br />
<strong>the</strong> same test sites and over several overseas sites. The third phase should be conducted at<br />
high altitudes, possibly up to 80,000 feet over <strong>the</strong> same test sites. Ultimately, it may be<br />
highly desirable during <strong>the</strong> early Earth-orbital missions to have <strong>the</strong> ground truth teams on<br />
<strong>the</strong> site, and <strong>the</strong> aircraft overhead at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> orbiting spacecraft overflys <strong>the</strong> area.<br />
[551] Convair 240A<br />
Implementation of this airplane was initiated in October 1964, and initial survey operations<br />
over geologic test sites got underway in early December 1964. First flights were<br />
made using only <strong>the</strong> camera systems; o<strong>the</strong>r instruments were installed as <strong>the</strong>y became<br />
available. The airplane is now scheduled to its full capability of sensors and no additional<br />
ones are being planned at this time for this aircraft. Following is a list of those sensors<br />
installed on board:<br />
1. Microwave radiometer,<br />
2. Metric camera system,<br />
3. Multiband camera system,<br />
4. Ultraviolet imager,<br />
5. Recon IV imaging IR,<br />
6. Redop scatterometer,<br />
7. Doppler chirping radar.<br />
Lockheed P-3A (Electra)<br />
This airplane was acquired in December 1965 and is ideally suited as a remote sensor<br />
test aircraft for altitudes up to 40,000 feet and contains much of <strong>the</strong> basic instrumentation<br />
necessary to meet <strong>the</strong> objectives of <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources Program. The navigation system<br />
contains <strong>the</strong> following items:<br />
1. APN 153 doppler navigator,<br />
2. ASA 47 air-mass computer,<br />
3. LN 12 attitude reference system,<br />
4. Inertial platform,<br />
5. ASQ 80 wea<strong>the</strong>r and ground point radar,<br />
6. APN 70 LORAN overwater navigation system.<br />
This equipment will provide <strong>the</strong> flight parameters such as roll, pitch, yaw, ground<br />
speed, heading, altitude, position, etc., for sensor operation, data correlation, and navigation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> aircraft. The aircraft has both a large cabin area and a bomb-bay area with a<br />
number of radomes and instrument mounting provisions in which to install sensor systems<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r experiments. With <strong>the</strong> installation of an auxiliary power unit, operation<br />
without <strong>the</strong> use of ground-based starting equipment and o<strong>the</strong>r ground support equipment<br />
will be possible. The P-3A is now being implemented to receive a compliment [sic]<br />
of sensors basically as described in Figure 2 and is planned to be in operation by July or<br />
August of 1966.<br />
Douglas A-3B<br />
This airplane contains a Westinghouse AN/APQ 97 (XE-1) side-looking radar system.<br />
It has completed seventy-two hours of flight time acquiring radar imagery over a number<br />
of test sites and o<strong>the</strong>r areas of interest. An additional sixty hours of flight time has been<br />
requested (twenty hours in FY 1966; forty hours in FY 1967).
[552] 4.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE TEST SITE PROGRAM<br />
The prime objectives of <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources Test Site Program are calibration of <strong>the</strong><br />
remote sensors and <strong>the</strong> development of a capability for supporting <strong>the</strong> use of remote sensors<br />
in performing natural resources investigations. To meet this objective, scientists are<br />
currently ga<strong>the</strong>ring data with electronic and electro optical remote sensors in and over<br />
areas of specific interest. Examples of aircraft and Gemini-acquired data are shown in<br />
Figures 3–7. [Figures 3–7 omitted] The data thus acquired will <strong>the</strong>n be used to:<br />
1. Advance our knowledge of <strong>the</strong> effects of terrain parameters on sensor data.<br />
2. Provide a means of calibrating data return from sensors in aircraft and spacecraft.<br />
3. Define sensor operational parameters and spacecraft integration requirements.<br />
4. Develop data handling and interpretation techniques.<br />
5. Define sensor systems to meet <strong>the</strong> scientific objectives of Earth-orbital missions.<br />
6. Provide a group of scientists skilled in application of remotely sensed data to natural<br />
resources investigations.<br />
4.4 TYPES OF TEST AREAS<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 231<br />
Experience in studies to date have indicated that two types of test areas or sites are<br />
necessary. The first type is designated as an “Instrument Calibration Test Site,” and for<br />
abbreviation purposes is referred to as a “Test Site.” The second type is designated as a<br />
“Natural Resources Applications Area,” and for abbreviation purposes is referred to as an<br />
“Applications Area.” Figures 8–12 give a complete list of <strong>the</strong> currently proposed<br />
Applications Areas and Test Sites and <strong>the</strong> names of <strong>the</strong> scientists responsible for data<br />
analysis at <strong>the</strong>se sites. [Figures 8–12 omitted]<br />
A Test Site is an area where studies are conducted in <strong>the</strong> calibration of <strong>the</strong> instruments.<br />
These studies will test instrument response to well-defined preselected conditions.<br />
Tasks will include <strong>the</strong> development of interpretation and correlation techniques, and<br />
investigations of <strong>the</strong> response of <strong>the</strong> remote sensors in terms of biological, chemical, and<br />
physical conditions in <strong>the</strong> area. Applications Areas are areas where extensive investigations<br />
are conducted using fully-developed instruments to ga<strong>the</strong>r and interpret data in<br />
terms of <strong>the</strong> area’s known conditions and features, e.g., agricultural, geographic, geologic,<br />
hydrologic, and oceanographic. These Applications Areas tentatively include a number<br />
of international sites which have been chosen principally to provide data on problems in<br />
<strong>the</strong> various Earth sciences, that are global or continental in scope and to promote international<br />
cooperation in line with NASA’s policy.<br />
Test Sites should have <strong>the</strong> following characteristics:<br />
1. They must satisfy <strong>the</strong> requirements of <strong>the</strong> specific instrument to be tested at whatever<br />
development stage it exists.<br />
2. There should be available an extensive amount of ground data so <strong>the</strong>y do not<br />
require extensive basic study.<br />
3. They should be as uniform as possible, commensurate with <strong>the</strong> purpose for which<br />
selected, so as to permit identification of <strong>the</strong> remote sensor response with a<br />
single (or minimum number of) features.<br />
Applications Areas should be:<br />
1. Areas in which studies by <strong>the</strong> participating agency (or one of its cooperating agencies<br />
or institutions) are taking place or have taken place in <strong>the</strong> recent past.<br />
[553] 2.Areas of broad natural resources or scientific interest, with scientific resources<br />
problems whose solution will contribute to <strong>the</strong> progress in <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources<br />
Program.<br />
3. Areas with well-documented features and for which <strong>the</strong>re is an active scientist prepared<br />
to analyze sensor data and report on results in a competent manner.
232<br />
International Applications Areas should:<br />
1. Contain features and conditions not well-developed or available in <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
2. Be readily accessible to all accredited scientists of o<strong>the</strong>r countries involved in <strong>the</strong><br />
Program and should not be located in countries where political instability could<br />
adversely affect <strong>the</strong> Program.<br />
3. Be areas in which studies can be adequately supported and which present no<br />
logistic problems.<br />
4.5 SELECTION OF SITES<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Prospective Test Sites are proposed by <strong>the</strong> instrument and/or disciplinary scientists<br />
with approval being vested in an ad hoc “Test Site and Aircraft Committee.” This<br />
Committee is chaired by <strong>the</strong> Chief, Natural Resources Program, or his deputy, and is composed<br />
of <strong>the</strong> program managers of <strong>the</strong> several natural and cultural resources disciplines<br />
and <strong>the</strong> chairmen of <strong>the</strong> “teams.” Actual investigations are carried out by scientists affiliated<br />
with <strong>the</strong> instrument teams, in <strong>the</strong> participating Federal agencies, and at universities<br />
under NASA contract.<br />
4.6 CURRENT STATUS OF TEST SITE ACTIVITIES<br />
Studies of Test Sites started in 1964 with infrared studies at <strong>the</strong> Pisgah Crater Area,<br />
California, for geology and at <strong>the</strong> Purdue Farm for agriculture. The number of studies<br />
increased in 1965 with additional studies in Western Kansas; Mono Craters, California;<br />
Davis, California; Weslaco, Texas; and Willcox Playa, Arizona. Concomitantly, <strong>the</strong> work at<br />
<strong>the</strong> original was broadened to include o<strong>the</strong>r sensors.<br />
Work at <strong>the</strong> Test Sites is being carried out principally by scientists of <strong>the</strong> instrument<br />
teams working under NASA contracts or grants. Current status of “Test Site” studies is<br />
given in Figure 13. [Figure 13 omitted]<br />
Many of <strong>the</strong>se measurements and problems require <strong>the</strong> development of new study<br />
concepts. For example, statistical sampling programs are being developed by geologists at<br />
Northwestern University. Geoscientists from <strong>the</strong> University of Nevada are working with <strong>the</strong><br />
instruments and user scientists to determine <strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> not usually measured<br />
parameters on remote sensor data, as well as providing very detailed geological, mineralogical,<br />
and micrometeorological data. Similar studies are being carried out in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
disciplinary areas.<br />
Airborne remote sensor data are now being acquired over a number of Applications<br />
Areas, and are being studied and evaluated by participating user agency scientists. A number<br />
of preliminary reports have been written describing <strong>the</strong> uses of <strong>the</strong> data. Although this program<br />
is in its infancy, it appears that <strong>the</strong> objectives of <strong>the</strong> Applications Areas are being met.<br />
4.7 DATA PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTING UNIT<br />
The Data Processing and Distributing Unit (Data Unit) has been established to handle<br />
<strong>the</strong> data recorded by several kinds of remote sensors, both electromagnetic and forcefield,<br />
onboard NASA-conducted aircraft and o<strong>the</strong>r cooperating flights over selected<br />
geoscience test sites. Additional calibration and ground-reference data is also collected at<br />
some specific ground-site installations using contact or short-range sensors for correlation<br />
and corroboration of <strong>the</strong> airborne remote-sensor data. The purpose of such collections is<br />
to aid in evaluating <strong>the</strong> usefulness of apparatus and data analysis techniques for remote<br />
sensing of [554] natural and cultural resources by means of spaceborne instrumentation.<br />
This involves a number of different data formats (film, paper, tapes, charts, etc.) providing<br />
records which present <strong>the</strong> data in a variety of forms, i.e., digital, analog, alphanumeric,<br />
etc.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 233<br />
The Data Unit will perform <strong>the</strong> following functions in support of <strong>the</strong> NASA Natural<br />
Resources Program:<br />
1. Process, reproduce, catalog, classify, index, disseminate, store, and retrieve geoscience<br />
data (original, reduced and/or analyzed, including preliminary, intermediate,<br />
and final reports) received from NASA-supported, or cooperating remote<br />
sensing of natural resources investigators.<br />
2. Provide supplemental support by maintaining an adequate supply of charts and<br />
maps relating to test sites and by conducting file searches and related services.<br />
Such charts and maps will be supplied from standard sources.<br />
3. Compile and furnish periodic accession lists of data to cooperating investigators.<br />
Accession lists will indicate type and size of format, originator, sensor type, geographic<br />
area, altitude, time and date of acquisition by originator. This information<br />
may be in <strong>the</strong> form of computer print-outs.<br />
4. Design and supply check lists to investigators for submission of data to <strong>the</strong> Data<br />
Unit. These check lists will contain minimum terms, descriptions and information<br />
required to provide a basis for data cataloging and entry into a computer or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
retrieval systems.<br />
5. Design a format for queries to <strong>the</strong> Data Unit and make copies available to investigators<br />
for <strong>the</strong>ir use.<br />
6. Process, reproduce, associate with related sensor data, catalog, classify, index, disseminate,<br />
store and retrieve all ground control data from test site supplied by<br />
investigators who support <strong>the</strong> NASA Natural Resources Program.<br />
5. ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED<br />
It is difficult to establish <strong>the</strong> economical importance or yield of a system which is virtually<br />
untried and untested. Economic benefits, however, cannot be derived from a natural<br />
resource until that resource is located and until sufficient knowledge and<br />
understanding of that resource and its environment are obtained to permit efficient<br />
exploitation.<br />
As examples of areas of potential economic benefit, <strong>the</strong> National Academy of<br />
Sciences, National Research Council (NASCO Publication 1228) cited <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
Shipping—The shipping industry currently transports about $40 billion per year in<br />
cargo. It is expected to rise about 48 per cent by 1970. By 1975 <strong>the</strong> shipping bill for transporting<br />
this cargo will be about $5 billion with <strong>the</strong> added costs of $500 million per year<br />
for new construction. Even a small improvement in ship routing techniques resulting<br />
from increased knowledge derived from spacecraft concerning high waves, shoaling of<br />
channels, existence of uncharted shoals, icebergs, and pack ice distribution, etc., will contribute<br />
a significant dollar savings when compared to <strong>the</strong> expected overall cost.<br />
Fisheries—U.S. fisheries production has increased less than 10 per cent in <strong>the</strong> past<br />
decade, yet <strong>the</strong> importing of fisheries products into <strong>the</strong> United States has resulted in an<br />
adverse balance of payments of approximately $500,000,000 in 1965. In fact, improved<br />
domestic development of fisheries in our near shore area could result in doubling domestic<br />
production in <strong>the</strong> next ten to fifteen years and bring about a marked reduction in <strong>the</strong><br />
adverse gold flow problem. Although dependent on many factors, any aid provided by<br />
spacecraft oceanography to locating, delineating, predicting <strong>the</strong> productivity of fishing<br />
grounds globally could produce large dollar payoffs to <strong>the</strong> entire industry and hence <strong>the</strong><br />
nation.<br />
[555] Ano<strong>the</strong>r example of interest relates to <strong>the</strong> field of water resources:<br />
A single, medium-sized, Canadian hydroelectric plant saves $1 million for each 1 per<br />
cent increase in accuracy in predicting April to August flow. This amount of power would<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise be lost because of <strong>the</strong> need to waste water to provide room for unanticipated
234<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
flood conditions.<br />
Base and <strong>the</strong>matic mapping by conventional aerial surveys is an extremely costly operation.<br />
It has been estimated that over $1 billion is spent annually to obtain <strong>the</strong> aircraftacquired<br />
data from which such maps are made, and yet only a very small percentage of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth’s resources are so covered in any one year. The Earth’s surface consists of<br />
504 million square kilometers, of which 146 million is land area. The following tabulation<br />
gives an idea of <strong>the</strong> costs involved to cover <strong>the</strong> land and adjacent shallow sea areas<br />
(150 million square kilometers) once by aircraft.<br />
ESTIMATED COST OF AERIAL SURVEYS<br />
Types of Surveys Cost/km 2 Cost to Cover Land<br />
and Adjacent Areas<br />
A. Small Scale Mapping and $6.00 $900,000,000<br />
Supplementary Photography<br />
and Infrared<br />
B. Magnetic-Gravity 5.00 750,000,000<br />
C. Side-Locking Radar 1.00 150,000,000<br />
$1,800,000,000<br />
If <strong>the</strong> remaining ocean areas were covered only in a synoptic manner using magnetic-gravity,<br />
infrared, microwave, and selective photography at an estimated cost of $10 per<br />
square kilometer, this would add $3.5 billion to <strong>the</strong> land coverage figures. Thus, a onetime<br />
aerial survey of <strong>the</strong> Earth and its force fields would cost about 7.5 billion. However,<br />
many of <strong>the</strong> phenomena affecting resources are time variant and repeated coverage is<br />
needed. Even if repetitive annual coverage were limited to about 20 per cent of <strong>the</strong> world<br />
(100 million square kilometers) and if only synoptic sensing totaling $10 per kilometer<br />
were performed, <strong>the</strong> program maintenance cost would be $1 billion annually. These figures<br />
cover only <strong>the</strong> cost of data acquisition. Data reduction and dissemination would<br />
involve costs far exceeding those of <strong>the</strong> acquisition phase.<br />
The cost of mounting an operational resource-sensing space program cannot be accurately<br />
determined at this time. Parameters, such as <strong>the</strong> payload, power, mode (manned or<br />
unmanned) have not been fully defined. However, if one assumes that <strong>the</strong>se parameters<br />
will be compatible with one or more of <strong>the</strong> space vehicles being developed, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> costs<br />
attributed to <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources Program for space-acquired data would be reasonable.<br />
Comparing <strong>the</strong> costs of a space program to one of conventional aerial surveys does<br />
not provide <strong>the</strong> total answer. Many aircraft surveys will still be required and some types of<br />
anticipated surveys might not prove practical by ei<strong>the</strong>r aircraft or spacecraft. However,<br />
indications are that, where coverage of a global repetitive nature is required and obtainable<br />
by both modes, a space system has unquestionable economic advantages. It appears<br />
that <strong>the</strong> cost will be on <strong>the</strong> order of a magnitude less for <strong>the</strong> space mode. The potential<br />
economic advantages of utilizing space for resource analysis is not limited to <strong>the</strong> acquisition<br />
phase, but it is also important in <strong>the</strong> data reduction phases. Since space-acquired data<br />
will be of a uniform and systematic nature, its conversion into maps and statistics will be<br />
enormously simplified when compared to conventional methods.<br />
The question of whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Program is worth <strong>the</strong> cost of a spaceborne data ga<strong>the</strong>ring<br />
system must be considered on <strong>the</strong> basis of future demands for natural resources. Current<br />
indications strongly support <strong>the</strong> need for new revolutionary means, such as orbiting spacecraft,<br />
to meet rapidly increasing demands for natural resources. The data of scientific value<br />
from such a program will also be enormous, but unfortunately cannot have a price tag put
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 235<br />
on it at this time. The full extent of <strong>the</strong> economic benefits to accrue from this program can<br />
be properly evaluated only by <strong>the</strong> scientists and economists associated with <strong>the</strong> various natural<br />
and cultural resources. This evaluation has been initiated as an [556] integral part of<br />
this Program, and <strong>the</strong>re are indications that <strong>the</strong> potential benefits will greatly exceed <strong>the</strong><br />
cost of <strong>the</strong> Program. However realistic experiments and additional research must be conducted<br />
before any specific dollar values can be placed on <strong>the</strong>se benefits.<br />
6. FUTURE PROGRAM<br />
Ideally, <strong>the</strong> Program should proceed through <strong>the</strong> following phases:<br />
Feasibility—This phase (in progress) is basically one of experimentation from aircraft<br />
to determine signatures of natural resource phenomena in terms of assumed spacecraft<br />
sensor resolution. During this phase, carefully selected and controlled test sites are being<br />
utilized. Using available aircraft instrumentation, <strong>the</strong> correlation and relative value of<br />
each sensor to <strong>the</strong> phenomena in question are being studied. Suborbital and orbital<br />
flights also will be utilized to obtain some limited sensor responses. These are being analyzed<br />
and used as a basis for relating aircraft to spacecraft obtained signatures. As instrumental<br />
value is established, design and procurement of space hardware are being<br />
initiated. Facilities for data handling and reduction must also be established during this<br />
stage. This includes provisions for space-acquired data as well as aircraft-acquired data.<br />
Aircraft testing of sensors is expected to be a continuing activity, and will continue beyond<br />
this phase to provide data from both aircraft and spacecraft simultaneously during <strong>the</strong><br />
spacecraft testing phase.<br />
Spacecraft Testing—During <strong>the</strong> 1968–1972 period <strong>the</strong> first flights with <strong>the</strong> primary<br />
purpose of sensing <strong>the</strong> Earth’s resources are expected. These are expected to include<br />
flights of <strong>the</strong> Apollo Applications Program, where manned spacecraft will carry a sizable<br />
number of sensors which can be directed at various parts of <strong>the</strong> Earth simultaneously. On<br />
<strong>the</strong>se initial spaceflights, coverage will be concentrated over areas such as <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States where ground controls may be used to verify <strong>the</strong> conclusions derived during <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
stage. Arctic, tropical, and o<strong>the</strong>r representative test sites will also be included. As a<br />
result of <strong>the</strong>se flights, it is expected that sufficient information will be available to determine<br />
<strong>the</strong> optimum:<br />
1. Mode—unmanned, manned or man-serviced;<br />
2. Orbital configuration and flight duration;<br />
3. Extent and variety of sensors;<br />
4. Mode of data recording and return to Earth;<br />
5. Methods of data reduction and dissemination.<br />
During this stage, <strong>the</strong> basic economics of resource sensing from space must be determined.<br />
This will involve weighing <strong>the</strong> benefits as opposed to <strong>the</strong> costs of <strong>the</strong> program<br />
entering into an operational stage. Although not an operational phase, it is expected that<br />
considerable data of economic importance will be obtained in addition to a large amount<br />
of scientific information.<br />
Operational—The existence and extent of this stage will depend on <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
analysis made during <strong>the</strong> previous stage. Indications are that it will be multidiscipline in<br />
nature, global in extent, and more or less continuous since many of <strong>the</strong> important phenomena<br />
associated with resources are time variant. Operational flights may well begin<br />
while <strong>the</strong> orbital testing stage is still in progress—perhaps during 1971 or 1972. By 1972 it<br />
is expected that testing and operational spaceflights will be combined.
236<br />
Agricultural Geographic Geologic Hydorlogic Oceanographic<br />
Vegetation Density<br />
Grass-Brush-Timberland Interfaces<br />
Plant Species and Vigor<br />
Soil Series, Temperature and Moisture<br />
Irrigation Water<br />
Fire Detection<br />
Land Use<br />
Transportation and Linkages<br />
Settle and Population Movements<br />
Resources Utilization<br />
Climatic Conditions<br />
Geomorphology<br />
Composition<br />
Structure<br />
Stratigraphy—Sedimentation<br />
Mineral Deposits<br />
Engineering<br />
Crustal-Mantle Studies<br />
Evapotranspiration<br />
Rain Distribution and Infiltration<br />
Ground Water Discharge<br />
Water Pollution<br />
Snow Surveying<br />
Glaciation<br />
Thermal Conditions<br />
Sea Surface Roughness<br />
Shoals and Coastal Mapping<br />
Biological Phenomena<br />
Ice Surveillance<br />
Subsurface Structure<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X ? X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
? ? X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X<br />
X X X ? X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X ? ? X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X<br />
X X<br />
X X X X X X<br />
X X X X X X X X X X X X<br />
X X X X<br />
X X X<br />
X<br />
X<br />
X<br />
X<br />
X<br />
X<br />
X<br />
Metric Mapping Camera<br />
Panoramic Camera<br />
Tracking Telescope<br />
Multiband Synoptic Cameras<br />
Radar Imager<br />
Radar Scatterometer/Altimeter<br />
Infrared Imager<br />
IR Radiometer/Spectrometer<br />
Optical Mechanical Scanner*<br />
Microwave Imager<br />
Microwave Radiometer<br />
Laser Altimeter/Scatterometer<br />
Magnetometers<br />
Gravity Gradiometer<br />
Absorption Spectroscopy<br />
Radio Frequency Reflectivity<br />
Viewfinder<br />
Ultraviolet System<br />
Telemetering Buoys<br />
Thermometer and Hydrometer<br />
Anemometer<br />
Weir Stream Guage<br />
Fathometer<br />
Snow Pack Integrator<br />
Xerometer<br />
Particle Size Analyzer<br />
Figure 1. Anticipated Applications** of Earth Orbital Natural Resources Data Ga<strong>the</strong>ring System<br />
** This table has been summarized from more detailed tables for each discipline and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
does not include all <strong>the</strong> anticipated applications which have been identified to date.<br />
* (0.32–16.0 Microns)
[557]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 237<br />
Information<br />
Resolution or<br />
Instantaneous<br />
Instrument Part of Spectrum Obtained Format Field of View Field of View<br />
RC8 Camera, Visible 0.4–0.7m Color Distribution Film 9x9 70 lines/mm 74° Edge-Edge<br />
Color IR* Qualitative<br />
T11 Camera, Visible 0.5–0.7m Conventional Film 9x9 35 lines/mm 74° Edge-Edge<br />
Black & White* Photo Information<br />
Multispectral Visible Color Distribution Film 70mm 70 lines/mm 18° (not stereo)<br />
Camera* Near IR 0.9<br />
Near UV 0.3–0.4m<br />
Quantitative<br />
IR Imager #1 IR 4.5–5.5 Radiant Tempera- Single Channel *** 78°<br />
ture Distribution 35mm<br />
Split Channel 16mm<br />
IR Imager #2 IR 8–13 Radiant Temperature<br />
Distribution<br />
Film 70mm *** 90°<br />
Passive UV 2900–4000 O<br />
A<br />
UV Reflectance Single Channel ***<br />
35mm<br />
Split Channel 16mm<br />
78°<br />
IR Spectrometer 5–15 Spectral Distribu- Line Trace Spectral Resolu- 2 1°<br />
tion of Emitted tion 0.1 of<br />
Energy (Gross<br />
Chemistry of<br />
Surface)<br />
Spectral Range<br />
Microwave 33mm; 8.5mm; Radiant Tempera- Line Trace 1° Kelvin Several Degrees<br />
Radiometer 19mm; 13.5mm ture Distribution<br />
to Some Depth<br />
Ryan 13.3Gh Radar Backscatter Magnetic 0.1° Beam Width 60° Fore<br />
Scatterometer (∇o∨sθ) Tape 60° Aft<br />
30° Wide<br />
Side Looking<br />
Radar **<br />
35Gh Radar Image Strip Photo *** ***<br />
Broad Band IR 8–14 Radiant Tempera- Line Trace 1° Kelvin 2 1°<br />
Radiometer** ture of Surface<br />
Passive Micro- Broad Band Distribution of Film 70mm<br />
2<br />
1° 90°<br />
wave Imager** Centered at Radiant Tempera-<br />
9Gh tures to Some Depth<br />
Imaging Radar*** *** Radar Image of 9-1/2" Film 15m 10-mile Swath<br />
Reflectivity of<br />
Surface and Near<br />
Surface<br />
Split Channel<br />
* Two of <strong>the</strong>se operable simultaneously<br />
** Not available at present<br />
*** Separate aircraft<br />
**** Classified<br />
Gh = (Gigahertz)=10 9<br />
cycles per second<br />
[558]<br />
Figure 2. Characteristics of Remote Sensing Instruments for <strong>the</strong> CV-240A, P3A, and O<strong>the</strong>r NASA Aircraft<br />
Document II-14<br />
Document title: “Prepared by Jaffe and Badgley at Seamans’ Request: NASA Natural<br />
Resources Program,” May 13, 1966.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
A continual problem in <strong>the</strong> NASA Earth Resources Program involved conflicts between <strong>the</strong> developers<br />
and <strong>the</strong> users of technology regarding spacecraft design. NASA wanted to develop large, complicated
238<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
satellites, which required considerable time between inception and flight. The various user<br />
communities, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, were willing to settle for less advanced hardware so as to fly earlier.<br />
This report, requested by NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., and prepared by<br />
Director for Space Applications Leonard Jaffe and Natural Resources Program Chief Peter Badgley,<br />
demonstrates NASA’s bias toward large experimental satellites and includes a ra<strong>the</strong>r lengthy instrument<br />
“wish list.”<br />
[1]<br />
Prepared by Jaffe and Badgley at Seamans’ Request<br />
NASA Natural Resources Program<br />
[rubber stamped: “May 13 1965”]<br />
Objective<br />
To conduct an experimental program to determine and develop <strong>the</strong> feasibility of <strong>the</strong><br />
use of satellite borne instrumentation to make measurements of and assist in surveying<br />
<strong>the</strong> earth’s natural and cultural resources (i.e. atmospherics, agriculture, forestry, hydrology,<br />
geology, geography, oceanography, and so forth).<br />
Scope<br />
1. Studies by user agencies of <strong>the</strong> applicability of spaceborne instrumentation to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir needs.<br />
2. Accumulation of data from an instrumented aircraft flight test program over calibrated<br />
test sites.<br />
3. Orbital flight testing of instrumentation and development of required data analysis<br />
techniques to determine feasibility and practicability of this space application.<br />
Urgency<br />
User agencies have expressed an urgent need for improvements in <strong>the</strong>ir observational<br />
and surveying capabilities to help maintain an adequate supply of natural resources. If<br />
vigorously pursued, <strong>the</strong> technology of spaceborne systems could be provided to fill many<br />
of <strong>the</strong> expressed needs by l975.<br />
Requirements of <strong>the</strong> Experimental Program<br />
The specific and ultimate requirements of <strong>the</strong> various users must necessarily be a<br />
result of <strong>the</strong> experimental program. This application will require data collection and<br />
analysis systems of <strong>the</strong> most advanced types with an optimum mix of high resolution<br />
(small area detailed data samples of resolutions below 20 meters) and moderate resolution<br />
(broad areas, resolutions above 20 meters) coverage. Instruments recording data<br />
from many portions of <strong>the</strong> electromagnetic spectrum are being considered including optical<br />
(visible), infrared, ultraviolet, and microwave radar. (Reference: “Objectives,<br />
Instrumentation, and Flight Time Recommendation of User Agencies and Cooperating<br />
Scientists Involved in <strong>the</strong> NASA Natural Resources Program”).<br />
The current NASA experimental program began in l964 with <strong>the</strong> initiation of discussions<br />
with and studies by <strong>the</strong> user agencies to assess <strong>the</strong>ir requirements and <strong>the</strong> applicability<br />
of space derived data by analysing [sic] available results from existing programs (Tiros,<br />
Nimbus, Mercury, and Gemini) and simulated results from instrumented aircraft tests.<br />
[2] The instrumented Aircraft Flight Test Program began in mid 1964 with flights of an<br />
infrared imaging system over calibrated agricultural ground test sites near Purdue<br />
University. Since <strong>the</strong>n we have added multispectral cameras, active imaging and scat-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 239<br />
terometer radars, passive microwave radiometers, and UV line scanners in 1965 and plan<br />
to add more advanced multispectral cameras, metric and panoramic cameras, more<br />
advanced infrared scanners, infrared spectrometers and passive microwave imagers in<br />
1966. The studies and <strong>the</strong> aircraft program are planned to be carried out on a continuing<br />
basis to provide for economical testing of instrumentation over sites of known characteristics<br />
prior to orbital testing.<br />
As a result of <strong>the</strong>se activities <strong>the</strong> user community has identified and specified candidate<br />
instruments for orbital test. The initial and most urgent of <strong>the</strong>se are a wide range<br />
spectral scanner (0.3–13 microns) covering <strong>the</strong> near UV, visible and part of <strong>the</strong> IR spectrum<br />
(190 meter resolution) and a multispectral synoptic photographic system (of<br />
approximately 30 meters resolution). NASA is currently planning incorporation of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
instruments into an already planned flight in 1969.<br />
A ra<strong>the</strong>r completely instrumented natural resources satellite is being considered for<br />
flight in 1970 or 1971 involving <strong>the</strong> following instruments:<br />
Metric Cameras<br />
Panoramic Cameras<br />
Multispectral Tracking Telescope<br />
Multispectral Synoptic Cameras<br />
Imaging Radars (8.0 gc)<br />
Radar Altimeter/Scatterometers (0.4 and 0.8 gc)<br />
Wide Range Spectral Scanner (0.3–13 microns)<br />
Infrared Long Wavelength Spectrometer (18–16 microns)<br />
Infrared Short Wavelength Spectrometer (0.4–2.5 microns)<br />
Infrared Radiometer (10–12 microns)<br />
Passive Microwave Imager (9.0 gc)<br />
Passive Multichannel Microwave Radiometers (0.4–21 cm)<br />
UV Imaging Spectrometer (3900–4900 Angstroms and 5800–6800 Angstroms)<br />
Laser Altimeter/Scatterometer<br />
Absorption Spectrometer (UV, visible, IR)<br />
Chirp Radar System (75–450 mc’s)<br />
Gravity Gradiometer<br />
Magnetometer System (triaxial fluxgate and rubidium vapor)<br />
Flight test of this entire group of instruments simultaneously is highly desirable<br />
because <strong>the</strong> cross correlation of data from various portions of <strong>the</strong> electromagnetic spectrum<br />
acquired under similar lighting and wea<strong>the</strong>r conditions will yield far more information<br />
than data acquired at separate times by individual instruments.<br />
If successful and needed, a repeat of this satellite is being considered for flight in<br />
1971–72 to continue <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> technology and <strong>the</strong> ability to handle and<br />
analyse [sic] accumulated data.<br />
[3] Orbital Requirements<br />
During <strong>the</strong> experimental phase of this program (pre-1975) <strong>the</strong> natural resource users<br />
require data to be collected periodically over a number of natural and cultural resources<br />
test sites. These sites must be readily accessible and available for study by well trained scientists.<br />
Many of <strong>the</strong> sites essential to this program fall within <strong>the</strong> United States both<br />
because of <strong>the</strong> subject matter involved (such as land use in metropolitan areas, water pollution<br />
in Great Lakes, water resources in nor<strong>the</strong>ast and arid west, geo<strong>the</strong>rmal power sites<br />
in Pacific Northwest etc.) and because of <strong>the</strong> ready availability of trained personnel for<br />
ground control studies. Orbital inclinations of at least 480 are <strong>the</strong>refore extremely important<br />
during <strong>the</strong> experimental phases of this program. It should be emphasized however,
240<br />
that a number of important users (Canadian government, Arctic Institute, several<br />
oceanographic groups, <strong>the</strong> National Science Foundation and <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey)<br />
have expressed strong recommendations for polar orbits. The U.S. Geological Survey and<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Science Foundation requirements relate to <strong>the</strong>ir work in Antarctica.<br />
Although requirements for polar orbits are not mandatory during <strong>the</strong> experimental phases,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are never<strong>the</strong>less highly desirable. However, data acquired during such flights can<br />
be controlled so that it is collected only over well studied end well specified test sites.<br />
Conclusions<br />
1. The discourse with <strong>the</strong> user scientists is well underway.<br />
2. The development of an operational capability requires that experience with<br />
orbital data be built up over a long period.<br />
3. In order to make progress in this field it is necessary that we have <strong>the</strong> widest participation<br />
of competent scientists and this can only be accomplished by unclassified access<br />
to data and <strong>the</strong> pertinent characteristics of <strong>the</strong> instrumentation and through availability<br />
to <strong>the</strong> program of already developed technology and hardware for incorporation in <strong>the</strong><br />
NASA experimental flight program.<br />
4. Many of <strong>the</strong> data collection instruments required for <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources<br />
Program are also vital to <strong>the</strong> broad exploration of <strong>the</strong> moon and planets and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
should be made available to NASA in any case.<br />
Document II-15<br />
Document title: Leonard Jaffe, Director, Space Applications Programs, OSSA, to Deputy<br />
Administrator, thru Homer S. Newell, Associate Administrator for Space Science and<br />
Applications, “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), August 25, 1966, regarding<br />
Remote Sensing and South America,” August 31, 1966, with attached: Robert G. Reeves,<br />
For <strong>the</strong> Record, “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 10 a.m., August 25,<br />
1966,” August 31, 1966.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
As different government and nongovernmental institutions became interested in <strong>the</strong> potential for a<br />
satellite Earth resources program, NASA came under pressure to deliver user-oriented working satellites<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than large experimental spacecraft. The State Department, as one of <strong>the</strong>se interested institutions,<br />
along with its Agency for International Development, viewed resource satellites as a way to<br />
assist third-world nations. Interested in providing a resource satellite for South America, <strong>the</strong><br />
Departments of State, Agriculture, and <strong>the</strong> Interior used <strong>the</strong> threat of a non-NASA satellite program<br />
based on a proposal by <strong>the</strong> Radio Corporation of America (RCA) to prod NASA into a more responsive<br />
attitude.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
AD/Deputy Administrator<br />
THRU: S/Associate Administrator for<br />
Space Science and Applications<br />
SA/Director, Space Applications Programs, OSSA<br />
[rubber stamped: “SEP 6 1966”]
Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), August 25,<br />
1966, regarding Remote Sensing and South America<br />
The enclosed is a fairly complete memorandum on <strong>the</strong> subject meeting, but following<br />
comments are in order:<br />
(1) USGS is apparently <strong>the</strong> prime mover in soliciting <strong>the</strong> Agency for International<br />
Development (AID) to promote South American use of orbital remote sensing techniques<br />
in general support of <strong>the</strong> Rostow Report recommendations approved as <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Security Action Memorandum 349 (NSAM 349) enclosed.<br />
(2) USGS would like to budget for an “operational” satellite as soon as possible to<br />
establish jurisdiction.<br />
(3) Plan based on <strong>the</strong> Radio Corporation of America (RCA) proposal to develop<br />
Delta class satellite with TV camera of 5,000 line resolution.<br />
(4) USGS and Department of Agriculture agree that <strong>the</strong> South American need is<br />
urgent and that <strong>the</strong> system proposed by RCA would be useful.<br />
(5) The RCA proposed camera is far beyond <strong>the</strong> Nimbus/TIROS state of <strong>the</strong> art.<br />
(6) We made note at <strong>the</strong> meeting that <strong>the</strong>re is some agreement between Department<br />
of State and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that NASA<br />
should establish and chair an interagency committee to develop governmental thoughts<br />
on <strong>the</strong> subject.<br />
(7) I suggested that <strong>the</strong> agencies pull toge<strong>the</strong>r requirements for such a lower resolution<br />
system and convey <strong>the</strong>m to NASA. NASA will <strong>the</strong>n determine how such a development<br />
might proceed from a technical standpoint and in <strong>the</strong> interests of overall economy<br />
in <strong>the</strong> space budget.<br />
(8) I suggest that <strong>the</strong> Deputy Administrator (AD), NASA, organize <strong>the</strong> committee recommended<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Administrator’s memorandum to AD, dated August 12, 1966, (See also<br />
NSAM 349) and that <strong>the</strong> agencies’ requirements and <strong>the</strong> NASA suggested approach to<br />
development be submitted to that committee. This will insure that NASA is <strong>the</strong> focal point<br />
for advice during <strong>the</strong> developmental period. This is most appropriate—because of <strong>the</strong><br />
multi-agency interest, NASA is in <strong>the</strong> best position to serve all of <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
[rubber stamped: “Leonard Jaffe”]<br />
Leonard Jaffe<br />
Enclosures<br />
NSAM 349<br />
The Frontiers of South America<br />
Memo For <strong>the</strong> Record, from SAR/Reeves, dated August 31, 1966<br />
SA/LJaffe/mc 8/31/66<br />
bcc: S/Newell<br />
AXC<br />
Concurrence: ____________<br />
Homer S. Newell<br />
Associate Administrator for<br />
Space Science and Applications<br />
I/Morrison<br />
[handwritten note: “9/6/66”]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 241<br />
**********
242<br />
[1] For <strong>the</strong> Record<br />
SAR/Robert G. Reeves<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
[rubber stamped “AUG 31 1966”]<br />
Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),<br />
10 a.m., August 25, 1966<br />
A meeting was called by Mr. Edgar L. Owens, Chief, Planning Division, Bureau for<br />
Latin America, Department of State, Agency from International Development (AID), and<br />
was held in <strong>the</strong> Director’s Conference Room, U.S. Geological Survey. Attendees were:<br />
Edgar L. Owens, State/AID<br />
Kenneth Milow, State/AID<br />
Leonard Jaffe, NASA/Code SA, Director<br />
James R. Morrison, NASA/Code I<br />
Robert G. Reeves, NASA/Code SAS (USGS)<br />
Arch B. Park, USDA/Agricultural Research Service<br />
James Bailey, U.S. Naval Oceanographic <strong>Office</strong> (USNOO)<br />
Leo V. Strees, USNOO<br />
William A. Fischer, USGA/<strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Director<br />
Montie R. Klepper, USGS/Associate Chief Geologist<br />
Charles J. Robinove, USGS/Hydrology Program Manager<br />
John Place, USGS/Geography Program Manager (Acting)<br />
Robert Peplies, USGS/Geography Program (East Tennessee State University)<br />
The subject of <strong>the</strong> meeting was to discuss <strong>the</strong> possibility of using Remote Sensors for<br />
resources surveys in <strong>the</strong> AID program, Latin America. Specifically, preparation of a paper<br />
explaining <strong>the</strong> techniques of remote sensing, suitable for use by higher officials State was<br />
requested (See enclosed letter to W.A. Fischer from E.L. Owens).<br />
[2] The meeting opened with a brief review of <strong>the</strong> recommendations of <strong>the</strong> Rostow<br />
Report, which includes formation of an interagency committee to, among o<strong>the</strong>r things,<br />
investigate use of space for resources studies in Latin America. The Department of State<br />
(Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs) has action, according to NSAM 349, to<br />
convene such a committee. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Dr.<br />
Seamans) will probably chair <strong>the</strong> committee. A “working group” drawn probably from<br />
among those in attendance at this meeting (and including o<strong>the</strong>rs, no doubt) will probably<br />
be constituted; results of this meeting will probably influence <strong>the</strong> decision whe<strong>the</strong>r or<br />
not to recommend constitution of a formal working group.<br />
Mr. Jaffe cautioned about overenthusiasm on part of underdeveloped nations for new<br />
and exotic techniques, with concomitant exclusion of proven methods. He gave as an<br />
example <strong>the</strong> reliance on satellites for communication in Latin America. Work on a<br />
microwave net connecting South American capitals was stopped when communication<br />
satellites made <strong>the</strong>ir appearance; however, <strong>the</strong> South American countries have not been<br />
able to use satellites, and nei<strong>the</strong>r do <strong>the</strong>y have a microwave link.<br />
Political sensitivity of remote sensing was briefing discussed. Mr. Morrison mentioned<br />
<strong>the</strong> Brazilian proposal, and I reviewed a recent memorandum from Dr. Fernando de<br />
Mendonca (Technical Director, Brazilian National Space Activities Commission) stating<br />
that <strong>the</strong> undertaking of <strong>the</strong> proposed Brazilian Remote Sensing Project has been
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 243<br />
approved by <strong>the</strong> Brazilian National Security Council.<br />
Mr. Fischer reviewed <strong>the</strong> USGS briefing to Secretary Udall outlining <strong>the</strong> USGS views<br />
on and needs for an “evolutionary” Earth Resources Observational Satellite (EROS).<br />
The RCA proposal was briefly discussed. It was agreed that it is 1) a commercial proposal,<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore some performance claims and cost data are suspect 2) possibly beyond<br />
present state of <strong>the</strong> art.<br />
Dr. Park stated need on part of agricultural/forestry scientists in Latin America and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r “developing” countries for more and improved data.<br />
He also stated that USDA has a need for a “tropical” test site and o<strong>the</strong>r activities to get<br />
remote sensor signatures and correlations and develop interpretative techniques. This is<br />
necessary to fulfill USDA’s mission of keeping track of worldwide agricultural activities.<br />
Mr. Fischer stated that USGS has same need as USDA for data, to fulfill its missions of<br />
supporting AID in assistance programs in underdeveloped countries and also studying<br />
geologic features and phenomena and mineral resources that are global in contact.<br />
[3] Mr. Robinove stated that more data, of <strong>the</strong> type possibly obtainable from space, are<br />
necessary for hydrologic studies. These too are global in space.<br />
It was generally agreed that more and improved data are necessary to assist in Latin<br />
American studies; commonly <strong>the</strong> platform is of no interest to <strong>the</strong> user scientists, only good<br />
data. However, <strong>the</strong> platform does effect <strong>the</strong> characteristics of data and it seems likely that<br />
data from space may provide at least some of <strong>the</strong> necessary resources, information in a<br />
form superior to aircraft data; and that <strong>the</strong>se data are needed now.<br />
To provide <strong>the</strong> necessary “background” materials various documents already in being<br />
or in preparation were discussed—chiefly <strong>the</strong> OSSA-SA-SAR prospectus and summer study<br />
prospectus. Certain key items are needed—in my opinion, it may be better to prepare a<br />
separate summary. These items are:<br />
(1) Statement of usefulness of remote sensors for resources investigations (discuss<br />
both airborne and spaceborne).<br />
(2) What is underway in development and use studies of remote sensors for resources<br />
investigation.<br />
(3) What needs to be done, in addition to work already under way.<br />
(4) Competence and abilities of Latin America scientists and organizations to undertake<br />
this project. (Also, desires of various countries should be commented on—<br />
for example, Argentina, in person of <strong>the</strong> Director of <strong>the</strong>ir Geological Survey, Dr.<br />
Felix Bonorino Gonzales, is very interested in this program.)<br />
(5) Cost of “natural resources” satellite program and how funded.<br />
Mr. Jaffe made <strong>the</strong> following points:<br />
(1) The user agencies should come up with <strong>the</strong>ir data requirement: resolution, areal<br />
[sic] coverage, spectral range, etc. Especially needed are requirements that might<br />
be met by a system such as that proposed by RCA.<br />
(2) NASA will examine requirements and determine how, from a technical stand<br />
point, <strong>the</strong>y can best be met; especially, how <strong>the</strong>y can be melded with on-going programs,<br />
with minimum cost.<br />
(3) That, although from a technical stand point, No. 2 could be done in a few weeks,<br />
certain decisions are being made which would greatly affect any examination of<br />
1)[;] <strong>the</strong>refore, it would be better to await <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong>se decisions. These<br />
decisions are expected in about a month.<br />
[4] Mr. Fischer agreed to pull toge<strong>the</strong>r USDA, USNOO, and USGS requirements into one<br />
document, for review by <strong>the</strong> user agencies and submission to NASA for engineering examination.<br />
Mr. Morrison stated that it is NASA policy for foreign countries to be “self supporting,”<br />
although NASA assists in providing some equipment, training, and technical service.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> foreign countries have to pay <strong>the</strong>ir share of <strong>the</strong> costs of space programs, <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>n
244<br />
make every effort to ensure that <strong>the</strong> programs are properly carried out. Mr. Owens<br />
generally agreed with this NASA concept, although AID does have limited technical cooperation<br />
funds to assist where absolutely necessary. Mr. Fischer made <strong>the</strong> point that it’s better<br />
to tie any space resources study projects to on-going program, to take advantage of<br />
United States and counterpart scientists already working in an area or on a project. I suggested<br />
that even if scientists are already at work in an area, it will probably be necessary to<br />
furnish scientific/technical advice on <strong>the</strong> application of remote sensors to <strong>the</strong> problems at<br />
hand.<br />
The meeting pointed up <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
(1) USDA and USGS agree on <strong>the</strong> immediate need for data, which might be obtained<br />
from spaceborne remote sensors, for domestic and foreign resources investigations.<br />
(2) The less costly, <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong> chances of success of any program involving <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of remote sensors for resources investigations will be.<br />
(3) High resolution is still a very touchy problem. An “intermediate” resolution evolutionary<br />
system has a good chance of being accepted, whereas a program using<br />
high resolution instruments might run into great political difficulties.<br />
Enclosure<br />
SARR/RGReeves:mc 8/31/66<br />
bcc: S/Newell<br />
AXC<br />
SA/Jaffe<br />
SAD/Tepper<br />
USGS/Fischer<br />
USDA Park<br />
NAVOCEANO/Alexiou<br />
SAR/Colvo<br />
SAR/Badgley<br />
I/Morrison<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Document II-16<br />
Robert G. Reeves<br />
Document title: <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Secretary, U.S. Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, “Earth’s<br />
Resources to be Studied from Space,” News Release, September 21, 1966.<br />
Source: Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior Library, Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, Washington, D.C.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior issued this press release announcing Project EROS (Earth<br />
Resources Observation Satellites) on September 21, 1966, it not only lacked a satellite supplier, but<br />
also funds had yet to be allocated for <strong>the</strong> project. Proposing <strong>the</strong> EROS project was actually a bold move<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Interior Department to force NASA into providing an initial Earth resource survey satellite in<br />
short order. Although NASA moved to comply, budget battles between both organizations and <strong>the</strong><br />
Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget delayed launch of <strong>the</strong> first satellite until July 1972.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 245<br />
[1] For release: SEPTEMBER 21, 1966<br />
Earth’s Resources to be Studied from Space<br />
Project EROS was announced today by Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior Stewart L. Udall.<br />
EROS (Earth Resources Observation Satellites) is a program aimed at ga<strong>the</strong>ring facts<br />
about <strong>the</strong> natural resources of <strong>the</strong> earth from earth-orbiting satellites carrying sophisticated<br />
remote sensing observation instruments.<br />
“Project EROS,” said Udall “is based upon a series of feasibility experiments carried<br />
out by <strong>the</strong> U. S. Geological Survey with NASA, universities, and o<strong>the</strong>r institutions over <strong>the</strong><br />
past two years. It is because of <strong>the</strong> vision and support of NASA that we are able to plan project<br />
EROS.”<br />
Udall said that “this project will provide data useful to civilian agencies of <strong>the</strong><br />
Government such as <strong>the</strong> Department of Agriculture who are concerned with many facets of<br />
our natural resources. The support of <strong>the</strong>se agencies is vital to <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong> program.”<br />
The Interior Secretary said that “<strong>the</strong> time is now right and urgent to apply space technology<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> solution of many pressing natural resources problems being compounded<br />
by population and industrial growth.”<br />
Udall said that <strong>the</strong> Interior Department program will provide us with an opportunity<br />
to collect valuable resource data and use it to improve <strong>the</strong> quality of our environment.”<br />
[2] “Facts on <strong>the</strong> distribution of needed minerals, our water supplies and <strong>the</strong> extent of<br />
water pollution, agricultural crops and forests, and human habitations, can be obtained<br />
on a global basis, and used for regional and continental long-range planning,” he said.<br />
Secretary Udall named Dr. William T. Pecora, Director of <strong>the</strong> U. S. Geological Survey,<br />
to head <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
“A team of knowledgeable scientists and resource data users will guide government<br />
and private agencies in making <strong>the</strong>ir data needs known, and to help plan a major effort<br />
in <strong>the</strong> exploration of <strong>the</strong> earth for human benefit,” Udall said.<br />
Pecora and his earth science colleagues described space-sensing of <strong>the</strong> earth as “<strong>the</strong><br />
ability to ‘see’ more easily beneath <strong>the</strong> water and forest or soil cover, and <strong>the</strong> ability to view<br />
areas of <strong>the</strong> earth repetitively at various times and seasons. Ano<strong>the</strong>r basic advantage is <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that comparable observations can be made all over <strong>the</strong> earth.”<br />
“Although we are now gaining valuable information from existing satellites,” Pecora<br />
said, “none are capable of providing global coverage of <strong>the</strong> type required for successful<br />
resource application.”<br />
“We visualize EROS as an evolutionary program,” said Pecora, “beginning with television<br />
cameras flown in an orbit that will cover <strong>the</strong> entire surface of <strong>the</strong> earth repeatedly,<br />
under nearly-identical conditions of illumination.”<br />
Pecora said that “we plan to fly <strong>the</strong> first satellite in 1969,” and that “<strong>the</strong> cost of launching<br />
<strong>the</strong> first EROS vehicles is not expected to exceed $20 million—far less than <strong>the</strong> cost<br />
of photographing <strong>the</strong> earth by conventional aerial means.”<br />
“What we have learned from photographs taken recently from orbiting spacecraft,”<br />
<strong>the</strong> Survey Director said, “indicates that <strong>the</strong> lands can be examined, evaluated, and<br />
mapped, and <strong>the</strong> type and vigor of plants can be determined. In addition to <strong>the</strong> cameras<br />
that will provide <strong>the</strong> photographic record, <strong>the</strong> first vehicle will also have a small telecommunications<br />
unit so that we may relay data to and from ground stations that will aid in<br />
interpreting <strong>the</strong> television images. These relayed ground data will include seismic and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r information that, hopefully, will enable us to predict some natural disasters.”<br />
Pecora explained that “future sensing systems will employ heat-measuring devices to
246<br />
monitor <strong>the</strong> earth’s volcanoes and search for sources of geo<strong>the</strong>rmal power, radar that will<br />
‘see’ beneath <strong>the</strong> clouds, and eventually cameras with sufficient resolving power to permit<br />
timely up-dating of our national topographic map series.”<br />
[3] “In addition to savings in <strong>the</strong> cost of updating <strong>the</strong>se maps,” said Pecora, “<strong>the</strong> availability<br />
of updated maps will result in a savings of over $100 million annually to <strong>the</strong><br />
American public. Applied on a global basis, <strong>the</strong> savings would exceed a billion dollars a<br />
year.”<br />
The earth scientist emphasized <strong>the</strong> importance of feasibility experiments that have<br />
been carried out by his agency with NASA and o<strong>the</strong>r research and technical agencies.<br />
“These experiments enable us to start <strong>the</strong> EROS program with confidence in its useful<br />
application for <strong>the</strong> benefit of man,” he said.<br />
In announcing <strong>the</strong> EROS program, Secretary Udall pointed to <strong>the</strong> huge national<br />
requirements for natural resources needed to feed out technologic society as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
need to conserve <strong>the</strong> Nation’s lands. “We must insure that we use our resources wisely,” he<br />
cautioned, adding that “<strong>the</strong> information gained from EROS vehicles will be syn<strong>the</strong>sized<br />
and made generally available; it will help us achieve maximum use of our resources with<br />
minimum waste.”<br />
“We firmly believe,” said <strong>the</strong> Interior Secretary, “that <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources<br />
Observation Satellite will provide technological support for <strong>the</strong> continuation of our society<br />
of ‘plenty’ for generations to come. EROS will be just <strong>the</strong> beginning of a great decade<br />
in land and resource analysis for a burgeoning population.”<br />
Document II-17<br />
Document title: Charles F. Luce, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, to Dr.<br />
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator, NASA, October 21, 1966, with attached:<br />
“Operational requirements for global resource surveys by earth-orbital satellites: EROS<br />
Program.”<br />
Source: Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior Library, Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, Washington, D.C.<br />
Shortly after <strong>the</strong> September 21, 1966, Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior press release announcing Project<br />
EROS, NASA served notice that it was willing to develop <strong>the</strong> sort of resource survey satellite that <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Geological Survey required. The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior wasted little time, quickly sending<br />
NASA its specific requirements for <strong>the</strong> initial satellite. Although <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior hoped<br />
to be receiving data from a satellite within two years, budgetary and management disputes delayed <strong>the</strong><br />
launch until 1972.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
Dear Bob:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
October 21, 1966<br />
In my letter to you of October 7, I indicated that <strong>the</strong> Geological Survey was prepared<br />
to submit a document of “performance specifications” of <strong>the</strong> EROS Program for evaluation<br />
by your staff. I am pleased to transmit <strong>the</strong> enclosed document which sets forth<br />
Interior’s operational requirements as a basis for extensive discussions.<br />
Since our meeting, Dr. Pecora has attended two meetings at NASA preparatory to spe-
cific recommendations on <strong>the</strong> Mexico-Brazil agreements and state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art analyses.<br />
Secretary Udall is very happy to know that our coordination is progressing so favorably<br />
and hopes <strong>the</strong>se discussions will lead to areas of early agreement and action in <strong>the</strong> context<br />
of <strong>the</strong> EROS concept.<br />
Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.<br />
Deputy Administrator, Code AD<br />
National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Administration<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546<br />
Enclosure<br />
[1]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 247<br />
**********<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
Charles F. Luce<br />
Under Secretary<br />
Operational Requirements for Global Resource<br />
Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites EROS Program<br />
The EROS Program of <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior requires sensors to be placed<br />
in orbit to obtain systematic synoptic and repetitive imaging of natural and cultural features<br />
whose description and understanding is vital to Interior Department missions in<br />
many disciplines. The Interior Department is convinced that <strong>the</strong> earliest possible acquisition<br />
of satellite data is of great importance and <strong>the</strong>refore outlines <strong>the</strong> following requirements<br />
for <strong>the</strong> first EROS satellite on a “performance specification” basis. All presently<br />
available qualified satellite platforms, sensors, and facilities should be evaluated for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
capabilities to fulfill Interior Department requirements. We hope to begin acquiring<br />
resource data from an operational system by <strong>the</strong> end of 1969.<br />
The first satellite, planned as an optimum general purpose data collector, should be<br />
followed by a series of EROS satellites carrying more sophisticated sensors using o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
regions of <strong>the</strong> electromagnetic spectrum and also measuring force fields. A tentative priority<br />
for <strong>the</strong> later sensors is 1) high resolution infrared imager, 2) radar imager and scatterometer,<br />
3) ultraviolet luminescence sensor, 4) microwave radiometer, and 5) gravity<br />
gradient and magnetic sensors. Specific requirements for <strong>the</strong>se sensors are not stated at<br />
[2] this time, but will be developed as <strong>the</strong> engineering of <strong>the</strong> sensors and interpretive<br />
capability develops of users of data.<br />
I. Basic Requirements<br />
A. Near global coverage<br />
B. Repetitive observation at same local time<br />
C. Photographic or imaging data<br />
D. Vertical viewing required in normal operation but oblique viewing desirable for<br />
supplementary coverage<br />
E. Slight overlap of images in direction of flight and sidelap at <strong>the</strong> equator<br />
F. Minimum operational life of one year<br />
G. Analog data return
248<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
H. Capability for in-flight command programming<br />
I. Capability of carrying additional unspecified instruments with weight of 50–100<br />
pounds<br />
J. Data telemetering capability from ground-based instruments through satellite<br />
communications link to central data-reduction facilities<br />
K. Unclassified systems and data<br />
II. System constraints imposed by basic requirements<br />
A. Sun-synchronous orbit with sun angle at 30˚ at 50˚ latitude, at vernal equinox at<br />
2.6 hours (local sun time) before or after true noon<br />
[3] B. Power supply sufficient for sensors and data transmission and relay<br />
C. Stabilization sufficient to maintain a minimum of 1˚ pointing accuracy at vertical<br />
D. On-board data storage as required by relation of orbit altitude, and tracking stations<br />
E. Data rate commensurate with resolution and number of elements in final design<br />
III. System requirements for optimum data acquisition<br />
A. Imagery<br />
1. Ground resolution of 100’–200’ per resolution element (on a side)<br />
2. Field of view of about 100 statute miles on a side (square format)<br />
3. Spectral resolution<br />
a. about 100 mµ spectral increment peaked at 510 mµ<br />
b. 150 mµ spectral increment peaked at about 700 mµ<br />
4. Ground recording in two modes (direct analog image and magnetic tape)<br />
with <strong>the</strong> least image degradation possible.<br />
B. Data communications relay<br />
1. Capable of relaying digital data from earth-based sensors to central datareduction<br />
and computing facilities.<br />
[4] 2. Required data transmission to be on a basis of at least daily readout of data<br />
stored at ground stations and collected at intervals of 1–5 hours. Data rate<br />
and volume would be low.<br />
3. Ground sensors may include, but not be limited to:<br />
a. insolation meters<br />
b. stream gages and water-quality recorders<br />
c. tiltmeters<br />
d. <strong>the</strong>rmal probes<br />
e. seismometers<br />
f. strain gages<br />
g. displacement meters<br />
[5] References<br />
Hackman, R. V., 1966, Time, shadows, terrain and photo-interpretation: U.S. Geol.<br />
Survey Tech. Ltr. NASA 22. 8p., 10 figs.<br />
U.S. Geol. Survey, 1966, Detailed plan and status report of U.S. Geol. Survey research in<br />
remote sensing under <strong>the</strong> Natural Resources Space Applications Program (internal report)<br />
Document II-18<br />
Document title: Irwin P. Halpern, Director, Policy Staff, NASA, Memorandum for General<br />
Smart, “Earth Resources Survey Program,” September 5, 1967.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In 1967, with no clear mission for <strong>the</strong> post-Apollo era, some NASA officials began to talk about space<br />
activities that could be justified in terms of public benefit. As <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Policy Staff, Irwin<br />
Halpern pointed out to Assistant Administrator for Policy Jacob E. Smart in this memorandum that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Survey represented <strong>the</strong> sort of justifiable program <strong>the</strong> space agency needed.<br />
[1] NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION<br />
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546<br />
MEMORANDUM for General Smart - E<br />
Subject: Earth Resources Survey Program<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 249<br />
September 5, 1967<br />
I would strongly recommend, from a policy point of view, that <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources<br />
Survey [ERS] Program and its place in <strong>the</strong> overall space budget now be reassessed.<br />
It is imperative, in my judgment, that NASA make plain that it is doing important<br />
things for people. This is what <strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> Congress are concerned about. This<br />
is <strong>the</strong> test to which <strong>the</strong> taxpayer is putting Federal programs. This is why, in essence, our<br />
budget has been cut so severely.<br />
The ERS program would score well in this test: with proper emphasis and direction,<br />
it could provide major demonstrable economic returns in <strong>the</strong> near as well as distant<br />
future. The need now, it seems to me, is to capitalize upon this asset, to pursue <strong>the</strong> program<br />
with a greater level of effort than now planned, and <strong>the</strong>reby to seize an important<br />
opportunity (while <strong>the</strong>re is still flexibility in <strong>the</strong> FY ‘68 budget) to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> basis for<br />
public support for <strong>the</strong> entire space program in an election year.<br />
We should, in my judgment, take <strong>the</strong> lead of <strong>the</strong> Vice President (who recently voiced<br />
concern that too little was being done in <strong>the</strong> ERS Program) and <strong>the</strong> recent Woods Hole<br />
Conference (which called for proceeding apace with an aircraft as well as satellite ERS<br />
development program) and ensure that this program is pursued with a higher level of<br />
effort. The Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Navy have asked NASA for support<br />
for R&D in <strong>the</strong> ERS area. We are responding by providing only 25 percent of <strong>the</strong> $8 million<br />
or so that is required. Such responsiveness to <strong>the</strong> interests of potential consumer<br />
agencies may well give rise to charges that NASA, instead of leading <strong>the</strong> assault on a whole<br />
new area of technology, is in <strong>the</strong> van dragging its feet. In my view, finding goals in common<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies and programs is tantamount to finding new bases of support<br />
for <strong>the</strong> space program. This would argue, in turn, for increased responsiveness to <strong>the</strong><br />
interests of o<strong>the</strong>r agencies.<br />
[2] Despite <strong>the</strong> low level of effort mounted to date, <strong>the</strong> NASA ERS Program has already<br />
made a substantial contribution to <strong>the</strong> economy in stimulating a national awareness of <strong>the</strong><br />
potential of remote sensing. It is probably fair to say that NASA has served as a catalyst in<br />
<strong>the</strong> field of exploiting <strong>the</strong> whole electromagnetic spectrum for economic uses. A new<br />
industry is aborning [sic]: Teledyne is planning to establish an ERS service company that<br />
may include from six to twenty twin-engine aircraft equipped with multiban camera systems;<br />
Westinghouse will soon hold a conference on <strong>the</strong> use of side-looking radar for natural<br />
resource exploitation. In my view, NASA has <strong>the</strong> opportunity and <strong>the</strong> obligation to<br />
follow through and remain at <strong>the</strong> cutting edge of <strong>the</strong> new technology (to <strong>the</strong> extent security<br />
considerations permit), in order to give new impetus to industry’s advance in this field.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, what we do or fail to do in this area may importantly affect our world<br />
position politically and economically. The ERS Program offers an opportunity to substantially<br />
expand international cooperation (Brazil and Mexico have already sought to work
250<br />
with us in this area). Encouraging <strong>the</strong> development of ERS capabilities at aircraft levels in<br />
<strong>the</strong> course of developing a satellite capability would afford <strong>the</strong> United States rich opportunities<br />
to assist less developed countries in ways that are very meaningful and beneficial to<br />
<strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> near term. At <strong>the</strong> same time, by shirking leadership in <strong>the</strong> ERS field, we risk<br />
being upstaged by <strong>the</strong> Soviets, who have lately indicated an interest in <strong>the</strong> economic uses<br />
of satellite photography. On <strong>the</strong> security side, <strong>the</strong> NASA program holds out <strong>the</strong> promise of<br />
contributions to a more stable world by helping to gain wide acceptance for “open skies.”<br />
In conclusion, I believe that by streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Survey Program,<br />
even at <strong>the</strong> expense of certain scientific or hardware projects, we would streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
total space program and protect its future. Such a step would draw public attention to<br />
meaningful post-Apollo activity and possibly even away from <strong>the</strong> moon mission itself.<br />
Above all, it would offer <strong>the</strong> President an opportunity to single out a tangible, indeed<br />
exciting, example of how <strong>the</strong> space program is supporting o<strong>the</strong>r important national goals,<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> war on hunger, and <strong>the</strong>reby helping people both at home and abroad.<br />
Document II-l9<br />
[hand-signed: “Irwin P. Halpern”]<br />
Director, Policy Staff<br />
Document title: Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Administrator for Policy, NASA, Memorandum<br />
for Dr. Mueller, et al., “Earth Resources Survey Program,” October 3, 1967, with attached:<br />
Draft Memorandum for Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Newell, “Issues Re: The Earth<br />
Resources Survey Program.”<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Throughout 1967, NASA debated making <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Survey (ERS) program a high priority<br />
for <strong>the</strong> post-Apollo era, perhaps involving <strong>the</strong> activities of a human crew. Although this program<br />
offered a number of potential payoffs for <strong>the</strong> agency, it contained several liabilities as well. Desiring<br />
agency-wide consensus on <strong>the</strong> proper approach to <strong>the</strong> ERS program, Assistant Administrator for Policy<br />
Jacob E. Smart sent this assessment of key issues involved with a request for feedback to Associate<br />
Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller and o<strong>the</strong>r high-level NASA officials.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION<br />
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546<br />
October 3, 1967<br />
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
MEMORANDUM for Dr. Mueller - M Mr. Dembling - G<br />
Dr. Adams - R Mr. Scheer - F<br />
Mr. Cortright - S Mr. Allnutt - C<br />
Mr. Finger - D Mr. Lilly - B<br />
Mr. Ma<strong>the</strong>ws - ML<br />
Mr. Jaffe - SA<br />
Mr. Wyatt - P<br />
Mr. Frutkin - I<br />
Admiral Boone - W<br />
Dr. Eggers - R<br />
General Cabell - OY
Subject: Earth Resources Survey Program<br />
For some time, this office has been attempting to understand <strong>the</strong> full ramifications of<br />
<strong>the</strong> policy and procedural aspects of <strong>the</strong> ERS matter. Our purpose is to identify and articulate<br />
issues, to assist in establishing procedures to ensure that <strong>the</strong> important issues are recognized,<br />
evaluated, and viewed in perspective by NASA’s decision makers and by <strong>the</strong><br />
specialist and generalist staff members whose function it is to advise decision makers. To<br />
grasp <strong>the</strong> significance of earth resource sensing, of its complexities, and attendant problems,<br />
requires <strong>the</strong> best talent that NASA can muster. We solicit your personal assistance<br />
and <strong>the</strong> cooperation of your office in <strong>the</strong> development of policy on this matter.<br />
Attached is a first draft appreciation of <strong>the</strong> issue as seen by this office. We request that<br />
you review and constructively criticize, ei<strong>the</strong>r verbally or in writing, this draft and continue<br />
to share with us a sense of responsibility for <strong>the</strong> development of policy guidance with<br />
respect to NASA’s internal and external activities.<br />
**********<br />
[hand-signed: “Jacob E. Smart”]<br />
Assistant Administrator<br />
for Policy<br />
[1] NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION<br />
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546<br />
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR<br />
DRAFT<br />
MEMORANDUM for Mr. Webb - A<br />
Dr. Seamans - AD<br />
Dr. Newell - AA<br />
Subject: Issues Re: The Earth Resources Survey Program<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 251<br />
The question of NASA’s involvement in <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Survey Program has<br />
reached a critical juncture at which fundamental decisions and overall guidance now<br />
seem imperative. On <strong>the</strong> one hand, ERS constitutes an important technical, political and<br />
economic challenge in which NASA could play a formidable role. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand,<br />
diverse and complex inter-agency issues which bear directly on security and o<strong>the</strong>r key<br />
national policies, as well as <strong>the</strong> requirement to arrive at internal managerial decisions,<br />
need to be weighed very carefully before any broad NASA go-ahead is given.<br />
The positive aspects of <strong>the</strong> program break down into three: compelling political realities,<br />
potential economic and social contributions, and fairly widespread scientific, technical<br />
and industrial interest. ERS offers NASA a unique and timely opportunity to furnish<br />
<strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> Congress with demonstrable evidence that <strong>the</strong> space program can<br />
be effectively applied to critical national and international problems such as poverty, overpopulation,<br />
urban stabilization and <strong>the</strong> enhancement of natural [2] resources. If it is to<br />
survive in today’s budgetary environment, NASA must be responsive to <strong>the</strong>se very real<br />
problems, as well as continue with its vital efforts to reach out and explore <strong>the</strong> solar system.<br />
With respect to <strong>the</strong> future, <strong>the</strong>se problems will also haunt <strong>the</strong> next Administration—<br />
and <strong>the</strong> next. The U.S.S.R. also stands in <strong>the</strong> wings, readying itself to exploit aerospace
252<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
science and technology for political and economic gain. At home, o<strong>the</strong>r governmental<br />
agencies, <strong>the</strong> Space and Marine Councils, <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Sciences and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
bodies already are embarked on what adds up to a national ERS program. And segments<br />
of industry are becoming increasingly interested in <strong>the</strong> prospects of such activity and are<br />
beginning to invest <strong>the</strong>ir own resources in this field of endeavor. Clearly, <strong>the</strong>re is no question<br />
of turning or holding back <strong>the</strong> technology, at least as far as aircraft-borne sensing is<br />
concerned. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> unclassified technology, including <strong>the</strong> release of Gemini pictures,<br />
has made plain that <strong>the</strong> state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art is ready for such a development.<br />
Constraints: The controlling issues which must be resolved fall into <strong>the</strong> categories of<br />
(1) security and foreign policy implications, (2) multi-agency management and funding,<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> need for a sound technical feasibility program to determine precisely what aerospace<br />
system[s] can and cannot accomplish, and (4) <strong>the</strong> several alternate organizational<br />
options which NASA could pursue in <strong>the</strong> event a go-ahead is decided.<br />
[3] The conflict with DOD and o<strong>the</strong>r national agencies extends beyond <strong>the</strong> security<br />
issue—itself a knotty one—into <strong>the</strong> eventual roles and missions of <strong>the</strong> military and civilian<br />
space agencies. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> State Department has been chary to date in its endorsement<br />
of an international ERS, even on bilateral lines. At issue is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> objections of<br />
those powerful agencies can be overcome and whe<strong>the</strong>r a mutually agreed-upon program,<br />
delineating respective responsibilities and soliciting mutual cooperation can be evolved.<br />
It must be made clear, in addition, that many of <strong>the</strong> constraints are policy constraints<br />
reflecting a dated policy environment that needs to be examined in <strong>the</strong> light of <strong>the</strong> environment<br />
of today and tomorrow.<br />
With respect to o<strong>the</strong>r governmental agencies such as <strong>the</strong> Agriculture and Interior, <strong>the</strong><br />
essential problem is definition of NASA’s role: whe<strong>the</strong>r to behave as <strong>the</strong> lead agency, at<br />
least through <strong>the</strong> R&D phase, utilizing an inter-agency Program Review Board chaired by<br />
NASA as a coordination instrument, or to consider multi-agency funding and management<br />
with all its attendant problems as <strong>the</strong> program proceeds. An example of a longerrange<br />
consideration is what NASA’s continuing role should be: Should we phase out as<br />
soon as an operational system is developed? Should we participate in operations beyond<br />
providing launch services?<br />
In <strong>the</strong> technical arena, while much research in selected areas has been accomplished,<br />
<strong>the</strong> practicability of remote sensing of aerospace systems remains to be demonstrated. We<br />
must also examine <strong>the</strong> political, economic and social [4] consequences of ERS, as well as<br />
<strong>the</strong> technological aspects, in much greater depth, lest we prematurely build up public<br />
expectations. The fact is, however, that NASA and o<strong>the</strong>rs have already proclaimed <strong>the</strong> program’s<br />
promise.<br />
Finally, ERS looms as a major undertaking for NASA if <strong>the</strong> above issues can be met.<br />
This warrants top-level review of Headquarters control and Center participation within<br />
NASA and a firm inter-agency arrangement to meet <strong>the</strong> myriad of problems and objections<br />
which occur.<br />
We come <strong>the</strong>n to <strong>the</strong> primary points at issue: At what pace should this nation pursue<br />
an Earth Resources Program utilizing aerospace systems and what should NASA’s role be?<br />
What opportunities exist to extend our demonstrated capabilities in communications,<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r and navigation satellites to <strong>the</strong> ERS area in order to be more responsive to problems<br />
of crucial concern to <strong>the</strong> Executive and Legislative Departments? Should NASA continue<br />
to be <strong>the</strong> major source of non-defense funds and resources? And in <strong>the</strong> same vein,<br />
should NASA fulfill a central role in a national civilian program? Should <strong>the</strong>re not be a<br />
clear national policy which allocates responsibilities for an integrated approach?
Document II-20<br />
Document title: Edgar M. Cortright for George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for<br />
Manned Space Flight, Memorandum to Assistant Administrator for Policy, “Earth<br />
Resources Survey Program,” November 17, 1967.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
More so than most o<strong>the</strong>r programs, NASA’s Earth Resources Survey (ERS) program was an interagency<br />
endeavor. The Departments of Agriculture, <strong>the</strong> Interior, and State all had active stakes in Earth<br />
resource surveys. With <strong>the</strong> possibility for turf disputes in mind, NASA approached program development<br />
with a mixture of confidence and caution. Responding to an assessment of ERS issues by<br />
Assistant Administrator for Policy General Jacob E. Smart, Associate Administrator for Manned<br />
Space Flight George E. Mueller suggested that NASA should take a firm leadership position. Given<br />
Mueller’s position as head of <strong>the</strong> portion of NASA in charge of humans in space, it is not surprising<br />
that Mueller seems to assume that NASA’s remote-sensing activities would be conducted aboard occupied<br />
platforms.<br />
[1] UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT<br />
Memorandum<br />
To: E/Assistant Administrator DATE: NOV 17 1967<br />
for Policy<br />
FROM: M/Associate Administrator<br />
for Manned Space Flight<br />
SUBJECT: Earth Resources Survey Program<br />
REFERENCE: Your memorandum of October 3, l967, same subject<br />
Thank you for <strong>the</strong> opportunity to comment on your draft memorandum regarding an<br />
Earth Resources Survey Program. The draft states <strong>the</strong> issues and brings <strong>the</strong>m into focus<br />
quite well. I <strong>the</strong>refore have a limited number of comments which are applicable to <strong>the</strong><br />
draft as such.<br />
Accepting your invitation for assistance I have extended my remarks in several areas<br />
to propose some solutions for consideration. Alternatively, I have suggested some factors<br />
which I feel must necessarily be accounted for in any approach to resolution of several<br />
questions raised in your memorandum. These suggestions are based on three years of<br />
study activity conducted by <strong>the</strong> Advanced Manned Missions Program <strong>Office</strong>, study in<br />
which participation of potential users has been encouraged. This work, which is continuing,<br />
has sharpened our intuition and provided some knowledgeability which I am pleased<br />
to share with you.<br />
Scope of <strong>the</strong> Memorandum<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 253<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> term “resources” is being used by some NASA spokesmen in a broad<br />
sense to include cultural resources as well as natural resources, I suggest that <strong>the</strong> scope of
254<br />
<strong>the</strong> memorandum be explicitly broadened by choice of o<strong>the</strong>r terms in title and text. It is<br />
not obvious, for instance, that a scheme for malaria control is within purview of <strong>the</strong> paper,<br />
and <strong>the</strong>re are enough people who use <strong>the</strong> terms “resources” and “natural resources” interchangeably<br />
that confusion is likely over <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong> subject matter involved. A title<br />
such as “Earth Applications Survey,” for instance, would have wider implications although<br />
I am sure this can be improved.<br />
The use of <strong>the</strong> terms “aerospace systems” and “aerospace technology” may also be misleading<br />
since I believe you are principally concerned here with those aspects of such programs<br />
which utilize space-borne technology.<br />
[2] Presumably, aircraft work performed by NASA as a phase in <strong>the</strong> development of space<br />
technology does not pose policy problems of <strong>the</strong> same genre at all. NASA developmental<br />
work directed at air-borne systems as such does not appear to run <strong>the</strong> same gamut of policy<br />
considerations as <strong>the</strong> space-borne work, nor is it apparent too that, in areas of overlap,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Agency will necessarily wish to approach resolution of <strong>the</strong> issues in <strong>the</strong> same way. I suggest<br />
that issues relevant to air-borne systems be separated from those relevant to spaceborne<br />
systems. The following commentary has been developed in <strong>the</strong> context of problems<br />
pertaining to space-borne systems.<br />
Present Status<br />
The assertion on page 2 that <strong>the</strong> U.S. virtually has a national ERS program requires<br />
comment. While it is true that a number of agencies, departments, councils, etc., are more<br />
or less actively engaged, <strong>the</strong> collection of efforts lacks <strong>the</strong> cohesiveness and leadership<br />
characteristic of a program. Moreover, of particular relevance in this context, <strong>the</strong> ongoing<br />
efforts are not heavily dependent on space technology. In addition, most of those projects<br />
oriented toward <strong>the</strong> application of space technology are being stimulated by NASA, usually<br />
with NASA funds. Thus, NASA is in a unique and strong position in <strong>the</strong> application of<br />
space-borne technology to earth oriented requirements.<br />
NASA Position vis a vis O<strong>the</strong>r Agencies<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
In terms of assumed role, as well as in terms of expertise, NASA is in <strong>the</strong> de facto position<br />
of lead agency for <strong>the</strong> space application of aerospace-borne sensors. It is logical and<br />
natural, as well as administratively superior, for NASA to continue in this role—at least<br />
through <strong>the</strong> R&D phases. With continued cooperation from <strong>the</strong> Departments of<br />
Agriculture, Interior, and o<strong>the</strong>rs, this arrangement would greatly facilitate a strong NASA<br />
lead in demonstrating <strong>the</strong> benefits of exploiting <strong>the</strong> advantages of this new medium. It<br />
would also be <strong>the</strong> most efficient way to rapidly bring <strong>the</strong> new technology along on behalf<br />
of potential users who are without strong R&D orientations.<br />
Since it is very unlikely on <strong>the</strong> face of it that a separate satellite system will become a<br />
reality for every user, <strong>the</strong> multi-purpose space platform is certain to play a major part in a<br />
future operational time period. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> cost per application ought<br />
to go down markedly as <strong>the</strong> total number of activities on board <strong>the</strong> platform increases<br />
weighs heavily in favor of such an approach. The establishment of a lead agency, at least<br />
through <strong>the</strong> R&D phase, is essential to carrying this kind of enterprise forward and it<br />
would be a mistake for NASA to turn aside from <strong>the</strong> lead position already established.<br />
[3] Although NASA might accept R&D funding from potential users, it is desirable to continue<br />
<strong>the</strong> practice of NASA funding. This is particularly true in cases where potential users<br />
lack R&D funding or management experience. They cannot be expected to crank up programs<br />
where <strong>the</strong> beneficial outcome to <strong>the</strong>m is not reasonably assured, whereas it is well<br />
within NASA’s charter to expend money for endeavors where a good measure of faith in
<strong>the</strong> expectation of favorable results is required.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> later operational period, after practical, earth-oriented applications of spaceborne<br />
systems have been demonstrated cost-effective, users should be expected to pay<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own way with NASA bearing responsibility for launching, tracking, data acquisition,<br />
and data dissemination.<br />
Security and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense<br />
It may be that <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense must be considered a special case in <strong>the</strong><br />
sort of situation envisaged above but it would seen nei<strong>the</strong>r necessary nor desirable for<br />
NASA to abandon <strong>the</strong> field. NASA’s charter is clear in authorizing military support and,<br />
properly handled, such undertakings will enhance public confidence in <strong>the</strong> worth of<br />
NASA programs. NASA’s predecessor, <strong>the</strong> NACA [National Advisory Committee for<br />
Aeronautics], supported <strong>the</strong> military without diminution of its public image or international<br />
reputation. In addition, workable arrangements exist with respect to classified<br />
undertakings and <strong>the</strong>se can be extended into <strong>the</strong> new arena.<br />
Proposals have been advanced that NASA be restricted from using some readily available<br />
technology as, for example, cameras larger than 6 inch aperture for ga<strong>the</strong>ring earth<br />
data from orbit. Such blanket proscriptions must never be allowed to become established<br />
policy since this would render some very promising remote sensing techniques inaccessible<br />
to anyone but <strong>the</strong> DOD. The existence of <strong>the</strong> technology which would be useful, and<br />
its capabilities, are openly known, hence security policy should concentrate on <strong>the</strong> collection<br />
and utilization of certain data and not on <strong>the</strong> equipment. Moreover, NASA has no<br />
need for access to special technologies which are of uniquely military character and which<br />
are <strong>the</strong>refore not at issue.<br />
International Considerations<br />
The reluctance in various sectors to consider international space applications programs<br />
must be broken down if we are not to forego an excellent opportunity to foster genuine<br />
international cooperation as well as to greatly enhance our prestige around <strong>the</strong><br />
world. There is ample successful precedent for international cooperation in space and it<br />
would be a mistake not to expand on it. Whatever peculiar problems are posed by an<br />
effort like an Earth Resources Survey, our experience with international efforts in<br />
research, in meteorology, in communications, and in manned flight offers an excellent<br />
basis upon which to proceed. It may be possible to initiate viable efforts on a national<br />
basis, but <strong>the</strong> full potential of “benefits for all mankind” will not be achieved without substantial<br />
international participation.<br />
[4] Feasibility, Development, and Operations<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 255<br />
It is quite important to differentiate between <strong>the</strong>se phases of program effort since <strong>the</strong><br />
policy to be pursued, as well as <strong>the</strong> promise of results, may be quite different in each case.<br />
The current aircraft program and early Apollo Applications flights are aimed at establishing<br />
<strong>the</strong> feasibility of remote sensing from orbit in <strong>the</strong> many spectral bands of interest.<br />
Based on Gemini [handwritten insertion in <strong>the</strong> original: “, meteorological satellites,”]<br />
and aircraft work to date, however, I believe that sufficient technical feasibility has been<br />
established to warrant laying out a development program. Such a program planning effort<br />
would provide focus and perspective for on-going and future feasibility efforts. It would<br />
furnish a structure into which <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong>se efforts could be fitted, <strong>the</strong>reby hastening<br />
<strong>the</strong> day on which a development program could be initiated. Potential user agencies
256<br />
should officially participate in <strong>the</strong> developmental program planning which would<br />
delineate program objectives, <strong>the</strong> benefits which can be expected, and <strong>the</strong> cost effectiveness<br />
of different ways of achieving <strong>the</strong> benefits, all as related to an eventual operational<br />
program.<br />
Much groundwork directly applicable to such program planning has been laid in <strong>the</strong><br />
normal course of our advanced studies program. These studies, which embraced both<br />
technical and programmatic aspects, include <strong>the</strong> Manned Orbital Research Laboratory<br />
(NAS1-36l2), an ORL Experiment Program (NASw-1215), and Spent Saturn S-IVB<br />
Utilization (NAS8-21064). In conjunction with <strong>the</strong>se studies, we have examined how such<br />
programs could be implemented organizationally, emphasising [sic] <strong>the</strong> use of NASA inhouse<br />
capability and <strong>the</strong> application of special, user-agency capabilities. We are currently<br />
pursuing a more definitive description of potential economic benefits through contract<br />
NASw-1604 with <strong>the</strong> Planning Research Corporation. This study is expected to provide<br />
greater understanding of this difficult area and yield a methodology which could support<br />
a [Planning Programming Budgeting System] type of analysis. These types of studies must<br />
be continued and expanded or we cannot hope to compete successfully in <strong>the</strong> Planning<br />
Programming Budgeting Systems with quantitative assessments of promising applications.<br />
In closing, I should like to request that you keep me informed of your progress in this<br />
matter. You may contact <strong>the</strong> Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, for information<br />
and assistance in support of your efforts.<br />
cc: See attached sheet<br />
Document II-21<br />
signed by Edgar M. Cortright<br />
for George E. Mueller<br />
Document title: Interior Department, “Appeal of 1971 Budget Allowance: EROS,”<br />
November 25, 1969.<br />
Source: Record Group 255, Records of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.<br />
Despite overcoming technical and boundary problems, and successfully selling <strong>the</strong> utility of an Earth<br />
resources survey system to a variety of users, NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior encountered<br />
almost intractable opposition to <strong>the</strong> initiative within <strong>the</strong> Nixon administration’s Bureau of <strong>the</strong><br />
Budget. The Budget Bureau nearly eliminated <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) program,<br />
but it relented when Senator Karl Mundt, pleased that <strong>the</strong> Interior Department had decided to<br />
locate <strong>the</strong> data-processing facility in his home state of South Dakota, led a drive to save <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
Appeal of 1971 Budget Allowance<br />
EROS<br />
Requested increase - $7,500,000<br />
Allowed increase - minus $3,900,000<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The most temperate comment that can be made about this allowance is that it must
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 257<br />
have been based on incredibly bad advice.<br />
Follow intensive review in <strong>the</strong> early days of this Administration President Nixon proposed<br />
in his 1970 budget start of a major earth resources satellite experiment. In his<br />
speech before <strong>the</strong> General Assembly of <strong>the</strong> United Nations on September 18, 1969, <strong>the</strong><br />
President reaffirmed his commitment to an earth resources satellite program.<br />
Ambassador Yost has undertaken fur<strong>the</strong>r initiative with Secretary General U Thant to<br />
implement <strong>the</strong> President’s commitment.<br />
During November 1969, Dr. DuBridge discussed with Canadian representatives <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of <strong>the</strong>ir collaboration with <strong>the</strong> United States in <strong>the</strong> earth resources satellite program.<br />
Dr. Paine’s support for <strong>the</strong> program as a major high payoff component of our space<br />
effort was publicly stated on a National TV appearance within <strong>the</strong> past ten days.<br />
The EROS-ERTS program has exceptionally strong support within <strong>the</strong> Congress.<br />
Interior 1970 budget proposals were not only approved but increased. The House<br />
Committee on Science and Astronautics terms <strong>the</strong> program “. . . perhaps <strong>the</strong> best possible<br />
opportunity to achieve tangible economic returns from <strong>the</strong> substantial investment already<br />
made by <strong>the</strong> American taxpayer in <strong>the</strong> U.S. space program.” The Committee has been vigorous<br />
in its advocacy of <strong>the</strong> earth resources concept and has urged expedited action on<br />
<strong>the</strong> EROS-ERTS programs.<br />
The program has attracted widespread professional, public, industrial, scientific, and<br />
academic interest throughout <strong>the</strong> Nation and <strong>the</strong> World.<br />
The abrupt change in Administration policy proposed by [<strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget]<br />
cannot help but become a major embarrassment to <strong>the</strong> Administration. The Budget<br />
Bureau has advanced no adequate rationale in support of its action. Accordingly <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
no basis for its defense by myself and my staff before <strong>the</strong> Congress or <strong>the</strong> public.<br />
I understand funds for <strong>the</strong> NASA ERTS program were cut because [<strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong><br />
Budget] claimed <strong>the</strong> resolution capability of <strong>the</strong> proposed system did not meet needs of<br />
<strong>the</strong> use[r] agencies. This is not <strong>the</strong> case. Dr. Pecora and o<strong>the</strong>r user agency authorities<br />
wrote NASA clarifying this point and I believe <strong>the</strong>se letters have been furnished to your<br />
examining staff. We support <strong>the</strong> technical discussion provided by NASA in defense of <strong>the</strong><br />
ERTS program. The questions posed in <strong>the</strong> Interior “passback” have been previously<br />
answered by <strong>the</strong> numerous independent appraisals of <strong>the</strong> earth resources concept and<br />
program and <strong>the</strong> Issue Papers provided by this Department in prior years.<br />
The course of action proposed by <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget affects our ‘70 program<br />
as well as our 1971 budget. For this reason a decision must be made as soon as possible.<br />
If, after consideration of this appeal, you are still unable to recommend that <strong>the</strong> program<br />
proceed as planned, I propose that <strong>the</strong> issue should be discussed by myself and<br />
Administrator Paine with <strong>the</strong> President at his earliest convenience.<br />
Document II-22<br />
Document title: Robert P. Mayo, Director, Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget, to Honorable Walter J. Hickel,<br />
Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior, April 14, 1970, with attached: “Statement for Senator Mundt.”<br />
Source: Record Group 51, Records of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, Federal<br />
Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget wanted to block spending on an Earth resources survey system,<br />
NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior maintained moderate program support through congressional<br />
pressure as well as through direct appeals to <strong>the</strong> president. NASA was given <strong>the</strong> go-ahead to work on<br />
two experimental satellites, while <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey in <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior would<br />
build a data-processing facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, but only if <strong>the</strong> satellites’ performance<br />
demonstrated <strong>the</strong> need for it. The latter development was made possible with <strong>the</strong> intervention of South<br />
Dakota Senator Karl Mundt, who lobbied strenuously for ERTS funding in <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Interior after Sioux Falls was designated as <strong>the</strong> preferred location for <strong>the</strong> data-processing facility.
258<br />
[1] APR 14, 1970<br />
Honorable Walter J. Hickel<br />
Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Dear Wally:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
I am concerned that you and your staff feel that you have experienced embarrassment<br />
in justifying <strong>the</strong> Administration’s position on <strong>the</strong> EROS program. I want to reassure you<br />
that <strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> Bureau carefully reviewed this program and we believe that <strong>the</strong><br />
approach developed is a realistic one for <strong>the</strong> development of this new technology.<br />
In our informal communications to your staff on <strong>the</strong> FY 1971 allowances, and also in<br />
material prepared for your review with <strong>the</strong> President on <strong>the</strong> FY 1971 budget, <strong>the</strong> rationale<br />
for this approach was explained. We note from your congressional justifications for <strong>the</strong> FY<br />
1971 budget that you have supported <strong>the</strong> Administration’s decision on this program by<br />
emphasizing <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> program is still experimental and that no substantial investments<br />
will be made now for facilities and equipment which would be needed for a possible<br />
follow-up operational system. We hope that this letter will fur<strong>the</strong>r clarify <strong>the</strong><br />
Administration’s position and be helpful to you in any necessary streng<strong>the</strong>ning of your<br />
presentation to Congress. It is important for all of us that <strong>the</strong> interested members in<br />
Congress clearly understand <strong>the</strong> Administration’s position.<br />
This Administration is placing high priority on <strong>the</strong> development of practical applications<br />
of space technology. Surveying earth resources is one of <strong>the</strong> applications which<br />
appears to be potentially productive. In an effort to explore this potential, <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration is seeking authorization from Congress to proceed<br />
with <strong>the</strong> development of two experimental Earth Resources Technology Satellites.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> space program of <strong>the</strong> Seventies will not be characterized by <strong>the</strong> pursuit of a<br />
single goal. We are attempting to develop a space program with a balanced emphasis on<br />
exploration, science and applications.<br />
We recognize that <strong>the</strong> FY 1971 budget allowance for <strong>the</strong> EROS program is somewhat<br />
smaller than your request. In our judgment, a constructive program of preparation for<br />
useful application of ERTS data can be developed within <strong>the</strong> resources provided. I am sure<br />
that you are aware [2] that NASA’s request was also reduced. While an increase has been<br />
allowed for actual satellite development, <strong>the</strong> NASA budget does not provide for increases<br />
requested for o<strong>the</strong>r parts of <strong>the</strong>ir earth resources program.<br />
We must emphasize that this program is an experimental effort. We do not believe<br />
that it is prudent to invest substantial resources at this time in preparing for an operational<br />
system capable of analysis of all ERTS data. Present funding for NASA will focus on<br />
satellite development while Interior and Agriculture will concentrate on continued<br />
research relating to potential applications of ERTS data and preparation for use of <strong>the</strong><br />
data once it becomes available.<br />
The Administration does not want to move beyond <strong>the</strong> experimental phase of this<br />
program until we are confident that <strong>the</strong> benefits of <strong>the</strong> program are more than <strong>the</strong> expected<br />
costs. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> evidence is unclear as to <strong>the</strong> technological capability of ERTS to<br />
provide pictures with sufficient resolution to give <strong>the</strong> payoff claimed in some studies that<br />
have been undertaken thus far. Until we have greater assurances on <strong>the</strong>se points, <strong>the</strong><br />
financial commitment to <strong>the</strong> programs should remain at a minimum level.<br />
We have previously furnished to your staff a copy of <strong>the</strong> enclosed statement which was<br />
supplied to Senator Mundt’s office. The statement outlines <strong>the</strong> Administration’s position
with respect to location and construction of facilities.<br />
I know that you and your staff recognize that <strong>the</strong> need for fiscal restraint requires<br />
selectivity and great care in our commitment to claims on our limited future budget<br />
resources. I appreciate <strong>the</strong> continuing support you are giving to <strong>the</strong> President’s program.<br />
If you desire to discuss this matter fur<strong>the</strong>r I and my staff will make arrangements.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Robert P. Mayo<br />
Director<br />
Enclosure<br />
[no pagination]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 259<br />
**********<br />
Statement for Senator Mundt<br />
In 1972, <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration plans to launch two<br />
experimental satellites designed to conduct experiments in <strong>the</strong> survey of agricultural and<br />
geological resources through <strong>the</strong> use of remote sensors on <strong>the</strong> spacecraft. If <strong>the</strong>se experiments<br />
are successful, this program may have considerable potential for future applications<br />
in <strong>the</strong> survey of earth resources.<br />
A review of <strong>the</strong> facility requirements for <strong>the</strong> Government’s earth resources survey programs<br />
has indicated that Sioux Falls, South Dakota, will [on <strong>the</strong> original, <strong>the</strong>re is an edited<br />
portion where <strong>the</strong> word “will” has been crossed out and replaced with <strong>the</strong> word<br />
“would”] be a desirable geographic location for a data processing and distribution facility<br />
for this program.<br />
The Administration will propose initial funding to be used for site selection and<br />
design of <strong>the</strong> proposed facility. The Sioux Falls earth resources data processing and distribution<br />
facility would be designed to process data from later satellites if <strong>the</strong> initial experiments<br />
are successful. For <strong>the</strong> initial Earth Resources Technology Satellites (ERTS), NASA<br />
will supply data to interested governmental and private organizations. Actual facility construction<br />
at Sioux Falls will depend on <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> experimental satellites.<br />
The city of Sioux Falls has agreed to supply <strong>the</strong> land and construct <strong>the</strong> building under<br />
a leasing agreement with <strong>the</strong> Government agencies involved if <strong>the</strong> ERTS satellite experiments<br />
prove promising. The facility will be designed to meet <strong>the</strong> specifications of <strong>the</strong><br />
Government agencies involved so as to serve <strong>the</strong> data reduction and analysis requirements<br />
of private and Government organizations which contemplate <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> earth<br />
resources survey data. Future management arrangements for <strong>the</strong> Sioux Falls facility will be<br />
developed by <strong>the</strong> Federal agencies currently involved in this experimental program.<br />
Document II-23<br />
Document title: Arnold W. Frutkin, Memorandum to Dr. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA,<br />
et al., “Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-1,” December 22, 1972.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
260<br />
One persuasive argument for creating an orbital Earth resources survey system was that this system<br />
would provide significant benefits to third-world nations in areas such as accurate mapping and<br />
resource location. NASA was suitably pleased, <strong>the</strong>refore, with favorable international responses to <strong>the</strong>se<br />
types of data from <strong>the</strong> first ERTS satellite.<br />
[1] NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION<br />
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546<br />
MEMORANDUM TO A/Dr. Fletcher<br />
AD/Dr. Low<br />
AA/Dr. Newell<br />
ADA/Mr. Shapley<br />
E/Mr. Ma<strong>the</strong>ws<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
SUBJECT: Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-1<br />
DEC 22, 1972<br />
We are listing below a few of <strong>the</strong> early foreign reactions to ERTS-1 on <strong>the</strong> basis that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y may be of some interest.<br />
a. Thailand: “The best of <strong>the</strong> (ERTS) scenes received are excellent; <strong>the</strong>y appear to<br />
demonstrate clearly that our decision to participate in <strong>the</strong> ERTS programme from its<br />
inception was wise, and that <strong>the</strong>re is much to be learned and much work to be done in<br />
order to exploit <strong>the</strong> new technology fully. . .” (from November 23, 1972 letter to NASA<br />
from Dr. Pradisth Chesosakul, Secretary General, Thai National Research Council).<br />
b. Mali: “The Malians expressed warm appreciation for <strong>the</strong> opportunity to participate<br />
in <strong>the</strong> ERTS and Skylab programs. Minister of Industrial Development N’Daw was<br />
particularly pleased with <strong>the</strong> information already being derived from ERTS imagery.<br />
Schweitzer (US/AID) observed that <strong>the</strong> Malians take a very practical attitude toward ERTS<br />
results, which <strong>the</strong>y already are beginning to utilize to make maps of remote areas, for guiding<br />
water exploration efforts and for deciding routing of new roads. They have quickly recognized<br />
<strong>the</strong> experimental nature of <strong>the</strong> ERTS project and are proud to be participating<br />
in this pioneering effort. . . . The ERTS project is a wonderful example of how <strong>the</strong> world’s<br />
most advanced country can cooperate with <strong>the</strong> poorest to our mutual benefit. For two air<br />
tickets (AID purchased airline tickets for <strong>the</strong> Malian Principal Investigator), <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government has gained a million dollars worth of Malian political mileage. This is an<br />
exciting project which should have increasingly important benefits for Mali and should<br />
also be applicable to o<strong>the</strong>r [2] developing countries. It deserves every bit of support we<br />
can give it, now and in <strong>the</strong> follow-up period.” (November 17, 1972 State Department<br />
telegram from <strong>the</strong> U.S. Embassy, Bamako, Mali.)<br />
c. Canada: “I have just seen <strong>the</strong> ERTS imagery for <strong>the</strong> first time and I wish to congratulate<br />
NASA on this fine achievement. We consider it an important breakthrough in<br />
providing data for <strong>the</strong> understanding of our environment. I would also like to express our<br />
appreciation for having an opportunity to participate in this experiment.” (August 2<br />
telegram to Dr. Fletcher from Mr. Jack Austin, Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and<br />
Resources, Government of Canada.)<br />
d. Brazil: Dr. Fernando de Mendonca, <strong>the</strong> Director-General of <strong>the</strong> Brazilian Space<br />
Agency, reported at <strong>the</strong> IAF on a wide range of valuable information provided by ERTS-1<br />
in an experiment relating to mapping of <strong>the</strong> Amazon system. He has summarized <strong>the</strong> first<br />
preliminary findings in a letter to NASA. The following excerpts are of relevance for illus-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 261<br />
trating <strong>the</strong> value of ERTS-1:<br />
“1. The course of <strong>the</strong> tributaries of <strong>the</strong> Amazon River are very different from <strong>the</strong><br />
ones shown in <strong>the</strong> most recent available charts. The difference in position is sometimes<br />
off by 20 km or more and <strong>the</strong> difference in direction is sometimes off by 90 degrees.<br />
“2. Islands with more than 200 km 2 exist which are not shown on maps.<br />
“3. Some lagoons which are shown on maps as 20 km long are in reality more<br />
than 100 km long.<br />
“4. Small villages and towns are located wrongly on <strong>the</strong> maps by several tens of<br />
kilometers.<br />
“5. The drainage systems of some areas are entirely wrong and this has caused<br />
among o<strong>the</strong>r things, <strong>the</strong> construction of roads (Manaus - Porto Velho for instance) with<br />
extra expenditures for bridges. In fact, <strong>the</strong> mentioned road is placed wrongly (by more<br />
than 20 km) in recent maps (1971).<br />
[3] “6. Large unsuspected geological features have been detected, which might provide<br />
new insights into <strong>the</strong> formation of <strong>the</strong> basin.<br />
“7. Large abandoned river meanders are shown which were not present in existing<br />
maps.<br />
“8. Even with high percentage (75%) of cloud coverage in some images one can<br />
still make good use of <strong>the</strong> obtained information for correcting maps.<br />
“9. Unmapped lineaments and fractures have been discovered.<br />
“10. The entire Amazonian region was covered last year with a Side Looking<br />
Airborne Radar (SLAR). The completed controlled photo-mosaics will not be ready for at<br />
least ano<strong>the</strong>r year. Over 150 people are working on <strong>the</strong> SLAR project which has cost Brazil<br />
about 20 million dollars. Since <strong>the</strong> region is ra<strong>the</strong>r flat <strong>the</strong> ERTS-1 MSS channel 6 provides<br />
practically <strong>the</strong> same information as <strong>the</strong> SLAR imagery. If one considers <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
MSS channels, <strong>the</strong>n one has substantially more information from ERTS than <strong>the</strong> SLAR.<br />
This without mentioning <strong>the</strong> repeatability of ERTS imagery. The cost of ERTS imagery per<br />
square kilometer is about two orders of magnitude less than <strong>the</strong> SLAR if <strong>the</strong> satellite operates<br />
for <strong>the</strong> expected lifetime of one year.”<br />
e. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of <strong>the</strong> United Nations): “NASA deserves<br />
FAO’s compliments on a successful launching of <strong>the</strong> satellite which will remotely sense<br />
earth resources for <strong>the</strong> benefit of mankind for <strong>the</strong> first time.” (letter of August 3 to NASA<br />
from Mr. Juan Yriart, Assistant Director-General, Development Department, FAO.)<br />
f. Iran: “We have located several lakes which do not appear on <strong>the</strong> Watershed Map<br />
of Iran. This phenomenon is presumably due to this year’s relatively abundant rainfall. . . .<br />
In <strong>the</strong> extreme sou<strong>the</strong>ast part of Iran (near <strong>the</strong> Pakistan border) several igneous bodies<br />
have been observed which do not figure on <strong>the</strong> . . . geological map of Iran. . . . By comparing<br />
images taken from <strong>the</strong> extreme sou<strong>the</strong>ast part of <strong>the</strong> Caspian Sea with a map of <strong>the</strong><br />
region prepared in 1945, it is quite noticeable that <strong>the</strong> shape of <strong>the</strong> [4] Bandar Shah<br />
peninsula has changed. This is possibly due to lowering of <strong>the</strong> Caspian Sea by evaporation<br />
which exceeds <strong>the</strong> inflow of stream waters. (November 12 letter to NASA from <strong>the</strong> Iranian<br />
Principal Investigator.)<br />
g. United Nations Secretariat: “It also gives me great pleasure at this time to extend<br />
my congratulations to you on <strong>the</strong> successful orbiting of this <strong>the</strong> first dedicated earth surveying<br />
satellite. It is a cause of particular satisfaction to us here at <strong>the</strong> UN that NASA and<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r United States agencies involved in <strong>the</strong> programme have, by <strong>the</strong>ir imaginative<br />
approach, laid a sound basis for <strong>the</strong> international cooperation which will be such a fundamental<br />
requirement in order that this new application of space technology may serve,<br />
as we all hope, for <strong>the</strong> benefit of all mankind.” (July 28 letter to NASA from A.H. Abdel-<br />
Ghani, Chief, Outer Space Affairs Division, UN.)<br />
h. Egypt: (Meguid) called ERTS a “significant technical achievement” in <strong>the</strong> UN
262<br />
General Assembly’s First Committee during <strong>the</strong> week of October 30, 1972.<br />
i. Ghana: (Boaten) commended <strong>the</strong> Food and Agricultural Organization in cooperation<br />
with NASA for applying space technology to problems of desert locusts and food<br />
in Africa, Asia and Latin America in <strong>the</strong> same meeting.<br />
j. The All-African Seminar held in Addis Ababa in August 1971 made a recommendation<br />
on <strong>the</strong> inventorying of natural resources reading in part as follows:<br />
“Recommends:<br />
– that a complete inventory of natural resources, such as water, soils, vegetation,<br />
wild life, be undertaken everywhere in Africa, and that particular attention be<br />
given to this recommendation at both national and regional levels;<br />
– that <strong>the</strong> most modern techniques be used to achieve this aim, such as remote<br />
sensing through satellites; in particular noting that <strong>the</strong> two earth resources technology<br />
satellites will be launched in 1972 and 1973.”<br />
[hand-signed: “AWF”]<br />
Arnold W. Frutkin<br />
Document II-24<br />
Document title: James V. Zimmerman for Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for<br />
International Affairs, to Dr. John V.N. Granger, Acting Director, Bureau of International<br />
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, September 12, 1974, with<br />
attached: “Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite: A Report<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs,” July 24, 1974.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Potential benefits to developing nations had been a key component in <strong>the</strong> NASA campaign to obtain<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nixon administration’s approval for an Earth resources survey system satellite. However, a number<br />
of nations objected to having little control over <strong>the</strong> dissemination of satellite information ga<strong>the</strong>red<br />
about <strong>the</strong>ir country. NASA proceeded with ERTS without a formal international regime, basing its<br />
position on a broad interpretation of <strong>the</strong> previously established “open skies” doctrine. The Advisory<br />
Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs of <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State suggested in its July 1974 report<br />
that additional U.S. action was required to avoid conflicts, particularly at <strong>the</strong> United Nations, over<br />
U.S. remote-sensing activities. NASA’s response argued that <strong>the</strong> space agency had anticipated and was<br />
effectively addressing any foreign policy repercussions of <strong>the</strong> ERTS program.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
REPLY TO<br />
ATTN OF I/PP SEP 12 1974<br />
Dr. John V.N. Granger<br />
Acting Director<br />
Bureau of International Scientific<br />
and Technological Affairs<br />
Department of State<br />
Washington, DC 20520<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE
Dear John:<br />
This is in response to Herman Pollack’s letter to Dr. Fletcher of August 2, 1974 forwarding<br />
<strong>the</strong> remote sensing policy report prepared by <strong>the</strong> State Department’s Advisory<br />
Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs. The report, in our judgment, is a welcome<br />
contribution to <strong>the</strong> on-going discussions of policy alternatives in this important area of<br />
space activity. There are, however, a number of points arising out of <strong>the</strong> report which we<br />
suggest be brought to <strong>the</strong> attention of <strong>the</strong> Advisory Committee.<br />
Page 2—The Advisory Committee’s assumption that <strong>the</strong> cost and technical sophistication<br />
of <strong>the</strong> appropriate data analysis is generally beyond <strong>the</strong> reach of developing countries<br />
does not accord with our developing country experiences. In effect, through one<br />
device or ano<strong>the</strong>r (U.S. or o<strong>the</strong>r aid), use of <strong>the</strong> data is in fact being made. We estimate,<br />
for example, that 19 African countries are directly or indirectly involved with <strong>the</strong> analysis<br />
of earth sources imagery of <strong>the</strong>ir territory.<br />
Page 3 and 17—We suggest <strong>the</strong> report reflect a distinction between ERS data <strong>the</strong>mselves,<br />
which <strong>the</strong> U.S. makes freely available, and analyses of <strong>the</strong>se data, which could be<br />
held proprietary as desired. This distinction could apply to all potential ERS data users—<br />
governmental and private, domestic and foreign.<br />
Page 5—It is important to note that Article I of <strong>the</strong> 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides<br />
that outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination<br />
of any kind. The “open skies” principle, <strong>the</strong>refore, can be considered a “cornerstone” of<br />
international as well as U.S. policy; no fur<strong>the</strong>r international political commitment (discussed<br />
on page 1) is necessary.<br />
Page 6—In view of <strong>the</strong> overall developments at <strong>the</strong> February-March 1974 U.N.<br />
Remote Sensing Working Group meetings, as well as <strong>the</strong> recent positions taken at <strong>the</strong> U.N.<br />
by <strong>the</strong> representatives of Canada and Sweden, we find it difficult to draw <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re is increased advocacy in <strong>the</strong> U.N. of restrictions on ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> acquisition or dissemination<br />
of ERS data. Such advocacy continues to have a very narrow base (<strong>the</strong> USSR<br />
and France plus Argentina, Brazil and Mexico).<br />
Pages 14 and 16—We believe <strong>the</strong> most effective means of enhancing international<br />
participation in U.S. earth resources programs and acceptance of <strong>the</strong> “open skies” concept<br />
is through <strong>the</strong> establishment of additional foreign ERTS data acquisition ground stations.<br />
To date such facilities have been established in Canada and Brazil. This spring an<br />
agreement providing for a similar facility was signed with Italy. Discussions are currently<br />
underway with a number of countries including Iran, Venezuela and <strong>the</strong> Federal Republic<br />
of Germany. Foreign governmental agencies establishing a ground station sign a memorandum<br />
of understanding with NASA which includes an open data dissemination provision;<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are, in effect, ratifying <strong>the</strong> “open skies” principle.<br />
Page 16—The Advisory Committee should know that a U.S. offer to provide (sell) to<br />
an agreed international distribution center a master copy of all ERTS imagery was made<br />
to <strong>the</strong> U.N. in January 1973. We understand that <strong>the</strong> FAO is currently studying <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
of establishing a world-wide ERS data storage, processing and dissemination center<br />
which could utilize <strong>the</strong> U.S.-offered imagery.<br />
We hope <strong>the</strong> above comments prove useful and would welcome <strong>the</strong> opportunity to fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
discuss NASA’s remote sensing activities with members of <strong>the</strong> Advisory Committee.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[James V. Zimmerman]<br />
[for] Arnold W. Frutkin<br />
Assistant Administrator<br />
for International Affairs<br />
cc: Dr. James C. Fletcher<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 263<br />
**********
264<br />
[1] July 24, 1974<br />
Summary<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Foreign Policy Issues Regarding<br />
Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite<br />
A Report of <strong>the</strong> Secretary’s Advisory<br />
Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs<br />
This report considers <strong>the</strong> options for U.S. foreign policy regarding <strong>the</strong> acquisition<br />
and dissemination of earth resource surveying data obtained from satellites (ERS).<br />
Foreign policy issues have arisen primarily in <strong>the</strong> course of debate in <strong>the</strong> Outer Space<br />
Committee of <strong>the</strong> UNGA, where <strong>the</strong> Brazilians, Soviets, French and o<strong>the</strong>rs have introduced<br />
“principles” which would limit State’s rights to acquire ERS data from space or to<br />
disseminate such data without <strong>the</strong> prior assent of <strong>the</strong> countries affected. While ERTS-1<br />
experiments have been accepted under <strong>the</strong> principle of freedom for unrestricted space<br />
observations, often called “Open Skies,” <strong>the</strong>re is no international political commitment to<br />
“Open Skies” in <strong>the</strong> context of “operational” ERS systems.<br />
For a variety of reasons, including national security, <strong>the</strong> U.S. (with <strong>the</strong> tacit support of<br />
<strong>the</strong> USSR) has insisted on <strong>the</strong> unencumbered right to acquire data from space. This posture<br />
must be maintained.<br />
The present paper deals with appropriate future directions for <strong>the</strong> ERS program, and<br />
in particular with <strong>the</strong> policy of dissemination of ERS data. The authors point out that<br />
[2] experience with ERTS-1 and Skylab have indicated that space technology has great<br />
promise for generating useful data bearing on agriculture, forestry, fisheries, <strong>the</strong> location<br />
of natural resources, land use planning and in many o<strong>the</strong>r areas. However, experience to<br />
date is wholly inadequate to establish <strong>the</strong> economic value of <strong>the</strong>se data or <strong>the</strong> cost-benefit<br />
character of its space acquisition as compared with o<strong>the</strong>r means. Extensive fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
experimentation is required to develop techniques for <strong>the</strong> interpretation and analysis of<br />
ERS data and for optimally combining that with data from o<strong>the</strong>r sources before its economic<br />
potential can be reliably assessed. The cost and technical sophistication of <strong>the</strong><br />
appropriate data analysis, at this point, is generally beyond <strong>the</strong> reach of individual developing<br />
countries. Cooperative projects with LDC’s could be important elements in U.S.<br />
strategy to develop for <strong>the</strong> needed applications of R&D that are <strong>the</strong> pacing elements in<br />
future progress. Eventually a viable commercial activity in data analysis may mature.<br />
With respect to <strong>the</strong> policy issues, <strong>the</strong> authors cite three U.S. alternatives with regard<br />
to data acquisition and dissemination:<br />
– assertion of unilateral rights;<br />
– negotiation of internationally acceptable principles, offering technical cooperation<br />
and assistance as an incentive; and<br />
[3] – abandonment of an open program and reliance on classified data.<br />
The authors conclude that <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r work necessary to establishing <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
utility of ERS requires <strong>the</strong> cooperation of o<strong>the</strong>r nations, and U.S. participation in and technical<br />
support of <strong>the</strong>ir efforts to develop data analysis techniques suited to <strong>the</strong>ir situation.<br />
We should continue to assert <strong>the</strong> right to acquire and disseminate primary data. But<br />
to encourage applications R and D, <strong>the</strong> [U.S. government] should be willing to permit
ano<strong>the</strong>r country which so requests to restrict joint research to those applications <strong>the</strong><br />
results of which <strong>the</strong>y are willing to publish. Thus NASA and o<strong>the</strong>r agencies would continue<br />
<strong>the</strong> policy of full disclosures of both primary and secondary data in which <strong>the</strong> [U.S. government]<br />
is involved, but we would respect <strong>the</strong> right of ano<strong>the</strong>r country to obtain <strong>the</strong><br />
primary data tape or read <strong>the</strong> satellite directly if for our own purposes we energize it over<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir territory, and make what use of <strong>the</strong> data <strong>the</strong>y will.<br />
U.S. policy must <strong>the</strong>refore focus on <strong>the</strong> distinction between primary data, and information<br />
available after processing. Policy should be directed to obtaining international<br />
acceptance of freedom of acquisition and freedom of dissemination of primary data tapes<br />
if <strong>the</strong> potential benefits [4] of this technology are to be realized. The strategy for advancing<br />
<strong>the</strong>se goals should be based on recognition that ERS should not be prematurely<br />
described as “operational” and in no event unless and until international acceptance of its<br />
potential benefits is obtained.<br />
[5] Introduction<br />
For more than a decade international acceptance of “Open Skies”—<strong>the</strong> right of any<br />
country to examine <strong>the</strong> earth from outer space without prior restraint—has been a cornerstone<br />
of U.S. space policy and should be continued. A number of factors reinforce <strong>the</strong><br />
importance of retaining this freedom:<br />
(a) SALT agreements force increasing reliance on national technical means of<br />
verification.<br />
(b) Growing interest in <strong>the</strong> possibility that Earth Resources Satellites (ERS) might<br />
provide economic benefits in <strong>the</strong> future makes <strong>the</strong> continued viability of Open Skies of<br />
special interest. Since foreign customers for satellite data analysis must find <strong>the</strong> initial<br />
acquisition of data acceptable, ei<strong>the</strong>r Open Skies policy must be maintained or else agreements<br />
or same form of internationalization of <strong>the</strong> space segment may be required.<br />
(c) Many new space technologies will have to call for some observations from space.<br />
Restriction on open observations will create barriers to effective operation.<br />
“Open Skies” is <strong>the</strong> preferred alternative, since it is necessary to sustain <strong>the</strong> legitimacy<br />
of remote sensing for national security purposes. In addition, it provides <strong>the</strong> minimum<br />
impediment to <strong>the</strong> development of ERS as a potential economic asset.<br />
[6] While ERTS-1 has been accepted under <strong>the</strong> Open Skies principle, <strong>the</strong>re is no international<br />
political commitment to Open Skies in <strong>the</strong> context of “operational” systems.<br />
However, as advocates of ERS become more vocal with <strong>the</strong> view that “operational” systems<br />
are economically viable, <strong>the</strong>re is increased advocacy in <strong>the</strong> U.N. of restrictions on <strong>the</strong><br />
acquisition and dissemination of ERS data and in <strong>the</strong> [U.S. government] on <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
value of restrictions on ERS data in order to capture more of <strong>the</strong> economic benefits.<br />
The policy question requiring resolution is: What posture toward acquisition and dissemination<br />
of ERS data is optimal today in <strong>the</strong> light of <strong>the</strong> present state of evolution of<br />
ERS experience?<br />
The answer depends substantially on an evaluation of that state of evolution and an<br />
analysis of <strong>the</strong> requirement to bring <strong>the</strong> ERS program to economic viability.<br />
Experience with ERTS-1<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 265<br />
A little over one year of experience with ERTS-1, plus some data from manned space<br />
flight programs and considerable commercial experience with airborne photography,<br />
have established both politically and commercially motivated interest in civil applications<br />
of remote sensing. From a technical point of view, <strong>the</strong> capability for image acquisition is<br />
well advanced and <strong>the</strong> potential for improvement established by very expensive national
266<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
security programs.<br />
[7] The spatial resolution achieved with multi-spectral scanning sensor in ERTS-1 is adequate<br />
to produce raw imagery that suggests a wide range of commercial/civil applications.<br />
It is not <strong>the</strong> case, however, that ERTS-1 and Skylab/Apollo experiments have given us <strong>the</strong><br />
experience to permit <strong>the</strong> design of a remote sensing satellite appropriate to an economically<br />
viable, operational system. This is so primarily because of inadequate experience with<br />
application-specific image processing and interpretation. But even <strong>the</strong> space segment is in<br />
an early stage of development.<br />
ERTS-1 is deficient in resolution for applications such as land use planning.<br />
Frequency of observation of a given point is not sufficient given <strong>the</strong> random interruption<br />
of cloud cover, for time-dependent problems in flood control, agricultural monitoring,<br />
iceberg tracking, etc. As a result, turnaround time between observation and analysis is too<br />
long for many purposes. Although technology exists to remedy <strong>the</strong>se deficiencies, we do<br />
not have enough systems experience, with both satellite configurations and image data<br />
processing and analysis, to make <strong>the</strong> tradeoffs between <strong>the</strong>se functional attributes and systems<br />
costs.<br />
One must remember that ERS applications are in <strong>the</strong>ir infancy. Although <strong>the</strong> technical<br />
capability to acquire images, generate geometric and radiometric corrections, and<br />
extract information by image enhancement have been [8] demonstrated, <strong>the</strong> majority of<br />
applications research projects to date involve manual (visual) processing of primary<br />
images. These images are available several weeks after data acquisition.<br />
A fully operational system would have to provide digital primary imagery to widely dispersed<br />
customers in approximately real time. This primary imagery is only <strong>the</strong> first step.<br />
The ground-based image filtering and contrast adjustment, information extraction and<br />
interpretation impose heavy data processing requirements. Correlation with ground truth<br />
data and final interpretation are tasks requiring very high levels [of] professional expertise,<br />
and extensive experience with end-use problems, institutions and customs. Since<br />
<strong>the</strong>se interpretation services are <strong>the</strong> key to obtaining <strong>the</strong> benefits from remote sensing<br />
technology[,] decisions on <strong>the</strong> major international political issues and on <strong>the</strong> character of<br />
<strong>the</strong> follow-on space projects must be made with <strong>the</strong> desired institutional structure for <strong>the</strong><br />
service delivery system clearly in mind.<br />
The first step is <strong>the</strong> study of <strong>the</strong> economics with a view to evaluating <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
potential for developing <strong>the</strong> services. At this time <strong>the</strong> institutional structure for exploiting<br />
an operational remote sensing system does not exist. A few commercial companies with<br />
substantial support from government R&D contracts are hoping to create a service business<br />
out of proprietary satellite photo interpretation. Several not-for-profits are developing<br />
experience, also on government contracts.<br />
[9] It would appear that <strong>the</strong> conditions required to make information services based on<br />
remote sensing technology economically viable call for:<br />
(a) Realistic evaluation of <strong>the</strong> total costs of processing, interpreting and marketing<br />
information as well as its initial acquisition. On a per-image basis, <strong>the</strong> space segment of <strong>the</strong><br />
system may prove <strong>the</strong> least expensive.<br />
(b) Identification of applications with very high economic leverage for which remote<br />
sensing from space is more economical than ground or airborne observation and for<br />
which a market can be aggregated.<br />
(c) Determining <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> economic leverage depends on exclusivity<br />
of access to ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> raw data or to <strong>the</strong> processed and interpreted data in order to permit<br />
a proprietary advantage,<br />
(d) Definition of [U.S. government] policies affecting <strong>the</strong> applications system economics—as<br />
well as international issues—and <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> point of responsi-
ility in <strong>the</strong> [U.S. government].<br />
(e) Definition of <strong>the</strong> optimum satellite system with respect to economic and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
considerations.<br />
The [<strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget] sponsored studies now under way may shed<br />
some light on those matters. However, <strong>the</strong> level of development of application services is<br />
so rudimentary at this time that much reliance will have to be placed on judgment—based<br />
on experience with similar new technologies.<br />
[10] ERS Applications<br />
It seems likely that ERS applications will have several characteristics:<br />
(a) Satellite data will usually have to be combined with data from many more conventional<br />
sources before useful, commercially saleable [sic] results are obtained. Thus it<br />
is unlikely that many applications will be found that do not require complex interfaces<br />
with existing service organizations—both in <strong>the</strong> region under study and in <strong>the</strong> client’s<br />
community.<br />
(b) Exclusivity of <strong>the</strong> information product may be achieved through <strong>the</strong> quality of<br />
interpretation and amalgamation with o<strong>the</strong>r data, but exclusivity based on primary<br />
imagery requires ei<strong>the</strong>r turning <strong>the</strong> satellite operation over to a private monopoly or finding<br />
legal justification and an administrative mechanism for exclusive licensing of imagery<br />
by <strong>the</strong> government. In any case, exclusivity is a will-o-<strong>the</strong>-wisp, since alternative platforms<br />
exist for surveying most areas of interest, and primary imagery alone will often prove inadequate.<br />
(c) Some applications may prove cost effective in <strong>the</strong> developing countries before<br />
<strong>the</strong>y do in <strong>the</strong> U.S., because of deficiencies in logistic and communications infrastructure,<br />
extensive poorly studied areas, lack of institutional structures for ground-based data collection,<br />
etc. (Flood management is an example.)<br />
[11] (d) The most valuable applications are probably still undiscovered, and may depend<br />
heavily on very sophisticated automated image processing. In general, <strong>the</strong> computing<br />
requirements would appear to pose serious problems for developing countries and very<br />
small organizations. A number of years of subsidized operations will probably be required<br />
before commercial incentives will produce <strong>the</strong> required development investment.<br />
Policy Issues<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 267<br />
In light of this background, <strong>the</strong> policy issues requiring clarification are:<br />
(a) What is <strong>the</strong> “critical path” impeding progress? O<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> obvious necessity<br />
for a follow-on program to ERTS-1, which is inadequate in resolution, re-observation rate,<br />
and is nearing end of useful life, it is experience in information extraction and use under<br />
realistic economic conditions that is most needed. A follow-on experimental satellite is<br />
well justified, and would permit several years of applications R&D, without which no viable<br />
commercial activity can occur. Thus, end-user programs would appear to deserve government<br />
priority. The second element in <strong>the</strong> critical path is <strong>the</strong> resolution of concerns of foreign<br />
nations with respect to acquisition and dissemination of data.<br />
(b) Is <strong>the</strong>re a relationship between <strong>the</strong> well established acceptability of meteorology<br />
satellites and <strong>the</strong> viability of Open Skies for ERS systems? U.S. policy in <strong>the</strong> meteorology<br />
[12] field is firmly and necessarily committed to free international exchange, as well as<br />
unilateral rights of observation. This is well accepted internationally because <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
to all depend on information interchange. Many ERS applications have a similar dependency<br />
on global access, as well as exchange of “ground truth” data. If our ERS policy<br />
moves away from commitments to international cooperation and disclosure of space data,<br />
characteristics of most NASA programs to date, <strong>the</strong> possible impact on <strong>the</strong> U.S. wea<strong>the</strong>r
268<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
satellite program must be clearly foreseen.<br />
(c) How can we take best advantage of <strong>the</strong> U.S. lead in most of <strong>the</strong> professional enduser<br />
skills (oil exploration, plant disease studies, airborne mapping, etc.) plus <strong>the</strong> lead in<br />
digital image processing? These assets may offer sufficient “exclusivity” to adequately protect<br />
national economic self interest if we move ahead to develop and apply <strong>the</strong>se skills. To<br />
facilitate this process, we should make imagery generally available to encourage fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
development of both institutions and technology.<br />
(d) Should primary data tapes from ERS systems be made fully available to anyone at<br />
very low cost by government, or should <strong>the</strong> operating entity be empowered to restrict dissemination,<br />
and offer exclusive access to economically motivated customers? Which<br />
approach would develop most rapidly <strong>the</strong> technology, institutions, and capital and market<br />
structures to deliver useful services? The answer hinges on [13] whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> work to date<br />
would justify private investment in a satellite and ground facility system, in which case proprietary<br />
rights in primary data might encourage investment. In our judgment, <strong>the</strong> work to<br />
date would not justify private investment; particularly since <strong>the</strong> character of most applications<br />
is such that <strong>the</strong> benefits are not capturable [sic] by individuals. When <strong>the</strong> product<br />
of an enterprise is an indivisible public good, <strong>the</strong>n it is certain that governments will be<br />
<strong>the</strong> primary customers. Examples are: land-use planning, flood control, crop estimation,<br />
iceberg tracking, pollution monitoring, etc.<br />
(e) What policy regarding acquisition and dissemination of imagery over o<strong>the</strong>r countries<br />
has <strong>the</strong> best chance of leading to a stable basis for global access by <strong>the</strong> U.S., maximum<br />
cooperation in <strong>the</strong> exchange of ground data, and best opportunities for U.S. firms<br />
to market services abroad? Obvious alternatives include:<br />
(1) Unilateral assertion of satellite data acquisition rights by <strong>the</strong> U.S., coupled with<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r an assertion of <strong>the</strong> right not to disseminate, or a commitment to do so.<br />
(2) Proposal for an international network (like Intelsat), with <strong>the</strong> first U.S. operational<br />
bird as <strong>the</strong> first prototype. This would doubtless produce serious<br />
delays. This is also <strong>the</strong> most aggressive form of internationalization.<br />
[14] (3) Effort to negotiate international acceptance of “Open Skies“ without asserting<br />
<strong>the</strong> unilateral right, perhaps with <strong>the</strong> commitment to share primary<br />
“(Master)” data fully and an offer of help to LDC’s in image processing and<br />
interpretation as an incentive.<br />
(4) Cancel <strong>the</strong> NASA program altoge<strong>the</strong>r and rely upon classified sources for<br />
U.S. national requirements.<br />
(f) What is required to maintain <strong>the</strong> credibility of a unilateral U.S. program in which<br />
we offer to disseminate primary data internationally? If, occasionally, data are withheld,<br />
what will be <strong>the</strong> political consequences? Is <strong>the</strong>re any merit to an extension of <strong>the</strong> “Master<br />
Tape” proposal to include <strong>the</strong> production and dissemination of photographs from <strong>the</strong><br />
tape by a U.N. agency, in parallel with U.S. government distribution domestically? How<br />
can <strong>the</strong> U.S. enhance <strong>the</strong> sense of participation and equity of o<strong>the</strong>r countries in <strong>the</strong> new<br />
technology, as a foundation for viable international machinery in <strong>the</strong> future?<br />
In an understandable desire to sustain or accelerate <strong>the</strong> public investment in ERS, its<br />
supporters are allowing policy authorities to underestimate <strong>the</strong> technical, institution and<br />
economic obstacles to be overcome before a widespread, cost-effective usage of remote<br />
sensing in civil applications can be sustained. The temptation to call <strong>the</strong> follow-on<br />
[15] program to ERTS-1 “operational” reflects this tendency. Political sensitivity of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
nations to unilateral remote sensing both grows on and enhances this optimism. In fact,<br />
a great deal more research and, more important, more applications experience in a realistic<br />
economic environment is needed before an economically viable “operational” ERTS<br />
program can emerge. Requirements for this fur<strong>the</strong>r experience include:<br />
(a) Continued access to remote sensing and ground truth data on as close to a glob-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 269<br />
al basis as possible, clearly calling for cooperation by o<strong>the</strong>r nations.<br />
(b) Continued broad availability of primary digital data at a subsidized cost from a<br />
NASA R&D system in which operational continuity is assured, and in which systems configuration<br />
tradeoffs can be evaluated.<br />
(c) Expanded public support for user application and image processing technology<br />
development.<br />
(d) A public commitment to <strong>the</strong> policy basis for future systems, should <strong>the</strong>y prove<br />
economically viable, on <strong>the</strong> basis of which international cooperation and private investment<br />
will be forthcoming.<br />
Thus we urge that policy reflect <strong>the</strong> fact that, while fur<strong>the</strong>r development of ERS systems—especially<br />
<strong>the</strong> ground segment—is desirable, <strong>the</strong> U.S. is not prepared to move now<br />
to an “operational” system. In accordance with (e) 3 above, [16] <strong>the</strong> U.S. should seek to<br />
establish de facto acceptance of Open Skies through <strong>the</strong> inevitable gradual development of<br />
<strong>the</strong> technology and a private sector institutional base for delivering ERS services both here<br />
and abroad.<br />
The pacing elements in commercial exploitation of <strong>the</strong> ERS technology are image<br />
processing, interpretation, and service marketing. Here <strong>the</strong> U.S. enjoys <strong>the</strong> most important<br />
elements of technological exclusivity. Rapid progress in improving and disseminating<br />
<strong>the</strong> basic image data distribution will maximize <strong>the</strong> opportunity to take advantage of this<br />
uniqueness. Thus a unilateral offer of <strong>the</strong> primary data tapes to an appropriate international<br />
body may well achieve <strong>the</strong> maximum political advantage of involvement of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
countries and <strong>the</strong> UN at an early stage at a minimum cost to <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
In addition, we should consider some form of expanded help to developing countries<br />
in <strong>the</strong> image processing and interpretation area. In <strong>the</strong> U.S. we should develop <strong>the</strong>se<br />
activities in <strong>the</strong> private sector, initially encouraged by government contracts.<br />
This policy framework could lead to acceptable negotiated agreements with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
nations. We should continue to assert <strong>the</strong> right to acquire and disseminate primary data.<br />
But to encourage applications R and D, <strong>the</strong> [U.S. government] should be willing to permit<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r countries to restrict joint research [17] with <strong>the</strong> U.S. to those applications that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are willing to publish. Thus NASA and o<strong>the</strong>r agencies would continue <strong>the</strong> policy of<br />
full disclosures of both primary and secondary data in which [<strong>the</strong> U.S. government] is<br />
involved. We would respect <strong>the</strong> right of o<strong>the</strong>r countries to obtain <strong>the</strong> primary data tape or<br />
read <strong>the</strong> satellite directly, if for our own purposes we energize it over <strong>the</strong>ir territories, and<br />
make what use of <strong>the</strong> data <strong>the</strong>y will.<br />
Finally, in order to maximize private sector confidence in <strong>the</strong> continuity of this program<br />
and to minimize political problems, <strong>the</strong> most rigid separation possible should be<br />
maintained between <strong>the</strong> organizational and managerial environments for civil ERS systems<br />
and national security systems. At <strong>the</strong> technology level only commonality in both<br />
space and ground segments can be considered to <strong>the</strong> extent that security requirements<br />
and economics permit.<br />
Document II-25<br />
Document title: Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space<br />
Sciences, U.S. Senate, to Dr. James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, October 14, 1972.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Because threatened budget cuts kept <strong>the</strong> future of NASA’s ERTS program in a state of doubt, <strong>the</strong> space<br />
agency was under steady pressure to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> program’s utility. NASA had campaigned for <strong>the</strong><br />
program on <strong>the</strong> grounds that it would provide solid benefits to various user communities. However,
270<br />
in <strong>the</strong> months following <strong>the</strong> launch of <strong>the</strong> first ERTS, NASA found that providing <strong>the</strong> specific data<br />
required by <strong>the</strong> users was in many ways more difficult than building <strong>the</strong> hardware. NASA’s limited<br />
knowledge of many fields hindered its ability to specifically tailor data. Nontechnical communities,<br />
particularly state agencies, did not understand <strong>the</strong> technology well enough to realize its capabilities<br />
and limitations. Many potential users, unable to effectively communicate <strong>the</strong>ir precise needs to NASA<br />
and unaware of what was available, were not profiting from ERTS data. A note on Senator<br />
Anderson’s letter to NASA Administrator James Fletcher refers to a “Chuck” and “Frank.” “Chuck”<br />
was Charles Mat<strong>the</strong>ws, <strong>the</strong> NASA Associate Administrator in charge of <strong>the</strong> ERTS program, and<br />
“Frank” was Senator Anderson’s aide Frank DiLuzio.<br />
[1] October 14, 1972<br />
Dr. James C. Fletcher, Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546<br />
[handwritten note: “Chuck, I’m inclined to think Frank is right here. $ is a problem but<br />
I’m afraid NASA has to take <strong>the</strong> leadership here—JGF”]<br />
Dear Jim:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
For quite some time, this office has been following <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>the</strong> ERTS-A<br />
Program, and, specifically, <strong>the</strong> transferring of information ga<strong>the</strong>red by <strong>the</strong> cameras and<br />
sensors on board ERTS to end users. It is obvious from testimony, news stories and public<br />
news releases of NASA that <strong>the</strong> initial users of <strong>the</strong> data will be <strong>the</strong> Corps of Engineers, <strong>the</strong><br />
Environmental Protection Agency and <strong>the</strong> Departments of <strong>the</strong> Interior, Commerce and<br />
Agriculture. These are Government agencies with statutory mission assignments that can<br />
utilize <strong>the</strong> data. It is also true that to a great degree, <strong>the</strong>y have within <strong>the</strong>ir agencies <strong>the</strong><br />
needed expertise to interpret and apply such data to specific programs. This is a talent<br />
which I do not believe exists in o<strong>the</strong>r potential user groups which need assistance and<br />
which are not being given <strong>the</strong> proper attention. These groups include state planning<br />
agencies, state regulatory agencies, regional compacts, state and regional industrial and<br />
educational groups and resource planning groups.<br />
I firmly believe that full and profitable utilization of ERTS data will only be accomplished<br />
when it is made available to individual states, regional compacts and consortia. I<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r believe that unless <strong>the</strong>re is a more concentrated effort to make <strong>the</strong> information<br />
available to <strong>the</strong> end users, nothing dramatic is going to happen regardless of how valuable<br />
and useful <strong>the</strong> collected data is for land use planning, flood plan control, forest land management,<br />
resources identification and development, etc.<br />
This problem was perhaps best illustrated at a recent meeting of <strong>the</strong> Federation of<br />
Rocky Mountain States in Boise, Idaho. It was very evident that while NASA has done a fair<br />
job in setting up sources to which users could write for “imagry,” [sic] <strong>the</strong> locations and<br />
capabilities of <strong>the</strong>se centers were not well known. Also, <strong>the</strong> potential users did not seem<br />
to know what was available and, <strong>the</strong>refore, could not ask for specific “imagry” [sic] with a<br />
precise reference.<br />
[2] I do not mean to criticize NASA, but merely to reiterate that it has always been very difficult<br />
to take new technology and make it easily available in understandable and useful<br />
forms to <strong>the</strong> end users. This has been true with many new technologies, and it also is true<br />
with ERTS. It is very difficult to initially inform and keep informed <strong>the</strong> several different ultimate<br />
users, and it also is difficult at times to even identify <strong>the</strong> ultimate user of such data.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 271<br />
I have been informed that <strong>the</strong>re is an agreement between NASA and <strong>the</strong> several<br />
Governmental departments involved as to <strong>the</strong>ir specific roles. However, I firmly believe<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re must be a lead agency in <strong>the</strong> application of any new technology, or it has a tendency<br />
to drift and dribble ra<strong>the</strong>r than follow a logical process of application which proves<br />
out its value to <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
I would appreciate it very much if NASA would take a look at what is now being done<br />
in terms of making <strong>the</strong> “imagry” [sic] and data available; and perhaps with <strong>the</strong> assistance<br />
of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, EPA and <strong>the</strong> Corps of Engineers, devise a more efficient<br />
method of accomplishing <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
1. A clear identification of information available, disseminated in a more effective way;<br />
2. An opportunity for states and regional users to participate in identifying <strong>the</strong> character<br />
of information needed and its form—not in lieu of, but in addition to <strong>the</strong> Principle<br />
Investigator process;<br />
3. A system whereby local users can obtain consultation with knowledgeable people<br />
on a regional, decentralized basis as to what is available and in what shape or form;<br />
4. Some direct technical assistance to <strong>the</strong> states and to potential and actual regional<br />
users as to how this data can be applied in <strong>the</strong>ir planning and problems; and<br />
5. Some method whereby state and regional people can be trained so that <strong>the</strong>y, in<br />
turn, can assist o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
It seems to me that it is imperative that some Governmental department which<br />
already has ei<strong>the</strong>r [a] regional or state offices network be designated [3] as <strong>the</strong> focal point<br />
through which all services can be provided in <strong>the</strong> initial application and evaluation of<br />
ERTS data. I am certain that as more and more data is accumulated and states and local<br />
users become familiar with <strong>the</strong> characteristics of <strong>the</strong> system, <strong>the</strong>re will evolve better and<br />
more efficient channels of transmission and assistance to <strong>the</strong> local end users.<br />
It may be that <strong>the</strong> local Geological Survey office of <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior<br />
might well serve as <strong>the</strong> initial focal point if it were adequately staffed and its file of ERTS<br />
data were maintained on a current basis. I know that <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> expertise to provide<br />
<strong>the</strong> advice and interpretations necessary for <strong>the</strong> early applications of ERTS data.<br />
Unless something is done along <strong>the</strong> lines that I have been outlining, we may fail to use<br />
this new capability which ERTS is giving us for constructive purposes. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, we may lose<br />
more support for <strong>the</strong> space program because of <strong>the</strong> inability to transmit space-ga<strong>the</strong>red<br />
information on a timely basis to users in order to help solve specific earth problems. The<br />
exchange of information may well lead to improved ERTS instrumentation and techniques.<br />
I propose to talk to <strong>the</strong> Chairmen of <strong>the</strong> Interior and Commerce Committees about<br />
joining me in obtaining greater cooperation from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r respective Government agencies<br />
involved. I do not intend that <strong>the</strong> initial setup which I am recommending is in any<br />
way a precedent setter, but it may buy time for <strong>the</strong> Federal agencies to evolve a more efficient<br />
system of disseminating ERTS information in a form usable by <strong>the</strong> end user until<br />
such time as a final communication system has been developed by <strong>the</strong> states and agencies<br />
involved. One such approach might be <strong>the</strong> regional setup proposed by <strong>the</strong> group from<br />
Hobbs, New Mexico, with which you are familiar. That plan has great merit, and even<br />
NASA staff members agree with it.<br />
In view of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Congress will adjourn prior to any action on this letter, I<br />
would appreciate it very much if you would keep Frank DiLuzio current on your thinking<br />
and your reactions to this letter, as he will be in Washington at least through December.<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
[hand-signed: “Clinton Anderson”]
272<br />
Document II-26<br />
Document title: Walter C. Shupe, Chief, GAO Liaison Activities, NASA, Memorandum to<br />
Distribution, “GAO Report to Congress ‘Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and<br />
Problems,’ B-183184, April 7, 1978,” April 21, 1978.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
In its efforts to promote Landsat, NASA placed much emphasis on improved crop forecasting. Toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Department of Agriculture and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service, NASA embarked on a project to demonstrate<br />
<strong>the</strong> system’s ability to accurately predict crop yield and quality. The project, titled LACIE (Large<br />
Area Crop Inventory Experiment), experienced some success, but in general it failed to meet expectations.<br />
[1] National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546<br />
LGG-19<br />
MEMORANDUM<br />
TO: Distribution<br />
FROM: LGG- l9/Chief, GAO Liaison Activities<br />
[rubber stamped: “APR 21 1978”]<br />
SUBJECT: GAO Report to Congress “Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and<br />
Problems,” B-183184, April 7, 1978<br />
This office made advance distribution of <strong>the</strong> enclosed report via route slip on April<br />
11, 1978. Additional copies were obtained and are now being distributed to those who did<br />
not receive one at that time. A copy of <strong>the</strong> Comptroller General’s transmittal letter, dated<br />
April 7, 1978, is enclosed, toge<strong>the</strong>r with a separate copy of <strong>the</strong> report Digest.<br />
GAO reported that USDA, NASA, and NOAA are currently planning a joint research<br />
program that will deemphasize wheat and expand LACIE techniques to o<strong>the</strong>r crops and<br />
applications, such as early warning of crop damage and crop condition assessment. GAO<br />
recommended that <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Agriculture provide cognizant congressional committees<br />
with periodic assessments of <strong>the</strong> LACIE project, <strong>the</strong> experimentation with o<strong>the</strong>r crops,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> experiments: with early warning of crop damage and crop condition assessment.<br />
Inasmuch as <strong>the</strong> report recommendation is not addressed to <strong>the</strong> Administrator, it is<br />
not necessary for NASA comments to be provided for <strong>the</strong> OMB, for GAO, or for<br />
Congressional committees, unless requested at a later date.<br />
[hand-signed: “Walter C. Shupe”]<br />
Enclosures<br />
Distribution attached<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE
[2] Distribution<br />
*A-1/Dr. Robert A. Frosch (Attn: Executive Secretary)<br />
*AD-1/Dr. Alan M. Lovelace<br />
ADB-1/Gen. Duward L. Crow<br />
*B-1/Mr. William Lilly<br />
*BR-2/Mr. Jeff Barber<br />
*BR-2/Mr. Dick Midgett<br />
*E-1/Dr. Anthony Calio<br />
*E-1/Mr. Leonard Jaffe<br />
*ER-2/Mr. Pitt Thome<br />
*EPR-3/ Mr. Pinkler<br />
G-1/Mr. Neil Hosenball<br />
*L-1/Mr. Kenneth R. Chapman<br />
*LC-5/Dr. Joseph Allen<br />
*LG-2/Mr. Edward Z. Gray<br />
LGW-2/Mr. Dick Stone<br />
LI-15/Mr. Norman Terrell<br />
N-1/Mr. Ray Kline<br />
*P-1/Dr. John E. Naugle<br />
R-1/Dr. James Kramer (Attn: Mr. R. Nysmith)<br />
S-1/Dr. Noel Hinners (Attn: Mr. C. Wash)<br />
T-1/Mr. Norman Pozinsky (Attn: Mr. R. Stock)<br />
Center<br />
*Dr. C. Kraft, Director, JSC (Attn: Messrs. P. Whitbeck & L. Sullivan)<br />
[i]<br />
**********<br />
COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS<br />
Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and Problems<br />
DIGEST<br />
A 3-year, three-agency Federal project is developing technology to improve estimates<br />
of foreign wheat crops. It is called <strong>the</strong> Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE)<br />
and is carried out as follows:<br />
— The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Earth Resources<br />
Technology Satellite (Landsat) provides data for estimating wheat acreage.<br />
— The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides information to<br />
assist in estimating crop yield under various wea<strong>the</strong>r conditions.<br />
— The Department of Agriculture—<strong>the</strong> user of wheat crop estimates—provides historical<br />
data and defines requirements for <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
IMPORTANCE OF WORLD CROP INFORMATION<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 273<br />
To date, LACIE has had mixed success in achieving its performance goals. Farmers,<br />
importers, exporters, agribusiness companies, Federal and State policymakers, foreign<br />
governments, and international organizations use foreign agricultural information. But if<br />
more accurate and timely information were available, <strong>the</strong>se parties could better achieve
274<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir goals by making improved decisions on planting, fertilizing, harvesting, storing, and<br />
exporting. (See p. 5.)<br />
Agriculture initially planned to implement an operational wheat-forecasting system if<br />
LACIE technology could produce cost-beneficial, improved estimates. However, this<br />
emphasis on wheat has changed, and Agriculture is planning a research program which<br />
will define <strong>the</strong> potential of <strong>the</strong> LACIE technology for o<strong>the</strong>r crops and applications. (See<br />
p. 2.)<br />
[ii] The Congress should be kept aware of <strong>the</strong> results of this program and of <strong>the</strong> experimentation<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r crops and applications.<br />
LACIE PERFORMANCE<br />
The LACIE project is developing new technology and, as to be expected with new<br />
technology, has had some technical problems, such as<br />
— difficulty in distinguishing spring wheat from o<strong>the</strong>r grains (see p. 12),<br />
— slow progress in developing methods for machine classification of wheat areas to<br />
reduce <strong>the</strong> need for heavy manual involvement in identifying wheat-growing<br />
areas (see p. l3), and<br />
— using current yield models which use highly aggregated wea<strong>the</strong>r inputs that are<br />
not fully, responsive to wea<strong>the</strong>r changes occurring for short periods over localized<br />
areas. (See p. 14.)<br />
LACIE performance needs to be improved to meet its goals of 90-percent accurate<br />
production estimates, 9 out of l0 years. In <strong>the</strong> most important test country, <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union, <strong>the</strong> LACIE production estimate was close to <strong>the</strong> official estimate; however, this<br />
resulted from offsetting errors; i.e., <strong>the</strong> wheat area estimate was high by over 12 percent,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> wheat yield estimate was low by nearly 15 percent. (See p. 8.)<br />
LACIE COSTS<br />
LACIE and related efforts planned through fiscal year 1978 will cost about $54 million,<br />
not including NASA personnel costs. The total costs of <strong>the</strong> follow-on research program<br />
involving <strong>the</strong> three agencies have not been determined. However, Agriculture is<br />
investing a substantial amount of funds in computer equipment, and in programs and<br />
related items to establish a facility near <strong>the</strong> Johnson Space Center, where much of <strong>the</strong><br />
research will be carried out. (See pp. 16 and 17.)<br />
[iii] CONTINUING EFFORTS<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Agriculture planned to implement <strong>the</strong> Application Test System—designed to test<br />
LACIE wheat-estimating techniques in an operational environment. It has, however,<br />
decided to extend experimentation to o<strong>the</strong>r crops and applications, such as early warning<br />
of crop damage and crop condition assessment. It will also defer a Landsat-based wheat<br />
information system until fur<strong>the</strong>r experimentation and evaluation is completed. (See p.<br />
17.) Project plans in 1974 called for <strong>the</strong> performance of a cost/benefit analysis to evaluate<br />
<strong>the</strong> usefulness and cost-effectiveness of a LACIE-type system in providing foreign crop<br />
information. The analysis will assess benefits based on expected improvements in timeliness<br />
and accuracy of information from a LACIE-type system for forecasting wheat.<br />
Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> reasonableness of <strong>the</strong> benefits set forth should be carefully examined if<br />
<strong>the</strong> analysis is used in deciding whe<strong>the</strong>r a crop-forecasting system based on LACIE technology<br />
should be carried out. The analysis will be carried out in 1978 but will not be completed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> LACIE project in July 1978. (See p. 18.)
RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE<br />
Since <strong>the</strong>re have been technical problems in reaching LACIE objectives and <strong>the</strong><br />
research direction has changed, GAO recommends that <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Agriculture provide<br />
cognizant congressional committees with periodic assessments of <strong>the</strong> LACIE project,<br />
<strong>the</strong> experimentation with o<strong>the</strong>r crops, and <strong>the</strong> experiments with early warning of crop<br />
damage and crop condition assessment. (See p. 21.)<br />
AGENCY COMMENTS<br />
The issues in this report have been discussed with LACIE officials in <strong>the</strong> three participating<br />
agencies, and <strong>the</strong>ir comments have been incorporated as appropriate. NASA<br />
believes that LACIE area and yield estimates for <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union should not be compared<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Soviet’s figures for area and yield because [iv] <strong>the</strong> latter are suspect. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
LACIE project makes this comparison, and Agriculture reports <strong>the</strong> figures in its regular<br />
periodic reports. . . .<br />
Document II-27<br />
Document title: Charles J. Robinove, Director, EROS Program <strong>Office</strong>, Geological Survey,<br />
U.S. Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, Memorandum to Staff of <strong>the</strong> EROS Program,<br />
“Optimism vs. pessimism or where do we go from here? (some personal views),”<br />
December 10, 1975.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
In bargaining with <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget to gain approval for an Earth resource survey satellite<br />
system, <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior was forced to accept an initial provisional program ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
<strong>the</strong> fully operational program it sought. To become fully operational, <strong>the</strong> program would have to prove<br />
its utility. As time passed and progress was slower than anticipated, this bargain hung like Damacles’<br />
sword over <strong>the</strong> program. In an effort to boost severely sagging morale in <strong>the</strong> EROS program office,<br />
Charles J. Robinove prepared this memorandum.<br />
[1] December 10, 1975<br />
Memorandum<br />
To: Staff of <strong>the</strong> EROS Program<br />
From: Charles J. Robinove<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 275<br />
Subject: Optimism vs. pessimism or where do we go from here?<br />
(some personal views)<br />
In <strong>the</strong> past months <strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> EROS Program has shown increasing pessimism<br />
and discontent regarding <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> EROS Program, <strong>the</strong> thrust of research and<br />
operations, programmatic and administrative problems, and <strong>the</strong> place of <strong>the</strong> scientific<br />
staff. All of us, from top to bottom, have at times been discouraged in our individual<br />
progress and in <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>the</strong> program—this is only natural in a growing and evolving<br />
area of science within <strong>the</strong> Federal bureaucracy.
276<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Certainly many things have progressed more slowly than any of us would like. In <strong>the</strong><br />
ten-year span since <strong>the</strong> EROS Program was announced, only two satellites have been<br />
launched, no commitment has been made to an operational system, organizational<br />
progress has seemed to be stifled, and budgets have never been large enough to do <strong>the</strong><br />
things that we have all felt need to be done.<br />
Pessimism in <strong>the</strong> face of slow progress and setbacks is a natural human condition, but<br />
why is it so prevalent now? Probably it is because all of us believe in <strong>the</strong> EROS Program as<br />
a soundly based scientific and technical framework that is good for <strong>the</strong> United States and<br />
<strong>the</strong> world, remote sensing is a scientifically exciting field to work in, our contacts with o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
in a vast area of scientific and resource management disciplines is a broadening and<br />
continuing learning experience, and through our efforts we can build a sound and<br />
respected scientific reputation both individually and for <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
Let us look at <strong>the</strong> progress that has been made. Landsats 1 and 2 are operating at performance<br />
levels higher than expected, Landsat-C is planned for launch in 1977, and<br />
Landsat-D is being planned. O<strong>the</strong>r more specific missions such as Magnetometer Satellite<br />
(Magsat) and Heat Capacity Mapping Mission (HCMM) are being planned.<br />
[2] Users of remote sensing data are increasing rapidly, and applications of data to<br />
resource and environmental problems are proving to be practical and beneficial. The<br />
EROS Data Center is an operating reality with increasing numbers of customers for data<br />
and training. The individual freedom of <strong>the</strong> staff to do research in both basic and applied<br />
remote sensing is a privilege envied by many outside <strong>the</strong> Survey. But in spite of <strong>the</strong>se positive<br />
factors, pessimism seems greater than optimism.<br />
Scientific progress is like individual freedom—both must be fought for day by day.<br />
Nei<strong>the</strong>r can be taken for granted. Regardless of <strong>the</strong> quality of our work or <strong>the</strong> necessity<br />
for such work to benefit <strong>the</strong> country and <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>the</strong>re will always be those who say our<br />
endeavors are of little value, that our concepts won’t work, and who battle against us in<br />
private and in public, ei<strong>the</strong>r to eliminate <strong>the</strong> EROS Program entirely or to reduce it to an<br />
unworkable level.<br />
Are <strong>the</strong>se reasons for pessimism? No—<strong>the</strong>y are reasons to increase our efforts and to<br />
convince our detractors, both by our results and our statements, that what we do is of<br />
value. This must be done continually. It is not enough to know we are making progress<br />
and helping o<strong>the</strong>rs. We must show it and tell it and be proud of it.<br />
In accomplishing <strong>the</strong> things that we have done, we have solved many problems—scientific,<br />
administrative, and political; we have built a constructive and useful phase of science<br />
and technology; and we have overcome many obstacles in doing so. There is every<br />
reason to continue to do so and every ability available to continue and increase our<br />
progress. In <strong>the</strong> context of pride in our purpose and our accomplishments, we can put up<br />
with enemies, misunderstandings, and continual nitpicking in small matters.<br />
Optimism derives from our purpose and our accomplishments; pessimism derives<br />
only from frustration in reaching our goals. I believe we can overcome our pessimism by<br />
looking at our purpose and our goals, recognizing <strong>the</strong> hard and often frustrating scientific,<br />
administrative, and political roadblocks in our way, and trying, day by day, to overcome<br />
<strong>the</strong>m.<br />
If we remain firmly committed to our broad goals and confident of our ability, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
optimism will aid us in achieving our goals and in overcoming <strong>the</strong> pessimism that can lead<br />
us to defeat ourselves.<br />
[hand-signed: “Charles J. Robinove”]
Document II-28<br />
Document title: James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Mr. John C. Sawhill, Associate<br />
Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, October 19, 1973.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
The Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget was given expanded responsibilities and renamed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of<br />
Management and Budget (OMB) in 1971. This name change did not result in a more welcome attitude<br />
toward <strong>the</strong> ERTS program. The second satellite, ERTS-B, was originally scheduled for launch<br />
in 1976. Fearing that a failure in ERTS-A might cause a potentially damaging gap in data, NASA<br />
requested permission to advance <strong>the</strong> launch date by two years. OMB resisted, believing that an earlier<br />
launch might imply a premature decision to declare <strong>the</strong> program operational and <strong>the</strong>reby increase<br />
funding. In this letter to OMB Associate Director John C. Sawhill, NASA Administrator James<br />
Fletcher presents NASA’s case.<br />
[1] NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION<br />
Washington, D.C. 20545<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Administrator<br />
Mr. John C. Sawhill<br />
Associate Director<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget<br />
Executive <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> President<br />
Washington, D.C. 20503<br />
Dear John:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 277<br />
OCT 19 1973<br />
I am writing to clarify and explain in greater detail <strong>the</strong> reasons to accelerate <strong>the</strong><br />
launch of ERTS-B from 1976 to 1974, as communicated in my letter to Roy Ash of<br />
September 5, 1973.<br />
First, let me address three points on which discussions with your staff indicate <strong>the</strong>re<br />
may have been some misunderstanding.<br />
1. The acceleration of ERTS-B is required for continued experimental work and<br />
does not depend on approval of <strong>the</strong> interagency pilot project I suggested to<br />
George Shultz in my letter of September 5, 1973. Even if it is decided not to<br />
undertake such a global agricultural experiment, <strong>the</strong> earlier launch of ERTS-B is<br />
required to continue current experimentation with <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> ERTS data systems<br />
for applications in agriculture and o<strong>the</strong>r fields to provide a better base of<br />
experience for <strong>the</strong> planning and design of possible future operational systems.<br />
2. The launch of ERTS-B in 1974 does not require or necessarily imply an earlier<br />
decision to commit to an operational ERS satellite system than envisaged with <strong>the</strong><br />
previously approved 1976 ERTS-B launch date, nor does it require or necessarily<br />
imply a decision to launch ano<strong>the</strong>r experimental satellite in 1976 to maintain continuity<br />
of data collection between <strong>the</strong> accelerated ERTS-B and an eventual operational<br />
satellite system. NASA and <strong>the</strong> user agencies generally [2] believe that an<br />
earlier commitment to an operational satellite system could be made, and I have
278<br />
recommended that continuity of data collection be maintained with ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
experimental satellite (ERTS-C) until an operational satellite system becomes available.<br />
However, even if nei<strong>the</strong>r an operational system nor ERTS-C is approved at<br />
this time, ERTS-B should never<strong>the</strong>less be launched in 1974 to extend <strong>the</strong> experimental<br />
operations conducted with ERTS-1. If <strong>the</strong>re has to be a gap, it would be<br />
preferable to get a stronger experimental base sooner and accept a hiatus between<br />
a more meaningful experimental phase and <strong>the</strong> operational system, ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
introduce an unnecessary hiatus into <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> experimental phase.<br />
3. The acceleration of ERTS-B, even if combined with a decision to proceed with<br />
ERTS-C for launch in 1976, as I have separately recommended, does not have<br />
budgetary implications that go beyond previously planned committed levels for<br />
space research and technology. The additional cost of ERTS-C can easily be<br />
accommodated within a total NASA budget well below <strong>the</strong> planning level of<br />
$3.2–3.4 billion (1971 dollars) agreed to in January 1972, as shown in my FY 1975<br />
budget letter of September 28, 1973.<br />
Now let me explain more fully <strong>the</strong> reasons for shifting <strong>the</strong> launch date of ERTS B to<br />
1974, independent of <strong>the</strong> related considerations discussed above.<br />
R&D Strategy<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The research and development strategy for <strong>the</strong> ERTS program, for which NASA and<br />
<strong>the</strong> associated technical agencies are responsible, must be based on recognition of <strong>the</strong> fact<br />
that a multipurpose development program like ERTS cannot be treated like a classical<br />
hardware systems development with clearly identifiable decision points for separate phases<br />
of research, development, test, evaluation, and operations. We are dealing with a system<br />
and many potential applications [3] in which <strong>the</strong> experimental phase has to include<br />
(in different ways for each application) a whole variety of activities, including among o<strong>the</strong>rs:<br />
• Development and test of sensor performance capabilities.<br />
• Development and test of satellite hardware capabilities.<br />
• Development and test of data collection and relay capabilities.<br />
• Development and test of ground data processing to provide data in useful form<br />
for each of many applications.<br />
• Development of data analysis aids and methodologies to convert data into useful<br />
information.<br />
• Test of information utility in each application for management and decision-making.<br />
Two key points must be stressed: First, <strong>the</strong> satellite data requirements for experimentation<br />
necessary to achieve an adequate basis for evaluation are different for each class of<br />
potential application; and second, some of <strong>the</strong> most important potential applications<br />
require a data base of repetitive coverage extending over several years and/or quasioperational<br />
testing using current, near-real-time data.<br />
There are two major areas of ERTS applications that clearly appear to have great nearterm<br />
potential value and which illustrate <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> continuity of data an<br />
ERTS-B 1974 launch would provide. These are <strong>the</strong> areas of vegetation and water boundary<br />
discrimination. It has been demonstrated, for example, that ERTS data can be used to<br />
identity and separate different crops, monitor crop vigor, end measure crop acreage. To<br />
be useful in <strong>the</strong> development of systematic crop yield [4] predictions, <strong>the</strong>se techniques<br />
need to be applied to current growing seasons that are influenced by current climatology.<br />
The same holds true for measurement of forest stress under insect attack and for exact<br />
delineation of coastal wetlands by grass species discrimination: <strong>the</strong> dynamic nature of <strong>the</strong><br />
problem requires current data for current use. For hydrology applications like flood mapping,<br />
seasonal lake and pond assessments, water sedimentation and pollution measure-
ment, and sea ice monitoring, near-real-time data is even more critical, since <strong>the</strong> dynamic<br />
phenomena <strong>the</strong>mselves are short-lived and <strong>the</strong> period for action in response to observation<br />
is also short. An early ERTS-B launch will provide assurance that <strong>the</strong> immediate<br />
values in <strong>the</strong>se application areas can be realized.<br />
These two examples illustrate how <strong>the</strong> first phase of ERTS investigations has been<br />
spent discovering and understanding <strong>the</strong> full extent of <strong>the</strong> informational content of space<br />
data; <strong>the</strong> next phase now needs to focus on making information extraction routine and<br />
on learning how <strong>the</strong> new information can be integrated into management and decision<br />
processes. This next phase requires experimental support and continuity in <strong>the</strong> flow of<br />
ERTS data. These are <strong>the</strong> considerations that led <strong>the</strong> Interagency Coordination<br />
Committee for <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Survey Program in its annual report to your office submitted<br />
on October 4 to identify <strong>the</strong> acceleration of ERTS-B to 1974 as <strong>the</strong> best step in <strong>the</strong><br />
overall transition from R&D to operations.<br />
A first-order analysis of <strong>the</strong> tradeoffs between <strong>the</strong> two launch dates shows <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
• The earlier launch maintains <strong>the</strong> momentum developed in <strong>the</strong> investigator and<br />
user communities, a momentum that would have to be reestablished at a cost in<br />
money and performance if a serious gap in data flow were permitted.<br />
[5] • The earlier launch is likely to provide earlier definitive experience among many<br />
diverse users and applications upon which decisions as to operational systems timing,<br />
configuration, and benefits can be reached.<br />
• The earlier launch of ERTS-3 means that <strong>the</strong> fifth (10–14 micrometer) MSS channel<br />
would not be carried until a later time; <strong>the</strong> development schedule for this<br />
<strong>the</strong>rmal IR channel would not be affected and <strong>the</strong> instrument could be flown in<br />
1976 if a suitable spacecraft is available. A two-year discontinuity in ERTS data<br />
availability is considered more serious than <strong>the</strong> potential delay in <strong>the</strong> flight test of<br />
<strong>the</strong> additional experimental channel.<br />
• The earlier launch date provides <strong>the</strong> possibility of near-continuous coverage following<br />
ERTS-1 which has exceeded its design life and can be expected to fail at<br />
any time. A later gap in data flow following ERTS-B in <strong>the</strong> period 1975–76 could<br />
be filled with a follow-on experimental or operational system as I have already recommended;<br />
however, this is a matter for a separate decision which can be made<br />
on its merits in <strong>the</strong> FY 1975 budget process, independently of <strong>the</strong> decision on <strong>the</strong><br />
ERTS-B launch date.<br />
• The earlier launch results in lower FY 1975 and total program costs.<br />
I would like to reiterate a basic point: <strong>the</strong> objective of <strong>the</strong> ERTS program, to identify<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r an operational approach to ERS is warranted, is earliest and most economically<br />
served by accelerating ERTS-B.<br />
[6] Congressional Direction<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 279<br />
The four Committees charged with <strong>the</strong> NASA authorization and appropriation have<br />
clearly and unambiguously gone on record on <strong>the</strong> ERTS-B matter. The FY 1974 authorization<br />
act includes $8 million specifically targeted for this purpose. Quotes are: “The<br />
[House] Committee, however, places <strong>the</strong> highest priority on <strong>the</strong> ERTS project.” “. . . <strong>the</strong><br />
[House] Committee believes that ERTS-B should be prepared for launch as soon a practicable.”<br />
“. . . <strong>the</strong> [Senate] Committee concurs with <strong>the</strong> House in adding $7 million to <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Applications Program to bring ERTS B into a ready status for launch in its present<br />
configuration . . . .” “. . . <strong>the</strong> [House] Committee urges NASA to reprogram <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />
funds to launch ERTS-B as early as possible.” [bracketed material in <strong>the</strong> original]<br />
The basis for Congressional interest is not political in <strong>the</strong> usual sense. Data from<br />
ERTS-1 is beginning to be used extensively by many different State agencies, and a serious
280<br />
gap in data availability would cause <strong>the</strong>se States to abandon <strong>the</strong>ir analysis teams—many of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m before <strong>the</strong>y have had <strong>the</strong> opportunity of working with real-time repetitive data.<br />
Perhaps <strong>the</strong> States were premature in building up <strong>the</strong>ir capabilities in response to an<br />
experimental satellite, but, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it seems that ERTS-1 has more values of an<br />
operational character <strong>the</strong>n [sic] had been anticipated.<br />
In addition, I have been personally informed by a number of both House and Senate<br />
members from both sides of <strong>the</strong> aisle that failure to accelerate ERTS-B would be considered<br />
a serious disregard of Congressional intent and would result in political and programmatic<br />
repercussions it would be in <strong>the</strong> best interests of <strong>the</strong> Administration to avoid.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> appropriation bill was still under review, it has been possible to point to that fact<br />
as a limitation on NASA’s programming flexibilities; now that it has passed, I am immediately<br />
accountable to <strong>the</strong> Committees on <strong>the</strong> matter of <strong>the</strong> FY 1974 program content.<br />
[7] International Considerations<br />
International interest, on <strong>the</strong> part of US agencies and firms, as well as numerous foreign<br />
governments, demonstrates a wide-spread positive evaluation of <strong>the</strong> ERTS program<br />
and a very strong concern for its continuity. The following are examples:<br />
• President McNamara of <strong>the</strong> World Bank looks forward to an early launching of<br />
ERTS-B, has established a special Bank office for applications of space surveys,<br />
and has requested <strong>the</strong> Bank to be designated a special (user) agency.<br />
• AID is utilizing ERTS data in specific projects of technical assistance and has<br />
requested continuity of coverage for some of <strong>the</strong>se.<br />
• The Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs has given special attention to<br />
ERTS data for <strong>the</strong> drought-stricken Sahelian area and <strong>the</strong>re has been a positive<br />
response, specific to <strong>the</strong> ERTS program, from <strong>the</strong> Governments of Niger and Mali.<br />
• Canada, Brazil, and Italy have committed to substantial investments in ERTS<br />
ground stations and data processing facilities, implying a clear expectation of <strong>the</strong><br />
continuity of ERTS-type data from whatever source.<br />
• Brazil convoked a meeting in May of this year in which some eleven countries<br />
expressed <strong>the</strong>ir interest in <strong>the</strong> continuity of ERTS data.<br />
• More than a dozen countries have inquired regarding <strong>the</strong> establishment of ERTS<br />
stations.<br />
• The Bendix company has informed us that US commercial advantage in overseas<br />
sales of equipment for ERTS data reception and analysis depends heavily upon an<br />
early start for ERTS-B.<br />
[8] I can provide you fur<strong>the</strong>r data on <strong>the</strong> international aspects if you desire. However, my<br />
own assessment is that <strong>the</strong> US stands to gain much by <strong>the</strong> earlier launch of ERTS-B and<br />
stands to lose, in both <strong>the</strong> near and <strong>the</strong> long term, if this launch is deferred for reasons<br />
which ignore US international policy interests.<br />
In conclusion, I have decided to request apportionment of FY 1974 funds on <strong>the</strong> basis<br />
of a 1974 ERTS-B launch. Time is already becoming critical if we are to assure <strong>the</strong><br />
smoo<strong>the</strong>st and most economical contractual and schedule changes.<br />
The separate question of whe<strong>the</strong>r to dedicate some parts of <strong>the</strong> ERTS-B capabilities to<br />
a special pilot project should be decided on its own merits in <strong>the</strong> context of national needs<br />
and national policy; it should be noted that <strong>the</strong> pilot project would not interfere with<br />
domestic data acquisition or with use of <strong>the</strong> satellite by those countries investing in ground<br />
stations. I am confident that this proposal is inherently sound and I urge your assistance in<br />
helping assure that it receives appropriate consideration within <strong>the</strong> Administration.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
James C. Fletcher<br />
Administrator<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE
cc: A/Dr. Fletcher<br />
AD/Dr. Low<br />
AA/Dr. Newell Prepared by: AAA:DWJr:djs:10/19/73<br />
ADA/Mr. Shapley<br />
B/Mr. Lilly<br />
E/Mr. Ma<strong>the</strong>ws<br />
AAA/Mr. Williamson<br />
AXM-3/Files<br />
Document II-29<br />
Document title: Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Director, Johnson Space Center, to Associate<br />
Administrator for Applications, NASA Headquarters, “Private Sector Operation of<br />
Landsat Satellites,” March 12, 1976.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
In January 1975, NASA renamed <strong>the</strong> ERTS program Landsat. By 1976, with two Landsat satellites<br />
in orbit, ano<strong>the</strong>r scheduled for launch, and a fourth under construction, many people associated with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth resources/Survey program felt <strong>the</strong> experimental phase had continued long enough, and it<br />
was time at least to begin to discuss where <strong>the</strong> program’s ultimate home should be. Many thought it<br />
would be best to transfer <strong>the</strong> entire program to private industry. O<strong>the</strong>rs, including Christopher Kraft,<br />
Director of NASA’s Johnson Space Center, argued that it was premature to decide on an operational<br />
structure for Landsat, given <strong>the</strong> character of <strong>the</strong> market for its products to date.<br />
TO: NASA Headquarters<br />
Attn: E/Associate Administrator for Applications<br />
FROM: AA/Director<br />
SUBJECT: Private Sector Operation of Landsat Satellites<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 281<br />
[rubber stamped: ”MAR 12 1976”]<br />
The following comments are provided in response to your request at <strong>the</strong> recent APIB<br />
Meeting regarding possible non-government operation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />
I have no doubt that private industry will eventually play a major role in <strong>the</strong> operational<br />
earth resources survey system. I believe this will make for a healthy situation and<br />
should be retained as a future option. However, just what that role will be is not at all clear<br />
at this time.<br />
It appears likely that for <strong>the</strong> next 5–10 years <strong>the</strong> Federal Government will be <strong>the</strong> major<br />
user of Landsat-type data. Although many o<strong>the</strong>rs use <strong>the</strong> data for a variety of purposes,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y probably would not be willing at this time to contribute significantly to supporting<br />
an operational Landsat system. Possible roles for private industry would be to build and<br />
operate Landsat as a commercial venture or under a long-term lease back to <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Government.<br />
Considering <strong>the</strong> high risk attendant to <strong>the</strong> currently uncertain commercial market, it<br />
is doubtful that industry would be willing to underwrite <strong>the</strong> Landsat development and<br />
operation. The prospects for negotiating a mutually acceptable long-term lease arrange-
282<br />
ment—considering <strong>the</strong> budgetary process—are also highly uncertain at this time.<br />
Therefore, I would suggest that no changes be made to present plans for operation of<br />
Landsat C and D. As operational data use develops in <strong>the</strong> next few years, this climate may<br />
change and a broader-based demand for Landsat-type data may emerge. The option for<br />
private sector operation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system should be reassessed at that time.<br />
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.<br />
HD/JFMitchell:nmm2/27/76:3751<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Document II-30<br />
cc:<br />
BD/E. B. Stewart<br />
HB/O. Smistad<br />
HC/R. A. Hoke<br />
Document title: Bruno Augenstein, Willis H. Shapley, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, “Earth<br />
Information From Space by Remote Sensing,” report prepared for Dr. Frank Press,<br />
Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, June 2, 1978, pp. ii–iv, 1–14.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
When this report came out in June 1978, <strong>the</strong> United States had been engaged in an “experimental”<br />
Earth resources observation program since 1966. Although by 1978 <strong>the</strong> program’s ultimate viability<br />
was still not clear, most involved felt it was time to make a policy decision regarding whe<strong>the</strong>r or not<br />
<strong>the</strong> program should be canceled, declared operational, or maintained on an experimental basis until<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r results made a choice more obvious. Among <strong>the</strong> issues facing decision makers was deciding<br />
which government agency should take <strong>the</strong> lead, if indeed an operational system was desired. This<br />
report from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy of <strong>the</strong> Executive <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> President examines<br />
<strong>the</strong> issues at hand and recommends NASA as <strong>the</strong> appropriate lead agency. The three authors of<br />
<strong>the</strong> report were consultants to Presidential Science Advisor Frank Press. Bruno Augenstein was a<br />
RAND Corporation scientist with early involvement in Earth observation systems. Willis Shapley was<br />
a long-time top staff official at <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget and NASA. Eugene Skolnikoff was a political<br />
science professor who specialized in science, technology, and foreign policy issues at <strong>the</strong><br />
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Included here are <strong>the</strong> executive summary and first two chapters<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir report.<br />
Earth Information From Space by Remote Sensing<br />
by<br />
Bruno Augenstein<br />
Willis H. Shapley<br />
Eugene B. Skolnikoff<br />
June 2, 1978 . . .<br />
[ii] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
1. The aim of <strong>the</strong> consultants in this report has been to develop policy recommenda-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 283<br />
tions and options for U.S. civil remote sensing activities.<br />
2. There is an urgent need for a clarification of policies on <strong>the</strong> future evolution of U.S.<br />
activities in civil remote sensing. Executive branch policy has supported technological<br />
R&D and some experimental applications, but has up to now deferred as premature<br />
commitments to operational uses and decisions on policies for operational systems.<br />
Congressional committees have urged that at a minimum <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch prepare<br />
clear policies to guide future civil uses of remote sensing from space.<br />
3. The report addresses first <strong>the</strong> basic question of <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy attitude toward civil<br />
remote sensing from space, and concludes that U.S. policies should be based on<br />
acceptance of <strong>the</strong> proposition that <strong>the</strong> U.S. should and will continue to be actively<br />
involved in civil remote sensing from space for <strong>the</strong> indefinite future. This conclusion<br />
is based on <strong>the</strong> manifold U.S. interests served by civil remote sensing, which include<br />
a wide variety of technical, public, economic, and international interests. The consultants<br />
recognize that <strong>the</strong>re have been exaggerated claims for benefits and <strong>the</strong> times by<br />
which <strong>the</strong>y can be achieved, but are never<strong>the</strong>less convinced that <strong>the</strong> many potential<br />
values fully justify a continuing U.S. effort to achieve <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
4. One important consequence of this conclusion is that <strong>the</strong> U.S. should, regardless of<br />
<strong>the</strong> program level approved, make a policy commitment to data continuity. This is<br />
essential to reduce present uncertainties among prospective users and to help forestall<br />
<strong>the</strong> growing threat of foreign competition.<br />
5. Policies on U.S. civil remote sensing must recognize <strong>the</strong> dynamic nature of <strong>the</strong> technologies<br />
involved and support strong continuing research and development efforts.<br />
Operational systems, however, should take advantage of existing and low cost technologies<br />
when <strong>the</strong>y are adequate to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> users.<br />
6. A top priority should be given to <strong>the</strong> preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive<br />
plan, covering <strong>the</strong> expected technical, programmatic, and institutional<br />
evolution of U.S. civil remote sensing for 10 to 15 years in <strong>the</strong> future.<br />
7. An equally high priority should be given to <strong>the</strong> designation of a lead agency. This is<br />
needed now to develop <strong>the</strong> initial version of <strong>the</strong> comprehensive plan to guide preparation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> FY 1980 budget and <strong>the</strong> accompanying legislative proposals. For <strong>the</strong> long<br />
term, it [iii] is essential to have a qualified single agency with authority and responsibility<br />
for leadership and management of U.S. activities in <strong>the</strong> collection and dissemination<br />
of civil remote sensing data and for serving as <strong>the</strong> interface with <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector and international interests in civil remote sensing. Federal mission agencies<br />
would continue to be responsible for <strong>the</strong>ir user interests in remote sensing information.<br />
8. After considering <strong>the</strong> criteria that should be applied, <strong>the</strong> consultants have concluded<br />
that <strong>the</strong> lead agency responsibility should be assigned to NASA, provided NASA is<br />
reconfigured to ensure that a user-oriented service outlook is given an equal footing<br />
with NASA’s important present R&D missions. Lower ranked alternatives would be,<br />
first, <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Commerce, and second, <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior.<br />
9. The report notes that U.S. civil remote sensing activities unavoidably have significant<br />
international aspects, because of <strong>the</strong> global nature of remote sensing from space and<br />
because of <strong>the</strong> strong existing foreign and international interests in <strong>the</strong> technology<br />
and its uses. The consultants believe that <strong>the</strong>re are many potential values to <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
(e.g., in dealing with lesser developed countries problems) in actively seeking constructive<br />
international involvement. The preferred institutional alternatives appear to<br />
be a U.S. owned and operated system serving international users or <strong>the</strong> establishment<br />
of an international consortium in which <strong>the</strong> U.S. and o<strong>the</strong>r nations would participate.<br />
10. The consultants propose a two-tiered concept for <strong>the</strong> U.S. National System for civil<br />
remote sensing. This would include (a) a core segment consisting of <strong>the</strong> assets and ser-
284<br />
vices required for a multipurpose open access system which would serve international<br />
as well as domestic users and which might become <strong>the</strong> nucleus of an international system<br />
if one is established, and (b) a segment composed of specific national means,<br />
which may be proprietary, for adding to and enhancing data and knowledge useful to<br />
interests of <strong>the</strong> U.S. This approach permits flexibility for international arrangements<br />
while assuring <strong>the</strong> availability of data services needed by U.S. interests.<br />
11. There is a variety of modes in which <strong>the</strong> U.S. private sector can participate, although<br />
such participation, especially as it relates to data collection, will generally be under<br />
<strong>the</strong> supervision and authority of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government. Private sector roles may<br />
include major systems management functions, systems engineering, or delegated<br />
operational functions, in addition to normal contractor roles in developing and producing<br />
system hardware and software.<br />
[iv] 12. The final chapter of <strong>the</strong> report gives four alternative scenarios which indicate <strong>the</strong><br />
range of options for <strong>the</strong> continuing involvement of <strong>the</strong> U.S. in civil remote sensing<br />
within <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> policy conclusions of <strong>the</strong> report. The scenarios differ in <strong>the</strong><br />
level of U.S. commitment and <strong>the</strong> degree of international involvement sought.<br />
Scenario “A” is a “minimum” scenario, providing some degree of institutionalization<br />
of current activities and a policy commitment to data continuity. Scenario “B” provides<br />
for some significant commitments to a quasi-operational or operational system<br />
in <strong>the</strong> mode of a tiered U.S. national system permitting international participation in<br />
<strong>the</strong> core segment. Scenario “B” is <strong>the</strong> same as “A” except that it includes a U.S. invitation<br />
to o<strong>the</strong>r countries to participate in an International System. Scenario “C,” a<br />
“maximum” scenario, goes beyond “B” to include active U.S. efforts to bring an international<br />
system into being.<br />
13. Finally, <strong>the</strong> consultants recommend approval of <strong>the</strong> conclusions and recommendations<br />
of <strong>the</strong> report and <strong>the</strong> selection of Scenario “B” as <strong>the</strong> general guides for <strong>the</strong><br />
future conduct of U.S. civil remote sensing activities. They fur<strong>the</strong>r note <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
of announcing this approval no later than <strong>the</strong> summer of 1978 to permit <strong>the</strong><br />
lead agency to prepare plans in time for incorporation in <strong>the</strong> FY 1980 budget decisions<br />
and <strong>the</strong> accompanying legislative program to be submitted to <strong>the</strong> Congress.<br />
[1] CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION<br />
A. Aim and Scope<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
1. The aim of <strong>the</strong> consultants in preparing this report has been to develop policy recommendations<br />
and options to guide decisions on United States policy with respect to civil<br />
remote sensing from space. The topics addressed include <strong>the</strong> future involvement of <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. in civil remote sensing, institutional arrangements in <strong>the</strong> Federal Government, international<br />
and private sector participation, and a proposed concept for a U.S. national system<br />
compatible with several policy options.<br />
2. The report is intended to apply to civil remote sensing systems using current and<br />
future sensors of <strong>the</strong> Landsat type and o<strong>the</strong>r types of systems for obtaining information on<br />
or from <strong>the</strong> earth from space. National security interests are taken into account but not<br />
discussed; <strong>the</strong> policies, options, and recommendations in <strong>the</strong> report are consistent with<br />
current statements of applicable National Security Policy. The policies, options, and recommendations<br />
in <strong>the</strong> report are also compatible with current policies and arrangements<br />
regarding meteorological satellites; questions of possible changes in <strong>the</strong>se arrangements<br />
are not addressed.
B. Background<br />
1. Official central policy in <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch has been somewhat ambivalent on civil<br />
remote sensing from space. There has been support for technological R&D and some<br />
experimental applications. But operational uses have been under a cloud—decisions on<br />
“operational systems” and even on policies for a transition to an operational mode have<br />
been regarded, up to now, as premature. On <strong>the</strong> Congressional side, however, and in<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r sectors <strong>the</strong>re has been support for an early transition to an operational mode and<br />
strong demands that at a minimum <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch propose clear policies to guide<br />
<strong>the</strong> future civil uses of remote sensing from space.<br />
2. There now appears to be a consensus that <strong>the</strong> time has come to formulate and adopt<br />
policies to govern future U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing from space. Actions to<br />
reformulate overall national policy in space are underway. The Director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of<br />
Science and Technology Policy has agreed to present an administration policy on civil<br />
remote sensing to <strong>the</strong> Congress later this year. The consultants’ report is intended as one<br />
of <strong>the</strong> steps leading to decisions on what <strong>the</strong>se policies should be.<br />
3. Some of <strong>the</strong> concerns which underline <strong>the</strong> urgency of <strong>the</strong> need for policy decisions<br />
on civil remote sensing are <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
[2] a. The absence of a U.S. policy on future directions and institutional arrangements<br />
has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and frustration. The U.S. agencies concerned<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r prospective users, domestic and foreign, are finding it difficult<br />
to make sensible decisions on <strong>the</strong>ir future plans and commitments. No single<br />
agency has had authority and responsibility for leadership in developing national<br />
policy on an overall plan.<br />
b. Lead-times are running out. Decision-making on <strong>the</strong> systems and services to follow<br />
Landsat D should start this year; significant opportunities and options may<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise be lost.<br />
c. Foreign competition is becoming a real threat. U.S. indecision in <strong>the</strong> face of<br />
strong, technologically advanced efforts by Japan, France, or <strong>the</strong> European Space<br />
Agency could result in loss of U.S. leadership in civil remote sensing and <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunities that would go with it.<br />
d. Existing U.S. policies are now having some counterproductive effects. The limitation<br />
of civil remote sensing from space to R&D and experimentation, combined<br />
with <strong>the</strong> practice of incremental program decisions without a long-term plan for<br />
operational services, is calling into question <strong>the</strong> future of U.S. involvement in civil<br />
remote sensing. This is adding to <strong>the</strong> uncertainties, discouraging prospective<br />
users, and encouraging foreign competition. Decisions on uses beyond R&D are<br />
no longer premature; <strong>the</strong>y are timely, even overdue.<br />
e. Finally, <strong>the</strong>re is a widespread feeling that <strong>the</strong> time has come to make a stronger<br />
effort to realize benefits of value from civil remote sensing.<br />
C. Definitions and Distinctions<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 285<br />
1. In this report, we will be dealing primarily with “Civil Remote Sensing from Space”<br />
activities and systems, by which we mean <strong>the</strong> totality of activities and systems required for<br />
<strong>the</strong> collection, production and initial dissemination of data on <strong>the</strong> earth obtained from<br />
space by civil remote sensing systems. These activities and systems are generally regarded<br />
as having a space segment and a ground segment. The space segment consists of <strong>the</strong><br />
production activities and systems required for <strong>the</strong> collection, initial processing, and delivery<br />
of earth data from space. The ground segment consists of dissemination activities and<br />
systems required for making <strong>the</strong> processed data available in appropriate formats to users
286<br />
and for maintaining archives of remote sensing data.<br />
2. To a lesser extent, <strong>the</strong> report will refer to <strong>the</strong> analysis activities or systems required by<br />
users for <strong>the</strong> analysis, enhancement, or display of remote sensing data and its consolidation<br />
with data from o<strong>the</strong>r sources. These are <strong>the</strong> activities and systems that convert<br />
processed remote sensing data—<strong>the</strong> output of <strong>the</strong> production and dissemination systems—into<br />
information, <strong>the</strong> product that is used by users and beneficiaries.<br />
[3] 3. Each of <strong>the</strong> above types of systems (production, dissemination, analysis) may be<br />
operated in one of three modes:<br />
a. Experimental, for R&D, test, or demonstration purposes (beneficial operational<br />
uses may also be made of data from such systems).<br />
b. Operational, for <strong>the</strong> provision of services on a continuing basis in accordance<br />
with a stated plan.<br />
c. Quasi-operational, for <strong>the</strong> combined or simultaneous conduct of experimentation<br />
and provision of operational services.<br />
4. The availability of <strong>the</strong> data output of remote sensing production systems may be:<br />
a. Open access, when all interested users are given access to <strong>the</strong> data on an equitable<br />
and non-discriminatory basis.<br />
b. Limited access, when access to <strong>the</strong> data may be limited by <strong>the</strong> system operator on<br />
a national or proprietary basis.<br />
[4] CHAPTER II - U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL<br />
REMOTE SENSING FROM SPACE<br />
A. The Basic Policy Questions<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
1. In this chapter, we address <strong>the</strong> basic question of <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy attitude toward a continuing<br />
future U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing from space. Policies and options<br />
on <strong>the</strong> conduct of civil remote sensing—to be discussed in succeeding chapters—are heavily<br />
dependent on <strong>the</strong> intentions of <strong>the</strong> U.S. with regard to a continuing future involvement,<br />
<strong>the</strong> reasons for such involvement, and expectations regarding benefits and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
consequences.<br />
2. The fundamental question is whe<strong>the</strong>r U.S. policy should be based on <strong>the</strong> premise that<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. will continue to be actively involved in civil remote sensing from space, in some<br />
mode and at a scale to be determined, for <strong>the</strong> indefinite future. If <strong>the</strong> basic policy attitude<br />
is that <strong>the</strong>re are expected to be significant benefits, advantages, and opportunities of value<br />
to <strong>the</strong> U.S. from such involvement, <strong>the</strong>n institutional and o<strong>the</strong>r policies should be directed<br />
at <strong>the</strong> best way of realizing <strong>the</strong>se values. If, as a second alternative, <strong>the</strong> policy attitude<br />
is that this is a technology of uncertain value to U.S. interests that should remain indefinitely<br />
in an experimental mode, policies should never<strong>the</strong>less still be directed at achieving<br />
<strong>the</strong> maximum values for U.S. interests from <strong>the</strong> continuing experimental program.<br />
Finally, if <strong>the</strong> policy attitude is that <strong>the</strong> expected values do not justify recognition of a longterm<br />
U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> implications for all U.S. interests<br />
should be squarely faced.<br />
3. To arrive at <strong>the</strong> appropriate policy attitude toward civil remote sensing at this time<br />
and <strong>the</strong> implications of <strong>the</strong> alternatives, we will, in <strong>the</strong> following sections, (a) review <strong>the</strong><br />
wide variety of U.S. interests that may be served by civil remote sensing from space, (b)<br />
give <strong>the</strong> consultants’ views on <strong>the</strong> considerations that should determine <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy<br />
attitude, (c) state <strong>the</strong> conclusions on U.S. policy attitudes reached by <strong>the</strong> consultants, and<br />
(d) indicate <strong>the</strong> consequences of <strong>the</strong>se conclusions which will be discussed in <strong>the</strong> remainder<br />
of <strong>the</strong> report.
B. The Manifold U.S. Interests in Civil Remote Sensing<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 287<br />
1. The U.S. interests that can be served by civil remote sensing from space are of many<br />
different kinds. We will group <strong>the</strong>m under <strong>the</strong> headings of technical, public, economic,<br />
and international interests.<br />
2. Technical Interests<br />
a. Basic scientific knowledge and understanding. Remote sensing from space provides<br />
a means to learn about <strong>the</strong> earth on a global or regional basis, update such<br />
information, and provide data for basic research on various aspects and features<br />
of <strong>the</strong> earth. Current administration policy properly stresses <strong>the</strong> national importance<br />
of basic research. Remote sensing from space is a unique tool for a wide<br />
range of scientific research interests.<br />
[5] b. Global capacities. Remote sensing from space has unique capabilities to provide<br />
information needed to deal on a global basis with national and international<br />
problems, such as food production, energy and mineral resources, water availability,<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>rs, especially in relation to developing countries.<br />
c. Support for U.S. decisionmaking. Remote sensing from space can provide information<br />
and data useful for U.S. decisions, such as current information on crop<br />
production in major agricultural countries.<br />
d. Technology development. Continuing R&D in remote sensing systems can provide<br />
a vehicle for achieving technological advances of significance in o<strong>the</strong>r fields<br />
as well as in remote sensing.<br />
3. Public Interests<br />
a. Specific Federal needs and functions. Earth information derived by remote sensing<br />
from space can make significant contributions to <strong>the</strong> needs and functions of<br />
Federal agencies and programs in many different areas, such as wea<strong>the</strong>r, crops,<br />
climate, geological resources, topographic mapping, land use, and environmental<br />
monitoring. Significant contributions by remote sensing information systems<br />
have been demonstrated or are clearly foreseen in <strong>the</strong>se and o<strong>the</strong>r fields.<br />
b. Public interest needs and benefits. The broader public interests of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States, as distinguished from specific Federal programmatic interests, are served<br />
by making available earth information from space to States, localities, universities,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> public at large, in usable form at a reasonable cost. State, regional, and<br />
local authorities and universities and o<strong>the</strong>r public interest groups can use such<br />
information in a variety of public interest functions, such as land use planning,<br />
environmental monitoring, demographic studies, etc.<br />
4. Economic Interests<br />
a. Economic interests of U.S. private sector. The availability of earth information<br />
derived by remote sensing from space can be used to <strong>the</strong> overall economic advantage<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States by private enterprise in a variety of fields, oil and mineral<br />
exploration being two outstanding examples.<br />
b. U.S. competitive position in space technology. With <strong>the</strong> emergence in Europe<br />
and Japan of strong competitive capabilities and interests in space technology,<br />
including remote sensing systems, it is clearly in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economic (as well as<br />
political) interest to maintain a leadership position in civil remote sensing.<br />
Competitive areas include <strong>the</strong> manufacturing and servicing of satellites, sensors,<br />
and ground equipment; <strong>the</strong> dissemination of data; and <strong>the</strong> provision of technical<br />
services and assistance in <strong>the</strong> analysis, enhancement, [6] and interpretation of<br />
remote sensing data. In each of <strong>the</strong>se fields, U.S. industry and private companies<br />
can undoubtedly compete successfully if <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government maintains a con-
288<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
tinuing active involvement in civil remote sensing.<br />
c. Reduce some U.S. information costs. Civil remote sensing systems in a routine<br />
operational mode may result in reduced data collection costs for some U.S. government,<br />
State and local, and private information needs. Such possibilities can be<br />
meaningfully explored only if U.S. policy calls for continuing active U.S. involvement<br />
in civil remote sensing.<br />
d. Contribute to general economic growth. The availability of civil remote sensing<br />
data and its appropriate use in resource planning and o<strong>the</strong>r fields can be expected<br />
to contribute to economic growth, especially in <strong>the</strong> less developed countries,<br />
which should have a positive effect on general economic growth.<br />
e. Return on space investment. Civil remote sensing is an area in which <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
opportunities for realizing returns, in <strong>the</strong> form of economic and o<strong>the</strong>r kinds of<br />
benefits, on <strong>the</strong> very large national investment in space of <strong>the</strong> past two decades,<br />
for relatively very small additional investments.<br />
5. U.S. International Interests<br />
a. Support of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing from<br />
space can provide opportunities and a vehicle for <strong>the</strong> support of many U.S. foreign<br />
policy objectives. The strong interest of many foreign countries in earth<br />
information derived by remote sensing, combined with <strong>the</strong> current U.S. leadership<br />
role in providing such information and related services, make this an area of<br />
positive potential in U.S. foreign relations.<br />
b. Maintain U.S. leadership. Civil remote sensing is an area in which <strong>the</strong> U.S. has<br />
developed and demonstrated a benign technology of obvious potential benefit.<br />
Active continuing U.S. involvement—exploiting a dramatic space capability clearly<br />
developed by <strong>the</strong> U.S.—would help maintain <strong>the</strong> fact and image of U.S. leadership<br />
in space. Conversely, if o<strong>the</strong>r nations take over leadership in this field, <strong>the</strong><br />
overall leadership position of <strong>the</strong> U.S. would be impaired.<br />
c. Support U.S. position with LDC’s. U.S. civil remote sensing activities can provide<br />
a constructive way to support U.S. commitments of technology to assist less developed<br />
countries. They can buttress <strong>the</strong> U.S. position in North/South dialogues, in<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.N. and o<strong>the</strong>r forums. For example, initiatives involving civil remote sensing<br />
might provide a constructive opportunity for U.S. leadership at <strong>the</strong> U.N. 1979<br />
Conference on Technology for Developing Countries.<br />
[7] d. Support international cooperation in space. U.S. commitments to service foreign<br />
Landsat ground stations, while contractually limited to support from U.S. experimental<br />
satellite systems, have resulted in foreign investments and expectations<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> assumption that U.S. Landsat or o<strong>the</strong>r generally compatible satellite<br />
data will continue to be available. It is generally in <strong>the</strong> U.S. interest to fulfill ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than disappoint <strong>the</strong>se expectations.<br />
e. Promote openness. U.S. civil remote sensing policies and activities can be used to<br />
support <strong>the</strong> general objective of treating open information as an international<br />
good, and contribute to <strong>the</strong> development of international law to that end. They<br />
can also continue to support <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy to preserve without limitation <strong>the</strong><br />
legitimacy of remote sensing from space, especially in <strong>the</strong> context of an active<br />
U.S. effort to permit and help o<strong>the</strong>r countries share in <strong>the</strong> benefits.<br />
f. General international cooperation. The development of international working<br />
arrangements in <strong>the</strong> field of remote sensing from space can provide <strong>the</strong> U.S. with<br />
useful opportunities to encourage international cooperative arrangements to<br />
deal with broader international concerns. It also offers opportunities to innovate<br />
in building international institutions to develop models of effective working bodies<br />
that also meet requirements of participation and equity.
C. The Guiding Considerations<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 289<br />
1. The consultants believe that <strong>the</strong> considerations presented below should guide and do<br />
in fact largely determine <strong>the</strong> basic policy attitude that should be taken toward a continuing<br />
U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing.<br />
2. The Basis for Assessment<br />
a. The assessment of <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> contributions of a continuing U.S. involvement<br />
in civil remote sensing to each of <strong>the</strong> 19 U.S. interests listed above is necessarily a<br />
matter of judgment. Few cases at most are susceptible to quantitative or o<strong>the</strong>r precise<br />
analysis; even in such cases <strong>the</strong> assessments also depend on judgments regarding<br />
objectives, criteria, and future eventualities. An overall assessment of <strong>the</strong><br />
combined value of remote sensing to all 19 U.S. interests is all <strong>the</strong> more a matter<br />
of judgment, a judgment that must take account of <strong>the</strong> impact of continuing or<br />
not continuing U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing on each of <strong>the</strong> different<br />
U.S. interests identified.<br />
b. The final assessment would be simplified if <strong>the</strong>re had already emerged a dramatic<br />
single beneficial use of civil remote sensing which provided an overriding justification<br />
for an operational system that was clear to all concerned (or if <strong>the</strong>re<br />
were a clear overriding reason for discontinuing U.S. civil remote sensing<br />
[8] activities). Given <strong>the</strong> present situation, however, in which <strong>the</strong>re is room for<br />
disagreement on <strong>the</strong> values and benefits that can be achieved, it is important to<br />
recognize that remote sensing systems from space are generally multipurpose in<br />
nature; in fact, <strong>the</strong>ir utility arises in good measure from <strong>the</strong> wide variety of uses to<br />
which <strong>the</strong> data and information <strong>the</strong>y provide may be put. The final assessment has<br />
to take <strong>the</strong> whole range of prospective uses into account.<br />
3. A Positive Assessment<br />
a. Taking into account <strong>the</strong> manifold U.S. interests and <strong>the</strong> variety of beneficial uses<br />
that can be served, <strong>the</strong> consultants believe that <strong>the</strong>re is ample justification for a<br />
continuing active U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing from space. The potential<br />
technical public interest, and economic and international benefits and opportunities,<br />
while not provable or even fully definable in advance, now seem clearly<br />
to justify <strong>the</strong> continuing federal investment and operating costs likely to be<br />
required (see paragraph C-5-b. below).<br />
b. In making this assessment, <strong>the</strong> consultants recognize and have taken account of<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that exaggerated claims have been made for benefits of civil remote sensing<br />
systems. It will take time—many years—to begin to realize <strong>the</strong> full potential.<br />
“Overselling,” especially with respect to how soon experimental demonstrations<br />
can produce definitive results, has frequently been <strong>the</strong> response to critical budgetary<br />
policies which threatened <strong>the</strong> extension of R&D programs while demanding<br />
an early determination of <strong>the</strong> value of operational uses. Policy acceptance of<br />
a continuing U.S. program would have <strong>the</strong> effect of removing such a threat to<br />
“survival” and encourage more realistic long-term planning.<br />
c. The difficulties of unambiguous justification must be noted. Estimates made to date<br />
of <strong>the</strong> economic benefits properly attributed to use of remote sensing have produced<br />
wide assessment variances. In part this is due to use of different baselines,<br />
accounting differences, and <strong>the</strong> need to predict future user markets from a starting<br />
position of a currently highly fragmented user community. O<strong>the</strong>r problems arise<br />
from <strong>the</strong> supposition that some users may tend to disguise or conceal <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
authoritative benefit estimates for commercial reasons. Finally, <strong>the</strong>re is no agreed<br />
method for estimating <strong>the</strong> value of public services where remote sensing can pro-
290<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
vide new or improved responses to hi<strong>the</strong>rto inadequate service availability.<br />
We consider that <strong>the</strong>re are unique attributes of remote sensing systems, and that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
utility resides in a complex mix of: (1) direct benefits presumably quantifiable by<br />
conventional cost benefit analysis, and perhaps less direct benefits accruing from<br />
an increased tax base resulting from new ventures prompted by <strong>the</strong> availability of<br />
remote sensing services and products; (2) general benefits for [9] better decision<br />
making by informed societies; (3) <strong>the</strong> payoffs to <strong>the</strong> public good by basic investments<br />
in information services; and (4) in some cases, by fundamental structural<br />
changes in economic and social welfare not capturable [sic] by conventional cost<br />
benefit analysis (e.g., here a general equilibrium approach is relevant, vice <strong>the</strong> simpler<br />
and much less encompassing cost benefit assessments).<br />
We believe that <strong>the</strong>re is both merit in and opportunities for additional analyses by<br />
which <strong>the</strong> utility, in <strong>the</strong> broadest sense, of remote sensing systems can better be<br />
measured, particularly in <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> latter three factors of <strong>the</strong> preceding paragraph.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> immediate future, decisions to pursue remote sensing must in part<br />
be founded on intuitively based social and political rationales. The current lack<br />
of fully quantifiable utility assessments does not outweigh <strong>the</strong> preponderance of<br />
evidence that remote sensing systems should be pursued.<br />
4. Consequences of not continuing. The consultants have also considered <strong>the</strong> implications<br />
of alternative U.S. policy attitudes, e.g., a decision not to continue indefinitely a U.S.<br />
involvement in civil remote sensing or a decision to defer still longer <strong>the</strong> making of a decision<br />
on a continuing future U.S. involvement.<br />
a. A decision not to continue would mean loss of <strong>the</strong> benefits and opportunities that<br />
are <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> favorable assessment given above. The consultants believe that<br />
<strong>the</strong> potential of many of <strong>the</strong>se benefits is widely recognized both in <strong>the</strong> U.S. and<br />
abroad. Any U.S. policy implying or presaging U.S. withdrawal, now or in <strong>the</strong><br />
future, from an active role in civil remote sensing from space would undoubtedly<br />
be met by <strong>the</strong> early development of foreign systems designed to meet U.S. as<br />
well as foreign needs. The consultants believe that such a loss of benefits, opportunities,<br />
and U.S. leadership is unacceptable.<br />
b. A decision to defer a decision would permit fur<strong>the</strong>r erosion of U.S. opportunities<br />
and leadership and could lead to results like those cited immediately above. It<br />
would also perpetuate <strong>the</strong> current unsatisfactory situation of general uncertainty<br />
and generate fur<strong>the</strong>r dissatisfaction in Congress and among State, local, private<br />
and international users of remote sensing data from space. The consultants are<br />
convinced that <strong>the</strong> time has come to make a positive decision.<br />
5. Some concerns addressed. Two recurring concerns that have played a part in policy<br />
consideration of <strong>the</strong> U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing need to be noted and discussed<br />
briefly:<br />
[10] a. Reliance on a market test of value. In <strong>the</strong> determination of <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch<br />
policy toward U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing <strong>the</strong>re has been a tendency<br />
to judge <strong>the</strong> value of possible operational uses in terms of <strong>the</strong> willingness of <strong>the</strong><br />
user to pay for <strong>the</strong> establishment and operation of <strong>the</strong> system, and, <strong>the</strong>refore, to<br />
defer a policy commitment to continuity of data services until <strong>the</strong> users are willing<br />
and able to commit <strong>the</strong>mselves to providing <strong>the</strong> funds required.<br />
The logic and appropriateness of this approach have been criticized on many<br />
grounds. Thus, it has been pointed out that in <strong>the</strong> private sector individual customers<br />
are not expected to finance in advance <strong>the</strong> investment costs necessary to<br />
produce a product or establish <strong>the</strong> capability for providing a service. It is also<br />
pointed out that making data continuity dependent on demonstrated benefits<br />
and user commitments to operational use tends to place <strong>the</strong> program in a “Catch<br />
22” situation because of <strong>the</strong> lead times involved: <strong>the</strong> decision on data continuity<br />
has to be faced before <strong>the</strong> demonstrations needed for a commitment have been
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 291<br />
completed.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r criticism relates to <strong>the</strong> tendency to regard <strong>the</strong> principal federal user agencies<br />
as <strong>the</strong> “market” for civil remote sensing and to judge <strong>the</strong> need for an operational<br />
system based on <strong>the</strong>ir willingness to budget for <strong>the</strong> cost. As shown by our listing<br />
of <strong>the</strong> many U.S. interests in civil remote sensing, <strong>the</strong> direct mission interests of<br />
federal agencies represent only a fraction of <strong>the</strong> overall U.S. interest. No federal<br />
agency has mission interests broad enough to represent <strong>the</strong> total “market.” In any<br />
case, <strong>the</strong> federal budget process is at best a very imperfect “market place”; to give<br />
one example, federal agencies do not have <strong>the</strong> options for separate financing of<br />
capital investment that are normally followed in <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
The consultants agree that users of civil remote sensing should pay a reasonable charge<br />
for <strong>the</strong> data products <strong>the</strong>y receive (transparencies, prints tapes, etc.), and would<br />
expect such charges to cover <strong>the</strong> out-of-pocket costs of producing <strong>the</strong>m. The question<br />
of fur<strong>the</strong>r recoupment of costs should receive fur<strong>the</strong>r study; such study must,<br />
however, give full recognition to <strong>the</strong> public interest benefits of civil remote sensing<br />
for which <strong>the</strong>re may be not identifiable customers to charge and to <strong>the</strong> broader<br />
national U.S. interests served by civil remote sensing that are not <strong>the</strong> budgetary<br />
responsibility of any federal department or agency. The basic policy decision on<br />
continuing U.S. involvement in remote sensing should be made on an overall<br />
national policy basis and not depend on user funding commitments or resolution<br />
in advance of <strong>the</strong> complex questions of user charges and cost recoupment.<br />
[11] b. Scale of funding and o<strong>the</strong>r commitments. The budgetary costs of a continuing<br />
U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing are a matter of legitimate concern and<br />
deserve careful consideration; an early priority should be given to <strong>the</strong> development<br />
of cost projections for <strong>the</strong> principal programmatic options.<br />
Current rough NASA projections (which require validation and refinement) suggest<br />
that a constructive evolution of operational civil remote sensing data services,<br />
including production and dissemination of data to primary users and analysis centers,<br />
could be accommodated within a budget averaging somewhere in <strong>the</strong> range<br />
of $150 to $300 million per year (FY 1979 dollars) over <strong>the</strong> next decade. In addition,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re would be a need for strong continuing R&D and experimental applications<br />
efforts (where some savings might result from <strong>the</strong> availability of<br />
operational services) and some added user analysis costs required as federal agencies<br />
learn to take full operational advantage of remote sensing and to combine<br />
<strong>the</strong>se data with data from <strong>the</strong>ir conventional sources.<br />
Costs of this magnitude, while considerable, do not constitute a major or “uncontrollable”<br />
budget threat. Insofar as <strong>the</strong>y go beyond R&D, <strong>the</strong>y can be regarded conceptually<br />
as a necessary new element in <strong>the</strong> Nation’s continuing overall<br />
investment in space technology—an essential step for realizing benefits from this<br />
investment that would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be lost.<br />
The implications of an “operational commitment,” in <strong>the</strong> sense of an assurance of<br />
continuity of data services, may sometimes be exaggerated. On <strong>the</strong> space segment<br />
side, <strong>the</strong> provision of continuous data services would not, in principle, have to<br />
represent a major expansion over a continuing R&D effort. Reasonable data continuity<br />
has been maintained—in fact if not by policy—by R&D satellites since <strong>the</strong><br />
launching of LANDSAT-1; <strong>the</strong> additional costs required in <strong>the</strong> future can be minimized<br />
by careful integration of R&D and operational planning. On <strong>the</strong> user side,<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessary expenditures by each using agency can be decided on a case-by-case<br />
basis, since each use has its own timetable of operational need and readiness.<br />
Policy decisions assuring data continuity and a continuing future U.S. involvement<br />
in civil remote sensing should be backed up by <strong>the</strong> budgetary support<br />
required. However, <strong>the</strong> commitment level for a continuing U.S. involvement and<br />
<strong>the</strong> commitments of each federal user can be controlled through <strong>the</strong> regular budget<br />
process.
292<br />
D. Conclusions and Consequences<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
1. On <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> considerations discussed above, <strong>the</strong> consultants’ conclusions on<br />
<strong>the</strong> basic question of U.S. policy attitude toward civil remote sensing are as follows:<br />
[12] a. U.S. policy should accept that <strong>the</strong> U.S. should and will be actively involved in civil<br />
remote sensing from space for <strong>the</strong> indefinite future.<br />
b. The Federal Government should establish and support affirmative policies in its<br />
continuing involvement in civil remote sensing from space, directed at realizing<br />
<strong>the</strong> potential benefits and taking advantage of <strong>the</strong> opportunities, both domestic<br />
and international.<br />
2. Six significant policy consequences <strong>the</strong> consultants see as flowing from <strong>the</strong> above conclusions<br />
on <strong>the</strong> basic policy attitude are outlined below. The first three are discussed<br />
briefly below; <strong>the</strong> last three require more extended discussion and are addressed in <strong>the</strong><br />
succeeding chapters of <strong>the</strong> report.<br />
a. The need for data continuity. Using interests require, in varying degrees, reasonable<br />
assurances on <strong>the</strong> nature, frequency, and o<strong>the</strong>r characteristics of remote<br />
sensing information that will be available and on <strong>the</strong> period of time in <strong>the</strong> future<br />
for which it will be available. As noted above, it has been unreasonable to expect<br />
significant investment or o<strong>the</strong>r operational type commitments by using interests<br />
in <strong>the</strong> absence of a clear expectation on <strong>the</strong>ir part that <strong>the</strong> information or data<br />
needed will be available for a period that will justify <strong>the</strong> commitments <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
to make. User lead times for operational preparations, and remote sensing systems<br />
lead times for maintaining flow of data, dictate <strong>the</strong> necessity of a long-term<br />
plan for data and continuity.<br />
The consultants have concluded that (1) without a long-term (periodically updated)<br />
plan for data continuity, U.S. remote sensing from space activities are not likely<br />
to generate <strong>the</strong> user commitments needed to realize <strong>the</strong> potential benefits, and<br />
(2) a policy commitment to such a plan is an essential cornerstone of any continuing<br />
U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing. The planning of <strong>the</strong> technical<br />
characteristics of <strong>the</strong> data to be provided should take account of <strong>the</strong> needs of<br />
Federal, State, local, private, and international users. The consultants note that in<br />
<strong>the</strong> nature of things <strong>the</strong>re cannot be an absolute or permanent commitment, and<br />
that a policy commitment can always be rescinded in <strong>the</strong> event that a future zerobase<br />
review shows that it is no longer warranted.<br />
b. The need for continuing R&D. It must be recognized that remote sensing systems<br />
are based on a very dynamic technology and that new possibilities for data collection<br />
and beneficial uses will continue to be discovered in <strong>the</strong> years ahead. This<br />
makes it essential that and <strong>the</strong> consultants conclude that:<br />
[13] (1) Strong and imaginative programs of technological R&D and experimental<br />
applications must continue to receive a high priority.<br />
(2) Remote sensing information systems should not become frozen to a particular<br />
technology.<br />
(3) At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> strong focus on advancing technology must not be permitted<br />
to obstruct <strong>the</strong> use of existing or lower technologies in operational systems<br />
when it is economically or technically advantageous to do so.<br />
(4) A close coupling must be maintained between R&D and operational activities<br />
in remote sensing information systems. Provision should be made whenever<br />
feasible for operational uses of remote sensing information produced by<br />
R&D systems or in experimental applications. Conversely, <strong>the</strong> use for experimental<br />
purposes of operational data and systems should be encouraged when
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 293<br />
operational uses will not be unacceptably downgraded.<br />
c. Need for a comprehensive plan. Given acceptance of <strong>the</strong> fact of a continuing U.S.<br />
involvement in civil remote sensing, <strong>the</strong> consultants conclude that a high priority<br />
should be given to <strong>the</strong> development, approval, and periodic updating of a comprehensive<br />
plan to guide U.S. Government activities in civil remote sensing.<br />
Preparation of an initial version of <strong>the</strong> comprehensive plan should be <strong>the</strong> first<br />
order of business once <strong>the</strong>re has been (a) policy acceptance of continuing U.S.<br />
involvement in civil remote sensing and (b) a lead agency has been designated<br />
(see next section). In <strong>the</strong> consultants’ view <strong>the</strong>se two actions can and must be<br />
taken prior to <strong>the</strong> development of an initial comprehensive plan, because a meaningful<br />
plan cannot be developed without a decision on <strong>the</strong> U.S.’s basic policy attitude<br />
toward civil remote sensing, as previously discussed, or without a lead agency<br />
with <strong>the</strong> necessary authority and competence, as will be discussed below and in<br />
Chapter III. Essential characteristics of <strong>the</strong> comprehensive plan should include<br />
<strong>the</strong> following:<br />
(1) The plan should cover programmatic, technical, and procedural plans for <strong>the</strong><br />
collection and dissemination of civil remote sensing data and for providing<br />
assistance and o<strong>the</strong>r services to users. It should cover R&D and experimental<br />
activities as well as <strong>the</strong> provision of services on an operational basis.<br />
(2) The plan should also cover institutional plans for <strong>the</strong> conduct and appropriate<br />
evolution of Federal activities related to civil remote sensing, including provision<br />
for effective participation by all federal agencies concerned and o<strong>the</strong>r user<br />
[14] interests (State, local, private, and international) in <strong>the</strong> decision process<br />
on <strong>the</strong> technical and o<strong>the</strong>r characteristics of <strong>the</strong> data services to be provided.<br />
(3) The plan must be as realistic as possible, both in technical expectations and<br />
projected schedules.<br />
(4) The plan should reflect a phased approach to future decisions and commitments,<br />
i.e., it should avoid predetermining matters that can be left to future<br />
decision and should indicate as clearly as possible <strong>the</strong> timing, extent, and<br />
implications of <strong>the</strong> commitments required.<br />
d. Need for designation of a lead agency. Acceptance of <strong>the</strong> policy that <strong>the</strong>re will be<br />
a continuing U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing underscores <strong>the</strong> urgent<br />
need—one that has been evident for some time—for <strong>the</strong> designation at <strong>the</strong> earliest<br />
possible date of a lead agency for U.S. civil remote sensing activities. Chapter<br />
III below is devoted to a discussion of <strong>the</strong> needs for a lead agency, <strong>the</strong> functions<br />
it should perform, <strong>the</strong> criteria and options for its selection, and <strong>the</strong> consultants’<br />
conclusions on <strong>the</strong> agency that should be designated. Chapter V includes some<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion of proposed lead agency activities.<br />
e. The need for attention to international involvement. A continuing future U.S.<br />
involvement in civil remote sensing will clearly require attention to international<br />
interactions that are (1) necessary because of <strong>the</strong> global nature of remote sensing,<br />
existing U.S. international commitments, and actions that have been or may<br />
be taken by o<strong>the</strong>r countries, <strong>the</strong> U.N., ESA, etc., or (2) desirable for U.S. interests<br />
or for general international interests as seen by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Alternatives for international<br />
institutional arrangements are discussed in Chapter IV. The proposed concept<br />
for a U.S. national system presented in Chapter V provides for international<br />
involvement under several scenarios.<br />
f. The need for a U.S. system concept. Finally, <strong>the</strong>re is a need to develop a viable<br />
conceptual framework for <strong>the</strong> continuing future involvement of <strong>the</strong> U.S. in civil<br />
remote sensing. Chapter V presents a proposed concept of a U.S. national system<br />
that is consistent with <strong>the</strong> policy conclusions of <strong>the</strong> preceding chapters, discusses<br />
some policy issues involved, and outlines alternative scenarios for implementing<br />
such a system.
294<br />
Document II-31<br />
Document title: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The White House, Presidential Directive/NSC-54,<br />
“Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” November 16, 1979.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> Nixon administration’s Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget agreed to finance an experimental multiagency<br />
Earth resources observation program in 1970, it was on <strong>the</strong> condition that such a system<br />
would have to prove its effectiveness before any commitment to an operational program. In 1978 and<br />
1979, <strong>the</strong> Carter administration commissioned studies to determine what should be done with <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat program. The first study (Document II-30) concluded that <strong>the</strong> federal government should<br />
move to an operational system run by NASA. The second study, however, focused on <strong>the</strong> feasibility of<br />
turning control of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system over to private industry. It was this second study that carried<br />
more weight in <strong>the</strong> deliberations leading to Presidential Directive/NSC-54. This document outlines <strong>the</strong><br />
November 1979 decision by President Jimmy Carter to name <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce’s National<br />
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) <strong>the</strong> lead agency for <strong>the</strong> Landsat program. Also,<br />
NOAA would be responsible for exploring ways to increase private-sector involvement.<br />
Presidential Directive/NSC-54<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
TO: The Secretary of State<br />
The Secretary of Defense<br />
The Secretary of Interior<br />
The Secretary of Agriculture<br />
The Secretary of Commerce<br />
The Secretary of Transportation<br />
The Secretary of Energy<br />
The Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Domestic Affairs and Policy<br />
The Administrator, Agency for International Development<br />
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<br />
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff<br />
The Director of Central Intelligence<br />
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency<br />
The Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy<br />
The Director, National Science Foundation<br />
SUBJECT: Civil Operational Remote Sensing<br />
November 16, 1979<br />
The President has approved <strong>the</strong> civil space policy discussed below. The policy amplifies<br />
that established in PD/NSC-37—National Space Policy and PD/NSC-42—Civil and<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r National Space Policy. . . .<br />
[in <strong>the</strong> original, <strong>the</strong>re was still a “blacked-out” classified area of <strong>the</strong> document in this position]<br />
2. LAND PROGRAMS. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 295<br />
(NOAA) of <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce is assigned <strong>the</strong> management responsibility for<br />
civil operational land remote sensing activities in addition to its ongoing atmospheric and<br />
oceanic responsibilities. Initially, <strong>the</strong> operational land remote sensing system from space<br />
will be based on LANDSAT technology. Commerce’s initial responsibility—in coordination<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate agencies—will be to develop a time-phased transition plan<br />
covering: (1) a Program Board (discussed below); (2) organization for management and<br />
regulation; (3) system financing including pricing policies for <strong>the</strong> users[’] sharing of<br />
costs; (4) technical programs; (5) establishment of private and international participation;<br />
(6) identification of facilities (including <strong>the</strong> EROS data center), hardware, and personnel<br />
that should be transferred; and (7) identification of actions such as executive<br />
orders and legislation required. Commerce will submit to OMB a preliminary implementation<br />
plan by December 15, 1979, covering any required FY 1981 budget adjustments and<br />
a final transition plan by June 1, 1980.<br />
a. Federal Management Mechanism. Commerce will establish and chair a Program<br />
Board for continuing federal coordination and regulation with representatives from <strong>the</strong><br />
involved federal organization (e.g., Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Transportation,<br />
Energy, State, NASA, CIA, AID, EPA, and Executive <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> President).<br />
Organizations such as <strong>the</strong> National Governors’ Association and National Conference of<br />
State Legislatures will be asked to participate as necessary. The Board will forward recommendations<br />
on unresolved policy issues to <strong>the</strong> Policy Review Committee (Space) for consideration<br />
and action.<br />
b. Private Sector Involvement. Our goal is <strong>the</strong> eventual operation by <strong>the</strong> private sector<br />
of our civil land remote sensing activities. Commerce will budget for fur<strong>the</strong>r work in<br />
FY 1981 to seek ways to enhance private sector opportunities (e.g., joint venture with<br />
industry, a quasi-government corporation, leasing etc.). Commerce will be <strong>the</strong> contact for<br />
private industry on this matter and with <strong>the</strong> Program Board will analyze any proposals<br />
received prior to submitting policy issues to <strong>the</strong> Policy Review Committee (Space) for consideration<br />
and action.<br />
c. International Participation. The United States will generally support nondiscriminatory<br />
direct readout to foreign ground stations to continue our present policy<br />
and to provide data to foreign users under specified conditions. Pricing policies must be<br />
developed that are consistent for foreign and domestic users. We will promote development<br />
of complementary nationally operated satellite systems so as to limit US program<br />
costs, but protect against unwarranted technology transfer.<br />
3. WEATHER PROGRAMS. Defense and Commerce will maintain and coordinate dual<br />
polar orbiting meteorological programs. We will continue procurement of current satellite<br />
systems with Defense and Commerce each operating separate satellites to meet <strong>the</strong> differing<br />
needs of <strong>the</strong> military and civil sectors. When any new polar orbiting satellites are<br />
justified <strong>the</strong>y will be jointly developed and procured by Defense, Commerce and NASA to<br />
maximize technology sharing and to minimize cost. An appropriate coordination mechanism<br />
will be established to assure effective cooperation and to prevent duplication.<br />
4. OCEAN PROGRAMS. If a decision is made to develop oceanographic satellites, joint<br />
Defense/Commerce/NASA development, acquisition and management will be pursued.<br />
A Committee will be established, with <strong>the</strong> above representation expanded to include<br />
State, CIA, and NSF. The Committee will forward recommendations on policy issues to <strong>the</strong><br />
Policy Review Committee (Space) for consideration and action.<br />
Zbigniew Brzezinski
296<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Document II-32<br />
Document title: David S. Johnson, Chairman, Satellite Task Force, Planning for a Civil<br />
Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System: A Discussion of Issues and Options (Rockville,<br />
MD: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,<br />
June 20, 1980), pp. 1–16.<br />
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Rockville, Maryland.<br />
Established by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42, an interagency task force charged with studying<br />
options for privatizing all or part of <strong>the</strong> nation’s remote-sensing systems concluded that such<br />
action was premature, but that more private-sector involvement was appropriate. Consequently, in<br />
November 1979 Presidential Directive 54 decreed that NOAA temporarily manage <strong>the</strong> Landsat system<br />
while also studying ways to increase private-sector involvement. The resulting study was released in<br />
June 1980, but its recommendations were swept aside as <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration entered office<br />
with its own agenda for Landsat. What follows is <strong>the</strong> executive summary of that study.<br />
Planning for a Civil Operational<br />
Land Remote Sensing Satellite System:<br />
A Discussion of Issues and Options<br />
June 20,1980<br />
Satellite Task Force<br />
David S. Johnson, Chairman<br />
[1] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
This document discusses <strong>the</strong> issues and options relating to a national civil operational<br />
land remote sensing satellite system pursuant to <strong>the</strong> President’s decision to assign to <strong>the</strong><br />
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce <strong>the</strong><br />
management responsibility for civil operational land remote sensing satellite activities. 1<br />
This document, prepared by <strong>the</strong> Commerce Department (Commerce), in coordination<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r interested agencies, 2 discusses <strong>the</strong> issues involved in implementing an operational<br />
land remote sensing system from space, initially based on Landsat technology, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> goal of eventual private sector ownership and operation of <strong>the</strong> system. Some policy<br />
and technical options related to implementing an operational system are contained in this<br />
document, but decisions on <strong>the</strong>se options will, for <strong>the</strong> most part, await <strong>the</strong><br />
Administration’s FY 1982 budget review and subsequent actions.<br />
A land remote sensing satellite system provides information about <strong>the</strong> condition of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface by a process of sensing radiation from objects on <strong>the</strong> Earth. The sys-<br />
1. The White House Press Release of November 20, 1979, announcing this decision is appended to this<br />
Summary as Attachment A.<br />
2. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, <strong>the</strong> Departments of Agriculture, <strong>the</strong> Interior,<br />
Energy, State, and Defense, <strong>the</strong> Agency for International Development, <strong>the</strong> Environmental Protection Agency,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Director of Central Intelligence.
tem uses sensors located on satellites which transmit <strong>the</strong> data to ground receiving stations<br />
for processing into usable data products. The current system is largely an experimental<br />
program called Landsat managed by <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
(NASA). Information from <strong>the</strong> system has proven of value to a variety of public and private<br />
sector users in <strong>the</strong> United States and abroad for helping to make decisions related to<br />
such areas as agricultural crop forecasting, rangeland and forest management, mineral<br />
and petroleum exploration, mapping, urban and regional land use planning, water quality<br />
assessment and disaster assessment.<br />
[2] Background<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 297<br />
The issuance of <strong>the</strong> President’s decision regarding civil operational remote sensing<br />
from space culminated a two-year Administration review of <strong>the</strong> nation’s space policy.<br />
During this period, <strong>the</strong> Policy Review Committee (Space) was established and national<br />
policy on space programs was clarified. In May 1978, <strong>the</strong> President announced that <strong>the</strong><br />
United States will encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space capabilities<br />
under appropriate U.S. authorization and supervision. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, in October 1978, <strong>the</strong><br />
President made a commitment to continue <strong>the</strong> availability of data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat program<br />
for all classes of users. In his March 27, 1979, Science and Technology Message, <strong>the</strong><br />
President reiterated his Administration’s commitment to <strong>the</strong> continuity of land remote<br />
sensing satellite data over <strong>the</strong> coming decade. Subsequently, Dr. Frank Press, <strong>the</strong><br />
President’s Science Advisor, in Administration testimony before <strong>the</strong> Senate Subcommittee<br />
on Science, Technology, and Space on April 9, 1979, stated that “<strong>the</strong> Administration is<br />
committed to an operational remote sensing system, although yet undefined.”<br />
From October 1978, through <strong>the</strong> summer of 1979, Executive Branch agencies examined<br />
<strong>the</strong> potential for integrating U.S. civil remote sensing satellite programs and for private<br />
sector involvement in U.S. civil space activities. They recommended that all U.S. civil<br />
operational remote sensing programs be managed by a single agency. The agencies also<br />
reported that <strong>the</strong> private sector would be interested in assuming more responsibility for<br />
land remote sensing from space if Federal policy and market uncertainties were clarified.<br />
In November 1979, <strong>the</strong> President provided <strong>the</strong> framework within which a civil operational<br />
land remote sensing satellite system should be implemented, and assigned to <strong>the</strong><br />
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in Commerce <strong>the</strong> management<br />
responsibility for civil operational land remote sensing activities in addition to its<br />
ongoing atmospheric and oceanic responsibilities. NOAA’s related ongoing responsibilities<br />
include managing <strong>the</strong> national civil operational meteorological satellite program and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Commerce Department’s responsibilities for a joint operational demonstration by <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense (DoD), NASA and Commerce of a National Oceanic Satellite<br />
System (NOSS).<br />
[3] The Executive Branch’s review of remote sensing satellite programs and policies was<br />
paralleled by a series of Congressional hearings during <strong>the</strong> 96th Congress on operational<br />
land remote sensing from space, including hearings before <strong>the</strong> House Subcommittee on<br />
Space Science and Applications of <strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and Technology and <strong>the</strong><br />
Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of <strong>the</strong> Committee on<br />
Commerce, Science and Transportation. Two bills before <strong>the</strong> 96th Congress focused on<br />
operational land remote sensing: S. 663, introduced by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, which<br />
proposed <strong>the</strong> establishment of an Earth Data and Information Service in NASA, and<br />
S. 875, introduced by Senator Harrison Schmitt, which proposed <strong>the</strong> creation of a<br />
for-profit Earth Resources Information Corporation.
298<br />
Assumptions<br />
This document was developed in accordance with <strong>the</strong> following assumptions, which<br />
reflect <strong>the</strong> policies, established in <strong>the</strong> President’s decision on civil operational remote<br />
sensing and previous space policy pronouncements, and <strong>the</strong> prerequisites to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
achievement:<br />
• The Federal government will ensure continuity of data during <strong>the</strong> l980s;<br />
• A national civil operational land remote sensing satellite system should ensure continuity<br />
of data and <strong>the</strong> appropriate reliability and timeliness of standard data products;<br />
• User requirements, projected levels of demand and <strong>the</strong> cost of meeting <strong>the</strong>se requirements<br />
should determine <strong>the</strong> design of <strong>the</strong> operational system;<br />
• The Administration’s goal is eventual private sector ownership and operation of <strong>the</strong><br />
operational system, which includes <strong>the</strong> assumption of financial risk, as well as operational<br />
control by <strong>the</strong> private operator;<br />
• Prices for land remote sensing satellite products should be set at levels that ensure<br />
maximum recovery of system costs consistent with <strong>the</strong> public good;<br />
• The practice of <strong>the</strong> widest practical dissemination of Landsat data on a public nondiscriminatory<br />
basis will be continued for <strong>the</strong> data and standard data products from <strong>the</strong><br />
Interim and Fully Operational Systems in accordance with prevailing U.S. national<br />
policies;<br />
[4] • Eventual private sector ownership and operation of <strong>the</strong> U.S. program will be conducted<br />
under Federal government regulation, consistent with U.S. policies and international<br />
obligations;<br />
• The civil operational land remote sensing satellite program is a national program<br />
responsive to Federal interests and U.S. user requirements. Due regard will be given<br />
to foreign user interests and to foreign participation in <strong>the</strong> U.S. program;<br />
• NOAA will manage <strong>the</strong> operational system until a new institutional framework is<br />
established.<br />
The Present Landsat System<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The existing Landsat system consists of one satellite, Landsat 3, launched in 1978,<br />
which covers <strong>the</strong> Earth once every 18 days and transmits sensed data from an on-board<br />
multi-spectral scanner (MSS) and two return beam vidicon (RBV) cameras back to Earth,<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r directly to U.S. or foreign ground stations or indirectly from an on-board tape<br />
recorder which stores data until <strong>the</strong> satellite is within range of a U.S. ground station.<br />
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center controls <strong>the</strong> satellite and performs <strong>the</strong> initial preprocessing<br />
of <strong>the</strong> data transmitted to Goddard from U.S. ground stations via domestic<br />
communications satellite (DOMSAT).<br />
At <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior’s EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Goddard preprocessed high density digital tapes are archived and fur<strong>the</strong>r processed<br />
into standard data products (ei<strong>the</strong>r computer compatible tapes or photographic images)<br />
for dissemination to domestic and foreign users at <strong>the</strong> cost of processing <strong>the</strong> order and<br />
reproduction. Similar preprocessing, processing, archiving and dissemination functions<br />
are performed by <strong>the</strong> nine foreign ground stations that now receive data direct from<br />
Landsat 3.<br />
Two additional satellites, Landsat D and D’, currently are under construction, with<br />
Landsat D tentatively planned for launch in 1982. The Landsat D series of satellites is
designed to carry a new sensor, <strong>the</strong> Thematic Mapper (TM), which will provide 30m<br />
resolution 3 for <strong>the</strong> first time, as well as <strong>the</strong> MSS, and to use <strong>the</strong> Tracking and Data Relay<br />
[5] Satellite System (TDRSS) for relay of data direct from Landsat to a single U.S. ground<br />
station at White Sands, New Mexico. To provide continuity with data from previous<br />
Landsats, <strong>the</strong> multispectral scanner (MSS), which provides 80m resolution, will continue<br />
to be deployed on Landsat D and D’. Direct readout of sensor data to foreign ground stations<br />
will be continued.<br />
Because of difficulties in developing <strong>the</strong> TM and <strong>the</strong> associated ground data processing<br />
system, NASA is considering launching Landsat D without TM in 1982, to be followed<br />
by Landsat D’ with TM later. 4 Current estimates for <strong>the</strong> operational preprocessing of<br />
Landsat D and D’ data at Goddard are 200 MSS scenes per day beginning no earlier than<br />
1983 and up to 50 TM scenes per day when <strong>the</strong> TM system becomes operational possibly<br />
no earlier than 1985.<br />
The Interim and Fully Operational Systems<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 299<br />
A fully operational land remote sensing system that meets optimal performance standards<br />
can be implemented at <strong>the</strong> earliest in 1989, given best estimates of <strong>the</strong> state of <strong>the</strong><br />
art advances in sensors and <strong>the</strong> time required for Federal contracting procedures if <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are used. Until that time, extension of <strong>the</strong> Landsat D system can ensure that, after 1983,<br />
<strong>the</strong> commitment to continuity of data during <strong>the</strong> decade of <strong>the</strong> 1980s is met.<br />
From a technical standpoint, <strong>the</strong> following performance standards have been identified<br />
as applicable to a high quality operational system:<br />
• Sensors designed to generate data meeting a broad range of user requirements at a<br />
reasonable price;<br />
• Assured continuity of satellite coverage without break, with one backup satellite in<br />
orbit at all times and ano<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong> ground;<br />
• 95% confidence that, averaged over a two-day period, all data will be processed and<br />
made available from <strong>the</strong> ground station within 48 hours of receipt; and<br />
• Ability to identify and process certain data out of order to meet urgent user needs.<br />
[6] However, <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong>se compabilities [sic] are pursued will depend upon<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir full capital and operating costs and <strong>the</strong> demonstrated existence of an adequate private<br />
and Federal market to justify such costs.<br />
While sensors specifically designed to generate data meeting a broad scope of user<br />
requirements cannot be provided until <strong>the</strong> late 1980s, <strong>the</strong> Landsat D sensors can be used<br />
as <strong>the</strong> basis for an interim system which will help to ensure continuity of data during <strong>the</strong><br />
1980s and meet many user needs.<br />
The Administration is currently reviewing <strong>the</strong> Landsat D system to see where improvements<br />
may be required to ensure data continuity during <strong>the</strong> 1980s. For instance, <strong>the</strong> current<br />
Landsat system includes no satellites after Landsat D’. Anticipated gaps in spacecraft<br />
coverage of several years between about 1986 and <strong>the</strong> initiation of a fully operational system<br />
may have to be filled by <strong>the</strong> construction of one or more satellites or by <strong>the</strong> refurbishment<br />
of Landsat D. In addition, changes in <strong>the</strong> Landsat D ground segment may be<br />
required to minimize <strong>the</strong> risk of losing some data or having an excessively long delay in<br />
processing some data. The Landsat D system, with any follow-on satellites and ground system<br />
improvements, has been designated <strong>the</strong> “Interim Operational System.”<br />
The earliest possible date by which all four performance standards for a high quality<br />
3. The term “resolution,” as used in this document, refers to <strong>the</strong> instantaneous field of view (IFOV).<br />
4. The Administration is also considering o<strong>the</strong>r alternatives such as delaying <strong>the</strong> launch of Landsat D<br />
until 1983 when <strong>the</strong> TM sensor will be ready.
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OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
operational system could be met is 1989, when <strong>the</strong> R&D necessary for <strong>the</strong> new solid state,<br />
multilinear array sensors should have been completed, and <strong>the</strong> sensors will have been fabricated,<br />
tested, and incorporated into ei<strong>the</strong>r an existing multi-mission modular spacecraft<br />
(MMS) or a new spacecraft. The Landsat D system so modified is designated <strong>the</strong> “Fully<br />
Operational System.”<br />
A decision on when to implement <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational System requires careful<br />
examination of <strong>the</strong> Federal government’s priorities, needed financial assistance, private<br />
sector willingness to invest in and take over <strong>the</strong> system, user demands during <strong>the</strong> interim<br />
system and <strong>the</strong> potential risk of foreign satellite systems obtaining a portion of <strong>the</strong> domestic<br />
and foreign land remote sensing market.<br />
Management Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> Interim Operational System<br />
Certain changes in management responsibility will take place as <strong>the</strong> Interim<br />
Operational System is implemented. Although <strong>the</strong> exact dates for transferring managerial<br />
responsibility to NOAA are subject to changes in NASA’s schedule for Landsat D, NOAA<br />
plans to assume <strong>the</strong> following responsibilities from NASA and Interior on <strong>the</strong> following<br />
schedule:<br />
[7] • NOAA will assume responsibility from NASA in FY 1983 for <strong>the</strong> command and control<br />
of <strong>the</strong> system and will begin providing MSS data on an operational basis after <strong>the</strong> successful<br />
launch and check-out of Landsat D and <strong>the</strong> MSS ground system and after NASA<br />
has demonstrated that <strong>the</strong> system is operational. NOAA will assume responsibility for TM<br />
data when that portion of <strong>the</strong> system reaches an initial operational level of performance;<br />
• NOAA will assume responsibility from NASA and <strong>the</strong> EROS Data Center in FY<br />
1983–84 for <strong>the</strong> generation and dissemination of data and standard data products.<br />
Assuming it is cost-effective, a new facility would be co-located with <strong>the</strong> Landsat D preprocessing<br />
facility at Goddard and would be <strong>the</strong> sole sales outlet in <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
of data and standard data products from <strong>the</strong> Interim Operational System; and<br />
• NOAA will take title to <strong>the</strong> Landsat archival material at Goddard and <strong>the</strong> EROS Data<br />
Center in FY 1984 and will be responsible for archival and dissemination functions for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Interim Operational System.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> interim operational phase based on <strong>the</strong> Landsat D series of satellites,<br />
NOAA will manage <strong>the</strong> system in coordination with an interagency Assistant Secretary<br />
level Program Board. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce will establish a Land<br />
Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory Committee with representatives of state and local governments,<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r domestic non-Federal users, and interested domestic private sector<br />
groups. Within NOAA, a new major line component, <strong>the</strong> National Earth Satellite Service,<br />
has been proposed to have managerial responsibility for <strong>the</strong> civil operational land remote<br />
sensing satellite program.<br />
User Requirements for <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational System<br />
User requirements should determine <strong>the</strong> design of <strong>the</strong> fully operational land remote<br />
sensing satellite system. A survey of governmental and private users indicates a wide range<br />
of possible requirements, depending on <strong>the</strong> type of application being considered, which<br />
could justify differing types of satellite systems.<br />
To assist NOAA or an eventual private owner to develop a responsive operational system,<br />
a preliminary survey of possible user requirements was made. This survey indicated,<br />
[8] for example, that agencies that are interested primarily in renewable resource applications<br />
such as agricultural crop assessment want frequent observations, delivery of data<br />
within 48 hours in certain circumstances, spectral bands that discriminate between various
types of vegetation and resolution higher than that provided by <strong>the</strong> current Landsat system.<br />
State and local governments, requiring data for land use management and protecting<br />
environmental quality, request higher resolution over urban and suburban areas and<br />
time-series analyses to detect detailed changes. The U.S. mineral extraction and related<br />
industries call for stereoscopic 5 capabilities, global coverage, thirty to forty meter resolution<br />
and processing of data within a few weeks. Foreign users[’] interests appear to be similar<br />
to those of <strong>the</strong>ir U.S. counterparts, although area coverage requests obviously differ.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r analysis and sorting of <strong>the</strong>se requirements with respect to resolution, spectral<br />
bands, stereo coverage, frequency of observation and timeliness of product delivery will<br />
be necessary as plans are developed for <strong>the</strong> operational system.<br />
Performance Options for <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational System<br />
Hypo<strong>the</strong>tical system performance options have been identified to meet some or most<br />
of <strong>the</strong> preliminary user requirements identified above. These options range from designing<br />
a system with capabilities similar to <strong>the</strong> Landsat 3 with MSS only, at an estimated 10-year<br />
cost of $1 billion, to building a new system which meets most of <strong>the</strong> currently stated user<br />
requirements, including two meter resolution, at an estimated 10-year maximum cost of<br />
$10 billion. 6 Stereo coverage can be provided at an additional cost of up to $700 million.<br />
A final decision on <strong>the</strong> system design to be pursued for <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational System<br />
can be reached only after fur<strong>the</strong>r analysis of user requirements, technical options, cost<br />
comparisons, system financing, and <strong>the</strong> effect of potential foreign competition.<br />
[9] Revenues, Pricing Policies and Financial Assistance<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 301<br />
Reliable projections of revenues from sales of standard data products, and from <strong>the</strong><br />
direct reception fees to be paid by foreign ground station operators cannot be made at<br />
this time since <strong>the</strong> characteristics of <strong>the</strong> Interim and <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational Systems, <strong>the</strong><br />
users’ level of demand at various prices, <strong>the</strong> impact of a market expansion program and<br />
<strong>the</strong> impact of foreign competition are not now known. Tentative projections indicate that<br />
this system may not and probably will not be self-financing before <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> century.<br />
Therefore, continued Federal financial contributions to support of <strong>the</strong> system likely will<br />
be necessary for <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future.<br />
System revenues, generated by <strong>the</strong> sale of standard data products and foreign ground<br />
station access fees, now amount to only $6 million 7 a year. 8 Current fees consist of a nominal<br />
$200,000 access fee for foreign ground stations and cost of reproduction charges for<br />
standard data products—$200 for a computer compatible tape and between $8 and $50<br />
for various types of Landsat images. The projected costs of <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational System<br />
range from $100 to $400 million a year. To achieve <strong>the</strong> objectives for <strong>the</strong> sharing of costs<br />
by users, and for <strong>the</strong> eventual ownership and operation by <strong>the</strong> private sector, prices must<br />
be increased to cover, over time, <strong>the</strong> capital and operating costs of <strong>the</strong> system and <strong>the</strong> data<br />
and data products treated in a proprietary manner.<br />
The system’s manager could charge three types of fees for data and standard data<br />
5. As used in this context, stereoscopic means two or more images, taken from different angles, to permit<br />
inference of <strong>the</strong> relative height of various topographic features.<br />
6. All costs are in FY 1980 dollars.<br />
7. All revenues are in FY 1980 dollars.<br />
8. This figure includes $2.7 million from sales, $1.8 million from foreign ground station access fees<br />
and $1.3 million attributed to <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> data distributed without charge to Federal agency users.
302<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
products:<br />
• Basic Fee. A fee paid by each user on each standard data product it purchases from<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. system operator. These fees would vary in proportion to <strong>the</strong> costs incurred in<br />
producing that product. They would be paid by users of both real-time and retrospective<br />
data. O<strong>the</strong>r factors such as timeliness, <strong>the</strong> placing of special orders and special<br />
handling could be reflected in a surcharge schedule.<br />
[10] • Royalty Fee. A fee paid by each U.S. and foreign user and foreign ground station<br />
operator on <strong>the</strong> reproduction or resale of Landsat standard data products.<br />
• Direct Reception Fee. One or more fees paid by foreign ground station operators<br />
receiving data directly from U.S. land remote sensing satellites. Examples of such fees<br />
are: (1) an annual access fee like <strong>the</strong> $200,000 fee per station per year currently being<br />
paid by Landsat station operators, and (2) a transmission fee paid by foreign ground<br />
station operators for data transmitted to and received by <strong>the</strong> foreign ground stations.<br />
This latter fee would be based on <strong>the</strong> amount of data requested.<br />
Upon <strong>the</strong> completion of pricing studies, a proposed pricing schedule will be developed<br />
based on <strong>the</strong>se types of fees, and possibly o<strong>the</strong>rs, for consideration by <strong>the</strong> Program<br />
Board and <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory Committee.<br />
Since a substantial shortfall is projected between annual revenues and <strong>the</strong> estimated<br />
annual costs of running an operational system of between $100 and $400 million per year,<br />
Federal financial assistance likely will be required. In this event, <strong>the</strong> Federal government<br />
could provide various types of capital and operating assistance to a private or government<br />
corporation, whichever institutional option is eventually chosen. Such Federal capital<br />
assistance could include grants, equity guarantees, and Federal loan and loan guarantees.<br />
Federal operating assistance could include Federal support of research and development,<br />
purchase guarantees, appropriations, free services and tax incentives.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> Interim or Fully Operational System, three possible options for<br />
Federal agencies to share in <strong>the</strong> costs of financing <strong>the</strong> operational land remote sensing<br />
system are under consideration:<br />
• NOAA could budget for all “core” 9 and special system costs;<br />
• NOAA could budget for “core” system costs and user agencies would budget for<br />
special system capabilities; 10<br />
[11] • User agencies could fund individually a predetermined portion of all “core” and<br />
special system costs.<br />
A decision on <strong>the</strong> preferred financing option will weigh, on <strong>the</strong> one hand, <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
of having a mechanism that forces agencies to make trade-offs between land remote<br />
sensing data and o<strong>the</strong>r sources and, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> advantages of focusing responsibility<br />
for <strong>the</strong> program and budgeting in one agency.<br />
Institutional Approaches to Eventual Private Sector Ownership and Operation<br />
1. Institutional Alternatives<br />
Several institutional options exist for achieving <strong>the</strong> goal of eventual ownership and<br />
operation by <strong>the</strong> private sector of our civil land remote sensing satellite activities. The four<br />
9. The “core” system includes <strong>the</strong> space and ground segment elements necessary to meet <strong>the</strong> common<br />
needs of <strong>the</strong> majority of users.<br />
10. Special system capabilities include stereoscopic coverage.
principal institutional options discussed in <strong>the</strong> document are:<br />
(1) A private corporation (or consortium) selected competitively to own and operate<br />
all or part of <strong>the</strong> civil operational land remote sensing satellite system and to sell<br />
data to Federal agency users under a guaranteed purchase contract;<br />
(2) A for-profit private corporation, authorized by Federal legislation, with private<br />
equity and privately and publicly appointed Board members;<br />
(3) A wholly-owned government corporation authorized by Federal legislation, with<br />
Government equity, reporting to <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce, with provision for<br />
subsequent transformation to a private stock corporation as system revenues<br />
warrant; and<br />
(4) Federal agency ownership with private contractor operation, and provision for<br />
subsequent transfer to a private sector owner as system revenues warrant.<br />
Options 1 and 2 offer <strong>the</strong> earliest possibilities of private sector ownership and assumption<br />
of risk. Options 3 and 4 delay implementation of private sector ownership until <strong>the</strong><br />
next decade.<br />
[12] These options will be examined by <strong>the</strong> Administration over <strong>the</strong> next several months<br />
to evaluate which alternative best serves <strong>the</strong> Federal, state and local government and private<br />
sector interests in having an operational land remote sensing satellite program.<br />
2. Establishment of Federal Policy to Encourage Private Sector Investment<br />
Several policies impact <strong>the</strong> likelihood or willingness of <strong>the</strong> private sector to own <strong>the</strong><br />
operational system. For example, under present policy, a system owner has no ownership<br />
rights in <strong>the</strong> Landsat data and standard data products. Without a change in this policy, a<br />
private owner would be denied <strong>the</strong> opportunity for profitability; <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
government would have to authorize <strong>the</strong> private sector to own and sell civil operational<br />
land remote sensing satellite data and standard data products on terms that eventually<br />
permit a reasonable return on investment. O<strong>the</strong>r factors that affect private sector investment<br />
are competition from ongoing Federally funded R&D land remote sensing satellite<br />
systems and <strong>the</strong> duration of <strong>the</strong> Federal government’s financial commitment to <strong>the</strong> land<br />
remote sensing satellite program. Conversely, a private system owner should be required<br />
to abide by <strong>the</strong> government policy of widest practical dissemination of data and standard<br />
data products on a public nondiscriminatory basis at prices that are consistent for domestic<br />
and foreign users.<br />
3. Regulation of Private Sector Operation<br />
A private owner of <strong>the</strong> land remote sensing satellite system could enjoy a monopoly.<br />
To protect <strong>the</strong> national interest, <strong>the</strong> private owner’s activities should be regulated to <strong>the</strong><br />
extent necessary to conform to national space and o<strong>the</strong>r domestic and foreign policy<br />
objectives. A private or government entity owning <strong>the</strong> operational system should be<br />
required, for example, to comply with international treaties such as <strong>the</strong> Outer Space<br />
Treaty for <strong>the</strong> conduct of peaceful activities in outer space; continue <strong>the</strong> widest practical<br />
dissemination of data and standard data products on a public nondiscriminatory basis;<br />
meet <strong>the</strong> needs of U.S. government users; and refrain from misuse of insider knowledge<br />
obtained from <strong>the</strong> land remote sensing satellite data.<br />
Market Expansion<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 303<br />
The system manager should undertake a market expansion program to increase revenues,<br />
reduce required Federal [13] financial assistance, and enhance decision-making<br />
through <strong>the</strong> use of land remote sensing satellite data. An important element of this program<br />
is assuring continuity of land remote sensing data.<br />
A market expansion program for <strong>the</strong> operational system can build on <strong>the</strong> types of
304<br />
training and technology transfer activities now being conducted by NASA and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior. NOAA could arrange for reimbursable training programs,<br />
enter into joint applications demonstration projects with users in all sectors, encourage<br />
university land remote sensing instructional programs and work with domestic and international<br />
assistance agencies to promote new opportunities for American business in <strong>the</strong><br />
land remote sensing satellite field. As part of its ongoing R&D responsibility, NASA could<br />
continue to develop and demonstrate to users new techniques and technologies for using<br />
land remote sensing satellite data.<br />
International Aspects<br />
The United States should continue to encourage international participation in <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. civil operational land remote sensing satellite program by fur<strong>the</strong>r developing an<br />
international community of data users and by continuing discussions with prospective foreign<br />
land satellite system operators to explore <strong>the</strong> prospects for encouraging complementary<br />
and compatibility among future operational land satellite systems.<br />
The United States should ensure that data from <strong>the</strong> Interim and Fully Operational<br />
Systems are made available to foreign users through sales of standard data products on a<br />
nondiscriminatory basis. NOAA, working closely with <strong>the</strong> Department of State and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
interested agencies, should take <strong>the</strong> following actions:<br />
• Consider foreign user requirements in planning <strong>the</strong> Fully Operational System;<br />
• Conclude agreements with those foreign agencies wishing to receive data directly<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Interim and Fully Operational Systems;<br />
• Establish pricing policies for data sales and direct reception fees that are consistent<br />
for domestic and foreign users; and<br />
[14] • Continue <strong>the</strong> Landsat Ground Station Operations Working Group as a forum for<br />
<strong>the</strong> exchange of technical information.<br />
The land remote sensing satellite systems being developed by o<strong>the</strong>r countries offer<br />
<strong>the</strong> prospect of both competition and cooperation with <strong>the</strong> U.S. The competitive challenge<br />
to U.S. technologies leadership is likely to occur in such areas as <strong>the</strong> development<br />
of multilinear array sensor technology, and sales of ground equipment, services and data<br />
products. NOAA, working closely with <strong>the</strong> Department of State and o<strong>the</strong>r interested agencies,<br />
should encourage <strong>the</strong> expansion of world-wide markets for U.S. equipment, services<br />
and data products, and pursue prospects for complementary with foreign satellite operators<br />
in order to develop complementary system characteristics (e.g., orbits, coverage patterns<br />
and repeat cycles) and compatible system outputs (e.g., standard data product<br />
formats).<br />
Legislation for <strong>the</strong> Operational System<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Legal authority in four principal areas may be required in order to implement a civil<br />
operational land remote sensing satellite system:<br />
1. Authorization for NOAA to develop, own and manage <strong>the</strong> civil operational land<br />
remote sensing satellite system until <strong>the</strong> responsibility is transferred to a private<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>r entity;<br />
2. Establishment of <strong>the</strong> institutional structure, financial assistance and transition to<br />
private sector ownership and operation of <strong>the</strong> U.S. civil land remote sensing satellite<br />
system;<br />
3. Establishment of a regulatory system to ensure that a private sector owner’s activities<br />
are in compliance with U.S. laws, policies and international obligations; and<br />
4. Establishment of proprietary interests in operational land remote sensing data<br />
and standard data products.
Summary of Issues<br />
The following is a summary of <strong>the</strong> issues that have to be addressed as <strong>the</strong> Federal government<br />
moves toward an operational land remote sensing satellite system:<br />
[15] 1. Continuity of Data in <strong>the</strong> 1980s<br />
a. Operations<br />
• Whe<strong>the</strong>r to fund, construct and launch additional Landsat D series satellites<br />
with tape recorders to provide continuity in <strong>the</strong> acquisition of data from<br />
space until a Fully Operational System can be deployed?<br />
• Whe<strong>the</strong>r to improve <strong>the</strong> existing Landsat D ground segment at <strong>the</strong> Goddard<br />
Space Flight Center to provide continuous processing of <strong>the</strong> acquired data<br />
into timely and reliable standard data products?<br />
• Whe<strong>the</strong>r to transfer responsibility for command and control of <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
D space and ground segments from NASA to NOAA?<br />
• Whe<strong>the</strong>r to transfer responsibility for archiving and disseminating land<br />
remote sensing satellite standard data products from <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Interior to NOAA, and whe<strong>the</strong>r to co-locate <strong>the</strong>se functions with <strong>the</strong> satellite<br />
command and control and preprocessing facilities at <strong>the</strong> Goddard Space<br />
Flight Center?<br />
b. Management<br />
• When to submit to Congress an Administration bill that authorizes NOAA to<br />
own and manage an operational land remote sensing satellite system until<br />
that system is transferred to ano<strong>the</strong>r entity?<br />
2. Initiation of a Fully Operational System<br />
• How to validate user requirements and <strong>the</strong>ir priorities?<br />
• When to establish a Fully Operational System utilizing new sensors that meet a<br />
broad range of user needs?<br />
[16] 3. Pricing Policies and Financial Assistance<br />
• How to establish initial price increases for direct reception and for data and standard<br />
data products that are consistent for foreign and domestic users, provide adequate<br />
advance notice of price increases, and encourage potential users to invest in<br />
support equipment and reduce use of competing methods of data collection?<br />
• When to implement price increases?<br />
• How to fund <strong>the</strong> capital and operating costs of <strong>the</strong> Interim and Fully Operational<br />
Systems that exceed revenues?<br />
4. Institution for Private Sector Involvement<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 305<br />
• What, if any, institutional framework for private sector ownership should be submitted<br />
to Congress?<br />
• What mechanisms for regulating and providing Federal financial assistance to <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector should be provided in any bill authorizing an institutional framework<br />
for private sector involvement?<br />
• What policies should control <strong>the</strong> activities of any private sector owner for ownership<br />
of data and standard data products, for conditioning <strong>the</strong>ir dissemination on
306<br />
<strong>the</strong> payment of appropriate fees, for making possible <strong>the</strong> users’ sharing of system<br />
costs beyond <strong>the</strong> costs of reproduction, and for requiring consistent pricing and<br />
ensuring nondiscriminatory availability of standard data products.<br />
5. Market Expansion<br />
• What market expansion should be authorized for <strong>the</strong> Federal system manager?<br />
6. International Aspects<br />
• How to encourage <strong>the</strong> growth of worldwide markets for U.S.-produced equipment,<br />
services and land remote sensing satellite data and standard data products?<br />
Document II-33<br />
Document title: Ed Harper, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, Memorandum to Craig<br />
Fuller/Martin Anderson, “Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil<br />
Land Observing Satellite Activities,” July 13, 1981.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
The new Reagan administration, eager to reduce <strong>the</strong> federal budget and to transfer as many government<br />
functions as possible to <strong>the</strong> private sector, quickly reversed <strong>the</strong> key elements of President Carter’s<br />
approach to creating an operational framework for remote sensing and sought to commercialize <strong>the</strong><br />
program as soon as possible. In response, Comsat proposed that <strong>the</strong> government transfer <strong>the</strong> operation<br />
of both wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites and remote-sensing satellites to <strong>the</strong> private sector, arguing that <strong>the</strong> profits from<br />
selling wea<strong>the</strong>r imagery back to <strong>the</strong> government could be used to finance <strong>the</strong> long-term commercial<br />
development of remote sensing. The White House formed a Cabinet Council working group to consider<br />
this proposition.<br />
MEMORANDUM TO: Craig Fuller/Martin Anderson<br />
FROM.: Ed Harper<br />
July 13, 1981<br />
SUBJECT: Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil<br />
Land Observing Satellite Activities<br />
The purpose of this memo is to request that a working group within <strong>the</strong> Cabinet<br />
Council system be established to consider <strong>the</strong> following two issues related to private sector<br />
transfer of civil land observing satellite activities:<br />
– What is <strong>the</strong> best mechanism to implement <strong>the</strong> current policy of transfer of civil<br />
land remote sensing systems (LANDSAT) to <strong>the</strong> private sector as soon as possible?<br />
– Should <strong>the</strong> Administration consider simultaneously private sector transfer of both<br />
civil wea<strong>the</strong>r and land remote sensing systems?<br />
Background<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
With <strong>the</strong> revisions to <strong>the</strong> 1982 Budget <strong>the</strong> Administration explicitly stated its intention<br />
to hand-off operational responsibilities for land remote sensing to <strong>the</strong> private sector in <strong>the</strong><br />
mid-1980’s or sooner, if possible. This policy reflected <strong>the</strong> judgment that <strong>the</strong> Federal
investments in <strong>the</strong> LANDSAT program contained in <strong>the</strong> revised budget were sufficient to<br />
evaluate <strong>the</strong> usefulness of this data and that, if <strong>the</strong> operational uses were significant, <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector would provide follow-on satellites—<strong>the</strong>re would be no need for <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Government to purchase additional satellites beyond <strong>the</strong> two new NASA budgeted satellites<br />
(i.e., LANDSAT D and D1). Thus, <strong>the</strong> Administration withdrew <strong>the</strong> Carter commitment<br />
to data continuity through <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> decade and decided that additional<br />
satellites beyond <strong>the</strong> two new NASA satellites would depend on <strong>the</strong> private sector’s willingness<br />
to invest in and operate follow-on satellites. We are not asking <strong>the</strong> Cabinet Council<br />
to revisit this policy.<br />
The Department of Commerce (NOAA) is currently developing draft legislation<br />
designed to facilitate private sector transfer of land observing satellite activities. This legislation<br />
needs to be consistent with <strong>the</strong> policy decisions on <strong>the</strong> issues being referred to <strong>the</strong><br />
Cabinet Council.<br />
A potential private sector owner/operator has requested that <strong>the</strong> Administration consider<br />
transferring simultaneously both <strong>the</strong> civil wea<strong>the</strong>r and land remote sensing satellite<br />
systems to <strong>the</strong> private sector, and that selection of a private sector proposal or combination<br />
of proposals be based on <strong>the</strong> merits of <strong>the</strong> total package.<br />
• What is <strong>the</strong> best mechanism to implement <strong>the</strong> current policy of private sector transfer,<br />
as soon as possible? The options available to <strong>the</strong> Administration seem to be <strong>the</strong><br />
following:<br />
Laissez-faire approach—continue NOAA operation of satellites consistent with current<br />
policy and do nothing to encourage or discourage independent private sector<br />
initiatives.<br />
A decision to consider transferring <strong>the</strong> current Government inventory of civil remote<br />
sensing satellites and ground equipment to a private corporation or consortium of<br />
private corporations in return for cash and/or future considerations.<br />
A decision to provide some form of subsidy or long-term data contract (details to be<br />
specified consistent with budget of user agencies) in order to facilitate private sector<br />
transfer.<br />
A combination of <strong>the</strong> two previous options.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 307<br />
A decision to establish a federally chartered for-profit private corporation to own and<br />
operate a civil, land remote sensing satellite system—along <strong>the</strong> lines envisioned in <strong>the</strong><br />
Schmitt Bill introduced in <strong>the</strong> previous Congress.<br />
• Should <strong>the</strong> Administration simultaneously consider private sector transfer of both<br />
civil wea<strong>the</strong>r and land remote sensing systems?<br />
Transfer of <strong>the</strong> civil wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite program to <strong>the</strong> private sector would place more<br />
emphasis on <strong>the</strong> private sector and market forces in determining <strong>the</strong> level and scope<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se satellite activities. However, <strong>the</strong> assertion that such a transfer could reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> Federal budget and increase <strong>the</strong> Federal tax base without incurring significant<br />
additional Federal risks has not yet been validated.<br />
The Administration probably will not be able to determine if such a private sector<br />
transfer can be achieved on terms acceptable to <strong>the</strong> Government until proposals are<br />
received and evaluated.
308<br />
• The sub-issues that will need serious review and consideration include:<br />
What type of Federal commitment, if any, would be appropriate for purchase of ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r and/or land satellite data? To what extent should <strong>the</strong> Federal Government<br />
continue related technology development (e.g., R&D on advanced sensors)?<br />
What type of relationship should exist between <strong>the</strong> Government and any potential private<br />
sector owner/operator?<br />
What Federal assets and data rights should <strong>the</strong> Government consider transferring to<br />
<strong>the</strong> private sector?<br />
Assumptions<br />
• In light of <strong>the</strong> need for fiscal restraint, an increase in <strong>the</strong> Federal commitment to land<br />
remote sensing from space should be considered only to <strong>the</strong> extent that user agencies<br />
are willing to make tradeoffs against previously approved activities for 1983 and<br />
beyond in order to facilitate an expanded Federal commitment.<br />
• Since <strong>the</strong>re are o<strong>the</strong>r options for reducing <strong>the</strong> Federal expenditures for needed<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite data (e.g., combining civil/military polar-orbiting satellites, reducing<br />
<strong>the</strong> number of civil wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites in orbit, and placing wea<strong>the</strong>r sensors on commercial<br />
communications satellites), it should be assumed that <strong>the</strong> 1983–86 budget<br />
projections for civil wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites may be revised downward.<br />
The agencies affected include:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Agency Area Affected<br />
Department of Commerce NOAA operation of wea<strong>the</strong>r and land satellite<br />
systems.<br />
Department of Agriculture Agriculture forecasting based on wea<strong>the</strong>r and<br />
land satellite data.<br />
Department of Defense Data from civil wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites (in addition<br />
to data from military wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites).<br />
Department of Interior Geological, mineral and land management<br />
activities use land satellite data.<br />
Department of State International agreements on satellite remote<br />
sensing.<br />
Central Intelligence Agency National security.<br />
National Aeronautics and R&D using satellite data and new sensor<br />
Space Administration development for wea<strong>the</strong>r and land satellites.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 309<br />
Document II-34<br />
Document title: Government Technical Review Panel, “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
Technical Review Panel on Industry Responses on Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote<br />
Sensing Systems,” November 10, 1982, pp. 1–25.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration was quite intent on transferring control of <strong>the</strong> nation’s civilian<br />
Earth observation satellites to private industry, implementing this policy was a formidable task.<br />
Members of Congress raised a number of objections, particularly to <strong>the</strong> suggestion of selling off wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellites, as well as <strong>the</strong> Landsat system. Private industry, <strong>the</strong> supposed beneficiary of this proposal,<br />
was less than enthusiastic, as evidenced by this report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical Review Panel<br />
established to review various options for establishing a new remote-sensing policy. This report is based<br />
on corporate responses to a Department of Commerce request for information concerning <strong>the</strong> transfer<br />
of remote-sensing satellites to private industry. Respondents were placed into four categories based on<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir degree of support for <strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> privatization of remote sensing.<br />
Report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical Review Panel<br />
on Industry Responses on Commercialization of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems . . .<br />
November 10, 1982 . . .<br />
[1] I. OVERVIEW<br />
The panel convened on 26 October and reviewed fourteen responses to <strong>the</strong> Request<br />
for Information [RFI] that appeared in <strong>the</strong> Commerce Business Daily (CBD) on<br />
September 10, 1982. No attempt was made to solicit additional information or clarification<br />
from respondents.<br />
The responses varied in scope and sophistication from a handwritten postcard to a<br />
fairly comprehensive, all inclusive submission. Criteria for evaluation could not, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
be applied uniformly to all proposals. However, <strong>the</strong> following general criteria were used,<br />
as applicable:<br />
(1) Responsiveness to federal needs;<br />
(2) Continuity of data services;<br />
(3) Feasibility; and<br />
(4) National security and foreign policy concerns.<br />
Responses were grouped into four (4) natural categories reflective of <strong>the</strong>ir basic<br />
thrust:<br />
(1) Those favoring near-term commercialization of existing civil remote sensing capabilities,<br />
entirely or in part.<br />
(2) Those espousing independent entrepreneurial interests and advocating a climate<br />
conducive to free market competition.<br />
(3) Those favoring government retention of <strong>the</strong> existing system, at least for <strong>the</strong> immediate<br />
future.<br />
(4) O<strong>the</strong>r.
310<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
[2] II. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS<br />
It could fairly be stated that a simple evaluation of responses to <strong>the</strong> RFI would fulfill <strong>the</strong><br />
charter of this panel and that fur<strong>the</strong>r comment is gratuitous. None<strong>the</strong>less, our study of this<br />
issue and <strong>the</strong> responses produced a consensus which we would be remiss not to surface.<br />
Insofar as <strong>the</strong> responses are positive toward <strong>the</strong> issue of commercialization, <strong>the</strong>y tend<br />
to assert ra<strong>the</strong>r than demonstrate an ability to satisfy whatever criteria we might establish.<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> panel harbors significant doubt as to whe<strong>the</strong>r all U.S. government interests<br />
could be satisfactorily protected if <strong>the</strong> approach is simply to substitute one monopolistic<br />
organization for ano<strong>the</strong>r. Perhaps, it will take an RFP [Request for Proposals] to<br />
answer <strong>the</strong> toughest questions.<br />
The RFI elicited more interest than might have been expected and surfaced a strong<br />
body of opinion that urges restraint and caution in proceeding with commercialization.<br />
There is an underlying <strong>the</strong>me common to <strong>the</strong> submissions from several large, responsible,<br />
and knowledgeable entities that commercialization now could inhibit <strong>the</strong> free market<br />
process. They suggest continued government operation of <strong>the</strong> system while fostering an<br />
environment conducive to an expansion of free enterprise activities.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> concerns which permeated our discussions of a non-government monopoly<br />
environment, was <strong>the</strong> potential lack of vigor in <strong>the</strong> R&D effort and lack of incentive to<br />
adopt improvements which may materialize. This has been <strong>the</strong> case in <strong>the</strong> satellite communications<br />
field. It is our belief that <strong>the</strong> best answer to <strong>the</strong> emerging foreign competition<br />
lies in <strong>the</strong> continuation of a dynamic U.S. government R&D system.<br />
It is also <strong>the</strong> belief of <strong>the</strong> panel that <strong>the</strong>re is considerable financial, policy and program<br />
risk to <strong>the</strong> government in commercializing wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites and that <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
clear policy or financial benefit to be realized. Too, <strong>the</strong>re is no clear consensus among <strong>the</strong><br />
respondents as to <strong>the</strong> desirability or feasibility of commercializing any of our civil remote<br />
sensing systems at this time.<br />
[3] Additionally, creation of a single, government-chartered, subsidized firm for this purpose<br />
would seem anti<strong>the</strong>tical to <strong>the</strong> underlying economic philosophy of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
and, in particular, this Administration, as we understand it. If regulated, it would result in<br />
<strong>the</strong> creation of a “utility” without <strong>the</strong> competitive incentives for reducing operating costs<br />
or increasing efficiency. If unregulated, <strong>the</strong> chartered entity would tend to assume <strong>the</strong><br />
characteristics of a legislated monopoly.<br />
Finally, <strong>the</strong> following general national security concerns exist in commercialization of<br />
remote sensing from space even though not specifically addressed in <strong>the</strong> individual evaluations:<br />
(1) There is some potential for military and intelligence application of current data<br />
products, and<br />
(2) with possible system improvement under private sector control <strong>the</strong>se concerns<br />
would increase.<br />
(3) There are technology transfer issues which might be exacerbated if a private sector<br />
operator became <strong>the</strong> world wide supplier of remote sensing equipment and<br />
spares.<br />
(4) Controls over data dissemination, and provision for DOD emergency use would<br />
require very careful stipulation in any transfer of civil remote sensing activities.<br />
[4] III. EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSES<br />
1. CATEGORY ONE - Those favoring near-term commercialization of existing civil<br />
remote sensing capabilities, entirely or in part.<br />
COMSAT, Environmental Satellite Data, Inc., and Control Data Corporation are will-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 311<br />
ing to proceed now in assuming at least part of <strong>the</strong> existing land and/or wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite<br />
systems. COMSAT proposes to take over both systems in <strong>the</strong>ir entirety. Control Data<br />
Corporation proposes a phased take-over of <strong>the</strong> Landsat ground processing and distribution<br />
system, while Environmental Satellite Data, Inc. suggests operating specific segments<br />
of <strong>the</strong> GOES ground system. Although <strong>the</strong> magnitude of <strong>the</strong> private sector take-over varies<br />
substantially among <strong>the</strong>se firms, sufficient details were provided to permit an evaluation<br />
under all four general criteria. A fourth respondent, <strong>the</strong> American Science and<br />
Technology Corporation, proposes to take over <strong>the</strong> command and control of <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
satellites. However, <strong>the</strong> thrust of this response focuses on new entrepreneurial interests<br />
and is <strong>the</strong>refore reported under Category 2.<br />
A. Communications Satellite Corporation, Comsat General Corporation (COMSAT)<br />
COMSAT has submitted <strong>the</strong> only proposal advocating total commercialization of<br />
civil remote sensing. Additionally, COMSAT emphasizes a “concern for urgency” in such<br />
a transfer. While COMSAT presents <strong>the</strong> most detailed proposal (due to <strong>the</strong> magnitude of<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer), it reiterates its earlier position of requiring both <strong>the</strong> civil wea<strong>the</strong>r and land<br />
remote sensing satellites to insure future commercial viability.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
The COMSAT concept involves private sector purchase of <strong>the</strong> current assets<br />
in <strong>the</strong> government’s land and civil wea<strong>the</strong>r systems. These would be enhanced in<br />
<strong>the</strong> future by incorporating additional sensors upon identification [5] of <strong>the</strong> specific<br />
user needs. The federal government would pay most of <strong>the</strong> incremental<br />
costs. For example, COMSAT suggests adding sensors that would collect oceanic<br />
data on water color, winds, ice, and wave conditions.<br />
It is not clear that Landsat’s coarse (80 meter) multispectral scanner data,<br />
which are used extensively for making agricultural assessments, would be included<br />
as part of <strong>the</strong> basic data collection package that COMSAT suggests for <strong>the</strong> post-<br />
Landsat D’ era of <strong>the</strong> late 1980’s. However, if this need is identified as a<br />
continuing federal user requirement COMSAT would provide this capability, at<br />
additional cost, if it were not part of <strong>the</strong> projected array of imagery collection<br />
capabilities. Thus, from <strong>the</strong> viewpoint of system technical capabilities, this concept<br />
would be more than fully responsive to <strong>the</strong> current and future level of federal<br />
user requirements with reference to timeliness, extent and frequency of<br />
coverage, imagery characteristics and data formats, and timeliness.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> proposal would not appear to meet ano<strong>the</strong>r critical user<br />
requirement—assurance of data availability at reasonable cost. The COMSAT<br />
concept would require federal data purchases at an annual level of about<br />
$315–330 million per year. For <strong>the</strong> government to meet this amount, it appears<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re will have to be ei<strong>the</strong>r a substantial increase in <strong>the</strong> cost of land and/or<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r data or <strong>the</strong>re will be substantial direct subsidy payments to COMSAT.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r factor that is less significant than ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> two preceding factors is<br />
<strong>the</strong> matter of proprietary rights. The COMSAT concept also calls for <strong>the</strong> system<br />
owner/operator to have copyright and proprietary rights over <strong>the</strong> data that are collected.<br />
Such rights, while desirable from <strong>the</strong> viewpoint of helping make <strong>the</strong> system<br />
self-financing, have <strong>the</strong> disadvantage of inhibiting <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> collected data.<br />
[6] (2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Implementation of <strong>the</strong> COMSAT concept would appear to satisfy <strong>the</strong> major<br />
consideration of maintaining continuity of data flow. However, <strong>the</strong> concept does<br />
afford <strong>the</strong> system operator a loophole for (a) restricted liability only if <strong>the</strong> “best<br />
efforts” are not made, and (b) also for performance being contingent upon <strong>the</strong> fed-
312<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
eral government meeting extensive financial commitments for a 15 year period.<br />
Should changes occur in <strong>the</strong> international price structure which adversely<br />
effect profitability, i.e., undercutting of U.S. commercial data prices by a foreign<br />
competitor, a commercial operator might elect to abandon <strong>the</strong> enterprise, or use<br />
<strong>the</strong> “best effort” principle to demand increased federal price subsidies.<br />
(3) Feasibility<br />
This proposal would replace existing wea<strong>the</strong>r ground systems, which need<br />
technical improvement, and would use current Landsat facilities and equipment.<br />
In addition, a centralized facility is proposed for both land and environmental<br />
data based on Landsat-type hardware. Centralization is technically valid, but does<br />
not exploit what is currently known about <strong>the</strong> advantage of distributed processing<br />
architecture, insofar as service to users is concerned[,] i.e., throughput, availability,<br />
and accessibility of data. The proposed technology to be employed on<br />
COMSAT’s LANDSTAR, <strong>the</strong> successor to LANDSAT, includes linear array focal<br />
planes and on-board data compression capability. These are needed improvements<br />
if high resolution solid-state sensors are adopted. Not mentioned, but very<br />
much needed on any follow-on sensor, is <strong>the</strong> addition of cooled focal planes for<br />
short-wave and <strong>the</strong>rmal infrared data, and a capability of off-nadir pointing for<br />
more frequent coverage of <strong>the</strong> same scene. The addition of syn<strong>the</strong>tic aperture<br />
radar sensors for data set merging is very appealing as is <strong>the</strong> integration of wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
and land remote sensing systems for [7] more efficient programming of data<br />
acquisition and low-orbit collection of environmental data. COMSAT recognizes<br />
that guaranteed progress in technological advances and maintenance of U.S.<br />
technological leadership can only be realized if government retains an active role<br />
in advanced technology development, ei<strong>the</strong>r alone or in some joint role with <strong>the</strong><br />
operator of <strong>the</strong> systems.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
The COMSAT proposal is based on a “best effort” principle which does not<br />
commit <strong>the</strong> Corporation to provide continuous services over <strong>the</strong> lifetime of <strong>the</strong><br />
contract. A disruption of land remote sensing and wea<strong>the</strong>r services could have<br />
substantial foreign policy implications in terms of traditional U.S. international<br />
data exchange policies which emphasize continuity and nondiscrimination.<br />
COMSAT states its intentions to broaden <strong>the</strong> primary data market by limiting<br />
secondary reproduction and distribution of data. This could ultimately jeopardize<br />
<strong>the</strong> continuous and reciprocal international exchange of meteorological data<br />
upon which this country is vitally dependent.<br />
If a national emergency required disruption of commercial service in Metsats<br />
and/or Landsats, <strong>the</strong> government would have to reimburse <strong>the</strong> commercial operator<br />
for lost revenues. This would entail an additional government expense not<br />
incurred under government ownership and would constitute an additional complicating<br />
factor in making national security and foreign policy decisions.<br />
COMSAT proposes to sell “surplus” DCS (data collection system) capacity to<br />
commercial users which could be used for non-environmental purposes.<br />
However, by agreement in <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Union (ITU),<br />
DCS frequencies are to be used exclusively for environmental monitoring.<br />
No contractual or legislative stipulation should preclude <strong>the</strong> government<br />
from developing its own satellite systems for national security purposes.<br />
[8] B. Environmental Satellite Data, Inc. (ESD)<br />
ESD does not address Landsat or <strong>the</strong> overall wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite system. Instead <strong>the</strong><br />
company offers to assume responsibility for a small segment of <strong>the</strong> GOES data processing
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 313<br />
while focusing on <strong>the</strong> distribution of GOES imagery to commercial users. The proposal<br />
would terminate <strong>the</strong> current GOES-TAP “no-cost” service and replace it with a larger,<br />
more efficient system requiring a commercial user contractual fee. This concept could be<br />
implemented under existing policies and regulations.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Within <strong>the</strong> limited scope of this proposal ESD appears to satisfy federal needs<br />
and to be responsive to increasing numbers of users.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Phased implementation should assure continuity of service.<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
This proposal contains no technical detail, but it does assert that <strong>the</strong> Visible<br />
and Infrared Spin-Scan Radiometer earth locating program can be improved to<br />
<strong>the</strong> point that one pixel location accuracy of <strong>the</strong> grid on <strong>the</strong> satellite imagery can<br />
be obtained within six hours after completion of maneuver of <strong>the</strong> satellite, vice 10<br />
pixels and 24 hours. Since larger and faster computers than those currently used<br />
are available, this should be readily achievable. However, no conclusions on capability<br />
are possible without specifics on computers and data management.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
ESD proposes to distribute only a small part of <strong>the</strong> total GOES wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite<br />
imagery. So long as any government agreement with ESD includes provision<br />
for equal, non-discriminatory access to data, no foreign policy issues are raised.<br />
No national security problems exist.<br />
[9] C. Control Data Corporation, CDC<br />
CDC proposes a time-phased, joint government/industry venture beginning with<br />
ground processing of Landsat data by 1984. This would lead to economic validation of a<br />
transition from a subsidized, government service operation to a product-based, profit<br />
making venture. The feasibility of transfer of <strong>the</strong> space segment for remote land sensing<br />
would be evaluated during <strong>the</strong> transition. Wea<strong>the</strong>r data could be included in such a<br />
ground data processing system.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
CDC’s joint venture concept could be designed to meet specific federal needs<br />
throughout <strong>the</strong> transition to private ownership and operation.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Not specifically addressed, but preceding comments are applicable.<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
CDC’s stated experience with data processing and analysis and with DOD<br />
space systems would attribute to CDC a technical credibility sufficient to warrant<br />
serious consideration of <strong>the</strong>ir suggestions on commercialization. However, no<br />
details of a technical nature were provided. CDC’s concept represents a conservative,<br />
low technical risk approach to eventual commercialization. CDC, along with<br />
COMSAT and Terra-Mar, explicitly recognizes <strong>the</strong> greatly improved information<br />
extraction potential in merged or “fused” data sets from different parts of <strong>the</strong><br />
electromagnetic spectrum. CDC recognizes that technological progress can only<br />
be assured if <strong>the</strong> government maintains an active role in advanced technology
314<br />
development, ei<strong>the</strong>r alone or in some joint role with <strong>the</strong> operator of <strong>the</strong> systems.<br />
The data provided on concepts for user services facilities illustrates at least a basic<br />
understanding of how such facilities should function in data processing, archiving,<br />
and distribution. The highly buffered system concept presented represents<br />
state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art thinking on high-rate, high-throughput, functional requirements.<br />
[10] (4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
CDC’s concept does not pose a foreign policy concern if <strong>the</strong> suggested user<br />
service scheme satisfies present policies on data access and distribution, and if a<br />
discriminatory pricing system is not imposed. However, <strong>the</strong> response fails to<br />
address <strong>the</strong>se issues. No national security concerns are raised.<br />
[11] 2. CATEGORY TWO - Those espousing independent entrepreneurial interests and<br />
advocating a climate conducive to free market competition.<br />
Three firms—Terra-Mar, American Science and Technology Corporation and Space<br />
Services, Inc.—advocate a free enterprise environment which permits a natural evolution<br />
and competitive development of <strong>the</strong> private sector remote sensing industry. Their premise<br />
is that successful commercialization will occur only in a competitive market where government<br />
regulations and guarantees are held to a minimum. System development would<br />
be driven by market forces and user requirements ra<strong>the</strong>r than technological capabilities.<br />
While Terra-Mar looks at <strong>the</strong> philosophy underlying <strong>the</strong> development of free-market<br />
remote sensing, AS&T and SSI outline <strong>the</strong>ir respective entrepreneurial concepts and<br />
future plans concerning satellite remote sensing, satellite launch and associated services.<br />
A. Terra-Mar<br />
Terra-Mar is developing an earth resources data service aimed primarily at commercial<br />
clients. The company’s data service plan is based on extensive in-house market<br />
research. Terra-Mar states that <strong>the</strong> exploitable market in remote sensing is based on computer<br />
and information technology. They advocate an open market for data within <strong>the</strong><br />
value-added industry. This company is concerned that <strong>the</strong> immediate transfer of <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
Landsat assets could be as much a hindrance to commercialization as a benefit, unless<br />
<strong>the</strong> government takes prudent steps to smooth a gradual transition to private operation.<br />
Terra-Mar is opposed to near-term transfer of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites because of <strong>the</strong> vital nature<br />
of wea<strong>the</strong>r information in serving <strong>the</strong> national interest.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Not specifically addressed<br />
[12] (2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Not addressed.<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
No specific systems were recommended or discussed in detail. Comments<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> desirability and feasibility of a distributed processing system, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> probable advance of computer technology are well within <strong>the</strong> current consensus<br />
of industry and government on this technology. The efficiencies of a distributed<br />
system regarding throughput and availability of data are recognized. In<br />
addition, a distributed system can provide many levels of complexity in analysis<br />
capability, which will permit superior tailoring of product and information extraction<br />
capabilities.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
No concerns were noted.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 315<br />
B. American Science and Technology Corporation (AS&T)<br />
AS&T proposes to take over command and control of Landsat-4 and D’ while pursuing<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong>ir own remote sensing satellites. They do not plan to process<br />
or to distribute Landsat data, but will build <strong>the</strong>ir own ground segment to serve future<br />
AS&T space platforms. AS&T does not express any interest in civil wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems.<br />
Additionally, <strong>the</strong>y do not believe fur<strong>the</strong>r government regulation or legislation is<br />
required or necessary for <strong>the</strong> implementation of this proposal.<br />
NOTE: AS&T has been working in conjunction with SSI in planning <strong>the</strong> launch<br />
of AS&T remote sensing satellites as early as 1984.<br />
[13] (1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
AS&T would assume operational control (not ownership) of Landsat-4 and<br />
Landsat D’. These satellites would be integrated with AS&T’s own low-cost Advanced<br />
Earth Resources Observation Satellite (AEROS) earth remote sensing satellites,<br />
which would provide complementary data. Thus, many user data needs, e.g., data<br />
format, compatibility, resolution, frequency of coverage, would be initially satisfied<br />
by <strong>the</strong> combined Landsat-AS&T system. AS&T’s proposed flat fee for access to sensors<br />
and data flows is attractive, and on <strong>the</strong> surface, very cost competitive. However,<br />
data from non-U.S. areas would have to be relayed via TDRSS, or obtained from foreign<br />
ground stations—with potentially high additional costs. Foreign coverage, lacking<br />
TDRSS capability and foreign stations, may prove inadequate.<br />
The stable of sensors which AS&T proposes to build and launch by 1985 cannot,<br />
by <strong>the</strong>mselves, satisfy current and projected federal requirements for multispectral<br />
data since <strong>the</strong> specifications do not include <strong>the</strong> spectral coverage or<br />
spectral resolutions required. Spatial resolutions which are comparable to<br />
Landsat do not solve <strong>the</strong> problem, since <strong>the</strong> large majority of analysis is with spectral,<br />
not spatial, information extraction.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Continuity of service appears to be assured, provided AS&T can maintain<br />
development, launch and operational schedules.<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
AS&T proposes <strong>the</strong> take-over of existing Landsat-4 ground subsystems relating<br />
to command, control, and maintenance of <strong>the</strong> health of <strong>the</strong> spacecraft. However,<br />
AS&T apparently does not possess <strong>the</strong> broad range of experience and expertise<br />
necessary to maintain highly complex spacecraft such as Landsat, nor is <strong>the</strong>re a<br />
personnel and facility resource extant in AS&T upon which <strong>the</strong> company could<br />
rely in any spacecraft emergency.<br />
[14] Statements made previously by AS&T in public fora, but not included in this<br />
submittal, have alluded to probable costs of replacement or complementary sensors<br />
which are unrealistically low, in our estimation. Technical risks associated<br />
with space activities to be undertaken by companies new to this activity are very<br />
high, and translate directly into <strong>the</strong> necessity for large cash contingencies. In<br />
addition, <strong>the</strong> probability that complex sensors can be acquired, integrated,<br />
launched and checked out in three years is very low, as discussed in <strong>the</strong> comparable<br />
section on feasibility for SSI.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
AS&T does not wish to pay for TDRSS. Unless <strong>the</strong> U.S. government continues<br />
to support TDRSS for Landsat, it is unlikely that a current Landsat global data<br />
base could be maintained for U.S. or foreign users. This has both national secu-
316<br />
rity and foreign policy implications.<br />
The AS&T proposal raises <strong>the</strong> following additional foreign policy and national<br />
security concerns: (a) Possible assumption of U.S. foreign policy obligations by a private<br />
firm; and (b) Data distribution in a nondiscriminatory manner to all customers.<br />
C. Space Services Incorporated of America (SSI)<br />
SSI is developing launch services for space activities and is not interested in <strong>the</strong><br />
ownership or operation of Landsat, related data acquisition or data distribution. SSI<br />
believes land and wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites should not be considered simultaneously for transfer<br />
to private industry, and fur<strong>the</strong>r that wea<strong>the</strong>r systems should not be commercialized at this<br />
time. SSI states that any transfer to private industry should not create a monopoly, but<br />
allow opportunity to compete in <strong>the</strong> free marketplace.<br />
[15] NOTE: SSI has been working in conjunction with AS&T in planning <strong>the</strong> launch<br />
of AS&T remote sensing satellites as early as 1984.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Not specifically addressed.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
See AS&T proposal.<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
This proposal states an intent to launch private sensors as early as 1984 which<br />
would “complement” or “overlap” existing Landsat capabilities. The development<br />
and acquisition of free-flying space remote sensors typically take six to eight years.<br />
However, disregarding government delays and procedures, and assuming state-of<strong>the</strong>-art<br />
technology, <strong>the</strong> fabrication, test, integration and launch might take three<br />
to five years given <strong>the</strong> most optimistic estimate. In addition, <strong>the</strong> inclusion of<br />
cooled focal planes aboard <strong>the</strong> sensor, which are important in geology and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
space applications, are unlikely to be achieved in this time frame, <strong>the</strong>reby eliminating<br />
<strong>the</strong> majority of federal and o<strong>the</strong>r sophisticated users of <strong>the</strong>rmal data.<br />
Lastly, SSI has not demonstrated a capability to launch a 1000–2000 Kg payload<br />
into orbit, nor does SSI appear to have <strong>the</strong> capability to command and control <strong>the</strong><br />
spacecraft, check out on-board systems, or process sensor data. SSI makes <strong>the</strong><br />
statement that it “supports <strong>the</strong> concept of allowing <strong>the</strong> private sector to use government<br />
facilities and equipment already in place.” However, existing facilities<br />
and equipment can only be used by expert, experienced personnel with access to<br />
a very broad range of resources to solve problems, maintain system capabilities<br />
and provide continuity. SSI does not appear to possess <strong>the</strong>se attributes<br />
[16] (4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
SSI recognizes government responsibilities to authorize and supervise private<br />
remote sensing activities in accordance with <strong>the</strong> 1967 Outer Space Treaty and<br />
national security interests. However, <strong>the</strong>re is concern whe<strong>the</strong>r fur<strong>the</strong>r commercial<br />
space launch services, from within <strong>the</strong> U.S., be permitted until a well-defined<br />
national policy and regulatory framework dealing with such activities have been<br />
established and approved.<br />
[17] 3. CATEGORY THREE - Those favoring government retention of <strong>the</strong> existing system,<br />
at least for <strong>the</strong> immediate future.<br />
The University of Massachusetts, RCA, Hughes Aircraft, General Electric and Ocean<br />
Routes Inc., support continued government operation and ownership of <strong>the</strong> remote sens-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 317<br />
ing system through <strong>the</strong> next ten years or more. They present alternatives that could lead<br />
to eventual commercialization of Landsat, but <strong>the</strong>se involve extensive government participation<br />
through various management, joint-operator or financing options. These respondents<br />
are opposed to commercialization of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite programs, as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
creation of any monopolistic commercial entity for land sensing. It should be noted that<br />
three of <strong>the</strong> nation’s major aerospace industries (RCA, GE, and Hughes) share this basic<br />
position.<br />
A. Remote Sensing Center, University of Massachusetts (UMass)<br />
The UMass proposal is somewhat ambiguous but looks to an evolutionary, step-bystep<br />
approach leading toward commercialization. However, <strong>the</strong>y believe <strong>the</strong> current systems<br />
would require extensive federal support if a transfer to private industry were<br />
attempted in <strong>the</strong> near-term. In <strong>the</strong> UMass plan, individual segments of <strong>the</strong> current systems<br />
would be modified and gradually replaced by <strong>the</strong> private sector until full commercialization<br />
of <strong>the</strong> land sensing system was achieved. They doubt that total private-sector ownership/operation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r sensing system is feasible now or in <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Insufficient information is provided to permit an evaluation; however, a<br />
phased take-over should fulfill user needs initially.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Information provided is indeterminate for evaluation; comments in <strong>the</strong> preceding<br />
paragraphs apply.<br />
[18] (3) Feasibility:<br />
The plan for stepwise commercialization can be implemented within current<br />
technology. The subsystems of data receive/record, command and control, image<br />
processing, assessment and analysis, and communications and distribution are<br />
readily separable. The distributed processing proposed is subject to <strong>the</strong> same comments<br />
as for Terra-Mar. The (apparent) desire for a central archive, as well as local,<br />
limited archives, is technically feasible; it requires only a data management decision.<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> “existing systems would be unaffected,” federal global modeling<br />
capacities would not be affected in <strong>the</strong> near-term (8–10 years). However, <strong>the</strong> proposal<br />
postulates eventual replacement of government sensors by private sensors<br />
which could acquire “Landsat-like” data. It seems unlikely that <strong>the</strong> requirements<br />
for more advanced sets of multispectral data can be satisfied by Landsat-like private<br />
sensors. For example, geological researchers are finding that spectral resolutions<br />
on <strong>the</strong> order of 10–20 nanometers within <strong>the</strong> short wavelength region<br />
(1.1–2.6 micrometers) and 30–50 nanometers within <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>rmal region (8–14<br />
micrometers) are showing enormous promise for extracting unique signatures of<br />
surficial minerals, <strong>the</strong>reby allowing inferences on subsurface content and structure.<br />
These capabilities are beyond <strong>the</strong> spectral resolutions on Landsat.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
This response mentions some aspects of national security and foreign policy<br />
issues—e.g., providing priority wea<strong>the</strong>r service to DOD. However, <strong>the</strong> entire concept<br />
is drawn up in <strong>the</strong> context of U.S. coverage only, with no provision for meeting<br />
federal needs for foreign area data, or for serving foreign users.
318<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
B. RCA (RCA Astro-Electronics, RCA American Communications and RCA Service<br />
Company)<br />
RCA believes that Landsat is a candidate for future transfer to private industry<br />
only if <strong>the</strong>re are significant government commitments and financial [19] guarantees.<br />
While stating that both wea<strong>the</strong>r systems (polar-orbiters and geostationary) must remain in<br />
<strong>the</strong> government, RCA offers an alternate financing proposal, i.e., leasing of GOES and<br />
TIROS spacecraft, tracking, data reception and data distribution. The leasing option does<br />
not provide cost savings over <strong>the</strong> long term and does not include provisions for R&D, data<br />
processing, or launch services.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Not adequately addressed for evaluation, although a leasing arrangement<br />
could stipulate those requirements to be met.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Landsat is not addressed. Continuity of metsat data is assured for <strong>the</strong> duration<br />
of a lease.<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
RCA has well-established technical credentials to perform as <strong>the</strong>y have outlined.<br />
The proposed changes in operations and system upgrade do not represent<br />
technical risk or significant technical development. The postulated 3-axis stabilized<br />
version of GOES appears reasonable, but not enough information is given<br />
to assess <strong>the</strong> weight margin or implied lifetime. The proposed Satellite<br />
Operations Control Center (SOCC) functional flow is credible and achievable,<br />
but whe<strong>the</strong>r or not higher automation will result in “minimum on-site support”<br />
cannot be ascertained. A particularly attractive aspect was <strong>the</strong> approach to distributed<br />
processing architecture, single-point failure recovery, and redundancy.<br />
Somewhat questionable was <strong>the</strong> claim made for optimized real-time versus off-line<br />
partitioning for telemetry analysis, since it is not clear what may be optimum for<br />
SOCC functional allocations.<br />
[20] For data distribution, <strong>the</strong> proposal indicates that satellite communications<br />
are <strong>the</strong> best form of consolidation of National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service (NWS) requirements,<br />
but <strong>the</strong> L-band frequency allocation would require a variance from <strong>the</strong><br />
FCC. The relay capability proposed for <strong>the</strong> GOES satellite requires new design<br />
work plus development effort on <strong>the</strong> Marisat traveling-wave-tube, not an attractive<br />
prospect from a technical risk standpoint. The electronic specifications given for<br />
power, frequency, gain, bandwidth and sidelobes were not analyzed in detail, but<br />
appear reasonable.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Issues:<br />
There are no national security or foreign policy implications in <strong>the</strong> RCA<br />
response.<br />
C. Hughes Aircraft Company (Hughes)<br />
Hughes does not propose to participate in commercialization activities and states<br />
that both land and wea<strong>the</strong>r programs should remain in <strong>the</strong> federal government for at least<br />
ten years. Hughes recognizes <strong>the</strong> national importance of land remote sensing data in<br />
international trade and global strategic resource inventories. Therefore, <strong>the</strong>y propose that<br />
if transfer of land sensing should proceed, <strong>the</strong>n: (a) The land and wea<strong>the</strong>r programs be<br />
addressed separately; (b) Vendor selection be done competitively; and (c) No dominant<br />
entity or monopoly be created.
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(2) Continuity of Services:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
[21] (3) Feasibility:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
D. General Electric Company, Space Systems Division (GE)<br />
GE states, “The Landsat program continues to perform as a significant national<br />
asset.” After extensive analysis, GE finds that private sector takeover of Landsat has unacceptably<br />
high business risks at this time. However, “. . . continuation of Landsat under government<br />
sponsorship is imperative to protect <strong>the</strong> $1 billion investment . . . and to permit<br />
eventual private sector involvement if it proves economically feasible in <strong>the</strong> future.”<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems are not addressed, and <strong>the</strong>re is no basis for substantive evaluation.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
[22] E. Ocean Routes Inc. (OCEANROUTES)<br />
This company strongly opposes <strong>the</strong> concept of transferring wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites to <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector, since such an enterprise would have to be regulated and run as a monopoly<br />
with government subsidies or guarantees. They do not address land remote sensing.<br />
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(2) Continuity of Service:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
(3) Feasibility:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 319<br />
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:<br />
Not applicable.<br />
[23] 4. CATEGORY FOUR - O<strong>the</strong>r Responses.<br />
Three additional responses were received which do not fit <strong>the</strong> criteria used in this
320<br />
report or explicitly address <strong>the</strong> questions outlined in <strong>the</strong> CBD announcement of<br />
September 10, 1982. Comments on <strong>the</strong>se responses are included to express <strong>the</strong> additional<br />
interest generated by <strong>the</strong> Commerce announcement.<br />
A. Autometric, Inc.<br />
Autometric favors <strong>the</strong> move to commercialize civil remote sensing systems but<br />
believes a near-term move is premature, i.e., industry is being placed in a position of bidding<br />
on an unknown entity. If industry miscalculates <strong>the</strong> market, <strong>the</strong> government may have<br />
to “. . . bail <strong>the</strong>m out.” Autometric does propose a quantitative evaluation of <strong>the</strong> relative<br />
merits of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 4 Thematic Mapper, <strong>the</strong> French SPOT [Haute (High) Resolution<br />
Visible on SPOT] HRV sensor, and <strong>the</strong> Large Format Camera that will be flown on <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Shuttle. The evaluation would be used to ascertain <strong>the</strong> commercial value of <strong>the</strong><br />
Thematic Mapper data. No commercialization proposition or comments are provided.<br />
B. Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)<br />
CSC has been involved with <strong>the</strong> Landsat program since its inception. They do not<br />
comment directly on private sector transfer, but state a keen interest in <strong>the</strong> future of land<br />
sensing and request inclusion in fur<strong>the</strong>r discussions which may be held with industry.<br />
C. Robert Georgevic<br />
This individual described himself as a University Professor from sou<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
California. He did not respond in detail, but advocates retaining civil remote sensing systems<br />
in <strong>the</strong> U.S. government.<br />
[24] IV. LIST OF RESPONSES<br />
Section Response<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
1.A Report, “Commercialization of Civil Remote Sensing,” Communications<br />
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), October 22, 1982.<br />
1.B Unsolicited Proposal, Environmental Satellite Data, Inc., September 17, 1982.<br />
1.C White Paper, “Civil Operational Remote Sensing From Space,” Control Data<br />
Corporation, October 1982.<br />
2.A Document TMA 10-011-82, “Civil Operational Remote Sensing From Space,”<br />
Terra-Mar, October 1982.<br />
2.B Report, “Response to <strong>the</strong> Request for Information With Respect to Civil<br />
Operational Remote Sensing From Space,” American Science and<br />
Technology Corporation, October 22, 1982.<br />
2.C Letter to Dr. John H. McElroy, Re: “Civil Remote Sensing Satellites; Request<br />
for Information,” Space Services Incorporated of America, October 22, 1982.<br />
3.A Document, “A Plan for Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Civil Remote Sensing<br />
System,” Remote Sensing Center - Hasbrouck, University of Massachusetts,<br />
October 21, 1982.<br />
3.B Report R-4412, “Private Sector Involvement in Civil Operational Remote<br />
Sensing from Space,” RCA, October 22, 1982.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 321<br />
3.C Report, “Commercialization of United States Civil Remote Sensing Satellite<br />
Systems,” Hughes Aircraft Company, October 21, 1982.<br />
[25] 3.D Letter to Dr. John H. McElroy, “Civil Operational Remote Sensing from<br />
Space,” Space Systems Division, General Electric Company, October 21, 1982.<br />
3.E Letter to Dr. John H. McElroy, Response to Secretary’s Request for<br />
Information, Ocean Routes Incorporated, October 15, 1982.<br />
4.A Precis, “A Quantitative Evaluation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat/TM, <strong>the</strong> SPOT/HRV and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Large Format Camera,” Autometric, Incorporated, October 20, 1982.<br />
4.B Letter to Dr. John H. McElroy, Computer Sciences Corporation, October 21,<br />
1982.<br />
4.C Postcard to Dr. John H. McElroy from Dr. Robert Georgevic, San Diego,<br />
California, October 12, 1982. . . .<br />
Document II-35<br />
Document title: “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,” House Concurrent<br />
Resolution 168, November 14, 1983.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
While Congress was willing to consider transferring control of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system to <strong>the</strong> private sector,<br />
it did not want to do <strong>the</strong> same with <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, citing <strong>the</strong> argument that wea<strong>the</strong>r services<br />
were clearly a public good. Therefore, House member Don Fuqua of Florida introduced House<br />
Concurrent Resolution 168 in November 1983; <strong>the</strong> resolution would effectively exclude wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites<br />
from <strong>the</strong> privatization process. Because <strong>the</strong> issue of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites was impeding progress on<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer of Earth observation satellites to <strong>the</strong> private sector, President Reagan signed <strong>the</strong> resolution,<br />
thus opening <strong>the</strong> door for <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, which was passed<br />
just seven months later.<br />
H 9812 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE November 14, 1983<br />
[no pagination] TRANSFER OF CIVIL METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Speaker, I move to suspend <strong>the</strong> rules and agree to <strong>the</strong> concurrent resolution,<br />
(H. Con. Res. 168) expressing <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong> Congress that it is not appropriate<br />
at this time to transfer ownership or management, of any civil meteorological satellite system<br />
and associated ground system equipment to <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
The clerk read as follows:<br />
H. Con. Res. 168<br />
Whereas <strong>the</strong> Federal Government has traditionally provided wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts which<br />
rely significantly upon data ga<strong>the</strong>red by civil meteorological satellites;<br />
Whereas within <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>the</strong> Federal Government is <strong>the</strong> principal user of
322<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
data ga<strong>the</strong>red by civil meteorological satellites:<br />
Whereas <strong>the</strong> Federal Government has <strong>the</strong> responsibility for providing forecasts and<br />
warnings regarding severe wea<strong>the</strong>r in order to protect property and public safety;<br />
Whereas <strong>the</strong> United States has engaged for over one hundred years in <strong>the</strong> free international<br />
exchange of meteorological data;<br />
Whereas civil meteorological satellite systems and associated ground system equipment<br />
are essential components in ensuring <strong>the</strong> national security of <strong>the</strong> Nation through<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir use in conjunction with satellites operated by <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense;<br />
Whereas transfer to <strong>the</strong> private sector of ownership or management of any civil meteorological<br />
satellite system and associated ground system equipment would likely create a<br />
Government-subsidized monopoly and jeopardize <strong>the</strong> cost efficiency and reliability of data<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>red by civil meteorological satellites;<br />
Whereas it is highly unlikely that, under <strong>the</strong> current plan for transfer of civil meteorological<br />
satellites, any significant new commercial venture involving marketing of wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
data would develop;<br />
Whereas skepticism in <strong>the</strong> Congress about <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> civil meteorological<br />
satellite system could complicate and delay <strong>the</strong> pressing decision about <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong><br />
civil land remote sensing satellite system; and<br />
Whereas no satisfactory explanations or proposals have been advanced for <strong>the</strong> transfer<br />
of ownership or management of any civil meteorological satellite and associated<br />
ground system equipment to <strong>the</strong> private sector: Now, <strong>the</strong>refore, be it<br />
Resolved by <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives (<strong>the</strong> Senate concurring), that it is <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong><br />
Congress that it is not appropriate at this time to transfer ownership or management of<br />
any civil meteorological satellite system and associated ground system equipment to <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector.<br />
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to <strong>the</strong> rule, a second is not required on this<br />
motion.<br />
The gentleman from Florida (Mr. FUQUA) will be recognized for 20 minutes and <strong>the</strong><br />
gentleman from New York (Mr. CARNEY) will be recognized for 20 minutes.<br />
The Chair recognizes <strong>the</strong> gentleman from Florida (Mr. FUQUA).<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.<br />
(Mr. FUQUA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 168 expresses <strong>the</strong> sense of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Congress that it is not appropriate at this time to sell this Nation’s civilian wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellites to <strong>the</strong> private sector. The purpose of <strong>the</strong> concurrent resolution is to halt <strong>the</strong><br />
administration’s effort to sell <strong>the</strong>se satellites by sending a clear and unambiguous signal<br />
to <strong>the</strong> administration and to U.S. industry that <strong>the</strong> Congress does not consider such a<br />
transfer to be in <strong>the</strong> national interest.<br />
Mr. Speaker, our committee is of <strong>the</strong> view, after reviewing both <strong>the</strong> public testimony<br />
on this issue and <strong>the</strong> administration’s plans for transfer, that <strong>the</strong> proposal to transfer<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites is not sound and that considerable time, effort, and resources will be<br />
saved by halting this proposal immediately. Our committee reached this conclusion for<br />
several reasons:<br />
The public service nature of wea<strong>the</strong>r services;<br />
The danger of establishing a federally protected monopoly;<br />
National security considerations; and<br />
The need to concentrate <strong>the</strong> debate on commercializing land remote-sensing satellites.<br />
In sum <strong>the</strong> committee concurred with <strong>the</strong> view presented in a November 10, 1983<br />
Joint NASA/Department of Defense study:<br />
There is considerable financial, policy, and program risk to <strong>the</strong> Government in commercializing
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 323<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites and <strong>the</strong>re is no clear policy or financial benefit to be realized.<br />
Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 168 currently has over 150 co-sponsors.<br />
The resolution received strong bipartisan support in our committee, and an identical resolution<br />
passed unanimously in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r body last month. This has not been, and it<br />
should not be, a partisan issue in <strong>the</strong> Congress, and I urge my colleagues to support passage<br />
of <strong>the</strong> resolution.<br />
Mr. Speaker, I yield to <strong>the</strong> gentleman from New York (Mr. SCHEUER), <strong>the</strong> chairman<br />
of <strong>the</strong> subcommittee that handled this concurrent resolution.<br />
Mr. SCHEUER. I thank <strong>the</strong> gentleman for yielding.<br />
Mr. Speaker, <strong>the</strong> chief Sponsor of this measure, <strong>the</strong> gentleman from Texas (Mr.<br />
ANDREWS), has done an outstandingly fine leadership job in promoting this resolution<br />
and in developing <strong>the</strong> support that <strong>the</strong> chairman just mentioned. I yield such time as he<br />
may consume to <strong>the</strong> gentleman to explain <strong>the</strong> resolution, what motivated him, what <strong>the</strong><br />
resolution means, and for any fur<strong>the</strong>r explanation <strong>the</strong> gentleman might like to make.<br />
(Mr. ANDREWS of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his<br />
remarks.)<br />
Mr. ANDREWS of Texas. I thank <strong>the</strong> gentleman for yielding time to me.<br />
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on an issue that I suspect many thought fell by <strong>the</strong><br />
wayside long ago. Back in March of this year when <strong>the</strong> President announced his intention<br />
to commercialize our Nation’s four wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, <strong>the</strong>re rose from <strong>the</strong> public and from<br />
Congress an outcry that was so loud, so overwhelmingly clear and devoid of partisanship<br />
that I would have thought <strong>the</strong> administration would have understood that this illconceived<br />
proposal would never gain <strong>the</strong> approval of Congress. In hearing after hearing<br />
held this year by <strong>the</strong> Science and Technology Committee, we have received testimony and<br />
reports which have been consistently negative with respect to this proposed sale—from<br />
sources which include <strong>the</strong> President’s own private sector survey on cost control, NASA, <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Defense, three congressionally chartered panels, a Commerce Department<br />
Advisory Committee, and <strong>the</strong> World Meteorological Organization. Representative of <strong>the</strong><br />
testimony was <strong>the</strong> conclusion of a joint DOD-NASA study:<br />
There is considerable financial policy, and program risk to <strong>the</strong> Government in commercializing<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites and <strong>the</strong>re is no clear policy or financial benefit to be realized.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> testimony, despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Senate has passed not only a resolution<br />
identical to this one but language actually prohibiting <strong>the</strong> use of Commerce funds to<br />
write a bid document including <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, despite <strong>the</strong> introduction of this resolution<br />
in <strong>the</strong> House; despite its 150 co-sponsors and its overwhelming endorsement by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Science and Technology Committee, <strong>the</strong> administration is moving ahead full speed.<br />
The Department of Commerce is drafting a request for proposal that includes wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellites and that document is due to be released to <strong>the</strong> private sector in final form in<br />
December.<br />
Selling <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites does not make economic sense. The National Wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Service accounts for 95 percent of <strong>the</strong> first use of our wea<strong>the</strong>r data. By what logic should<br />
<strong>the</strong> Government sell its $1.6 billion wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite system to a private company at a<br />
greatly reduced rate, only to sign a long-term monopolistic contract for data services<br />
which could end up costing taxpayers more than $100 million per year?<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, such a sale would have serious national security implications. Selling<br />
<strong>the</strong>se satellites would necessitate significant, and perhaps unwieldy, oversight and regulation<br />
by <strong>the</strong> DOD which relies on civil wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites both in its routine operations and<br />
in military emergencies.<br />
The sale would threaten <strong>the</strong> quality of our wea<strong>the</strong>r data since a private operator would<br />
have little incentive—o<strong>the</strong>r than price-gouging perhaps—to improve services. Stagnant<br />
technology would hurt everyone who relies on wea<strong>the</strong>r information: <strong>the</strong> farmer, <strong>the</strong> pilot
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and <strong>the</strong> citizen dependent on Federal tornado and hurricane warnings.<br />
In addition, while some wea<strong>the</strong>r information is commercially marketed now, <strong>the</strong> sale<br />
of our satellite system would not enhance that market one iota. In reviewing <strong>the</strong> initial<br />
draft of Commerce’s RFP, <strong>the</strong> DOD insisted that a provision be included allowing <strong>the</strong> free<br />
and open distribution of wea<strong>the</strong>r data to our allies around <strong>the</strong> world, as we have traditionally<br />
done. The DOD insisted on this provision because of <strong>the</strong>ir fear that should <strong>the</strong><br />
United States begin selling wea<strong>the</strong>r data to foreign governments instead of offering it free,<br />
those foreign governments would limit <strong>the</strong> data <strong>the</strong>y provide to <strong>the</strong> United States, data<br />
which is crucial to U.S. military operations. This leads inescapably to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong>se satellites is nei<strong>the</strong>r militarily prudent nor commercially viable. For if<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r data from U.S. satellites is made available internationally, it can be transmitted on<br />
public airwaves to <strong>the</strong> United States, thus destroying not only <strong>the</strong> international market,<br />
but <strong>the</strong> domestic market as well. The demands of our military and <strong>the</strong> requirements of<br />
commercialization are irreconcilable.<br />
But perhaps <strong>the</strong> most compelling reason to disassociate <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites from <strong>the</strong><br />
RFP process now is that <strong>the</strong> extended consideration we are giving to <strong>the</strong>ir sale only delays<br />
<strong>the</strong> decision to commercialize land remote sensing satellites. The continued coupling of<br />
<strong>the</strong> land and wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites only guarantees that <strong>the</strong> land satellite issue will not be<br />
resolved by Congress until as late as mid-1985 at which point we may have forfeited to our<br />
competitors overseas what promises to be a multibillion domestic market.<br />
Thanks to <strong>the</strong> Bateman amendment to <strong>the</strong> NASA bill, <strong>the</strong> administration will have to<br />
come to Congress sooner or later to seek approval for that RFP. And when <strong>the</strong>y do, I feel<br />
sure <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite portion of it will not survive <strong>the</strong> scrutiny of this Congress. My<br />
concern is that <strong>the</strong> private sector be adequately forewarned. It is disingenuous and unfair<br />
to ask American companies to spend <strong>the</strong>ir valuable time and resources responding to a<br />
proposal that has no hope of getting by Congress. It is time that we send a clear message<br />
to <strong>the</strong> administration and to <strong>the</strong> boardrooms of those companies that would bid our<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites. They are not for sale. That is <strong>the</strong> sole purpose of this resolution. It<br />
deserves to pass and I urge its prompt approval.<br />
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.<br />
(Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)<br />
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, as <strong>the</strong> gentleman from Texas (Mr. ANDREWS) indicated,<br />
this proposal to sell <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites is truly a nonstarter. It is truly a proposal<br />
whose time will never come. And it is a dangerous proposal, not just a silly proposal. It is<br />
a dangerous proposal because it is diverting our attention from <strong>the</strong> main game, from <strong>the</strong><br />
main competitive global arena in which U.S. enterprise really can play a dynamic successful<br />
role and that is in <strong>the</strong> area of Landsat, in <strong>the</strong> area of Landsat that is appropriate for<br />
commercialization. And if we dilly and dally with this absolutely preposterous idea of commercializing<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>rsat which 13 out of 14 Government-industry respondents have told us<br />
is intrinsically a Government function and should never be commercialized, if we dilly and<br />
dally, fiddling about with this, we are going to continue to let our position in Landsat<br />
erode to <strong>the</strong> point where <strong>the</strong> French and <strong>the</strong> Japanese are going to beat us to <strong>the</strong> punch<br />
and preempt our leadership in space in <strong>the</strong> very arena where private capital could pay a<br />
dynamic and successful role.<br />
Mr. Speaker, l would like to expand upon a point raised by <strong>the</strong> gentleman from<br />
Florida (Mr. FUQUA)—that pursuing <strong>the</strong> sale of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites needlessly complicates<br />
<strong>the</strong> urgent need to maintain U.S. leadership in land remote sensing.<br />
The U.S. Government has operated civilian land-remote-sensing satellites, or Landsat,<br />
since 1972.<br />
Since that time, Landsat has provided a wealth of information on: Natural resources,<br />
mineral deposits, and agricultural productivity.<br />
At low cost to: Federal agencies, to private industry, and over 40 nations around <strong>the</strong>
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 325<br />
world.<br />
The program has been an enormous scientific success, and it has been a great source<br />
of international good will for our Nation.<br />
Landsat, unlike wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, might profitably be operated by <strong>the</strong> private sector,<br />
since <strong>the</strong> data that it produces are of use not only to scientific researchers and to<br />
Government agencies, but also to a number of private companies, including oil and mineral<br />
exploration firms and various agricultural interests.<br />
I agree with <strong>the</strong> administration that <strong>the</strong> time is right to investigate our options for<br />
commercializing this emerging technology, especially since <strong>the</strong> United States will face stiff<br />
competition in <strong>the</strong> field of land remote-sensing from <strong>the</strong> French and <strong>the</strong> Japanese by <strong>the</strong><br />
mid- to late-l980’s.<br />
I disagree strongly, however, with <strong>the</strong> administration’s perverse approach to this international<br />
challenge—namely, to kill immediately all funding for <strong>the</strong> Landsat program and<br />
to put our civilian wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, an inherently governmental system, up for sale.<br />
The administration pursued <strong>the</strong>se policies under <strong>the</strong> assumption that U.S. industry<br />
would rush into competition with subsidized French and Japanese systems by launching<br />
fully private land remote-sensing systems.<br />
Predictably <strong>the</strong> gamble failed.<br />
No U.S. industry could possibly enter this field at <strong>the</strong> present time without some form<br />
of temporary Government subsidy.<br />
This subsidy is a necessary evil if we hope to avoid giving up ano<strong>the</strong>r potentially lucrative<br />
commercial opportunity to our competitors.<br />
The irony of our deteriorating situation, of course, is that this commercial opportunity<br />
exists only because <strong>the</strong> U.S. taxpayer, over <strong>the</strong> past 12 years, has supported a Landsat<br />
program which has convincingly demonstrated <strong>the</strong> feasibility of commercial land remote<br />
sensing.<br />
Mr. Speaker, many of us share a deep concern that <strong>the</strong> United States is about to fritter<br />
away its technological leadership in an area where, over <strong>the</strong> next 20 years, we expect<br />
to see tremendous global commercial expansion.<br />
In this case, our industrial expansion and ability to compete in global markets is threatened<br />
not by a lack of resources, nor by a lack of creativity, nor by a lack of productivity.<br />
We are threatened solely by Government inaction.<br />
I believe we still have time to preserve our remote-sensing industry, but only if we act<br />
expeditiously on two fronts.<br />
First, we need to halt this absurd proposal to commercialize wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites. It is a<br />
silly diversion from <strong>the</strong> main global game—Landsat. We must get our eye on <strong>the</strong> ball.<br />
Next, we need to agree on a policy which will effect a rational transition between<br />
Government operation of land remote-sensing systems and fully private operation of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
systems.<br />
Last week, <strong>the</strong> gentleman from Missouri (Mr. VOLKMER) and I held 2 days of joint<br />
hearings on draft legislation aimed at effecting such a transition.<br />
Concurrent with our consideration of this draft legislation, <strong>the</strong> administration has<br />
been preparing a request-for-proposal (RFP) to solicit industry bids on present and future<br />
land remote-sensing systems.<br />
I was greatly heartened by <strong>the</strong> testimony that we received on <strong>the</strong> legislation, both from<br />
witnesses representing U.S. industry and from <strong>the</strong> administration’s witness, Mr. Ray<br />
Kammer, who is chairman of <strong>the</strong> Source Evaluation Board for Civil Remote Sensing.<br />
Mr. Kammer found many parallels and few major inconsistencies between his efforts<br />
and <strong>the</strong> provisions of <strong>the</strong> legislation, and I look forward to working with Mr. Kammer and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs in <strong>the</strong> administration to insure that, as Congress articulates a coherent policy for<br />
commercializing land remote-sensing activities over <strong>the</strong> next 6 months, <strong>the</strong> administration
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aggressively implements that policy.<br />
It would be truly unfortunate to see a repetition of <strong>the</strong> circumstances surrounding <strong>the</strong><br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r-satellite issue, wherein despite repeated signals from <strong>the</strong> Congress, <strong>the</strong> administration<br />
continued to pursue a policy which had little, if any, support in ei<strong>the</strong>r House of<br />
Congress.<br />
Mr. Chairman, I strongly support <strong>the</strong> concurrent resolution sponsored by <strong>the</strong> gentleman<br />
from Texas (Mr. ANDREWS), both because selling wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites is a bad idea and<br />
because we need to proceed quickly toward <strong>the</strong> resolution of <strong>the</strong> real issue of this<br />
debate—namely, how to transfer, in a rational way, our land remote-sensing capabilities to<br />
<strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
I urge my colleagues to support House Concurrent Resolution 168.<br />
1640<br />
Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.<br />
(Mr. McGRATH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)<br />
Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution, but I do so with some<br />
reservations. Right now I do not feel that <strong>the</strong> transfer to <strong>the</strong> private sector of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellites is in <strong>the</strong> national interest. However, I would like to withhold final judgment on<br />
this issue until <strong>the</strong> RFP process currently being conducted by <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
Commerce is complete.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> responses to <strong>the</strong> RFP are in, we will have a great deal more information<br />
about whe<strong>the</strong>r or not to go forward with this transfer. We will have <strong>the</strong> factual basis for<br />
determining whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r-satellite system is suitable for transfer to <strong>the</strong> private sector<br />
or if, as I believe will be <strong>the</strong> case, <strong>the</strong>y are not suitable.<br />
Mr. Speaker, I have been following this issue very carefully for <strong>the</strong> past 2 1/2 years.<br />
The civilian wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites are essential to <strong>the</strong> protection of public health and safety,<br />
and <strong>the</strong>y serve as a backup to <strong>the</strong> defense meteorological system. The wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites<br />
are inherently governmental, as evidenced by <strong>the</strong> fact that over 95 percent of <strong>the</strong> market<br />
for <strong>the</strong> data from <strong>the</strong>se satellites is <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government. For <strong>the</strong>se reasons, I do not think<br />
it would be wise to transfer this system to <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and Technology, we held five hearings on <strong>the</strong> commercialization<br />
of <strong>the</strong> land and wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, and while <strong>the</strong> consensus was that <strong>the</strong> land<br />
system should be commercialized, strong opposition to <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> Metsat system<br />
was expressed by a wide range of witnesses from both <strong>the</strong> public and private sectors.<br />
Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that once <strong>the</strong> controversy of <strong>the</strong> Metsat transfer has been<br />
removed from consideration, <strong>the</strong> Congress and <strong>the</strong> administration will be able to concentrate<br />
on <strong>the</strong> commercialization of <strong>the</strong> land remote-sensing system which is more rationally<br />
in <strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
Mr. Speaker. I yield 2 minutes for myself.<br />
(Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska asked and was given permission to revise and extend her<br />
remarks.)<br />
Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation<br />
expressing <strong>the</strong> sense of Congress with regard to wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites.<br />
I am a cosponsor of this bill which puts Congress on record in opposition to <strong>the</strong> transfer<br />
of ownership or management of <strong>the</strong> Nation’s wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites to <strong>the</strong> private sector at<br />
this time.<br />
In March of this year, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce proposed to commercialize civil<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r and land remote-sensing satellites. This proposal has had remarkably little support<br />
especially with respect to wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites. It is no wonder. Over 99 percent of <strong>the</strong><br />
data generated by <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites is in fact used by civil and military agencies of <strong>the</strong>
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 327<br />
U.S. Government.<br />
The proposed sale of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites would not save <strong>the</strong> Government any money.<br />
The Defense Department estimates that <strong>the</strong> sale would cost tax-payers about $800 million<br />
more over 10 years than it would cost <strong>the</strong> Government to continue to operate <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Congressional hearings have brought out considerable opposition to selling off <strong>the</strong><br />
Government’s satellites. The administration’s own private sector survey on cost control,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Department of Defense, NASA, and o<strong>the</strong>r Government groups all find that <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
advantage to commercializing <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites.<br />
My main concern about <strong>the</strong> satellite sale proposal is <strong>the</strong> effect it would have on our<br />
farmers and ranchers, pilots, and o<strong>the</strong>r citizens who depend on accurate and timely<br />
reports on <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r. The future of <strong>the</strong> present wea<strong>the</strong>r reporting systems would be in<br />
doubt with <strong>the</strong> sale of our “eyes in <strong>the</strong> sky.” There are no answers to <strong>the</strong> questions about<br />
future availability of wea<strong>the</strong>r information, <strong>the</strong> national security implications of selling our<br />
satellites, or <strong>the</strong> safety implications because this idea has not had enough study. Let us<br />
adopt this simple resolution and give <strong>the</strong> whole issue of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites and Landsat<br />
thorough study.<br />
Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes, for debate only, to <strong>the</strong> gentleman from<br />
Virginia (Mr. BATEMAN).<br />
Mr. BATEMAN Mr. Speaker, I appreciate <strong>the</strong> gentleman’s yielding this time to me.<br />
I would like to associate myself with <strong>the</strong> remarks that have been made by <strong>the</strong> distinguished<br />
Members who preceded me who spoke in favor of <strong>the</strong> resolution and against <strong>the</strong><br />
proposition of commercializing our wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> gentleman from Texas (Mr. ANDREWS) observed, earlier this year I offered an<br />
amendment which was adopted and has passed both Houses of <strong>the</strong> Congress which would<br />
have made <strong>the</strong> prior consent of <strong>the</strong> Congress as to <strong>the</strong> commercialization of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellites a condition of such a step being taken. In view of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r body has<br />
conclusively and unanimously indicated that it is not disposed and would not consent to<br />
any commercialization of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, it is my feeling, which I share with <strong>the</strong> gentleman<br />
from Texas, that private industry and <strong>the</strong> Government itself should not be put<br />
through a frivolous exercise, with <strong>the</strong> expenditure of a great deal of money, research,<br />
investigation, and study, all to come to absolutely naught.<br />
For those reasons Mr. Speaker, I think this resolution is well conceived and should be<br />
supported.<br />
Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve <strong>the</strong> balance of my time.<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to <strong>the</strong> distinguished<br />
gentleman from Florida (Mr. NELSON), a member of <strong>the</strong> committee.<br />
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank <strong>the</strong> chairman of <strong>the</strong> committee for<br />
yielding this time to me.<br />
I just want to say that this resolution sponsored by <strong>the</strong> gentleman from Texas (Mr.<br />
ANDREWS) is a resolution that we should not have to be debating here. But here is constitutional<br />
government working at its best, one branch balancing off against <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
branch. The executive branch has simply made a mistake. And <strong>the</strong>y have to be brought<br />
back onto <strong>the</strong> correct course by <strong>the</strong> congressional branch.<br />
With security at risk, we should not be sending our wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites to <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
sector where in a time of emergency <strong>the</strong> Government may not have access to that<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r information.<br />
So, Mr. Speaker, I certainly urge a yes vote on this resolution.<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to <strong>the</strong> distinguished<br />
delegate from Puerto Rico (Mr. CORRADA).<br />
Mr. CORRADA. Mr. Speaker, I thank <strong>the</strong> gentleman for yielding this time to me.<br />
Mr. Speaker, I join in voicing my strong support for House Concurrent Resolution 168<br />
which expresses <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong> Congress that <strong>the</strong> civil meteorological satellite system
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should not be sold or transferred to <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
The important data and work collected by <strong>the</strong>se satellites underscore <strong>the</strong> need for<br />
maintaining <strong>the</strong>m in Government hands. The collection and dissemination of wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
information is crucial to every person across <strong>the</strong> Nation, from <strong>the</strong> farmers in Nebraska to<br />
vacationers in Puerto Rico. The need for precise and reliable access must be protected<br />
and preserved to ensure not only <strong>the</strong> health of our population but also our continued economic<br />
vitality.<br />
The plan to transfer <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites to <strong>the</strong> private sector is misguided and inimical<br />
to <strong>the</strong> public good. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this resolution and thus<br />
send a clear signal to <strong>the</strong> administration about our position on this important issue.<br />
Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes, for debate purposes, to <strong>the</strong> gentleman<br />
from Pennsylvania (Mr. WALKER).<br />
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, in his book “The High Road,” Ben Bova talked about <strong>the</strong><br />
proposition that <strong>the</strong>re are two types of people that approach policy in this country or<br />
throughout history. They are <strong>the</strong> Promethians and <strong>the</strong> Luddites. The Promethians are<br />
essentially those people who look toward <strong>the</strong> future, who try to find ways in which to use<br />
that which is in <strong>the</strong> present to promote <strong>the</strong> future. The Luddites are those people who are<br />
wedded to <strong>the</strong> past, who try to hold on to exactly what is without having any concept of<br />
<strong>the</strong> future at all.<br />
I submit, Mr. Speaker, that this is a Luddite bill. I say that by stating that we are unwilling<br />
to move forward toward commercialization of wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites; we are exempting<br />
one large area from commercialization that has <strong>the</strong> potential of being commercialized<br />
immediately. If <strong>the</strong>re is one thing that we should be all about in our space program, it is<br />
moving out of research and development toward commercialization. The more commercialization<br />
we promote as a nation in outer space, <strong>the</strong> more chance we have of reaping <strong>the</strong><br />
economic rewards that come from that.<br />
1650<br />
These are not minor economic rewards. There are some people who are farsighted<br />
enough to believe that commercialization of outer space over <strong>the</strong> next 20 to 25 years, if<br />
given <strong>the</strong> proper investment attitude, could reap a trillion dollar economy from outer<br />
space, a spaced-based economy of a trillion dollars. That in terms of 1983, that is <strong>the</strong><br />
equivalent of 35 million jobs.<br />
We often sit on this House floor and we hear debating about <strong>the</strong> fact, where are <strong>the</strong><br />
jobs going to come from? How are we going to provide jobs for <strong>the</strong> future? Where are <strong>the</strong><br />
jobs for people who do not have <strong>the</strong>m? With hi-tech emerging, where are <strong>the</strong> jobs going<br />
to come from?<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> places <strong>the</strong>y are going to come from is by properly industrializing and commercializing<br />
outer space. When we pass bills of this type, when we say that we are going to<br />
take as a matter of public policy and X-out of our consideration wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, we are<br />
taking <strong>the</strong> first step toward limiting <strong>the</strong> amount of investment that will ever be made in<br />
outer space and <strong>the</strong> amount of jobs that can be created.<br />
I think that is wrong. I think this is a sad bill and I hope people will vote against it.<br />
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, this past March <strong>the</strong> President announced his intention to<br />
commercialize our Government’s wea<strong>the</strong>r and land remote sensing satellites. It was clear<br />
from <strong>the</strong> beginning that <strong>the</strong> offer to sell <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites was simply an attempt to<br />
make <strong>the</strong> sale of <strong>the</strong> land remote sensing satellite more appealing.<br />
I find this entire commercialization effort most bo<strong>the</strong>rsome and have been vocally<br />
opposed to it from <strong>the</strong> very beginning. While many of us may disagree with <strong>the</strong> desirability<br />
of retaining a land remote sensing satellite program within <strong>the</strong> Government, I know of<br />
no one who disagrees with <strong>the</strong> wisdom of retaining Government control over our Nation’s
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 329<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites. Many of us have made this fact known to <strong>the</strong> administration during <strong>the</strong><br />
past few months, and yet <strong>the</strong> process to commercialize <strong>the</strong>m continues. At risk, if this<br />
process continues to completion, is <strong>the</strong> very security and well-being of our Nation, for we<br />
depend daily upon our ability to ga<strong>the</strong>r and analyze wea<strong>the</strong>r data from around <strong>the</strong> country<br />
as well as <strong>the</strong> globe.<br />
I urge all of you to support this resolution, of which I am a cosponsor, and hope that<br />
<strong>the</strong> administration will financially understand and accept that our Nation’s wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites<br />
will not be sold.<br />
Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, I yield back <strong>the</strong> balance of my time.<br />
GENERAL LEAVE<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative<br />
days in which to revise and extend <strong>the</strong>ir remarks on House Concurrent Resolution 168.<br />
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is <strong>the</strong>re objection to <strong>the</strong> request of <strong>the</strong> gentleman from<br />
Florida?<br />
There was no objection.<br />
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, I have no fur<strong>the</strong>r requests for time and I yield back <strong>the</strong> balance<br />
of my time.<br />
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on <strong>the</strong> motion offered by <strong>the</strong> gentleman<br />
from Florida (Mr. FUQUA) that <strong>the</strong> House suspend <strong>the</strong> rules and agree to <strong>the</strong> concurrent<br />
resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 168.<br />
The question was taken.<br />
Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand <strong>the</strong> yeas and nays.<br />
The yeas and nays were ordered.<br />
The SPEAKER, pro tempore. Pursuant to <strong>the</strong> provisions of clause 5 of rule I and <strong>the</strong><br />
Chair’s prior announcement, fur<strong>the</strong>r proceedings on this motion will be postponed. . . .<br />
1810<br />
So (two-thirds having voted in favor <strong>the</strong>reof) <strong>the</strong> rules were suspended and <strong>the</strong> concurrent<br />
resolution was agreed to.<br />
The result of <strong>the</strong> vote was announced as above recorded [yeas 377, nays 28, not voting<br />
29].<br />
A motion to reconsider was laid on <strong>the</strong> table.<br />
Document II-36<br />
Document title: “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” Public Law<br />
98–365, 98 Stat. 451, July 17, 1984.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 was <strong>the</strong> culmination of many years of debate<br />
over who should control <strong>the</strong> Earth remote-sensing system operated through <strong>the</strong> Landsat satellites.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration had advocated <strong>the</strong> outright sale of <strong>the</strong> entire Landsat system as<br />
well as <strong>the</strong> nation’s wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, <strong>the</strong> Remote Sensing Act of 1984 was much more limited in scope.<br />
Specifically, it gave <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce authority to contract to private industry <strong>the</strong> marketing<br />
of unenhanced Landsat data. Subsequently, <strong>the</strong> contract was awarded to <strong>the</strong> Earth Observation<br />
Satellite Company (EOSAT), a joint venture between RCA and Hughes Aircraft Corporation.
330<br />
[no pagination] PUBLIC LAW 98–365—JULY 17, 1984<br />
Public Law 98–365<br />
98th Congress<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
An Act<br />
98 STAT. 451<br />
To establish a system to promote <strong>the</strong> use of land remote-sensing satellite data, and for<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r purposes. [citation in margin: “July 17, 1984 (H.R. 5155).”]<br />
Be it enacted by <strong>the</strong> Senate and House of Representatives of <strong>the</strong> United States of America in Congress<br />
assembled, That this Act may be cited as <strong>the</strong> “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act<br />
of 1984.” [citation in margin: “Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984.<br />
Communications and telecommunications. 15 USC 4201 note.”]<br />
TITLE I—DECLARATION OF FINDINGS, PURPOSES, AND POLICIES<br />
FINDINGS<br />
SEC. 101. The Congress finds and declares that— [citation in margin: “Congress. 15 USC<br />
4201.”]<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> continuous civilian collection and utilization of land remote-sensing data<br />
from space are of major benefit in managing <strong>the</strong> Earth’s natural resources and in planning<br />
and conducting many o<strong>the</strong>r activities of economic importance;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> Federal Government’s experimental Landsat system has established <strong>the</strong><br />
United States as <strong>the</strong> world leader in land remote-sensing technology; [marginal note:<br />
“Landsat system.”]<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> national interest of <strong>the</strong> United States lies in maintaining international leadership<br />
in civil remote sensing and in broadly promoting <strong>the</strong> beneficial use of remotesensing<br />
data;<br />
(4) land remote sensing by <strong>the</strong> Government or private parties of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
affects international commitments and policies and national security concerns of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States; [marginal note: “Defense and national security.”]<br />
(5) <strong>the</strong> broadest and most beneficial use of land remote-sensing data will result from<br />
maintaining a policy of nondiscriminatory access to data;<br />
(6) competitive, market-driven private sector involvement in land remote sensing is<br />
in <strong>the</strong> national interest of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(7) use of land remote-sensing data has been inhibited by slow market development<br />
and by <strong>the</strong> lack of assurance of data continuity;<br />
(8) <strong>the</strong> private sector, and in particular <strong>the</strong> “value-added” industry, is best suited to<br />
develop land remote-sensing data markets;<br />
(9) <strong>the</strong>re is doubt that <strong>the</strong> private sector alone can currently develop a total land<br />
remote-sensing system because of <strong>the</strong> high risk and large capital expenditure involved;<br />
(10) cooperation between <strong>the</strong> Federal Government and private industry can help<br />
assure both data continuity and United States leadership;<br />
(11) <strong>the</strong> time is now appropriate to initiate such cooperation with phased transition<br />
to a fully commercial system;<br />
(12) such cooperation should be structured to involve <strong>the</strong> minimum practicable<br />
amount of support and regulation by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government and <strong>the</strong> maximum practicable<br />
amount of competition by <strong>the</strong> private sector while assuring continuous availability<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government of land remote-sensing data;
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 331<br />
(13) certain Government oversight must be maintained to assure that private sector<br />
activities are in <strong>the</strong> national interest and that <strong>the</strong> international commitments and policies<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States are honored; and<br />
(14) <strong>the</strong>re is no compelling reason to commercialize meteorological satellites at this<br />
time.<br />
PURPOSES<br />
SEC. 102. The purposes of this Act are to— [citation in margin: “15 USC 4202.”]<br />
(1) guide <strong>the</strong> Federal Government in achieving proper involvement of <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector by providing a framework for phased commercialization of land remote sensing<br />
and by assuring continuous data availability to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government;<br />
(2) maintain <strong>the</strong> United States worldwide leadership in civil remote sensing, preserve<br />
its national security, and fulfill its international obligations; [marginal note: “Defense and<br />
national security.”]<br />
(3) minimize <strong>the</strong> duration and amount of fur<strong>the</strong>r Federal investment necessary to<br />
assure data continuity while achieving commercialization of civil and land remote sensing;<br />
(4) provide for a comprehensive civilian program of research, development, and<br />
demonstration to enhance both <strong>the</strong> United States capabilities for remote sensing from<br />
space and <strong>the</strong> application and utilization of such capabilities; and<br />
(5) prohibit commercialization of meteorological satellites at this time.<br />
POLICIES<br />
SEC. 103. (a) It shall be <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States to preserve its right to acquire and<br />
disseminate unenhanced remote-sensing data. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4203.”]<br />
(b) It shall be <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States that civilian unenhanced remotesensing<br />
data be made available to all potential users on a nondiscriminatory basis and in<br />
a manner consistent with applicable antitrust laws.<br />
(c) It shall be <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> United States both to commercialize those remotesensing<br />
space systems that properly lend <strong>the</strong>mselves to private sector operation and to<br />
avoid competition by <strong>the</strong> Government with such commercial operations, while continuing<br />
to preserve our national security, to honor our international obligations, and to retain in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Government those remote-sensing functions that are essentially of a public service<br />
nature. [marginal note: “Defense and national security.”]<br />
DEFINITIONS<br />
SEC. 104. For purposes of this Act: [citation in margin: “15 USC 4204.”]<br />
(1) The term “Landsat system” means Landsats 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and any related<br />
ground equipment, systems, and facilities, and any successor civil land remote-sensing<br />
space systems operated by <strong>the</strong> United States government prior to <strong>the</strong> commencement of<br />
<strong>the</strong> six-year period described in title III.<br />
(2) The term “Secretary” means <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce.<br />
(3) (A) The term “nondiscriminatory basis” means without preference bias, or any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r special arrangement (except on <strong>the</strong> basis of national security concerns pursuant to<br />
section 607) regarding delivery, format, financing, or technical considerations which<br />
would favor one buyer or class of buyers over ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
(B) The sale of data is made on a nondiscriminatory basis only if (i) any offer to<br />
sell or deliver data is published in advance in such manner as will ensure that <strong>the</strong> offer is<br />
equally available to all prospective buyers; (ii) <strong>the</strong> system operator has not established or<br />
changed any price, policy, procedure, or o<strong>the</strong>r term or condition in a manner which gives
332<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
one buyer or class of buyer de facto favored access to data; (iii) <strong>the</strong> system operator does<br />
not make unenhanced data available to any purchaser on an exclusive basis; and (iv) in a<br />
case where a system operator offers volume discounts, such discounts are no greater than<br />
<strong>the</strong> demonstrable reductions in <strong>the</strong> cost of volume sales. The sale of data on a nondiscriminatory<br />
basis does not preclude <strong>the</strong> system operator from offering discounts o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than volume discounts to <strong>the</strong> extent that such discounts are consistent with <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />
of this paragraph.<br />
(C) The sale of data on a nondiscriminatory basis does not require (i) that a system<br />
operator disclose names of buyers or <strong>the</strong>ir purchases; (ii) that a system operator maintain<br />
all, or any particular subset of, data in a working inventory; or (iii) that a system<br />
operator expend equal effort in developing all segments of a market.<br />
(4) The term “unenhanced data” means unprocessed or minimally processed signals<br />
or film products collected from civil remote-sensing space systems. Such minimal processing<br />
may include rectification or distortions, registration with respect to features of <strong>the</strong><br />
Earth, and calibration of spectral response. Such minimal processing does not include<br />
conclusions, manipulations, or calculations derived from such signals or film products or<br />
combination of <strong>the</strong> signals or film products with o<strong>the</strong>r data or information.<br />
(5) The term “system operator” means a contractor under title II or title III or a<br />
license holder under title IV.<br />
TITLE II—OPERATION AND DATA MARKETING OF LANDSAT SYSTEM<br />
OPERATION<br />
SEC. 201. (a) The Secretary shall be responsible for— [citation in margin: “15 USC<br />
4211.”]<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, including <strong>the</strong> orbit, operation, and disposition of Landsat system,<br />
including <strong>the</strong> orbit, operation, and disposition of Landsats 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and<br />
(2) provision of data to foreign ground stations under <strong>the</strong> terms of agreements<br />
between <strong>the</strong> United States Government and nations that operate such ground stations<br />
which are in force on <strong>the</strong> date of commencement of <strong>the</strong> contract awarded pursuant<br />
to <strong>the</strong> title.<br />
(b) The provisions of this section shall not affect <strong>the</strong> Secretary’s authority to contract<br />
for <strong>the</strong> operation or part or all of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, so long as <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government retains—<br />
(1) ownership of such system;<br />
(2) ownership of <strong>the</strong> unenhanced data; and<br />
(3) authority to make decisions concerning operation of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
CONTRACT FOR MARKETING OF UNENHANCED DATA<br />
SEC. 202. (a) In accordance with <strong>the</strong> requirements of this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary, by means of<br />
a competitive process and to <strong>the</strong> extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts, shall<br />
contract with a United States private sector party (as defined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary) for <strong>the</strong> marketing<br />
of unenhanced data collected by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system. Any such contract— [citation<br />
in margin: “15 USC 4212.”]<br />
(1) shall provide that <strong>the</strong> contractor set <strong>the</strong> prices of unenhanced data;<br />
(2) may provide for financial arrangements between <strong>the</strong> Secretary and <strong>the</strong> contractor<br />
including fees for operating <strong>the</strong> system, payments by <strong>the</strong> contractor as an initial fee<br />
or as a percentage of sales receipts, or o<strong>the</strong>r such considerations;<br />
(3) shall provide that <strong>the</strong> contractor will offer to sell and deliver unenhanced data to<br />
all potential buyers on a nondiscriminatory basis;
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 333<br />
(4) shall provide that <strong>the</strong> contractor pay to <strong>the</strong> United States Government <strong>the</strong> full<br />
purchase price of any unenhanced data that contractor elects to utilize for purposes<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r than sale;<br />
(5) shall be entered into by <strong>the</strong> Secretary only if <strong>the</strong> Secretary has determined that such<br />
contract is likely to result in net cost savings for <strong>the</strong> United States Government; and<br />
(6) may be reawarded competitively after <strong>the</strong> practical demise of <strong>the</strong> space segment<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, as determined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary.<br />
(b) Any contract authorized by subsection (a) may specify that <strong>the</strong> contractor use,<br />
and, at his own expense, maintain, repair, or modify, such elements of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system<br />
as <strong>the</strong> contractor finds necessary for commercial operations.<br />
(c) Any decision or proposed decision by <strong>the</strong> Secretary to enter into any such contract<br />
shall be transmitted to <strong>the</strong> Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Senate and <strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and Technology of <strong>the</strong> House of<br />
Representatives for <strong>the</strong>ir review. No such decision or proposed decision shall be implemented<br />
unless (A) a period of thirty calendar days has passed after <strong>the</strong> receipt by each<br />
such committee of such transmittal, or (B) each such committee before <strong>the</strong> expiration of<br />
such period has agreed to transmit and has transmitted to <strong>the</strong> Secretary written notice to<br />
<strong>the</strong> effect that such committee has no objection to <strong>the</strong> decision or proposed decision. As<br />
part of <strong>the</strong> transmittal, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall include information on <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> contract<br />
described in subsection (a). [marginal note: “Congress.”]<br />
(d) In defining “United Stated private sector party” for purposes of this Act, <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary may take into account <strong>the</strong> citizenship of key personnel, location of assets, foreign<br />
ownership, control, influence, and o<strong>the</strong>r such factor.<br />
CONDITIONS OF COMPETITION FOR CONTRACT<br />
SEC. 203. (a) The Secretary shall, as part of <strong>the</strong> advertisement for <strong>the</strong> competition for <strong>the</strong><br />
contract authorized by section 202, identify and publish <strong>the</strong> international obligations,<br />
national security concerns (with appropriate protection of sensitive information, domestic<br />
legal considerations, and any o<strong>the</strong>r standards or conditions which a private contractor<br />
shall be required to meet). [citation in margin: “15 USC 4213.”]<br />
(b) In selecting a contractor under this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall consider—<br />
(1) ability to market aggressively unenhanced data;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> best overall financial return to <strong>the</strong> Government, including <strong>the</strong> potential cost<br />
savings to <strong>the</strong> Government that are likely to result from <strong>the</strong> contract;<br />
(3) ability to meet <strong>the</strong> obligations, concerns, considerations, standards, and conditions<br />
identified under subsection (a);<br />
(4) technical competence, including <strong>the</strong> ability to assure continuous and timely delivery<br />
of data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system;<br />
(5) ability to effect a smooth transition with <strong>the</strong> contractor selected under title III; and<br />
(6) such o<strong>the</strong>r factors as <strong>the</strong> Secretary deems appropriate and relevant.<br />
(c) If, as a result of <strong>the</strong> competitive process required by section 202(a), <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
receives no proposal which is acceptable under <strong>the</strong> provisions of this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
shall so certify and fully report such finding to <strong>the</strong> Congress. As soon as practicable but<br />
not later than thirty days after so certifying and reporting, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall reopen <strong>the</strong><br />
competitive process. The period for <strong>the</strong> subsequent competitive process shall not exceed<br />
one hundred and twenty days. If, after such subsequent competitive process, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
receives no proposal which is acceptable under <strong>the</strong> provisions of this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
shall so certify and fully report such finding to <strong>the</strong> Congress. In <strong>the</strong> event that no acceptable<br />
proposal is received, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall continue to market data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
system. [marginal note: “Report.”]
334<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(d) A contract awarded under section 202 may, in <strong>the</strong> discretion of <strong>the</strong> Secretary, be<br />
combined with <strong>the</strong> contract required by title III, pursuant to section 304(b).<br />
SALE OF DATA<br />
SEC. 204. (a) After <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> commencement of <strong>the</strong> contract described in section<br />
202(a), <strong>the</strong> contractor shall be entitled to revenues from sales of copies of data from <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat system, subject to <strong>the</strong> conditions specified in sections 601 and 602. [citation in<br />
margin: 15 USC 4214.”]<br />
(b) The contractor may continue to market data previously generated by <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
system after <strong>the</strong> demise of <strong>the</strong> space segment of <strong>the</strong> system.<br />
FOREIGN GROUND STATIONS<br />
SEC. 205. (a) The contract under this title shall provide that Contractor shall act as <strong>the</strong><br />
agent of <strong>the</strong> Secretary by continuing to supply unenhanced data to foreign ground stations<br />
for <strong>the</strong> life, and according to <strong>the</strong> terms of those agreements between <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Government and such foreign ground stations that are in force on <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong><br />
commencement of <strong>the</strong> contract. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4215.”]<br />
(b) Upon <strong>the</strong> expiration of such agreements, or in <strong>the</strong> case of foreign ground stations<br />
that have no agreement with <strong>the</strong> United States on <strong>the</strong> date of commencement of <strong>the</strong> contract,<br />
<strong>the</strong> contract shall provide—<br />
(1) that unenhanced data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system shall be made available to foreign<br />
ground stations only by <strong>the</strong> contractor; and<br />
(2) that such data shall be made available on a nondiscriminatory basis.<br />
TITLE III—PROVISION OF DATA CONTINUITY AFTER THE LANDSAT SYSTEM<br />
PURPOSES AND DEFINITION<br />
SEC. 301 (a) It is <strong>the</strong> purpose of this title— [citation in margin: “15 USC 4221.”]<br />
(1) to provide, in an orderly manner and with minimal risk, for a transition from<br />
Government operation to private, commercial operation of civil land remote-sensing<br />
systems; and<br />
(2) to provide data continuity for six years after <strong>the</strong> practical demise of <strong>the</strong> space segment<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />
(b) For purposes of this title, <strong>the</strong> term “data continuity” means <strong>the</strong> continued availability<br />
of unenhanced data—<br />
(1) including data which are from <strong>the</strong> point of view of a data user—<br />
(A) functionally equivalent to <strong>the</strong> multispectral data generated by <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat 1 and 2 satellites; and<br />
(B) compatible with such data and with equipment used to receive and<br />
process such data; and<br />
(2) at an annual volume at least equal to <strong>the</strong> Federal usage during fiscal year 1983.<br />
(c) Data continuity may be provided using whatever technologies are available.<br />
DATA CONTINUITY AND AVAILABILITY<br />
SEC. 302. The Secretary shall solicit proposals from Unites States private sector parties (as<br />
defined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary pursuant to section 202) for a contract for <strong>the</strong> development and<br />
operation of a remote-sensing space system capable of providing data continuity for a period<br />
of six years and for marketing unenhanced data in accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions of
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 335<br />
sections 601 and 602. Such proposals, at a minimum, shall specify— [citation in margin:<br />
“Contracts with U.S. 15 USC 4222.”]<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> quantities and qualities of unenhanced data expected from <strong>the</strong> system;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> projected date upon which operations could begin;<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> number of satellites to be constructed and <strong>the</strong>ir expected lifetimes;<br />
(4) any need for Federal funding to develop <strong>the</strong> system;<br />
(5) any percentage of sales receipts or o<strong>the</strong>r returns offered to <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Government;<br />
(6) plans for expanding <strong>the</strong> market for land remote-sensing data; and<br />
(7) <strong>the</strong> proposed procedures for meeting <strong>the</strong> national security concerns and international<br />
obligations of <strong>the</strong> United States in accordance with section 607.<br />
AWARDING OF THE CONTRACT<br />
SEC. 303. (a)(1) In accordance with <strong>the</strong> requirements of this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall evaluate<br />
<strong>the</strong> proposals described in section 302 and, by means of a competitive process and to<br />
<strong>the</strong> extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts, shall contract with <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States private sector party for <strong>the</strong> capability of providing data continuity for a period of six<br />
years and for marketing unenhanced data. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4223.”]<br />
(2) Before commencing space operations <strong>the</strong> contractor shall obtain a license under<br />
title IV.<br />
(b) As part of <strong>the</strong> evaluation described in subsection (a), <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall analyze<br />
<strong>the</strong> expected outcome of each proposal in terms of—<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> net cost to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government of developing <strong>the</strong> recommended system;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> technical competence and financial condition of <strong>the</strong> contractor;<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> availability of such data after <strong>the</strong> expected termination of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system;<br />
(4) <strong>the</strong> quantities and qualities of data to be generated by <strong>the</strong> recommended system;<br />
(5) <strong>the</strong> contractor’s ability to supplement <strong>the</strong> requirement for data continuity by<br />
adding, at <strong>the</strong> contractor’s expense, remote-sensing capabilities which maintain<br />
United States leadership in remote sensing;<br />
(6) <strong>the</strong> potential to expand <strong>the</strong> market for data;<br />
(7) expected returns to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government based on any percentage of data<br />
sales or o<strong>the</strong>r such financial consideration offered to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government in<br />
accordance with section 305;<br />
(8) <strong>the</strong> commercial viability of <strong>the</strong> proposal;<br />
(9) <strong>the</strong> proposed procedures for satisfying <strong>the</strong> national security concerns and international<br />
obligations of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(10) <strong>the</strong> contractor’s ability to effect a smooth transition with any contractor selected<br />
under title II; and<br />
(11) such o<strong>the</strong>r factors as <strong>the</strong> Secretary deems appropriate and relevant.<br />
(c) Any decision or proposed decision by <strong>the</strong> Secretary to enter into any such contract<br />
shall be transmitted to <strong>the</strong> Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Senate and <strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and Technology of <strong>the</strong> House of<br />
Representatives for <strong>the</strong>ir review. No such decision or proposed decision shall be implemented<br />
unless (1) a period of thirty calendar days has passed after <strong>the</strong> receipt by each<br />
such committee of such transmittal, or (2) each such committee before <strong>the</strong> expiration of<br />
such period has agreed to transmit and has transmitted to <strong>the</strong> Secretary written notice to<br />
<strong>the</strong> effect that such committee has no objection to <strong>the</strong> decision or proposed decision. As<br />
part of <strong>the</strong> transmittal, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall include <strong>the</strong> information specified in subsection<br />
(a). [marginal note: “Congress.”]<br />
(d) If, as a result of <strong>the</strong> competitive process required by this section, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
receives no proposal which is acceptable under <strong>the</strong> provisions of this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary
336<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
shall so certify and fully report such finding to <strong>the</strong> Congress. As soon as practicable but<br />
not later than thirty days after so certifying and reporting, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall reopen <strong>the</strong><br />
competitive process. The period for <strong>the</strong> subsequent competitive process shall not exceed<br />
one hundred and eighty days. If, after such subsequent competitive process, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
receives no proposal which is acceptable under <strong>the</strong> provisions of this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
shall so certify and fully report such finding to <strong>the</strong> Congress. Not earlier than ninety days<br />
after such certification and report, <strong>the</strong> Secretary may assure data continuity by procurement<br />
and operation by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government of <strong>the</strong> necessary systems, to <strong>the</strong> extent<br />
provided in advance by appropriation Acts. [marginal note: “Report.”]<br />
TERMS OF CONTRACT<br />
SEC. 304. (a) Any contract entered into pursuant to this title— [citation in margin:<br />
“15 USC 4224.”]<br />
(1) shall be entered into as soon as practicable, allowing for <strong>the</strong> competitive procurement<br />
process required by this title;<br />
(2) shall, in accordance with criteria determined and published by <strong>the</strong> Secretary, reasonably<br />
assure data continuity for a period of six years, beginning as soon as practicable<br />
in order to minimize any interruption of data availability;<br />
(3) shall provide that <strong>the</strong> contractor will offer to sell and deliver unenhanced data to<br />
all potential buyers on a nondiscriminatory basis;<br />
(4) shall not provide a guarantee of data purchases from <strong>the</strong> contractor by <strong>the</strong><br />
Federal Government;<br />
(5) may provide that <strong>the</strong> contractor utilize, on a space-available basis, a civilian<br />
United States Government satellite or vehicle as a platform for a civil land remotesensing<br />
space system, if—<br />
(A) <strong>the</strong> contractor agrees to reimburse <strong>the</strong> Government immediately for all<br />
related costs incurred with respect to such utilization, including a reasonable<br />
and proportionate share of fixed, platform, data transmission, and launch<br />
costs; and<br />
(B) such utilization would not interfere with or o<strong>the</strong>rwise compromise<br />
intended civilian Government missions, as determined by <strong>the</strong> agency responsible<br />
for <strong>the</strong> civilian platform; and<br />
(6) may provide financial support by <strong>the</strong> United States Government, for a portion of<br />
<strong>the</strong> capital costs required to provide data continuity for a period of six years, in <strong>the</strong><br />
form of loans, loan guarantees, or payments pursuant to section 305 of <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 255).<br />
(b)(1) Without regard to whe<strong>the</strong>r any contract entered into under this title is combined<br />
with a contract under title II, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall promptly determine whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />
contract entered into under this title reasonably effectuates <strong>the</strong> purposes and policies of<br />
title II. Such determination shall be submitted to <strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> Congress, toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with a full statement of <strong>the</strong> basis for such determination.<br />
(2) If <strong>the</strong> Secretary determines that such contract does not reasonably effectuate <strong>the</strong><br />
requirements of title II, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall promptly carry out <strong>the</strong> provisions of such title<br />
to <strong>the</strong> extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts.<br />
MARKETING<br />
SEC. 305. (a) In order to promote aggressive marketing of land remote-sensing data, any<br />
contract entered into pursuant to this title may provide that <strong>the</strong> percentage of sales paid<br />
by <strong>the</strong> contractor to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government shall decrease according to stipulated<br />
increase in sales levels. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4225.”]
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 337<br />
(b) After <strong>the</strong> six-year period described in section 304(a)(2), <strong>the</strong> contractor may continue<br />
to sell data. If licensed under title IV, <strong>the</strong> contractor may continue to operate a civil<br />
remote-sensing space system.<br />
REPORT<br />
SEC. 306. Two years after <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> commencement of <strong>the</strong> six-year period described<br />
in section 304(a)(2), <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall report to <strong>the</strong> President and to <strong>the</strong> Congress on<br />
<strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>the</strong> transition to fully private financing, ownership, and operation of<br />
remote-sensing space systems, toge<strong>the</strong>r with any recommendations for actions, including<br />
actions necessary to ensure United States leadership in civilian land remote sensing from<br />
space. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4226.”]<br />
TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY<br />
SEC. 307. The authority granted to <strong>the</strong> Secretary by this title shall terminate ten years<br />
after <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of this Act. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4227.”]<br />
TITLE IV—LICENSING OF PRIVATE REMOTE-SENSING SPACE SYSTEMS<br />
GENERAL AUTHORITY<br />
SEC. 401. (a)(1) In consultation with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate Federal agencies, <strong>the</strong> Secretary is<br />
authorized to license private sector parties to operate private remote-sensing space systems<br />
for such period as <strong>the</strong> Secretary may specify and in accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />
of this title. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4241.”]<br />
(2) In <strong>the</strong> case of a private space system that is used for remote sensing and o<strong>the</strong>r purposes,<br />
<strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong> Secretary under this title shall be limited only to <strong>the</strong> remotesensing<br />
operations of such space system.<br />
(b) No license shall be granted by <strong>the</strong> Secretary unless <strong>the</strong> Secretary determines in<br />
writing that <strong>the</strong> applicant will comply with <strong>the</strong> requirements of this Act, any regulations<br />
issued pursuant to this Act, and any applicable international obligations and national<br />
security concerns of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
(c) The Secretary shall review any application and make a determination <strong>the</strong>reon<br />
within one hundred and twenty days of <strong>the</strong> receipt of such application. If final action has<br />
not occurred within such time, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall inform <strong>the</strong> applicant of any pending<br />
issues and of actions required to resolve <strong>the</strong>m. [marginal note: “Review date.”]<br />
(d) The Secretary shall not deny such license in order to protect any existing licenses<br />
from competition.<br />
CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION<br />
SEC. 402. (a) No person who is subject to <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction or control of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
may, directly or through any subsidiary or affiliate, operate any private remote-sensing<br />
space system without a license pursuant to section 401.<br />
(b) Any license issued pursuant to this title shall specify, at a minimum, that <strong>the</strong><br />
license shall comply with all of <strong>the</strong> requirements of this Act and shall—<br />
(1) operate <strong>the</strong> system in such manner as to preserve and promote <strong>the</strong> national security<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States and to observe and implement <strong>the</strong> international obligations<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States in accordance with section 607;<br />
(2) make unenhanced data available to all potential users on a nondiscriminatory<br />
basis;
338<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(3) upon termination of operations under <strong>the</strong> license, make disposition of any satellites<br />
in space in a manner satisfactory to <strong>the</strong> President;<br />
(4) promptly make available all unenhanced data which <strong>the</strong> Secretary may request<br />
pursuant to section 602;<br />
(5) furnish <strong>the</strong> Secretary with complete orbit and data collection characteristics of<br />
<strong>the</strong> system, obtain advance approval of any intended deviation from such characteristics,<br />
and inform <strong>the</strong> Secretary of any unintended deviation;<br />
(6) notify <strong>the</strong> Secretary of any agreement <strong>the</strong> licensee intends to enter with a foreign<br />
nation, entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities;<br />
(7) permit <strong>the</strong> inspection by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of <strong>the</strong> licensee’s equipment, facilities, and<br />
financial records;<br />
(8) surrender <strong>the</strong> license and terminate operations upon notification by <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary pursuant o <strong>the</strong> section 403(a)(1); and<br />
(9) (A) notify <strong>the</strong> Secretary of any “value added” activities (as defined by <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary by regulation) that will be conducted by <strong>the</strong> licensee or by a subsidiary<br />
or affiliate; and<br />
(B) if such activities are to be conducted, provide <strong>the</strong> Secretary with a plan for<br />
compliance with <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act concerning nondiscriminatory access.<br />
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY<br />
SEC. 403. (a) In order to carry out <strong>the</strong> responsibilities specified in this title, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
may— [citation in margin: “15 USC 4243.”]<br />
(1) grant, terminate, modify, condition, transfer, or suspend licenses under this title,<br />
and upon notification of <strong>the</strong> licensee may terminate licensed operations on an immediate<br />
basis, if <strong>the</strong> Secretary determines that <strong>the</strong> licensee has substantially failed to<br />
comply with any provision of this Act, with any regulation issued under this Act, with<br />
any terms, conditions, or restrictions of such license, or with any international obligations<br />
or national security concerns of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(2) inspect <strong>the</strong> equipment, facilities, or financial records of any licensee under this<br />
title;<br />
(3) provide penalties for noncompliance with <strong>the</strong> requirements for licenses or regulations<br />
issued under this title, including civil penalties not to exceed $10,000 (each day of<br />
operation in violation of such licenses or regulations constituting a separate violation);<br />
(4) compromise, modify, or remit any such civil penalty;<br />
(5) issue subpenas [sic] for any materials, documents, or records, or for <strong>the</strong> attendance<br />
and testimony of witnesses for <strong>the</strong> purpose of conducting a hearing under this<br />
section;<br />
(6) seize any object, record, or report where <strong>the</strong>re is probable cause to believe that<br />
such object, record, or report was used, is being used, or is likely to be used in violation<br />
of this Act, or <strong>the</strong> requirements of a license or regulation issued <strong>the</strong>reunder; and<br />
(7) make investigations and inquiries and administer to or take from any person an<br />
oath, affirmation, or affidavit concerning any matter relating to <strong>the</strong> enforcement of<br />
this Act.<br />
(b) Any applicant or licensee who makes a timely request for review of an adverse<br />
action pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), or (a)(6) shall be entitled to adjudication by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary on <strong>the</strong> record after an opportunity for an agency hearing with respect to<br />
such adverse action. Any final action by <strong>the</strong> Secretary under this subsection shall be subject<br />
to judicial review under chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code. [citation in margin:<br />
“5 USC 701 et seq.”]
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 339<br />
REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY<br />
SEC. 404. The Secretary may issue regulations to carry out <strong>the</strong> provisions of this title. Such<br />
regulations shall be promulgated only after public notice and comment in accordance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. [citation in margin: “15<br />
USC 4244.”]<br />
AGENCY ACTIVITIES<br />
SEC. 405. (a) A private sector party may apply for a license to operate a private remotesensing<br />
space system which utilizes, on a space-available basis, a civilian United States<br />
Government satellite or vehicle as a platform for such system. The Secretary, pursuant to<br />
<strong>the</strong> authorities of this title, may license such system if it meets all <strong>the</strong> conditions of this title<br />
and— [citation in margin: “15 USC 4245.”]<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> system operator agrees to reimburse <strong>the</strong> Government immediately for all<br />
related costs incurred with respect to such utilization, including a reasonable and proportionate<br />
share of fixed, platform, data transmission, and launch costs; and<br />
(2) such utilization would not interfere with or o<strong>the</strong>rwise compromise intended civilian<br />
Government missions, as determined by <strong>the</strong> agency responsible for such civilian<br />
platform.<br />
(b) The Secretary may offer assistance to private sector parties in finding appropriate<br />
opportunities for such utilization.<br />
(c) To <strong>the</strong> extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts, any Federal agency may<br />
enter into agreements for such utilization if such agreements are consistent with such<br />
agency’s mission and statutory authority, and if such remote-sensing space system is<br />
licensed by <strong>the</strong> Secretary before commencing operation.<br />
(d) The provisions of this section do not apply to activities carried out under title V.<br />
(e) Nothing in this title shall affect <strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications<br />
Commission pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 151 et<br />
seq.). [citation in margin: “47 USC 609.”]<br />
TERMINATION<br />
SEC. 406. If, five years after <strong>the</strong> expiration of <strong>the</strong> six-year period described in section<br />
304(a)(2), no private sector party has been licensed and continued in operation under<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions of this title, <strong>the</strong> authority of this title shall terminate. [citation in margin:<br />
“15 USC 4246.”]<br />
TITLE V—RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT<br />
CONTINUED FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT<br />
SEC. 501. (a)(1) The Administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
is directed to continue and to enhance such Administration’s programs of remote-sensing<br />
research and development. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4261.”]<br />
(2) The Administrator is authorized and encouraged to—<br />
(A) conduct experimental space remote-sensing programs (including applications<br />
demonstration programs and basis research at universities);<br />
(B) develop remote-sensing technologies and techniques, including those<br />
needed for monitoring <strong>the</strong> Earth and its environment; and<br />
(C) conduct such research and development in cooperation with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Federal agencies and with public and private research entities (including
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private industry, universities, State and local governments, foreign governments,<br />
and international organizations) and to enter into arrangements<br />
(including joint ventures) which will foster such cooperation.<br />
(b) (1) The Secretary is directed to conduct a continuing program of—<br />
(A) research in applications of remote-sensing;<br />
(B) monitoring of <strong>the</strong> Earth and its environment; and<br />
(C) development of technology for such monitoring.<br />
(2) Such program may include support of basic research at universities and demonstrations<br />
of applications.<br />
(3) The Secretary is authorized and encouraged to conduct such research, monitoring,<br />
and development in cooperation with o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies and with public and private<br />
research entities (including private industry, universities, State and local<br />
governments, foreign governments, and international organizations) and to enter into<br />
arrangements (including joint ventures) which will foster such cooperation.<br />
(c) (1) In order to enhance <strong>the</strong> United States ability to manage and utilize its renewable<br />
and nonrenewable resources, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Agriculture and <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Interior are authorized and encouraged to conduct programs of research<br />
and development in <strong>the</strong> applications of remote sensing using funds appropriated<br />
for such purposes.<br />
(2) Such programs may include basic research at universities, demonstrations of<br />
applications, and cooperative activities involving o<strong>the</strong>r Government agencies, private<br />
sector parties, and foreign and international organizations.<br />
(d) O<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies are authorized and encouraged to conduct research and<br />
development on <strong>the</strong> use of remote sensing in fulfillment of <strong>the</strong>ir authorized missions,<br />
using funds appropriated for such purposes.<br />
(e) The Secretary and <strong>the</strong> Administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration shall, within one year after <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of this Act and biennially<br />
<strong>the</strong>reafter, jointly develop and transmit to <strong>the</strong> Congress a report which includes (1) a<br />
unified national plan for remote-sensing research and development applied to <strong>the</strong> Earth<br />
and its atmosphere; (2) a compilation of progress in <strong>the</strong> relevant ongoing research and<br />
development activities of <strong>the</strong> Federal agencies; and (3) an assessment of <strong>the</strong> state of our<br />
knowledge of <strong>the</strong> Earth and its atmosphere, <strong>the</strong> needs for additional research (including<br />
research related to operational Federal remote-sensing space programs), and opportunities<br />
available for fur<strong>the</strong>r progress. [marginal note: “Report.”]<br />
USE OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA<br />
SEC. 502. Data ga<strong>the</strong>red in Federal experimental remote-sensing space programs may be<br />
used in related research and development programs funded by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government<br />
(including applications programs) and cooperative research programs, but not for commercial<br />
uses or in competition with private sector activities, except pursuant to section<br />
503. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4262.”]<br />
SALE OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA<br />
SEC. 503. Data ga<strong>the</strong>red in Federal experimental remote-sensing space programs may be<br />
sold en bloc through a competitive process (consistent with national security interests and<br />
international obligations of <strong>the</strong> United States and in accordance with section 607) to any<br />
United States entity which will market <strong>the</strong> data on a nondiscriminatory basis. [citation in<br />
margin: “15 USC 4263.”]
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 341<br />
TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS<br />
NONDISCRIMINATORY DATA AVAILABILITY<br />
SEC. 601. (a) Any unenhanced data generated by any system operator under <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />
of this Act shall be made available to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis in accordance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> requirements of this Act. [citation in margin: “Public availability. 15 USC<br />
4263.”]<br />
(b) Any system operator shall make publicly available <strong>the</strong> prices, policies, procedures,<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r terms and conditions (but, in accordance with section 104(3)(C), not necessarily<br />
<strong>the</strong> names of buyers or <strong>the</strong>ir purchases) upon which <strong>the</strong> operator will sell such data.<br />
ARCHIVING OF DATA<br />
SEC. 602. (a) It is in <strong>the</strong> public interest for <strong>the</strong> United States Government— [citation in<br />
margin: “15 USC 4272.”]<br />
(1) to maintain an archive of land remote-sensing data for historical, scientific, and<br />
technical purposes, including long-term global environmental monitoring;<br />
(2) to control <strong>the</strong> content and scope of <strong>the</strong> archive; and<br />
(3) to assure <strong>the</strong> quality, integrity, and continuity of <strong>the</strong> archive.<br />
(b) The Secretary shall provide for long-term storage, maintenance and upgrading of<br />
basic, global, land remote-sensing data set (hereinafter referred to as <strong>the</strong> “basic data set”)<br />
and shall follow reasonable archival practices to assure proper storage and preservation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> basic data set and timely access for parties requesting data. The basic data set which<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary assembles in <strong>the</strong> Government archive shall remain distinct from any inventory<br />
of data which a system operator may maintain for sales and for o<strong>the</strong>r purposes.<br />
(c) In determining <strong>the</strong> initial content of, or in upgrading, <strong>the</strong> basic data set, <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary shall–<br />
(1) use as a baseline <strong>the</strong> data archived on <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of this Act;<br />
(2) take into account future technical and scientific developments and needs;<br />
(3) consult with and seek <strong>the</strong> advice of users and products;<br />
(4) consider <strong>the</strong> need for data which may be duplicative in terms of geographical coverage<br />
but which differ in terms of season, spectral bands, resolution, or o<strong>the</strong>r relevant factors;<br />
(5) include, as <strong>the</strong> Secretary considers appropriate, unenhanced data generated<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, pursuant to title III, or by licensees under title IV;<br />
(6) include, as <strong>the</strong> Secretary considers appropriate, data collected by foreign ground<br />
stations or by foreign remote-sensing space systems; and<br />
(7) ensure that <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> archive is developed in accordance with section 607.<br />
(d) Subject to <strong>the</strong> availability of appropriations, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall request data needed<br />
for <strong>the</strong> basic data set and pay to <strong>the</strong> providing system operator reasonable costs for<br />
reproduction and transmission. A system operator shall promptly make requested data<br />
available in a form suitable for processing for archiving.<br />
(e) Any system operator shall have <strong>the</strong> exclusive right to sell all data that <strong>the</strong> operator<br />
provides to <strong>the</strong> United States remote-sensing data archive for a period to be determined<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Secretary but not to exceed ten years from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>the</strong> data are sensed. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> case of data generated from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system prior to <strong>the</strong> implementation of <strong>the</strong><br />
contract described in section 202(a), any contractor selected pursuant to section 202 shall<br />
have <strong>the</strong> exclusive right to market such data on behalf of <strong>the</strong> United States Government<br />
for <strong>the</strong> duration of such contract. A system operator may relinquish <strong>the</strong> exclusive right<br />
and consent to distribution from <strong>the</strong> archive before <strong>the</strong> period of exclusive right has<br />
expired by terminating <strong>the</strong> offer to sell particular data. [marginal note: “Marketing.”]
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OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(f) after <strong>the</strong> expiration of such exclusive right to sell, or after relinquishment of such<br />
right, <strong>the</strong> data provided to <strong>the</strong> United States remote-sensing data archive shall be in <strong>the</strong> public<br />
domain and shall be made available to requesting parties by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of prices reflecting<br />
reasonable costs of reproduction and transmittal. [marginal note: “Public availability.”]<br />
(g) In carrying out <strong>the</strong> functions of this section, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall, to <strong>the</strong> extent<br />
practicable and as provided in advance by appropriations Act, use existing Government<br />
facilities.<br />
NONREPRODUCTION<br />
SEC. 603. Unenhanced data distributed by any system operator under <strong>the</strong> provisions of<br />
this Act may be sold on <strong>the</strong> condition that such data will not be reproduced or disseminated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> purchaser. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4273.”]<br />
REIMBURSEMENT FOR ASSISTANCE<br />
SEC. 604. The Administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration, <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary of Defense and <strong>the</strong> heads of o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies may provide assistance to system<br />
operators under <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act. Substantial assistance shall be reimbursed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> operator, except as o<strong>the</strong>rwise provided by law. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4274.”]<br />
ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT<br />
SEC. 605. The Secretary may, by means of a competitive process, allow a licensee under<br />
title IV or any o<strong>the</strong>r private party to buy, lease, or o<strong>the</strong>rwise acquire <strong>the</strong> use or equipment<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, when such equipment is no longer needed for <strong>the</strong> operation of<br />
such system or for <strong>the</strong> sale of data from such system. Officials of o<strong>the</strong>r Federal civilian<br />
agencies are authorized and encouraged to cooperative with <strong>the</strong> Secretary in carrying out<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions of this section. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4275.”]<br />
RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION<br />
SEC. 606. (a) Within thirty days after <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of this Act, <strong>the</strong> President (or<br />
<strong>the</strong> President’s delegee [sic], if any, with authority over <strong>the</strong> assignment of frequencies of<br />
radio stations of classes of radio stations operated by <strong>the</strong> United States) shall make available<br />
for nongovernmental use spectrum presently allocated to Government use, for use<br />
by United States Landsat and commercial remote-sensing space systems. The spectrum to<br />
be so made available shall conform to any applicable international radio or wire treaty or<br />
convention, or regulations annexed <strong>the</strong>reto. Within ninety days <strong>the</strong>reafter, <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission shall utilize appropriate procedures to authorize <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
such spectrum for nongovernmental use. Nothing in this section shall preclude <strong>the</strong> ability<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Commission to allocate additional spectrum to commercial land remote-sensing<br />
space satellite system use. [citation in margin: “President of <strong>the</strong> U.S. 15 USC 4276.”]<br />
(b) To <strong>the</strong> extent required by <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended<br />
(47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), an application shall be filed with <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications<br />
Commission for any radio facilities involved with <strong>the</strong> commercial remote-sensing space<br />
system. [citation in margin: “47 USC 609.”]<br />
(c) It is <strong>the</strong> intent of Congress that <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission complete<br />
<strong>the</strong> radio licensing process under <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47<br />
U.S.C. 151 et seq.), upon <strong>the</strong> application of any private sector party or consortium operator<br />
of any commercial land remote-sensing space system subject to this Act, within one<br />
hundred and twenty days of <strong>the</strong> receipt of an application for such licensing. If final action
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 343<br />
has not occurred within one hundred and twenty days of <strong>the</strong> receipt of such an application,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission shall inform <strong>the</strong> applicant of any pending<br />
issues and of actions required to resolve <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
(d) Authority shall not be required from <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission<br />
for <strong>the</strong> development and construction of any United States land remote-sensing space system<br />
(or (component <strong>the</strong>reof), o<strong>the</strong>r than radio transmitting facilities or components,<br />
while any licensing determination is being made.<br />
(e) Frequency allocations made pursuant to this section by <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications<br />
Commission shall be consistent with international obligations and with <strong>the</strong> public<br />
interest.<br />
CONSULTATION<br />
SEC. 607. (a) The Secretary shall consult with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense on all matters<br />
under this Act affecting national security. The Secretary of Defense shall be responsible<br />
for determining those conditions, consistent with this Act, necessary to meet national<br />
security concerns of <strong>the</strong> United States and for notifying <strong>the</strong> Secretary promptly of such<br />
conditions. [citation in margin: “Defense and national security. 15 USC 4277.”]<br />
(b) (1) The Secretary shall consult with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State on all matters under<br />
this Act affecting international obligations. The Secretary of State shall be responsible<br />
for determining those conditions, consistent with this Act, necessary to meet<br />
international obligations and policies of <strong>the</strong> United States and for notifying <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary promptly of such conditions.<br />
(2) Appropriate Federal agencies are authorized and encouraged to provide<br />
remote-sensing data, technology, and training developing nations as a component<br />
of programs of international aid.<br />
(3) The Secretary of State shall promptly report to <strong>the</strong> Secretary any instances<br />
outside <strong>the</strong> United States of discriminatory distribution of data.<br />
(c) If, as a result of technical modifications imposed on a system operator on <strong>the</strong> basis<br />
of national security concerns, <strong>the</strong> Secretary, in consultation with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense<br />
or with o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies, determines that additional costs will be incurred by <strong>the</strong> system<br />
operator, or that past development costs (including <strong>the</strong> cost of capital) will not be<br />
recovered by <strong>the</strong> system operator, <strong>the</strong> Secretary may require <strong>the</strong> agency or agencies<br />
requesting such technical modifications to reimburse <strong>the</strong> system operator for such additional<br />
or development costs, but not for anticipated profits. Reimbursements may cover<br />
costs associated with required changes in system performance, but not costs ordinarily<br />
associated with doing business abroad.<br />
AMENDMENT TO NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND<br />
SPACE ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION, 1983<br />
SEC. 608. Subsection (a) of section 201 of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration Authorization Act, 1983 (Public Law 97–324; 96 Stat. 1601) is amended to<br />
read as follows: [citation in margin: “15 USC 1517 note.”]<br />
“(a) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to plan and provide for <strong>the</strong> management<br />
and operation of civil remote-sensing space systems, which may include <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
4 and 5 satellites and associated ground system equipment transferred from <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration; to provide for user fees; and to plan for <strong>the</strong> transfer<br />
of <strong>the</strong> operation of civil remote-sensing space systems to <strong>the</strong> private sector when in <strong>the</strong><br />
national interest.”
344<br />
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS<br />
SEC. 609. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated to <strong>the</strong> Secretary $75,000,000 for<br />
fiscal year 1985 for <strong>the</strong> purpose of carrying out <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act. Such sums shall<br />
remain available until expended, but shall not become available until <strong>the</strong> time periods<br />
specified in sections 202(c) and 303(c) have expired. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4278.”]<br />
(b) The authorization provided for under subsection (a) shall be in addition to moneys<br />
[sic] authorized pursuant to title II of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration Act, 1983. [citation in margin: “15 USC 1517.”]<br />
TITLE VII—PROHIBITION OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF WEATHER SATELLITES<br />
PROHIBITION<br />
SEC. 701. Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> President nor any o<strong>the</strong>r official of <strong>the</strong> Government shall make any<br />
effort to lease, sell, or transfer to <strong>the</strong> private sector, commercialize, or in any way dismantle<br />
any portion of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite systems operated by <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce<br />
or any successor agency. [citation in margin: “President of U.S. 15 USC 4291.”]<br />
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS<br />
SEC. 702. Regardless of any change in circumstances subsequent to <strong>the</strong> enactment of this<br />
Act, even if such change makes it appear to be in <strong>the</strong> national interest to commercialize<br />
wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> President nor any official shall take any action prohibited by<br />
section 701 unless this title has first been repealed. [citation in margin: “15 USC 4292.”]<br />
Approved July 17, 1984.<br />
_______________________________<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 5155:<br />
HOUSE REPORT No. 96-647 (Comm. on Science and Technology).<br />
SENATE REPORT No. 98-458 (Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.<br />
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Vol. 130 (1984);<br />
Apr. 9, considered and passed House.<br />
June 8, considered and passed Senate, amended.<br />
June 28, House concurred in Senate amendment with an amendment.<br />
June 29, Senate concurred in House amendment.<br />
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 20, No. 29 (1984):<br />
July 17, Presidential statement.<br />
Document II-37<br />
Document title: <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The White House, “Statement by <strong>the</strong> Press<br />
Secretary,” June 1, 1989.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
By mid-1989, EOSAT had been operating Landsats 4 and 5 for more than three years, but EOSAT’s<br />
income from data sales did not quite equal, let along exceed, its operating costs. Hence, EOSAT still<br />
relied on <strong>the</strong> support of several million of dollars from <strong>the</strong> federal government to continue to collect<br />
Landsat data. No single government agency was willing to provide this relatively small amount of
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 345<br />
money. Because of this dispute, Landsat operations were in danger of being closed down. This presidential<br />
decision settled <strong>the</strong> immediate future of Landsat and set up a mechanism for later reexamination<br />
of its status.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
For Immediate Release June 1, 1989<br />
Statement by <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary<br />
The President today announced he had approved funding for continued operations<br />
of Landsat satellites 4 and 5 and for <strong>the</strong> completion and launch of Landsat 6. The<br />
President’s action endorsed a recommendation from <strong>the</strong> National Space Council chaired<br />
by Vice President Dan Quayle. The President also directed <strong>the</strong> National Space Council<br />
and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget to review options with <strong>the</strong> intention of continuing<br />
Landsat-type data collections after Landsat 6.<br />
Landsat, which takes detailed photographs of <strong>the</strong> earth, is <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government’s civil,<br />
space-based, land remote sensing program. Landsat-type imagery data is important for<br />
such applications as global change research, environmental monitoring, law enforcement,<br />
natural resource estimates, national security and a variety of private sector uses. In addition,<br />
Landsat provides a visible symbol of <strong>the</strong> U.S. commitment to, and leadership in, <strong>the</strong><br />
use of space for <strong>the</strong> common good.<br />
Over recent years, it has become increasingly evident that commercializing <strong>the</strong> entire<br />
Landsat program would not be feasible until at least <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> century. Since earlier<br />
government planning was based on commercializing <strong>the</strong> entire program, <strong>the</strong> absence of<br />
near-term commercial viability threatened continuity of Landsat and jeopardized continuity<br />
of Landsat data. The National Space Council, at its first meeting on May 12, recommended<br />
<strong>the</strong> action endorsed by President Bush today.<br />
Continued operation of Landsats 4 and 5 will require and additional $5 million in FY<br />
89 and $19 million in FY 90. Cost of completion and launch of Landsat 6 by 1991 has<br />
already been included in <strong>the</strong> Commerce Department budget.<br />
Document II-38<br />
Document title: <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The Vice President’s <strong>Office</strong>, “Vice<br />
President Announces Landsat Policy,” February 13, 1992, with attached: “Landsat Remote<br />
Sensing Policy.”<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
The National Space Council’s detailed reexamination of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program in late 1991 prompted<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bush administration to release this policy statement about <strong>the</strong> Landsat system’s future. The<br />
plan called for transferring <strong>the</strong> development and operations of Landsat 7 back to <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
Landsat 6, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, would still be launched and operated by EOSAT, which also would be<br />
responsible for overseeing Landsats 4 and 5 until Landsat 6 became fully operational.
346<br />
[no pagination]<br />
For Immediate Release February 13, 1992<br />
Vice President Announces Landsat Policy<br />
The Vice President announced today that President Bush has approved a National Space<br />
Policy Directive which reaffirms <strong>the</strong> importance of Landsat-type multispectral imaging and<br />
provides a plan for maintaining continuity of Landsat coverage into <strong>the</strong> 21st century.<br />
Landsat is an important satellite program which provides multispectral pictures of <strong>the</strong><br />
Earth. It supports U.S. government needs, including those related to national security and<br />
global change research, and benefits <strong>the</strong> U.S. private sector. In May 1989, President Bush<br />
directed that continuity of Landsat-type remote sensing data be maintained, and<br />
approved a series of near term actions to implement this policy. The new National Space<br />
Policy Directive, which was developed by <strong>the</strong> National Space Council chaired by Vice<br />
President Quayle, establishes a comprehensive, long range strategy and assigns agency<br />
responsibilities for <strong>the</strong> future.<br />
A key element of this strategy is <strong>the</strong> assignment of management and funding responsibility<br />
for <strong>the</strong> next satellite, Landsat 7, to <strong>the</strong> agencies which have <strong>the</strong> primary requirements<br />
for <strong>the</strong> data, NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense. The strategy seeks to minimize<br />
<strong>the</strong> cost of Landsat-type images for U.S. government uses, calls on agencies to eliminate<br />
unnecessary regulations governing private sector remote sensing activities, and fosters<br />
development of advanced remote sensing technologies to reduce <strong>the</strong> cost and improve<br />
<strong>the</strong> performance of future satellites.<br />
Attachment<br />
I. Policy Goals<br />
#####<br />
Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy<br />
A remote sensing capability such as is currently being provided by Landsat satellites 4<br />
and 5 benefits <strong>the</strong> civil and national security interests of <strong>the</strong> United States and makes contributions<br />
to <strong>the</strong> private sector which are in <strong>the</strong> public interest. For <strong>the</strong>se reasons, <strong>the</strong><br />
United States government will seek to maintain continuity of Landsat-type data. The U.S.<br />
government will:<br />
a) Provide data which are sufficiently consistent in terms of acquisition geometry,<br />
coverage characteristics, and spectral characteristics with previous Landsat data to allow<br />
comparisons for chance detection and characterization;<br />
b) Make Landsat data available to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of national security, global change<br />
research, and o<strong>the</strong>r federal users; and,<br />
c) Promote and not preclude private sector commercial opportunities in Landsattype<br />
remote sensing.<br />
II. Landsat Strategy<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
a. The Landsat strategy is composed of <strong>the</strong> following elements:<br />
(1) Ensuring that Landsat satellites 4 and 5 continue to provide data as long as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are capable of doing so, or until Landsat 6 becomes operational.<br />
(2) Acquiring a Landsat 7 satellite with <strong>the</strong> goal of maintaining continuity of<br />
Landsat-type data beyond <strong>the</strong> projected Landsat 6 end-of-life.
(3) Fostering <strong>the</strong> development of advanced remote sensing technologies, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> goal of reducing <strong>the</strong> cost and increasing <strong>the</strong> performance of future Landsattype<br />
satellites to meet U.S. government needs, and potentially, enabling substantially<br />
greater opportunities for commercialization.<br />
(4) Seeking to minimize <strong>the</strong> cost of Landsat-type data for U.S. government agencies<br />
and to provide data for use in global change research in a manner consistent<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Administration’s Data Management for Global Change Research Policy<br />
Statements.<br />
(5) Limiting U.S. government regulations affecting private sector remote sensing<br />
activities to only those required in <strong>the</strong> interest of national security, foreign policy,<br />
and public safety.<br />
(6) Maintaining an archive, within <strong>the</strong> United States, of existing and future<br />
Landsat-type data.<br />
(7) Considering alternatives for maintaining continuity of data beyond Landsat 7.<br />
b. These strategy elements will be implemented within <strong>the</strong> overall resource and policy<br />
guidance provided by <strong>the</strong> President.<br />
III. Implementing Guidelines<br />
a. The Department of Commerce will:<br />
(1) Complete and launch Landsat 6.<br />
(2) In coordination with OMB, arrange for <strong>the</strong> continued operation of Landsat<br />
satellites 4 and 5 until Landsat 6 becomes operational.<br />
b. The Department of Defense and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration will:<br />
(1) Develop and launch a Landsat 7 satellite of at least equivalent performance<br />
to replace Landsat 6 and define alternatives for maintaining data continuity<br />
beyond Landsat 7.<br />
(2) Prepare a plan by March 1, 1992, which addresses management and funding<br />
responsibilities, operations, data archiving and dissemination, and commercial<br />
considerations associated with <strong>the</strong> Landsat program. This plan will be coordinated<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r U.S. government agencies, as appropriate, and reviewed by <strong>the</strong><br />
National Space Council.<br />
(3) With <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Department of Energy and o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate agencies,<br />
prepare a coordinated technology plan that has as its goals improving <strong>the</strong> performance<br />
and reducing <strong>the</strong> cost for future Landsat-type remote sensing systems.<br />
c. The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior will continue to maintain a national archive of<br />
Landsat-type remote sensing data.<br />
d. Affected agencies will identify funds, within <strong>the</strong>ir approved fiscal year 1993 budget,<br />
necessary to implement this strategy.<br />
IV. Reporting Requirements<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 347<br />
U.S. government agencies affected by <strong>the</strong>se strategy guidelines are directed to report<br />
by March 15, 1992, to <strong>the</strong> National Space Council on <strong>the</strong> implementation of this strategy.<br />
Document II-39<br />
Document title: Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration, “Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program,” March 10, 1992.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
348<br />
This management plan spells out how <strong>the</strong> Bush administration planned to manage <strong>the</strong> continuation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program. It roughly split <strong>the</strong> financial responsibility for Landsat development and<br />
operations evenly between <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense and NASA over <strong>the</strong> projected lifetime of <strong>the</strong> satellite.<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> agreement, <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense was to procure <strong>the</strong> satellite and NASA was<br />
to build and operate <strong>the</strong> data reception and distribution facility.<br />
[1]<br />
Introduction<br />
Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program<br />
The Landsat Program benefits a wide community of users, including <strong>the</strong> private sector,<br />
<strong>the</strong> global change research community, national security and o<strong>the</strong>r Government<br />
users. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of Defense (DoD) agree that <strong>the</strong> program provides a unique capability that should be continued.<br />
The two agencies will <strong>the</strong>refore cooperate in <strong>the</strong> continuation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program,<br />
including <strong>the</strong> development and operation of a Landsat follow-on (Landsat 7)<br />
satellite, as well as in planning for future operations and advanced technology development<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate agencies.<br />
This plan responds to <strong>the</strong> President’s National Space Policy Directive 5 on Landsat<br />
Remote Sensing Strategy, dated February 1992. It outlines an integrated approach to <strong>the</strong><br />
management, development and operation of a newly structured Landsat program tailored<br />
to be more responsive to national security and global change research needs through <strong>the</strong><br />
year 2002 and potentially beyond.<br />
To implement this plan, <strong>the</strong> involved agencies will work with <strong>the</strong> Congress to obtain<br />
any necessary enabling legislation.<br />
Concept<br />
DoD, representing <strong>the</strong> national security community, and NASA, representing <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Global Change Research Program and <strong>the</strong> civil/private Landsat use community in general,<br />
will divide <strong>the</strong> management responsibilities and costs for <strong>the</strong> program with approximate<br />
equality.<br />
General Description<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The program will:<br />
• Be consistent with <strong>the</strong> following goals:<br />
– Maintain Landsat program data continuity beyond Landsat 6 by:<br />
[2] – Seeking to launch Landsat, approximately 5 years after <strong>the</strong> launch of Landsat 6<br />
– Continuing to provide data which are sufficiently consistent in terms of acquisition<br />
geometry, calibration, coverage characteristics and spectral characteristics<br />
with previous Landsat data to allow comparisons for global and regional<br />
change detection and characterization<br />
– Continue to make such data available for U.S. civil, national security, and private<br />
sector uses<br />
– Seek to expand <strong>the</strong> use of such data for global change research and national<br />
security purposes<br />
• Acquire a Landsat 7 satellite which is, as a minimum, functionally equivalent to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 satellite, with <strong>the</strong> addition of a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite<br />
[System] (TDRSS) communications capability. Additional improvements will be
sought if <strong>the</strong>y do not increase risk to data continuity, and are attainable within<br />
agreed-to funding. Potential improvements could include features such as<br />
improved spatial or spectral resolution, stereoscopic viewing and o<strong>the</strong>r capabilities<br />
that could improve <strong>the</strong> operational utility of <strong>the</strong> data.<br />
• Evaluate <strong>the</strong> need, and alternative means, for implementing follow-on satellite<br />
systems and improvements beyond Landsat 7. This would include evaluation of<br />
potential changes in program management, funding responsibilities, data management/utilization,<br />
system configuration and operational concepts, as well as<br />
use of advanced technologies to improve performance and reduce cost.<br />
Program Management Responsibilities<br />
• DoD will have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility for <strong>the</strong> acquisition and launch of <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat 7 satellite, and with NASA and Department of Energy (DoE) participation,<br />
will prepare a technology demonstration plan for post-Landsat 7 satellites.<br />
In addition, <strong>the</strong> DoD Project <strong>Office</strong> will provide general systems level engineering<br />
and integration services in support of both <strong>the</strong> NASA and DoD Project<br />
Managers. The DoD portion of <strong>the</strong> program will be administered under <strong>the</strong><br />
Director, Defense Support Project <strong>Office</strong>, as part of <strong>the</strong> Defense Reconnaissance<br />
Support Program. NASA will provide appropriate participation in <strong>the</strong> responsible<br />
DoD project office as required.<br />
[3] • NASA will have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility for <strong>the</strong> development and operation of <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat ground system, including data processing, archiving, distribution, user<br />
support and mission operations management. The NASA portion of <strong>the</strong> program<br />
will be administered under <strong>the</strong> Director, Earth Science and Applications Division,<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Space Science and Applications in coordination with <strong>the</strong> Mission to<br />
Planet Earth Program. DoD will provide appropriate participation in <strong>the</strong> responsible<br />
NASA project office as required.<br />
• A jointly chaired Landsat Coordinating Group (LCG) will be formed, with appropriate<br />
representation from both NASA and DoD. The group will be responsible<br />
for coordinating top-level program plans, budgets and policies; handling interagency<br />
matters related to <strong>the</strong> program; staffing any issues requiring adjudication<br />
at senior departmental levels; and coordinating reports to Congress and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
tasks related to <strong>the</strong> program. Participation of o<strong>the</strong>r government agencies in LCG<br />
activities will be sought as appropriate.<br />
• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and<br />
Intelligence and <strong>the</strong> NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science and<br />
Applications will be <strong>the</strong> senior agency officials responsible for program oversight<br />
and issue resolution. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Director, Defense Research and<br />
Engineering (DDR&E), <strong>the</strong> NASA Associate Administrator of Aeronautics and<br />
Space Technology, and <strong>the</strong> Director of <strong>the</strong> DoE <strong>Office</strong> of Space will be consulted<br />
on matters related to advanced technology.<br />
Funding Responsibilities<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 349<br />
• NASA and DoD will each fund that portion of <strong>the</strong> program for which it is responsible.<br />
Thus DoD will fund <strong>the</strong> procurement and launch of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 satellite,<br />
and NASA will fund satellite operations, data processing, archiving, and data distribution<br />
(including any ground hardware and facilities that are required). A<br />
mutually acceptable cost baseline will be developed, with each agency’s total funding<br />
responsibility approximately equal as spread across <strong>the</strong> development and<br />
operational life of Landsat 7. Any significant funding disparities incurred in program<br />
planning or execution will be resolved through mutually acceptable
350<br />
funding adjustments as agreed to by <strong>the</strong> Deputy Secretary of Defense and <strong>the</strong><br />
NASA Administrator (<strong>the</strong> cost baseline, reflecting this approach, is provided in<br />
Attachment 1).<br />
• Any improvements over a Landsat 6 functional equivalent capability for Landsat<br />
7 will be funded by <strong>the</strong> sponsoring agency, if <strong>the</strong> required funding exceeds <strong>the</strong><br />
baseline defined above. If it is agreed that improvements benefit <strong>the</strong> interests of<br />
both agencies, <strong>the</strong>y would be funded based upon a mutually [4] acceptable sharing<br />
arrangement approved by <strong>the</strong> Deputy Secretary of Defense and <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
Administrator.<br />
• NASA and DoD will coordinate <strong>the</strong>ir interactions with Congress with regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat program.<br />
• Agency funding and management responsibilities for subsequent Landsat satellite(s)<br />
would be <strong>the</strong> subject of a separate agreement.<br />
Data Management<br />
• Data Access and Acquisition for Landsat 7:<br />
– U.S. Government (USG) civil, national security, commercial and noncommercial<br />
users, including global change research users, will have near-real time<br />
and/or archival access to all data acquired. Collection scheduling for such<br />
users will be accomplished jointly by NASA and DoD, through <strong>the</strong> NASA project<br />
office.<br />
– Commercial users will be given input into collection scheduling and access to<br />
data through NASA.<br />
– USG users will have unrestricted rights of redistribution within <strong>the</strong> USG.<br />
• Data from Landsats 1–6. NASA will seek to negotiate an agreement such that data<br />
from Landsats 1–6 are made available to USG civil, national security, commercial<br />
and non-commercial users, including global change research users in a manner<br />
similar to <strong>the</strong> arrangements for data access and acquisition for Landsat 7,<br />
described above.<br />
• Data Pricing. The program will seek to limit <strong>the</strong> cost of data for USG civil, national<br />
security, and global change research use to <strong>the</strong> marginal cost of fulfilling <strong>the</strong><br />
specific user request. In doing so, it will make such data available to <strong>the</strong> global<br />
change research community in a manner consistent with <strong>the</strong> Administration’s<br />
Data Management for Global Change Research policy statements. Data will be<br />
provided for commercial use, with <strong>the</strong> goal of encouraging Landsat remote sensing<br />
commercialization and economic growth. Prices, policies, procedures and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r terms and conditions for <strong>the</strong> distribution and sale of unenhanced Landsat<br />
data will be made publicly available.<br />
• Data Archiving. NASA will work with <strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior to develop<br />
and maintain a permanent national archive for all Landsat data.<br />
[5] • National Security and Foreign Policy Considerations. As a general principle, all<br />
Landsat data will remain unclassified. Special data prioritization, distribution procedures<br />
or restrictions might be necessary under certain national security and foreign<br />
policy conditions, or if future system improvements substantially increase <strong>the</strong><br />
national security or foreign policy sensitivity of some Landsat data. DoD and<br />
NASA will develop procedures to minimize <strong>the</strong> impact of potential restrictions on<br />
Landsat system users.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r Considerations<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
• International Cooperation. NASA will have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility, with DoD support,<br />
for evaluating opportunities for international cooperation and utilization of
Landsat. NASA will have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility for arranging for foreign ground<br />
station operations.<br />
• Commercialization. NASA will have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility, with support from<br />
DoD and o<strong>the</strong>r agencies, for promoting and periodically assessing U.S. commercial<br />
opportunities, to <strong>the</strong> extent feasible in <strong>the</strong> Landsat program.<br />
• Advanced Technologies for Landsat 8 and Beyond. NASA, DoD and o<strong>the</strong>r USG<br />
agencies are pursuing advanced technologies that hold significant promise for<br />
future land remote sensing systems. Conducting an advanced technology demonstration<br />
and evaluation effort, with <strong>the</strong> goal of allowing for technology insertion at<br />
an appropriate point in <strong>the</strong> program, is desirable. Accordingly, with <strong>the</strong> support of<br />
NASA, <strong>the</strong> DoE and o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies, DoD will have <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility<br />
for preparing a coordinated technology plan that has as a goal improved performance<br />
and reduced cost for future Landsat-type systems. The plan will identify relevant<br />
agency activities and funding that can contribute to this goal.<br />
[6] Approved:<br />
[hand-signed: “Aaron Cohen for”] [hand-signed: “Donald J. Atwood”]<br />
Richard H. Truly Donald J. Atwood<br />
Administrator Deputy Secretary of Defense<br />
National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Administration<br />
3/10/92 3/20/92<br />
Date Approved Date Approved<br />
[7] Attachment 1<br />
Cost Baseline (Then Year $M) 1<br />
DoD Costs:<br />
FY 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Total<br />
30 80 158 134 52 6 2 2 2 2 2 470<br />
Includes:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 351<br />
• Development of One Landsat 6-Equivalent Performance Satellite<br />
– Enhanced Thematic Mapper-class Sensor Performance as a Minimum<br />
– Baseline includes TDRSS Communications<br />
• Launch<br />
– Planned for FY 1997<br />
– Titan II-class launch vehicle from West Cost (Vandenberg AFB)<br />
• Program Support/General Systems-Level Engineering and Integration (SE &I)<br />
NASA Costs:<br />
FY 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Total<br />
7 25 59 61 48 30 32 34 36 38 40 410<br />
1. Subject to enabling legislation and contract negotiations.
352<br />
Includes:<br />
• Ground System Development<br />
– Enhanced Command/Control/Telemetry System<br />
– Enhanced Data Processing/Product Generation Capability<br />
– Archival Restoration<br />
• Mission Operations<br />
– Landsat 4–6 Operations, with Landsat 7 Operations Beginning in FY 1997<br />
– Landsat 4–7 Data Processing, Archival, and Distribution Beginning mid-1993<br />
– Program Support/Ground Segment System Engineering<br />
– Mission Operations Management<br />
• TDRSS Link Added to Landsat 7 Satellite<br />
Document II-40<br />
Document title: “Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” Public Law 102–555, 106 Stat.<br />
4163, October 28, 1992.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This law codified <strong>the</strong> substantial changes in policy toward <strong>the</strong> Landsat program that had developed<br />
in <strong>the</strong> early 1990s. It returned <strong>the</strong> development and operation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program to <strong>the</strong> government<br />
at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> operational life of Landsats 4, 5, and 6. It also reiterated <strong>the</strong> federal government’s<br />
willingness, first noted in <strong>the</strong> Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, to grant<br />
an operating license to operators of private remote-sensing satellites.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
Public Law 102–555<br />
102d Congress<br />
PUBLIC LAW 102–555—OCT. 28, 1992 106 STAT. 4163<br />
An Act<br />
To enable <strong>the</strong> United States to maintain its leadership in land remote sensing by providing<br />
data continuity for <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, to establish a new national land remote<br />
sensing policy, and for o<strong>the</strong>r purposes. [citation in margin: “October 28, 1992, H.R. 6133”]<br />
Be it enacted by <strong>the</strong> Senate and House of Representatives of <strong>the</strong> United States of America in<br />
Congress assembled, [citation in margin: “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992. National<br />
defense. 15 USC 5601 note”]<br />
SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.<br />
This Act may be cited as <strong>the</strong> “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992.”<br />
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The Congress finds and declares <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
(1) The continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data from space<br />
are of major benefit in studying and understanding human impacts on <strong>the</strong> global envi-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 353<br />
ronment, in managing <strong>the</strong> Earth’s natural resources, in carrying out national security<br />
functions, and in planning and conducting many o<strong>the</strong>r activities of scientific, economic,<br />
and social importance.<br />
(2) The Federal Government’s Landsat system established <strong>the</strong> United States as <strong>the</strong><br />
world leader in land remote sensing technology.<br />
(3) The national interest of <strong>the</strong> United States lies in maintaining international leadership<br />
in satellite land remote sensing and in broadly promoting <strong>the</strong> beneficial use of<br />
remote sensing data.<br />
(4) The cost of Landsat data has impeded <strong>the</strong> use of such data for scientific purposes,<br />
such as for global environmental change research, as well as for o<strong>the</strong>r public sector<br />
applications.<br />
(5) Given <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program to <strong>the</strong> United States, urgent actions,<br />
including expedited procurement procedures, are required to ensure data continuity.<br />
(6) Full commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program cannot be achieved within <strong>the</strong><br />
foreseeable future, and thus should not serve as <strong>the</strong> near-term goal of national policy on<br />
land remote sensing; however, commercialization of land remote sensing should remain<br />
a long-term goal of United States policy.<br />
(7) Despite <strong>the</strong> success and importance of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, funding and organizational<br />
uncertainties over <strong>the</strong> past several years have placed its future in doubt and have<br />
jeopardized United States leadership in land remote sensing.<br />
(8) Recognizing <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program in helping to meet national<br />
and commercial objectives, <strong>the</strong> President approved, on February 11, 1992, a National<br />
Space Policy Directive which was developed by <strong>the</strong> National Space Council and commits<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States to ensuring <strong>the</strong> continuity of Landsat coverage into <strong>the</strong> 21st century.<br />
(9) Because Landsat data are particularly important for national security purposes<br />
and global environmental change research, management responsibilities for <strong>the</strong> program<br />
should be transferred from <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce to an integrated program management<br />
involving <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration.<br />
(10) Regardless of management responsibilities for <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, <strong>the</strong> Nation’s<br />
broad civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign policy interests in remote sensing<br />
will best be served by ensuring that Landsat remains an unclassified program that operates<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> principles of open skies and nondiscriminatory access.<br />
(11) Technological advances aimed at reducing <strong>the</strong> size and weight of satellite systems<br />
hold <strong>the</strong> potential for dramatic reductions in <strong>the</strong> cost, and substantial improvements in<br />
<strong>the</strong> capabilities, of future land remote sensing systems, but such technological advances<br />
have not been demonstrated for land remote sensing and <strong>the</strong>refore cannot be relied<br />
upon as <strong>the</strong> sole means of achieving data continuity for <strong>the</strong> Landsat program.<br />
(12) A technology demonstration program involving advanced remote sensing technologies<br />
could serve a vital role in determining <strong>the</strong> design of a follow-on spacecraft to<br />
Landsat 7, while also helping to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r such a spacecraft should be funded<br />
by <strong>the</strong> United States Government, by <strong>the</strong> private sector, or by a international consortium.<br />
(13) To maximize <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program to <strong>the</strong> American public, unenhanced<br />
Landsat 4 through 6 data should be made available, at a minimum, to United<br />
States Government agencies, to global environmental change researchers, and to o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
researchers who are financially supported by <strong>the</strong> United States Government, at <strong>the</strong> cost of<br />
fulfilling user requests, and unenhanced Landsat 7 data should be made available to all<br />
users at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
(14) To stimulate development of <strong>the</strong> commercial market for enhanced data and<br />
value-added services, <strong>the</strong> United States Government should adopt a data policy for<br />
Landsat 7 which allows competition within <strong>the</strong> private sector for distribution of unenhanced<br />
data and value-added services.
354<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(15) Development of <strong>the</strong> remote sensing market and <strong>the</strong> provision of commercial<br />
value-added services based on remote sensing data should remain exclusively <strong>the</strong> function<br />
of <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
(16) It is in <strong>the</strong> best interest of <strong>the</strong> United States to maintain a permanent, comprehensive<br />
Government archive of global Landsat and o<strong>the</strong>r land remote sensing data for<br />
long-term monitoring and study of <strong>the</strong> changing global environment.<br />
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5602”]<br />
In this Act, <strong>the</strong> following definitions apply:<br />
(1) The term “Administrator” means <strong>the</strong> Administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics<br />
and Space Administration.<br />
(2) The term “cost of fulfilling user requests” means <strong>the</strong> incremental costs associated<br />
with providing product generation, reproduction, and distribution of unenhanced data in<br />
response to user requests and shall not include any acquisition, amortization, or depreciation<br />
of capital assets originally paid for by <strong>the</strong> United States Government or o<strong>the</strong>r costs<br />
not specifically attributable to fulfilling user requests.<br />
(3) The term “data continuity means <strong>the</strong> continued acquisition and availability of<br />
unenhanced data which are, from <strong>the</strong> point of view of <strong>the</strong> user—<br />
(A) sufficiently consistent (in terms of acquisition geometry, coverage characteristics,<br />
and spectral characteristics) with previous Landsat data to allow comparisons<br />
for global and regional change detection and characterization; and<br />
(B) compatible with such data and with methods used to receive and process such<br />
data.<br />
(4) The term “data preprocessing” may include—<br />
(A) rectification of system and sensor distortions in land remote sensing data as<br />
it is received directly from <strong>the</strong> satellite in preparation for delivery to a user;<br />
(B) registration of such data with respect to features of <strong>the</strong> Earth; and<br />
(C) calibration of spectral response with respect to such data, but does not<br />
include conclusions, manipulations, or calculations derived from such data, or a<br />
combination of such data with o<strong>the</strong>r data.<br />
(5) The term “land remote sensing” means <strong>the</strong> collection of data which can be<br />
processed into imagery of surface features of <strong>the</strong> Earth from an unclassified satellite or<br />
satellites, o<strong>the</strong>r than an operational United States Government wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite.<br />
(6) The term “Landsat Program Management” means <strong>the</strong> integrated program management<br />
structure—<br />
(A) established by, and responsible to, <strong>the</strong> Administrator and <strong>the</strong> Secretary of<br />
Defense pursuant to section 101(a); and<br />
(B) consisting of appropriate officers and employees of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics<br />
and Space Administration, <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense, and any o<strong>the</strong>r United<br />
States Government agencies <strong>the</strong> President designates as responsible for <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat program.<br />
(7) The term “Landsat system” means Landsats 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and any follow-on<br />
land remote sensing system operated and owned by <strong>the</strong> United States Government, along<br />
with any related ground equipment, systems, and facilities owned by <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government.<br />
(8) The term “Landsat 6 contractor” means <strong>the</strong> private sector entity which was awarded<br />
<strong>the</strong> contract for spacecraft construction, operations, and data marketing rights for <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat 6 spacecraft.<br />
(9) The term “Landsat 7” means <strong>the</strong> follow-on satellite to Landsat 6.<br />
(10) The term “National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive” means <strong>the</strong>
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 355<br />
archive established by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior pursuant to <strong>the</strong> archival responsibilities<br />
defined in section 502.<br />
(11) The term “noncommercial purposes” refers to those activities undertaken by<br />
individuals or entities on <strong>the</strong> condition, upon receipt of unenhanced data, that—<br />
(A) such data shall not be used in connection with any bid for a commercial contract,<br />
development of a commercial product, or any o<strong>the</strong>r non-United States<br />
Government activity that is expected, or has <strong>the</strong> potential, to be profitmaking;<br />
(B) <strong>the</strong> results of such activities are disclosed in a timely and complete fashion in<br />
<strong>the</strong> open technical literature or o<strong>the</strong>r method of public release, except when such<br />
disclosure by <strong>the</strong> United States Government or its contractors would adversely<br />
affect <strong>the</strong> national security or foreign policy of <strong>the</strong> United States or violate a provision<br />
of law or regulation; and<br />
(C) such data shall not be distributed in competition with unenhanced data provided<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor.<br />
(12) The term “Secretary” means <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce.<br />
(13) The term “unenhanced data” means land remote sensing signals or imagery<br />
products that are unprocessed or subject only to data preprocessing.<br />
(14) The term “United States Government and its affiliated users” means—<br />
(A) United States Government agencies;<br />
(B) researchers involved with <strong>the</strong> United States Global Change Research<br />
Program and its international counterpart programs; and<br />
(C) o<strong>the</strong>r researchers and international entities that have signed with <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Government a cooperative agreement involving <strong>the</strong> use of Landsat data for<br />
non- commercial purposes.<br />
SEC. 4. REPEAL OF LAND REMOTE-SENSING COMMERCIALIZATION ACT OF<br />
1984.<br />
The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.) is<br />
repealed.<br />
TITLE I—LANDSAT<br />
SEC. 101. LANDSAT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5611”]<br />
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator and <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense shall be<br />
responsible for management of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program. Such responsibility shall be carried<br />
out by establishing an integrated program management structure for <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />
(b) MANAGEMENT PLAN.—The Administrator, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense, and any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r United States Government official <strong>the</strong> President designates as responsible for part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, shall establish, through a management plan, <strong>the</strong> roles, responsibilities,<br />
and funding expectations for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program of <strong>the</strong> appropriate United<br />
States Government agencies. The management plan shall—<br />
(1) specify that <strong>the</strong> fundamental goal of <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management is <strong>the</strong><br />
continuity of unenhanced Landsat data through <strong>the</strong> acquisition and operation of<br />
a Landsat 7 satellite as quickly as practicable which is, at a minimum, functionally<br />
equivalent to <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 satellite, with <strong>the</strong> addition of a tracking and data<br />
relay satellite communications capability;<br />
(2) include a baseline funding profile that—<br />
(A) is mutually acceptable to <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense for <strong>the</strong> period covering <strong>the</strong><br />
development and operation of Landsat 7; and
356<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(B) provides for total funding responsibility of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Administration and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense, respectively, to be<br />
approximately equal to <strong>the</strong> funding responsibility of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r as spread<br />
across <strong>the</strong> development and operational life of Landsat 7;<br />
(3) specify that any improvements over <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 functional equivalent capability<br />
for Landsat 7 will be funded by a specific sponsoring agency or agencies, in<br />
a manner agreed to by <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management, if required funding<br />
exceeds <strong>the</strong> baseline funding profile required by paragraph (2), and that additional<br />
improvements will be sought only if <strong>the</strong> improvements will not jeopardize<br />
data continuity; and<br />
(4) provide for a technology demonstration program whose objective shall be <strong>the</strong><br />
demonstration of advanced land remote sensing technologies that may potentially<br />
yield a system which is less expensive to build and operate, and more responsive<br />
to data users, than is <strong>the</strong> current Landsat system.<br />
(c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Landsat Program Management shall be responsible<br />
for—<br />
(1) Landsat 7 procurement, launch, and operations;<br />
(2) ensuring that <strong>the</strong> operation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system is responsive to <strong>the</strong> broad<br />
interests of <strong>the</strong> civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign users of <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat system;<br />
(3) ensuring that all unenhanced Landsat data remain unclassified and that,<br />
except as provided in section 506 (a) and (b), no restrictions are placed on <strong>the</strong><br />
availability of unenhanced data;<br />
(4) ensuring that land remote sensing data of high priority locations will be<br />
acquired by <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 system as required to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Global Change Research Program, as established in <strong>the</strong> Global Change<br />
Research Act of 1990, and to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of national security users;<br />
(5) Landsat data responsibilities pursuant to this Act;<br />
(6) oversight of Landsat contracts entered into under sections 102 and 103;<br />
(7) coordination of a technology demonstration program, pursuant to section<br />
303; and<br />
(8) ensuring that copies of data acquired by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system are provided to<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive.<br />
(d) AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT.— The Landsat Program Management may, subject<br />
to appropriations and only under <strong>the</strong> existing contract authority of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government agencies that compose <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management, enter into contracts<br />
with <strong>the</strong> private sector for services such as, but not limited to, satellite operations<br />
and data preprocessing.<br />
(e) LANDSAT ADVISORY PROCESS—<br />
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.— Landsat Program Management shall seek impartial<br />
advice and comments regarding <strong>the</strong> status, effectiveness, and operation of <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat system, using existing advisory committees and o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate mechanisms.<br />
Such advice shall be sought from individuals who represent—<br />
(A) a broad range of perspectives on basic and applied science and operational<br />
needs with respect to land remote sensing data;<br />
(B) <strong>the</strong> full spectrum of users of Landsat data, including representatives from<br />
United States Government agencies, State and local government agencies,<br />
academic institutions, nonprofit organizations, value-added companies, <strong>the</strong><br />
agricultural mineral extraction, and o<strong>the</strong>r user industries, and <strong>the</strong> public;<br />
and<br />
(C) a broad diversity of age groups, sexes, and races.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 357<br />
(2) REPORTS.—Within 1 year after <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> enactment of this Act and<br />
biennially <strong>the</strong>reafter, <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management shall prepare and submit<br />
a report to <strong>the</strong> Congress which—<br />
(A) reports <strong>the</strong> public comments received pursuant to paragraph (1); and<br />
(B) includes—<br />
(i) a response to <strong>the</strong> public comments received pursuant to paragraph (1);<br />
(ii) information on <strong>the</strong> volume of use, by category of data from <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat system; and<br />
(iii)any recommendations for policy or programmatic changes to<br />
improve <strong>the</strong> utility and operation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />
SEC. 102 PROCUREMENT OF LANDSAT 7. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5612”]<br />
(a) CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS.—The Landsat Program Management shall, subject<br />
to appropriations and only under <strong>the</strong> existing contract authority of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government agencies that compose <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management, expeditiously<br />
contract with a United States private sector entity for <strong>the</strong> development and delivery of<br />
Landsat 7.<br />
(b) DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY CONSIDERATION.—In negotiating a contract<br />
under this section for <strong>the</strong> development and delivery of Landsat 7, <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
Program Management shall—<br />
(1) seek, as a fundamental objective, to have Landsat 7 operational by <strong>the</strong> expected<br />
end of <strong>the</strong> design life of Landsat 6;<br />
(2) seek to ensure data continuity by <strong>the</strong> development delivery of a satellite which<br />
is, at a minimum, functionally equivalent to <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 satellite; and<br />
(3) seek to incorporate in Landsat 7 any performance improvements required to<br />
meet United States Government needs that would not jeopardize data continuity.<br />
(c) NOTIFICATION OF COST AND SCHEDULE CHANGES.—The Landsat<br />
Program Management shall promptly notify <strong>the</strong> Congress of any significant deviations<br />
from <strong>the</strong> expected cost, delivery date, and launch date of Landsat 7, that are specified by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management upon award of <strong>the</strong> contract under this section.<br />
(d) UNITED STATES PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES.—The Landsat Program<br />
Management shall, for purposes of this Act, define <strong>the</strong> term “United States private sector<br />
entities,” taking into account <strong>the</strong> location of operations, assets, personnel, and o<strong>the</strong>r such<br />
factors.<br />
SEC. 103. DATA POLICY FOR LANDSAT 4 THROUGH 6. [citation in margin: “15 USC<br />
5613”]<br />
(a) CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Within 30 days after <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of<br />
this Act, <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management shall enter into negotiations with <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
6 contractor to formalize an arrangement with respect to pricing, distribution, acquisition,<br />
archiving, and availability of unenhanced data for which <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor<br />
has responsibility under its contract. Such arrangement shall provide for a phased transition<br />
to a data policy consistent with <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 data policy (developed pursuant to section<br />
105) by <strong>the</strong> date of initial operation of Landsat 7. Conditions of <strong>the</strong> phased<br />
arrangement should require that <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor adopt provisions so that by <strong>the</strong><br />
final phase of <strong>the</strong> transition period—<br />
(1) such unenhanced data shall be provided, at a minimum, to <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government and its affiliated users at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests, on <strong>the</strong> condition<br />
that such unenhanced data are used solely for noncommercial purposes;
358<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
(2) instructional data sets, selected from <strong>the</strong> Landsat data archives, will be made<br />
available to educational institutions exclusively for noncommercial, educational<br />
purposes at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests;<br />
(3) Landsat data users are able to acquire unenhanced data contained in <strong>the</strong> collective<br />
archives of foreign ground stations as easily and affordably as practicable;<br />
(4) adequate data necessary to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of global environmental change<br />
researchers and national security users are acquired;<br />
(5) <strong>the</strong> United States Government and its affiliated users shall not be prohibited<br />
from reproduction or dissemination of unenhanced data to o<strong>the</strong>r agencies of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States Government and o<strong>the</strong>r affiliated users, on <strong>the</strong> condition that such<br />
unenhanced data are used solely for noncommercial purposes;<br />
(6) nonprofit, public interest entities receive vouchers, data grants, or o<strong>the</strong>r such<br />
means of providing <strong>the</strong>m with unenhanced data at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user<br />
requests, on <strong>the</strong> condition that such unenhanced data are used solely for noncommercial<br />
purposes;<br />
(7) a viable role for <strong>the</strong> private sector in <strong>the</strong> promotion and development of <strong>the</strong><br />
commercial market for value-added and o<strong>the</strong>r services using unenhanced data<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system is preserved; and<br />
(8) unenhanced data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system are provided to <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive at no more than <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling<br />
user requests.<br />
(b) FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT.—If negotiations under subsection (a) have<br />
not, by September 30,1993, resulted in an agreement that <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program<br />
Management determines generally achieves <strong>the</strong> goals stated in subsection (b) (1) through<br />
(8), <strong>the</strong> Administrator and <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense shall, within 30 days after <strong>the</strong> date of<br />
such determination, jointly certify and report such determination to <strong>the</strong> Congress. The<br />
report shall include a review of options and projected costs for achieving such goals, and<br />
shall include recommendations for achieving such goals. The options reviewed shall<br />
include— [marginal note: “Reports”]<br />
(1) retaining <strong>the</strong> existing or modified contract with <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> termination of existing contracts for <strong>the</strong> exclusive right to market unenhanced<br />
Landsat data; and<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> establishment of an alternative private sector mechanism for <strong>the</strong> marketing<br />
and commercial distribution of such data.<br />
SEC. 104. TRANSFER OF LANDSAT 6 PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES. [citation in<br />
margin: “15 USC 5614”]<br />
The responsibilities of <strong>the</strong> Secretary with respect to Landsat 6 shall be transferred to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management, as agreed to between <strong>the</strong> Secretary and <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
Program Management, pursuant to section 101.<br />
SEC. 105. DATA POLICY FOR LANDSAT 7. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5615”]<br />
(a) LANDSAT 7 DATA POLICY.—The Landsat Program Management, in consultation<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate United States Government agencies, shall develop a data policy<br />
for Landsat 7 which should—<br />
(1) ensure that unenhanced data are available to all users at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling<br />
user requests;<br />
(2) ensure timely and dependable delivery of unenhanced data to <strong>the</strong> full spectrum<br />
of civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign users and <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive;
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 359<br />
(3) ensure that <strong>the</strong> United States retains ownership of all unenhanced data generated<br />
by Landsat 7;<br />
(4) support <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> commercial market for remote sensing data;<br />
(5) ensure that <strong>the</strong> provision of commercial value-added services based on remote<br />
sensing data remains exclusively <strong>the</strong> function of <strong>the</strong> private sector; and<br />
(6) to <strong>the</strong> extent possible, ensure that <strong>the</strong> data distribution system for Landsat 7<br />
is compatible with <strong>the</strong> Earth Observing System Data and Information System.<br />
(b) In addition, <strong>the</strong> data policy for Landsat 7 may provide for—<br />
(1) United States private sector entities to operate ground receiving stations in<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States for Landsat 7 data;<br />
(2) o<strong>the</strong>r means for data: access by private sector entities to unenhanced data<br />
from Landsat 7; and<br />
(3) <strong>the</strong> United States Government to charge a per image fee, license fee, or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
such fee to entities operating ground receiving stations or distributing Landsat 7<br />
data.<br />
(c) LANDSAT 7 DATA POLICY PLAN.—Not later than July 15, 1994, <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
Program Management shall develop and submit to Congress a report that contains a<br />
Landsat 7 Data Policy Plan. This plan shall define <strong>the</strong> roles and responsibilities of <strong>the</strong> various<br />
public and private sector entities that would be involved in <strong>the</strong> acquisition, processing,<br />
distribution, and archiving of Landsat 7 data and in operations of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7<br />
spacecraft. [marginal note: “Reports”]<br />
(d) REPORTS.—Not later than 12 months after submission of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 Data<br />
Policy Plan, required by subsection (c), and annually <strong>the</strong>reafter until <strong>the</strong> launch of<br />
Landsat 7, <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management, in consultation with representatives of<br />
appropriate United States Government agencies, shall prepare and submit a report to <strong>the</strong><br />
Congress which—<br />
(1) provides justification for <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 data policy in terms of <strong>the</strong> civilian,<br />
national security, commercial, and foreign policy needs of <strong>the</strong> United States; and<br />
(2) provides justification for any elements of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 data policy which are<br />
not consistent with <strong>the</strong> provisions of subsection (a).<br />
TITLE II—LICENSING OF PRIVATE REMOTE SENSING SPACE SYSTEMS<br />
SEC. 201. GENERAL LICENSING AUTHORITY. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5621”]<br />
(a) LICENSING AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY.—<br />
(1) In consultation with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate United States Government agencies,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary is authorized to license private sector parties to operate private<br />
remote sensing space systems for such period as <strong>the</strong> Secretary may specify and in<br />
accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions of this title.<br />
(2) In <strong>the</strong> case of a private space system that is used for remote sensing and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
purposes, <strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong> Secretary under this title shall be limited only to<br />
<strong>the</strong> remote sensing operations of such space system.<br />
(b) COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW, REGULATIONS, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGA-<br />
TIONS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY.—No license shall be granted by <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
unless <strong>the</strong> Secretary determines in writing that <strong>the</strong> applicant will comply with <strong>the</strong> requirements<br />
of this Act, any regulations issued pursuant to this Act, and any applicable international<br />
obligations and national security concerns of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
(c) DEADLINE FOR ACTION ON APPLICATION.—The Secretary shall review any<br />
application and make a determination <strong>the</strong>reon within 120 days of <strong>the</strong> receipt of such<br />
application. If final action has not occurred within such time, <strong>the</strong> Secretary shall inform<br />
<strong>the</strong> applicant of any pending issues and of actions required to resolve <strong>the</strong>m.
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(d) IMPROPER BASIS FOR DENIAL.—The Secretary shall not deny such license in<br />
order to protect any existing licensee from competition.<br />
(e) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE UNENHANCED DATA.—<br />
(1) The Secretary, in consultation with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate United States<br />
Government agencies and pursuant to paragraph (2), shall designate in a license<br />
issued pursuant to this title any unenhanced data required to be provided by <strong>the</strong><br />
licensee under section 202(b)(3).<br />
(2) The Secretary shall make a designation under paragraph (1) after determining<br />
that—<br />
(A) such data are generated by a system for which all or a substantial part of<br />
<strong>the</strong> development, fabrication, launch, or operations costs have been or will be<br />
directly funded by <strong>the</strong> United States Government; or<br />
(B) it is in <strong>the</strong> interest of <strong>the</strong> United States to require such data to be provided<br />
by <strong>the</strong> licensee consistent with section 202(b)(3), after considering <strong>the</strong><br />
impact on <strong>the</strong> licensee and <strong>the</strong> importance of promoting widespread access<br />
to remote sensing data from United States and foreign systems.<br />
(3) A designation made by <strong>the</strong> Secretary under paragraph (1) shall not be inconsistent<br />
with any contract or o<strong>the</strong>r arrangement entered into between a United<br />
States Government agency and <strong>the</strong> licensee.<br />
SEC. 202. CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5622”]<br />
(a) LICENSE REQUIRED FOR OPERATION.—No person who is subject to <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction<br />
or control of <strong>the</strong> United States may, directly or through any subsidiary or affiliate,<br />
operate any private remote sensing space system without a license pursuant to section 201.<br />
(b) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS.—Any license issued pursuant to this title shall<br />
specify that <strong>the</strong> licensee shall comply with all of <strong>the</strong> requirements of this Act and shall—<br />
(1) operate <strong>the</strong> system in such manner as to preserve <strong>the</strong> national security of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States and to observe <strong>the</strong> international obligations of <strong>the</strong> United States in<br />
accordance with section 506;<br />
(2) make available to <strong>the</strong> government of a country (including <strong>the</strong> United States)<br />
unenhanced data collected by <strong>the</strong> system concerning <strong>the</strong> territory under <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction<br />
of such government as soon as such data are available and on reasonable<br />
terms and conditions;<br />
(3) make unenhanced data designated by <strong>the</strong> Secretary in <strong>the</strong> license pursuant<br />
to section 201(e) available in accordance with section 501;<br />
(4) upon termination of operations under <strong>the</strong> license, make disposition of any<br />
satellites in space in a manner satisfactory to <strong>the</strong> President;<br />
(5) furnish <strong>the</strong> Secretary with complete orbit and data collection characteristics<br />
of <strong>the</strong> system, and inform <strong>the</strong> Secretary immediately of any deviation; and<br />
(6) notify <strong>the</strong> Secretary of any agreement <strong>the</strong> licensee intends to enter with a foreign<br />
nation, entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities.<br />
(c) ADDITIONAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR LANDSAT 6 CONTRAC-<br />
TOR.—In addition to <strong>the</strong> requirements of paragraph (b), any license issued pursuant to<br />
this title to <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor shall specify that <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor shall—<br />
(1) notify <strong>the</strong> Secretary of any value-added activities (as defined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
by regulation) that will be conducted by <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 contractor or by a subsidiary<br />
or affiliate; and<br />
(2) if such activities are to be conducted, provide <strong>the</strong> Secretary with a plan for<br />
compliance with section 501 of this Act.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 361<br />
SEC. 203. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY. [citation in margin:<br />
“15 USC 5623”]<br />
(a) FUNCTIONS.—In order to carry out <strong>the</strong> responsibilities specified in this title, <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary may—<br />
(1) grant, condition, or transfer licenses under this Act;<br />
(2) seek an order of injunction or similar judicial determination from a United<br />
States District Court with personal jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> licensee to terminate,<br />
modify, or suspend licenses under this title and to terminate licensed operations<br />
on an immediate basis, if <strong>the</strong> Secretary determines that <strong>the</strong> licensee has substantially<br />
failed to comply with any provisions of this Act, with any terms, conditions,<br />
or restrictions of such license, or with any international obligations or national<br />
security concerns of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
(3) provide penalties for noncompliance with <strong>the</strong> requirements of licenses or<br />
regulations issued under this title, including civil penalties not to exceed $10,000<br />
(each day of operation in violation of such licenses or regulations constituting a<br />
separate violation);<br />
(4) compromise, modify, or remit any such civil penalty;<br />
(5) issue subpoenas for any materials, documents, or records, or for <strong>the</strong> attendance<br />
and testimony of witnesses for <strong>the</strong> purpose of conducting a hearing under<br />
this section;<br />
(6) seize any object, record, or report pursuant to a warrant from a magistrate<br />
based on a showing of probable cause to believe that such object, record, or<br />
report was used, is being used, or is likely to be used in violation of this Act or <strong>the</strong><br />
requirements of a license or regulation issued <strong>the</strong>reunder; and<br />
(7) make investigations and inquiries and administer to or take from any person<br />
an oath, affirmation, or affidavit concerning any matter relating to <strong>the</strong> enforcement<br />
of this Act.<br />
(b) REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION.—Any applicant or licensee who makes a timely<br />
request for review of an adverse action pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5), or<br />
(a)(6) shall be entitled to adjudication by <strong>the</strong> Secretary on <strong>the</strong> record after an opportunity<br />
for any agency hearing with respect to such adverse action. Any final action by <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary under this subsection shall be subject to judicial review under chapter 7 of title<br />
5, United States Code.<br />
SEC. 204. REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY. [citation in margin:<br />
“15 USC 5624”]<br />
The Secretary may issue regulations to carry out this title. Such regulations shall be<br />
promulgated only after public notice and comment in accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions of<br />
section 553 of title 5, United States Code.<br />
SEC. 205. AGENCY ACTIVITIES. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5625”]<br />
(a) LICENSE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE.—A private sector party may apply for<br />
a license to operate a private remote sensing space system which utilizes, on a space-available<br />
basis, a civilian United States Government satellite or vehicle as a platform for such<br />
system. The Secretary, pursuant to this title, may license such system if it meets all conditions<br />
of this title and—<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> system operator agrees to reimburse <strong>the</strong> Government in a timely manner<br />
for all related costs incurred with respect to such utilization, including a reasonable
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and proportionate share of fixed, platform, data transmission, and launch costs;<br />
and<br />
(2) such utilization would not interfere with or o<strong>the</strong>rwise compromise intended<br />
civilian Government missions, as determined by <strong>the</strong> agency responsible for such<br />
civilian platform.<br />
(b) ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary may offer assistance to private sector parties in<br />
finding appropriate opportunities for such utilization.<br />
(c) AGREEMENTS.—To <strong>the</strong> extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts, any<br />
United States Government agency may enter into agreements for such utilization if such<br />
agreements are consistent with such agency’s mission and statutory authority, and if such<br />
remote sensing space system is licensed by <strong>the</strong> Secretary before commencing operation.<br />
(d) APPLICABILITY.—This section does not apply to activities carried out under<br />
title III.<br />
(e) EFFECT ON FCC AUTHORITY.—Nothing in this title shall affect <strong>the</strong> authority of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934<br />
(47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.).<br />
TITLE III—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION<br />
SEC. 301. CONTINUED FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. [citation in margin:<br />
15 USC 5631]<br />
(a) ROLES OF NASA AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—<br />
(1) The Administrator and <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense are directed to continue and<br />
to enhance programs of remote sensing research and development.<br />
(2) The Administrator is authorized and encouraged to—<br />
(A) conduct experimental space remote sensing programs (including applications<br />
demonstration programs and basic research at universities);<br />
(B) develop remote sensing technologies and techniques, including those<br />
needed for monitoring <strong>the</strong> Earth and its environment; and<br />
(C) conduct such research and development in cooperation with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
United States Government agencies and with public and private research<br />
entities (including private industry, universities, non-profit organizations,<br />
State and local governments, foreign governments, and international organizations)<br />
and to enter into arrangements (including joint ventures) which will<br />
foster such cooperation.<br />
(b) ROLES OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND DEPARTMENT OF INTE-<br />
RIOR.—<br />
(1) In order to enhance <strong>the</strong> ability of <strong>the</strong> United States to manage and utilize its<br />
renewable and nonrenewable resources, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Agriculture and <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior are authorized and encouraged to conduct programs of<br />
research and development in <strong>the</strong> applications of remote sensing using funds<br />
appropriated for such purposes.<br />
(2) Such programs may include basic research at universities, demonstrations of<br />
applications, and cooperative activities involving o<strong>the</strong>r Government agencies, private<br />
sector parties, and foreign and international organizations.<br />
(c) ROLE OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES.— United States Government agencies<br />
are authorized and encouraged to conduct research and development on <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
remote sensing in <strong>the</strong> fulfillment of <strong>the</strong>ir authorized missions, using funds appropriated<br />
for such purposes.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 363<br />
SEC. 302. AVAILABILITY OF FEDERALLY GATHERED UNENHANCED DATA. [citation<br />
in margin: “15 USC 5632”]<br />
(a) GENERAL RULE.—All unenhanced land remote sensing data ga<strong>the</strong>red and<br />
owned by <strong>the</strong> United States Government, including unenhanced data ga<strong>the</strong>red under <strong>the</strong><br />
technology demonstration program carried out pursuant to section 303, shall be made<br />
available to users in a timely fashion.<br />
(b) PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL DATA DISTRIBUTOR.—The President<br />
shall seek to ensure that unenhanced data ga<strong>the</strong>red under <strong>the</strong> technology demonstration<br />
program carried out pursuant to section 303 shall, to <strong>the</strong> extent practicable, be made<br />
available on terms that would not adversely effect [sic] <strong>the</strong> commercial market for unenhanced<br />
data ga<strong>the</strong>red by <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6 spacecraft. [marginal note: “President”]<br />
SEC. 303. TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM. [citation in margin:<br />
“15 USC 5633”]<br />
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—As a fundamental component of a national land remote<br />
sensing strategy, <strong>the</strong> President shall establish, through appropriate United States<br />
Government agencies, a technology demonstration program. The goals of such programs<br />
shall be to— [marginal note: “President”]<br />
(1) seek to launch advanced land remote sensing system components within<br />
5 years after <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> enactment of this Act;<br />
(2) demonstrate within such 5-year period advanced sensor capabilities suitable<br />
for use in <strong>the</strong> anticipated land remote sensing program; and<br />
(3) demonstrate within such 5-year period an advanced land remote sensing system<br />
design that could be less expensive to procure and operate than <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
system projected to be in operation through year 2000, and that <strong>the</strong>refore holds<br />
greater potential for private sector investment and control.<br />
(b) EXECUTION OF PROGRAM.—In executing <strong>the</strong> technology demonstration program,<br />
<strong>the</strong> President shall seek to apply technologies associated with United States<br />
National Technical Means of intelligence ga<strong>the</strong>ring, to <strong>the</strong> extent that such technologies<br />
are appropriate for <strong>the</strong> technology demonstration and can be declassified for such purposes<br />
without causing adverse harm to United States national security interests. [marginal<br />
note: “President”]<br />
(c) BROAD APPLICATION.—To <strong>the</strong> greatest extent practicable, <strong>the</strong> technology<br />
demonstration program established under subsection (a) shall be designed to be responsive<br />
to <strong>the</strong> broad civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign policy needs of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States.<br />
(d) PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDING.—The technology demonstration program under<br />
this section may be carried out in part with private sector funding.<br />
(e) LANDSAT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COORDINATION.—The Landsat<br />
Program Management shall have a coordinating role in <strong>the</strong> technology demonstration<br />
program carried out under this section.<br />
(f) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The President shall assess <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>the</strong> technology<br />
demonstration program under this section and, within 2 years after <strong>the</strong> date of<br />
enactment of this Act, submit a report to <strong>the</strong> Congress on such progress. [marginal note:<br />
“President”]
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TITLE IV—ASSESSING OPTIONS FOR SUCCESSOR LAND<br />
REMOTE SENSING SYSTEM<br />
SEC. 401. ASSESSING OPTIONS FOR SUCCESSOR LAND REMOTE SENSING SYS-<br />
TEM. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5641”]<br />
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Within 5 years alter <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> enactment of this Act, <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat Program Management, in consultation with representatives of appropriate<br />
United States Government agencies, shall assess and report to <strong>the</strong> Congress on <strong>the</strong><br />
options for a successor land remote sensing system to Landsat 7. The report shall include<br />
a full assessment of <strong>the</strong> advantages and disadvantages of— [marginal note: “Reports”]<br />
(1) private sector funding and management of a successor land remote sensing<br />
system;<br />
(2) establishing an international consortium for <strong>the</strong> funding and management of<br />
a successor land remote sensing system;<br />
(3) funding and management of a successor land remote sensing system by <strong>the</strong><br />
United States Government; and<br />
(4) a cooperative effort between <strong>the</strong> United States Government and <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector for <strong>the</strong> funding and management of a successor land remote sensing system.<br />
(b) GOALS.—In carrying out subsection (a), <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management shall<br />
consider <strong>the</strong> ability of each of <strong>the</strong> options to—<br />
(1) encourage <strong>the</strong> development, launch, and operation of a land remote sensing<br />
system that adequately serves <strong>the</strong> civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign<br />
policy interests of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(2) encourage <strong>the</strong> development, launch, and operation of a land remote sensing<br />
system that maintains data continuity with <strong>the</strong> Landsat system; and<br />
(3) incorporate system enhancements, including any such enhancements developed<br />
under <strong>the</strong> technology demonstration program under section 303, which<br />
may potentially yield a system that is less expensive to build and operate, and<br />
more responsive to data users than is <strong>the</strong> Landsat system projected to be in operation<br />
through <strong>the</strong> year 2000.<br />
(c) PREFERENCE FOR PRIVATE SECTOR SYSTEM.—If a successor land remote<br />
sensing system to Landsat 7 can be funded and managed by <strong>the</strong> private sector while still<br />
achieving <strong>the</strong> goals stated in subsection (b) without jeopardizing <strong>the</strong> domestic, national<br />
security, and foreign policy interests of <strong>the</strong> United States, preference should be given to<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of such a system by <strong>the</strong> private sector without competition from <strong>the</strong><br />
United States Government.<br />
TITLE V—GENERAL PROVISIONS<br />
SEC. 501. NONDISCRIMINATORY DATA AVAILABILITY. [citation in margin: “15 USC<br />
5651”]<br />
(a) GENERAL RULE.—Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any unenhanced<br />
data generated by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system or any o<strong>the</strong>r land remote sensing system<br />
funded and owned by <strong>the</strong> United States Government shall be made available to all users<br />
without preference, bias, or any o<strong>the</strong>r special arrangement (except on <strong>the</strong> basis of national<br />
security concerns pursuant to section 506) regarding delivery, format, pricing, or technical<br />
considerations which would favor one customer or class of customer over ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
(b) EXCEPTIONS.—Unenhanced data generated by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system or any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
land remote sensing system funded and owned by <strong>the</strong> United States Government may be<br />
made available to <strong>the</strong> United States Government and its affiliated users at reduced prices,
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 365<br />
in accordance with this Act, on <strong>the</strong> condition that such unenhanced data are used solely<br />
for noncommercial purposes.<br />
SEC. 502. ARCHIVING OF DATA. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5652”]<br />
(a) PUBLIC INTEREST.—It is in <strong>the</strong> public interest for <strong>the</strong> United State Government<br />
to—<br />
(1) maintain an archive of land remote sensing data for historical, scientific, and<br />
technical purposes, including long-term global environmental monitoring;<br />
(2) control <strong>the</strong> content and scope of <strong>the</strong> archive; and<br />
(3) assure <strong>the</strong> quality, integrity, and continuity of <strong>the</strong> archive.<br />
(b) ARCHIVING PRACTICES.—The Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior, in consultation with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management, shall provide for long-term storage, maintenance, and<br />
upgrading of a basic, global, land remote sensing data set (hereinafter referred to as <strong>the</strong><br />
“basic data set”) and shall follow reasonable archival practices to assure proper storage<br />
and preservation of <strong>the</strong> basic data set and timely access for parties requesting data.<br />
(c) DETERMINATION OF CONTENT OF BASIC DATA SET.—In determining <strong>the</strong><br />
initial content of, or in upgrading, <strong>the</strong> basic data set, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Interior shall—<br />
(1) use as a baseline <strong>the</strong> data archived on <strong>the</strong> date of enactment of this Act;<br />
(2) take into account future technical and scientific developments and needs,<br />
paying particular attention to <strong>the</strong> anticipated data requirements of global environmental<br />
change research;<br />
(3) consult with and seek <strong>the</strong> advice of users and producers of remote sensing<br />
data and data products;<br />
(4) consider <strong>the</strong> need for data which may be duplicative geographical coverage<br />
but which differ in term of season, spectral bands, resolution, or o<strong>the</strong>r relevant<br />
factors;<br />
(5) include, as <strong>the</strong> Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior considers appropriate, unenhanced<br />
data generated ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, pursuant to title I, or by licensees<br />
under title II;<br />
(6) include, as <strong>the</strong> Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior considers appropriate, data collected<br />
by foreign ground stations or by foreign remote sensing space systems; and<br />
(7) ensure that <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> archive is developed in accordance with section<br />
506.<br />
(d) PUBLIC DOMAIN.—After <strong>the</strong> expiration of any exclusive right to sell, or after<br />
relinquishment of such right, <strong>the</strong> data provided to <strong>the</strong> National Satellite Land Remote<br />
Sensing Data Archive shall be in <strong>the</strong> public domain and shall be made available to requesting<br />
parties by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
SEC. 503. NONREPRODUCTION. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5653”]<br />
Unenhanced data distributed by any licensee under title II of this Act may be sold on<br />
<strong>the</strong> condition that such data will not be reproduced or disseminated by <strong>the</strong> purchaser for<br />
commercial purposes.<br />
SEC. 504. REIMBURSEMENT FOR ASSISTANCE. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5654”]<br />
The Administrator, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense, and <strong>the</strong> heads of o<strong>the</strong>r United States<br />
Government agencies may provide assistance to land remote sensing system operators<br />
under <strong>the</strong> provisions of this Act. Substantial assistance shall be reimbursed by <strong>the</strong> operator,<br />
except as o<strong>the</strong>rwise provided by law.
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SEC. 505. ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5655”]<br />
The Landsat Program Management may, by means of a competitive process, allow a<br />
licensee under title II or any o<strong>the</strong>r party to buy, lease, or o<strong>the</strong>rwise acquire <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
equipment from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, when such equipment is no longer needed for <strong>the</strong><br />
operation of such system or for <strong>the</strong> sale of data from such system. Officials of o<strong>the</strong>r United<br />
States Government civilian agencies are authorized and encouraged to cooperate with <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary in carrying out this section.<br />
SEC. 506. RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5656”]<br />
(a) APPLICATION TO FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION.—To <strong>the</strong><br />
extent required by <strong>the</strong> Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), an application<br />
shall be filed with <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission for any radio facilities<br />
involved with commercial remote sensing space systems licensed under title II.<br />
(b) DEADLINE FOR FCC ACTION.—It is <strong>the</strong> intent of Congress that <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission complete <strong>the</strong> radio licensing process under <strong>the</strong><br />
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), upon <strong>the</strong> application of any private<br />
sector party or consortium operator of any commercial land remote sensing space system<br />
subject to this Act, within 120 days of <strong>the</strong> receipt of an application for such licensing. If<br />
final action has not occurred within 120 days of <strong>the</strong> receipt of such an application, <strong>the</strong><br />
Federal Communications Commission shall inform <strong>the</strong> applicant of any pending issues<br />
and of actions required to resolve <strong>the</strong>m. [marginal note: “Licensing”]<br />
(c) DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES SYSTEMS.—<br />
Authority shall not be required from <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission for <strong>the</strong><br />
development and construction of any United States land remote sensing space system (or<br />
component <strong>the</strong>reof), o<strong>the</strong>r than radio transmitting facilities or components, while any<br />
licensing determination is being made.<br />
(d) CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND PUBLIC<br />
INTEREST.—Frequency allocations made pursuant to this section by <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission shall be consistent with international obligations and with<br />
<strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
SEC. 507. CONSULTATION. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5657”]<br />
(a) CONSULTATION WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—The Secretary and <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat Program Management shall consult with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense on all matters<br />
under this Act affecting national security. The Secretary of Defense shall be responsible<br />
for determining those conditions, consistent with this Act, necessary to meet national<br />
security concerns of <strong>the</strong> United States and for notifying promptly <strong>the</strong> Secretary and <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat Program Management promptly of such conditions.<br />
(b) CONSULTATION WITH SECRETARY OF STATE.—<br />
(1) The Secretary and <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program Management shall consult with <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary of State on all matters under this Act affecting international obligations.<br />
The Secretary of State shall be responsible for determining those conditions, consistent<br />
with this Act, necessary to meet international obligations and policies of<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States and for notifying promptly <strong>the</strong> Secretary and <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
Program Management of such conditions.<br />
(2) Appropriate United States Government agencies are authorized and encouraged<br />
to provide remote sensing data, technology, and training to developing<br />
nations as a component of programs of international aid.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 367<br />
(3) The Secretary of State shall promptly report to <strong>the</strong> Secretary and Landsat<br />
Program Management any instances outside <strong>the</strong> United States of discriminatory<br />
distribution of Landsat data. [marginal note: “Reports”]<br />
(c) STATUS REPORT.—The Landsat Program Management shall, as often as necessary,<br />
provide to <strong>the</strong> Congress complete and update[d] information about <strong>the</strong> status of<br />
ongoing operations of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system, including timely notification of decisions made<br />
with respect to <strong>the</strong> Landsat system in order to meet national security concerns and international<br />
obligations and policies of <strong>the</strong> United States Government.<br />
(d) REIMBURSEMENT.—If as a result of technical modifications imposed on a<br />
licensee under title II on <strong>the</strong> basis of national security concerns, <strong>the</strong> Secretary, in consultation<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense or with o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies, determines that additional<br />
costs will be incurred by <strong>the</strong> licensee, or that past development costs (including <strong>the</strong><br />
cost of capital) will not be recovered by <strong>the</strong> licensee, <strong>the</strong> Secretary may require <strong>the</strong> agency<br />
or agencies requesting such technical modifications to reimburse <strong>the</strong> licensee for such<br />
additional or development costs, but not for anticipated profits. Reimbursements may<br />
cover costs associated with required changes in system performance, but not costs ordinarily<br />
associated with doing business abroad.<br />
SEC. 508. ENFORCEMENT. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5658”]<br />
(a) IN GENERAL.—In order to ensure that unenhanced data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system<br />
received solely for noncommercial purposes are not used for any commercial purpose,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary (in collaboration with private sector entities responsible for <strong>the</strong><br />
marketing and distribution of unenhanced data generated by <strong>the</strong> Landsat system) shall<br />
develop and implement a system for enforcing this prohibition, in <strong>the</strong> event that unenhanced<br />
data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system are made available for noncommercial purposes at<br />
a different price than such data are made available for o<strong>the</strong>r purposes.<br />
(b) AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY. —Subject to subsection (d), <strong>the</strong> Secretary may<br />
impose any of <strong>the</strong> enforcement mechanisms described in subsection (c) against a person<br />
who—<br />
(1) receives unenhanced data from <strong>the</strong> Landsat system under this Act solely for<br />
noncommercial purposes (and at a different price than <strong>the</strong> price at which such<br />
data are made available for o<strong>the</strong>r purposes); and<br />
(2) uses such data for o<strong>the</strong>r than noncommercial purposes.<br />
(c) ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS.—Enforcement mechanisms referred to in subsection<br />
(b) may include civil penalties of not more than $10,000 (per day per violation),<br />
denial of fur<strong>the</strong>r unenhanced data purchasing privileges, and any o<strong>the</strong>r penalties or<br />
restrictions <strong>the</strong> Secretary considers necessary to ensure, to <strong>the</strong> greatest extent practicable,<br />
that unenhanced data provided for noncommercial purposes are not used to unfairly<br />
compete in <strong>the</strong> commercial market against private sector entities not eligible for data at<br />
<strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
(d) PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall issue any regulations<br />
necessary to carry out this section and shall establish standards and procedures governing<br />
<strong>the</strong> imposition of enforcement mechanisms under subsection (b). The standards and procedures<br />
shall include a procedure for potentially aggrieved parties to file formal protests<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Secretary alleging instances where such unenhanced data has been, or is being,<br />
used for commercial purposes in violation of <strong>the</strong> terms of receipt of such data. The<br />
Secretary shall promptly act to investigate any such protest, and shall report annually to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Congress on instances of such violations. [marginal note: “Reports”]
368<br />
TITLE VI—PROHIBITION OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF<br />
WEATHER SATELLITES<br />
SEC. 601. PROHIBITION. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5671”]<br />
Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> President nor any o<strong>the</strong>r official of <strong>the</strong> Government shall make any effort<br />
to lease, sell, or transfer to <strong>the</strong> private sector, or commercialize, any portion of <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellite systems operated by <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce or any successor agency.<br />
SEC. 602. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS. [citation in margin: “15 USC 5672”]<br />
Regardless of any change in circumstances subsequent to <strong>the</strong> enactment of this Act,<br />
even if such change makes it appear to be in <strong>the</strong> national interest to commercialize wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
satellites, nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> President nor any official shall take any action prohibited by section<br />
601 unless this title has first been repealed.<br />
Approved October 28,1992.<br />
________________________________<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 6133:<br />
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 138 (1992):<br />
Oct. 5, considered and passed House.<br />
Oct. 7, considered and passed Senate.<br />
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 28 (1992):<br />
Oct. 28, Presidential statement.<br />
Document II-41<br />
Document title: George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and<br />
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to John H. Gibbons, Assistant to <strong>the</strong><br />
President, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, August 9, 1993.<br />
Document II-42<br />
Document title: John Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense, to George E. Brown, Jr.,<br />
Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of<br />
Representatives, December 9, 1993.<br />
Document II-43<br />
Document title: John H. Gibbons, Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, to<br />
George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.<br />
House of Representatives, December 10, 1993.<br />
Document II-44<br />
Document title: George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and<br />
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to John H. Gibbons, Assistant to <strong>the</strong><br />
President, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, December 14, 1993.<br />
Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Theses four letters highlight <strong>the</strong> policy and funding dispute over <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense (DOD)<br />
provision of <strong>the</strong> High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager (HRMSI) for Landsat 7, which DOD<br />
had originally proposed for <strong>the</strong> satellite but <strong>the</strong>n backed away from when NASA refused to fund a substantial<br />
upgrade for <strong>the</strong> ground system to collect <strong>the</strong> data. U.S. Representative George Brown had<br />
played a major role in drafting and sponsoring <strong>the</strong> Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992 and<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore had a stake in seeing <strong>the</strong> controversy successfully resolved. Dr. John Gibbons, President<br />
Clinton’s science advisor and <strong>the</strong> director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, helped craft<br />
<strong>the</strong> Clinton administration’s policy toward Landsat 7.<br />
The Honorable John Gibbons<br />
Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy<br />
Old Executive <strong>Office</strong> Building<br />
Washington, DC 20500<br />
Dear Jack:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 369<br />
Document II-41<br />
August 9, 1993<br />
As you know, NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense are roughly splitting <strong>the</strong> cost of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat program in accordance with <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Policy Act (P.L.<br />
102–555), which <strong>the</strong> Vice President played an important role in shaping. However, only<br />
DOD has requested funding for <strong>the</strong> High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager<br />
(HRMSI), a new sensor that would produce 5-meter resolution imagery; NASA’s budget<br />
does not include its proposed funding share for HRMSI, which would be used to build <strong>the</strong><br />
data handling system.<br />
While I recognize <strong>the</strong> difficult choices that <strong>the</strong> Administration faced in formulating<br />
NASA’s budget, I was greatly disappointed that this funding for HRMSI was not included.<br />
HRMSI is exactly what many users of remote sensing data have wanted for years. In addition<br />
to global change research, environmental applications that need HRMSI-type data<br />
include biodiversity ecosystem mapping, forest and coastal wetlands inventories, oil spill<br />
tracking, toxic waste sitting and monitoring, and land use planning.<br />
The lack of NASA co-funding for HRMSI could lead to <strong>the</strong> cancellation of HRMSI if<br />
DOD is not able to obtain additional funding. Without HRMSI, DOD’s interest in Landsat<br />
could diminish, possibly jeopardizing this valuable program that we have worked so hard<br />
to preserve. Even if DOD is able to fund <strong>the</strong> entire cost of HRMSI, most civil users may be<br />
unable to obtain imagery <strong>the</strong>y need because DOD funding would not cover data acquisition<br />
and processing for civil users.<br />
I hope that you will turn your attention to <strong>the</strong> need to establish a funding framework<br />
for HRMSI that ensures full civil participation and use of <strong>the</strong> data. I stand ready to assist<br />
you in any way possible.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “George”]<br />
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.<br />
Chairman
370<br />
Document II-42<br />
Honorable George E. Brown, Jr.<br />
Chairman<br />
Committee on Science, Space and Technology<br />
U.S. House of Representatives<br />
Washington, D.C. 20515<br />
Dear Mr. Chairman,<br />
December 9, 1993<br />
I promised to keep you informed about LANDSAT. Yesterday, Dan Goldin and I met<br />
to talk abut some program decisions in preparation for <strong>the</strong> FY95 budget. Basically, <strong>the</strong><br />
decision is for NASA to go its own way with a 30 meter resolution <strong>the</strong>matic mapper, and<br />
DoD will consider if it will go forward with <strong>the</strong> 5 meter High Resolution Multispectral<br />
Instrument (HRMSI). DoD and NASA could not afford to go forward with <strong>the</strong> LANDSAT<br />
7 and LANDSAT 8 program.<br />
I am available to discuss this with you at anytime. Hope you had a productive trip to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Far East.<br />
Document II-43<br />
Best regards,<br />
[hand-signed: “John”]<br />
John Deutch<br />
[1] December 10, 1993<br />
[handwritten note: “George”]<br />
Dear Mr. Chairman:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Thank you for sharing your concerns on <strong>the</strong> loss of Landsat 6. I also share your disappointment<br />
with respect to <strong>the</strong> loss of Landsat 6 and your concern with <strong>the</strong> potential<br />
data gap that could result from this loss. The <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy is<br />
taking an active role in reviewing <strong>the</strong> options for responding to this new situation. To this<br />
end OSTP is working with <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense, <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and<br />
Atmospheric Administration, and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration to<br />
develop options for reducing <strong>the</strong> likelihood of a gap in critical remote sensing data.<br />
The Administration recognizes that Landsat data is valuable to a broad user community<br />
as represented by Federal, state, and local governments, as well as <strong>the</strong> business, intelligence,<br />
and academic communities. Landsat is primarily valuable because its 20+ year<br />
long data base allows trends in land-surface characteristics to be determined, its radiometric<br />
measurement accuracy supports detailed characterization of <strong>the</strong> land-surface, and<br />
its combination of wide area coverage and 30 meter resolution allows broad areas to be<br />
assessed prior to initiating detailed studies requiring higher spatial resolution.<br />
Consequently, as <strong>the</strong> Administration develops a response to <strong>the</strong> loss of Landsat 6 we will<br />
take into consideration <strong>the</strong> requirements of <strong>the</strong> broad user community and <strong>the</strong> capabilities<br />
required to meet <strong>the</strong>ir needs.
Although we are in <strong>the</strong> early stages of assessing options, initial indications from<br />
EOSAT, <strong>the</strong> system’s operator, are that Landsat 5 could continue to operate for several<br />
more years even though it is already 9 years old and well past its design life. Consequently,<br />
<strong>the</strong> likelihood of a significant data gap may not be as great as originally anticipated, assuming<br />
that Landsat 7 is launched on schedule. However, we do have serious concerns with<br />
<strong>the</strong> coverage of <strong>the</strong> earth and <strong>the</strong> site revisit time of Landsat 5. Landsat 6 would have<br />
addressed <strong>the</strong>se concerns and added some additional capabilities that would have fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
increased <strong>the</strong> competitiveness and utility of <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />
OSTP in conjunction with <strong>the</strong> DOD, NOAA, and NASA is carefully considering<br />
options to address both <strong>the</strong> loss of Landsat 6 and <strong>the</strong> cost and risk of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 program.<br />
These two items are linked because <strong>the</strong> availability of Landsat 7 directly affects when<br />
or if a replacement spacecraft for Landsat 6 should be launched. As you are aware <strong>the</strong> current<br />
budgetary environment has made it necessary to examine options in terms of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
cost and risk; <strong>the</strong>refore, I want to assure you that any alternatives to <strong>the</strong> current program<br />
will undergo careful interagency review in order to evaluate potential impacts relative to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat program’s diverse requirements and users. [2] Fur<strong>the</strong>r, I would like to assure<br />
you that any proposal for responding to <strong>the</strong> loss of Landsat 6 or for significantly modifying<br />
<strong>the</strong> current Landsat program will address data continuity; impacts on agency budgets;<br />
schedule impacts; <strong>the</strong> acquisition, launch and operation of <strong>the</strong> necessary satellites and<br />
instruments; and <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> user communities.<br />
The necessary interagency review will be expedited to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of FY95 budgetary<br />
decision timetables. However, it is important to make clear that no decision on program<br />
alternatives has been or will be taken prior to <strong>the</strong> completion of this review.<br />
I look forward to working with you on this important issue and will provide a more<br />
detailed discussion of <strong>the</strong> alternatives being considered in <strong>the</strong> near future.<br />
The Honorable George E. Brown, Jr.<br />
Chairman<br />
Committee on Science, Space and Technology<br />
U.S. House of Representatives<br />
Washington, DC 20510<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 371<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
[hand-signed: “Jack”]<br />
John H. Gibbons<br />
Director
372<br />
The Honorable John H. Gibbons<br />
Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy<br />
Old Executive <strong>Office</strong> Building<br />
Washington, D.C. 20500<br />
[handwritten note: “Jack”]<br />
Dear Dr. Gibbons:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Document II-44<br />
December 14, 1993<br />
Thank you for your letter concerning <strong>the</strong> Landsat program. I appreciate your keeping<br />
me informed about <strong>the</strong> review of Landsat issues, but <strong>the</strong> letter does not directly<br />
respond to <strong>the</strong> concerns about Landsat 7 outlined in my letter to you of [handwritten<br />
underlining] August 9. [handwritten note in margin: “(attached)”] Specifically, <strong>the</strong> letter<br />
made no mention of what I believe is <strong>the</strong> most critical issue—resolving <strong>the</strong> differences<br />
between NASA and DOD concerning funding for <strong>the</strong> High Resolution Multispectral<br />
Stereo Imager (HRMSI) on Landsat 7.<br />
I would like to reiterate my strong support for <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 program and my belief that<br />
HRMSI represents a valuable new capability for both national security and civilian users.<br />
I would like to request again that you personally intervene to provide a solution that<br />
ensures continuation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 program. Any solution should fulfill <strong>the</strong> requirements<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Policy Act (Public Law 102–555), including an integrated<br />
management by NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense, procurement of Landsat 7<br />
as quickly as practicable that is at least as capable as Landsat 6 would have been, and, where<br />
possible, incorporation of any improvement needed to meet U.S. Government needs.<br />
As always, I stand ready to assist you in any way possible.<br />
Document II-45<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “George”]<br />
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.<br />
Chairman<br />
Document title: The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-3, “Landsat<br />
Remote Sensing Strategy,” May 5, 1994.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense decided to stop directly participating in <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, policy<br />
makers within <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration faced <strong>the</strong> task of determining how to proceed. After considerable<br />
discussion within <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration’s National Science and Technology Council, with<br />
input from <strong>the</strong> National Security Council, President Clinton signed this directive, which gave NASA<br />
responsibility for procuring Landsat 7, NOAA <strong>the</strong> responsibility for managing operations, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior <strong>the</strong> responsibility for distributing <strong>the</strong> data through <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological<br />
Survey’s EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
[no pagination]<br />
Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-3<br />
TO: The Vice President<br />
The Secretary of Defense<br />
The Secretary of Interior<br />
The Secretary of Commerce<br />
The Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget<br />
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for National Security Affairs<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Science and Technology<br />
The Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for Economic Policy<br />
SUBJECT: Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy<br />
I. Introduction<br />
This directive provides for continuance of <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 program, assures continuity<br />
of Landsat-type and quality of data, and reduces <strong>the</strong> risk of a data gap.<br />
The Landsat program has provided over 20 years of calibrated data to a broad user<br />
community including <strong>the</strong> agricultural community, global change researchers, state and<br />
local governments, commercial users, and <strong>the</strong> military. The Landsat 6 satellite which failed<br />
to reach orbit in 1993 was intended to replace <strong>the</strong> existing Landsat satellites 4 and 5, which<br />
were launched in 1982 and 1984. These satellites which are operating well beyond <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
three year design lives, represent <strong>the</strong> only source of global calibrated high spatial resolution<br />
measurements of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s surface that can be compared to previous data records.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Fall of 1993 <strong>the</strong> joint Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Administration Landsat 7 program was being reevaluated due to severe budgetary<br />
constraints. This fact, coupled with <strong>the</strong> advanced age of Landsat satellites 4 and 5, resulted<br />
in a re-assessment of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program by representatives of <strong>the</strong> National Science<br />
and Technology Council. The objectives of <strong>the</strong> National Science and Technology Council<br />
were to minimize <strong>the</strong> potential for a gap in <strong>the</strong> Landsat data record if Landsat satellites<br />
4 and 5 should cease to operate, to reduce cost, and to reduce development risk. The<br />
results of this re-assessment are identified below.<br />
This document supersedes National Space Policy Directive #5, dated February 2,<br />
1992, and directs implementation of <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program consistent with <strong>the</strong> intent of<br />
P. L. 102–555, <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, and P. L. 103–221, <strong>the</strong><br />
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. The Administration will seek all legislative<br />
changes necessary to implement this PDD.<br />
II. Policy Goals<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 373<br />
A remote sensing capability, such as is currently being provided by Landsat satellites<br />
4 and 5, benefits <strong>the</strong> civil, commercial, and national security interests of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
and makes contributions to <strong>the</strong> private sector which are in <strong>the</strong> public interest. For <strong>the</strong>se<br />
reasons, <strong>the</strong> United States Government will seek to maintain <strong>the</strong> continuity of Landsattype<br />
data. The U.S. Government will:<br />
(a) Provide unenhanced data which are sufficiently consistent in terms of acquisition<br />
geometry, coverage characteristics, and spectral characteristics with previous Landsat data<br />
to allow quantitative comparisons for change detection and characterization;
374<br />
(b) Make government-owned Landsat data available to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of all users at<br />
no more than <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests consistent with data policy goals of P. L.<br />
102–555; and<br />
(c) Promote and not preclude private sector commercial opportunities in Landsattype<br />
remote sensing.<br />
III. Landsat Strategy<br />
a. The Landsat strategy is composed of <strong>the</strong> following elements:<br />
(1) Ensuring that Landsat satellites 4 and 5 continue to provide data as long as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are technically capable of doing so.<br />
(2) Acquiring a Landsat 7 satellite that maintains <strong>the</strong> continuity of Landsat-type<br />
data, minimizes development risk, minimizes cost, and achieves <strong>the</strong> most<br />
favorable launch schedule to mitigate <strong>the</strong> loss of Landsat 6.<br />
(3) Maintaining an archive within <strong>the</strong> United States for existing and future<br />
Landsat-type data.<br />
(4) Ensuring that unenhanced data from Landsat 7 are available to all users at no<br />
more than <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
(5) Providing data for use in global change research in a manner consistent with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Global Change Research Policy Statements for Data Management.<br />
(6) Considering alternatives for maintaining <strong>the</strong> continuity of data beyond Landsat 7.<br />
(7) Fostering <strong>the</strong> development of advanced remote sensing technologies, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> goal of reducing <strong>the</strong> cost and increasing <strong>the</strong> performance of future<br />
Landsat-type satellites to meet U.S. Government needs, and potentially,<br />
enabling substantially greater opportunities for commercialization.<br />
b. These strategy elements will be implemented within <strong>the</strong> overall resource and policy<br />
guidance provided by <strong>the</strong> President.<br />
IV. Implementing Guidelines<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Affected agencies will identify funds necessary to implement <strong>the</strong> National Strategy for<br />
Landsat Remote Sensing within <strong>the</strong> overall resource and policy guidance provided by <strong>the</strong><br />
President. {In order to effectuate <strong>the</strong> strategy enumerated herein, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of<br />
Commerce and <strong>the</strong> Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Interior are hereby designated as members of <strong>the</strong><br />
Landsat Program Management in accordance with section 101(b) of <strong>the</strong> Landsat Remote<br />
Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. 5602 (6) and 5611(b).} Specific agency responsibilities<br />
are provided below.<br />
a. The Department of Commerce/NOAA will:<br />
(1) In participation with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate government agencies arrange for <strong>the</strong><br />
continued operation of Landsat satellites 4 and 5 and <strong>the</strong> routine operation<br />
of future Landsat satellites after <strong>the</strong>ir placement in orbit.<br />
(2) Seek better access to data collected at foreign ground stations for U.S.<br />
Government and private sector users of Landsat data.<br />
(3) In cooperation with NASA, manage <strong>the</strong> development of and provide a share<br />
of <strong>the</strong> funding for <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 ground system.<br />
(4) Operate <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 spacecraft and ground system in cooperation with <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior.<br />
(5) Seek to offset operations costs through use of access fees from foreign ground<br />
stations and/or <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
(6) Aggregate future Federal requirements for civil operational land remote sensing<br />
data.<br />
b. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will:
(1) Ensure data continuity by <strong>the</strong> development and launch of a Landsat 7 satellite<br />
system which is at a minimum functionally equivalent to <strong>the</strong> Landsat 6<br />
satellite in accordance with section 102, P. L. 102–555.<br />
(2) In coordination with DOC and DOI, develop a Landsat 7 ground system compatible<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Landsat 7 spacecraft.<br />
(3) In coordination with DOC, DOI, and DOD, revise <strong>the</strong> current Management<br />
plan to reflect <strong>the</strong> changes implemented through this directive, including<br />
programmatic, technical, schedule, and budget information.<br />
(4) Implement <strong>the</strong> joint NASA/DOD transition plan to transfer <strong>the</strong> DOD<br />
Landsat 7 responsibilities to NASA.<br />
(5) In coordination with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate agencies of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government develop<br />
a strategy for maintaining continuity of Landsat-type data beyond Landsat 7.<br />
(6) Conduct a coordinated technology demonstration program with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
appropriate agencies to improve <strong>the</strong> performance and reduce <strong>the</strong> cost for<br />
future unclassified earth remote sensing systems.<br />
c. The Department of Defense will implement <strong>the</strong> joint NASA/DOD transition plan<br />
to transfer <strong>the</strong> DOD Landsat 7 responsibilities to NASA.<br />
d. The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior will continue to maintain a national archive of<br />
existing and future Landsat-type remote sensing data within <strong>the</strong> United States and make<br />
such data available to U.S. Government and o<strong>the</strong>r users.<br />
e. Affected agencies will identify <strong>the</strong> funding, and funding transfers for FY 1994,<br />
required to implement this strategy that are within <strong>the</strong>ir approved fiscal year 1994 budgets<br />
and subsequent budget requests.<br />
V. Reporting Requirements<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 375<br />
U.S. Government agencies affected by <strong>the</strong> strategy guidelines are directed to report<br />
no later that 30 days following <strong>the</strong> issuance of this directive, to <strong>the</strong> National Science and<br />
Technology Council on <strong>the</strong>ir implementation. The agencies will address management and<br />
funding responsibilities, government and contractor operations, data management,<br />
archiving, and dissemination, necessary changes to P. L. 102–555 and commercial considerations<br />
associated with <strong>the</strong> Landsat program.<br />
Document II-46<br />
Document title: Gregory W. Wi<strong>the</strong>e, Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite and<br />
Information Services, NOAA, to Walter S. Scott, President and Chief Executive <strong>Office</strong>r,<br />
World View Imaging Corporation, January 4, 1993.<br />
Document II-47<br />
Document title: Duane P. Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Gregory W. Wi<strong>the</strong>e,<br />
Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information Services, NOAA,<br />
December 24, 1992.<br />
Document II-48<br />
Document title: Ralph Braibanti, Deputy Director, <strong>Office</strong> of Advanced Technology,<br />
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S.<br />
Department of State, to Michael Mignogno, Chief, Landsat Commercialization Division,<br />
NOAA, October 19, 1992.<br />
Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
376<br />
The letter from NOAA’s Gregory Wi<strong>the</strong>e represents <strong>the</strong> first license to operate a commercial remote-sensing<br />
satellite system granted under Title II of <strong>the</strong> Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992. The license<br />
was granted to WorldView Imaging Corporation and subsequently transferred to EarthWatch, Inc.,<br />
when WorldView and Ball Aerospace formed an alliance to build and operate remote-sensing satellites<br />
and to market data from <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Document II-46<br />
[1] JAN 4, 1993<br />
Mr. Walter S. Scott<br />
President and Chief Executive <strong>Office</strong>r<br />
WorldView Imaging Corporation<br />
7015 Elverton Drive<br />
Oakland, California 94611-1111<br />
Dear Mr. Scott:<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
This letter constitutes a license under Title II or <strong>the</strong> Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act<br />
of 1992, P.L. 102–555 (<strong>the</strong> Act), for WorldView Imaging Corporation (Licensee) to operate<br />
a private remote-sensing space system. The license is valid for a period of 10 years from<br />
<strong>the</strong> above date.<br />
A. Approval is based on operational specifications set forth in paragraph (d)<br />
attached to <strong>the</strong> letter of application dated July 15, 1992, and additional information provided<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Licensee’s letter dated August 20, 1992, in response to questions 2–4 and 8.<br />
B. This license is subject to <strong>the</strong> following terms and conditions which apply to<br />
WorldView and any affiliate or contractor as appropriate.<br />
1. Licensee will not change <strong>the</strong> operational characteristics described above in a<br />
way that would result in materially different capabilities than those described<br />
in <strong>the</strong> application information. Licensee will notify <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) at least<br />
60 days in advance of scheduled launch.<br />
2. Licensee will operate <strong>the</strong> system in a manner that will preserve <strong>the</strong> national<br />
security of <strong>the</strong> United States through positive control of <strong>the</strong> spacecraft including<br />
safeguards to assure <strong>the</strong> integrity of spacecraft operations. In <strong>the</strong> event of<br />
a national security crisis, as defined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense, <strong>the</strong> Secretary<br />
of Commerce may, after consultation with <strong>the</strong> Secretary or Defense, require<br />
<strong>the</strong> Licensee to limit data collection and/or distribution by <strong>the</strong> system to <strong>the</strong><br />
extent necessitated by <strong>the</strong> crisis. During such periods, <strong>the</strong> Licensee shall<br />
endeavor to provide system data requested by DOD and o<strong>the</strong>r national security<br />
agencies under reasonable cost terms.<br />
[2] 3. Licensee will make available to <strong>the</strong> Government of any country (including <strong>the</strong><br />
United States) unenhanced data concerning <strong>the</strong> territory under <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction<br />
of such Government as soon as such data are available and on reasonable<br />
terms and conditions.<br />
4. Licensee will make available unenhanced data requested by <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Satellite Land Remote-Sensing Data Archive (<strong>the</strong> Archive) in <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Interior on reasonable cost terms as agreed by <strong>the</strong> Licensee and <strong>the</strong><br />
Archive. After a reasonable period of time as agreed with <strong>the</strong> Licensee, <strong>the</strong><br />
Archive may make <strong>the</strong>se data available to <strong>the</strong> public at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling<br />
user requests.
Before purging any data in its possession, <strong>the</strong> Licensee shall offer <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong><br />
Archive at <strong>the</strong> cost of reproduction and transmission. The Archive may make<br />
<strong>the</strong>se data available immediately to <strong>the</strong> public at <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user<br />
requests.<br />
5. Licensee will notify NESDIS of any agreement pertaining to operations under<br />
this license which <strong>the</strong> Licensee intends to enter into with a foreign nation,<br />
entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities, at least 30 days<br />
before concluding such agreement. Standard data purchase, distribution,<br />
and processing agreements and agreements incidental to <strong>the</strong> maintenance of<br />
sales offices in foreign countries are not included in this condition.<br />
C. Enforcement of <strong>the</strong> Act and this license will be carried out in accordance with section<br />
203 of <strong>the</strong> Act. Any civil penalties authorized by section 203(a) (3) will be assessed in<br />
accordance with <strong>the</strong> procedures set forth in Subparts B and C of 15 CFR Part 904. Such<br />
civil penalties may be assessed in amounts up to $10,000 for any violation of <strong>the</strong> Act or any<br />
condition of this license with each day of violation constituting a separate violation.<br />
D. The following require an amendment of <strong>the</strong> license;<br />
l. Assignment of <strong>the</strong> license;<br />
2. Any change in ownership of Licensee that would result in foreign individuals,<br />
entities, or consortia having an aggregate interest in Licensee in excess of<br />
15 percent; and<br />
[3] 3. Any operation outside <strong>the</strong> range of orbits and altitudes, <strong>the</strong> range of spatial<br />
resolution or <strong>the</strong> spectral bands approved above, provided that in <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
an emergency posing an imminent and substantial threat of harm to human<br />
life, property, environment, or <strong>the</strong> remote-sensing space system itself,<br />
Licensee shall not be required to obtain such amendment. If circumstances<br />
permit, however, Licensee shall attempt to obtain oral approval from NESDIS<br />
prior to making any substantial change.<br />
I wish you well in your endeavors.<br />
Document II-47<br />
Mr. Gregory W. Wi<strong>the</strong>e<br />
Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite,<br />
Data, and Information Services<br />
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration<br />
Department of Commerce<br />
Washington, DC 20233<br />
Dear Mr. Wi<strong>the</strong>e:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 377<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Gregory W. Wi<strong>the</strong>e<br />
Acting Assistant Administrator for<br />
Satellite and Information Service<br />
December 24, 1992<br />
I have reviewed World View Imaging Corporation’s answers to our questions provided<br />
in your September 16, 1992, letter. I am satisfied that <strong>the</strong> system and <strong>the</strong> terms and conditions<br />
in your proposed approval letter will provide <strong>the</strong> necessary protection to meet<br />
Department of Defense requirements. I recommend approval of <strong>the</strong>ir request.
378<br />
There is currently considerable and growing international activity in remote sensing.<br />
Since this appears to be <strong>the</strong> first attempt to license a system under <strong>the</strong> LANDSAT Act, we<br />
are very interested and would like to track its progress. Please ask Mr. Scott to contact<br />
Colonel Pete Gill of my staff at (703) 697-9897 to arrange for a briefing to DoD representatives<br />
on how <strong>the</strong> system is developing.<br />
Mr. Michael Mignogno<br />
Chief, Landsat Commercialization Division<br />
NOAA/NESDIS, FB-4, room 3301E<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce<br />
Washington, D.C. 20233<br />
Dear Mr. Mignogno:<br />
Document II-48<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Duane P. Andrews<br />
October 19, 1992<br />
We thank NOAA’s Thomas Pyke for his September 16, 1992, letter to Richard Smith<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> licensing of WorldView Imaging Corporation’s proposed private remotesensing<br />
satellite system.<br />
Mr. Pyke’s letter requested Department review of WorldView’s August 20, 1992,<br />
response to earlier USG [U.S. Government] follow-up questions on WorldView’s initial<br />
license application.<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong> information provided, <strong>the</strong> WorldView license application appears to be<br />
consistent with U.S. international obligations, and this office recommends approval of <strong>the</strong><br />
application.<br />
We note in this connection that <strong>the</strong> “National Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of<br />
1992” has codified <strong>the</strong> requirement for appropriate Government oversight (with appropriate<br />
interagency consultation) of private system activities affecting international obligations,<br />
foreign policy, and <strong>the</strong> national security of <strong>the</strong> United States. We look forward to<br />
participation in this process.<br />
cc: NOAA/NESDIS - Gregory Wi<strong>the</strong>e<br />
OES - Richard Smith<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Ralph Braibanti<br />
Deputy Director<br />
<strong>Office</strong> of Advanced Technology
Document II-49<br />
Document title: <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The White House, “U.S. Policy on<br />
Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems,” March 10, 1994.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
The June 1993 request of Lockheed Corporation’s Space Systems, Inc., for a license to operate a remotesensing<br />
system capable of receiving and marketing data of one-meter resolution caused <strong>the</strong> Clinton<br />
administration to review its policy toward <strong>the</strong> commercial operation of high-resolution satellites. After<br />
a thorough interagency review, <strong>the</strong> White House released this policy statement, which reaffirms support<br />
for <strong>the</strong> international sale of relatively high-resolution data and allows <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce<br />
<strong>the</strong> right to limit data collection or distribution “during periods when national security or international<br />
obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised.” The policy is considerably restrictive<br />
toward <strong>the</strong> sales of systems to foreign entities, noting that each request will be reviewed on a case-bycase<br />
basis and will be made only “on <strong>the</strong> basis of a government-to-government agreement.”<br />
[no pagination]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 379<br />
For Immediate Release March 10, 1994<br />
U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation of<br />
Private Remote Sensing Systems<br />
License requests by US firms to operate private remote sensing space systems will be<br />
reviewed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Policy Act<br />
of 1992 (<strong>the</strong> Act). There is a presumption that remote sensing space systems whose performance<br />
capabilities and imagery quality characteristics are available or are planned for<br />
availability in <strong>the</strong> world marketplace (e.g., SPOT, Landsat, etc.) will be favorably considered,<br />
and that <strong>the</strong> following conditions will apply to any US entity that receives an operating<br />
license under <strong>the</strong> Act.<br />
1. The licensee will be required to maintain a record of all satellite tasking for <strong>the</strong><br />
previous year and to allow <strong>the</strong> USG access to this record.<br />
2. The licensee will not change <strong>the</strong> operational characteristics of <strong>the</strong> satellite system<br />
from <strong>the</strong> application as submitted without formal notification and approval of <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Commerce, which would coordinate with o<strong>the</strong>r interested agencies.<br />
3. The license being granted does not relieve <strong>the</strong> licensee of <strong>the</strong> obligation to obtain<br />
export license(s) pursuant to applicable statutes.<br />
4. The license is valid only for a finite period, and is nei<strong>the</strong>r transferable nor subject<br />
to foreign ownership, above a specified threshold, without <strong>the</strong> explicit permission of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce.<br />
5. All encryption devices must be approved by <strong>the</strong> US Government for <strong>the</strong> purpose<br />
of denying unauthorized access to o<strong>the</strong>rs during periods when national security, international<br />
obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised as provided for in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Act.<br />
6. A licensee must use a data downlink format that allows <strong>the</strong> US Government access<br />
and use of <strong>the</strong> data during periods when national security, international obligations<br />
and/or foreign policies may be compromised as provided for in <strong>the</strong> Act.
380<br />
7. During periods when national security or international obligations and/or foreign<br />
policies may be compromised, as defined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense or <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary of State, respectively, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce may, after consultation<br />
with <strong>the</strong> appropriate agency(ies), require <strong>the</strong> licensee to limit data collection and/or<br />
distribution by <strong>the</strong> system to <strong>the</strong> extent necessitated by <strong>the</strong> given situation. Decisions<br />
to impose such limits only will be made by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce in consultation<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense or <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State, as appropriate. Disagreements<br />
between Cabinet Secretaries may be appealed to <strong>the</strong> President. The Secretaries of<br />
State, Defense and Commerce shall develop <strong>the</strong>ir own internal mechanisms to enable<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to carry out <strong>the</strong>ir statutory responsibilities.<br />
8. Pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Act, <strong>the</strong> US Government requires US companies that have been<br />
issued operating licenses under <strong>the</strong> Act to notify <strong>the</strong> US Government of its intent to<br />
enter into significant or substantial agreements with new foreign customers.<br />
Interested agencies shall be given advance notice of such agreements to allow <strong>the</strong>m<br />
<strong>the</strong> opportunity to review <strong>the</strong> proposed agreement in light of <strong>the</strong> national security,<br />
international obligations and foreign policy concerns of <strong>the</strong> US Government. The<br />
definition of a significant or substantial agreement, as well as <strong>the</strong> time frames and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r details of this process, will be defined in later Commerce regulations in consultation<br />
with appropriate agencies.<br />
U.S. Policy on <strong>the</strong> Transfer of Advanced Remote Sensing Capabilities<br />
Advanced Remote Sensing System Exports<br />
The United States will consider requests to export advanced remote sensing systems<br />
whose performance capabilities and imagery quality characteristics are available or are<br />
planned for availability in <strong>the</strong> world marketplace on a case-by-case basis.<br />
The details of <strong>the</strong>se potential sales should take into account <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
• <strong>the</strong> proposed foreign recipient’s willingness and ability to accept commitments to<br />
<strong>the</strong> US Government concerning sharing, protection, and denial of products and<br />
data; and<br />
• constraints on resolution, geographic coverage, timeliness, spectral coverage,<br />
data processing and exploitation techniques, tasking capabilities, and ground<br />
architectures.<br />
Approval of requests for exports of systems would also require certain diplomatic steps<br />
be taken, such as informing o<strong>the</strong>r close friends in <strong>the</strong> region of <strong>the</strong> request, and <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
we would likely attach to any sale; and informing <strong>the</strong> recipient of our decision and<br />
<strong>the</strong> conditions we would require as part of <strong>the</strong> sale.<br />
Any system made available to a foreign government or o<strong>the</strong>r foreign entity may be<br />
subject to a formal government-to-government agreement.<br />
Transfer of Sensitive Technology<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
The United States will consider applications to export remote sensing space capabilities<br />
on a restricted basis. Sensitive technology in this situation consists of items of technology<br />
on <strong>the</strong> US Munitions List necessary to develop or to support advanced remote<br />
sensing space capabilities and which are uniquely available in <strong>the</strong> United States. Such sensitive<br />
technology shall be made available to foreign entities only on <strong>the</strong> basis of a government-to-government<br />
agreement. This agreement may be in <strong>the</strong> form of end-use and<br />
retransfer assurances which can be tailored to ensure <strong>the</strong> protection of US technology.
Government-to-Government Intelligence and Defense Partnerships<br />
Proposals for intelligence or defense partnerships with foreign countries regarding<br />
remote sensing that would raise questions about US Government competition with <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector or would change <strong>the</strong> US Government’s use of funds generated pursuant to a USforeign<br />
government partnership arrangement shall be submitted for interagency review.<br />
Document II-50<br />
Document title: Robert S. Winokur, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information<br />
Services, NOAA, to Albert E. Smith, Vice President, Advanced Government and<br />
Commercial Systems, Lockheed Missile and Space Company, Inc., April 22, 1994.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This letter, which “constitutes a license under Title II of <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,”<br />
spells out <strong>the</strong> requirements of government policy for <strong>the</strong> operation of Lockheed’s one-meter system, consistent<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration’s policy on remote sensing, licensing, and exports of March<br />
10, 1994 (see Document II-49).<br />
[1] [rubber stamped: “APR 22, 1994”]<br />
Albert E. Smith<br />
Vice President, Advanced Government<br />
and Commercial Systems<br />
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc.<br />
1111 Lockheed Way<br />
Sunnyvale, California 94089-3504<br />
Dear Mr. Smith:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 381<br />
This letter constitutes a license under Title II of <strong>the</strong> Land Remote Sensing Policy Act<br />
of 1992, P.L. 102–555 (<strong>the</strong> Act), for Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc.<br />
(Licensee) to operate a private remote-sensing space system. The license is valid for a period<br />
of 10 years from <strong>the</strong> above date.<br />
A. Approval is based on <strong>the</strong> operational specifications set forth in your letter of application<br />
dated June 10, 1993, as amended by your letter dated August 13, 1993, and additional<br />
information provided in response to agency requests dated September 12, 1993.<br />
B. This license is limited to <strong>the</strong> operations of a land remote-sensing space system and<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> following terms and conditions that apply to <strong>the</strong> Licensee and any subsidiary,<br />
affiliate, or contractor, as appropriate. The issuance of this license does not relieve<br />
<strong>the</strong> Licensee of <strong>the</strong> obligation to obtain export or o<strong>the</strong>r licenses from appropriate U.S.<br />
Government agencies pursuant to applicable statutes.<br />
1. Licensee shall comply with <strong>the</strong> requirements of <strong>the</strong> Act, and any applicable<br />
regulations issued pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Act. The Licensee shall operate <strong>the</strong> system<br />
in a manner that preserves <strong>the</strong> national security and observes <strong>the</strong> international<br />
obligations and foreign polices of <strong>the</strong> United States. The Licensee shall<br />
at all times maintain positive control of <strong>the</strong> spacecraft including safeguards to<br />
ensure <strong>the</strong> integrity of spacecraft operations. The Licensee shall maintain<br />
and make available to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government, as requested, a record of all satellite<br />
tasking operations, for <strong>the</strong> previous year.
382<br />
OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />
During periods when national security or international obligations<br />
and/or foreign policies may be compromised, as defined by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of<br />
Defense or <strong>the</strong> Secretary of State, respectively, <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Commerce<br />
may, after [2] consultation with <strong>the</strong> appropriate agency(ies), require <strong>the</strong><br />
Licensee to limit data collection and/or distribution by <strong>the</strong> system to <strong>the</strong><br />
extent necessitated by <strong>the</strong> given situation. During those periods when, and<br />
for those geographic areas that, <strong>the</strong> secretary of Commerce has required <strong>the</strong><br />
Licensee to limit distribution, <strong>the</strong> Licensee shall, on request, make <strong>the</strong> unenhanced<br />
data thus limited from <strong>the</strong> system available exclusively, by means of<br />
government furnished rekeyable encryption on <strong>the</strong> downlink, to <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government. The costs and terms associated with meeting this condition will<br />
be negotiated directly between <strong>the</strong> Licensee and DOD (for <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government) in accordance with Section 507(d) of <strong>the</strong> Act.<br />
The Licensee shall ensure that all encryption devices used are approved<br />
by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government for <strong>the</strong> purpose of denying unauthorized access to<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs during periods when national security or international obligations<br />
and/or foreign policies may be compromised.<br />
The Licensee shall use a data downlink format that allows <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government access and use of <strong>the</strong> data during periods when national security<br />
or international obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised.<br />
The Licensee shall provide sufficient documentation to <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government on <strong>the</strong> Licensee’s downlink data format to assure this access.<br />
2. Licensee will make available to <strong>the</strong> Government of any country (including <strong>the</strong><br />
United States) unenhanced data concerning <strong>the</strong> territory under <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction<br />
of such Government as soon as such data are available and on reasonable<br />
cost terms and conditions.<br />
3. Licensee will make available unenhanced data requested by <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive (<strong>the</strong> Archive) in <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Interior on reasonable cost terms as agreed by <strong>the</strong> Licensee and <strong>the</strong><br />
Archive. After a reasonable period of time, as agreed with <strong>the</strong> Licensee, <strong>the</strong><br />
Archive may make <strong>the</strong>se data available to <strong>the</strong> public at a price equivalent to<br />
<strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
Before purging any data in its possession, <strong>the</strong> Licensee shall offer such<br />
data to <strong>the</strong> Archive at <strong>the</strong> cost of reproduction and transmission. The Archive<br />
may make <strong>the</strong>se data available immediately to <strong>the</strong> public at a price equivalent<br />
to <strong>the</strong> cost of fulfilling user requests.<br />
[3] 4. Upon termination of operations under license, <strong>the</strong> Licensee will dispose of<br />
any satellite in space in a manner satisfactory to <strong>the</strong> President. To meet this<br />
condition and to deal with any circumstances involving [<strong>the</strong>] satellite’s end of<br />
life/termination of mission, <strong>the</strong> Licensee shall obtain priori U.S.<br />
Government approval of all plans and procedures to deal with <strong>the</strong> safe disposition<br />
of <strong>the</strong> satellite (e.g., burn on reentry or controlled deorbit).<br />
5. Licensee shall not change <strong>the</strong> operational specifications of <strong>the</strong> satellite system<br />
from <strong>the</strong> application as submitted, which would result in materially different<br />
capabilities than those described in <strong>the</strong> application, without filing an amendment<br />
as specified in paragraph D.3 of this license.<br />
6. Licensee shall notify <strong>the</strong> National Environmental Satellite, Data, and<br />
Information Service (NESDIS) of any significant or substantial agreement <strong>the</strong><br />
Licensee intends to enter with a foreign nation, entity, or consortium involving<br />
foreign nations or entities at least 60 days before concluding such agreement.<br />
Significant or substantial agreements include, but are not limited to,<br />
agreements which would provide for <strong>the</strong> tasking of <strong>the</strong> satellite and its sensors,
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 383<br />
provide for real-time direct access to unenhanced data, or involve high-volume<br />
data purchase agreements. NESDIS, in consultation with <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
agencies, shall review <strong>the</strong> proposed agreement to ensure that it is consistent<br />
with <strong>the</strong> terms and conditions of this license. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> agreement shall<br />
require that <strong>the</strong> foreign entity will abide by <strong>the</strong> conditions in this license<br />
addressing national security, and international obligations and foreign policies.<br />
If NESDIS, in consultation with appropriate agencies, determines that <strong>the</strong><br />
proposed agreement will compromise national security concerns or international<br />
obligations or foreign policy, NESDIS will so advise <strong>the</strong> Licensee.<br />
C. Enforcement of this license will be carried out in accordance with section 203 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Act. Any civil penalties authorized by section 203(a) (3) will be assessed in accordance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> procedures set forth in Subparts B and C of 15 C.F.R. Part 904. Such civil penalties<br />
may be assessed in amounts up to $10,000 for any violation of <strong>the</strong> Act or any condition<br />
of this license with each day of violation constituting a separate violation.<br />
[4] D. Before <strong>the</strong> Licensee may take any of <strong>the</strong> following actions, NESDIS must grant an<br />
amendment to <strong>the</strong> license. NESDIS will consult with <strong>the</strong> appropriate Federal agencies as<br />
required by <strong>the</strong> Act before taking final action on <strong>the</strong> amendment. The Licensee must<br />
promptly file all relevant information with NESDIS if <strong>the</strong> Licensee anticipates <strong>the</strong> occurrence<br />
of any of <strong>the</strong> following conditions:<br />
1. Assignment or transfer of <strong>the</strong> license;<br />
2. Any change in ownership of <strong>the</strong> Licensee that would result in foreign individuals,<br />
entities, or consortia having an aggregate interest in <strong>the</strong> Licensee in<br />
excess of 25 percent; and<br />
3. Any change in <strong>the</strong> orbital characteristics, performance specifications, or data<br />
collection and exploitation capabilities approved above. In <strong>the</strong> case of an<br />
emergency posing an imminent and substantial threat of harm to human life,<br />
property, environment, or <strong>the</strong> remote-sensing space system itself, Licensee<br />
shall not be required to obtain such amendment. If circumstances permit,<br />
Licensee shall attempt to obtain oral approval from NESDIS prior to making<br />
any such substantial change.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Robert S. Winokur<br />
Assistant Administrator for<br />
Satellite and Information Services
Chapter Three<br />
Space as an Investment<br />
in Economic Growth<br />
by Henry R. Hertzfeld<br />
Introduction<br />
The research and development investments that NASA has made have greatly affected<br />
<strong>the</strong> economy of <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> world. New industries have been created.<br />
New technologies have been advanced from <strong>the</strong> laboratory to <strong>the</strong> marketplace more<br />
quickly than if <strong>the</strong>re had been no space program. Not only have jobs and income been<br />
created, but new ways of viewing <strong>the</strong> world now exist and o<strong>the</strong>r innovations that can be<br />
traced to NASA requirements and investments have improved <strong>the</strong> quality of life.<br />
Describing <strong>the</strong>se advances is relatively easy. Measuring <strong>the</strong>m is difficult. This chapter<br />
describes various economic methods that have been applied to <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>the</strong> measurement<br />
of NASA investments, as well as <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong>ir use. It shows that economists<br />
are not in agreement in finding a clear and best approach to measurement. It is also clear<br />
that no one measure is a comprehensive indicator of NASA impacts and benefits.<br />
This chapter also tracks two o<strong>the</strong>r issues. The first is <strong>the</strong> political and social need for<br />
NASA to measure its impact on <strong>the</strong> economy. From <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> Apollo program<br />
until funding started to decrease in <strong>the</strong> late 1960s, NASA had no pressing need to justify<br />
its program from an economic perspective. Falling NASA budgets and very high national<br />
visibility greatly increased <strong>the</strong> need to explain to Congress and <strong>the</strong> public <strong>the</strong> usefulness<br />
of <strong>the</strong> space program. Also, with <strong>the</strong> growing budget deficit and social programs of <strong>the</strong><br />
1970s and 1980s, NASA had to compete for its share of <strong>the</strong> discretionary budget against<br />
many o<strong>the</strong>r national priorities. Finally, with <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War in <strong>the</strong> late 1980s, <strong>the</strong><br />
space race with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union was over, and <strong>the</strong> pressure to view NASA and space investments<br />
from <strong>the</strong> perspective of a rate of return to <strong>the</strong> nation from its investments became<br />
paramount.<br />
The second issue reflects an overall economic-related push within <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
to collect more and better data on research and development (R&D) and to expand <strong>the</strong><br />
available methodological tools in economics to analyze those data. It is no coincidence<br />
that this trend also parallels <strong>the</strong> overall growth of R&D performed in large laboratories<br />
and institutions across <strong>the</strong> United States following World War II, including <strong>the</strong> establishment<br />
of <strong>the</strong> National Science Foundation, NASA, and <strong>the</strong> Department of Energy (which<br />
included <strong>the</strong> Atomic Energy Commission), as well as <strong>the</strong> very steady and rapid growth of<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Institutes of Health. Prior to World War II, successful government programs<br />
in technology development and transfer were limited to <strong>the</strong> Agricultural Extension<br />
Service and NASA’s predecessor, <strong>the</strong> National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. With<br />
<strong>the</strong> great expansion of R&D programs in government, <strong>the</strong>re was an emphasis on documenting<br />
and measuring results to develop public support, convince Congress to continue<br />
and expand funding, and better understand <strong>the</strong> role of R&D and technological innovation<br />
in society. By <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, as described below, <strong>the</strong> mandate to develop performance<br />
measures for R&D had changed from a voluntary and ad hoc effort to one that is<br />
now mandated by congressional legislation.<br />
385
386<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
NASA Activities<br />
The cumulative investment that <strong>the</strong> United States has made in civilian space activities<br />
through NASA alone has been more than $200 billion over a period of nearly 40 years. 1<br />
As with any federal expenditure, each year’s budget outlays pump money into <strong>the</strong> economy,<br />
directly create jobs, and stimulate additional employment and income throughout <strong>the</strong><br />
nation. Although <strong>the</strong> distribution among occupations and regions may differ for NASAtype<br />
expenditures, from <strong>the</strong> expenditures on new roads, housing, or welfare payments,<br />
<strong>the</strong> overall multiplier effects are similar. Also, if any of <strong>the</strong> programs are eliminated, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
employment and income effects are eliminated.<br />
What makes NASA and o<strong>the</strong>r R&D investments different is that <strong>the</strong>y also stimulate <strong>the</strong><br />
productive capacity of <strong>the</strong> economy through <strong>the</strong> development and introduction of new<br />
technology. New technology can make existing production methods more efficient, and it<br />
can also create new products and services that not only stimulate new markets, industries,<br />
and opportunities, but can also improve <strong>the</strong> way people do things and <strong>the</strong> overall quality<br />
of life. These benefits and impacts on <strong>the</strong> economy are not immediate—it may take years<br />
or decades for an idea to be transformed into a marketable product or service. Thus, <strong>the</strong><br />
benefits from R&D investments in space are more difficult to measure and more unpredictable<br />
than <strong>the</strong> short-term benefits that accrue from <strong>the</strong> immediate jobs and income created<br />
by direct federal spending.<br />
The measurement difficulties center around <strong>the</strong> unpredictable ways that technology<br />
is transferred and <strong>the</strong> problems inherent in tracing <strong>the</strong> progression of ideas and experiments<br />
into consumer products whose sales contribute to <strong>the</strong> gross domestic product. This<br />
process, even when <strong>the</strong> route to <strong>the</strong> marketplace is fast, may take years. For some fundamental<br />
research, <strong>the</strong> process may take decades. The process of technology transfer will<br />
include false leads, dead ends, and even products that are technical successes, but fail in<br />
<strong>the</strong> marketplace. However, it also may generate major commercial successes. In many<br />
cases, <strong>the</strong> R&D stage represents only a small fraction of <strong>the</strong> monetary investment necessary<br />
for bringing a product or service to <strong>the</strong> market. Also necessary for economic success are<br />
large-scale manufacturing technology, marketing efforts, advertising, product support, and<br />
so forth. Many government-developed technologies that are highly useful for <strong>the</strong>ir design<br />
objective in fulfilling a government mission need a large amount of additional R&D to<br />
make <strong>the</strong>m optimal for commercial markets. Tracing over time <strong>the</strong> many paths of technology<br />
development and transfer and placing a value on <strong>the</strong> returns to <strong>the</strong> NASA R&D<br />
component of <strong>the</strong>se innovations continue to be challenges to <strong>the</strong> economic community.<br />
Certain “big” technologies for which NASA has been responsible and those that have<br />
been greatly stimulated through <strong>the</strong> space agency’s programs have made <strong>the</strong>ir way into<br />
product and service markets with virtually no active government technology transfer program.<br />
Examples of <strong>the</strong>se technologies are communications satellites, <strong>the</strong> miniaturization<br />
of electronic components, large management computer software applications, and<br />
advanced composite materials. Historically, industry has performed about two-thirds of<br />
NASA R&D under contract arrangements. Therefore, when a technology is developed<br />
that is basically a better or more efficient way of serving a proven and existing market,<br />
industry is already actively involved, knowledgeable, and often willing to commit <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />
funds to modify <strong>the</strong> government product or service for <strong>the</strong> commercial market. Of<br />
course, as time elapses, new consumer demands may emerge and grow from <strong>the</strong> original<br />
space-related technology. The rapid growth of new satellite telecommunications products<br />
and services offers an excellent example.<br />
1. If this were translated to constant 1997 dollars, <strong>the</strong> investment would be more than $450 billion.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 387<br />
However, discerning <strong>the</strong> economic impact of “little” technologies is ano<strong>the</strong>r matter.<br />
Since NASA has been committed to increasing its impact on <strong>the</strong> economy through an<br />
aggressive technology transfer program, that program has primarily focused on funding<br />
demonstration projects that attempt to take ideas generated within NASA (or its contractors)<br />
and moving <strong>the</strong>m toward usable end products. Although <strong>the</strong>re have been some successes<br />
in this process, <strong>the</strong> technology transfer program has generated criticism over <strong>the</strong><br />
years. NASA has been keenly aware of <strong>the</strong> vulnerability of <strong>the</strong> program as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
importance of measuring its success through case studies and more aggregated metrics.<br />
In many ways, <strong>the</strong> agency has gained political support through <strong>the</strong> anecdotal accounts of<br />
useful products developed through <strong>the</strong> technology transfer process. These examples, particularly<br />
in <strong>the</strong> biomedical area, have provided a grounding for space technology that is<br />
understandable to Congress and <strong>the</strong> general population in human terms.<br />
The focus of this chapter is twofold. First, it traces <strong>the</strong> history of macroeconomic measures<br />
of NASA’s impact on <strong>the</strong> economy from both policy and economic methodology perspectives.<br />
Second, it discusses <strong>the</strong> efforts to develop measures of specific technology transfer<br />
activities. Toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se two trends are related to overall political and social forces that<br />
have influenced NASA’s budget and <strong>the</strong> public’s perception of space activities. This chapter<br />
does not review <strong>the</strong> short-term impact analyses or <strong>the</strong> impacts of <strong>the</strong> “big” technologies<br />
on <strong>the</strong> economy because <strong>the</strong>se issues are well documented in o<strong>the</strong>r literature. 2<br />
Measuring NASA’s Impact on <strong>the</strong> Economy<br />
Three distinct approaches have been used to quantify <strong>the</strong> economic impacts of space<br />
R&D:<br />
• An adaptation of a macroeconomic production function model estimates impacts of<br />
technological change attributed to R&D spending on <strong>the</strong> “gross domestic product” and<br />
derivative measures such as employment and earnings. The results of using this type of<br />
model can be expressed as a rate of return to a given investment or as a total value.<br />
• A microeconomic model evaluates <strong>the</strong> returns to specific technologies through <strong>the</strong><br />
use of benefit-cost ratios. Benefits derived from <strong>the</strong>se studies are rarely additive to<br />
aggregate benefits across different technologies because of technical incompatibilities<br />
in data collection and economic assumptions underlying <strong>the</strong> models.<br />
• An examination of data provides evidence of <strong>the</strong> direct transfer of technology from<br />
federal space R&D programs to <strong>the</strong> private sector. The results of <strong>the</strong>se analyses tend<br />
to be reported in actual numbers measured (number of patents or inventions, value<br />
of royalties, value of sales, and so on). They are rarely compared to associated government<br />
expenditures because of <strong>the</strong> difficulty of linking specific funding to specific<br />
products or patents.<br />
Until <strong>the</strong> very late 1960s, NASA did not have to worry much about defending its budget.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> early years of <strong>the</strong> Apollo era (which ran from 1961 to 1972) <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States was in <strong>the</strong> most heated part of <strong>the</strong> Cold War and had made a commitment to get a<br />
human on <strong>the</strong> Moon before <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. The expense was almost secondary, and<br />
NASA was provided with a budget large enough to perform <strong>the</strong> job. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong><br />
United States had an overall budget surplus. This was before <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> expenses<br />
2. The short-term direct impact of federal expenditures is a topic that is thoroughly discussed in any<br />
elementary economics textbook. Reference will be made in this essay to studies that have focused on <strong>the</strong> special<br />
distribution of NASA short-term employment and income effects.
388<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War were well understood and before <strong>the</strong> large social welfare programs<br />
passed by Congress during <strong>the</strong> administration of Lyndon Johnson attained rapid growth.<br />
This was also before <strong>the</strong> very high inflationary period of <strong>the</strong> 1970s and early 1980s, which<br />
propelled <strong>the</strong> federal government into a deficit and made <strong>the</strong> interest payments on <strong>the</strong><br />
national debt one of <strong>the</strong> largest single components of <strong>the</strong> federal budget, dwarfing even<br />
<strong>the</strong> defense budget.<br />
Early studies commissioned by NASA show that <strong>the</strong> space agency was not unaware of<br />
<strong>the</strong> implications of its spending on <strong>the</strong> economy. However, those impacts were secondary<br />
to NASA’s primary mission of space exploration. A 1965 study by Jack Faucett Associates<br />
found that NASA’s socioeconomic activities were “separate, uncoordinated, and almost<br />
incidental.” The Faucett study recommended that NASA create a headquarters staff devoted<br />
to collecting economic data and coordinating various economic activities throughout<br />
<strong>the</strong> agency. These recommendations were ignored; to this day, <strong>the</strong> agency still addresses<br />
economic policy on an ad hoc and uncoordinated basis. [III-1]<br />
The goal of stimulating economic growth through NASA technology was very much a<br />
side issue to <strong>the</strong> space agency during <strong>the</strong> 1960s and 1970s. For example, a 1968 NASA publication<br />
listing goals and objectives for <strong>the</strong> next decades in space does not mention economic<br />
growth at all, but only refers in passing to <strong>the</strong> facilitation of communications and<br />
navigation as an afterthought to developing space capabilities for managing <strong>the</strong> Earth’s<br />
resources. 3<br />
During <strong>the</strong> 1960s, one of <strong>the</strong> important goals of NASA was to stimulate science and<br />
engineering at <strong>the</strong> universities. NASA sponsored social science and economic studies during<br />
this era, which were oriented primarily toward defining and identifying <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />
NASA expenditures on particular regions. One study, performed at <strong>the</strong> University of<br />
Pennsylvania in its Regional Science Department, was an input-output economic analysis<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Philadelphia economy that developed measures of NASA expenditures on <strong>the</strong><br />
Philadelphia region. 4 There is no evidence that <strong>the</strong> results of this study were ever used by<br />
NASA to publicize <strong>the</strong> local benefits, nor is <strong>the</strong>re any evidence that <strong>the</strong> results directly<br />
influenced NASA policy. The primary purpose and benefit of this study were to support<br />
university research activities and to advance knowledge in regional economic measurement<br />
techniques. NASA also sponsored ano<strong>the</strong>r input-output study by William Miernyk of<br />
West Virginia University during this era. 5 Orr and Jones of Indiana University performed<br />
an industrial breakdown of NASA expenditures to measure national impacts. 6 Again, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
were primarily academic <strong>the</strong>ory-building studies that were not sponsored by policy-making<br />
offices at NASA, nor were <strong>the</strong> results extensively used by <strong>the</strong> space agency in support<br />
of its programs.<br />
In 1974, Mary Holman of George Washington University published a comprehensive<br />
review of <strong>the</strong> ways in which NASA had an impact on <strong>the</strong> economy, based on her research<br />
at <strong>the</strong> agency during <strong>the</strong> late 1960s. 7 According to <strong>the</strong> preface in <strong>the</strong> book, this research<br />
was initiated by concerns that NASA’s associate administrator for manned spaceflight,<br />
George Mueller, had about possible future “serious problems and distortions in several<br />
3. Space Task Group, The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for <strong>the</strong> Future, September 1969, published<br />
Document III-25 in John M. Logsdon, gen. ed., with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson,<br />
and Dwayne A. Day, <strong>Exploring</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Unknown</strong>: Selected Documents in <strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I,<br />
Organizing for Exploration (Washington, DC: NASA Special Publication (SP)-4407, 1995), 1:522–43.<br />
4. See Walter Isard, Regional Input-Output Study: Recollections, Reflections, and Diverse Notes on <strong>the</strong><br />
Philadelphia Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).<br />
5. William H. Miernyk, Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program on a Local Economy: An Input-Output Analysis<br />
(Morgantown, WV: West Virginia University Press, 1967).<br />
6. L.D. Orr and D. Jones, “An Industrial Breakdown of NASA Expenditures,” November 1969,<br />
Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, Washington, DC.<br />
7. M.A. Holman, The Political Economy of <strong>the</strong> Space Program (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, 1974).
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 389<br />
sectors of <strong>the</strong> economy as a result of a probable peak in spending for <strong>the</strong> Manned Space<br />
Flight Program at that time.” This book also includes a comprehensive bibliography of<br />
studies and books addressing <strong>the</strong> impacts of space and o<strong>the</strong>r federal programs during <strong>the</strong><br />
1960s and earlier.<br />
The Stanford Research Institute looked at economic impacts of <strong>the</strong> space program in<br />
1968. Although this report recognized <strong>the</strong> developing literature in <strong>the</strong> economics of R&D<br />
and new technology development, its emphasis was on <strong>the</strong> local and regional impacts on<br />
areas surrounding NASA field centers. These impacts fell generally into <strong>the</strong> category of<br />
short-term direct spending effects on per-capita income, construction, and so on, not on<br />
<strong>the</strong> lasting impacts of <strong>the</strong> new technologies created. [III-2]<br />
By 1970, <strong>the</strong> NASA budget had fallen by nearly one-third from its 1965–1966 peak. A<br />
new era had arrived for NASA—one that meant a constant battle with Congress and <strong>the</strong><br />
White House for money, programs, and new directions. Thus, it is no coincidence that<br />
NASA commissioned <strong>the</strong> first comprehensive economic analysis of its impact on <strong>the</strong> entire<br />
national economy at that time. The study was meant to be used as a lobbying and public<br />
relations tool for <strong>the</strong> agency. NASA officials hoped that <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> study would show<br />
very robust impacts on <strong>the</strong> economy, proving <strong>the</strong> benefits from <strong>the</strong> investment in space.<br />
A Midwest Research Center report in 1971 accomplished its purpose in two ways.<br />
[III-3] 8 First, using an aggregate production function, it showed large long-run economic<br />
returns to R&D. Second, it documented a number of case studies of successful examples<br />
of NASA technology being used for commercial purposes. 9 It used a fairly new economic<br />
methodology developed by Robert Solow of MIT (who later received a Nobel Prize for his<br />
work on <strong>the</strong> economic impacts of technological change) and showed that <strong>the</strong>re was a<br />
seven-to-one ratio of long-term economic benefits to expenditures. 10 This methodology<br />
and its application to NASA (a small subset of all R&D expenditures) were sharply criticized<br />
on both technical grounds and <strong>the</strong> interpretation of <strong>the</strong> data. While <strong>the</strong> calculation<br />
of a “bottom line” number provided NASA with some extra ammunition for its budget battles,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> long term, how successful this line of argument was in Congress is very debatable.<br />
NASA has always been funded because of <strong>the</strong> merit of its missions. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
economic data added “window dressing” to <strong>the</strong> project mission requirements and made<br />
<strong>the</strong> funding decisions for <strong>the</strong> new programs of <strong>the</strong> 1970s and beyond easier to sell.<br />
Following <strong>the</strong> 1971 Midwest Research Institute study, NASA commissioned several<br />
additional major macroeconomic studies of its R&D. The space agency hired Chase<br />
Econometrics in 1976 to conduct a macroeconomic simulation analysis. [III-4] Chase<br />
Econometrics performed a follow-on study in 1980. [III-5] Then in 1988, <strong>the</strong> Midwest<br />
Research Institute, under contract to <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Public Administration, performed<br />
an analysis that essentially replicated its 1971 study with updated data and econometric<br />
techniques. [III-6]<br />
Although each of <strong>the</strong>se four studies differed in time, technique, and reliability, <strong>the</strong>y had<br />
much in common. Each was a rudimentary attempt to measure <strong>the</strong> overall returns to NASA<br />
in terms of national economic measures: gross national product, employment, and productivity.<br />
Each (with <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> Chase follow-on) calculated rates of return to NASA<br />
that were between seven-to-one and fourteen-to-one (which translated into discounted<br />
returns on investment between 30 and 43 percent). Also, each attempted to look at <strong>the</strong> lasting<br />
impact on <strong>the</strong> economy through technological changes that increased productivity.<br />
8. Please note that <strong>the</strong> documents supporting this essay do not appear in chronological order but<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> order in which <strong>the</strong>y support <strong>the</strong> complex subject addressed in <strong>the</strong> essay.<br />
9. Many of <strong>the</strong> case studies were taken from <strong>the</strong> aeronautics R&D program.<br />
10. Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and <strong>the</strong> Aggregate Production Function,” Review of Economics<br />
and Statistics 38 (August 1957): 312.
390<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
These studies had <strong>the</strong>ir critics. The most pointed one was <strong>the</strong> report of <strong>the</strong> General<br />
Accounting <strong>Office</strong> (GAO), which examined <strong>the</strong> Chase Econometrics study of 1976.<br />
[III-7] The GAO analysis was sympa<strong>the</strong>tic to <strong>the</strong> idea that NASA had generated technological<br />
returns, but it did not accept <strong>the</strong> Chase study metrics, nor did <strong>the</strong> GAO reviewers<br />
view <strong>the</strong> methodology of <strong>the</strong> Chase study as valid. They were probably correct because <strong>the</strong><br />
Chase follow-on study of 1980 could not replicate <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> 1976 study. There were<br />
a number of technical economic reasons for <strong>the</strong> lack of confidence in <strong>the</strong> Chase results.<br />
Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most telling reason was <strong>the</strong> belief by Chase that NASA needed to have “good”<br />
results from <strong>the</strong> study. Thus, Chase ran about sixty different simulations of <strong>the</strong> economy<br />
under different assumptions and chose <strong>the</strong> best results to present in <strong>the</strong> report. 11 The<br />
study did result in good public relations and press releases, but it was not well received by<br />
<strong>the</strong> professional economics community. Despite <strong>the</strong> critics’ assessments, <strong>the</strong> results<br />
became benchmark figures that have been quoted time and again in speeches by NASA<br />
officials and in various testimony and publications.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s, NASA also commissioned studies to attempt to develop measures<br />
of <strong>the</strong> aggregate benefits from specific successful technologies that <strong>the</strong> agency had<br />
supported. These studies were funded by <strong>the</strong> NASA headquarters office responsible for<br />
technology utilization and transfer, and <strong>the</strong>y applied a case study approach to measuring<br />
benefits. By focusing on successful innovations, <strong>the</strong> selection of technologies was not random,<br />
nor did it adequately measure overall benefits to NASA. 12 These studies had <strong>the</strong><br />
advantage of using more standard economic tools and of identifying concrete cases ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than abstract measures of gross domestic product. They were, in short, more easily understood<br />
than <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic approaches used by <strong>the</strong> Midwest Research Institute and<br />
Chase Econometrics.<br />
In 1972, <strong>the</strong> Denver Research Institute studied NASA contributions to specific fields<br />
of technology. [III-8] It found that <strong>the</strong> major significance of NASA contributions was in<br />
causing technology advances in those fields to occur at an earlier time than <strong>the</strong>y would<br />
have without NASA funding and support, that more than one-half of <strong>the</strong> technologies<br />
were employed in <strong>the</strong> aerospace and defense sectors, and that <strong>the</strong> technologies had only<br />
a moderate economic impact and relatively low scientific and social impacts. There was<br />
wide variation in <strong>the</strong> quantitative estimates from technology field to field. The study was<br />
based on interviews with <strong>the</strong> NASA engineers and scientists responsible for <strong>the</strong> innovations.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> methodology was subjective and <strong>the</strong> sample biased because <strong>the</strong> data<br />
were collected from NASA officials, <strong>the</strong> general policy results are consistent with later<br />
studies that used more sophisticated methodologies.<br />
In 1976, a study performed by Ma<strong>the</strong>matica analyzed <strong>the</strong> contribution of NASA to<br />
only four technologies and found nearly $7 billion of economic impacts. [III-9] The<br />
$7 billion was more than <strong>the</strong> NASA budget of 1976, and <strong>the</strong> results of this study were used<br />
in connection with <strong>the</strong> Chase and Midwest Research Institute results to suggest <strong>the</strong> leverage<br />
that NASA funds have on <strong>the</strong> economy. This study focused on gas turbines, cryogenics,<br />
integrated circuits, and NASTRAN (a software program). The primary NASA benefits<br />
measured were <strong>the</strong> “speedup” of bringing <strong>the</strong>se technologies into <strong>the</strong> marketplace, not<br />
11. This conclusion was related to <strong>the</strong> author in a conversation with Michael Evans, president of Chase<br />
Econometrics, several years after <strong>the</strong> study was completed. It is backed up by <strong>the</strong> research results of <strong>the</strong> 1980 follow-on<br />
study, which could not replicate <strong>the</strong> results for two reasons: (1) <strong>the</strong> calculation of <strong>the</strong> actual variables was<br />
not well documented in <strong>the</strong> original study, and <strong>the</strong> values assigned to some of <strong>the</strong> variables could not be verified;<br />
and (2) <strong>the</strong> statistical tests showed that <strong>the</strong> returns to NASA were not significantly different from zero. The<br />
second reason could also be explained by <strong>the</strong> very small percentage coming from <strong>the</strong> NASA budget of <strong>the</strong> R&D<br />
expenditures in <strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
12. In fact, by overlooking unsuccessful technologies, <strong>the</strong> cost side of <strong>the</strong>se benefit-cost studies may have<br />
been significantly understated.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 391<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> technologies <strong>the</strong>mselves. Because this was a study of four cases<br />
and used <strong>the</strong> more traditional consumer surplus <strong>the</strong>ory of microeconomics, <strong>the</strong> results<br />
were more readily accepted by <strong>the</strong> economics community than <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic<br />
studies of that era.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> 1980s, NASA economic impact and benefit studies took on <strong>the</strong> additional<br />
role of creating <strong>the</strong> climate for large, new NASA programs, such as <strong>the</strong> space station, not<br />
of simply justifying <strong>the</strong> overall budget. The combination of <strong>the</strong> maturity of <strong>the</strong> space activities<br />
and <strong>the</strong> national budget deficit began to change <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong> nation viewed <strong>the</strong> space<br />
program. Beyond <strong>the</strong> space race with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, it became apparent that practical<br />
uses of space and <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> economic growth and benefits that space could provide<br />
were logical reasons for <strong>the</strong> government to invest in space and provide additional infrastructure<br />
and incentives for future business and <strong>the</strong> commercial development of space.<br />
Also, by <strong>the</strong> late 1980s and <strong>the</strong> 1990s, with <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War, economic benefits<br />
became one of <strong>the</strong> more important justifications for a continued U.S. presence in space,<br />
at least from <strong>the</strong> civilian perspective. However, <strong>the</strong> evidence of economic benefits as measured<br />
by <strong>the</strong> existing studies was still relatively weak.<br />
To build political support for <strong>the</strong> space station, several studies were performed to analyze<br />
its expenditures by industry and state. 13 The NASA Alumni League sponsored a study<br />
in 1983 that analyzed expenditures by standard economic industrial categories and by<br />
state. This study also attempted to measure <strong>the</strong> indirect (or multiplier) benefits by industry<br />
and state. It did not address <strong>the</strong> more interesting and more challenging task of measuring<br />
technological or productivity benefits. [III-10]<br />
Major contractors also supported <strong>the</strong> space station with economic benefits analyses.<br />
Rockwell commissioned The WEFA Group (a merger between WEFA and Chase<br />
Econometrics had occurred) to perform a macroeconomic simulation of space station<br />
expenditures. [III-11] This was a more sophisticated attempt at measuring multiplier<br />
effects throughout <strong>the</strong> national economy, but it also did not take <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r steps to analyze<br />
<strong>the</strong> productivity or technological changes that might be expected to occur with <strong>the</strong><br />
space station R&D program.<br />
The most recent study of economic benefits that looked at technology change and<br />
national growth stimulated by NASA was performed by <strong>the</strong> Midwest Research Institute<br />
(see Document III-6 above) through <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Public Administration<br />
under contract to NASA. This study repeated <strong>the</strong> methodology of <strong>the</strong> 1971 study and was<br />
conducted by <strong>the</strong> same researchers. It used updated econometric methods and more than<br />
fifteen additional years of data. The results were remarkably similar to <strong>the</strong> earlier study.<br />
They measured a nine-to-one rate of return to NASA R&D programs. This finding held up<br />
under Midwest Research Institute’s sensitivity analysis. The institute also looked at case<br />
studies on a more qualitative basis. However, NASA never officially released <strong>the</strong> study,<br />
because <strong>the</strong> methodology used was still subject to many technical economic qualifications. 14<br />
13. Internally, NASA procurement office reports even generated contracts and expenditures listed by<br />
voting districts as a method of influencing congressmen and senators of <strong>the</strong> importance of NASA on <strong>the</strong>ir constituents.<br />
However, no specific economic multipliers or analyses were performed internally to augment <strong>the</strong> raw<br />
procurement numbers.<br />
14. An October 5, 1988, internal NASA memorandum from Jim Bain to NASA Associate Administrator<br />
Willis Shapley, which commented on <strong>the</strong> Midwest Research Institute study, documented <strong>the</strong> reservations of inhouse<br />
economists as well as some members of <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Public Administration’s (NAPA) advisory<br />
panel concerning <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> study. The memo stated: “The NAPA Advisory Panel letter to <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
Administrator endorses <strong>the</strong> conclusion of positive R&D impacts on <strong>the</strong> economy, but does not reference<br />
endorsement of <strong>the</strong> study’s conclusions on <strong>the</strong> magnitude of this impact. Discussions with individual members<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Advisory Panel have indicated that this was not an oversight, but <strong>the</strong> direct result of <strong>the</strong> unwillingness of<br />
some members to publicly endorse those numbers.”
392<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A detailed accounting of <strong>the</strong> difficulties of measuring macroeconomic benefits to NASA<br />
R&D is beyond <strong>the</strong> scope of this essay. 15<br />
Briefly, however, <strong>the</strong>re were several major problems with <strong>the</strong>se studies. First, <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of <strong>the</strong> production function approach implied that technological change is a function of<br />
R&D expenditures. In <strong>the</strong> usual statistical method of regression analysis, only an association<br />
between <strong>the</strong>se parameters is measured; causation is not proven. Second, <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic<br />
studies (particularly <strong>the</strong> ones performed in <strong>the</strong> early to mid-1970s) had only<br />
about fifteen years of data with which to work. This skewed <strong>the</strong> results; <strong>the</strong> particular time<br />
span may have been measuring coincidental returns, because it was a time of expansionary<br />
economic growth in <strong>the</strong> United States that had little to do with <strong>the</strong> space program.<br />
The dramatic peak of NASA spending during <strong>the</strong> Apollo years was a one-time surge in <strong>the</strong><br />
long-run trend of NASA’s space expenditures. It has never been repeated. Third, although<br />
NASA R&D reached as much as one-third of all federal R&D in 1965 (one-fourth of all<br />
U.S. R&D), R&D in total comprised only 1.9 percent of <strong>the</strong> gross national product. The<br />
statistical errors (“noise”) in macroeconomic measures such as <strong>the</strong> gross national product<br />
was larger than NASA R&D. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> studies associate large impacts on gross<br />
national product from a relatively small component of <strong>the</strong> product. This relationship is<br />
extremely difficult to validate statistically, given <strong>the</strong> general accuracy problems with <strong>the</strong><br />
national income data <strong>the</strong>mselves. Finally, according to <strong>the</strong> accounting practices of <strong>the</strong> government<br />
during those years, <strong>the</strong>re is no such thing as a government investment. All government<br />
expenditures are treated as outlays in <strong>the</strong> year spent. There is no imputed rate<br />
of return to <strong>the</strong> government expenditures and no government capital account. 16<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> process of calculating and equating a rate of return to NASA (or any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r government) expenditures with a rate of return to an equivalent private investment in<br />
a venture with high levels of risk is not accurate. Although <strong>the</strong>re may well be robust returns<br />
to NASA R&D, using <strong>the</strong> type of methodology and statistics available when <strong>the</strong>se studies<br />
were performed was much more of an exercise in doing research and experimentation on<br />
economic methodology than it was in measuring <strong>the</strong> benefits to NASA’s programs.<br />
National Policy, Commercial Space, and Economic Impacts<br />
Economic growth and development and international competitiveness are goals of<br />
national policy. This is reflected in legislative and executive branch objectives as outlined<br />
in various laws and policy directives. The direct investment in space R&D and technology<br />
is one means to stimulate <strong>the</strong> economy of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 17 calls for NASA to be a leader in<br />
technological development. In addition to NASA’s charter for space and aeronautics activities,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s Congress added provisions chartering NASA to support R&D in<br />
civilian ground propulsion (including advanced automobile) systems. 18 The NASA budget<br />
15. A good description of <strong>the</strong> technical economic methodology and its use in measuring <strong>the</strong> benefits of<br />
NASA R&D can be found in “Measuring <strong>the</strong> Economic Returns to Space,” in J. Greenberg, and H. Hertzfeld, editors,<br />
Space Economics (Washington, DC: AIAA Progress Series #44, 1992). Ano<strong>the</strong>r perspective on government studies<br />
of R&D benefits can be found in P. Kochanowsky and H. Hertzfeld, “Often Overlooked Factors in Measuring<br />
<strong>the</strong> Rate of Return to Government R&D Expenditures,” Policy Analysis 7 (Spring 1981): 16–27. Also, any standard<br />
textbook on public finance will include a detailed description of <strong>the</strong> problems with benefit-cost analyses.<br />
16. These practices have changed recently. The government now has begun to estimate a capital<br />
account, and special attempts are being made to more accurately measure R&D expenditures in <strong>the</strong> national<br />
income accounts.<br />
17. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85–568, 72 Stat. 426.<br />
18. Subsection 102(e) was added by <strong>the</strong> Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and<br />
Demonstration Act of 1976, Public Law 94–413, September 17, 1976, section 15 (90 Stat. 1270). Also, Subsection 102(f)<br />
was added by <strong>the</strong> Department of Energy Act of 1978—Civilian Applications, Public Law 95–238, February 25, 1978.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 393<br />
during <strong>the</strong>se years was comparatively low, and this was one method to employ NASA engineers<br />
in meeting <strong>the</strong> national need of developing more fuel-efficient energy systems as a<br />
result of <strong>the</strong> OPEC oil crises. It was also an example of one of <strong>the</strong> first direct links of NASA<br />
programs to civilian economic issues.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r references to national economic growth policies began to become apparent in<br />
official space directives. In <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration’s 1988 presidential directive on<br />
space policy, an entire section is devoted to commercial space sector guidelines, which<br />
outlined a number of government actions aimed directly at stimulating private-sector<br />
activity in space. [III-12] This was followed by <strong>the</strong> Bush administration’s 1991 U.S.<br />
Commercial Space Policy Guidelines, which explicitly recognized <strong>the</strong> fast-growing commercial<br />
space sector and expanded government initiatives to encourage <strong>the</strong> space sector’s<br />
growth. [III-13]<br />
Finally, <strong>the</strong> most comprehensive statement of national commercial space policy is<br />
found in <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration’s 1996 presidential space directive, which propels<br />
space activities directly into <strong>the</strong> mainstream of national economic policy and international<br />
competitiveness issues. [III-14] Two of <strong>the</strong> five goals listed in <strong>the</strong> introduction to this<br />
policy specifically mention both economic competitiveness and <strong>the</strong> stimulation of nonfederal<br />
investment in space. The document also includes a list of guidelines aimed at<br />
enhancing commercial space. The significance of this document is <strong>the</strong> extent of coverage<br />
of commercial issues surrounding space activities. It is indicative of <strong>the</strong> maturity of <strong>the</strong><br />
satellite communications industry coupled with <strong>the</strong> many industry proposals to develop<br />
commercial space systems. Prior presidential directives on space issues have evolved from<br />
barely addressing any commercial issues to those of <strong>the</strong> late 1980s and early 1990s, which<br />
initiated government studies and actions aimed at stimulating an emerging potential for<br />
<strong>the</strong> industrial use of space.<br />
Economic forecasts have long played a part in NASA plans for commercial space.<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> earliest were <strong>the</strong> projections of <strong>the</strong> demand for communications satellites,<br />
which was <strong>the</strong> major driver of <strong>the</strong> demand for expendable launch vehicles (and Space<br />
Shuttle flights before <strong>the</strong> Challenger accident). NASA was <strong>the</strong> owner and operator of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
vehicles before <strong>the</strong> push to transfer expendable launch vehicles to <strong>the</strong> private sector, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> agency needed such forecasts for planning and budgeting purposes. In addition, <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Shuttle was designed to launch commercial and industrial payloads as well as to perform<br />
NASA missions in space. Therefore, forecasts of potential users of <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle<br />
vehicle provided information to NASA management that was important for developing a<br />
mission model, manifest, and pricing algorithm.<br />
An example of <strong>the</strong> use of projections was <strong>the</strong> 1983 forecast of a $60 billion commercial<br />
space market fifteen years hence (2000) performed by <strong>the</strong> Center for Space Policy.<br />
This projection received a large amount of publicity and helped set <strong>the</strong> stage for <strong>the</strong> political<br />
and industrial support of <strong>the</strong> International Space Station. 19 However, any projection<br />
of economic markets many years in <strong>the</strong> future is so prone to error that economists and<br />
industry planners discount any such projections as premature and wishful thinking. In<br />
fact, <strong>the</strong> Center for Space Policy forecast was revised in 1984 with more industrial and economic<br />
detail, and it was presented as a range of possible markets in contrast to <strong>the</strong>ir controversial<br />
prior forecast. [III-15] Never<strong>the</strong>less, as with <strong>the</strong> earlier macroeconomic benefit<br />
studies, <strong>the</strong>se and o<strong>the</strong>r projections of vast new markets had significant political impact<br />
and were influential in both stimulating new government initiatives in industrial space<br />
activities and in providing an underlying rationale for new big space programs such as <strong>the</strong><br />
International Space Station.<br />
19. New York Times, June 24, 1988, Section 3, p. 1.
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SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A 1977 study by <strong>the</strong> Hudson Institute that did not receive a lot of publicity, but was<br />
extremely interesting and well balanced, made 100-year projections of space activities.<br />
The analysis provided a number of different scenarios ranging from space being dominated<br />
by military activities to space being an instrument of a “green” society. In each of<br />
<strong>the</strong> scenarios, <strong>the</strong> economic activities, costs, and benefits of space were major factors. The<br />
projections were based on a combination of economic growth and technology forecasting,<br />
superimposed on different assumptions concerning overall future societal and political<br />
perspectives. This is one of <strong>the</strong> first studies sponsored by NASA that gave equal weight to<br />
economic as well as technological trends and changes. The authors recognized that <strong>the</strong><br />
purpose of <strong>the</strong> study was to provide NASA with both qualitative projections of <strong>the</strong> future<br />
for planning and public relations purposes and very broad guidelines to answering critics’<br />
questions about <strong>the</strong> value and long-term use of space. [III-16]<br />
In <strong>the</strong> early 1980s, NASA embarked on a number of efforts to find new and better<br />
ways to commercialize space. NASA officials commissioned a task to review <strong>the</strong> agency’s<br />
options. The <strong>Office</strong> of General Counsel prepared an in-depth legal and policy paper<br />
detailing <strong>the</strong> options available to NASA for stimulating commercial investments and<br />
opportunities. [III-17] The final series of reports of <strong>the</strong> task force was instrumental in<br />
establishing a headquarters office responsible for all commercial activities, ranging from<br />
technology transfer functions to direct support of R&D and joint projects with industry<br />
that had prospects of developing commercial space manufacturing activities. This office,<br />
as with most prior efforts to stimulate commercial uses of space, had some near-term success,<br />
but it failed to generate long-term changes in <strong>the</strong> operations or goals of <strong>the</strong> agency.<br />
The office (but not <strong>the</strong> commercialization functions) met with <strong>the</strong> fate of all prior NASA<br />
economics-oriented program offices; it was slowly dismantled in <strong>the</strong> early 1990s.<br />
There were many reasons various internal NASA attempts at establishing and making<br />
economic analysis and economic stimulation programs were unsuccessful. Primarily,<br />
NASA is an agency managed and staffed by engineers and scientists. Historically, NASA<br />
officials and program managers have been recognized and rewarded by developing successful<br />
scientific or engineering programs. Cost management and economic stimulation<br />
were seen as important, but were not <strong>the</strong> yardsticks for promotion. Even though NASA’s<br />
top management recognized <strong>the</strong> need and <strong>the</strong> potential for NASA to be an important element<br />
in economic policy for <strong>the</strong> United States, <strong>the</strong> message was not adequately transmitted<br />
to <strong>the</strong> program offices. The transition to a more business-like approach to space has<br />
been slow, but <strong>the</strong> trend, as evidenced in both legislative and presidential directives as well<br />
as NASA’s own planning documents, is unmistakably toward emphasizing economic objectives<br />
as well as technological advances. 20<br />
In addition, during <strong>the</strong> 1983–1984 time period, <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration took a<br />
proactive stand on encouraging private-sector involvement in space. There had been a<br />
number of successful Space Shuttle flights, and experiments in materials processing in<br />
microgravity were beginning to show <strong>the</strong> promise of future business opportunities. In<br />
August 1983, business leaders and top-level executive branch officials attended a meeting<br />
on space commercialization and had lunch with President Reagan. [III-18] By April 1984,<br />
a memorandum from Craig Fuller on commercial space initiatives had been prepared by<br />
industry representatives that began a dialogue on <strong>the</strong> various incentives and changes in government<br />
activities and regulations that might be necessary to encourage more industrial<br />
participation in space. [III-19] An interagency working group was established under <strong>the</strong><br />
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade to begin work on <strong>the</strong>se commercialization issues.<br />
20. The motto, “faster, cheaper, better,” which is <strong>the</strong> byline of Daniel S. Goldin’s term as NASA<br />
Administrator, is indicative of this new culture being instilled within NASA.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 395<br />
International economic competition in space activities has developed as foreign<br />
nations have invested in space and used space and related technological R&D to stimulate<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own industrial activities. Unlike <strong>the</strong> United States, one of <strong>the</strong> major reasons for<br />
European nations and many o<strong>the</strong>r nations of <strong>the</strong> world to invest in space has been an economic<br />
motivation. 21 Because of <strong>the</strong> different attitudes of <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> rest of<br />
<strong>the</strong> world concerning government subsidization of industrial development, a number of<br />
questions are frequently raised concerning <strong>the</strong> fair pricing of space products on <strong>the</strong> international<br />
market. The subject of international economic trade and competition in space<br />
goods and services is too large and complex a topic to address in detail in this essay.<br />
NASA has made many attempts to encourage commercial uses of space. 22 Beginning<br />
in <strong>the</strong> late 1970s, and through <strong>the</strong> period of <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle and<br />
now <strong>the</strong> International Space Station, <strong>the</strong> government has commissioned space commercialization<br />
studies, given free access to microgravity facilities in space for R&D projects<br />
from universities, nonprofit institutions, and for-profit companies, and made personnel<br />
and terrestrial facilities available for testing. NASA officials have always hoped that commercial<br />
customers for <strong>the</strong> Shuttle, Space Station, and o<strong>the</strong>r space platforms will both provide<br />
<strong>the</strong> agency with revenue and <strong>the</strong> resources to encourage still more R&D and will also,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> longer run, provide <strong>the</strong> nation with large economic and social benefits.<br />
One example of this type of stimulation of manufacturing in space is <strong>the</strong> production<br />
of new chemicals and drugs. Anticipating <strong>the</strong> operational phase of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle, NASA<br />
commissioned several studies of <strong>the</strong> feasibility of commercial space manufacturing. [III-<br />
20, III-21, III-22] These studies looked in detail at <strong>the</strong> many possible markets and opportunities<br />
that could be present for R&D in microgravity and eventual commercial products.<br />
The studies were comprehensive and included both a detailed technology assessment and<br />
a sample business plan with expected markets, development times, and potential rates of<br />
return. They assumed, of course, that space transportation and facilities would be available<br />
on a scheduled basis and would be competitively priced. 23 The study performed by<br />
McDonnell-Douglas in 1978, under contract to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, is<br />
particularly interesting. It outlines in great detail <strong>the</strong> potential technologies that could<br />
produce different types of new drugs in space, and it shows that a portfolio of such drugs<br />
could serve many markets and possibly be profitable. [III-23]<br />
21. See, for example, <strong>the</strong> Convention for <strong>the</strong> Establishment of a European Space Agency<br />
(CSE.CD(73)19. rev. 7, Paris, May 30, 1975). Article VII (I) (b) states: “The industrial policy which <strong>the</strong> Agency<br />
is to elaborate and apply by virtue of Article II (d) shall be designed in particular to: . . . b) improve <strong>the</strong> worldwide<br />
competitiveness of European industry by maintaining and developing space technology and by encouraging<br />
<strong>the</strong> rationalisation and development of an industrial structure appropriate to market requirements, making<br />
use in <strong>the</strong> first place of <strong>the</strong> existing industrial potential of all Member States.”<br />
22. As mentioned in <strong>the</strong> introduction, this essay does not describe <strong>the</strong> “big” space commercial technologies.<br />
The communications satellite industry is <strong>the</strong> most obvious and most successful of all space ventures to<br />
date. O<strong>the</strong>r examples include <strong>the</strong> global positioning system (a military space system) that has revolutionized<br />
land positioning systems, composite materials, and software management systems. These technologies are characterized<br />
by being new ways of providing services to existing markets. Only after <strong>the</strong> existing markets are satisfied<br />
and revenue streams are large, do <strong>the</strong> firms <strong>the</strong>n innovate with new types of services and products that<br />
require significant market development. Most of <strong>the</strong> examples of both commercial space manufacturing and<br />
technology transfer discussed in <strong>the</strong> body of this essay are new goods and services that have no currently defined<br />
market. The risks of a new product coupled with <strong>the</strong> high risks of using space itself have not yet generated great<br />
commercial interest in space manufacturing. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> government has seen a role for itself in encouraging<br />
<strong>the</strong> “infant industry” of space manufacturing.<br />
23. Most of <strong>the</strong>se analyses also assumed that <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle would be flying, according to early plans,<br />
seven orbiters, twenty to thirty flights per year, and so forth. This type of ready access did not materialize with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Shuttle program, and access to space today is limited to expendable launch vehicles for most commercial<br />
payloads.
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SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
McDonnell Douglas teamed with <strong>the</strong> pharmaceutical firm Johnson and Johnson<br />
(Ortho Division) in <strong>the</strong> early 1980s to build a space version of an electrophoresis instrument<br />
to conduct <strong>the</strong> R&D necessary to manufacture new drugs (<strong>the</strong> Electrophoresis<br />
Operations in Space (EOS) Program). NASA provided <strong>the</strong> Shuttle for testing <strong>the</strong> machine<br />
without charge, and it proved to be successful in separating chemicals and drugs in microgravity<br />
that could not easily be separated on Earth. An early, and perhaps overly optimistic,<br />
letter from John F. Yardley, president of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, to<br />
NASA Administrator James M. Beggs testified to <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong>se experiments and<br />
predicted commercial production in space by 1987. 24 [III-24] A 1983 McDonnell Douglas<br />
briefing details some of <strong>the</strong> commercial possibilities on which companies hoped to capitalize.<br />
[III-25]<br />
Two major factors led to <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> EOS Program. First, <strong>the</strong> Challenger accident in<br />
1986 halted all flights on <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle, and this eventually led to a national policy that<br />
eliminated most commercial payloads from <strong>the</strong> Shuttle. It also dramatically illustrated that<br />
space was a very risky place to do business. Access could be delayed or denied suddenly.<br />
These risks were greater than most normal terrestrial business risks. Not only were ongoing<br />
commercial programs halted, but <strong>the</strong> accident also put a long-term damper on companies<br />
considering new space business ventures (particularly those that depended on<br />
bringing back material from space).<br />
The second factor is <strong>the</strong> unpredictable nature of innovation and new technological<br />
developments. The drug industry in <strong>the</strong> United States was undergoing change itself.<br />
Genetic engineering and a burgeoning biochemical industry were busy developing new<br />
drugs through new terrestrial methods. Also, some of those breakthroughs were in drugs<br />
that would directly compete with <strong>the</strong> ones with which McDonnell Douglas was working in<br />
space. Even though <strong>the</strong> space experiments in electrophoresis were extremely successful,<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r, less risky terrestrial methods to meet similar markets ended <strong>the</strong> private partnership<br />
to produce drugs in space. A little recognized spinoff benefit from this experiment was a<br />
significant improvement in <strong>the</strong> electrophoresis process on Earth.<br />
The Centers for Commercial Development of Space programs of <strong>the</strong> 1990s was ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
attempt to stimulate private operations in space. [III-26] Through seed money to universities,<br />
NASA hoped to generate university-industry partnerships in space-related R&D<br />
leading to commercial operations.<br />
Similar efforts by NASA to find commercial uses of space were undertaken for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Space Station program as well as for remote sensing and o<strong>the</strong>r applications<br />
of space hardware and technology. To date, <strong>the</strong>re are many proposals and ideas, but space<br />
manufacturing is still a tantalizing future business activity for industry. Perhaps after <strong>the</strong><br />
International Space Station is operating, and transportation to and from space is cheaper<br />
and more reliable, a number of <strong>the</strong> possible business ideas for space manufacturing will<br />
materialize.<br />
The Stimulation of Technology Transfer<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> most historically successful technology transfer programs of <strong>the</strong> U.S. government<br />
has been <strong>the</strong> stimulation and development of aeronautics. 25 From 1915 to 1958,<br />
<strong>the</strong> agency directly responsible for R&D in aeronautics was <strong>the</strong> National Advisory<br />
24. This letter was also a direct positive and reinforcing response to <strong>the</strong> August 3, 1983, luncheon at <strong>the</strong><br />
White House with industrial leaders and President Reagan. Yardley had attended <strong>the</strong> luncheon.<br />
25. The stimulation of aeronautics as an infant industry in <strong>the</strong> early part of this century involved not<br />
only <strong>the</strong> NACA, but also many o<strong>the</strong>r government activities, ranging from wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasting (aviation safety) to<br />
<strong>the</strong> postal service (creating a market for air cargo through mail delivery contracts).
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 397<br />
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). Founded in 1915, it was <strong>the</strong> predecessor agency to<br />
NASA. Although space activities involve more than 90 percent of <strong>the</strong> NASA budget, aeronautics<br />
R&D is still a very important activity for <strong>the</strong> agency. The NACA was organized so<br />
that industry and government personnel involved with aircraft worked toge<strong>the</strong>r, in both<br />
directing <strong>the</strong> R&D program and making government facilities such as wind tunnels available<br />
to industry.<br />
NASA inherited this tradition of creating technology transfer opportunities. However,<br />
it has discovered that transferring space technology to <strong>the</strong> civilian sector is different and<br />
more difficult than aeronautics technology. Aeronautics began as an infant industry serving<br />
<strong>the</strong> military and civilian government (post office) sectors. A civilian consumer market<br />
for passenger and cargo transportation grew rapidly. In contrast, space applications have<br />
yet to develop and capture a robust civilian market (outside of communications satellites)<br />
and have evolved over time as government programs carried out by aerospace contractors.<br />
Unlike aeronautics, finding ready markets in nonaerospace applications for <strong>the</strong> results of<br />
R&D has been difficult.<br />
The 1958 Space Act recognizes, in a general way, <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
being a leader in technology. 26 This law also gives direction to NASA to disseminate information<br />
to <strong>the</strong> widest possible audience. 27 These sections of <strong>the</strong> law do not directly charter<br />
a technology transfer activity. The first section refers primarily to <strong>the</strong> Cold War technology<br />
race with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. The second was meant for <strong>the</strong> civilian effort to make widely<br />
available <strong>the</strong> data obtained from space for scientific and research uses. However, taken<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r, NASA has also used this legislative mandate to create, maintain, and expand its<br />
activities in moving technology from <strong>the</strong> NASA (and industry contractor) laboratories to<br />
benefit society.<br />
An internal NASA study in 1969 recognizes that in <strong>the</strong> post-Apollo era, <strong>the</strong>re was an<br />
important role for NASA to play in transferring its know-how and expertise to nonspace<br />
activities. The report recommended <strong>the</strong> establishment of a NASA office to coordinate<br />
efforts to transfer technology from NASA to o<strong>the</strong>r civil systems. There was little mention<br />
of industrial or commercial benefits from <strong>the</strong>se proposed transfer activities. The emphasis<br />
was instead on supporting <strong>the</strong> social issues <strong>the</strong> nation faced, such as <strong>the</strong> design of new<br />
communities, <strong>the</strong> development of Earth resources survey systems, <strong>the</strong> application of technology<br />
to highway safety and traffic control, crime control, educational television systems,<br />
and so forth. [III-27]<br />
The earliest NASA technology utilization and transfer programs did focus on <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of NASA management skills and technological know-how in o<strong>the</strong>r government (both<br />
national and state and local) applications. With <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> patent waiver program,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was a reluctance to directly involve industry in <strong>the</strong> programs because of <strong>the</strong><br />
appearance of subsidies to particular firms. 28 Therefore, <strong>the</strong> majority of programs and projects<br />
of <strong>the</strong> technology transfer office focused on two areas: <strong>the</strong> dissemination of information<br />
and publications describing NASA advances in technology and <strong>the</strong> direct<br />
involvement in continued R&D on technologies that could be used to help solve specific<br />
social problems.<br />
A 1971 evaluation of <strong>the</strong> NASA technology transfer information dissemination program<br />
concluded that <strong>the</strong> program had not been very successful. 29 Specifically, <strong>the</strong> study<br />
26. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.<br />
27. Ibid.<br />
28. Each year, NASA patented between 150 and 200 inventions, originating from both in-house R&D<br />
and contract research. Upon application and review by NASA, some patents’ waivers were issued to individuals<br />
and to firms to permit <strong>the</strong>m to develop inventions into commercial products.<br />
29. S.I. Doctors, The NASA Technology Transfer Program, an Evaluation of <strong>the</strong> Dissemination System (New York:<br />
Praeger Publishers, 1971).
398<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
found that information dissemination concerning new inventions and innovations was not<br />
an effective way to encourage industry to use <strong>the</strong> information. More direct methods, such<br />
as interpersonal contacts, were found to be superior ways to transfer technology. The recommendations<br />
of <strong>the</strong> study centered around having more interactive exchanges between<br />
NASA and its regional development centers and giving <strong>the</strong> centers a longer time frame<br />
and more money to develop and focus <strong>the</strong> target technologies to <strong>the</strong>ir civilian uses.<br />
There have been a number of attempts to measure <strong>the</strong> benefits of <strong>the</strong> transfer activities.<br />
As with <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic measures discussed earlier, <strong>the</strong> studies date from <strong>the</strong> mid-<br />
1970s, coinciding with <strong>the</strong> overall decline of NASA budget allocations. The most visible set<br />
of documents produced by <strong>the</strong> office of technology transfer has been <strong>the</strong> annual Spinoff<br />
publication. 30 The reports of many different applications of technology give <strong>the</strong> impression<br />
that <strong>the</strong> payoff from space investments has been very large. Indeed, it may have been.<br />
However, most of <strong>the</strong> reported technological successes in Spinoff are ei<strong>the</strong>r demonstration<br />
projects (that is, not fully commercialized) or are public-sector uses of space technology.<br />
Public-sector applications may well have large social value, but that is not quite <strong>the</strong> same<br />
as a measure of productivity increases from privately produced and sold goods and services.<br />
31 The benefits that accrue to commercial firms are also more easily measured, and<br />
in <strong>the</strong>ory, some of <strong>the</strong> costs of <strong>the</strong> transfer activities of <strong>the</strong> government may be recouped<br />
through royalties and through eventual tax payments from <strong>the</strong> profits of <strong>the</strong> firms.<br />
Studies of technology transfer activities in <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s were conducted for <strong>the</strong> same<br />
reasons as <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic analyses. NASA had a need to justify its budget by showing<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re were more and longer term benefits than successful space missions. Agency officials<br />
were trying to answer <strong>the</strong> political questions raised by statements such as: “It’s fine to<br />
walk on <strong>the</strong> Moon, but what have you done that improves <strong>the</strong> everyday life of <strong>the</strong> average<br />
American citizen?” The technology transfer studies were designed to provide concrete<br />
cases that illustrated advances such as heart pacemakers and o<strong>the</strong>r medical instrumentation,<br />
new materials such as anti-fog glasses, and new construction and building techniques.<br />
In 1977, two studies were performed that attempted measures of <strong>the</strong>se cases of technology<br />
transfer that could be traced to <strong>the</strong> specific efforts of <strong>the</strong> agency. One was <strong>the</strong><br />
Denver Research Institute study of <strong>the</strong> NASA Tech Brief program. This study analyzed <strong>the</strong><br />
users of <strong>the</strong> information publications that NASA produced that were made available to<br />
industry in <strong>the</strong> hope that technology developed by NASA would be adapted and extended<br />
by private firms. The results showed that <strong>the</strong>re were few new products or commercial<br />
sales from <strong>the</strong>se technologies, but that <strong>the</strong> information was particularly helpful to industry<br />
in improving <strong>the</strong> production process. [III-28]<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> thinking in government was that this “free” information would be very<br />
valuable, <strong>the</strong> government overlooked three important factors. First, industry had to invest<br />
time and people to search for <strong>the</strong> information, which had a significant cost. Second, <strong>the</strong><br />
published information was available to anybody, and <strong>the</strong>re were no property rights that<br />
could be claimed by industry in <strong>the</strong> innovation, <strong>the</strong>refore making it risky to invest additional<br />
development funds in <strong>the</strong> technology. Third, very often government technologies<br />
30. Every year since 1976, this publication has been distributed by NASA. It is a glossy paper report that<br />
describes successful technology applications that have been fostered by NASA program offices and/or <strong>the</strong> office<br />
responsible for technology transfer. The discussion is descriptive in nature, and in some ways, <strong>the</strong> report looks<br />
like a corporate annual report, without <strong>the</strong> financial statements.<br />
31. One reason that <strong>the</strong> emphasis has been on public-sector benefits is that, until recently, NASA was<br />
reluctant to focus its transfer efforts on private companies because of <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong> allegation of an unfair<br />
competitive subsidy to one company or industry over ano<strong>the</strong>r. In more recent years, NASA (and <strong>the</strong> government<br />
in general) has been more aggressive in helping firms and industries directly. One way this has been accomplished<br />
is through competitive awards and joint ventures with firms.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 399<br />
are not sufficiently optimized for <strong>the</strong> market, and a large financial commitment must be<br />
made to fur<strong>the</strong>r develop and market <strong>the</strong> technology. Combined, it is not surprising that<br />
studies showed a relatively low economic return to <strong>the</strong> information publications.<br />
The second study released in 1977 was done by MathTech (a successor company to<br />
Ma<strong>the</strong>matica). This study looked at a number of successful technologies that <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
technology transfer office had encouraged with additional R&D funds and personnel.<br />
[III-29] Technologies such as an improved firefighter’s breathing apparatus and zinc paint<br />
coatings were analyzed from an economic benefits perspective. Benefit-cost ratios were calculated<br />
and in some cases were quite high. The major problem with those results is not<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re were no significant benefits (<strong>the</strong>re were), but that <strong>the</strong> cost figures were artificially<br />
low because <strong>the</strong>y were primarily <strong>the</strong> costs of transferring <strong>the</strong> technology, not <strong>the</strong> costs<br />
involved with initially developing <strong>the</strong> technology. The selection of only a few successful<br />
cases ignores o<strong>the</strong>r transfers that were not successful and, again, tends to overstate <strong>the</strong> benefit-cost<br />
ratios. None<strong>the</strong>less, an argument can be made that without <strong>the</strong> efforts of <strong>the</strong><br />
added value contributed by <strong>the</strong> technology transfer process, ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re would have been<br />
no benefits from <strong>the</strong>se NASA innovations or <strong>the</strong> benefits would have come much later.<br />
The Chapman study of 1989 is interesting because it selected 400 technologies mentioned<br />
in Spinoff, and researchers performed interviews with <strong>the</strong> companies to attempt to<br />
measure <strong>the</strong> cumulative benefits. They found that <strong>the</strong> benefits may have been as large as<br />
$21 billion (spread over twenty years). However, <strong>the</strong> report did not attempt to calculate<br />
<strong>the</strong> costs associated with <strong>the</strong> development and transfer of those technologies, nor did it<br />
determine when or if those technologies might have been forthcoming from <strong>the</strong> firms<br />
without NASA involvement. In addition, it did not attempt to separate <strong>the</strong> NASA investment<br />
or stimulation of <strong>the</strong> products from prior and future company investments. In<br />
essence, this report is a comprehensive update of <strong>the</strong> earlier studies that documented specific<br />
cases of technologies moving from NASA to industry. [III-30]<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r aspect of technology transfer was <strong>the</strong> realization in <strong>the</strong> early 1970s that <strong>the</strong><br />
United States is unique among nations in <strong>the</strong> world in its openness concerning R&D<br />
results from civilian (unclassified) government-sponsored work. During <strong>the</strong> early years of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nixon administration, an effort was made to provide U.S. government technology and<br />
information to U.S. firms first. Recognizing that under <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n-current operating practices<br />
and laws of <strong>the</strong> nation, <strong>the</strong> United States could not easily restrict information from<br />
foreign nations and firms, a program named FEDD (For Early Domestic Distribution) was<br />
initiated. NASA participated in this program and made an attempt to get information to<br />
U.S. industry before it was openly published. However, no formal evaluation was ever<br />
made of <strong>the</strong> program, and a NASA white paper in 1978 essentially concluded that it was<br />
impossible to enforce this policy. [III-31]<br />
The NASA technology transfer office also invested considerable funds in activities<br />
aimed at education and at encouraging new users for space data and products. To support<br />
<strong>the</strong>se transfer programs, <strong>the</strong> office also sponsored economic studies that focused on specific<br />
program benefits. For example, <strong>the</strong>re were a number of analyses performed in <strong>the</strong><br />
mid-1970s on <strong>the</strong> benefits that might be attributed to having improved information from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Landsat series of remote-sensing satellites. 32 Because wheat is traded on <strong>the</strong> futures<br />
market and <strong>the</strong> prices are highly volatile depending on <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> worldwide crops,<br />
32. See, for example, ECON, Inc., Economic Benefits of Improved Information on Worldwide Crop Production,<br />
Report 76-243-1, November 15, 1976. A <strong>the</strong>oretical report on which <strong>the</strong> ECON studies were based was published<br />
by D. Bradford and H. Kelejian, The Value of Information for Crop Forecasting with Bayesian Speculators: Theory and<br />
Empirical Results, 1974, Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University,<br />
Washington, DC.
400<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
having better information about future yields is having information with a significant economic<br />
value. The extent that remote-sensing satellites can help provide that information<br />
and <strong>the</strong> subsequent influence that <strong>the</strong> information has on <strong>the</strong> futures market can be measured<br />
in terms of reducing <strong>the</strong> speculative swings on <strong>the</strong> market.<br />
Recognizing that <strong>the</strong> NASA efforts to transfer technology have had a very uneven and<br />
often uncoordinated history, NASA established an internal task force in 1992 to study <strong>the</strong><br />
problems and recommend changes. The final task force report had a series of recommendations<br />
to improve <strong>the</strong> system. These recommendations also included <strong>the</strong> development<br />
of measures to evaluate <strong>the</strong> performance of <strong>the</strong> components of <strong>the</strong> transfer process.<br />
[III-32] It is interesting to note that <strong>the</strong>se findings and recommendations are not very different<br />
in thrust from those of <strong>the</strong> Doctors study of 1971. 33 The process of technology transfer<br />
and information dissemination still took too much time. Paperwork and o<strong>the</strong>r formal<br />
efforts remained cumbersome and slow. The money allocated to <strong>the</strong> program was insufficient.<br />
There was a lack of good data and feedback on many of <strong>the</strong> programs between<br />
NASA and industry, universities, and nonprofit organizations that use <strong>the</strong> technology<br />
transfer–generated information and facilities, and NASA employees generally did not get<br />
recognized for <strong>the</strong>ir efforts in fostering technology transfer.<br />
The technology transfer programs at NASA are not unique in <strong>the</strong>ir frustrations and<br />
problems in implementing more effective programs. O<strong>the</strong>r agencies face similar issues.<br />
There has been a general recognition of <strong>the</strong>se problems, and Congress has passed a number<br />
of acts to help force <strong>the</strong> agencies to address <strong>the</strong> measurement and management of<br />
technology. One of <strong>the</strong> most important of <strong>the</strong>se acts is <strong>the</strong> Government Performance and<br />
Results Act, which requires government agencies to develop new performance measures. 34<br />
It is a clear signal from Congress that measuring economic activities and impacts is an<br />
important effort, not only to manage <strong>the</strong> programs better, but also to help justify continued<br />
government financial support of <strong>the</strong> programs. All R&D agencies are struggling with<br />
finding appropriate measures, and NASA is no exception.<br />
Summary<br />
Economics and commercial/industrial activities have never been <strong>the</strong> top priority of<br />
NASA space programs. NASA is an R&D agency, dedicated to advancing science and technology.<br />
That is its history and its culture. NASA’s aeronautics activities have a very different<br />
history and a different relationship to industry than space activities, but <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
never able to become models for <strong>the</strong> space side of NASA. The documents included in this<br />
chapter amply reflect <strong>the</strong> push and pull of economics. The push is to attempt to find uses<br />
of <strong>the</strong> innovative space technology in consumer applications. The pull is that if a robust<br />
set of market-driven uses for space can be developed, <strong>the</strong>re will be a continued demand<br />
for resources, both public and private, to accelerate future space programs.<br />
Various economic studies and forecasts have whetted <strong>the</strong> appetites of <strong>the</strong> public that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re may actually be robust commercial uses of space that have been promised and that<br />
space spinoffs are very beneficial today. However, without <strong>the</strong> development of truly ongoing,<br />
profitable, and publicly visible commercial space ventures, <strong>the</strong> studies and projections<br />
will fall short of being convincing.<br />
As space technology matures and as innovative products and services are developed<br />
using space technology, commercial and market developments will materialize. There are<br />
33. Doctors, NASA Technology Transfer Program. However, because <strong>the</strong> technology transfer program has<br />
changed, <strong>the</strong> specific recommendations are quite different.<br />
34. Government Performance and Results Act, Public Law 103–62, August 3, 1993.
still many hurdles for <strong>the</strong> space industry to overcome, but <strong>the</strong> tide is moving toward <strong>the</strong><br />
stimulation of new space markets. The burden will have to shift from government-sponsored<br />
studies and analyses to business-sponsored proposals. In addition, <strong>the</strong>se will have to<br />
reach beyond serving government markets and needs to serving <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> consumer.<br />
In summary, <strong>the</strong> trends in government-led economic studies, technology transfer<br />
activities, and o<strong>the</strong>r stimuli toward business and market-driven space activities reflected<br />
<strong>the</strong> political needs of <strong>the</strong> times and <strong>the</strong> developing maturity of <strong>the</strong> space industry.<br />
Government will provide <strong>the</strong> infrastructure and will use space for its own civilian and security<br />
needs. The point is fast approaching when commercial space activities will ei<strong>the</strong>r be<br />
able to develop and compete on a price basis or <strong>the</strong>y will not materialize. The government<br />
can provide incentives, as it has in <strong>the</strong> past, but performing studies and pumping funds<br />
into marginal economic projects will have diminishing results.<br />
Document III-1<br />
Document title: Jack G. Faucett, President, Jack Faucett Associates, Inc., to Willis H.<br />
Shapley, Associate Deputy Administrator, NASA, November 22, 1965, with attachment<br />
omitted.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
The report that was attached to this letter to NASA is one of <strong>the</strong> first comprehensive analyses of <strong>the</strong> role<br />
economics could play in NASA management decisions. It points out that most of NASA’s economic<br />
analyses, policies, and decisions are done on an ad hoc basis, without top management coordination.<br />
By 1965, with <strong>the</strong> Apollo program in full swing and NASA funding reaching its all-time high, <strong>the</strong><br />
importance of economics as well as technology began to become evident to NASA management. The<br />
report concludes that an office for economics at NASA Headquarters be established to coordinate<br />
NASA economic policy. George Wright was an assistant to Willis Shapley.<br />
November 22, 1965<br />
Mr. Willis H. Shapley<br />
Associate Deputy Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546 Attention: Mr. George W. Wright<br />
Dear Mr. Shapley:<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 401<br />
The attached report, “A Preliminary Survey of Socio-Economic Capabilities for<br />
Meeting NASA’s Future Policy and Program Analysis Requirements,” represents <strong>the</strong> completion<br />
of NASA Contract NASW 1331, authorized by you on September 11, 1965.<br />
As we see it, <strong>the</strong> study’s principal usefulness to you is three-fold: (1) it identifies and<br />
describes <strong>the</strong> principal data collections, reports, and studies relevant to economic analysis<br />
in <strong>the</strong> NASA Headquarters; (2) it pinpoints <strong>the</strong> chief means by which your central staff<br />
capabilities can be improved for purposes of socio-economic analysis; and (3) it recommends<br />
a general course of action which, by pulling toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> now largely uncoordinated<br />
activities, should serve to bring socio-economic analysis more effectively to bear on<br />
NASA’s policy planning and decision processes.
402<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A word of elaboration on point (3) is in order. It is not surprising to find that NASA’s<br />
socio-economic activities are at this stage separate, uncoordinated, and almost incidental<br />
activities. Until now <strong>the</strong> highest national priority on NASA has been that of creating a<br />
large technical organization and getting on with <strong>the</strong> task of moving <strong>the</strong> nation toward <strong>the</strong><br />
position of pre-eminence in space. Most of NASA’s socio-economic studies are now carried<br />
out on an ad hoc basis by technical offices under <strong>the</strong> Associate Administrator. In each of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se specialized staffs, <strong>the</strong> perspective and outlook are constrained by mission statement,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> analyses are almost never carried out by trained economists, statisticians, and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r social scientists skilled in perceiving social implications. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> various<br />
reporting systems and data elements are not adequately integrated and coordinated from<br />
<strong>the</strong> point of view of economic analysis; <strong>the</strong>y were developed almost without exception for<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r specialized management purposes and only fortuitously serve socio-economic analysis<br />
needs. To continue this approach would deny your office <strong>the</strong> strong central staff and<br />
perspective needed to analyze critical agency positions with respect to overall NASA programs<br />
and policies. A new professionalism is needed if NASA is to maintain leadership in<br />
<strong>the</strong> new national environment for goal selection and public policy formulation.<br />
Our key recommendation is that your Chief Economist’s responsibility of serving as a<br />
focal point for agencywide socio-economic analyses under <strong>the</strong> Associate Deputy<br />
Administrator be clarified, and his authority be spelled out in management instructions<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r suitable media. Our detailed recommendations for achieving this are set forth<br />
in Chapter IV, especially section A, and <strong>the</strong> remainder of that chapter deals with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
improvements. The NASA Economist should become involved in major NASA decision<br />
processes and selected interagency committees, and he should develop an information<br />
base to serve top agency needs just as <strong>the</strong> activities of <strong>the</strong> Management Information<br />
Systems Division now serve middle management and project management needs.<br />
I do not want to close without noting that in our judgment successful implementation<br />
of our recommendations will require a number of additional positions with high enough<br />
grades to attract outstanding personnel, and also a period of about six months to assimilate<br />
<strong>the</strong> data collections and cited reports, and to study and begin to carry out <strong>the</strong> recommended<br />
improvements.<br />
We wish to express our appreciation for <strong>the</strong> cooperation we received from NASA personnel<br />
and our gratitude for <strong>the</strong> opportunity to review for you <strong>the</strong> central socio-economic<br />
staff role in NASA.<br />
I, of course, will be happy to discuss any points in this report at your convenience.<br />
Document III-2<br />
Yours sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “Jack G. Faucett”]<br />
President<br />
Document title: Roger W. Hough, “Some Major Impacts of <strong>the</strong> National Space Program,”<br />
Stanford Research Institute, Contract NASW-1722, June, 1968, pp. 1–2, 19–22, 36.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> 1960s, as economists began to develop methodologies designed to evaluate <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />
research and development (R&D) on <strong>the</strong> economy, NASA contracted for studies to document <strong>the</strong> space<br />
agency’s specific impacts. These excerpts are from one of <strong>the</strong> early studies that focused on <strong>the</strong> impact<br />
of NASA field centers on <strong>the</strong>ir localities. The report did not address national economic impacts.
[1] SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 403<br />
Some Major Impacts of<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Space Program<br />
Recent studies have begun to show conclusive evidence of a dramatic relationship<br />
between advancing technology and economic growth. Although such a relationship seems<br />
intuitively obvious, <strong>the</strong> proof has been, and still is, considerably elusive. No clear, definitive,<br />
quantitative <strong>the</strong>ory yet exists in <strong>the</strong> economic literature, although much attention has<br />
been paid to <strong>the</strong> subject in <strong>the</strong> past 10 years.<br />
Since NASA is exclusively a research and development agency of <strong>the</strong> government, it<br />
is important that <strong>the</strong> relationship between R&D and economic growth be understood.<br />
This report discusses some aspects of <strong>the</strong> relation-ship and indicates some of <strong>the</strong> required<br />
ingredients for economic growth. These are, for example, a more productive work force,<br />
gained largely through education; a continuous building up of <strong>the</strong> store of knowledge;<br />
greater utilization of knowledge by entrepreneurs; and a high rate of utilization of human<br />
capital, first by virtue of low unemployment in all occupational categories and second by<br />
a continual development and utilization of higher skills.<br />
To find out how NASA contributes to <strong>the</strong>se various elements, this study examined to<br />
some extent <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> Agency in extending <strong>the</strong> quality of environment at its centers<br />
and production and test areas in <strong>the</strong> South. It was found that by contributing to improvements<br />
in local educational systems, NASA had effectively modified <strong>the</strong> direction of growth<br />
taking place in a number of locations. It is clear that this is more noticeable in small cities,<br />
towns, or counties than in large metropolitan areas. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, in a particular<br />
kind of environment, such as Houston, growth in both quantity and quality is also apparent<br />
if <strong>the</strong> immediate vicinity of a center is examined separately. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> same<br />
elements that have been detected before with regard to scientific complexes in o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
cities, such as growth of graduate and higher education facilities, are noticeable in connection<br />
with NASA centers and o<strong>the</strong>r facilities in <strong>the</strong> South. In each of <strong>the</strong> areas—with <strong>the</strong><br />
possible exception of New Orleans, where it may not be possible to detect such changes—<br />
NASA has contributed to those elements that constitute <strong>the</strong> ingredients for economic<br />
growth. It has upgraded <strong>the</strong> skills of <strong>the</strong> labor force, upgraded <strong>the</strong> level of education available<br />
to local inhabitants, decreased unemployment, and built up <strong>the</strong> store of knowledge<br />
by virtue of its scientific mission.<br />
In summary, we find that:<br />
1. NASA activities have had a positive and consequential influence on <strong>the</strong> localities<br />
in <strong>the</strong> South in which it has established research and development centers and<br />
production, testing, and launch facilities.<br />
[2] 2. These influences have gone beyond those associated merely with <strong>the</strong> channeling<br />
of government funds into an area, primarily because of <strong>the</strong> research and development<br />
nature of <strong>the</strong> work.<br />
3. R&D is different from o<strong>the</strong>r transfers of government funds because it requires<br />
more highly paid, highly educated workers who demand more in <strong>the</strong> way of quality<br />
of environment. This in turn affects <strong>the</strong> quality of education, for example,<br />
available to new residents of <strong>the</strong> community as well as to old ones, resulting in<br />
greater levels of achievement by all.<br />
4. NASA and NASA-contractor personnel have contributed to this upgrading of <strong>the</strong><br />
environment in each community in a variety of ways, from running for and being<br />
elected to local political offices to providing pressure through neighborhood and<br />
community organizations and volunteer, charitable, and religious groups.
404<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it was found that, in many cases, a substantial portion of <strong>the</strong> teaching<br />
staff in local grade and high schools was made up of wives of engineers and<br />
scientists on NASA projects. These women are generally well educated, often<br />
from a more cosmopolitan environment than that found in many of <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
locations in <strong>the</strong> South, and thus able to bring to school children a broader experience<br />
and a greater appreciation for education than <strong>the</strong>y would have o<strong>the</strong>rwise.<br />
5. NASA’s influence is also felt because of radical changes in per capita income that<br />
it brings about. Recent scholarly studies have indicated that <strong>the</strong> South must<br />
upgrade <strong>the</strong> productivity of its workers to achieve a position of economic (and<br />
social) health and well-being equivalent to that of <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
Per capita income is <strong>the</strong> most reliable measure available to judge such progress,<br />
and this indicator has been affected greatly by NASA presence.<br />
6. In certain cases, NASA has been a catalyst in stimulating o<strong>the</strong>r developments, particularly<br />
in New Orleans. In this case, <strong>the</strong> local economy was in a slump before <strong>the</strong><br />
advent of space activities in <strong>the</strong> area. Uniform agreement was found among local<br />
business leaders, Chamber of Commerce officials, and o<strong>the</strong>rs that <strong>the</strong> NASA presence<br />
was a critical influence in enlightening <strong>the</strong> community to new and progressive<br />
business opportunities.<br />
7. The influence of NASA on education in <strong>the</strong> South is pertinent, above and beyond<br />
that mentioned above. In insisting on good educational facilities for <strong>the</strong>ir sons<br />
and daughters (and for <strong>the</strong>mselves through college extension and graduate programs),<br />
NASA and NASA-contractor employees have laid <strong>the</strong> groundwork for a<br />
higher quality educational environment for all of <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> communities<br />
where <strong>the</strong>y reside. The South particularly needs such influences to enhance its<br />
own development. . . .<br />
[19] IDENTIFIABLE NASA CONTRIBUTIONS<br />
The impact on certain of <strong>the</strong> communities in which NASA operates in <strong>the</strong> South has<br />
been extensive. In three of <strong>the</strong>se areas, <strong>the</strong> economic impact has been direct and substantial;<br />
in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two areas, local economies have been affected only slightly, but <strong>the</strong><br />
catalytic effect of <strong>the</strong> space program has stimulated businessmen and community leaders<br />
to think in even broader terms of expansion and utilization of local resources than <strong>the</strong>y<br />
had before.<br />
Much of this change might reasonably be attributed to an influx of, and an enthusiasm<br />
for, funds from <strong>the</strong> federal government—whatever <strong>the</strong>ir specific source and whatever<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir end use or purpose. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it appeared during this study that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was something distinct about <strong>the</strong> infusion into a community of federal funds for research<br />
and development, as opposed to federal funds for o<strong>the</strong>r uses.<br />
To investigate this hypo<strong>the</strong>sis, <strong>the</strong> principal investigator in this study visited each of<br />
<strong>the</strong> NASA centers or bases of operations in <strong>the</strong> South. This chapter describes <strong>the</strong> results<br />
of those visits and discussions, toge<strong>the</strong>r with background material drawn from previous<br />
studies along similar lines.<br />
Huntsville, Alabama<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
In 1964, a Select Committee of <strong>the</strong> U.S. House of Representatives, 88th Congress, performed<br />
a study entitled, “Impact of Federal Research and Development Programs.” In this<br />
investigation, impacts on communities, higher education, industry, and <strong>the</strong> economy and<br />
<strong>the</strong> nation generally were examined. The study revealed, in part, that:<br />
1. Federal research and development programs make <strong>the</strong>ir impact on a given area<br />
in one or more of three ways: The federally owned or operated research and
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 405<br />
development installation; <strong>the</strong> research and development contract . . .; and <strong>the</strong><br />
expenditure of basic research funds . . . in institutions of higher learning.<br />
2. Regardless of <strong>the</strong> channel, if significant numbers of Federal research and development<br />
activities, projects or dollars are involved, <strong>the</strong>re is often a special impact<br />
on <strong>the</strong> locale, seemingly distinct from <strong>the</strong> spending of Federal dollars in o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
types of activities, which impact is especially noticeable in small cities.<br />
3. Aspects of this impact include, on <strong>the</strong> one hand, <strong>the</strong> phenomenon of university<br />
and especially of graduate program expansion [20] following upon <strong>the</strong> location<br />
of a Federal research and development installation in a community; and, on <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r hand, in a particular climate, <strong>the</strong> occasional phenomenon of certain types<br />
of research and development related industries growing up around those universities<br />
which are heavily endowed with Federal research and development grants<br />
and contracts.<br />
4. One apparently consistent characteristic of Federal research and development<br />
activity, and especially any activity which involves significant numbers of scientists<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r professional personnel, is that primary and secondary school systems<br />
are upgraded, often markedly. The select committee found striking examples of<br />
this in Huntsville, Alabama, and Tullahoma, Tennessee, where major Federal<br />
research and development installations are located; Stanford Research Institute<br />
found similar evidence of favorable changes in o<strong>the</strong>r communities.<br />
These results of several years ago were substantiated in <strong>the</strong> present study. For example,<br />
discussions with members of <strong>the</strong> Executive Staff at Marshall Space Flight Center confirmed<br />
each of <strong>the</strong> findings of <strong>the</strong> select committee with regard to Huntsville, especially<br />
as to improvements in <strong>the</strong> school system, <strong>the</strong> active role played by <strong>the</strong> center in <strong>the</strong> establishment<br />
and continuity of <strong>the</strong> Research Institute, <strong>the</strong> establishment of an impressive<br />
research and industrial park, and <strong>the</strong> establishment and expansion of a branch of <strong>the</strong><br />
University of Alabama at Huntsville.<br />
Since <strong>the</strong>se facts are important to <strong>the</strong> present discussion, it is appropriate to reiterate<br />
<strong>the</strong>m here. First, <strong>the</strong> select committee found that educational facilities in Huntsville had<br />
been improved radically from 1950 to 1964:<br />
Total enrollment in primary and secondary schools increased from 3,138 in<br />
1950 to 27,537 in 1964, with a consequent burden on local budgets. In 1956,<br />
Huntsville voters overwhelmingly approved an increase in ad valorem taxes,<br />
boosting <strong>the</strong> total tax rate (including city, county, and State levies) to $4.10 per<br />
$100. Revenues realized from this additional levy were earmarked for school construction<br />
programs.<br />
Since 1955 school construction in <strong>the</strong> Huntsville area has increased at <strong>the</strong><br />
rate of approximately one new classroom a week. The number of public schools<br />
increased from 8 in 1956 to 28 in 1964, representing more than 800 classrooms.<br />
Because of <strong>the</strong> steady growth of facilities <strong>the</strong> community has not been forced to<br />
resort to double sessions at any time.<br />
Whereas in 1950 <strong>the</strong> figure for median school years completed by Huntsville<br />
residents 25 and older was well below <strong>the</strong> national average (7.5 years as against<br />
9.3 years), by 1960 <strong>the</strong> Huntsville average was 0.2 years above <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n national<br />
average of 10.6 years. Results of testing programs for students in grades<br />
[21] 1 through 12, showed that Huntsville students compared quite favorably with<br />
those in o<strong>the</strong>r States using similar tests. A majority of <strong>the</strong> scores are consistently<br />
in <strong>the</strong> upper 25 percentile. Comparable results show up on tests of <strong>the</strong> American<br />
College Testing program, <strong>the</strong> National Merit Scholarship program, and <strong>the</strong> college<br />
entrance examination program. Between 75 and 80 percent of all Huntsville<br />
secondary school graduates now enter college.
406<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Some 350 spouses of Redstone personnel or of <strong>the</strong> local defense-related<br />
industry serve as teachers in <strong>the</strong> Huntsville system. Substantial salary increases in<br />
recent years, coupled with an actual decrease in student-teacher ratios contribute<br />
to <strong>the</strong> attractiveness of teaching opportunities. Of <strong>the</strong> more than 800 teachers in<br />
<strong>the</strong> city school system, approximately one-fourth hold master’s degrees, a high<br />
percentage compared with o<strong>the</strong>r Alabama cities.<br />
Significant improvements in curriculum content have been made since <strong>the</strong><br />
initial influx of NASA and Missile Command personnel. Such courses as advanced<br />
biology and calculus have been added to <strong>the</strong> secondary school program.<br />
The school system of Madison County (in which Huntsville is situated) consists<br />
of 30 schools with an enrollment of 12,860 students, about 1,500 of <strong>the</strong>m<br />
“federally connected.” Three private academies and two parochial schools serve<br />
an additional 1,800 students. An extension unit of <strong>the</strong> State vocational technical<br />
school was recently established at Huntsville, offering high school students <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunity to complete <strong>the</strong> 11th and 12th grades with training in electronics,<br />
auto mechanics, and related technical fields. The effect of this new program has<br />
been to up-grade substantially <strong>the</strong> labor force for <strong>the</strong> entire area, and many of <strong>the</strong><br />
graduates of <strong>the</strong> technical school find ready employment at <strong>the</strong> Redstone Arsenal.<br />
The Huntsville Center of <strong>the</strong> University of Alabama and <strong>the</strong> university’s<br />
Research Institute developed concurrently with <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong> Redstone complex,<br />
largely as a result of concerted community effort. The university center has<br />
attracted an enrollment of more than 4,000 students. Of this number, 1,515 are<br />
estimated by Huntsville’s superintendent of public schools to be dependents of<br />
Federal employees at Redstone and of those of related industries. The Center’s<br />
drive toward expansion has been greatly accelerated since 1959 by <strong>the</strong> mushrooming<br />
demands placed upon it by scientific personnel in <strong>the</strong> area. The university<br />
allocated $250,000, matched by similar appropriations from both <strong>the</strong> city and<br />
Madison County, for a total of $750,000. In addition, <strong>the</strong> city and county donated<br />
355 acres of land for <strong>the</strong> campus, and <strong>the</strong> county contributed <strong>the</strong> building of all<br />
necessary roads.<br />
[22] The university center presently houses <strong>the</strong> largest graduate engineering<br />
school in <strong>the</strong> South. A fur<strong>the</strong>r expansion of <strong>the</strong> center is currently underway, and<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r $750,000 is being raised to finance a new undergraduate program, first<br />
instituted in September 1964. Projected figures indicate that more than 6,000 students<br />
will be enrolled at <strong>the</strong> university center by 1966 in both graduate and<br />
undergraduate programs. This compares with a total enrollment of 1,500 in<br />
degree-granting institutions in <strong>the</strong> Huntsville area prior to 1958.<br />
The Research Institute, founded in 1960, is adjacent to <strong>the</strong> university center,<br />
and with Research Park, constitutes <strong>the</strong> complex of research facilities bordering<br />
<strong>the</strong> arsenal. Many of <strong>the</strong> institute’s staff participate as professors in <strong>the</strong> resident<br />
master’s degree program offered by <strong>the</strong> university center, while <strong>the</strong> latter supplies<br />
<strong>the</strong> institute with graduate and undergraduate students who wish to participate in<br />
particular research projects. The institute is served by more than 200 full-time<br />
academic, research, and technical service personnel.<br />
Second, <strong>the</strong> committee discussed <strong>the</strong> establishment of an R&D industry in Huntsville:<br />
The Huntsville Industrial Expansion Committee, organized in <strong>the</strong> early forties,<br />
had long realized <strong>the</strong> vast opportunities which <strong>the</strong> Redstone Arsenal complex,<br />
in close proximity to <strong>the</strong> heart of <strong>the</strong> city on <strong>the</strong> one side and large, unused<br />
tracts of land, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, presented. Efforts to attract industry and educational<br />
institutions into <strong>the</strong> Huntsville area were intensified in <strong>the</strong> late 1950’s and were<br />
centered around <strong>the</strong> two major projects. The expansion committee played an
important role in raising funds for <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> Research Institute, a<br />
branch of <strong>the</strong> University of Alabama created to provide research in <strong>the</strong> aerospace<br />
physical sciences. Dr. von Braun, shortly after being appointed Director of <strong>the</strong><br />
Marshall Space Flight Center, helped by making an eloquent appeal before <strong>the</strong><br />
Alabama State Legislature for funds to establish <strong>the</strong> institute. It was officially<br />
opened 3 months after Marshall Space Flight Center, on October 1, 1960, on an<br />
interim basis with personnel loaned by main campus departments. A State bond<br />
issue provided $3 million for buildings and equipment, and an additional<br />
$400,000 was pledged by <strong>the</strong> city of Huntsville and Madison County.<br />
A concurrent development was <strong>the</strong> creation of Industrial Research Park by a<br />
nonprofit group known as Research Sites Foundation, Inc., a land holding arm of<br />
<strong>the</strong> industrial expansion committee. This organization leases and sells properties<br />
on a 2,000-acre tract adjacent to <strong>the</strong> arsenal to private firms and research groups<br />
at attractive rates; it is pledged to donate profits from <strong>the</strong>se transactions to <strong>the</strong><br />
Research Institute. . . .<br />
[36] Because of <strong>the</strong> demand for additional courses of instruction, <strong>the</strong> University of<br />
Houston now teaches 15 graduate courses at MSC [Manned Space Center], including<br />
management and political science, as well as engineering, ma<strong>the</strong>matics, and physics. The<br />
University is now establishing a new graduate school on a site adjacent to MSC on land<br />
donated by <strong>the</strong> Humble Oil Company. According to representatives of <strong>the</strong> center, this new<br />
facility represents an investment of more than $3 million at <strong>the</strong> outset, and is expected to<br />
serve a community of 80,000 people eventually in <strong>the</strong> Nassau-Clear Lake area.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r examples exist such as <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> Lunar Science Institute under<br />
joint sponsorship of Rice, NASA, and <strong>the</strong> National Science Foundation. All of <strong>the</strong>se elements<br />
are representative of <strong>the</strong> pattern found in Huntsville. Although it may not be possible<br />
to credit NASA with <strong>the</strong> entire series of developments (in fact, it would be incorrect<br />
to do so), <strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> center at Houston goes much beyond<br />
mere numbers of people and a government payroll, just as it does elsewhere.<br />
Finally, impacts on Houston and <strong>the</strong> Clear Lake Area are summarized in Table 7.<br />
Table 7<br />
Summary of Impacts on Houston-Clear Lake Area<br />
Direct Economic Impacts*<br />
1960 1966<br />
Population 6,500 33,000<br />
School enrollment 1,900 6,700<br />
School bonds (in millions) $2.4 $ 7.4<br />
Bank deposits (in millions) $4.8 $30.9<br />
Residential construction† — 1,260<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r Impacts<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 407<br />
Expansion of higher education facilities in general<br />
Establishment of cross-disciplinary materials science laboratory at Rice University<br />
Establishment of University of Houston Graduate School<br />
Establishment of Lunar Science Institute<br />
Dramatic change in character of Houston, expressed in pride in being a Space Center<br />
Great expansion in number of firms locating in area, primarily to serve NASA, but<br />
expanding to o<strong>the</strong>r markets as well<br />
* As given in Reference 7.<br />
† New since 1961.
408<br />
Document III-3<br />
Document title: “Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,” Final Report,<br />
Midwest Research Institute, Contract NASW-2030, October 15, 1971, pp. 1–11.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This analysis was <strong>the</strong> first truly comprehensive national estimate of <strong>the</strong> returns from NASA R&D<br />
expenditures. It used a methodology developed by Robert Solow based on an aggregate national production<br />
function to estimate overall returns from R&D and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> subset of NASA R&D impacts.<br />
The results of a seven-to-one return on NASA expenditures and a projected 33-percent discounted rate<br />
of return from 1958 through 1987 were used for many years in press releases and public statements<br />
about <strong>the</strong> beneficial effects of NASA R&D. The following is Part I of what was a three-part report.<br />
Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity<br />
[1] ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STIMULATED TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY<br />
“The nation’s technological capacity, which is conceptually analogous to <strong>the</strong> capacity<br />
of its physical plant, is unquestionably a nation’s most important economic resource. By<br />
<strong>the</strong> same token, <strong>the</strong> rate at which its technological capacity grows sets what is probably <strong>the</strong><br />
most important ceiling on its long-term rate of economic growth.<br />
The rate of growth of a nation’s technological capacity depends jointly upon <strong>the</strong> rate<br />
at which it produces new technology and <strong>the</strong> rate at which it disseminates <strong>the</strong> old.”<br />
OVERVIEW<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Jacob Schmookler<br />
Invention and Economic Growth<br />
1966<br />
The degree to which a nation can satisfy its collective and individual wants is dependent<br />
upon <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> nation and its citizens. The accumulation of economic wherewithal<br />
is obtained through combinations of labor, capital, and technology. All three inputs<br />
are essential but it is through technological progress that <strong>the</strong> productivity of labor and<br />
capital are increased to obtain more output per unit of input and, consequently, greater<br />
per capita wealth. The United States leads <strong>the</strong> world in <strong>the</strong> generation and application of<br />
technology. Our technological progress poses certain dilemmas, but is also <strong>the</strong> source of<br />
much of <strong>the</strong> economic power we are bringing to bear on societal deficiencies—deficiencies<br />
that many less wealthy nations cannot afford to consider, much less mount assaults<br />
upon.<br />
This volume highlights <strong>the</strong> findings of a research inquiry into <strong>the</strong> relationships<br />
between technological progress and economic development, with emphasis on <strong>the</strong> several<br />
ways in which NASA research and development has aided in <strong>the</strong> accumulation and commercial<br />
application of new or improved scientific and technological knowledge.<br />
[2] Scope of Research<br />
The research undertaken had three separate, but related parts: Part I was an examination<br />
of <strong>the</strong> importance of technological progress in <strong>the</strong> generation of national eco-
nomic growth. The focus was on aggregate economic effects of technological progress—<br />
with technological progress being viewed abstractly as one of <strong>the</strong> principal growth-inducing<br />
forces operating in <strong>the</strong> economic milieu. Part I was concerned with effects: <strong>the</strong><br />
economic effect of technological progress, <strong>the</strong> effect which R&D has on technological<br />
progress, and <strong>the</strong> effect of NASA on <strong>the</strong> nation’s R&D spending. Specifically, this portion<br />
of <strong>the</strong> study was based on an econometric examination of <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy during <strong>the</strong><br />
last 20 years to identify and measure <strong>the</strong> portion of growth which can be attributed to<br />
technological progress. Part I also examined <strong>the</strong> relationship between R&D and technological<br />
progress and, finally, made some tentative estimates of <strong>the</strong> relative effectiveness of<br />
NASA R&D expenditures in generating economic growth via technological progress.<br />
Part II was a case study of <strong>the</strong> process whereby technology is developed and commercially<br />
applied. It was designed to undergird—by example—<strong>the</strong> findings of <strong>the</strong> econometric<br />
study. It was also intended to illustrate <strong>the</strong> extreme complexity of <strong>the</strong> application<br />
process—in particular, that any large technological undertaking produces both direct and<br />
indirect commercial applications, that <strong>the</strong>se come in a wide variety of forms and types,<br />
that countless individual increments of technological progress are combined in any application,<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re are many participants in <strong>the</strong> process—no one of whom can claim sole<br />
credit—and finally to examine <strong>the</strong> several roles that a mission-oriented research and<br />
development agency such as NASA plays in <strong>the</strong> application process.<br />
The specific case study undertaken was of <strong>the</strong> R&D programs and application endeavors<br />
which have culminated in commercial communication via satellite.<br />
Part III of <strong>the</strong> report was an illustration of ways in which a NASA undertaking has contributed<br />
to <strong>the</strong> nation’s scientific and technical knowledge reservoir—<strong>the</strong> reservoir which<br />
is drawn upon and extended by any move toward application. The intent was to demonstrate<br />
that a large body of knowledge is accumulated in <strong>the</strong> process of satisfying missionoriented<br />
program requirements and that this knowledge is retained for use by o<strong>the</strong>rs for<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r purposes. The research procedure was again a case study. In this instance <strong>the</strong> focus<br />
was on what we had to learn to keep man alive and productive in space—with emphasis<br />
on those things which have relevance in one form or ano<strong>the</strong>r to earthly problems.<br />
[3] Thus, in three separate but interlocked studies, [Midwest Research Institute] attempted<br />
to touch upon major elements in <strong>the</strong> progression from science through technology to<br />
viable application in <strong>the</strong> economic realm: Part I measures <strong>the</strong> economic effect of technological<br />
progress. Part II illustrates <strong>the</strong> process whereby technology is developed and commercially<br />
applied (covering <strong>the</strong> invention/innovation portion of <strong>the</strong> spectrum). Part III<br />
shows that an inherent aspect of mission-oriented R&D is <strong>the</strong> generation of new or<br />
improved knowledge—in many fields: basic phenomena, applied science, engineering,<br />
design, materials, processing, etc. And, that this knowledge is added to <strong>the</strong> nation’s knowledge<br />
bank for withdrawal when demand and <strong>the</strong> state of industrial practice evolve to <strong>the</strong><br />
point where <strong>the</strong> technology will be applied.<br />
[4] PART I<br />
A. BACKGROUND<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 409<br />
OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL<br />
PROGRESS—ITS MEASUREMENT<br />
The central questions toward which this phase of <strong>the</strong> report was addressed are:<br />
1. What is <strong>the</strong> role of technological progress in national economic growth?<br />
2. What factors determine <strong>the</strong> rate of economic growth due to technological<br />
progress?
410<br />
3. Can <strong>the</strong> relationships between technological progress, its determinants, and subsequent<br />
economic growth be measured—quantitatively?<br />
4. And, how do <strong>the</strong> research and development activities of <strong>the</strong> space program tie<br />
into <strong>the</strong> preceding questions?<br />
Before World War II, <strong>the</strong>re was little need to ask such questions at <strong>the</strong> national level.<br />
Most development was performed by <strong>the</strong> individual inventor or by industrial laboratories<br />
supported by company funds. Choices as to whe<strong>the</strong>r or not to allocate resources to development<br />
and how to distribute resources among projects were made within individual companies.<br />
Most of <strong>the</strong> nation’s research effort was performed at universities as an adjunct to<br />
graduate education. National priorities had little direct influence on <strong>the</strong> allocation of<br />
resources to R&D, and <strong>the</strong> scale of R&D was small enough that <strong>the</strong> formulation of precise<br />
relationships between R&D and <strong>the</strong> economy lacked urgency.<br />
R&D grew dramatically following World War II under <strong>the</strong> stimulus of <strong>the</strong> Cold War and<br />
<strong>the</strong> race to combine atomic weapons with rocketry. Massive mission-oriented R&D programs<br />
were mounted, using as <strong>the</strong>ir model <strong>the</strong> Manhattan Project of World War II. All facets<br />
of research—basic and applied—as well as development and sophisticated production plus<br />
scientific and engineering education underwent huge federally funded expansions. A<br />
strong scientific and technological capability became an essential instrument for national<br />
survival—decisions to allocate resources to R&D were made on <strong>the</strong> basis of necessity.<br />
[5] By <strong>the</strong> late 1950’s, when <strong>the</strong> nation’s first large-scale civilian mission-oriented R&D<br />
agency—NASA—was created, <strong>the</strong> economic effects of such undertakings were receiving<br />
explicit, if imprecise, recognition. At about <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> short-term and regional<br />
economic impacts of expanded R&D began to receive widespread recognition.<br />
Community after community strove to become ano<strong>the</strong>r Route 128, or San Francisco Bay<br />
Area, or Huntsville. The immediate benefits of a local R&D complex were clear. Less clear<br />
were <strong>the</strong> processes whereby R&D led to new or improved processes, products, and services.<br />
But more important to <strong>the</strong> purposes of <strong>the</strong> present portion of this report, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory,<br />
methodologies and empirical data needed to measure quantitatively <strong>the</strong> cumulative<br />
effect over time of <strong>the</strong> product and process advances were notably deficient.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> 1960’s a number of <strong>the</strong>orists and researchers undertook to improve our<br />
ability to measure <strong>the</strong> economic impact of technological advances, for it had become clear<br />
that technology was a large and powerful force in <strong>the</strong> accumulation of national wealth.<br />
Pioneering work by Solow, Kendrick, and Denison was amplified and extended by a number<br />
of o<strong>the</strong>rs. Much progress has been made, but <strong>the</strong> fact remains that we got to <strong>the</strong> moon<br />
in a decade, but are, as yet, unable to fully measure <strong>the</strong> present and future economic<br />
impact of <strong>the</strong> science and technology accumulated on <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> moon (or <strong>the</strong> aggregate<br />
effect of technological progress in general). Our present capability to measure <strong>the</strong><br />
relationship between technological progress and R&D is even less precise.<br />
Yet, national decisions with respect to <strong>the</strong> allocation of resources to and within R&D<br />
are being and will be made. These decisions cannot be postponed until precise measurements<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir effects are possible. Thus, <strong>the</strong> intent of this part of <strong>the</strong> study was to provide—from<br />
within <strong>the</strong> existing state of <strong>the</strong> art—some measurements of technology’s<br />
contribution to this nation’s wealth during recent years and <strong>the</strong> role of R&D in generating<br />
growth through technological progress.<br />
B. RESEARCH APPROACH<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The investigations were performed at <strong>the</strong> national economic level. We were exploring<br />
<strong>the</strong> aggregate effects of technological progress ra<strong>the</strong>r than those stemming from <strong>the</strong> individual<br />
inventions or innovations. Inadequacies in all existing macro-economic yardsticks<br />
forced <strong>the</strong> study to focus on <strong>the</strong> “cost savings” effects, i.e., increases in <strong>the</strong> productivity of<br />
labor and capital achieved through technological progress. The many improvements in
<strong>the</strong> quality of goods and services due to research and development are not adequately<br />
reflected in existing aggregate economic series and cannot be directly measured.<br />
[6] Given <strong>the</strong>se restrictions on <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> study, six research tasks were performed:<br />
First, we adopted a definition of technological progress that is consistent with how<br />
progress occurs and how it is generally perceived to occur. The definition presumes that<br />
all increases in output not attributable to added quantities of labor and capital are due to<br />
technological progress; i.e., all quality improvements in labor and capital are traceable to<br />
technological progress.<br />
Second, within <strong>the</strong> framework of <strong>the</strong> definition of technological progress and neoclassical<br />
economic growth <strong>the</strong>ory, a suitable macro-economic production function was<br />
structured.<br />
The adopted production function states that technological progress acts in a multiplicative<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than an additive fashion in augmenting labor and capital in <strong>the</strong> outputgenerating<br />
process. The general form of <strong>the</strong> production function employed is:<br />
Q t = A t f (K t , L t )<br />
where:<br />
Q t = Output in time period t<br />
K t = Capital utilized in time period t<br />
L t = Labor expended in time period t<br />
A t = Level of technology applied in time period t.<br />
Third, <strong>the</strong> technology index 1 implicit in <strong>the</strong> production function was used to assess<br />
quantitatively <strong>the</strong> impact of applied technology on economic growth and output.<br />
Fourth, having determined <strong>the</strong> level of technology and resulting output, we related<br />
technological progress generating activities such as research and development, economies<br />
of scale, education, etc., in a ma<strong>the</strong>matical model. Here, <strong>the</strong> determinants of technological<br />
progress were linked to <strong>the</strong> effect of <strong>the</strong>ir stimulus in terms of incremental economic<br />
output.<br />
[7] With respect to growth in output in <strong>the</strong> private, non-farm sector of <strong>the</strong> economy traceable<br />
to R&D—which was denoted G(R&D)—we hypo<strong>the</strong>sized <strong>the</strong> following relationship:<br />
G(R&D) t = f(R t )<br />
where:<br />
R t = The weighted sum of past R&D expenditures for year.<br />
Ma<strong>the</strong>matically, <strong>the</strong> weights are expressed:<br />
R t = w 0 r t-0 + w 1 r t-1 + w 2 r t-2 + . . . + w i r t-i + . . . w 18 r t-18<br />
where:<br />
w i = Weight for <strong>the</strong> ith year lag, and<br />
r t-i = R&D expenditures in <strong>the</strong> year t-i.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 411<br />
1. The index, A t, represents <strong>the</strong> technology being applied in <strong>the</strong> production process through time. It<br />
is arrived at through analysis of actual output and output possible with labor and capital quality—i.e., embodied<br />
technology—fixed at a base year.
412<br />
Thus, R t is a reflection of <strong>the</strong> current year’s R&D activity plus <strong>the</strong> effective value of each<br />
of <strong>the</strong> past 18 years of R&D expenditures. Conceptually, R t can be considered <strong>the</strong> effective<br />
investment in R&D “at work” in year t. The 18-year payout period and <strong>the</strong> payout pattern<br />
within <strong>the</strong> period were derived from several comprehensive and respected surveys of<br />
industry’s pay-back expectations for R&D spending and new product lifetimes.<br />
Fifth, through <strong>the</strong> use of statistical analysis, we empirically determined quantitative<br />
relationships existing between growth due to technological progress and determinants of<br />
technological progress.<br />
Finally, within <strong>the</strong> preceding analytical framework, we examined <strong>the</strong> economic impact<br />
associated with <strong>the</strong> technological stimulus provided by <strong>the</strong> space program.<br />
C. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
As have o<strong>the</strong>rs before us, we found technological progress has been a powerful force<br />
in economic growth. Our study considered:<br />
• That technology is one of <strong>the</strong> factors of production—along with labor and capital—with<br />
which <strong>the</strong> output requirements of <strong>the</strong> nation are satisfied;<br />
• That what we term technological progress is responsible for improvements in <strong>the</strong><br />
quality or productivity of labor and capital;<br />
[8] • That technological progress results from <strong>the</strong> introduction of new or previously<br />
unused knowledge into <strong>the</strong> production process;<br />
• That <strong>the</strong>re are many mechanisms by which knowledge is productively applied,<br />
including: Improved worker skills, improved machine design, improved management<br />
techniques, and so on.<br />
Measuring <strong>the</strong> effect of technological progress—so defined—during <strong>the</strong> 1949<br />
through 1968 time period, we found that:<br />
• The technology added to <strong>the</strong> nation’s production recipe after 1949 accounted for 40 percent<br />
of <strong>the</strong> real increase in private, non-farm output during <strong>the</strong> period.<br />
• Cumulatively, total output for <strong>the</strong> period was about $8.2 trillion. If <strong>the</strong>re had been no<br />
increase in <strong>the</strong> level of technology used after 1949, <strong>the</strong> stock of labor and capital applied<br />
would have only yielded a cumulative output of $6.9 trillion. Thus, <strong>the</strong> leverage on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
two factors of production by technological progress permitted almost 20 percent more output<br />
than might o<strong>the</strong>rwise have been achieved with <strong>the</strong> same quantity of labor and capital.<br />
• Throughout <strong>the</strong> period <strong>the</strong> technology factor in <strong>the</strong> production function increased at a compound<br />
rate of 1.7 percent per year. By <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> period—in 1968—<strong>the</strong> compounding<br />
growth of technology had reached a point at which technological improvements beyond 1949<br />
levels were accounting for 37 percent of output (Figure 1).<br />
Although it is possible to dissent on certain grounds about <strong>the</strong> exact amount of productivity<br />
gains due to technology, <strong>the</strong> major conclusion is clear. Without <strong>the</strong> increase of<br />
technology and its introduction into <strong>the</strong> production recipe, this nation would be substantially<br />
less wealthy than it is. Much of <strong>the</strong> economic wherewithal we are now attempting<br />
to apply toward <strong>the</strong> solution of pressing domestic problems is <strong>the</strong> product of applied<br />
technological progress. To expand this economic capacity for problem resolution, this<br />
nation must continue to allocate resources to enterprises which generate technological<br />
progress and encourage its productive utilization.<br />
This brings us to <strong>the</strong> second set of findings—those related to <strong>the</strong> sources or determinants<br />
of technological progress. The <strong>the</strong>oretical and empirical foundation for <strong>the</strong>se<br />
assessments is less definitive than for <strong>the</strong> preceding findings. However, <strong>the</strong>re is general<br />
agreement on a list of forces important in <strong>the</strong> generation of technological progress. The<br />
forces are highly interactive but, for analytical reasons, were treated independently. Our
findings indicated that most of <strong>the</strong>se forces were of insignificant effect during <strong>the</strong> relatively<br />
short time period under study.<br />
[9]<br />
Billions of 1958 $'s<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
600<br />
1950<br />
Figure 1. Output and Gains Resulting From Technological Progress (1949–1968)<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 413<br />
Output<br />
Gains From<br />
Technological<br />
Progress<br />
1955 1960 1965<br />
Output at 1949<br />
Technology Level<br />
[10] However, three factors—<strong>the</strong> sex mix of <strong>the</strong> workforce, education, and R&D—-were<br />
found to be important determinants of economic gains through technological progress<br />
during <strong>the</strong> Post-World War II period. The first, sex mix, is <strong>the</strong> product of increasing participation<br />
by females in <strong>the</strong> workforce and increasing productivity by distaff employees.<br />
Improvements in this factor during <strong>the</strong> period accounted for 4 percent of <strong>the</strong> total gains<br />
due to technology. Improved worker productivity through higher educational levels contributed<br />
approximately 36 percent. The balance of <strong>the</strong> technology-induced gain—60 percent—was<br />
attributed to R&D after having ascertained that o<strong>the</strong>r possible determinants<br />
had no measurable or identifiable impact.<br />
The relationship between R&D- and technology-induced economic gains was<br />
explored on a distributed-lag basis. Lag distributions between R&D expenditures and initial<br />
pay-back and final pay-out in <strong>the</strong> form of national economic gains were constructed<br />
from industry estimates and experience, but when subjected to statistical tests <strong>the</strong> relationships<br />
exhibited reasonably good explanatory power. The findings were that:<br />
On <strong>the</strong> average—each dollar spent on R&D returns slightly over seven dollars in technologically<br />
induced economic gains over an 18-year period following <strong>the</strong> expenditure.<br />
This finding leads to <strong>the</strong> strong conclusion that, on <strong>the</strong> average (including good, bad,<br />
and indifferent projects), R&D expenditures have been an excellent national investment.<br />
The final set of findings relates to <strong>the</strong> economic impact—via technological progress—<br />
of NASA’s R&D programs. Assuming that NASA’s R&D expenditures had <strong>the</strong> same pay-off<br />
as <strong>the</strong> average, we found that:
414<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The $25 billion, in 1958 dollars, spent on civilian space R&D during <strong>the</strong> 1959–1969 period<br />
has returned $52 billion through 1970 and will continue to produce pay-off through 1987, at which<br />
time <strong>the</strong> total pay-off will have been $181 billion (Table 1). The discounted rate of return for this<br />
invest-ment will have been 33 percent.<br />
As noted, <strong>the</strong> preceding finding was based on <strong>the</strong> assumption that NASA R&D spending<br />
has an average pay-off effect; <strong>the</strong>re is strong preliminary evidence that <strong>the</strong> exacting<br />
demands of <strong>the</strong> space program may produce greater than average economic effects due<br />
to increased technological leverage. This comes about because NASA allocates its R&D<br />
dollar to <strong>the</strong> more technologically intensive segments of <strong>the</strong> industrial sector of <strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
The weighted average technological index (At) of <strong>the</strong> industries which perform<br />
research for NASA is 2.1, while <strong>the</strong> multiplier for all manufacturing is 1.4. Although <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are a number of conceptual and procedural limitations to <strong>the</strong> construction of industrylevel<br />
technological multipliers, <strong>the</strong> spread seems large enough to support <strong>the</strong> view that<br />
highly technological undertakings, such as <strong>the</strong> space program, do exert disproportionate<br />
weight toward increased national productivity.<br />
[11] Table 1<br />
G(R&D) Generation Pattern Resulting From NASA R&D<br />
Annual Annual<br />
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 G G<br />
Annual<br />
NASA<br />
R&D 128 351 602 1,261 2,446 3,315 3,982 4,283 3,414 3,116 2,518<br />
G (R&D) Generated<br />
1959 1<br />
1960 6 2<br />
1961 21 16 4<br />
1962 48 57 28 8<br />
1963 84 132 97 58 16<br />
1964 118 231 227 204 113 22<br />
1965 138 324 397 475 395 153 26<br />
1966 138 378 556 832 922 536 184 28<br />
1967 120 378 649 1,165 1,614 1,250 644 198 22<br />
1968 93 331 649 1,359 2,259 2,187 1,501 692 158 21<br />
1969 64 256 567 1,359 2,636 3,572 2,627 1,615 552 144 17 12,898 35,167<br />
1970 40 177 439 1,187 2,636 3,572 3,678 2,826 1,287 504 116 16,462 51,629<br />
1971 22 109 303 919 2,303 3,572 4,291 3,956 2,253 1,175 407 19,311 70,939<br />
1972 11 61 188 634 1,782 3,122 4,291 4,615 3,153 2,056 949 20,864 91,803<br />
1973 5 31 105 393 1,231 2,415 3,750 4,615 3,679 2,878 1,661 20,764 112,566<br />
1974 2 14 53 219 763 1,668 2,901 4,033 3,679 3,358 2,326 19,016 131,582<br />
1975 1 5 24 110 426 1,034 2,003 3,121 3,215 3,358 2,713 16,010 147,592<br />
1976 2 9 50 214 577 1,242 2,155 2,487 2,934 2,713 12,384 159,975<br />
1977 1 3 20 96 290 693 1,336 1,718 2,270 2,371 8,797 168,773<br />
1978 1 7 38 130 348 745 1,065 1,568 1,835 5,737 174,509<br />
1979 2 13 52 156 374 594 972 1,267 3,430 177,940<br />
1980 4 18 62 168 298 542 785 1,878 179,818<br />
1981 1 5 21 67 134 272 438 939 180,757<br />
1982 1 6 23 53 122 220 426 181,183<br />
1983 1 7 18 49 99 174 181,358<br />
1984 1 5 17 39 63 181,419<br />
1985 1 5 14 19 181,438<br />
1986 1 4 5 181,443<br />
1987 1 1 181,444<br />
TOTAL 914 2,506 4,298 9,002 17,462 23,665 28,427 30,576 24,372 22,245 17,976 181,444<br />
Document III-4<br />
Document title: Michael K. Evans, “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,”<br />
Executive Summary, Chase Econometric Associates, Inc., Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania,<br />
Contract NASW-2741, April 1976, pp. i–iii, 1–18.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This study showed an overall seven-to-one return to NASA expenditures using a macroeconomic production<br />
function approach. It differs from <strong>the</strong> 1971 Midwest Research Institute study (Document<br />
III-3) in many technical ways, <strong>the</strong> most important of which was that it assumed that NASA R&D<br />
was different from overall R&D. This study was <strong>the</strong> last in a series of major efforts in <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s<br />
to justify NASA expenditures on <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong>ir economic impacts. During <strong>the</strong> post-Apollo period of<br />
<strong>the</strong> mid-1970s, NASA R&D budgets were less than one-half of those of <strong>the</strong> peak years of 1965–66;<br />
NASA economic analyses were designed to buttress arguments for increased space budgets.<br />
The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending<br />
[i] Abstract<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 415<br />
In this study Chase Econometrics, Inc., has undertaken an evaluation of <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
impact of NASA R&D programs. The crux of <strong>the</strong> methodology and hence <strong>the</strong> results<br />
revolve around <strong>the</strong> interrelationships existing between <strong>the</strong> demand and supply effects of<br />
increased R&D spending, in particular, NASA R&D spending. The demand effects are primarily<br />
short-run in nature and have consequences similar to that of o<strong>the</strong>r types of government<br />
spending. The supply effects, which represent <strong>the</strong> results of a higher rate of<br />
technological growth manifested through a larger total productive capacity, are long-run<br />
in nature and have consequences very dissimilar to that of general types of government<br />
spending.<br />
The study is divided into two principal parts. In <strong>the</strong> first part, <strong>the</strong> INFORUM Inter-<br />
Industry Forecasting Model is used to measure <strong>the</strong> short-run economic impact of alternative<br />
levels of NASA expenditures for 1975. The principal results of this part of <strong>the</strong> study are<br />
that a shift toward higher NASA spending within <strong>the</strong> framework of a constant level of total<br />
Federal expenditures would increase output and employment and would probably reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> inflationary pressures existing in <strong>the</strong> economy. Hence, Chase concludes that NASA<br />
spending is more stabilizing in a recovery period than general government spending.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> second part of <strong>the</strong> study, an aggregate production function approach is used to<br />
develop <strong>the</strong> data series necessary to measure <strong>the</strong> impact of NASA R&D spending, and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r determinants of technological progress, on <strong>the</strong> rate of growth in productivity of <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. economy. The principal finding of this part of <strong>the</strong> study is that <strong>the</strong> historical rate of<br />
return from NASA R&D spending is 43 percent.<br />
[ii] In <strong>the</strong> final part of <strong>the</strong> study, <strong>the</strong> measured relationship between NASA R&D spending<br />
and technological progress is simulated in <strong>the</strong> Chase Macroeconometric Model to<br />
measure <strong>the</strong> immediate, intermediate, and long-run economic impact of increased NASA<br />
R&D spending over a sustained period. The principal findings of this part of <strong>the</strong> study are<br />
that a sustained increase in NASA spending of $1 billion (1958 dollars) for <strong>the</strong> 1975–1984<br />
period would have <strong>the</strong> following effects:<br />
1) Constant-dollar GNP would be $23 billion higher by 1984, a 2% increase over <strong>the</strong><br />
“baseline,” or no-additional-expenditure projections.<br />
2) The rate of increase in <strong>the</strong> Consumer Price Index would be reduced to <strong>the</strong> extent that<br />
by 1984 it would be a full 2% lower than indicated in <strong>the</strong> baseline projection.<br />
3) The unemployment rate would be reduced by 0.4% by 1984, and <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> labor<br />
force would be increased through greater job opportunities so that <strong>the</strong> total number of<br />
jobs would increase by an additional 0.8 million.<br />
4) By 1984 productivity in <strong>the</strong> private non-farm sector would be 2.0% higher than indicated<br />
in <strong>the</strong> baseline projection.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r simulations, of $100 to $500 million increases, show proportional results.
416<br />
The large beneficial economic effects of NASA R&D programs, particularly <strong>the</strong><br />
unique combination of increased real GNP and a lower inflation rate, stem from <strong>the</strong><br />
growth in general productivity resulting from NASA programs. Growth in productivity<br />
means that less labor (and/or capital) is needed per unit of output. This results in lower<br />
unit labor costs and hence lower prices. A [iii] slower rate of inflation leads in turn to a<br />
more rapid rise in real disposable income, which provides consumers with <strong>the</strong> additional<br />
purchasing power to buy <strong>the</strong> additional goods and services made possible by <strong>the</strong> expansion<br />
of <strong>the</strong> economy’s production possibility frontier. Finally, <strong>the</strong> increase in real consumer<br />
expenditure leads to an increase in demand for <strong>the</strong> services of labor.<br />
[1] Introduction<br />
Chase Econometric Associates, Inc. has undertaken an evaluation of <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
impact of NASA R&D spending on <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy. This study reports on both <strong>the</strong><br />
short-run and long-run effects of changing levels of spending. Both <strong>the</strong> Chase<br />
Econometrics macro model and input-output model are used to calculate <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />
different spending levels on <strong>the</strong> overall economy and on specific industries in <strong>the</strong> shortrun<br />
part of <strong>the</strong> study. The long-run part of <strong>the</strong> study includes an estimate of <strong>the</strong> relationship<br />
between NASA R&D spending and <strong>the</strong> rate of technological growth. This<br />
relationship is used to determine how much higher spending levels would raise aggregate<br />
supply and increase <strong>the</strong> total productive capacity of <strong>the</strong> economy. The demand effects<br />
stemming from an increase in spending are not substantially different from traditional<br />
multiplier analysis and are primarily short-run in nature. The supply effects do not begin<br />
to have a significant effect on aggregate economic activity until five years later, but <strong>the</strong> ultimate<br />
effects are much larger and very different than <strong>the</strong> effects of most forms of government<br />
spending.<br />
Description of Approach<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Short-Run Impacts of NASA R&D Spending<br />
The first part of <strong>the</strong> study deals with <strong>the</strong> short-term economic impact of NASA expenditures<br />
and attempts to answer <strong>the</strong> question of whe<strong>the</strong>r a higher level of NASA expenditures<br />
is more beneficial to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy than a lower level during <strong>the</strong> year that <strong>the</strong><br />
expenditures are made, holding <strong>the</strong> level of total [2] Federal spending constant. This<br />
analysis is useful in examining <strong>the</strong> effects of altering <strong>the</strong> level of NASA expenditures as<br />
part of an overall economic stabilization policy.<br />
The economic impact was calculated by preparing two forecasts of <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy<br />
for 1975 using alternative levels of NASA expenditures, which we term NASAHI and<br />
NASALO. The NASALO forecast assumed an expenditure by NASA of $1.35 billion in<br />
1971 dollars for goods and services (excluding NASA employee wages) during calendar<br />
1975. The NASAHI forecast assumed an expenditure of $2.35 billion by NASA with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Federal government spending reduced by $1 billion, hence leaving <strong>the</strong> total level of government<br />
spending unchanged. Because of this, <strong>the</strong> aggregate economic impact shown for<br />
this shift is quite small.<br />
In order to measure <strong>the</strong> differential industry effect of <strong>the</strong> NASAHI and NASALO<br />
expenditure levels, we utilized <strong>the</strong> INFORUM Inter-Industry Forecasting Model. This<br />
model, which was developed by <strong>the</strong> Interindustry Forecasting Project of <strong>the</strong> University of<br />
Maryland, has been expanded and modified by Chase Econometrics and has been linked<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Chase Econometrics Macroeconomic Forecasting Model to provide consistent economic<br />
forecasts for <strong>the</strong> industries included in <strong>the</strong> model. Through use of this model, it is pos-
sible to forecast <strong>the</strong> impacts on major economic indicators such as inflation, employment,<br />
GNP, and productivity of a shift in <strong>the</strong> Federal budget to a higher level of NASA spending.<br />
Short-Run Results<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 417<br />
The effects of <strong>the</strong> two alternative forecasts on <strong>the</strong> aggregate economy, as estimated<br />
through use of INFORUM, are shown in Tables 1 and 2. While <strong>the</strong> results are not dramatic,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y do indicate that <strong>the</strong> direction of change in economic activity from an increase<br />
in <strong>the</strong> level of NASA expenditure is positive [3] [original placement of Tables 1 and 2] [4]<br />
and beneficial. The magnitudes are small because <strong>the</strong> total Federal expenditure has not<br />
been altered and <strong>the</strong>se improvements result solely from a shift within total Federal expenditures.<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>se results do indicate that NASA expenditures are less inflationary<br />
than o<strong>the</strong>r Federal government expenditures, and that a shift toward higher NASA<br />
spending with a constant Federal expenditure is not inflationary in <strong>the</strong> present economy.<br />
Conversely, it would follow that a shift away from NASA to o<strong>the</strong>r Federal programs could<br />
be relatively inflationary in <strong>the</strong> present economy. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> employment effect of NASA<br />
expenditures is beneficial, although not large for this small change, and thus both goals<br />
of higher employment and lower rates of inflation would be hindered by a lower level of<br />
NASA expenditure.<br />
Table 1<br />
Macroeconomic Impact of NASAHI and NASALO Expenditures<br />
NASALO NASAHI<br />
1975 1975<br />
Gross National Product 1529.9 1530.1<br />
Gross National Product (1958$ 820.7 820.7<br />
Consumer Price Index (% change) 10.5 10.5<br />
Disposable Personal Income 1084.9 1085.0<br />
Federal Government Deficit 17.0 16.9<br />
All figures are in billions of dollars except where indicated o<strong>the</strong>rwise.<br />
NASAHI = NASA expenditures during 1975 of $2.35 billion in 1971 dollars.<br />
NASALO = NASA expenditures during 1975 of $1.35 billion in 1971 dollars.<br />
Table 2<br />
Employment by Industries Affected by a NASA Spending Shift<br />
Employment by Selected Industries HI LO Diff<br />
(thousands)<br />
Industry<br />
Number Industry SIC Code<br />
5 Missiles and Ordnance 19 154 142 +12<br />
59 Machine Shop Products 359 191 190 + 1<br />
67 Communication Equip. 366 404 402 + 2<br />
71 Aircraft 501 488 +13<br />
Total +28
418<br />
22 Logging and Lumber 241, 242 307 308 - 1<br />
25 Furniture 25 543 544 - 1<br />
27 Paper and Products 26 501 502 - 1<br />
30 Printing & Publishing 27 688 689 - 1<br />
31 Industrial Chemicals 295 296 - 1<br />
72 Shipbuilding 373 169 171 - 2<br />
Total - 7<br />
Net gain in Manufacturing Employment +20<br />
(thousands of jobs)<br />
Thus in this section of <strong>the</strong> study we show that a shift to NASA expenditures from o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Federal government spending will stimulate <strong>the</strong> economy without raising prices. In particular,<br />
we found <strong>the</strong> following effects of a shift of $1 billion in 1971 dollars.<br />
1) A higher level of NASA expenditures would not have had an inflationary impact on <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. economy during 1975 and would probably have reduced <strong>the</strong> inflation pressures in<br />
<strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
2) A shift of $1.0 billion in 1971 dollars, or $1.4 billion in 1975 estimated prices, from<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r Federal non-defense expenditures to NASA expenditures would have reduced <strong>the</strong><br />
inflationary pressures in several key basic materials industries.<br />
3) A shift to increase NASA expenditures would have increased employment by 25,000 in<br />
<strong>the</strong> missile and ordnance and aircraft industries. While it would have reduced employment<br />
in ten o<strong>the</strong>r industries, <strong>the</strong> net increase in <strong>the</strong> manufacturing sector would have<br />
been 20,000 jobs.<br />
[5] 4) Output would have been stimulated in twenty-one industries. The principal industries<br />
which would have been affected had considerable excess capacity in 1975 and were<br />
producing at levels well below <strong>the</strong>ir peak years and in most cases below <strong>the</strong> average of <strong>the</strong><br />
past five years.<br />
The general conclusion reached in this section is that a shift toward higher NASA spending<br />
within <strong>the</strong> framework of a constant level of total Federal expenditures creates jobs without raising<br />
<strong>the</strong> rate of inflation, and hence is more stabilizing in a recovery period than general government<br />
spending.<br />
Description of Approach<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The Impact of NASA R&D on <strong>the</strong><br />
Rate of Change of Technological Progress<br />
The second part of this study is an examination of <strong>the</strong> historical relationship between<br />
NASA R&D spending and <strong>the</strong> rate of technological progress. This examination requires<br />
two steps: (1) <strong>the</strong> construction of a time series to measure <strong>the</strong> rate of change of technological<br />
progress; and (2) an empirical investigation through regression analysis of <strong>the</strong><br />
determinants of technological progress suggested by economic <strong>the</strong>ory.<br />
(1) Time Series for γ (gamma). The time series representing <strong>the</strong> rate of change in<br />
technological progress (γ) is a somewhat elusive measure, inasmuch as it requires developing<br />
a series for potential Gross National Product (GNP) as well as related series for<br />
labor and capital inputs. The series that was developed to measure γ is based on <strong>the</strong><br />
methodology used by <strong>the</strong> Council of [6] Economic Advisers. In addition, an alternative<br />
series for γ was developed, following <strong>the</strong> methodology of E. F. Denison, to test <strong>the</strong> sensitivity<br />
of <strong>the</strong> results to a change in <strong>the</strong> formulation of <strong>the</strong> γ series.
Our formulation of γ is as follows:<br />
γ =<br />
∆X<br />
X<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 419<br />
∆L<br />
− α L<br />
∆K<br />
−<br />
(1 - α) K<br />
where X = full capacity or maximum potential output (national income or GNP) in<br />
constant prices<br />
L = maximum available labor force<br />
K = capital stock, defined as K = Σ where λ is <strong>the</strong> rate of economic<br />
depreciation and I is fixed nonresidential investment.<br />
α = share of potential output<br />
γ = <strong>the</strong> rate of technological progress (that is, <strong>the</strong> rate of increase in full capacity<br />
real GNP that cannot be accounted for by a change in ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> size and composition<br />
of <strong>the</strong> labor force or <strong>the</strong> size and composition of <strong>the</strong> capital stock).<br />
λi N<br />
It-1 i=0<br />
(2) Determinants of γ. Economic <strong>the</strong>ory and prior econometric studies suggest <strong>the</strong><br />
following possible determinants for γ: (a) R&D spending; (b) an industry mix variable;<br />
(c) an index of capacity utilization; (d) an index of labor quality reflecting changes in age<br />
mix, sex mix, health levels, and educational levels of <strong>the</strong> labor force; and (e) an index of<br />
economies of scale. After considerable experimentation, we found <strong>the</strong> latter two determinants<br />
to be insignificant for <strong>the</strong> time period examined. The exclusion of economies of<br />
scale as an explanatory variable for γ can be justified on <strong>the</strong>oretical grounds since this variable<br />
is generally relevant to only firm [7] or industry or underdeveloped nation studies.<br />
The statistical insignificance of <strong>the</strong> labor quality variable may be partly explained by <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that some of its characteristics are already reflected by <strong>the</strong> manner in which we constructed<br />
<strong>the</strong> labor force variable used to generate γ. Undoubtedly, <strong>the</strong> insignificance of <strong>the</strong><br />
labor quality variable is also partly due to our inability to reflect significant improvements<br />
(variability) in labor education and training over an observation period as short as 15<br />
years.<br />
Hence, based upon both <strong>the</strong>oretical considerations and empirical investigation, we<br />
offer <strong>the</strong> following conclusions regarding <strong>the</strong> determinants of γ. First, R&D spending<br />
should be included as a determinant and should be subdivided into two explanatory variables,<br />
namely, NASA R&D spending and o<strong>the</strong>r R&D spending. Secondly, we found that<br />
both R&D variables could be closely approximated by a distributed lag structure that follows<br />
<strong>the</strong> general shape of an inverted U-distribution; that is, as a result of an increase in<br />
R&D spending in year 0, modest increase in <strong>the</strong> productivity growth rate begin in year 2,<br />
peak in year 5, and terminate in year 8. The actual distributed lag weights, determined by<br />
Almon method and used in <strong>the</strong> study, are given in Table 3. Thirdly, an industry mix variable<br />
should also be used in <strong>the</strong> equation that attempts to explain movements in γ. This<br />
specification is necessary to capture <strong>the</strong> impact on γ of shifts over time in resource allocation<br />
from high- to low-technology industries. Finally, <strong>the</strong> equation explaining γ should also<br />
include a capacity utilization variable to account for <strong>the</strong> fact that shortages and bottlenecks<br />
reduce productivity growth as <strong>the</strong> economy approaches full capacity.
420<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
[8] Table 3<br />
Distributed Lag Weights for R&D Spending<br />
Time Lag (Yrs.) Proportional Weight<br />
0 0.0<br />
1 0.0<br />
2 0.061<br />
3 0.164<br />
4 0.220<br />
5 0.232<br />
6 0.200<br />
7 0.123<br />
8 and later 0.0<br />
The Measured Effect of R&D Spending on Productivity Growth<br />
(1) The Regression Equation. The final regression equation which was used to<br />
explain γ in this study is as follows:<br />
γ = -1.81+0.426 Σ Ai (NRD) -i +0.074 Ai (ORD) i ———<br />
(3.9) (2.0)<br />
(4.5) (3.1) DW = 1.95<br />
Sample Period 1960–1974<br />
7<br />
Σ i=0<br />
7<br />
(1–Cp)<br />
_ _<br />
i=0 (1–Cp)<br />
– – – –<br />
–2<br />
+0.031(IM – IM)–0.157(CP–Cp) R = 0.883<br />
where: NRD = NASA R&D spending as a proportion of GNP<br />
ORD = o<strong>the</strong>r R&D spending as a proportion of GNP<br />
IM = industry mix variable, fraction<br />
Cp = index of capacity utilization, percent<br />
[9] The numbers in paren<strong>the</strong>ses below <strong>the</strong> regression coefficients represent t-statistics. As<br />
can be seen from <strong>the</strong> regression results, all coefficients are statistically significant and <strong>the</strong><br />
overall fit of <strong>the</strong> equation to <strong>the</strong> data, as measured by <strong>the</strong> –2<br />
R<br />
value of 88.3 percent, is<br />
impressively high, especially for a first difference equation.<br />
(2) The NASA Contribution to γ. Using <strong>the</strong> regression results above, we found that<br />
<strong>the</strong> increased levels of constant-dollar GNP stemming from a $1 billion increase in constant-dollar<br />
NASA R&D spending in 1975 are as given in Table 4. For purposes of this calculation<br />
we hold <strong>the</strong> baseline level of GNP constant and ignore all interactive and<br />
dynamic demand and supply multipliers. As will be explained later, <strong>the</strong> actual changes in<br />
GNP will be considerably larger once we do include <strong>the</strong> effect of <strong>the</strong>se multipliers.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 421<br />
Table 4<br />
Increase in GNP per Unit Increase in NASA R&D Spending<br />
“Pure” Productivity Effects Only<br />
Year Cumulative Change in GNP<br />
1975 0<br />
1976 0<br />
1977 0<br />
1978 0<br />
1979 0.26<br />
1980 0.96<br />
1981 1.90<br />
1982 2.88<br />
1983 3.74<br />
1984 and 4.26<br />
succeeding years<br />
[10] The rate of return on NASA spending may be found by substituting <strong>the</strong> results of<br />
Table 4 into <strong>the</strong> conventional rate of return formula. increase in spending, <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
expression would be<br />
0.255 0.952 1.888 2.882 3.736 (1+r) 10<br />
–––––– + –––––– + –––––– + –––––– + –––––– + 4.261<br />
(1=r)<br />
= 1.00<br />
5 (1=r) 6 (1=r) 7 (1=r) 8 (1=r) 9 1– ——<br />
1<br />
1+r<br />
where r is <strong>the</strong> rate of return. Solving this equation yields r = 43% to <strong>the</strong> nearest percent.<br />
4.26<br />
If we resolve <strong>the</strong> equation by substituting for <strong>the</strong> last term, thus not assuming an<br />
(1=r)<br />
infinite life, we find <strong>the</strong> rate of return diminishes to 38%.<br />
10<br />
Thus an increase of $1 billion in NASA R&D spending would increase productivity<br />
and total capacity of <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy by $4.26 billion in 1984 and each succeeding year.<br />
It should be stressed that this figure stems from a $1 billion increase in 1975 and <strong>the</strong>n a<br />
return to previous spending levels. If spending were to remain $1 billion higher indefinitely,<br />
<strong>the</strong> first-order supply effects, i.e., disregarding interactive and dynamic effects, are<br />
shown in Table 5. As indicated above, <strong>the</strong> actual results are significantly larger because of<br />
<strong>the</strong> demand and multiplier effects calculated by simulating <strong>the</strong> Chase macroeconomic<br />
model.
422<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
[11] Table 5<br />
Cumulative Effect on GNP of a Sustained<br />
Increase in NASA R&D Spending<br />
“Pure” Productivity Effects Only<br />
1975<br />
1976<br />
1977<br />
1978<br />
1979 0.26 = 0.26<br />
1980 0.96 + 0.26 = 1.22<br />
1981 1.90 + 0.96 + 0.26 = 3.12<br />
1982 2.88 + 1.90 + 0.96 + 0.26 = 6.00<br />
1983 3.74 + 2.88 + 1.90 + 0.96 + 0.26 = 9.74<br />
1984 4.26 + 3.74 + 2.88 + 1.90 + 0.96 + 0.26 = 14.00<br />
Macroeconomic Impacts of NASA<br />
R&D-Induced Technological Progress<br />
The third part of <strong>the</strong> study uses <strong>the</strong> relationship which has been developed between<br />
NASA R&D spending and <strong>the</strong> rate of technological progress to translate an increase in<br />
spending into a higher overall level of productivity for <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy. This section features<br />
a number of simulations with <strong>the</strong> Chase Econometrics macro model which determine<br />
<strong>the</strong> total effect of higher NASA R&D spending on <strong>the</strong> economy when interactive and<br />
dynamic effects are taken into account. These simulations consider <strong>the</strong> supply side of <strong>the</strong><br />
economy as well as <strong>the</strong> demand side, and stress <strong>the</strong> fact that real GNP can be expanded by<br />
increasing productivity and lowering prices as well as by increasing government spending.<br />
[12] Approach to Determining Macroeconomic Effects<br />
Up to this point we have considered only <strong>the</strong> static supply or “pure” productivity<br />
effects of NASA R&D spending. We now employ <strong>the</strong> Chase Econometrics macro model to<br />
determine <strong>the</strong> effects of an increase of $1 billion in constant prices (1958 dollars) in<br />
NASA R&D spending. We assume that such spending is increased by this amount at <strong>the</strong><br />
beginning of 1975 and remains in force throughout <strong>the</strong> next decade. There are two types<br />
of effects from this increased spending.<br />
The first type of effect is <strong>the</strong> ordinary expenditure (demand) impact of increased government<br />
spending. The second type of effect—this effect being what really differentiates<br />
NASA R&D from o<strong>the</strong>r types of government spending—is <strong>the</strong> longer run impact of NASA<br />
R&D-induced changes in <strong>the</strong> rate of technological progress. These changes lead to an<br />
expansion in <strong>the</strong> productive capacity of <strong>the</strong> economy and ultimately lead to an increase<br />
in society’s standard of living.<br />
(1) The Expenditure (Demand) Impact of NASA R&D. In a period of economic<br />
slackness, an increase in government spending leads to increased real GNP and lower<br />
unemployment. These expenditure effects for NASA R&D are not markedly different<br />
than those experienced for most increases in o<strong>the</strong>r types of government spending or for<br />
<strong>the</strong> release of funds to <strong>the</strong> private sector for construction. It should be noted, however,<br />
that NASA R&D expenditure increases have a larger impact per dollar than similar spending<br />
on welfare or low productivity type job programs.<br />
[13] (2) The Important Productivity Impacts of NASA R&D. The productivity impacts of<br />
NASA R&D generate social benefits in a somewhat more complex manner. We have
already shown above (Table 5) <strong>the</strong> magnitude of increase which will occur in <strong>the</strong> productive<br />
capacity of <strong>the</strong> economy for an increase in NASA R&D spending. However, <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
automatic increase in demand which will occur just because total supply is now higher,<br />
and until this newly created capacity is utilized through higher demand no social benefits<br />
are realized.<br />
There is an economic mechanism through which increased supply does create its own<br />
demand. Greater R&D spending leads to an increase in productivity, primarily in <strong>the</strong> manufacturing<br />
sector. As a result of this increase, less labor is needed per unit of output. This<br />
in turn lowers unit labor costs, which leads to lower prices. Yet this decrease is not immediately<br />
transferred into higher output and employment. As prices are lowered (or grow at<br />
a less rapid rate), real disposable income of consumers increases at a faster rate.<br />
Consumers can <strong>the</strong>n purchase a larger market basket of goods and services, which in turn<br />
are now available because <strong>the</strong> production possibility frontier has moved outward. Yet <strong>the</strong>se<br />
decisions are not instantaneous and friction-less, as <strong>the</strong>y would be in an oversimplified static<br />
model. We do not see significant effects of increased technology on aggregate demand<br />
until 1980.<br />
Results of Macroeconomic Simulations<br />
Once <strong>the</strong> increase in productive capacity has worked itself into aggregate demand<br />
through <strong>the</strong> mechanisms discussed above, real growth is <strong>the</strong>n fairly steady as can be seen<br />
from Table 6. In particular, we find that real GNP rises near $5 billion per year faster than<br />
would be <strong>the</strong> case under [14] [original placement of Table 6 ] [15] <strong>the</strong> baseline simulation<br />
which does not include increased NASA R&D spending. Thus constant-dollar GNP is $6 billion<br />
higher in 1980, $10 billion in 1981, $14 billion in 1982, $18 billion in 1983, and $23<br />
billion higher in 1984. If we were to continue this simulation far<strong>the</strong>r into <strong>the</strong> future, we<br />
would find that <strong>the</strong> gap between GNP in <strong>the</strong> two simulations would continue to increase at<br />
approximately $5 billion per year—$28 billion in 1985, $33 billion in 1986, and so on.<br />
[Table 6 originally placed here.]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 423<br />
As greater productivity is translated into higher demand, we find that <strong>the</strong> economy<br />
can produce more goods and services with <strong>the</strong> same amount of labor. This has two beneficial<br />
effects. First, unit labor costs decline, hence lowering prices. Second, lower prices<br />
enable consumers to purchase more goods and services with <strong>the</strong>ir income, hence leading<br />
to fur<strong>the</strong>r increases in output and employment.<br />
We find that <strong>the</strong> consumer price index grows at a slower rate with higher NASA R&D<br />
spending than without, and is a full 2% lower by 1984 than would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be <strong>the</strong> case.<br />
Once again, this change does not occur in <strong>the</strong> early years of <strong>the</strong> simulation, but begins to<br />
become important in 1980.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> major effects of <strong>the</strong> higher level of real GNP and aggregate demand is <strong>the</strong><br />
reduction in <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate of 0.4% by 1984. Since <strong>the</strong> labor force will be<br />
approximately 100 million strong by that date, this indicates, as a first approximation, an<br />
increase of 400,000 jobs. However, if we take into account <strong>the</strong> increase in <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong><br />
labor force, <strong>the</strong> total will rise to 0.8 million new jobs. The increase in <strong>the</strong> labor force will<br />
occur for three principal reasons. First, <strong>the</strong> derived demand for labor will be greater<br />
because <strong>the</strong> marginal productivity of labor has increased. Second, <strong>the</strong> [16] supply of labor<br />
will rise because <strong>the</strong> real wage has increased. Third, and probably most important, <strong>the</strong><br />
increase in aggregate demand will reduce <strong>the</strong> amount of hidden unemployment as more<br />
entrants join <strong>the</strong> labor force.<br />
It is also important to note that labor productivity rises substantially as a result of <strong>the</strong><br />
increased NASA R&D spending. The index of labor productivity for <strong>the</strong> private nonfarm
424<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Table 6<br />
Change in Selected Variables With an Increase in NASA R&D Spending of $1 Billion<br />
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984<br />
Gross National Product, Billions of 1958 Dollars<br />
Base 788.1 834.0 869.6 859.8 868.5 922.4 977.7 1012.2 1059.6 1090.8<br />
NASA 790.2 836.5 871.7 862.1 871.7 928.6 988.0 1035.0 1077.4 1114.1<br />
Change 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.3 3.2 6.2 10.3 13.8 17.8 23.3<br />
% Change .3 .3 .2 .3 .4 .7 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.1<br />
Consumer Price Index, 1967 = 100.0<br />
Base 161.1 173.9 188.4 204.9 219.4 232.0 244.2 257.0 270.9 286.5<br />
NASA 161.0 173.8 188.4 204.7 219.0 231.0 242.2 254.0 266.9 280.7<br />
Change -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.8<br />
% Change 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 -2.0<br />
Rate of Inflation, %<br />
Base 9.1 7.9 8.3 8.7 7.1 5.8 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.8<br />
NASA 9.1 7.9 8.3 8.6 7.0 5.5 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.3<br />
Change 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5<br />
Unemployment Rate, %<br />
Base 9.0 8.2 7.4 8.6 9.9 9.2 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.0<br />
NASA 8.9 8.0 7.3 8.5 9.8 9.1 7.7 6.8 6.1 5.6<br />
Change -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4<br />
Employees on Payrolls, Millions<br />
Base 76.9 79.9 82.8 83.3 83.2 85.3 88.1 90.5 92.5 94.3<br />
NASA 77.0 80.0 82.9 83.4 83.3 85.5 88.4 90.9 93.1 95.1<br />
Change 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8<br />
% Change 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8<br />
Index of Industrial Production, Manufacturing Sector, 1967 = 100.0<br />
Base 109.1 120.2 129.6 125.3 122.4 132.6 145.3 154.6 162.2 168.6<br />
NASA 109.9 121.2 130.5 126.3 123.5 134.3 148.1 158.1 166.5 174.0<br />
Change 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.8 3.5 4.3 5.4<br />
% Change 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.2<br />
Index of Labor Productivity, 1967 = 100.0<br />
Base 110.2 112.1 113.3 112.5 115.2 120.1 123.9 126.9 129.9 132.0<br />
NASA 110.3 112.2 113.4 112.7 115.5 120.8 125.1 128.6 132.0 134.7<br />
Change 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.7<br />
% Change 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0<br />
Change in Labor Productivity, %<br />
Base -0.4 1.7 1.1 -0.7 2.4 4.3 3.2 2.4 2.4 1.6<br />
NASA -0.3 1.7 1.1 -0.6 2.7 4.6 3.6 2.7 2.7 2.0<br />
Change 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4<br />
Base = baseline projection with current estimates of NASA R&D spending for next decade.<br />
NASA = an increase of $1 billion in 1958 dollars in NASA R&D spending.<br />
Change = NASA - Base<br />
% Change = NASA - Base Since <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate is already given in percentage terms,<br />
Base we do not calculate this item for unemployment.<br />
sector grows at a rate of 2.75% during <strong>the</strong> 1980–1984 period, compared to an average<br />
annual rise of 2.40% with no increase in spending. By 1984 <strong>the</strong> level of labor productivity<br />
is 2.0% higher than <strong>the</strong> baseline projection.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r details and comparisons are given in Table 6 for a $1 billion increase in NASA<br />
R&D spending. We also calculated alternative runs for $0.5 and $0.1 billion and found<br />
that <strong>the</strong> results were approximately linear for o<strong>the</strong>r levels of spending change of equal or<br />
smaller magnitude. Similarly a decrease in NASA R&D spending of $1 billion would have<br />
reverse effects of <strong>the</strong> same magnitude on economic activity.
Significance of Findings<br />
Significance and Reliability of Findings<br />
One does not need an econometric model to show that an increase in government<br />
spending will raise GNP and lower unemployment. We learned many years ago that it is<br />
easy to spend our way out of a recession if no o<strong>the</strong>r constraints are involved. Yet having<br />
just recently come from <strong>the</strong> realm of double-digit inflation and <strong>the</strong> first postwar decline<br />
in labor productivity, [17] it is clear that alternative policies must be examined not only<br />
from <strong>the</strong> point of view of <strong>the</strong>ir effect on demand and employment but on <strong>the</strong> real growth<br />
rate and <strong>the</strong> rate of inflation as well.<br />
NASA R&D spending increases <strong>the</strong> rate of technological change and reduces <strong>the</strong> rate<br />
of inflation for two reasons. First, in <strong>the</strong> short run, it redistributes demand in <strong>the</strong> direction<br />
of <strong>the</strong> high-technology industries, thus improving aggregate productivity in <strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
As a result, NASA R&D spending tends to be more stabilizing in a recovery period<br />
than general government spending.<br />
Second, in <strong>the</strong> long run, it expands <strong>the</strong> production possibility frontier of <strong>the</strong> economy<br />
by increasing <strong>the</strong> rate of technological progress. This improves labor productivity fur<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
which results in lower unit labor costs and hence lower prices. A slower rate of<br />
inflation leads in turn to a more rapid rise in real disposable income permitting consumers<br />
to purchase <strong>the</strong> additional goods and services being produced and generating<br />
greater employment.<br />
In assessing <strong>the</strong>se results, we once again stress <strong>the</strong> importance of distinguishing<br />
between demand and supply effects. A $1 billion increase in NASA spending will have an<br />
immediate effect on real GNP, raising it approximately $2.1 billion <strong>the</strong> first year and $2.5<br />
billion <strong>the</strong> second year. These demand multiplier effects are not markedly different than<br />
those which would have occurred for a similar increase in o<strong>the</strong>r purchases of goods and<br />
services by <strong>the</strong> government sector or for release of funds to <strong>the</strong> private sector for construction<br />
projects. They are, however, substantially higher than <strong>the</strong> effects which would be<br />
obtained from a $1 billion increase in transfer payments or low-productivity jobs programs.<br />
In particular we have found that <strong>the</strong> demand multiplier is smallest and <strong>the</strong> increase<br />
in inflation is largest for a [18] unit change in transfer payments. When we turn to <strong>the</strong><br />
supply side, however, <strong>the</strong> multiplier effects of lowering prices and increasing real income<br />
are more than twice as large. O<strong>the</strong>r government spending programs which do not expand<br />
<strong>the</strong> production possibility frontier and improve productivity have no additional effect on<br />
<strong>the</strong> economy after <strong>the</strong> initial increase in demand.<br />
Reliability of Findings<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 425<br />
The results found for <strong>the</strong> equation estimating γ are all in agreement with economic<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory, as <strong>the</strong> signs and magnitude of <strong>the</strong> coefficients are within <strong>the</strong> range expected from<br />
a priori expectations. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> statistical results indicate a high degree of correlation<br />
and no bias in <strong>the</strong> regression coefficients, or <strong>the</strong> goodness-of-fit statistics or <strong>the</strong> standard<br />
errors of estimate. In addition, <strong>the</strong> results are in accord with <strong>the</strong> findings of o<strong>the</strong>r econometric<br />
studies. Never<strong>the</strong>less, a number of criticisms have been raised about <strong>the</strong> final equation<br />
for γ, suggesting that <strong>the</strong> results might be significantly different if relatively minor<br />
changes were made to <strong>the</strong> function. These suggested changes focus on three areas; <strong>the</strong><br />
choice of γ C (<strong>the</strong> CEA series) instead of γ D (<strong>the</strong> Denison series), <strong>the</strong> inclusion of <strong>the</strong> Cp<br />
term by itself and in conjunction with ORD, and <strong>the</strong> exclusion of <strong>the</strong> indexes of labor<br />
quality, particularly <strong>the</strong> level of education. To test <strong>the</strong> validity of <strong>the</strong>se suggestions, we calculated<br />
sixty regression equations, including a “least favorable” case which incorporated<br />
all of <strong>the</strong> above changes. The sample period fits are some-what worse, indicating that γ D
426<br />
contains a larger random component than γ C , but <strong>the</strong> coefficient of <strong>the</strong> term for NASA<br />
R&D spending is similar for <strong>the</strong>se regressions. Even <strong>the</strong> “least favorable” case does not<br />
change <strong>the</strong> general conclusions of <strong>the</strong> study concerning ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> rate of return or <strong>the</strong><br />
economic impact of changes in NASA R&D spending.<br />
Document III-5<br />
Document title: Robert D. Shriner, Director of Washington Operations, Chase<br />
Econometrics, to Henry Hertzfeld, NASA, April 15, 1980.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
In 1980, NASA commissioned Chase Econometrics to redo its 1976 study (Document III-4), this time<br />
taking into account changes in <strong>the</strong> overall business cycle and possible statistical errors that might have<br />
accounted for <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> earlier study. In <strong>the</strong> 1980 analysis, Chase found that <strong>the</strong> percentage<br />
of overall R&D for which NASA accounted was so small that <strong>the</strong> quantitative results that showed <strong>the</strong><br />
benefits from NASA R&D were statistically insignificant. The study did not conclude that benefits<br />
did not occur, only that this type of economic tool was not capable of precise measurement, given <strong>the</strong><br />
quality of <strong>the</strong> data available. This is <strong>the</strong> letter that accompanied <strong>the</strong> 1980 report, “The Economic<br />
Impact of NASA R&D Spending, an Update,” by Chase’s David M. Cross under Contract No.<br />
NASW-3345, dated March 1980.<br />
Dr. Henry Hertzfeld<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Room 6133, FOB#6<br />
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546<br />
Dear Henry:<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
April 15, 1980<br />
Chase Econometrics is pleased to transmit herewith 10 copies of <strong>the</strong> final report of<br />
our efforts under Contract NASW-3345 to update <strong>the</strong> 1976 study of <strong>the</strong> economic impact<br />
of NASA R&D spending.<br />
As you are aware, major technical problems were encountered in <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong><br />
study which ultimately led to <strong>the</strong> decision to abandon an attempt to prepare a 10-year<br />
macro simulation because <strong>the</strong> estimates of several variables developed in preliminary work<br />
were judged unstable and unreliable. The problems encountered in trying to replicate <strong>the</strong><br />
prior study with an expanded time series calls into serious question <strong>the</strong> soundness of<br />
results obtainable from this sort of “macro” level approach to <strong>the</strong> estimation of returns to<br />
NASA R&D expenditures. While it is possible that some of <strong>the</strong>se difficulties could be overcome<br />
if more time and effort were devoted to <strong>the</strong> task, <strong>the</strong>re are conceptual simplifications<br />
implicit in <strong>the</strong> aggregate approach that will not disappear with more work. We have<br />
noted <strong>the</strong>se in our report.<br />
Our experience and that of o<strong>the</strong>r investigators in this general area suggests that fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
attention should be focused in <strong>the</strong> future on <strong>the</strong> examination of effects at a more<br />
micro level. Industry case studies (for which much data already exists) and interindustry<br />
studies would be mutually complementary and should provide significant new insights.
David Cross and I will be glad to discuss details of our analysis and conclusions with<br />
you at any time.<br />
Document III-6<br />
Cordially,<br />
[hand-signed “Bob”]<br />
Robert D. Shriner, Ph.D.<br />
Director of Washington Operations<br />
Document title: “Economic Impact and Technological Progress of NASA Research and<br />
Development Expenditures,” Executive Summary, Midwest Research Institute, Kansas<br />
City, Missouri, for <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Public Administration, September 20, 1988,<br />
pp. 1–4.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This Midwest Research Institute study of NASA economic impacts replicated <strong>the</strong> methodology of <strong>the</strong><br />
1971 analysis and calculated a nine-to-one return. Modifications of <strong>the</strong> economic methodology that<br />
had been developed subsequent to 1971 were employed, and <strong>the</strong> results were subjected to sensitivity<br />
analysis. This study was mainly a postscript to earlier studies—it did not add anything significantly<br />
new to <strong>the</strong> previous results, and it met with similar technical criticisms as had <strong>the</strong> prior macroeconomic<br />
analyses performed by Chase in 1976 (Document III-4), and <strong>the</strong> Midwest Research Institute in<br />
1971 (Document III-3). What follows is <strong>the</strong> Executive Summary from Volume I, Executive Report.<br />
Economic Impact and Technological Progress of<br />
NASA Research and Development Expenditures<br />
[1] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 427<br />
“Thirty years ago, <strong>the</strong>re was no satellite communications industry. Today that industry<br />
generates gross annual revenues from sales of services and equipment exceeding $6 billion,<br />
provides an indispensable service to people, businesses, and governments throughout <strong>the</strong><br />
world—and is responsible for returning more each year in tax revenues than <strong>the</strong> entire 30year<br />
NASA investment cost to U.S. taxpayers.<br />
“Perhaps even more significant, although not as obvious, is NASA’s role in driving<br />
technologies which benefit <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy and <strong>the</strong> nation’s security across <strong>the</strong> board.<br />
Requirements posed by NASA programs like Apollo, planetary exploration, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Shuttle have produced miniaturized electronics, power systems and components, automatic<br />
checkout equipment, computers and software, high-volume data processing and<br />
communication, guidance and control systems, high-strength materials—<strong>the</strong> list is virtually<br />
endless. These technologies have transformed American business, spawned hundreds<br />
of new products and services, and made innumerable contributions to national defense.” 1<br />
1. “The Civil Space Program: An Investment in America,” Report, American Institute of Aeronautics<br />
and Astronautics Workshop, Airlie House, Virginia, November 17–18, 1987.
428<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
In 1971 <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration commissioned Midwest<br />
Research Institute (MRI) to conduct a macroeconomic analysis to measure <strong>the</strong> extent of<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefits of NASA R&D expenditures on growth in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy. This research<br />
was augmented with two case studies, synchronous communication satellites and space<br />
crew support systems. The case studies detailed <strong>the</strong> substantive contributions and benefits<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se NASA-related technologies to NASA programs, <strong>the</strong> private sector, and <strong>the</strong><br />
American public in general. The study was well received and was used extensively by NASA<br />
in <strong>the</strong> 1970s to depict its role in U.S. economic growth and technology transfer.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> fall of 1987, NASA commissioned <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Public<br />
Administration (NAPA), with MRI as a subcontractor, to conduct fur<strong>the</strong>r research and to<br />
evaluate NASA contributions in <strong>the</strong> 1948–1986 time frame. The objectives of this latest<br />
study are to:<br />
• Measure <strong>the</strong> impact of technological change on <strong>the</strong> economic growth of <strong>the</strong><br />
nation and characterize NASA’s contribution to <strong>the</strong> growth process.<br />
• Identify linkages between <strong>the</strong> technology generated by selected NASA missions<br />
and <strong>the</strong> broader economic benefits.<br />
• Identify and characterize future benefits of selected NASA programs.<br />
[2] • Identify and characterize <strong>the</strong> economic impact of continued investment in NASA<br />
R&D programs.<br />
This Executive Report presents MRI’s findings and conclusions.<br />
A primary objective of <strong>the</strong> earlier study by MRI was to measure <strong>the</strong> impact of R&D<br />
expenditures on <strong>the</strong> national economy. While R&D expenditures do have a nearly immediate<br />
economic impact through employment and payroll, <strong>the</strong> primary economic effects of<br />
R&D are felt over time. The 1971 study findings indicated that <strong>the</strong> average dollar spent<br />
on R&D returns about $7 in technology-induced economic gain over an 18-year period<br />
following <strong>the</strong> expenditure.<br />
The approach MRI took in <strong>the</strong> 1971 study was based on methodologies developed by<br />
Dr. Robert Solow. 2 Dr. Solow was honored in 1987 with a Nobel Prize for Economics for<br />
his pioneering work in measuring total factor productivity. The approach MRI used,<br />
though relatively new at <strong>the</strong> time, has stood up under critical review in <strong>the</strong> 17-year period<br />
following <strong>the</strong> release of <strong>the</strong> report.<br />
MRI’s current study has been designed to be similar in approach and content to <strong>the</strong><br />
1971 study. The 1988 study primarily uses Dr. Robert Solow’s approach in measuring <strong>the</strong><br />
impact of technology on economic growth, but it incorporates refinements developed by<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r economists in recent years. 3 The 1971 study estimated economic impact during <strong>the</strong><br />
period of 1948 to 1968; <strong>the</strong> 1988 study covers not only <strong>the</strong> original period but extends <strong>the</strong><br />
estimates through 1986. The findings of <strong>the</strong> 1988 study, which incorporate essentially <strong>the</strong><br />
same qualifying assumptions as in 1971, are:<br />
• R&D expenditures have been an excellent national investment.<br />
• On <strong>the</strong> average, each dollar spent on R&D returns about $9 in technologyinduced<br />
economic gain over an 18-year period following <strong>the</strong> expenditure.<br />
2. Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and <strong>the</strong> Aggregate Production Function,” The Review of<br />
Economics and Statistics, August 1957.<br />
3. Edward F. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experience in Nine Western Countries (Washington,<br />
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967); Accounting for U.S. Economic Growth, 1929–1969 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings<br />
Institution, 1974); Accounting for Slower Economic Growth: The United States in <strong>the</strong> 1970s (Washington, D.C.:<br />
Brookings Institution, 1979); and Trends in American Economic Growth, 1929–1982 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings<br />
Institution, 1985). Also, reviews and comments by Drs. Z. Griliches, J. Kendrick, E. Denison, and N. Terleckyj.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 429<br />
• The discounted rate of return ranges from 19 to 35 percent annually (depending<br />
on <strong>the</strong> assumptions made regarding <strong>the</strong> time-lag relationships between an R&D<br />
expenditure and its contribution to productivity growth).<br />
[3] • The $148 billion, in 1982 dollars, spent on NASA R&D during <strong>the</strong> 1960 to 1986<br />
period has returned to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy at least $950 billion through 1986 and<br />
will continue to produce payoff through 2004, at which time <strong>the</strong> total payoff will<br />
be an estimated $1,338 billion.<br />
MRI used <strong>the</strong> payback coefficient of $9 to $1 to measure <strong>the</strong> economic impact of<br />
NASA R&D. The $9 to $1 payback is slightly higher than <strong>the</strong> estimate of $7 found in <strong>the</strong><br />
earlier study. Differences in <strong>the</strong>se results are attributable, for <strong>the</strong> most part, to methodological<br />
refinements developed in <strong>the</strong> 1971 to 1988 time period.<br />
Any economic estimation requires an approach based on certain underlying assumptions.<br />
Critics of <strong>the</strong> production function approach as it is applied to NASA R&D in this<br />
study may have concerns that (1) <strong>the</strong> gains ascribed to <strong>the</strong> stock of technical knowledge<br />
measured by R&D expenditures are overstated and (2) <strong>the</strong>re is no empirical evidence for<br />
<strong>the</strong> assumption that NASA R&D is representative of <strong>the</strong> average of all R&D.<br />
To address <strong>the</strong> first issue, MRI conducted a sensitivity analysis which showed that a<br />
10 to 30 percent overestimation of <strong>the</strong> economic gains attributable to R&D would reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> R&D payback from $9 to a range of $8.50 to $6.50. If, in fact, <strong>the</strong> MRI payback figure<br />
is overestimated even by <strong>the</strong> worst case of 30 percent and <strong>the</strong> coefficient is more in <strong>the</strong><br />
range of 6.5 to 1, <strong>the</strong> $148 billion spent on NASA R&D during <strong>the</strong> 1960 to 1986 period<br />
would return an estimated $966 billion ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> $1,338 billion estimated return<br />
from a 9-to-1 payback. In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, <strong>the</strong> payback from NASA R&D would be substantial.<br />
The second principal assumption in <strong>the</strong> MRI study is that NASA R&D expenditures<br />
have <strong>the</strong> same economic payoff as <strong>the</strong> average of all R&D. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, NASA R&D is<br />
assumed to contribute as much to productivity growth as <strong>the</strong> average of all R&D. To illustrate<br />
and support this assumption, MRI selected two case studies to trace how technology<br />
developed by specific NASA missions has been applied commercially:<br />
• Digital communications—including <strong>the</strong> use of error-correcting codes and data<br />
compression in processing digital signals for modern-day digital communication<br />
and data storage.<br />
• Civil aeronautics performance and efficiency—centering on a series of advances<br />
in aerodynamic drag reduction, advances in propulsion, and advances in night<br />
control technology.<br />
MRI chose <strong>the</strong>se two from a list of over 250 major NASA technologies. Our results from<br />
<strong>the</strong>se two case studies, as well as <strong>the</strong> knowledge we have gained in reviewing <strong>the</strong><br />
250 principal NASA technologies, indicate a very high payback from <strong>the</strong> NASA R&D investment.<br />
In narrowing <strong>the</strong> possibilities to two, MRI visited all of <strong>the</strong> major NASA R&D centers<br />
and reviewed NASA’s research and technology operating plans (RTOPS), NASA’s Tech<br />
Briefs and Spinoffs, and key NASA patents. During <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> project, MRI staff interviewed<br />
over 200 NASA personnel familiar with past and current technological achievements.<br />
[4] The MRI study team chose <strong>the</strong> case studies to be representative of <strong>the</strong> breadth and diversity<br />
of NASA programs. The team sought to include both sides of NASA—aeronautics and<br />
space—and to select two vastly different technologies—incremental vs. leapfrogging<br />
advances—yet with common characteristics from <strong>the</strong> point of view of <strong>the</strong>ir beneficial offspring.<br />
It is clear that without NASA’s mission objective of communicating in deep space, digital<br />
communications would not be as advanced as it is today. “NASA pushed this technology
430<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r than any o<strong>the</strong>r entity.” 4 The work of <strong>the</strong> MRI research team documents that<br />
NASA’s support and extensive R&D funding made possible many comprehensive and<br />
ground-breaking advancements in coding <strong>the</strong>ory. For many years coding was considered<br />
to be an esoteric and impractical approach to communications, yet it provided NASA an<br />
excellent alternative to adding weight, power, and complexity to spacecraft. The case<br />
study of digital communication/error-correcting codes illustrates how a technology<br />
advanced by NASA to meet <strong>the</strong> mission requirements for deep space communications has<br />
spawned a family of high performance and productivity-enhancing electronic devices with<br />
annual sales expected to reach over $17 billion by 1990.<br />
Likewise, NASA’s role in civil aeronautics is a good example of why <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
has a decided edge in <strong>the</strong> world’s commercial aircraft market. Improvements in civil aeronautics<br />
performance and efficiency have spanned some 70 years since <strong>the</strong> early days of <strong>the</strong><br />
National Advisory Committee [for] Aeronautics (NACA). This report summarizes a series<br />
of advances aimed at enhancing <strong>the</strong> performance and efficiency of civil aircraft. The cases<br />
cited are intended to illustrate <strong>the</strong> complex paths by which new knowledge applicable to<br />
<strong>the</strong> design, construction, and operation of modern aircraft comes into being; <strong>the</strong> interactions<br />
between <strong>the</strong> aerospace industry and government centers of research and technology;<br />
<strong>the</strong> numerous evolutionary changes and improvements that are contributed from<br />
many sources; and <strong>the</strong> often prolonged period of time required to validate, demonstrate,<br />
and refine technological advances before <strong>the</strong>y become accepted commercially and widely<br />
used.<br />
As a result of NASA’s continuing R&D in aeronautics, man can fly far<strong>the</strong>r, faster, higher,<br />
and more efficiently and safely than thought possible 20 years ago.<br />
This Executive Report summarizes <strong>the</strong> economic impact of NASA’s research. Part I<br />
explains <strong>the</strong> methodology, findings, and projections of economic benefits resulting from<br />
NASA R&D. Part II presents <strong>the</strong> technology advances and resulting benefits from digital<br />
communications, civil aeronautics performance and efficiency, and seven future technology<br />
areas. . . .<br />
Document III-7<br />
Document title: “NASA Report May Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Research and<br />
Development Spending,” Report of <strong>the</strong> Comptroller General of <strong>the</strong> United States,<br />
PAD-78-18, October 18, 1977, pp. i–iii.<br />
Source: General Accounting <strong>Office</strong> Library, General Accounting <strong>Office</strong>, Washington, D.C.<br />
Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin commissioned <strong>the</strong> Government Accounting <strong>Office</strong><br />
(GAO) to review <strong>the</strong> 1976 Chase study (Document III-4). Because of <strong>the</strong> study’s somewhat unusual<br />
approach to macroeconomic forecasting, <strong>the</strong> GAO was critical of its findings and concluded that case<br />
studies of innovation and benefits were more telling of NASA impacts than overall budget/economy<br />
calculations. During this era, <strong>the</strong>re was a general belief that R&D was an economic investment with<br />
a good payoff to society, but economic models, and particularly macroeconomic models, were not considered<br />
definitive evidence of long-term projected benefits. The following are <strong>the</strong> opening pages of <strong>the</strong><br />
GAO report.<br />
4. Interview with Irving Reed at his office at <strong>the</strong> University of Sou<strong>the</strong>rn California, April 28, 1988.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 431<br />
[i]<br />
NASA Report May Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits<br />
of Research and Development Spending . . .<br />
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) contracted with Chase<br />
Econometrics Associates, Inc., to evaluate how Government research and development<br />
spending, particularly NASA’s, affects <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy.<br />
Chase’s report “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending” concluded that this<br />
spending produced many benefits between 1960 and 1974. The study did not try to evaluate<br />
how effectively NASA carried out its primary objectives, such as space exploration<br />
and satellite communication. NASA cited <strong>the</strong> Chase study in its 1976 appropriations hearings<br />
as evidence of certain beneficial effects of research and development.<br />
The Chase study does not prove convincingly that <strong>the</strong> benefits are as large as stated.<br />
The study is useful as exploratory research, but o<strong>the</strong>r types of studies are necessary to provide<br />
a complete evaluation of NASA research and development.<br />
The most significant conclusion of <strong>the</strong> Chase study is that “. . . a $1 billion sustained<br />
increase in NASA R&D spending will raise real GNP $23 billion by 1984. . . .” Of this estimated<br />
increase, $21 billion would result from improved technology and productivity, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> rest would result from increased Government spending, which stimulates spending in<br />
different parts of <strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
Since similar increases would result from Government spending on o<strong>the</strong>r projects,<br />
such as welfare programs, <strong>the</strong> “multiplier effects” alone do not justify more NASA research<br />
and development spending. For this reason, GAO focused on projected technological<br />
improvement.<br />
[ii] The Chase conclusions are questionable from three points of view:<br />
— The results, even if accepted as accurate, do not provide <strong>the</strong> type of information<br />
needed to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r NASA’s spending should increase or decrease. The<br />
estimates are of average, ra<strong>the</strong>r than incremental, effects. Therefore <strong>the</strong>y do not<br />
show whe<strong>the</strong>r more spending for research and development would result in as<br />
many benefits as before. Within NASA’s budget, <strong>the</strong> most productive or unproductive<br />
projects or types of spending have not been spelled out.<br />
— Even if <strong>the</strong> Chase approach is accepted, <strong>the</strong> techniques used had certain shortcomings.<br />
Plausible and seemingly minor changes in <strong>the</strong> study’s assumptions lead<br />
to major changes in <strong>the</strong> results. Under some of <strong>the</strong>se alternatives, NASA research<br />
and development seemed to have no great effect on productivity. Such sensitivity<br />
to small changes in methodology indicates considerable uncertainty in Chase’s<br />
results.<br />
— Basically, <strong>the</strong> results depend upon statistical correlation between NASA research<br />
and development spending and changes in a measure of gross productivity in <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. economy. No information on specific NASA projects or on <strong>the</strong> adoption of<br />
new techniques by private business is used in <strong>the</strong> study. Because of problems in<br />
measuring total productivity in <strong>the</strong> economy and because o<strong>the</strong>r possible causes of<br />
technological progress were ignored, <strong>the</strong> correlations may not indicate a true<br />
cause-and-effect relationship.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> methodology of a particular study may be questioned, <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
of evaluating NASA’s programs is undiminished. NASA has clearly been an important<br />
source of technical progress in recent years.
432<br />
[iii] RECOMMENDATION TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF NASA<br />
Future evaluation studies should look at specific innovations, <strong>the</strong>ir effect on specific<br />
industries, and <strong>the</strong> process by which NASA expenditures for research and development<br />
improve productivity in <strong>the</strong> economy. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, some of <strong>the</strong> more important innovations,<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> total budget, could be examined, and individual technological<br />
improvements in individual industries, ra<strong>the</strong>r than gross national product figures, could<br />
be studied. GAO believes that such studies would give <strong>the</strong> Congress a more accurate picture<br />
of what taxpayers are getting for <strong>the</strong>ir money.<br />
MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS<br />
Technical studies are frequently presented to <strong>the</strong> Congress in support of agency budgets<br />
and as evidence for or against proposed legislation. When important questions are at<br />
stake, such studies should be subjected to independent examination and appraisal.<br />
AGENCY COMMENTS<br />
In general, NASA as well as Chase Econometrics, Inc., agreed with our assessment of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Chase report. . . .<br />
Document III-8<br />
Document title: Martin D. Robbins, John A. Kelley, and Linda Elliott, “Mission-Oriented<br />
R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology: The Impact of NASA Contributions,” Final<br />
Report, Industrial Economics Division, Denver Research Institute, University of Denver,<br />
Contract NSR 06-004-063, May 1972, pp. iii–iv, 25–39, 59.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> late 1960s and early 1970s, <strong>the</strong> Denver Research Institute supported NASA’s technology<br />
transfer program. This study reported <strong>the</strong> results of interviews with NASA personnel on <strong>the</strong> type and<br />
field of technology on which <strong>the</strong>ir work had an impact. The conclusions that impacts were indirect and<br />
were often due to <strong>the</strong> speed-up of bringing a new technology to <strong>the</strong> market presented a different perspective<br />
to <strong>the</strong> more aggregated national benefits measured by <strong>the</strong> 1971 Midwest Research Institute<br />
study. The following are excerpts of <strong>the</strong> report.<br />
Mission-Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of<br />
Technology: The Impact of NASA Contributions<br />
[iii] MAJOR FINDINGS<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Primary objective of this study was to identify and characterize <strong>the</strong> nature of NASA<br />
contributions to <strong>the</strong> advancement of major developments in several selected fields of technology.<br />
Major developments were identified through interviews with recognized leaders<br />
in each of <strong>the</strong> selected fields while NASA contributions were identified through interviews<br />
with NASA scientists, engineers and administrators and an extensive search of <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
and non-NASA literature.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 433<br />
The major findings of <strong>the</strong> study follow:<br />
1. NASA contributions to <strong>the</strong> advancement of major developments in <strong>the</strong> selected<br />
fields of technology appear to be broader, more complex and more indirect than has been<br />
realized to date. The number of NASA contributions that find direct nonaerospace applications<br />
represent only a small fraction of <strong>the</strong> large number of contributions that advance<br />
<strong>the</strong> state of technology in a field.<br />
2. Ten dominant types of NASA contributions to <strong>the</strong> advancement of major developments<br />
were identified. Individual contributions identified in this study embodied from<br />
one to all ten types. The types include: developing new knowledge; developing new technology;<br />
demonstrating <strong>the</strong> application of new technology for <strong>the</strong> first time; augmenting<br />
existing technology; applying existing technology in a new context; stimulating industry<br />
to acquire or develop new technology; identifying problem areas requiring fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
research; and creating new markets. Certain types of NASA contributions appeared to be<br />
more dominant in some fields of technology than in o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
3. The “significance” of most of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions was to have caused <strong>the</strong> technological<br />
advancement to occur at an earlier time than it would have occurred o<strong>the</strong>rwise.<br />
Significance of NASA contributions varied between fields of technology, with those fields<br />
most closely identified with NASA missions, such as cryogenics and telemetry, having <strong>the</strong><br />
largest proportion of contributions leading to advancements that probably would not<br />
have occurred without <strong>the</strong> NASA contribution.<br />
4. The NASA contributions represented all levels of technology, including major<br />
step-changes in technology, incremental advances in technology, and consolidations of<br />
technology. Contributions that represented incremental or systematic advances in technology<br />
were <strong>the</strong> most frequent type of contribution, followed by contributions that represented<br />
a consolidation of knowledge. Contributions that represented major<br />
step-changes were relatively infrequent. Wide differences in <strong>the</strong>se different classes of contribution<br />
to different fields of technology were found, depending upon <strong>the</strong> existing state<br />
of technology in <strong>the</strong> field and NASA’s mission requirements.<br />
[iv] 5. NASA contributions were found in all stages of developmental activity studied,<br />
with more than one-half finding military or aerospace applications and almost one-quarter<br />
finding commercial applications.<br />
6. When impact was assessed on a linear scale of high, moderate or low, <strong>the</strong> technological<br />
impact of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions was estimated to be moderate-to-high, <strong>the</strong><br />
economic impact to be moderate, <strong>the</strong> scientific impact to be moderate-to-low, and <strong>the</strong><br />
direct social impact to be low, with impact varying widely between different fields. . . .<br />
[25] III. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF NASA CONTRIBUTIONS<br />
Measuring innovative activity is itself a formidable problem which has not been solved<br />
to anyone’s satisfaction. Moving from a measure of this activity to a measure of economic<br />
impact greatly increases <strong>the</strong> problem. Focusing <strong>the</strong> task on measurement of <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
impact of NASA’s technological efforts reduces few problems and adds many. One<br />
recent attempt to measure <strong>the</strong> overall economic impact of technological progress appears<br />
to have met with some success. 1<br />
1. Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity. Part I: Overall Economic Impact of Technological<br />
Progress—Its Measurement. Kansas City, Missouri: Midwest Research Institute, Final Report 7, April 1970–15 April<br />
1971 (NASA Contract NASW-2030).
434<br />
A. Quantitative Assessment<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The measurement process associated with quantifying <strong>the</strong> economic benefits of <strong>the</strong><br />
NASA contributions in this study would require <strong>the</strong> three following steps: (1) identification<br />
of technological advances and NASA contributions; (2) estimation of economic benefits<br />
attributable to <strong>the</strong> advances; and (3) isolation of <strong>the</strong> links between <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions<br />
and <strong>the</strong> advances from among diverse o<strong>the</strong>r contributions. The first step has already been<br />
accomplished for a sizeable [sic] sample of technologies. Measuring <strong>the</strong> benefits of new<br />
technological advances—<strong>the</strong> second step—requires benefit/cost analysis. It is on <strong>the</strong> third<br />
step that <strong>the</strong> most difficult challenges arise. The knowledge and techniques needed to<br />
assess <strong>the</strong> relative economic contribution of one agency in a multi-agency development and<br />
diffusion process appears to be beyond <strong>the</strong> present state of <strong>the</strong> art.<br />
1. Measuring <strong>the</strong> Benefits<br />
During <strong>the</strong> past two decades considerable progress has been made on <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory and<br />
practice of benefit/cost analysis. 2 One pioneering example of <strong>the</strong> research and development<br />
area was Griliches’ study of <strong>the</strong> economic benefits from hybrid corn research, in<br />
which he found <strong>the</strong> return on research investment to be approximately 700 percent. 3 Most<br />
of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions that were identified in this study, however, present more difficult<br />
estimation problems. Perhaps most important, corn is a simple, nearly homogeneous<br />
product, while many of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions have multiple nonaerospace applications.<br />
[26] In this respect a better prototype is A. W. Brown’s study of economic benefits attributable<br />
to <strong>the</strong> development of atomic absorption spectroscopy by <strong>the</strong> Australian<br />
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO). 4 Brown identified<br />
more than a dozen applications for a new and more efficient spectrometer and, to<br />
estimate <strong>the</strong> benefits from <strong>the</strong>se diverse applications, he interviewed some 37 different<br />
user organizations. An equally extensive interview schedule would undoubtedly be necessary<br />
to assess with tolerable precision <strong>the</strong> benefits from a typical NASA contribution. Even<br />
<strong>the</strong>n, many NASA cases would pose special difficulties because <strong>the</strong>y involve know-how and<br />
techniques not directly embodied in hardware, whereas Brown was able to devote his<br />
analysis to a single well-defined instrument.<br />
2. Assessing NASA’s Share of <strong>the</strong> Benefits<br />
More fundamental conceptual problems must be solved in estimating how much of<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefits of an advance one can attribute to a NASA contribution. The crux of <strong>the</strong> matter<br />
is that few technological advances of any importance originate through <strong>the</strong> efforts of<br />
only a single person, group, or organization. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, numerous groups are likely to be at<br />
work on various aspects of <strong>the</strong> technology in a complex interacting way. This process can<br />
be illustrated with a well-known example in <strong>the</strong> field of nuclear physics. The basic experiment<br />
through which Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann discovered nuclear fission in late<br />
1938 had been performed previously by Enrico Fermi in Rome during 1934, by Irene<br />
Joliot-Curie and associates in Paris during 1937 and 1938, and was being prepared by<br />
Philip Abelson at Berkeley when <strong>the</strong> nuclear age dawned. Knowledge flowed freely among<br />
<strong>the</strong> several research teams, influencing hypo<strong>the</strong>ses and experimental design. In this multiple-paths<br />
environment, it seems fair to say that if Hahn and Strassmann had not achieved<br />
2. For a general survey, see Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis (New<br />
York: Wiley, 1958), Chaps. 8–12.<br />
3. Zvi Griliches, “Research Costs and Social Return: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations,” Journal of<br />
Political Economy, October 1958, pp. 419–431.<br />
4. A. W. Brown, “The Economic Benefits to Australia from Atomic Absorption Spectroscopy,” The<br />
Economic Record, June 1969, pp. 158–180.
<strong>the</strong>ir momentous insight when <strong>the</strong>y did, someone else surely would have done so later,<br />
and in all probability not much later. 5 Similar parallelism occurred in <strong>the</strong> experimental<br />
proof that chain reactions were possible and in <strong>the</strong> conception of isotopic separation<br />
methods. For instance, <strong>the</strong> gaseous diffusion process using uranium hexafluoride was outlined<br />
almost simultaneously and independently by George Kistiakowski in <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States and Franz Simon in England.<br />
[27] Examination of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions suggests that, like Hahn and Strassmann,<br />
NASA has typically not been working alone in <strong>the</strong> new fields of technology where it has<br />
made contributions. Instead, <strong>the</strong>re was usually parallel and prior work sponsored by o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
federal government agencies, private firms, universities, and/or research institutes. For<br />
purposes of <strong>the</strong> present study, <strong>the</strong> key methodological question was, how should <strong>the</strong> credit<br />
be divided up among <strong>the</strong> several contributors?<br />
This problem would require <strong>the</strong> use of marginal analysis, supplemented by network<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory. The simplest <strong>the</strong>oretical illustration is <strong>the</strong> case of multiple research groups working<br />
in parallel, but independently, on a problem, with each group having, say, one chance<br />
in twenty of solving <strong>the</strong> problem during any given year’s activity. Given <strong>the</strong>se assumptions,<br />
<strong>the</strong> contribution of an additional equally competent and lucky research group can be evaluated<br />
through straightforward probability analysis. Thus, it can be shown that if four<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>tically identical groups are working in parallel and if a fifth path is added to <strong>the</strong><br />
network, <strong>the</strong> average expected time from start to successful solution is reduced from<br />
5.39 years to 4.42 years. In this case, <strong>the</strong> economic benefits from <strong>the</strong> 0.97 year speedup are<br />
correctly attributable to that fifth group, even though some o<strong>the</strong>r group turns out after<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact to have “won” <strong>the</strong> race, since ex ante a resource-allocating decision-maker could<br />
not have foretold which group would have been lucky enough to find <strong>the</strong> solution first.<br />
To be sure, this illustration grossly oversimplifies reality. The typical real-world case<br />
characteristically involves an extremely complex network. If <strong>the</strong> network for some particular<br />
contribution process could be specified at least approximately, it would be possible to<br />
simulate <strong>the</strong> network on a computer, adding and withdrawing paths, modifying demand<br />
levels and hence resource allocations, etc., to determine how <strong>the</strong> presence or absence of<br />
a contributor like NASA affects <strong>the</strong> rate or character of technological progress. There is<br />
no reason why such an undertaking would not be feasible. Indeed, a group of British economists<br />
did some modest exploratory research in this direction. 6 Still <strong>the</strong> voids in our<br />
knowledge of <strong>the</strong> nodal functions and <strong>the</strong> interaction effects are so great that a major<br />
research effort would be required merely to estimate <strong>the</strong> network relationships for a single,<br />
relatively simple, technological advance. Even <strong>the</strong>n, a high degree of quantitative precision<br />
could not be expected from such a pioneering venture. Such a venture was<br />
obviously beyond <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> study.<br />
[28] B. Subjective Assessment<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 435<br />
Given <strong>the</strong>se difficulties in quantitatively assessing <strong>the</strong> impacts of various contributions<br />
on <strong>the</strong> advancement of a development, two subjective approaches were developed. The<br />
first was a simple subjective assessment of <strong>the</strong> actual and potential impact of each contribution<br />
on a linear scale of high, moderate and low. The second was a case study approach,<br />
describing <strong>the</strong> economic impact of several major technological advances on a particular<br />
development and tracing NASA’s role in helping to bring about those advances. The<br />
scalar approach is described below, while <strong>the</strong> case studies are contained in section IV of<br />
this report.<br />
5. See F. M. Scherer, “Was <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Arms Race Inevitable?” Co-Existence, January 1966, pp. 59–69.<br />
6. I. C. R. Byatt and A. V. Cohen, An Attempt to Quantify <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Scientific Research. London:<br />
United Kingdom Department of Education and Sciences, 1969.
436<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The impact of a NASA contribution on <strong>the</strong> advancement of a major development was<br />
defined as <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>the</strong> contribution had on <strong>the</strong> development itself or on <strong>the</strong> environment<br />
in which <strong>the</strong> development exists. That is, did <strong>the</strong> contribution bring about a positive<br />
change? Four types of impacts were assessed:<br />
• Technological impact. The [e]ffect a contribution has in changing <strong>the</strong> matrix of<br />
products, processes, techniques, methods and materials that make up <strong>the</strong> development.<br />
• Scientific impact. The [e]ffect a contribution has in changing what we know or<br />
how well we understand <strong>the</strong> basic phenomena related to a technological development.<br />
• Economic impact. The [e]ffect a contribution has in changing <strong>the</strong> economics of<br />
<strong>the</strong> development or <strong>the</strong> economics of <strong>the</strong> system in which <strong>the</strong> development is<br />
applied, including <strong>the</strong> availability and cost of <strong>the</strong> technology that makes up <strong>the</strong><br />
development.<br />
• Social impact. The [e]ffect a contribution has in changing <strong>the</strong> immediate social<br />
environment in which <strong>the</strong> development exists. (For <strong>the</strong> purposes of this study<br />
only first-order or primary social impacts were included.)<br />
In interviews, NASA scientists, engineers and administrators were asked to subjectively<br />
assess <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong>ir own contributions and <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions with which<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were most familiar. Using a linear scale of 1 for high, 2 for moderate and 3 for low,<br />
an assessment was made for each contribution in each of <strong>the</strong> above four categories (technological,<br />
scientific, economic and social) for both actual (present) and potential impact.<br />
Each NASA assessment was reviewed by two members of <strong>the</strong> project team. In those cases<br />
where a NASA assessment of <strong>the</strong> impact of a contribution [29] could not be obtained, <strong>the</strong><br />
assessment was made by <strong>the</strong> analyst on <strong>the</strong> project team responsible for that particular<br />
field of technology. These judgements [sic] were, in turn, reviewed by ano<strong>the</strong>r member of<br />
<strong>the</strong> team.<br />
Weighted averages for actual and potential impact were calculated for each field, in<br />
each of <strong>the</strong> four categories. Actual impact represents impact that has already been realized<br />
to date from <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions while potential impact represents <strong>the</strong> total<br />
impact of <strong>the</strong> contributions to be realized. Using potential impact as a measure of total<br />
impact to be realized does not mean to imply that <strong>the</strong> estimated total impact will definitely<br />
occur, since <strong>the</strong>se are estimates of potential that might never be realized. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong><br />
assessment of impact already realized (actual) versus total impact (potential) is an important<br />
concept since it reveals much about <strong>the</strong> time lags experienced in applying NASA technology<br />
to nonaerospace needs.<br />
Impacts of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions, averaged for all twelve fields by category of<br />
impact, are shown in Figure 1. The technological impact of NASA contributions is greatest,<br />
followed by economic impact, scientific impact and social impact.<br />
Technological impact of NASA contributions, by fields of technology, is shown in<br />
Figure 2. The technological impact does not appear to vary too greatly between fields,<br />
with assessments ranging from moderate to moderate to high. NASA contributions had<br />
<strong>the</strong> highest technological impact upon <strong>the</strong> field of telemetry and <strong>the</strong> lowest on integrated<br />
circuits.<br />
The scientific impact of NASA contributions, shown in Figure 3, appears to vary much<br />
more by field of technology, with NASA having a very low impact on some fields such a<br />
machinery and joining, and a moderate impact on o<strong>the</strong>rs such as microwave systems and<br />
internal gas dynamics.<br />
Economic impact assessments, shown in Figure 4, ranged from telemetry with <strong>the</strong><br />
highest potential economic impact of those studied, to energy conversion with <strong>the</strong> lowest<br />
potential impact.
The direct social impact of NASA contributions varies greatly between fields studied,<br />
as shown in Figure 5. For most fields, NASA’s contributions have low social impact. For<br />
some o<strong>the</strong>r fields, however, such as gas dynamics, simulation, and telemetry, <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />
NASA’s contributions approach moderate.<br />
[30]<br />
Impact of NASA Contributions<br />
High<br />
Moderate<br />
Low<br />
Technological<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 437<br />
Economic Scientific Social<br />
Type of Impact<br />
Already Realized<br />
Potential<br />
Figure 1. Impact of NASA Contributions on Major Developments in 12 Selected Fields of Technology
438<br />
[31]<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Telemetry<br />
Cryogenics<br />
Internal Gas Dynamics<br />
Machining and Forming<br />
High-Temperature Metals<br />
Microwave Systems<br />
Energy Conversion<br />
Materials Joining<br />
Simulation<br />
NDT<br />
High-Temperature Ceramics<br />
Integrated Circuits<br />
Twelve Fields Average<br />
Low<br />
Moderate<br />
High<br />
Already Realized<br />
Potential<br />
Figure 2. Technological Impact of NASA Contributions on Major Developments in Selected Fields of Technology
[32]<br />
Microwave Systems<br />
Internal Gas Dynamics<br />
High-Temperature Ceramics<br />
Telemetry<br />
Simulation<br />
Cryogenics<br />
High-Temperature Metals<br />
Energy Conversion<br />
Integrated Circuits<br />
NDT<br />
Materials Joining<br />
Machining and Forming<br />
Twelve Fields Average<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 439<br />
Low<br />
Moderate<br />
Already Realized<br />
Potential<br />
Figure 3. Scientific Impact of NASA Contributions on Major Developments in Selected Fields of Technology<br />
High
440<br />
[33]<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Telemetry<br />
Integrated Circuits<br />
High-Temperature Metals<br />
Internal Gas Dynamics<br />
Microwave Systems<br />
Cryogenics<br />
Machining and Forming<br />
Simulation<br />
NDT<br />
High-Temperature Ceramics<br />
Materials Joining<br />
Energy Conversion<br />
Twelve Fields Average<br />
Low<br />
Moderate<br />
Already Realized<br />
Potential<br />
Figure 4. Economic Impact of NASA Contributions on Major Developments in Selected Fields of Technology<br />
High
[34]<br />
Internal Gas Dynamics<br />
Telemetry<br />
Simulation<br />
Cryogenics<br />
High Temperature Ceramics<br />
NDT<br />
Microwave Systems<br />
Energy Conversion<br />
Machining and Forming<br />
Materials Joining<br />
Integrated Circuits<br />
High-Temperature Metals<br />
Twelve Fields Average<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 441<br />
Low<br />
Moderate<br />
Already Realized<br />
Potential<br />
Figure 5. Social Impact of NASA Contributions on Major Developments in Selected Fields of Technology<br />
High
442<br />
[35] Impact of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions also varies with <strong>the</strong> level of technological change<br />
brought about by <strong>the</strong> contribution. As expected, class I contributions have a greater<br />
impact than class II contributions, and class II contributions have a greater impact than<br />
class III contributions. This was true for each of <strong>the</strong> individual fields as well as for <strong>the</strong><br />
twelve fields combined, as shown in Figure 6.<br />
Taking <strong>the</strong> assessments of actual and potential impact for each field, <strong>the</strong> extent of<br />
impact already realized was determined by calculating <strong>the</strong> ratio of impact felt to date<br />
(actual) to <strong>the</strong> total impact to be realized (potential). For all twelve fields, almost all of <strong>the</strong><br />
total scientific impact of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions has already been realized (90 percent)<br />
as has <strong>the</strong> technological impact (70 percent). This is understandable in light of how <strong>the</strong>se<br />
types of impact are [a]ffected. That is, <strong>the</strong> scientific and technological impact of a contribution<br />
starts to be felt when <strong>the</strong> contribution is still in its early stages of development.<br />
Economic impact on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, is much more dependent on <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong><br />
contributions. The fact that only 30 percent of <strong>the</strong> total economic impact of <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
contributions to <strong>the</strong> 12 fields has been realized to date indicates a lower level of application.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> same way only 30 percent of <strong>the</strong> potential social impact of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions<br />
has been realized to date.<br />
The relationship between <strong>the</strong> economic impact and rate of application was examined<br />
for each of <strong>the</strong> fields, and is shown in Figures 7 and 8.<br />
Data on economic impact already realized for each field was calculated as described<br />
above. Figures on aerospace and commercial applications were calculated from data collected<br />
on each NASA contribution.<br />
Using least squares regression analysis, <strong>the</strong>re appears to be a valid correlation between<br />
economic impact and rate of application. This is as expected, and indicates that even<br />
when a sizeable [sic] proportion of NASA contributions are finding aerospace applications,<br />
<strong>the</strong> percentage of economic impact realized is relatively low. With almost 55 percent<br />
of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions being applied in aerospace, only 30 percent of <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
impact has been realized (Fig. 7). Economic impact realized rises more sharply as NASA<br />
contributions find commercial applications (Fig. 8). However, with less than 25 percent of<br />
<strong>the</strong> contributions being applied commercially, it is not surprising that <strong>the</strong> amount of economic<br />
impact felt to date is only a small proportion of its total potential.<br />
[36] [Figure 6 originally placed here.]<br />
[37] [Figure 7 originally placed here.]<br />
[38] [Figure 8 originally placed here.]<br />
[39] A similar analysis determined that a correlation did not exist between technological<br />
impact and applications rate. This indicates, as stated earlier, that <strong>the</strong> technological impact<br />
of contribution might start to be felt much earlier in <strong>the</strong> life cycle of <strong>the</strong> contribution, during<br />
research or advanced development, and a good part of its total impact is probably<br />
already realized by <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> contribution starts to find widespread application. . . .<br />
[59] V. CONCLUSIONS<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The general conclusions of this study concerning NASA contributions to <strong>the</strong> advancement<br />
of major developments in selected fields of technology include <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
(1) <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions are indirect and varied; (2) <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions become<br />
“embodied” in <strong>the</strong> advanced technology of a field; (3) <strong>the</strong> major effect of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions<br />
was to cause technological advancement to occur earlier than it would have o<strong>the</strong>rwise;<br />
(4) <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions represented all levels of technology, including<br />
step-changes, incremental advances and consolidations; (5) <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions were<br />
in all stages of developmental activity; and (6) <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> NASA contributions<br />
ranged from low to moderate-to-high.
Impact of NASA Combinations<br />
High<br />
Moderate<br />
Low<br />
Class<br />
I<br />
Class<br />
II<br />
Technological<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 443<br />
Class<br />
III<br />
Scientific<br />
Already Realized<br />
Potential<br />
Type of Impact of NASA Contributions<br />
Economic<br />
Figure 6. Impact of NASA Contributions on Major Developments in Twelve Fields of Technology for Different Classes of<br />
Technology<br />
From <strong>the</strong>se conclusions it becomes apparent that, in effect, NASA’s role in advancing<br />
technology has been to create a demand for <strong>the</strong> technology to fill. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, by creating this<br />
demand, NASA apparently aided industry, in several cases, in carrying out <strong>the</strong>ir own development<br />
efforts to fur<strong>the</strong>r advance <strong>the</strong> technology in a field, resulting in new products and<br />
processes.<br />
The impact of NASA contributions appears to be related to those factors which are<br />
inherent in <strong>the</strong> contribution as well as those factors which deal with <strong>the</strong> uses to which <strong>the</strong><br />
contributions are put. If <strong>the</strong> NASA contribution can be thought of as a stimulus and <strong>the</strong><br />
impact as a response, <strong>the</strong>re does not appear to be too great a time lag between <strong>the</strong> stimulus<br />
provided by NASA’s technological efforts which resulted in <strong>the</strong> contributions and <strong>the</strong><br />
response in <strong>the</strong> form of technological and scientific impact brought about by <strong>the</strong>se contributions.<br />
That is, most of <strong>the</strong> technological and scientific impact a contribution is going<br />
to have is felt within a reasonable time after <strong>the</strong> contribution occurs. For <strong>the</strong> identified<br />
contributions, 70 percent of <strong>the</strong> technological impact and 90 percent of <strong>the</strong> scientific<br />
impact has already been realized.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> rate at which <strong>the</strong> economic impact of NASA’s contributions is<br />
felt, appears to be related to <strong>the</strong> rate at which <strong>the</strong> contributions find nonaerospace application.<br />
In many of <strong>the</strong> areas of NASA contributions, industry is ready to take immediate<br />
advantage of <strong>the</strong> technological and scientific stimulus provided, with a resulting economic<br />
impact. In many o<strong>the</strong>r areas, however, a gap apparently exists between <strong>the</strong> NASA stimulus<br />
and <strong>the</strong> ability of industry to respond. In <strong>the</strong>se cases, only a small proportion of <strong>the</strong><br />
potential economic impact inherent in <strong>the</strong> NASA contribution can occur.<br />
The net result is that with only one-quarter of <strong>the</strong> identified NASA contributions<br />
being applied commercially, <strong>the</strong> amount of economic impact felt to date is less than onethird<br />
of its potential total impact. With a greater rate of commercialization, <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
impact of NASA contributions could be expected to rise sharply.<br />
Class<br />
I<br />
Class<br />
II<br />
Class<br />
III<br />
Class<br />
I<br />
Class<br />
II<br />
Class<br />
III
444<br />
Percentage of Economic Impact Already<br />
Realized from NASA Contributions<br />
100<br />
75<br />
50<br />
25<br />
0<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Gas Dynamics<br />
Metals<br />
Microwaves<br />
Ceramics<br />
Energy Conversion<br />
Integrated Circuits<br />
25 50 75 100<br />
Percentage of NASA Contributions with<br />
Military or Aerospace Applications<br />
Figure 7. Relationship Between Economic Impact Already Realized from NASA Contributions and Proportion of Contributions<br />
Finding Military or Aerospace Applications<br />
NDT<br />
Cryogenics<br />
Telemetry<br />
Simulation<br />
Machining<br />
Joining
Percentage of Economic Impact Already<br />
Realized from NASA Contributions<br />
100<br />
75<br />
50<br />
25<br />
0<br />
Metals<br />
Telemetry<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 445<br />
Simulation<br />
Machining<br />
Gas Dynamics<br />
Joining<br />
NDT Microwaves<br />
Ceramics<br />
Energy Conversion<br />
25 50 75 100<br />
Percentage of NASA Contributions with<br />
Commercial Applications<br />
Figure 8. Relationship Between Economic Impact Already Realized From NASA Contributions and Proportion of Contributions<br />
Finding Commercial Applications<br />
Document III-9<br />
Cryogenics<br />
Integrated Circuits<br />
Document title: “Quantifying <strong>the</strong> Benefits to <strong>the</strong> National Economy from Secondary<br />
Applications of NASA Technology—Executive Summary,” NASA CR-2674, Ma<strong>the</strong>matica,<br />
Inc., March 1976.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This study examined four cases of major technologies (cryogenics, gas turbines, integrated circuits,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> NASTRAN computer program) that NASA had advanced during <strong>the</strong> 1960s and showed,<br />
based on economic studies and interviews, that <strong>the</strong>ir benefits could be as high as $6.9 billion over ten<br />
years. Ma<strong>the</strong>matica, Inc., relied on microeconomic consumer surplus <strong>the</strong>ory, which is a more traditional<br />
approach to measuring benefits and more easily understood than production function<br />
approaches. Most of <strong>the</strong> benefits resulted from <strong>the</strong> earlier introduction of <strong>the</strong> specific technology ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> technology itself.
446<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Quantifying <strong>the</strong> Benefits to <strong>the</strong> National Economy<br />
from Secondary Applications of NASA Technology—<br />
Executive Summary<br />
[1] A. INTRODUCTION<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1958 law establishing <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration,<br />
Congress charged NASA with conducting its research activities “so as to contribute . . . to<br />
<strong>the</strong> expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere and space.”<br />
Recognizing that such knowledge, like much of <strong>the</strong> knowledge generated by research,<br />
could also have potential applicability in non-aerospace sectors of <strong>the</strong> economy, Congress<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r directed NASA to “provide for <strong>the</strong> widest practicable and appropriate dissemination<br />
of information concerning its activities and <strong>the</strong> results <strong>the</strong>reof.”<br />
NASA’s success in accomplishing its aerospace objectives is unquestioned. The<br />
achievements of <strong>the</strong> satellite programs, manned space flights, and exploration of <strong>the</strong><br />
moon are dramatic and well-known. Less clear, however, is <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> knowledge<br />
developed in <strong>the</strong> NASA programs has been useful outside its originally intended<br />
aeronautical and space applications. While literally hundreds of instances of nonaerospace<br />
applications, ranging from <strong>the</strong> cardiac pacemaker to gas turbines, have been<br />
cataloged, hardly anything is known of <strong>the</strong> quantitative economic significance of NASA’s<br />
contributions.<br />
The purpose of this study was to develop preliminary estimates of <strong>the</strong> economic benefits<br />
to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy from secondary applications of “NASA technology.” If technology<br />
is defined as <strong>the</strong> body of knowledge [2] concerning how society’s resources can be<br />
combined to yield economic goods and services, <strong>the</strong>n NASA technology represents<br />
NASA’s contribution to this body of technical knowledge. Secondary applications refer to<br />
uses of NASA generated knowledge for purposes o<strong>the</strong>r than those primary missionoriented<br />
ones for which <strong>the</strong> original R&D was done. These applications occur whenever<br />
a non-NASA entity, with or without encouragement from NASA, uses this knowledge in<br />
some economic activity.<br />
B. MEASUREMENT APPROACH<br />
The development of procedures to quantify <strong>the</strong> economic benefits of secondary applications<br />
involved <strong>the</strong> adoption of concepts and tools that are <strong>the</strong>oretically sound and yet<br />
practically useful in dealing with a wide variety of applications of NASA technology. There<br />
are two key foundational elements of <strong>the</strong> approach: one, an understanding of how technological<br />
change generates economic benefits; and two, a determination of <strong>the</strong> role that<br />
NASA can play in <strong>the</strong> process of technological change.<br />
1. The Economic Benefits of Technological Change<br />
In broad terms, <strong>the</strong> economic process involves <strong>the</strong> conversion of society’s stock of<br />
resources into goods and services and <strong>the</strong> sale or exchange of <strong>the</strong>se goods and services in<br />
<strong>the</strong> marketplace. This activity generates economic benefits by allowing people to consume<br />
desired combinations of goods and services. Advancing technology increases <strong>the</strong>se benefits<br />
by allowing society to get more from <strong>the</strong> same stock of resources.<br />
[3] The specific methods for quantifying economic benefits have been <strong>the</strong> subject of<br />
much discussion in <strong>the</strong> economics literature. The most widely accepted principle for evaluating<br />
economic benefits is founded on individuals’ “willingness to pay” to move from a
“less” to a “more” preferred state. What this principle translates into for <strong>the</strong> purposes here<br />
is that <strong>the</strong> benefits of technological change can be measured as <strong>the</strong> cost savings generated<br />
by new or improved production processes plus <strong>the</strong> extra value that consumers attach<br />
to new or improved final products. Therefore, by determining how cost and demand for<br />
various products are affected by specific technological advances, one can estimate <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se advances.<br />
2. The Benefits Due to NASA<br />
The research process by which technological advances are generated typically involves<br />
a complex interaction of various groups and individuals. In solving <strong>the</strong> particular problems<br />
associated with an advance, <strong>the</strong> individual research “actors” build on or combine<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir results with those generated by o<strong>the</strong>rs. As a result, any “credit” for <strong>the</strong> benefits created<br />
by a particular advance should, in a real sense, be shared by <strong>the</strong> various contributors.<br />
The goal here, of course, is to assign a particular share to NASA in some specific cases.<br />
The method for assigning this share is based on <strong>the</strong> premise that NASA R&D led to an earlier<br />
realization [4] of <strong>the</strong> particular technological advances being considered. In o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
words, had NASA not done its R&D—and had its failure to do so not led to changes in<br />
R&D by o<strong>the</strong>rs—<strong>the</strong>se technological advances would indeed have occurred, but at a later<br />
date.<br />
If one accepts this view of technological advance—and it has been proposed and<br />
defended by a number of authors—<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> measurement of benefits attributable to<br />
NASA becomes, at least <strong>the</strong>oretically, a ra<strong>the</strong>r straightforward task. These benefits can be<br />
measured as <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> present value of two benefits streams: one, <strong>the</strong><br />
stream resulting from <strong>the</strong> advance as it has occurred, and two, <strong>the</strong> stream that would have<br />
resulted had NASA not been involved.<br />
In each of <strong>the</strong> specific cases technical experts outside <strong>the</strong> NASA establishment were<br />
questioned about <strong>the</strong> speed-up resulting from NASA’s role. Of course, <strong>the</strong>re was some<br />
variation in <strong>the</strong>ir judgment. In order to allow for <strong>the</strong> inherent uncertainty in this aspect<br />
of <strong>the</strong> study, calculations were made based on alternative assumptions concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
extent to which NASA accelerated <strong>the</strong> time stream of benefits. More specifically, benefits<br />
were calculated based on a minimum, a maximum, and a conservative “probable” speedup<br />
due to NASA.<br />
C. RESULTS OF CASE STUDIES<br />
Before describing <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> analysis, three points are worthy of mention. First,<br />
<strong>the</strong> case studies are by no means [5] a random selection from <strong>the</strong> possible cases which<br />
might have been examined. Cases were deliberately selected where data were available,<br />
where NASA’s role was widely acknowledged, and where benefits were anticipated to be<br />
relatively large. Consequently, until additional experience with more case studies is<br />
acquired, it is not possible to draw inferences regarding <strong>the</strong> total secondary benefits of<br />
NASA’s R&D. Second, because <strong>the</strong> case selection was not random and because of <strong>the</strong> innovative<br />
nature of <strong>the</strong> work, an effort was made to be conservative in <strong>the</strong> calculations. Third,<br />
<strong>the</strong> brief discussion of <strong>the</strong> cases which follows is not sufficient for a full understanding of<br />
<strong>the</strong> qualifications and limitations of <strong>the</strong> analyses. To acquire a more complete comprehension<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se, a careful reading of <strong>the</strong> technical report is required.<br />
1. Cryogenic Multilayer Insulation Materials<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 447<br />
NASA’s role in cryogenic technology is an outgrowth of <strong>the</strong> effort to minimize <strong>the</strong><br />
weight, volume, and evaporative loss of gases used in launch and flight propulsion systems,
448<br />
life support systems, and power generation on board spacecraft. An integral part of this<br />
general concern was <strong>the</strong> design of improved insulation systems. The development of cryogenic<br />
insulation technology has contributed substantially to <strong>the</strong> rapid growth of <strong>the</strong> cryogenics<br />
industry.<br />
In this case study, benefits are calculated as <strong>the</strong> cost savings generated by <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
multilayer insulation instead of <strong>the</strong> next best [6] insulation material (perlite) in <strong>the</strong> transport<br />
of liquid hydrogen, liquid helium, and liquid nitrogen. It should be emphasized that<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r savings arise from <strong>the</strong> use of multilayer insulation with liquid hydrogen, helium, and<br />
nitrogen, insofar as it is used to insulate storage tanks, piping and o<strong>the</strong>r equipment used<br />
in <strong>the</strong> production of <strong>the</strong>se liquid gases.<br />
The two principal sources of measured cost savings due to multilayer insulation are:<br />
reduced boil-off loss during <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> cryogen is transported, and reduced transportation<br />
costs due to <strong>the</strong> lighter weight of multilayer insulated tanks. Benefits were estimated<br />
using an engineering approach to specify <strong>the</strong> relevant technical relationships between<br />
evaporation loss, weight, and insulation characteristics. The “best guess” or “probable”<br />
estimate of benefits is $1,054 million.<br />
2. Integrated Circuits<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Prior to 1960, conventional electronic circuitry was based on <strong>the</strong> assembly of individually<br />
encapsulated circuit components such as transistors, resistors, capacitors, and<br />
diodes. Integrated circuit technology—<strong>the</strong> combination of <strong>the</strong>se circuit functions on an<br />
inseparable, continuous base—provides significant advantages over conventional circuit<br />
technology, particularly in smaller size, lower power consumption, increased speed of<br />
operation, improved reliability, and reduced cost per electronic function. These features<br />
make integrated circuits especially attractive for space applications.<br />
The introduction of integrated circuit technology produced significant changes in all<br />
electronic products, including consumer electronic products, and <strong>the</strong> estimates of <strong>the</strong><br />
total benefits to advancing integrated circuit technology reflect its very widespread applicability.<br />
[7] Based on a simultaneous equation estimation of <strong>the</strong> demand for integrated circuits,<br />
estimates of benefits were derived. The “probable” estimate is $5,080 million.<br />
3. Gas Turbines in Electric Power Generation<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> early 1940’s NASA (<strong>the</strong>n NACA) has been intimately involved in gas turbine<br />
technology, primarily as it relates to improvement of jet engines for military and commercial<br />
aircraft. This basic research has also produced benefits in <strong>the</strong> production of electric<br />
power, as gas turbines have become more widely used as sources of peaking power and<br />
standby capacity.<br />
The use of gas turbines in electric power generation undoubtedly confers may social<br />
benefits; e.g., gas turbines are relatively “clean” from an environmental point of view and<br />
also enhance <strong>the</strong> reliability of power production. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> estimates of benefits<br />
are based only on <strong>the</strong> fuel cost savings in power production produced by improvements<br />
in gas turbine performance. Improvements in gas turbine performance are assumed to<br />
result from advances in turbine technology; gas turbine vintage was used as a proxy for<br />
technology level in <strong>the</strong>se calculations. Using standard regression analysis, <strong>the</strong> relationship<br />
between gas turbine vintage and <strong>the</strong> average cost of fuel consumed in <strong>the</strong> production of<br />
power was estimated; based on this relationship, a “probable” estimate of <strong>the</strong> total fuel<br />
cost savings of $111 million was determined.
[8] 4. NASTRAN<br />
NASTRAN (NASA Structural Analysis) is a general purpose finite element computer<br />
software package for static and dynamic analysis of <strong>the</strong> behavior of elastic structures.<br />
Industrial users are generally product engineers in mechanical or civil engineering applications<br />
such as aircraft and automobile production, bridge construction, or power plant<br />
modeling.<br />
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center developed NASTRAN, through a combination<br />
of in-house and contracted research, over <strong>the</strong> period 1965 to 1970. It represented substantial<br />
improvement over similar extant programs, and was released to public users in<br />
November of 1970.<br />
Because few published data exist regarding <strong>the</strong> extent of use of NASTRAN, estimates<br />
of cost savings from <strong>the</strong> use of NASTRAN were obtained from telephone interviews with<br />
a sample of users. From <strong>the</strong> sample responses <strong>the</strong> “probable” benefits accruing to <strong>the</strong> population<br />
of NASTRAN users were estimated at $701 million.<br />
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS<br />
A summary of <strong>the</strong> “probable” estimates for each case study is presented in Table 1. It<br />
indicates that total benefits due to NASA for <strong>the</strong> four cases studied are probably on <strong>the</strong><br />
order of $7,000 million.<br />
[9] Table 1<br />
Results of Benefits Estimation<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 449<br />
Estimated Probable Probable Benefits<br />
Interval of NASA Acceleration Attributable to NASA<br />
Technology Benefits Estimation (Years) (Millions)<br />
Gas Turbines 1969–1972 1.0 $ 111<br />
Cryogenics 1960–1963 5.0 $1,054<br />
Integrated Circuits 1963–1982 2.0 $5,080<br />
NASTRAN 1971–1984 4.0 $ 701<br />
Total — — $6,946<br />
[10] In interpreting <strong>the</strong> results of this study one should recognize that it is one of <strong>the</strong> first<br />
of its kind ever attempted. The results, while arrived at through careful and rigorous techniques,<br />
are sensitive to data uncertainties and analytical simplifications. Though one must<br />
necessarily view such results with caution, it seems that <strong>the</strong> following general observations<br />
could be safely made:<br />
• Operational methods can be developed for estimating <strong>the</strong> secondary benefits of<br />
mission oriented R&D.<br />
• Secondary benefits attributable to NASA’s R&D programs may be impressively<br />
large. For example, <strong>the</strong> $7,000 million total for <strong>the</strong> four cases studied is more<br />
than twice NASA’s present yearly budget.<br />
• Because secondary benefits may indeed be significant, public decisions concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> allocation of resources to research and development programs should,<br />
where possible, consider such benefits.
450<br />
Document III-10<br />
Document title: “Economic Effects of a Space Station: Preliminary Results,” NASA, June<br />
16, 1983, pp. 1–2, 20–21.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This study, sponsored by <strong>the</strong> NASA Alumni League, reports on only <strong>the</strong> direct and indirect employment<br />
and income that were generated by NASA spending. It came as NASA was seeking White House<br />
approval to initiate a space station program. Although <strong>the</strong> impacts are presented by industry and<br />
state, <strong>the</strong> benefits only represent <strong>the</strong> multiplier effects of <strong>the</strong> spending patterns of NASA. These findings<br />
and similar studies were important in convincing legislators how important NASA’s budget had<br />
become to <strong>the</strong>ir regions. The following text is <strong>the</strong> introduction and conclusions from <strong>the</strong> first draft of<br />
<strong>the</strong> report.<br />
The Economic Effects of a Space Station:<br />
Preliminary Results<br />
[1] 1.0 INTRODUCTION<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
This report discusses <strong>the</strong> economic effects of a manned Space Station. Since <strong>the</strong><br />
major reasons for building a Space Station are not economic, this report will also discuss<br />
some of <strong>the</strong> non-economic benefits to be gained. Some of <strong>the</strong>se benefits include:<br />
• The Space Station will enhance <strong>the</strong> defense posture of <strong>the</strong> United States by<br />
demonstrating an ability to control <strong>the</strong> high ground of space.<br />
• The Space Station will build respect for <strong>the</strong> industrial strength of <strong>the</strong> nation by<br />
proving <strong>the</strong> ability to initiate and maintain large-scale, high technology programs.<br />
• The Space Station program will increase <strong>the</strong> nation’s pride and confidence just as<br />
<strong>the</strong> Shuttle and o<strong>the</strong>r space programs have done.<br />
Since few of <strong>the</strong>se benefits can be quantitatively assessed, it is not feasible at this time<br />
to justify a Space Station on economic grounds alone.<br />
To look at <strong>the</strong> Space Station program from an economic perspective, <strong>the</strong> program is<br />
divided into two major phases: a development phase and an operational phase. During<br />
<strong>the</strong> development phase, cash flows will consist primarily of government expenditures (to<br />
plan, design, construct, test, and deploy <strong>the</strong> Space Station hardware) and <strong>the</strong> resulting<br />
direct and multiplier effects of those expenditures on <strong>the</strong> economy. During <strong>the</strong> operational<br />
phase, <strong>the</strong> direct economic effects will diversify as a variety of government and private<br />
customers begin to use <strong>the</strong> Space Station.<br />
An important point that needs to be stated is <strong>the</strong> level at which a Space Station will<br />
influence <strong>the</strong> economy. During <strong>the</strong> development phase, <strong>the</strong> expenditures will be too small<br />
to notice at a macroeconomic level (e.g., about .25% of <strong>the</strong> Gross National Product).<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> development expenditures will have significant effects for specific industries<br />
and locations. The operational phase should have a major influence on <strong>the</strong> overall economy<br />
as [2] <strong>the</strong> technology spreads throughout all sectors. A Space Station could open <strong>the</strong><br />
door to <strong>the</strong> creation of a whole new industry based on space operations and may provide<br />
<strong>the</strong> stimulus for new and improved consumer products. The projected revenues for commercial<br />
space activities are highly uncertain due to <strong>the</strong> length of time (10–20 years) being<br />
addressed. The most likely near-term effect an operational Space Station will have is <strong>the</strong><br />
reduced cost of performing certain missions in space.
The following sections will discuss <strong>the</strong> cost of building and operating a Space Station,<br />
<strong>the</strong> effect of Space Station expenditures on <strong>the</strong> economy, <strong>the</strong> potential savings on planned<br />
missions, <strong>the</strong> new or improved capabilities that will be provided by a Space Station, <strong>the</strong><br />
influence of new technology on <strong>the</strong> economy, and <strong>the</strong> opportunities for new space industries.<br />
. . .<br />
[20] 8.0 CONCLUSIONS<br />
The acquisition of a Space Station will substantially enhance <strong>the</strong> ability of NASA to<br />
more effectively perform <strong>the</strong> planned space missions of <strong>the</strong> 1990’s and will establish an<br />
exciting capability for <strong>the</strong> post 2000’s that could foster <strong>the</strong> growth of a broad range of<br />
financially attractive space endeavors. The Space Station is a project that is consistent with<br />
existing NASA budget levels and does not conflict with <strong>the</strong> nation’s economic policies of<br />
a balanced budget and reduced Federal deficits. In fact, <strong>the</strong> capabilities offered by <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Station result in cost savings through <strong>the</strong> 1990’s that are approximately equal to <strong>the</strong><br />
cost of <strong>the</strong> project. 4 Larger economic benefits are expected beyond <strong>the</strong> year 2000.<br />
The existence of a Space Station will also stimulate evolving commercial opportunities<br />
in space. It will provide a permanently manned and easily accessible research and<br />
development facility for new space ventures and ensure <strong>the</strong> nation’s leadership in <strong>the</strong><br />
industrial frontiers of space.<br />
The real value of a Space Station, however, extends beyond economic benefits.<br />
The Space Station will also continue <strong>the</strong> unbroken chain of United States advances in<br />
space technology that has existed for 25 years. It will once again demonstrate <strong>the</strong> industrial<br />
prowess and military strength that has made <strong>the</strong> United States a great nation. It will<br />
also enhance <strong>the</strong> confidence and pride <strong>the</strong> people of this country have for <strong>the</strong>ir nation.<br />
[21] REFERENCES . . .<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 451<br />
4. “Space Station Needs, Attributes and Architectural Options Study: Final Report,”<br />
Contract NASW-3680 (eight reports by various authors), 1983.<br />
Document III-11<br />
Document title: “The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program: A Macro and Industrial<br />
Perspective,” prepared for Rockwell International by The WEFA Group, Bala Cynwyd,<br />
Pennsylvania, May 1994, pp. 1–4 (reprinted with permission).<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
To support <strong>the</strong> space station program, Rockwell International commissioned WEFA (which had<br />
merged with Chase) to conduct an analysis of <strong>the</strong> industrial and economic impacts of <strong>the</strong> space station<br />
program expenditures. It did not calculate impacts of new technology, but instead focused on <strong>the</strong><br />
total multiplier impact on jobs and income from NASA. This study was used to develop political support<br />
for <strong>the</strong> space station by illustrating that investments in high-tech industries were beneficial. It did<br />
not analyze impacts if <strong>the</strong> money had been spent elsewhere or if <strong>the</strong>re had been a tax cut of equal proportions.<br />
The following is just <strong>the</strong> report’s executive summary.
452<br />
The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program:<br />
A Macro and Industrial Perspective<br />
[1] Executive Summary<br />
In this study, <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic and industry impacts of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics<br />
and Space Administration Program on <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy are evaluated. In performing<br />
this study, The WEFA Group’s macroeconomic model of <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy and its<br />
Industrial Analysis Service model were utilized. These simulations were generated by<br />
removing NASA expenditures from <strong>the</strong> current baseline projections of economic activity.<br />
The NASA program provides <strong>the</strong> following economic impacts:<br />
• By 1997, an estimated 380,000 jobs in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy are generated by NASA related<br />
activity. Summary Figure 1 depicts how many jobs would be lost in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy<br />
if <strong>the</strong> NASA budget were eliminated beginning in fiscal year 1995. Aerospace,<br />
communications equipment, transportation equipment, industrial machinery, metals,<br />
research and consulting services, and construction jobs are highly dependent upon<br />
NASA. These employment estimates flow from direct sources (government contractors),<br />
indirect sources (<strong>the</strong> contractors’ supplier network), and expenditure related<br />
(feedthrough of employment and income) sources. The direct and indirect employment<br />
totals 217,000, with ano<strong>the</strong>r 163,000 due to <strong>the</strong> multiplier impact on <strong>the</strong> rest of<br />
<strong>the</strong> economy. One important facet of this analysis is that many of <strong>the</strong> industries identified<br />
as likely beneficiaries of NASA programs are <strong>the</strong> industries that are important<br />
to <strong>the</strong> country’s achievement of critical technologies, as identified by <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of Commerce, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Vice President, and <strong>the</strong> Council on Competitiveness.<br />
These technologies include Applied Molecular Biology, Distributed Computing and<br />
Telecommunications, Flexible Manufacturing Electrical Supply and Distribution,<br />
Materials Syn<strong>the</strong>sis and Processing, Microelectronics and Optoelectronics, and<br />
Software. While no one would make an argument that certain industries are sacred, it<br />
is true that <strong>the</strong> types of activities that NASA funds correlate highly with many technologies<br />
that have been identified as key to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy’s future competitiveness.<br />
[Figure 1 originally placed here.]<br />
[2] • An estimated $23.49 billion of real GDP [Gross Domestic Product] (economic<br />
output) in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy is tied to activities at NASA by 1997. Between 1995 and<br />
2000, <strong>the</strong> space program will contribute a cumulative addition of $130 billion to real<br />
GDP. This estimate does not include <strong>the</strong> increase to GDP that might result from technological<br />
innovation. Summary Figure 2 displays <strong>the</strong> loss of real economic output that<br />
would occur if <strong>the</strong> NASA budget were eliminated beginning in fiscal year 1995. The<br />
positive impact on <strong>the</strong> economy is far greater than just federal outlays on NASA. Due<br />
to NASA’s purchases of goods and services, firms increase <strong>the</strong>ir output and employment,<br />
promoting personal income growth. Higher personal income growth causes<br />
consumers to raise <strong>the</strong>ir purchases. Capital investment is stimulated due to its high<br />
sensitivity to output growth. Higher investment leads to a greater accumulation in <strong>the</strong><br />
capital stock, promoting productivity growth and U.S. international competitiveness.<br />
[Figure 2 originally placed here.]<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Diff. From Baseline, Thousands<br />
Figure 1. Establishment Employment NASA Simulation vs. Baseline<br />
Diff. From Baseline, Billions $87<br />
0<br />
-50<br />
-100<br />
-150<br />
-200<br />
-250<br />
-300<br />
-350<br />
-400<br />
0<br />
-5<br />
-10<br />
-15<br />
-20<br />
-25<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 453<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Figure 2. Real GDP: NASA Simulation I vs. Baseline<br />
Note: Calendar Year Basis<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Note: Calendar Year Basis<br />
• If <strong>the</strong> NASA budget were eliminated, <strong>the</strong>re is a loss of economic output, lower employment,<br />
and decreased corporate profits which reduce federal tax receipts. Payments<br />
for unemployment insurance and o<strong>the</strong>r related transfer payments rise, increasing government<br />
expenditures on <strong>the</strong>se programs. The combination of lower tax receipts and<br />
higher transfer payments offsets much of <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> elimination of <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
budget on <strong>the</strong> federal surplus. By 1997, <strong>the</strong> federal budget improves by only $1.60 billion<br />
relative to what it would be if NASA spending of $16.14 billion were not cut.<br />
Summary Figure 3 highlights <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong> improvement in <strong>the</strong> federal budget if<br />
<strong>the</strong> NASA budget were eliminated beginning in fiscal year 1995.
454<br />
[3]<br />
Diff. From Baseline, Billions $<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
1994<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Figure 3: Federal Gov. Surplus: NASA Simulation I vs. Baseline<br />
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Note: Calendar Year Basis<br />
• Additionally, potential technology spinoffs from NASA-derived research would be lost<br />
if NASA programs were eliminated (such as artificial intelligence, advanced robotics,<br />
optical communication, and advanced computers). Because of <strong>the</strong>ir cutting-edge<br />
nature, NASA programs are highly conducive to promoting technology advancements.<br />
This store of technology is an important national resource because it can be<br />
adapted to develop new products and processes.<br />
NASA’s human space flight program provides <strong>the</strong> following economic impacts:<br />
• By 1997, an estimated 179,000 jobs in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy are created by <strong>the</strong> human<br />
space flight program. The composition of <strong>the</strong> job gains are similar to those of <strong>the</strong> total<br />
NASA budget. Many industries identified as likely beneficiaries of <strong>the</strong> human space<br />
flight program are those that have been determined as important to <strong>the</strong> country’s<br />
achievement of critical technologies. Much of <strong>the</strong> research and development efforts<br />
taking place at NASA’s human space flight program are devoted to high-technology<br />
sectors and stimulate employment in <strong>the</strong>se vital sectors of <strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
• An estimated $8.37 billion of real GDP in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy is tied to <strong>the</strong> human space<br />
flight program by 1997. Between 1995 and 2000, <strong>the</strong> human space flight program will<br />
contribute a cumulative addition of $44.4 billion to real GDP. This estimate does not<br />
include <strong>the</strong> increase to GDP that might result from technological innovation. Though<br />
<strong>the</strong> transmission mechanism of federal expenditures on <strong>the</strong> human space flight program<br />
throughout <strong>the</strong> economy is similar to <strong>the</strong> first simulation, <strong>the</strong> impact is lower<br />
due to <strong>the</strong> smaller expenditures. One of <strong>the</strong> most critical benefits for <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy<br />
from NASA’s human space flight program is <strong>the</strong> stimulus it provides to capital<br />
investment. We estimate that by 1997, capital investment is aided by $1.12 billion.<br />
Investment in equipment benefits <strong>the</strong> most and tends to foster productivity growth.<br />
[4] • If <strong>the</strong> human space flight program were eliminated, <strong>the</strong> federal deficit would not<br />
improve as much as <strong>the</strong> expenditure cuts. The combination of lower tax receipts and<br />
higher transfer payments offset much of <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> elimination of federal
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 455<br />
expenditures on <strong>the</strong> human space flight program. By 1997, <strong>the</strong> federal budget<br />
improves by only $0.80 billion relative to what it would be if NASA spending on <strong>the</strong><br />
human space flight program were not cut.<br />
• Potential technology spinoffs would be lost if <strong>the</strong> human space flight program were<br />
eliminated. Much of <strong>the</strong> research in <strong>the</strong> human space flight program is taking place<br />
in artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, optical communication, and advanced<br />
computers. These are all areas that would have clear commercial applications.<br />
NASA’s space station program provides <strong>the</strong> following economic impacts:<br />
• By 1997, an estimated 55,000 jobs in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy are created by <strong>the</strong> space station<br />
program. Many are in high-technology sectors (such as high-tech capital goods,<br />
electronics, telecommunications, and software development). Employment at aerospace,<br />
communications equipment, transportation equipment, and industrial<br />
machinery manufacturers are dependent upon <strong>the</strong> continuation of space station program.<br />
Over <strong>the</strong> next couple of years, spending on <strong>the</strong> space station program will center<br />
on <strong>the</strong> final R&D and on manufacturing. While <strong>the</strong> estimated employment<br />
impacts are smaller than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two simulations, <strong>the</strong> industries most impacted<br />
again show a high correlation with those sectors targeted as critical for national competitiveness.<br />
• An estimated $2.60 billion of real GDP in <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy is tied to <strong>the</strong> space station<br />
program by 1997. Between 1995 and 2000, <strong>the</strong> space station program will contribute<br />
a cumulative addition of $13.8 billion to real GDP. This estimate does not<br />
include <strong>the</strong> increase to GDP that might result from technological innovation. The<br />
transmission mechanism throughout <strong>the</strong> economy of federal expenditures on <strong>the</strong><br />
space station program are similar to <strong>the</strong> first two simulations, but <strong>the</strong> estimated<br />
impact is lower due to smaller expenditures. An important implication of <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
activity associated with <strong>the</strong> space station program is that it promotes proportionally<br />
more towards investment in equipment than ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> total NASA budget or<br />
<strong>the</strong> human space flight program. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> productivity enhancing properties of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se federal expenditures are high.<br />
• If <strong>the</strong> space station program were eliminated, <strong>the</strong> federal deficit would not improve<br />
as much as <strong>the</strong> expenditure cuts. The combination of lower tax receipts and higher<br />
transfer payments offset much of <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> elimination of <strong>the</strong>se federal expenditures.<br />
By 1997, <strong>the</strong> federal budget improves by only $0.26 billion relative to what it<br />
would be if spending on <strong>the</strong> space station program were not cut.<br />
• Potential technology spinoffs would be lost if <strong>the</strong> space station program were eliminated.<br />
Similar to <strong>the</strong> human space flight program, much of <strong>the</strong> research is taking place<br />
in artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, optical communication, and advanced<br />
computers. All of <strong>the</strong>se areas promise a high degree of commercial applications. . . .<br />
Document III-12<br />
Document title: <strong>Office</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Press Secretary, The White House, “The President’s Space<br />
Policy and Commercial Space Initiative to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century,” Fact Sheet, February<br />
11, 1988.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.
456<br />
By 1988, private sector activities in space were beginning to grow rapidly, particularly in <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
satellite and launch vehicle sectors. The Reagan administration issued this presidential<br />
directive, which, for <strong>the</strong> first time, made <strong>the</strong> creation of commercial opportunities in space a major component<br />
of national space policy. It prohibited NASA from operating an expendable launch vehicle program<br />
and encouraged <strong>the</strong> government to purchase commercial launch services. Also, it called for open<br />
private opportunities in space in microgravity, remote sensing, and o<strong>the</strong>r space ventures where <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was <strong>the</strong> potential for commercial operations.<br />
[no page number]<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
For Immediate Release February 11, 1988<br />
The President’s Space Policy and Commercial Space<br />
Initiative to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century<br />
FACT SHEET<br />
The President today announced a comprehensive “Space Policy and Commercial<br />
Space Initiative to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century” intended to assure United States space leadership.<br />
The President’s program has three major components:<br />
• Establishing a long-range goal to expand human presence and activity beyond<br />
Earth orbit into <strong>the</strong> Solar System;<br />
• Creating opportunities for U.S. commerce in space; and<br />
• Continuing our national commitment to a permanently manned Space Station.<br />
The new policy and programs are contained in a National Security Decision Directive<br />
(NSDD) signed by <strong>the</strong> President on January 5, 1988, <strong>the</strong> FY 1989 Budget <strong>the</strong> President will<br />
submit shortly to Congress, and a fifteen point Commercial Space Initiative.<br />
I. EXPANDING HUMAN PRESENCE BEYOND EARTH ORBIT<br />
In <strong>the</strong> recent NSDD, <strong>the</strong> President committed to a goal of expanding human presence<br />
and activity in <strong>the</strong> Solar System. To lay <strong>the</strong> foundation for this goal, <strong>the</strong> President will<br />
be requesting $100 million in his FY 1989 Budget for a major new technology development<br />
program “Project Pathfinder” that will enable a broad range of manned or<br />
unmanned missions beyond <strong>the</strong> Earth’s orbit.<br />
Project Pathfinder will be organized around four major focuses:<br />
— Exploration technology;<br />
— Operations technology;<br />
— Humans-in-space technology; and<br />
— Transfer vehicle technology.<br />
This research effort will give <strong>the</strong> United States know-how in critical areas, such as<br />
humans in <strong>the</strong> space environment, closed loop life support, aero braking, orbital transfer<br />
and maneuvering, cryogenic storage and handling, and large scale space operations, and<br />
provide a base for wise decisions on long term goals and missions.<br />
Additional highlights of <strong>the</strong> NSDD are outlined in Section IV of this fact sheet.
[2] II. CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. COMMERCE IN SPACE<br />
The President is announcing a fifteen point commercial space initiative to seize <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunities for a vigorous U.S. commercial presence in Earth orbit and beyond—in<br />
research and manufacturing. This initiative has three goals:<br />
• Promoting a strong U.S. commercial presence in space;<br />
• Assuring a highway to space; and<br />
• Building a solid technology and talent base.<br />
Promoting a Strong U.S. Commercial Presence in Space<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 457<br />
1. Private Sector Space Facility: The President is announcing an intent for <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Government to lease space as an “anchor tenant” in an orbiting space facility suitable<br />
for research and commercial manufacturing that is financed, constructed, and operated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> private sector. The Administration will solicit proposals from <strong>the</strong> U.S. private<br />
sector for such a facility. Space in this facility will be used and/or subleased by<br />
various Federal agencies with interest in microgravity research.<br />
The Administration’s intent is to award a contract during mid-summer of this year for<br />
such space and related services to be available to <strong>the</strong> Government no later than <strong>the</strong><br />
end of FY 1993.<br />
2. Spacehab: The Administration is committing to make best efforts to launch within <strong>the</strong><br />
Shuttle payload bay, in <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, <strong>the</strong> commercially developed, owned, and managed<br />
Shuttle middeck module: Spacehab. Manifesting requirements will depend on<br />
customer demand.<br />
Spacehab is a pressurized metal cylinder that fits in <strong>the</strong> Shuttle payload bay and connects<br />
to <strong>the</strong> crew compartment through <strong>the</strong> orbiter airlock. Spacehab takes up approximately<br />
one-quarter of <strong>the</strong> payload bay and increases <strong>the</strong> pressurized living and working<br />
space of an orbiter by approximately 1,000 cubic feet or 400 percent in useable research<br />
volume. The facility is intended to be ready for commercial use in mid-1991.<br />
3. Microgravity Research Board: The President will establish, through Executive Order,<br />
a National Microgravity Research Board to assure and coordinate a broader range of<br />
opportunities for research in microgravity conditions.<br />
NASA will chair this board, which will include senior-level representatives from <strong>the</strong><br />
Departments of Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Defense, NIH, and NSF; and<br />
will consult with <strong>the</strong> university and commercial sectors. The board will have <strong>the</strong> following<br />
responsibilities:<br />
• To stimulate research in microgravity environments and its applications to commercial<br />
uses by advising Federal agencies, including NASA, on microgravity priorities,<br />
and consulting with private industry and academia on microgravity<br />
research opportunities;<br />
• To develop policy recommendations to <strong>the</strong> Federal Government on matters relating<br />
to microgravity research, including types of research, government/industry/academic<br />
cooperation, and access to space, including a potential launch<br />
voucher programs;<br />
• [3] To coordinate <strong>the</strong> microgravity programs of Federal agencies by:<br />
— reviewing agency plans for microgravity research and recommending priorities<br />
for <strong>the</strong> use of Federally-owned or leased space on microgravity facilities; and
458<br />
— ensuring that agencies establish merit review processes for evaluating microgravity<br />
research proposals; and<br />
• To promote transfer of federally funded microgravity research to <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
sector in fur<strong>the</strong>rance of Executive Order 12591.<br />
NASA will continue to be responsible for making judgments on <strong>the</strong> safety of experiments<br />
and for making manifesting decisions for manned space flight systems.<br />
4. External Tanks: The Administration is making available for five years <strong>the</strong> expended<br />
external tanks of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle fleet at no cost to all feasible U.S. commercial and nonprofit<br />
endeavors, for uses such as research, storage, or manufacturing in space.<br />
NASA will provide any necessary technical or o<strong>the</strong>r assistance to <strong>the</strong>se endeavors on<br />
a direct cost basis. If private sector demand exceeds supply, NASA may auction <strong>the</strong><br />
external tanks.<br />
5. Privatizing Space Station: NASA, in coordination with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and<br />
Budget, will revise its guidelines on commercialization of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Space Station to<br />
clarify and streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Federal commitment to private sector investment in this<br />
program.<br />
6. Future Privatization: NASA will seek to rely to <strong>the</strong> great-est extent feasible on private<br />
sector design, financing, construction, and operation of future Space Station requirements,<br />
including those currently under study.<br />
7. Remote Sensing: The Administration is encouraging <strong>the</strong> development of commercial<br />
remote sensing systems. As part of this effort, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce, in consultation<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r agencies, is examining potential opportunities for future Federal<br />
procurement of remote sensing data from <strong>the</strong> U.S. commercial sector.<br />
Assuring a Highway to Space<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
8. Reliance on Private Launch Services: Federal agencies will procure existing and<br />
future required expendable launch services directly from <strong>the</strong> private sector to <strong>the</strong><br />
fullest extent feasible.<br />
9. Insurance Relief for Launch Providers: The Administration will take administrative<br />
steps to address <strong>the</strong> insurance concerns of <strong>the</strong> U.S. commercial launch industry,<br />
which currently uses Federal launch ranges. These steps include:<br />
• Limits on Third Party Liability: Consistent with <strong>the</strong> Administration’s tort policy,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Administration will propose to Congress a $200,000 cap on noneconomic<br />
damage awards to individual third parties resulting from commercial launch accidents;<br />
[4] • Limits on Property Damage Liability: The liability of commercial launch operators<br />
for damage to Government property resulting from a commercial launch<br />
accident will be administratively limited to <strong>the</strong> level of insurance required by <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Transportation. If losses to <strong>the</strong> Government exceed this level, <strong>the</strong><br />
Government will waive its right to recover for damages. If losses are less than this<br />
level, <strong>the</strong> Government will waive its right to recover for those damages caused by<br />
Government willful misconduct or reckless disregard.
10. Private Launch Ranges: The Administration will consult with <strong>the</strong> private sector on <strong>the</strong><br />
potential construction of commercial launch range facilities separate from Federal<br />
facilities and <strong>the</strong> use of such facilities by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government.<br />
11. Vouchers for Research Payloads: NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Transportation will<br />
explore providing to research payload owners manifested on <strong>the</strong> Shuttle a one time<br />
launch voucher that can be used to purchase an alternative U.S. commercial launch<br />
service.<br />
Building a Solid Technology and Talent Base<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 459<br />
12. Space Technology Spin-Offs: The President is directing that <strong>the</strong> new Pathfinder program,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Civil Space Technology Initiative, and o<strong>the</strong>r technology programs be conducted<br />
in accordance with <strong>the</strong> following policies:<br />
• Federally funded contractors, universities, and Federal laboratories will retain <strong>the</strong><br />
rights to any patents and technical data, including copyrights, that result from<br />
<strong>the</strong>se programs. The Federal Government will have <strong>the</strong> authority to use this intellectual<br />
property royalty free;<br />
• Proposed technologies and patents available for licensing will be housed in a<br />
Pathfinder/CSTI library within NASA; and<br />
• When contracting for commercial development of Pathfinder, CSTI and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
technology work products, NASA will specify its requirements in a manner that<br />
provides contractors with maximum flexibility to pursue innovative and creative<br />
approaches.<br />
13. Federal Expertise on Loan to American Schools: The President is encouraging<br />
Federal scientists, engineers, and technicians in aerospace and space related careers<br />
to take a sabbatical year to teach in any level of education in <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
14. Education Opportunities: The President is requesting in his FY 1989 Budget expanding<br />
five-fold opportunities for U.S. teachers to visit NASA field centers and related<br />
aerospace and university facilities.<br />
In addition, NASA, NSF, and DOD will contribute materials and classroom experiments<br />
through <strong>the</strong> Department of Education to U.S. schools developing “tech shop”<br />
programs. NASA will encourage corporate participation in this program.<br />
15. Protecting U.S. Critical Technologies: The Administration is requesting that Congress<br />
extend to NASA <strong>the</strong> authority it has given <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense to protect from<br />
wholesale release under <strong>the</strong> Freedom of Information Act those critical national technologies<br />
and systems that are prohibited from export.<br />
[5] III. CONTINUING THE NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE SPACE STATION<br />
In 1984, <strong>the</strong> President directed NASA to develop a permanently manned Space<br />
Station. The President remains committed to achieving this end and is requesting $1 billion<br />
in his FY 1989 Budget for continued development and a three year appropriation<br />
commitment from Congress for $6.1 billion. The Space Station, planned for development<br />
in cooperation with U.S. friends and allies, is intended to be a multi-purpose facility for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nation’s science and applications programs. It will permit such things in space as:<br />
research, observation of <strong>the</strong> solar system, assembly of vehicles or facilities, storage, servic-
460<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
ing of satellites, and basing for future space missions and commercial and entrepreneurial<br />
endeavors in space.<br />
To help ensure a Space Station that is cost effective, <strong>the</strong> President is proposing as part<br />
of his Commercial Space Initiative actions to encourage private sector investment in <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Station, including directing NASA to rely to <strong>the</strong> greatest extent feasible on private<br />
sector design, financing, construction, and operation of future Space Station requirements.<br />
IV. ADDITIONAL HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JANUARY 5, 1988 NSDD<br />
• Space Leadership: Leadership is reiterated as a fundamental national objective in<br />
areas of space activity critical to achieving U.S. national security, scientific, economic<br />
and foreign policy goals.<br />
• Defining Federal Roles and Responsibilities: Government activities are specified in<br />
three separate and distinct sectors: civil, national security, and nongovernmental.<br />
Agency roles and responsibilities are codified and specific goals are established for <strong>the</strong><br />
civil space sector; those for o<strong>the</strong>r sectors are updated.<br />
• Encouraging a Commercial Sector: A separate, nongovernmental or commercial<br />
space sector is recognized and encouraged by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government actions shall<br />
not preclude or deter <strong>the</strong> continuing development of this sector. New guidelines are<br />
established to limit unnecessary Government competition with <strong>the</strong> private sector and<br />
ensure that Federal agencies are reliable customers for commercial space goods and<br />
services.<br />
• The President’s launch policy prohibiting NASA from maintaining an expendable<br />
launch vehicle adjunct to <strong>the</strong> Shuttle, as well as limiting commercial and foreign payloads<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Shuttle to those that are Shuttle-unique or serve national security or foreign<br />
policy purposes, is reaffirmed. In addition, policies endorsing <strong>the</strong> purchase of<br />
commercial launch services by Federal agencies are fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>ned.<br />
• National Security Space Sector: An assured capability for national security missions is<br />
clearly enunciated, and <strong>the</strong> survivability and endurance of critical national security<br />
space functions is stressed.<br />
• Assuring Access to Space: Assured access to space is recognized as a key element of<br />
national space policy. U.S. space transportation systems that provide sufficient<br />
resiliency to allow continued operation, despite failures in any single system, are<br />
emphasized. The mix of space transportation vehicles will be defined to support mission<br />
needs in <strong>the</strong> most cost effective manner.<br />
• Remote Sensing: Policies for Federal “remote sensing” or observation of <strong>the</strong> Earth are<br />
established to encourage <strong>the</strong> development of U.S. commercial systems competitive<br />
with or superior to foreign-operated civil or commercial systems.<br />
Document III-13<br />
Document title: National Space Policy Directive 3, “U.S. Commercial Space Policy<br />
Guidelines,” The White House, February 12, 1991.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.<br />
These Bush administration guidelines expanded on <strong>the</strong> earlier Reagan administration presidential<br />
directive (Document III-12). They explicitly recognized <strong>the</strong> use of space for commercial purposes as an<br />
important element in developing <strong>the</strong> international competitiveness of <strong>the</strong> United States. They detail<br />
many government initiatives that range from a requirement to purchase commercially available space
products and services to <strong>the</strong> avoidance of government regulations that could preclude or deter commercial<br />
space activities. In addition, <strong>the</strong>y direct <strong>the</strong> government to enter into trade negotiations that<br />
encourage market-oriented competition on an international basis.<br />
[no page number]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 461<br />
National Space Policy Directive 3<br />
February 12, 1991<br />
U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines<br />
A fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has been space leadership,<br />
which requires preeminence in key areas of space activity. In an increasingly competitive<br />
international environment, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government encourages <strong>the</strong> commercial use<br />
and exploitation of space technologies and systems for national economic benefit. These<br />
efforts to encourage commercial activities must be consistent with national security and<br />
foreign policy interests; international and domestic legal obligations, including U.S. commitments<br />
to stem missile proliferation; and agency mission requirements.<br />
United States space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: two<br />
U.S. Government sectors—<strong>the</strong> civil and national security—and a nongovernmental commercial<br />
space sector. The commercial space sector includes a broad cross section of potential<br />
providers and users, including both established and new market participants. There<br />
also has been a recent emergence of State government initiatives related to encouraging<br />
commercial space activities. The commercial space sector is comprised of at least five market<br />
areas, each encompassing both Earth- and space-based activities, with varying degrees<br />
of market maturity or potential:<br />
Satellite Communications—<strong>the</strong> private development, manufacture, and operation of<br />
communications satellites and marketing of satellite telecommunications services,<br />
including position location and navigation;<br />
Launch and Vehicle Services—<strong>the</strong> private development, manufacture, and operation<br />
of launch and reentry vehicles, and <strong>the</strong> marketing of space transportation services;<br />
Remote Sensing—<strong>the</strong> private development, manufacture, and operation of remote<br />
sensing satellites and <strong>the</strong> processing and marketing of remote sensing data;<br />
Materials Processing—<strong>the</strong> experimentation with, and production of, organic and<br />
inorganic materials and products utilizing <strong>the</strong> space environment; and<br />
Commercial Infrastructure—<strong>the</strong> private development and provision of space-related<br />
support facilities, capabilities, and services.<br />
In addition, o<strong>the</strong>r market-driven commercial space sector opportunities are emerging.<br />
The U.S. Government encourages private investment in, and broader responsibility<br />
for, space-related activities that can result in products and services that meet <strong>the</strong> needs of<br />
Government and o<strong>the</strong>r customers in a competitive market. As a matter of policy, <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government pursues its commercial space objectives without <strong>the</strong> use of direct Federal subsidies.<br />
A robust commercial space sector has <strong>the</strong> potential to generate new technologies,<br />
products, markets, jobs, and o<strong>the</strong>r economic benefits for <strong>the</strong> Nation, as well as indirect<br />
benefits for national security.
462<br />
Commercial space sector activities are characterized by <strong>the</strong> provision of products and<br />
services such that:<br />
[III-20]— private capital is at risk;<br />
— <strong>the</strong>re are existing, or potential, nongovernmental customers for <strong>the</strong> activity;<br />
— <strong>the</strong> commercial market ultimately determines <strong>the</strong> viability of <strong>the</strong> activity; and<br />
— primary responsibility and management initiative for <strong>the</strong> activity resides with <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector.<br />
Implementing Guidelines<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The following implementing guidelines shall serve to provide <strong>the</strong> U.S. private sector<br />
with a level of stability and predictability in its dealings with agencies of <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Government. The agencies will work separately but cooperatively, as appropriate, to develop<br />
specific measures to implement this strategy. U.S. Government agencies shall, consistent<br />
with national security and foreign policy interests, international and domestic legal<br />
obligations, and agency mission requirements, encourage <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong> U.S. commercial<br />
space sector in accordance with <strong>the</strong> following guidelines:<br />
• U.S. Government agencies shall utilize commercially available space products and services<br />
to <strong>the</strong> fullest extent feasible. This policy of encouraging U.S. Government agencies<br />
to purchase, and <strong>the</strong> private sector to sell, commercial space products and<br />
services has potentially large economic benefits.<br />
— A space product or service is “commercially available” if it is currently offered<br />
commercially, or if it could be supplied commercially in response to a<br />
Government procurement request.<br />
— “Feasible" means that products and services meet mission requirements in a costeffective<br />
manner.<br />
— “Cost-effective” generally means that <strong>the</strong> commercial product or service costs no<br />
more than governmental development or directed procurement where such<br />
Government costs include applicable Government labor and overhead costs, as<br />
well as contractor charges and operations costs.<br />
— However, <strong>the</strong> acquisition of commercial space products and services shall generally<br />
be considered cost effective if <strong>the</strong>y are procured competitively using performance-based<br />
contracting techniques. Such contracting techniques give<br />
contractors <strong>the</strong> freedom and financial incentive to achieve economies of scale by<br />
combining <strong>the</strong>ir Government and commercial work, as well as increased productivity<br />
through innovation.<br />
[III-21]<br />
— U.S. Government agencies shall actively consider, at <strong>the</strong> earliest appropriate time,<br />
<strong>the</strong> feasibility of <strong>the</strong>ir using commercially available products and services in<br />
agency programs and activities.<br />
— U.S. Government agencies shall continue to take appropriate measures to protect<br />
from disclosure any proprietary data which is shared with <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government in<br />
<strong>the</strong> acquisition of commercial space products and services.<br />
• Government agencies shall promote <strong>the</strong> transfer of U.S. Government-developed technology<br />
to <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
— U.S. Government-developed unclassified space technology will be transferred to<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. commercial space sector in as timely a manner as possible and in ways<br />
that protect its commercial value.<br />
— U.S. Government agencies may undertake cooperative research and development<br />
activities with <strong>the</strong> private sector, as well as State and local governments, consistent<br />
with policies and funding, in order to fulfill mission requirements in a manner<br />
which encourages <strong>the</strong> creation of commercial opportunities.
— With respect to technologies generated in <strong>the</strong> performance of Government contracts,<br />
U.S. Government agencies shall obtain only those rights necessary to meet<br />
Government needs and mission requirements, as directed by Executive Order 12591.<br />
• U.S. Government agencies may make unused capacity of space assets, services, and<br />
infrastructure available for commercial space sector use.<br />
— Private sector use of U.S. Government agency space assets, services, and infrastructure<br />
shall be made available on a reimbursable basis consistent with OMB<br />
Circular A-25 or appropriate legislation.<br />
• Government agencies may make available to <strong>the</strong> private sector those assets which have<br />
been determined to be excess to <strong>the</strong> requirements of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government in accordance<br />
with U.S. law and applicable international treaty obligations. Due regard shall<br />
be given to <strong>the</strong> economic impact such transfer may have on <strong>the</strong> commercial space sector,<br />
promoting competition, and <strong>the</strong> long-term public interest.<br />
• The U.S. Government shall avoid regulating domestic space activities in a manner<br />
that precludes or deters commercial space sector activities, except to <strong>the</strong> extent necessary<br />
to meet international and domestic legal obligations, including those of <strong>the</strong><br />
Missile Technology Control Regime.<br />
Document III-14<br />
Document title: “Fact Sheet, National Space Policy,” The White House, National Science<br />
and Technology Council, September 19, 1996.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.<br />
While this addresses a full range of space policy issues, it is also <strong>the</strong> first presidential space policy directive<br />
that directly and specifically details <strong>the</strong> process by which <strong>the</strong> government can stimulate economic and<br />
business activity from space programs. It reflects <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War, <strong>the</strong> shrinking federal discretionary<br />
budget, <strong>the</strong> maturity of some parts of <strong>the</strong> space program, and international competitive pressures.<br />
[1] For Immediate Release September 19, 1996<br />
Introduction<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 463<br />
Fact Sheet<br />
National Space Policy<br />
(1) For over three decades, <strong>the</strong> United States has led <strong>the</strong> world in <strong>the</strong> exploration and use<br />
of outer space. Our achievements in space have inspired a generation of Americans<br />
and people throughout <strong>the</strong> world. We will maintain this leadership role by supporting<br />
a strong, stable and balanced national space program that serves our goals in national<br />
security, foreign policy, economic growth, environmental stewardship and scientific<br />
and technical excellence. Access to and use of space is central for preserving peace<br />
and protecting U.S. national security as well as civil and commercial interests. The<br />
United States will pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national<br />
and international space activities and work with o<strong>the</strong>r nations to ensure <strong>the</strong> continued<br />
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
464<br />
(2) The goals of <strong>the</strong> U.S. space program are to:<br />
(a) Enhance knowledge of <strong>the</strong> Earth, <strong>the</strong> solar system and <strong>the</strong> universe through<br />
human and robotic exploration;<br />
(b) Streng<strong>the</strong>n and maintain <strong>the</strong> national security of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(c) Enhance <strong>the</strong> economic competitiveness, and scientific and technical capabilities<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States;<br />
(d) Encourage State, local and private sector investment in and use of space technologies;<br />
(e) Promote international cooperation to fur<strong>the</strong>r U.S. domestic, national security,<br />
and foreign policies.<br />
(3) The United States is committed to <strong>the</strong> exploration and use of outer space by all<br />
nations for peaceful purposes and for <strong>the</strong> benefit of all humanity. “Peaceful purposes”<br />
allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r goals. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over<br />
outer space or celestial [2] bodies, or any portion <strong>the</strong>reof and rejects any limitations<br />
on <strong>the</strong> fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space. The United<br />
States considers <strong>the</strong> space systems of any nation to be national property with <strong>the</strong> right<br />
of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference<br />
with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights.<br />
(4) The U.S. Government will maintain and coordinate separate national security and<br />
civil space systems where differing needs dictate. All actions undertaken by agencies<br />
and departments in implementing <strong>the</strong> national space policy shall be consistent with<br />
U.S. law, regulations, national security requirements, foreign policy, international<br />
obligations and nonproliferation policy.<br />
(5) The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is <strong>the</strong> principal forum for<br />
resolving issues related to national space policy. As appropriate, <strong>the</strong> NSTC and NSC<br />
will co-chair policy processes.<br />
This policy will be implemented within <strong>the</strong> overall resource and policy guidance provided<br />
by <strong>the</strong> President.<br />
Civil Space Guidelines<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is <strong>the</strong> lead agency for research<br />
and development in civil space activities.<br />
(2) NASA, in coordination with o<strong>the</strong>r departments and agencies as appropriate, will focus<br />
its research and development efforts in: space science to enhance knowledge of <strong>the</strong><br />
solar system, <strong>the</strong> universe, and fundamental natural and physical sciences; Earth<br />
observation to better understand global change and <strong>the</strong> effect of natural and human<br />
influences on <strong>the</strong> environment; human spaceflight to conduct scientific, commercial,<br />
exploration activities; and space technologies and applications to develop new technologies<br />
in support of U.S. Government needs and our economic competitiveness.<br />
(3) To enable <strong>the</strong>se activities, NASA will:<br />
(a) Develop and operate <strong>the</strong> International Space Station to support activities requiring<br />
<strong>the</strong> unique attributes of humans in space and establish a permanent human
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 465<br />
presence in Earth orbit. The International Space Station will support future decisions<br />
on <strong>the</strong> feasibility and desirability of conducting fur<strong>the</strong>r human exploration<br />
activities.<br />
(b) Work with <strong>the</strong> private sector to develop flight demonstrators that will support a<br />
decision by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> decade on development of a next-generation reusable<br />
launch system.<br />
[3] (c) Continue a strong commitment to space science and Earth science programs.<br />
NASA will undertake:<br />
(i) a sustained program to support a robotic presence on <strong>the</strong> surface of Mars by<br />
year 2000 for <strong>the</strong> purposes of scientific research, exploration and technology<br />
development;<br />
(ii) a long-term program, using innovative new technologies, to obtain in-situ measurements<br />
and sample returns from <strong>the</strong> celestial bodies in <strong>the</strong> solar system;<br />
(iii)a long-term program to identify and characterize planetary bodies in orbit<br />
around o<strong>the</strong>r stars;<br />
(iv) a program of long-term observation, research, and analysis of <strong>the</strong> Earth’s<br />
land, oceans, atmosphere and <strong>the</strong>ir interactions, including continual measurements<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Earth Observing System by 1998.<br />
(d) In carrying out <strong>the</strong>se activities, NASA will develop new and innovative space technologies<br />
and smaller more capable spacecraft to improve <strong>the</strong> performance and<br />
lower <strong>the</strong> cost of future space missions.<br />
(4) In <strong>the</strong> conduct of <strong>the</strong>se research and development programs, NASA will:<br />
(a) Ensure safety on all space flight missions involving <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle and <strong>the</strong><br />
International Space Station.<br />
(b) Emphasize flight programs that reduce mission costs and development times by<br />
implementing innovative procurement practices, validating new technologies and<br />
promoting partnerships between government, industry, and academia.<br />
(c) Acquire spacecraft from <strong>the</strong> private sector unless, as determined by <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
Administrator, development requires <strong>the</strong> unique technical capabilities of a NASA<br />
center.<br />
(d) Make use of relevant private sector remote sensing capabilities, data, and information<br />
products and establish a demonstration program to purchase data products<br />
from <strong>the</strong> U.S. private sector.<br />
(e) Use competition and peer review to select scientific investigators.<br />
(f) Seek to privatize or commercialize its space communications operations no later<br />
than 2005.<br />
[4] (g) Examine with DoD, NOAA and o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate federal agencies, <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
of consolidating ground facilities and data communications systems that cannot<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise be provided by <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />
(5) The Department of Commerce (DoC), through <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration (NOAA), has <strong>the</strong> lead responsibility for managing Federal space-based<br />
civil operational Earth observations necessary to meet civil requirements. In this role,<br />
<strong>the</strong> DoC, in coordination with o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate agencies, will:<br />
(a) acquire data, conduct research and analyses, and make required predictions<br />
about <strong>the</strong> Earth’s environment;<br />
(b) consolidate operational U.S. Government civil requirements for data products,<br />
and define and operate Earth observation systems in support of operational monitoring<br />
needs; and<br />
(c) in accordance with current policy and Public Law 102–555 provide for <strong>the</strong> regulation<br />
and licensing of <strong>the</strong> operation of private sector remote sensing systems.
466<br />
(6) The Department of <strong>the</strong> Interior, through <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), will<br />
maintain a national archive of land remote sensing data and o<strong>the</strong>r surface data as<br />
appropriate, making such data available to U.S. Government and o<strong>the</strong>r users.<br />
(7) The Department of Energy will maintain <strong>the</strong> necessary capability to support civil<br />
space missions, including research on space energy technologies and space radiation<br />
effects and safety.<br />
National Security Space Guidelines<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
(1) The United States will conduct those space activities necessary for national security.<br />
These activities will be overseen by <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense and <strong>the</strong> Director of<br />
Central Intelligence (DCI) consistent with <strong>the</strong>ir respective responsibilities as set forth<br />
in <strong>the</strong> National Security Act of 1947, as amended, o<strong>the</strong>r applicable law, and Executive<br />
Order 12333. O<strong>the</strong>r departments and agencies will assist as appropriate.<br />
(2) Improving our ability to support military operations worldwide, monitor and respond<br />
to strategic military threats, and monitor arms control and non-proliferation agreements<br />
and activities are key priorities for national security space activities. The<br />
Secretary of Defense and DCI shall ensure that defense and intelligence space activities<br />
are closely coordinated; that space architectures are integrated to <strong>the</strong> maximum<br />
extent feasible; and will continue to modernize and improve <strong>the</strong>ir respective activities<br />
to collect against, and respond to, changing threats, environments and adversaries.<br />
[5] (3) National security space activities shall contribute to U.S. national security by:<br />
(a) providing support for <strong>the</strong> United States’ inherent right of self-defense and our<br />
defense commitments to allies and friends;<br />
(b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack;<br />
(c) assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space;<br />
(d) countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes;<br />
(e) enhancing operations of U.S. and allied forces;<br />
(f) ensuring our ability to conduct military and intelligence space-related activities;<br />
(g) satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace and crisis as well as<br />
through all levels of conflict;<br />
(h) supporting <strong>the</strong> activities of national policy makers, <strong>the</strong> intelligence community,<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Command Authorities, combatant commanders and <strong>the</strong> military services,<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r federal officials, and continuity of government operations.<br />
(4) Critical capabilities necessary for executing space missions must be assured. This<br />
requirement will be considered and implemented at all stages of architecture and system<br />
planning, development, acquisition, operation, and support.<br />
(5) The Department of Energy, in coordination with DoD, ACDA [<strong>the</strong> Arms Control and<br />
Disarmament Agency] and <strong>the</strong> DCI will carry out research on and development of<br />
technologies needed to effectively verify international agreements to control special<br />
nuclear materials and nuclear weapons.<br />
(6) Defense Space Sector Guidelines:<br />
(a) DoD shall maintain <strong>the</strong> capability to execute <strong>the</strong> mission areas of space support,<br />
force enhancement, space control and force application.<br />
(b) In accordance with Executive Orders and applicable directives, DoD shall protect<br />
critical space-related technologies and mission aspects.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 467<br />
(c) DoD, as launch agent for both <strong>the</strong> defense and intelligence sectors, will maintain<br />
<strong>the</strong> capability to evolve and support those space transportation systems, infrastructure,<br />
and support activities necessary to meet national security requirements.<br />
DoD will be <strong>the</strong> lead agency for improvement and evolution of <strong>the</strong> current<br />
expendable launch vehicle fleet, including appropriate technology development.<br />
[6] (d) DoD will pursue integrated satellite control and continue to enhance <strong>the</strong> robustness<br />
of its satellite control capability. DoD will coordinate with o<strong>the</strong>r departments<br />
and agencies, as appropriate, to foster <strong>the</strong> integration and interoperability of<br />
satellite control for all governmental space activities.<br />
(e) The Secretary of Defense will establish DoD’s specific requirements for military<br />
and national-level intelligence information.<br />
(f) The Secretary of Defense, in concert with <strong>the</strong> DCI, and for <strong>the</strong> purpose of supporting<br />
operational military forces, may propose modifications or augmentations<br />
to intelligence space systems as necessary. The DoD may develop and operate<br />
space systems to support military operations in <strong>the</strong> event that intelligence space<br />
systems cannot provide <strong>the</strong> necessary intelligence support to <strong>the</strong> DoD.<br />
(g) Consistent with treaty obligations, <strong>the</strong> United States will develop, operate and<br />
maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if<br />
directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also<br />
be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary’s<br />
hostile use of space systems and services. The U.S. will maintain and modernize<br />
space surveillance and associated battle management command, control, communications,<br />
computers, and intelligence to effectively detect, track, categorize,<br />
monitor, and characterize threats to U.S. and friendly space systems and contribute<br />
to <strong>the</strong> protection of U.S. military activities.<br />
(h) The United States will pursue a ballistic missile defense program to provide for:<br />
enhanced <strong>the</strong>ater missile defense capability later this decade; a national missile<br />
defense deployment readiness program as a hedge against <strong>the</strong> emergence of a<br />
long-range ballistic missile threat to <strong>the</strong> United States; and an advanced technology<br />
program to provide options for improvements to planned and deployed<br />
defenses.<br />
(7) Intelligence Space Sector Guidelines:<br />
(a) The DCI shall ensure that <strong>the</strong> intelligence space sector provides timely information<br />
and data to support foreign, defense and economic policies; military operations;<br />
diplomatic activities; indications and warning; crisis management; and<br />
treaty verification, and that <strong>the</strong> sector performs research and development related<br />
to <strong>the</strong>se functions.<br />
(b) The DCI shall continue to develop and apply advanced technologies that respond<br />
to changes in <strong>the</strong> threat environment and support national intelligence priorities.<br />
(c) The DCI shall work closely with <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense to improve <strong>the</strong> intelligence<br />
space sector’s ability to support military operations worldwide.<br />
[7] (d) The nature, <strong>the</strong> attributable collected information and <strong>the</strong> operational details of<br />
intelligence space activities will be classified. The DCI shall establish and implement<br />
policies to provide appropriate protection for such data, including provisions<br />
for <strong>the</strong> declassification and release of such information when <strong>the</strong> DCI<br />
deems that protection is no longer required.<br />
(e) Collected information that cannot be attributed to space systems will be classified<br />
according to its content.<br />
(f) These guidelines do not apply to imagery product, <strong>the</strong> protection of which is governed<br />
by Executive Order 12951.
468<br />
(g) Strict security procedures will be maintained to ensure that public discussion of<br />
satellite reconnaissance by Executive Branch personnel and contractors is consistent<br />
with DCI guidance. Executive Branch personnel and contractors should<br />
refrain from acknowledging or releasing information regarding satellite reconnaissance<br />
until a security review has been made.<br />
(h) The following facts are UNCLASSIFIED:<br />
(i) That <strong>the</strong> United States conducts satellite photoreconnaissance for peaceful<br />
purposes, including intelligence collection and monitoring arms control<br />
agreements.<br />
(ii) That satellite photoreconnaissance includes a near real-time capability and is<br />
used to provide defense-related information for indications and warning, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> planning and conduct of military operations.<br />
(iii)That satellite photoreconnaissance is used in <strong>the</strong> collection of mapping,<br />
charting, and geodetic data and such data is provided to authorized federal<br />
agencies.<br />
(iv) That satellite photoreconnaissance is used to collect mapping, charting and<br />
geodetic data to develop global geodetic and cartographic materials to support<br />
defense and o<strong>the</strong>r mapping-related activities.<br />
(v) That satellite photoreconnaissance can be used to collect scientific and environmental<br />
data and data on natural or man-made disasters, and such data<br />
can be disseminated to authorized federal agencies.<br />
(vi) That photoreconnaissance assets can be used to image <strong>the</strong> United States and<br />
its territories and possessions.<br />
(vii) That <strong>the</strong> U.S. conducts overhead signals intelligence collection.<br />
[8] (viii) That <strong>the</strong> U.S. conducts overhead measurement and signature intelligence<br />
collection.<br />
(ix)The existence of <strong>the</strong> National Reconnaissance <strong>Office</strong> (NRO) and <strong>the</strong> identification<br />
and official titles of its senior officials.<br />
All o<strong>the</strong>r details, facts and products of intelligence space activities are subject<br />
to appropriate classification and security controls as determined by <strong>the</strong> DCI.<br />
(i) Changes to <strong>the</strong> space intelligence security policy set forth in <strong>the</strong> national space<br />
policy can be authorized only by <strong>the</strong> President.<br />
Commercial Space Guidelines<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
(1) The fundamental goal of U.S. commercial space policy is to support and enhance U.S.<br />
economic competitiveness in space activities while protecting U.S. national security<br />
and foreign policy interests. Expanding U.S. commercial space activities will generate<br />
economic benefits for <strong>the</strong> Nation and provide <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government with an increasing<br />
range of space goods and services.<br />
(2) U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercially available space goods and services<br />
to <strong>the</strong> fullest extent feasible and shall not conduct activities with commercial<br />
applications that preclude or deter commercial space activities except for reasons of<br />
national security or public safety. A space good or service is “commercially available”<br />
if it is currently offered commercially, or if it could be supplied commercially in<br />
response to a government service procurement request. “Feasible” means that such<br />
goods or services meet mission requirements in a cost-effective manner.<br />
(3) The United States will pursue its commercial space objectives without <strong>the</strong> use of direct<br />
Federal subsidies. Commercial Sector space activities shall be supervised or regulated<br />
only to <strong>the</strong> extent required by law, national security, international obligations and<br />
public safety.
(4) To stimulate private sector investment, ownership, and operation of space assets, <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Government will facilitate stable and predictable U.S. commercial sector access<br />
to appropriate U.S. Government space-related hardware, facilities and data. The U.S.<br />
Government reserves <strong>the</strong> right to use such hardware, facilities and data on a priority<br />
basis to meet national security and critical civil sector requirements. Government<br />
Space Sectors shall:<br />
(a) Enter into appropriate cooperative agreements to encourage and advance private<br />
sector basic research, development, and operations while protecting <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
value of <strong>the</strong> intellectual property developed.<br />
[9] (b) Identify and propose appropriate amendments to or <strong>the</strong> elimination of applicable<br />
portions of United States laws and regulations that unnecessarily impede commercial<br />
space sector activities.<br />
(c) Consistent with national security, provide for <strong>the</strong> timely transfer of governmentdeveloped<br />
space technology to <strong>the</strong> private sector in such a manner as to protect<br />
its commercial value, including retention of technical data rights by <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector.<br />
(d) To <strong>the</strong> extent feasible, pursue innovative methods for procurement of space products<br />
and services.<br />
(5) Free and fair trade in commercial space launch services is a goal of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
In support of this goal, <strong>the</strong> United States will implement, at <strong>the</strong> expiration of current<br />
space launch agreements, a strategy for transitioning from negotiated trade in launch<br />
services towards a trade environment characterized by <strong>the</strong> free and open interaction<br />
of market economies. The U.S. Trade Representative, in coordination with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong><br />
of Science and Technology Policy and <strong>the</strong> National Economic Council, will develop a<br />
strategy to guide this implementation.<br />
(6) Consistent with Executive Order 12046 and applicable statutes, U.S. Government<br />
agencies and departments will ensure that U.S. Government telecommunications<br />
policies support a competitive international environment for space-based telecommunications.<br />
Intersector Guidelines<br />
The following paragraphs identify priority intersector guidance to support major United<br />
States space policy objectives.<br />
(1) International Cooperation<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 469<br />
The United States will pursue and conduct international cooperative space-related<br />
activities that achieve scientific, foreign policy, economic, or national security benefits<br />
for <strong>the</strong> nation. International agreements related to space activities shall be subject to<br />
normal interagency coordination procedures, consistent with applicable laws and<br />
regulations. United States cooperation in international civil space activities will:<br />
(a) Promote equitable cost-sharing and yield benefits to <strong>the</strong> United States by increasing<br />
access to foreign scientific and technological data and expertise and foreign<br />
research and development facilities;<br />
(b) Enhance relations with U.S. allies and Russia while supporting initiatives with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r states of <strong>the</strong> former Soviet Union and emerging spacefaring nations;<br />
(c) Support U.S. technology transfer and nonproliferation objectives;<br />
[10] (d) Create new opportunities for U.S. commercial space activities; and
470<br />
(e) Protect <strong>the</strong> commercial value of intellectual property developed with Federal support<br />
and ensure that technology transfers resulting from cooperation do not<br />
undermine U.S. competitiveness and national security.<br />
(f) In support of <strong>the</strong>se objectives:<br />
(i) NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of State will negotiate changes in <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
legal framework for International Space Station cooperation to include<br />
Russia in <strong>the</strong> program along with <strong>the</strong> United States, Europe, Japan, and<br />
Canada; and<br />
(ii) NASA, in coordination with concerned U.S. Government agencies, will<br />
explore with foreign space agencies and international organizations <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
adoption of international standards for <strong>the</strong> interoperability of civil<br />
research spacecraft communication and control facilities.<br />
(2) Space Transportation<br />
(a) Assuring reliable and affordable access to space through U.S. space transportation<br />
capabilities is fundamental to achieving national space policy goals.<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> United States will:<br />
(i) Balance efforts to modernize existing space transportation capabilities with<br />
<strong>the</strong> need to invest in <strong>the</strong> development of improved future capabilities;<br />
(ii) Maintain a strong transportation capability and technology base to meet<br />
national needs for space transport of personnel and payloads;<br />
(iii)Promote reduction in <strong>the</strong> cost of current space transportation systems while<br />
improving <strong>the</strong>ir reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety;<br />
(iv) Foster technology development and demonstration to support a future decision<br />
on <strong>the</strong> development of next generation reusable space transportation<br />
systems that greatly reduce <strong>the</strong> cost of access to space;<br />
(v) Encourage, to <strong>the</strong> fullest extent feasible, <strong>the</strong> cost-effective use of commercially<br />
provided U.S. products and services that meet mission requirements;<br />
and<br />
(vi) Foster <strong>the</strong> international competitiveness of <strong>the</strong> U.S. commercial space transportation<br />
industry, actively considering commercial needs and [11] factoring<br />
<strong>the</strong>m into decisions on improvements to launch facilities and vehicles.<br />
(b) The Department of Transportation (DoT) is <strong>the</strong> lead agency within <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
government for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space transportation<br />
activities, as set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., and Executive Order 12465.<br />
The U.S. Government encourages and will facilitate U.S. private sector and state<br />
and local government space launch and recovery activities.<br />
(c) All activities related to space transportation undertaken by U.S. agencies and<br />
departments will be consistent with PDD/NSTC-4<br />
(3) Space-based Earth Observation<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
(a) The United States requires a continuing capability for space-based Earth observation<br />
to provide information useful for protecting public health, safety, and<br />
national security. Such a capability contributes to economic growth and stimulates<br />
educational, scientific and technological advancement. The U.S.<br />
Government will:<br />
(i) Continue to develop and operate space-based Earth observing systems, including<br />
satellites, instruments, data management and dissemination activities;<br />
(ii) Continue research and development of advanced space-based Earth observation<br />
technologies to improve <strong>the</strong> quality and reduce <strong>the</strong> costs of Earth observations;
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 471<br />
(iii)Support <strong>the</strong> development of U.S. commercial Earth observation capabilities<br />
by:<br />
– pursuing technology development programs, including partnerships<br />
with industry;<br />
– licensing <strong>the</strong> operation and, as appropriate, <strong>the</strong> export of private Earth<br />
observation systems and technologies, consistent with existing policy;<br />
– providing U.S. Government civil data to commercial firms on a non-discriminatory<br />
basis to foster <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong> “value-added” data enhancement<br />
industry; and<br />
– making use, as appropriate, of relevant private sector capabilities, data,<br />
and information products in implementing this policy.<br />
[12] (iv) Produce and archive long-term environmental data sets.<br />
(b) The U.S. Government will continue to use Earth observation systems to collect<br />
environmental data and provide all U.S. Government civil environmental data<br />
and data products consistent with OMB Circular A-130, applicable statute and<br />
guidelines contained in this directive.<br />
(c) The U. S. Government will seek mutually beneficial cooperation with U.S. commercial<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r national and international Earth observation system developers<br />
and operators, to:<br />
(i) define an integrated global observing strategy for civil applications;<br />
(ii) develop U.S. Government civil Earth observing systems in coordination with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r national and international systems to ensure <strong>the</strong> efficient collection<br />
and dissemination of <strong>the</strong> widest possible set of environmental measurements;<br />
(iii)obtain Earth observation data from non-U.S. sources, and seek to make such<br />
data available to users consistent with OMB Circular A-130, national security<br />
requirements, and commercial sector guidance contained in <strong>the</strong> national<br />
space policy; and<br />
(iv) support, as appropriate, <strong>the</strong> public, non-discriminatory direct read-out of<br />
data from Federal civil systems.<br />
(d) The U.S. Government space sectors will coordinate, and where feasible, seek to<br />
consolidate Earth observation activities to reduce overlaps in development, measurements,<br />
information processing, and archiving where cost-effective and consistent<br />
with U.S. space goals.<br />
(i) In accordance with PDD/NSTC-2, DoC/NOAA, DoD, and NASA shall establish<br />
a single, converged, National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite<br />
System (NPOESS) to satisfy civil and national security requirements.<br />
(ii) NASA, DoC/NOAA, DoD, <strong>the</strong> Intelligence Community, and DoE shall work<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r to identify, develop, demonstrate, and transition advanced technologies<br />
to U.S. Earth observation satellite systems.<br />
(iii)In accordance with PDD/NSTC-3, NASA, DoC/NOAA, and DoI/USGS shall<br />
develop and operate an ongoing program to measure <strong>the</strong> Earth’s land surface<br />
from space and ensure <strong>the</strong> continuity of <strong>the</strong> Landsat-type data set.<br />
[13] (iv) Consistent with national security, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government space sectors shall<br />
continue to identify national security products and services that can contribute<br />
to global change research and civil environmental monitoring, and<br />
seek to make technology, products and services available to civil agencies for<br />
such uses. Both unclassified and, as appropriate, classified data from national<br />
security programs will be provided through established mechanisms.<br />
(4) Nonproliferation, Export Controls, and Technology Transfer<br />
(a) The MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Guidelines are not designed to<br />
impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs
472<br />
as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of<br />
mass destruction. Consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy, <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
will continue to oppose missile programs of proliferation concern, and will exercise<br />
particular restraint in missile-related cooperation. The United States will continue<br />
to retain a strong presumption of denial against exports of complete space<br />
launch vehicles or o<strong>the</strong>r MTCR Category I components.<br />
(b) The United States will maintain its general policy of not supporting <strong>the</strong> development<br />
or acquisition of space launch vehicle systems in non-MTCR states.<br />
(c) For MTCR countries we will not encourage new space launch vehicle programs<br />
which raise questions from a proliferation and economic standpoint. The United<br />
States will, however, consider exports of MTCR-controlled items to MTCR countries.<br />
Additional safeguard measures could also be considered for such exports,<br />
where appropriate. Any exports would remain subject to <strong>the</strong> non-transfer provisions<br />
of <strong>the</strong> INF [International Nuclear Forces] and START treaties.<br />
(d) The United States will work to stem <strong>the</strong> flow of advanced space technology to<br />
unauthorized destinations. Executive departments and agencies will be fully<br />
responsible for protecting against adverse technology transfer in <strong>the</strong> conduct of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir programs.<br />
(e) In entering into space-related technology development and transfer agreements<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r countries, Executive Departments and Agencies will take into consideration<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r such countries practice and encourage free and fair trade in<br />
commercial space activities.<br />
(5) Arms Control<br />
The United States will consider and, as appropriate, formulate policy positions on<br />
arms control and related measures governing activities in space, and will conclude<br />
agreements on such measures only if <strong>the</strong>y are equitable, effectively verifiable, and<br />
enhance <strong>the</strong> security [14] of <strong>the</strong> United States and our allies. The Arms Control and<br />
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is <strong>the</strong> principal agency within <strong>the</strong> Federal government<br />
for arms control matters. ACDA, in coordination with <strong>the</strong> DoD, DCI, State, DoE, and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate Federal agencies, will identify arms control issues and opportunities<br />
related to space activities and examine concepts for measures that support national<br />
security objectives.<br />
(6) Space Nuclear Power<br />
The Department of Energy will maintain <strong>the</strong> necessary capability to support space<br />
missions which may require <strong>the</strong> use of space nuclear power systems. U.S. Government<br />
agency proposals for international cooperation involving space nuclear power systems<br />
are subject to normal interagency review procedures. Space nuclear reactors will not<br />
be used in Earth orbit without specific approval by <strong>the</strong> President or his designee. Such<br />
requests for approval will take into account public safety, economic considerations,<br />
international treaty obligations, and U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.<br />
The <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology Policy, in coordination with <strong>the</strong> NSC staff,<br />
will examine <strong>the</strong> existing approval process, including measures to address possible<br />
commercial use of space nuclear systems<br />
(7) Space Debris<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
(a) The United States will seek to minimize <strong>the</strong> creation of space debris. NASA, <strong>the</strong><br />
Intelligence Community, and <strong>the</strong> DoD, in cooperation with <strong>the</strong> private sector, will
develop design guidelines for future government procurement of spacecraft,<br />
launch vehicles, and services. The design and operation of space tests, experiments<br />
and systems, will minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent<br />
with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.<br />
(b) It is in <strong>the</strong> interest of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government to ensure that space debris minimization<br />
practices are applied by o<strong>the</strong>r spacefaring nations and international organizations.<br />
The U.S. Government will take a leadership role in international fora to<br />
adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization and will cooperate<br />
internationally in <strong>the</strong> exchange of information on debris research and <strong>the</strong> identification<br />
of debris mitigation options.<br />
(8) Government Pricing<br />
The price charged for <strong>the</strong> use of U.S. Government facilities, equipment, and service,<br />
will be based on <strong>the</strong> following principles:<br />
(a) Prices charged to U.S. private sector, state and local government space activities<br />
for <strong>the</strong> use of U.S. Government facilities, equipment, and services will be based<br />
on costs consistent with Federal guidelines, applicable statutes and <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
guidelines contained within <strong>the</strong> policy. The U.S. Government will not seek to<br />
[15] recover design and development costs or investments associated with any<br />
existing facilities or new facilities required to meet U.S. Government needs and<br />
to which <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government retains title.<br />
(b) Consistent with mission requirements, NASA and DoD will seek to use consistent<br />
pricing practices for facilities, equipment, and services.<br />
(c) Tooling, equipment, and residual hardware on hand at <strong>the</strong> completion of U.S.<br />
Government programs will be priced and disposed of on a basis that is in <strong>the</strong> best<br />
overall interest of <strong>the</strong> United States while not precluding or deterring <strong>the</strong> continuing<br />
development of <strong>the</strong> U.S. commercial space sector.<br />
Document III-15<br />
Document title: “Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000: A Market Forecast,” The<br />
Center for Space Policy (CSP), Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1985 (reprinted with<br />
permission).<br />
Source: CSP Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 473<br />
In 1984, <strong>the</strong> Center for Space Policy, a small analytic group, projected a private space market of $60<br />
billion by 2000. This projection was influential in promoting <strong>the</strong> potential of space as a commercial<br />
enterprise and in developing support for <strong>the</strong> space station program. This document is a revision of <strong>the</strong><br />
1984 projection, widely criticized for its optimism. The 1985 revisions are more detailed and reflect<br />
<strong>the</strong> broader range of space commercial markets ra<strong>the</strong>r than point estimates.
474<br />
Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000<br />
A Market Forecast<br />
[1] I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
A. INTRODUCTION<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> most remarkable facts of our industrial society is <strong>the</strong> accelerating rate of<br />
progress. Our scientific knowledge and understanding of <strong>the</strong> universe doubles now in less<br />
than a generation, and we have had more progress in <strong>the</strong> past fifty years than in <strong>the</strong> preceding<br />
millennium in terms of practical impact. It is interesting to note that economists<br />
predict that a substantial percentage of <strong>the</strong> jobs that will exist in <strong>the</strong> year 2010 (i.e.<br />
25 years from now) do not exist now; ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>y will be created by <strong>the</strong> dynamism of new<br />
industries made possible by technologies which are only beginning to emerge from laboratories<br />
today.<br />
Our nation’s brief history in space is an unparalleled example of this trend. While <strong>the</strong><br />
United States had been investigating space and began to develop rudimentary space technologies<br />
after <strong>the</strong> close of World War II, our civilian space programs did not begin in<br />
earnest until <strong>the</strong> creation of NASA in 1958. In a little more than a quarter of a century, we<br />
have come to understand <strong>the</strong> requirements of living and working in space.<br />
Importantly, <strong>the</strong> way we look at <strong>the</strong> heavens is changing. For <strong>the</strong> first two decades,<br />
NASA’s space programs had three primary objectives: <strong>the</strong> advancement of scientific<br />
knowledge about our universe; <strong>the</strong> development of an engineering capability which<br />
enabled us to conduct manned and unmanned operations in space; and <strong>the</strong> pursuit of<br />
heroic feats of exploration reminiscent of those of <strong>the</strong> maritime explorers of centuries<br />
ago. Now, we are beginning to look at space as a place of enterprise. The Administration<br />
and NASA have both come out strongly in support of commercial investment in space,<br />
and have expended considerable amounts of talent in order to understand what <strong>the</strong><br />
Government can do to encourage <strong>the</strong> private sector to invest in a new industrial frontier.<br />
This report focuses on <strong>the</strong> year 2000, and projects <strong>the</strong> commercial revenues for six<br />
space industries: satellite communications, materials processing in space (MPS), remote<br />
sensing, on-orbit services, space transportation, and ground--based support. Revenues are<br />
for U.S. industry only, and are stated in 1985 dollars. The projections do not take into<br />
account revenues accruing to <strong>the</strong> private sector through <strong>the</strong> R&D expenditures of <strong>the</strong> government<br />
(e.g. <strong>the</strong> NASA space station program is not included). However, government<br />
purchases of commercially developed space hardware and products are included (for<br />
example, government purchases of commercial upper stages). High and low scenarios<br />
have been generated for each industry. Under <strong>the</strong> low scenario, extremely conservative<br />
assumptions have been used in defining [2] <strong>the</strong> product or service and its market. Under<br />
<strong>the</strong> high scenarios, more optimistic assumptions have been used.<br />
The satellite communications, MPS and remote sensing markets can be considered<br />
“Applications Markets” in that some aspect of space is critical to <strong>the</strong> provision of service.<br />
Satellite communications and remote sensing profit from <strong>the</strong> vantage point afforded by<br />
space; MPS utilizes o<strong>the</strong>r physical attributes of space (most notably microgravity) to produce<br />
materials which cannot be made on Earth. Space transportation, on-orbit services,<br />
and ground support, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, can be considered “Infrastructure Markets.” They<br />
are not end products in <strong>the</strong>mselves, but are necessary for <strong>the</strong> provision of o<strong>the</strong>r products.
B. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Satellite communications is <strong>the</strong> oldest and most mature commercial space industry.<br />
The three basic types of satellite services that have commercial applications are known as<br />
“fixed satellite service” (FSS), “broadcast satellite service” (BSS) and “mobile satellite service”<br />
(MSS). Total revenues projected for this industry are $8.8 billion under CSP’s low<br />
market scenario, and $15.3 billion under <strong>the</strong> high scenario.<br />
FSS provides a common carrier link for point-to-point and point-to-multipoint transmission.<br />
The primary FSS markets are <strong>the</strong> transmission of voice, video and data. The last<br />
two markets, addressing corporate needs for <strong>the</strong> development of private networks, are<br />
especially expected to grow to a $5.0–6.8 billion level by <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> century.<br />
Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service has had a spotty record in <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, long term market prospects look tremendous for <strong>the</strong> industry (large upfront<br />
capital requirements, and <strong>the</strong> inability of DBS firms to secure affordable programming<br />
have been <strong>the</strong> major obstacles to date). By <strong>the</strong> 1990s, DBS services should be<br />
available; by <strong>the</strong> year 2000, annual revenues could be $2.6–6.6 billion.<br />
Mobile satellite communications services will take advantage of <strong>the</strong> large footprint of<br />
a satellite to make thin-route mobile communications economically feasible. The market<br />
consists of two major segments: limited alphanumeric message services and full voice and<br />
data transmission. Annual revenues are projected to rise to $.8–1.5 billion by <strong>the</strong> year<br />
2000.<br />
CSP anticipates a domestic demand for approximately five new spacecraft per year by<br />
2000. FSS satellites will comprise <strong>the</strong> largest component of market demand for spacecraft.<br />
[3] C. MATERIALS PROCESSING IN SPACE<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 475<br />
Commercial materials processing in space (MPS) will allow U.S. companies to take<br />
advantage of <strong>the</strong> properties of <strong>the</strong> space environment. There will be two general types of<br />
MPS activity: basic materials research, and <strong>the</strong> development and production of new products<br />
or processes that are possible only in space. This study includes only those revenues<br />
accruing from <strong>the</strong> second activity.<br />
Basic economics limits severely <strong>the</strong> number of candidates for space processing to<br />
those which can justify high production costs, which include an estimated transportation<br />
cost of $10,000 per pound. In <strong>the</strong> next fifteen years, only three kinds of materials are likely<br />
to meet this threshold value while also generating sufficient demand to justify production.<br />
These materials include pharmaceuticals, semiconductor crystals, and halide optical<br />
fibers.<br />
There will be significant research in numerous o<strong>the</strong>r materials fields, notably organic<br />
crystals, ceramics, and alloys. The knowledge gained from space research will be applied<br />
to terrestrial production techniques, or demand for products in <strong>the</strong>se fields will be so limited<br />
that individual markets will be small (under $50 million). It must be noted that <strong>the</strong><br />
development of a strong knowledge base is essential for <strong>the</strong> continued growth of commercial<br />
MPS revenues in <strong>the</strong> long term; current projections based on what is now known<br />
will likely prove conservative as <strong>the</strong> rate and quality of space-based materials research<br />
improves.<br />
A key driver in <strong>the</strong> development of MPS markets will be <strong>the</strong> availability of appropriate<br />
research facilities on orbit. Present Shuttle facilities in <strong>the</strong> mid-deck and <strong>the</strong> payload bay<br />
are inadequate, especially for tasks requiring a high level of human interaction. The space<br />
station will alleviate this situation, but will be unavailable to researchers before 1995.<br />
MPS is expected to generate revenues of $2.6 billion to $17.9 billion in <strong>the</strong> year 2000,<br />
based on 6 to 30 products. Most of <strong>the</strong>se revenues will come from pharmaceutical products<br />
($2.0 billion to $14. 9 billion); much of <strong>the</strong> rest will come from gallium arsenide
476<br />
crystal production ($500 million to $1 billion). These crystals will be employed primarily<br />
in defense applications. The balance of MPS products will come from o<strong>the</strong>r semiconductors<br />
($1 billion in <strong>the</strong> high scenario) and halide optical fiber ($100 million to $1 billion).<br />
[4] D. REMOTE SENSING<br />
Remote sensing satellites provide data from space concerning <strong>the</strong> earth’s surface and<br />
atmosphere. To date, satellites have been operated by <strong>the</strong> government as public goods.<br />
The government is still <strong>the</strong> largest user and supplier of Landsat data and services. The<br />
imminent launch of <strong>the</strong> first SPOT satellite, a foreign private system, and <strong>the</strong> current<br />
attempt to shift <strong>the</strong> American Landsat to <strong>the</strong> private sector will alter this situation dramatically.<br />
The success or failure of <strong>the</strong> Landsat transfer will be <strong>the</strong> greatest single factor in <strong>the</strong><br />
development of <strong>the</strong> American remote-sensing industry for <strong>the</strong> rest of this century. Delays<br />
in <strong>the</strong> process have already ensured that an interruption in service lasting at least two years<br />
will follow <strong>the</strong> expected 1987 failure of <strong>the</strong> current operating satellite, Landsat 5. This<br />
data gap could allow <strong>the</strong> SPOT system to preempt opportunities for a future American system.<br />
The development of a “value-added” industry to process satellite data depends heavily<br />
on <strong>the</strong> existence of an American system on orbit. Without access to affordable data during<br />
<strong>the</strong>se formative years, <strong>the</strong> value-added industry cannot get on its feet. The<br />
opportunities for private satellite raw data companies would <strong>the</strong>n be limited severely: <strong>the</strong><br />
demand for raw data will not support a private remote sensing satellite venture.<br />
Total revenues for satellite remote sensing in <strong>the</strong> United States are expected to be<br />
between $500 million and $2.5 billion in <strong>the</strong> year 2000. In our low scenario, <strong>the</strong> only applications<br />
likely to be continued are those which require global coverage (such as <strong>the</strong> global<br />
crop assessment service). All U.S. revenues would be obtained from value-added<br />
services: $380 million is forecast for expenditures by <strong>the</strong> petroleum industry, while <strong>the</strong><br />
remainder will derive from a number of smaller users, including paper and lumber companies,<br />
grain traders, commodity brokers, and some very large agricultural associations.<br />
Federal, state and local governments will continue to use Landsat data, processed by private<br />
contractors, for those surveying purposes where cost-effective alternatives are not<br />
available.<br />
In our high scenario, a private remote sensing satellite is in operation, as well as private<br />
sensors on <strong>the</strong> space station’s polar platform. The American value-added market also<br />
finds sufficient support for continued development. Computer and information technology<br />
improvements, increasing prices for non-renewable resources, and increasing competition<br />
in agricultural and forest-related industries support this development. Of <strong>the</strong> $2.5<br />
billion generated in this scenario, $500 million accrues from raw data sales, while <strong>the</strong><br />
remaining $2.0 billion are derived from value-added [5] services. Of <strong>the</strong> total revenues,<br />
$1 billion derives from non-renewable resource industries, $1.35 billion from renewable<br />
resource industries, and $150 million from o<strong>the</strong>r sources.<br />
E. ON-ORBIT SERVICES<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A large market opportunity will materialize in <strong>the</strong> coming years for companies providing<br />
on-orbit workspace and servicing. Several companies currently offer forerunners of<br />
<strong>the</strong> on-orbit hardware that can be expected to serve <strong>the</strong> MPS industry at <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong><br />
century, and NASA is developing servicing concepts and hardware that should be applicable<br />
to commercial use. Total yearly industry revenues are projected at $.6–2.8 billion.<br />
Commercial workspace will be <strong>the</strong> location for all commercial production activities<br />
(R&D is assumed to take place aboard <strong>the</strong> NASA space station). Free flyers and Man-
Tended Facilities (MTFs) each offer specific technical advantages, depending upon <strong>the</strong><br />
complexity of <strong>the</strong> process. Using <strong>the</strong> MPS market scenarios, requirements for on-orbit<br />
workspace were derived. Under <strong>the</strong> low scenario, five free flying platforms and two MTFs<br />
satisfy commercial demand; under <strong>the</strong> high scenario, <strong>the</strong>se numbers climb to nineteen<br />
free flyers and twelve MTFs. The annual revenues earned by <strong>the</strong>se facilities should be<br />
$.6–2.5 billion per year.<br />
Satellite servicing revenues are comprised of commercial OMV [Orbital Maneuvering<br />
Vehicle] servicings of free flyers (MTFs must be serviced by <strong>the</strong> Shuttle; <strong>the</strong>se revenues are<br />
included under <strong>the</strong> section on space transportation). Under <strong>the</strong> low scenario, no commercial<br />
OMV operations are predicted; hence <strong>the</strong>re are no commercial revenues. Under <strong>the</strong><br />
high scenario, seventy annual servicing missions generate revenues of almost $.3 billion.<br />
F. SPACE TRANSPORTATION<br />
Space transportation systems (STS) are required to support all space activities:<br />
launching payloads into <strong>the</strong>ir operational orbits, retrieving payloads and returning <strong>the</strong>m<br />
to Earth, and performance of experiments and manufacturing activities on orbit. For <strong>the</strong><br />
remainder of <strong>the</strong> century, <strong>the</strong> majority of space transportation requirements will focus on<br />
three orbital destinations: Low Earth Orbit (LEO—Shuttle “parking orbit”), geostationary<br />
orbit (GEO), and LEO polar orbits.<br />
The space transportation systems available in <strong>the</strong> Western world to reach <strong>the</strong>se orbits<br />
are <strong>the</strong> U.S. Space Shuttle, Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs—which include Europe’s<br />
Ariane launch vehicle) and upper stages for use in conjunction with <strong>the</strong> Shuttle and ELVs.<br />
[6] In <strong>the</strong> low scenario, CSP assumes that <strong>the</strong> STS remains a government-owned and managed<br />
system, and hence no revenues accrue to commercial entities. Total demand of<br />
12.8 STS equivalent launches in <strong>the</strong> year 2000 provides no “overflow” demand for <strong>the</strong> ELV<br />
industry and thus <strong>the</strong>re is no inclusion of commercial ELV revenues. Upper stages are <strong>the</strong><br />
only source of commercial revenues in <strong>the</strong> low scenario. Total revenues are expected to<br />
top $.2 billion.<br />
The high scenario assumes a fleet of five Shuttle orbiters (each operating at six<br />
flights annually), with two operated by commercial entities to service man-tended facilities<br />
in LEO. The cost of an orbiter to <strong>the</strong> operator is a straight--line depreciation of <strong>the</strong><br />
$1.7B purchase cost (in $1982) over 100 flights. An average of capital costs over remaining<br />
flights plus a gross margin of 30 percent brings <strong>the</strong> launch price to $76.2M. The strong<br />
demand for LEO transportation services generated by <strong>the</strong> MPS industry (especially for<br />
MTFs) is expected to use all of <strong>the</strong> available STS capacity; a strong market exists for ELVs<br />
to take up <strong>the</strong> overload. Under <strong>the</strong> high scenario, commercial orbiter revenues and ELV<br />
revenues reach over $1 billion each, and commercial upper stage revenues are projected<br />
at almost $300 million.<br />
G. GROUND BASED SUPPORT SERVICES<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 477<br />
Space operations require support services that are located on earth. The major services<br />
include: payload processing, earth station equipment manufacture, and space insurance.<br />
Each of <strong>the</strong>se could become a significant market in its own right by <strong>the</strong> year 2000.<br />
Payload processing must be performed on all commercial payloads prior to launch.<br />
Payloads include communications satellites, MPS free-flyers and resupply modules, and<br />
commercial OMVs and MTFs. By <strong>the</strong> year 2000, it is assumed that all commercial payloads<br />
will be processed by a commercial firm(s). The market for <strong>the</strong>se services was calculated by<br />
evaluating <strong>the</strong> processing requirements for payloads generated in Chapters III–VI of <strong>the</strong><br />
report. Under <strong>the</strong> low scenario, <strong>the</strong>se revenues total $.03 billion; in our high scenario, <strong>the</strong><br />
revenues rise to $.11 billion.
478<br />
The earth station market includes transmitting and receiving antennas for satellite<br />
services, tracking and control facilities, and o<strong>the</strong>r ground equipment used with satellites.<br />
CSP expects that <strong>the</strong> principal sources of revenues will be sales of fixed and broadcast service<br />
earth station equipment. Revenues for this market are dominated by FSS services,<br />
although DBS and MSS equipment are expected to generate large revenues as well.<br />
Revenue totals are $3.7 billion in <strong>the</strong> low scenario, and $8.6 billion in <strong>the</strong> high scenario.<br />
[7] The insurance industry is a key element in <strong>the</strong> development of commercial space<br />
activity. Major forms of insurance to be offered include launch, operational lifetime, and<br />
liability. New types of insurance will need to be developed to support LEO operations for<br />
MPS and servicing. Industry revenues will depend directly on <strong>the</strong> level of development of<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r commercial space activities. Total insurance revenues are forecast at $.33 billion in<br />
<strong>the</strong> low scenario, and $1.64 billion in <strong>the</strong> high scenario.<br />
Total revenues for <strong>the</strong> ground based support services are $4.1 billion in <strong>the</strong> low scenario<br />
and $10.4 billion in <strong>the</strong> high scenario.<br />
H. SUMMARY<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Table I-1 summarizes <strong>the</strong> revenue projections forecast in this report. Under <strong>the</strong> conservative<br />
assumptions used to generate <strong>the</strong> low scenarios, revenues in <strong>the</strong> year 2000 should<br />
be $16.8 billion; using <strong>the</strong> more optimistic conditions of <strong>the</strong> high scenario, revenues rise<br />
to $51.3 billion. As noted elsewhere in this report, <strong>the</strong> key determinants affecting <strong>the</strong> actual<br />
outcome are <strong>the</strong> continued commitment to developing <strong>the</strong> commercial space infrastructure,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> development of an MPS R&D base which will allow broad-scale<br />
industrial activity.<br />
Table I-1<br />
Commercial Space Revenues in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000<br />
Low High<br />
Activity Scenario Scenario<br />
Communications $8.8B $15.3B<br />
MPS 2.6B 17.9B<br />
Remote Sensing 5B 2.5B<br />
On-Orbit Services 6B 2.8B<br />
Space Transportation 2B 2.4B<br />
Ground Based Services 4.1B 10.4B<br />
Total Revenues $1.6.8B $51.3B . . .<br />
[9] B. COMPARISON WITH EARLIER STUDIES<br />
The market projections presented in this study are a revision of an earlier internal<br />
study conducted by CSP in January, 1984. The current figures (see below) are approximately<br />
[10] twenty percent lower than those presented a year ago. Two factors are responsible<br />
for <strong>the</strong> change. First, <strong>the</strong> earlier study assumed that <strong>the</strong> space station would be on<br />
orbit and functional in 1992, as predicated in NASA’s original timeline. However, due to<br />
a slowdown in funding in <strong>the</strong> FY 1985 and FY 1986 budgets, <strong>the</strong> target date for space station<br />
has slipped until 1993. Reviewing historical evidence with <strong>the</strong> Shuttle program, it is<br />
not unreasonable to expect that <strong>the</strong> station will be delayed a year longer (i.e. 1994). This<br />
delay has a negative impact because of <strong>the</strong> critical role <strong>the</strong> space station will have on <strong>the</strong>
amount of R&D activity which can be performed, and <strong>the</strong> economics of working on orbit.<br />
Much of <strong>the</strong> growth which had been projected for <strong>the</strong> late 1990s will still occur, but not<br />
until after <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> century.<br />
The second factor has been a stronger methodological approach. As any statistician<br />
will note, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict markets in <strong>the</strong> year 2000 for products<br />
and services which do not currently exist. Without an historical database, trend analysis is<br />
meaningless, and concepts such as focus groups are of limited value when talking of<br />
entirely new concepts that may not be on <strong>the</strong> market for a decade.<br />
As a result, projection of commercial space markets must rely more upon developing<br />
a cohesive set of common sense assumptions about <strong>the</strong> basic economics of supply and<br />
demand. Earlier projections have been predicated on assumptions which tend to focus on<br />
<strong>the</strong> “supply side” of <strong>the</strong> market equation. hat is, many have made <strong>the</strong> assumption that<br />
once a product or service becomes possible, it will become profitable. This is a “technology<br />
push” approach to market projection which has often led to error.<br />
[11] In addition to <strong>the</strong> supply side, <strong>the</strong> current analysis also addresses <strong>the</strong> issue of<br />
demand. It looks not only at what can be produced in space, but what advantage <strong>the</strong> space<br />
product has to <strong>the</strong> buyer as compared with o<strong>the</strong>r alternatives. In addition to looking at <strong>the</strong><br />
relative advantages of space products, we have examined analogous situations (<strong>the</strong> introduction<br />
of technologically sophisticated, relatively high cost products into new markets)<br />
to determine what has happened in <strong>the</strong> past, and often have used <strong>the</strong>se as models.<br />
It should be noted that <strong>the</strong>se projections are only as valid as <strong>the</strong>ir underlying assumptions.<br />
CSP has endeavored to use conservative assumptions in defining its scenarios, and<br />
has sought corroboration of <strong>the</strong>se assumptions through lengthy interviews of experts in<br />
<strong>the</strong> aerospace industry. In short, CSP has used what might be termed a “modified-Delphi”<br />
approach. 1<br />
Actual revenues might be substantially lower than expected, due to an unforeseeable<br />
and fundamental change. For example, if new medical evidence proved that men cannot<br />
work in space without serious health drawbacks, <strong>the</strong> scope of feasible endeavors would be<br />
severely circumscribed. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it should be noted that <strong>the</strong> revenue projections<br />
could be substantially lower than reality. Many of <strong>the</strong> activities contemplated in this<br />
study involve new materials that would be used in “high-end” applications. Thus, <strong>the</strong> situation<br />
might be analogous to projecting <strong>the</strong> future for <strong>the</strong> manufacture of silicon crystals<br />
in <strong>the</strong> early 1950s (i.e. [12] before <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> transistor and <strong>the</strong> takeoff of<br />
<strong>the</strong> computer industry). Revolutionary products may create a substantial demand for<br />
space products that are not included in this study. Therefore, as with all long term projections,<br />
this study should be used as an indicator of potential, and not a prognosticator<br />
of fact.<br />
C. GENERAL APPROACH<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 479<br />
This report focuses on <strong>the</strong> year 2000, and projects <strong>the</strong> commercial revenues for six<br />
space industries: satellite communications, materials processing in space (MPS), remote<br />
sensing, on-orbit services, space transportation, and ground--based support. Revenues are<br />
for U.S. industry only, and are stated in 1985 dollars. The projections do not take into<br />
account revenues accruing to <strong>the</strong> private sector through <strong>the</strong> R&D expenditures of <strong>the</strong> government<br />
(e.g. <strong>the</strong> NASA space station program is not included). However, government pur-<br />
1. The Delphi method uses a group of experts in a field, who <strong>the</strong>n develop <strong>the</strong>ir individual scenarios<br />
of <strong>the</strong> future. The experts <strong>the</strong>n critique each o<strong>the</strong>r in order to develop a set of agreed-upon assumptions that<br />
serve as <strong>the</strong> basis for analysis of future trends. Historically, this method has proven to be <strong>the</strong> best means of predicting<br />
<strong>the</strong> change in situations where <strong>the</strong>re are numerous variables and where data are scarce.
480<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
chases of commercially developed space hardware and products are included (for example,<br />
government purchases of commercial upper stages such as <strong>the</strong> PAM-D and <strong>the</strong> TOS). High<br />
and low scenarios have been generated for each industry. Under <strong>the</strong> low scenario, extremely<br />
conservative assumptions have been used in defining <strong>the</strong> product or service and its market.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> high scenarios, more optimistic assumptions have been used.<br />
The satellite communications, MPS and remote sensing markets can be considered<br />
“Applications Markets,” in that some aspect of space is critical to <strong>the</strong> provision of service.<br />
Satellite communications and remote sensing profit from <strong>the</strong> vantage point afforded by<br />
space; MPS utilizes o<strong>the</strong>r physical attributes of space (most notably microgravity) to produce<br />
materials which cannot be made on Earth. Space transportation, on-orbit services,<br />
and ground support, on <strong>the</strong> [13] o<strong>the</strong>r hand, can be considered “Infrastructure Markets.”<br />
They are not end products in <strong>the</strong>mselves, but are necessary for <strong>the</strong> provision of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
products.<br />
It immediately becomes clear that <strong>the</strong> markets are inextricably linked. The demand<br />
for <strong>the</strong> applications markets is generated “externally” by individuals, companies, governments,<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r organizations here on Earth. This demand is clearly influenced by <strong>the</strong><br />
functional alternatives that can be produced on Earth. For example, <strong>the</strong> demand for satellite<br />
communications is dependent upon <strong>the</strong> economics and capabilities of terrestrial communications<br />
media. The demand for space infrastructure is a function of this applications<br />
demand.<br />
Working in <strong>the</strong> opposite direction, <strong>the</strong> supply (and cost) of space infrastructure products<br />
and services is <strong>the</strong> dominant factor in determining which applications products and<br />
services can be produced economically (i.e. at a cost that <strong>the</strong> market will support, and<br />
which will earn <strong>the</strong> firm a minimum level of profit). In order to develop overall consistency<br />
within this report, <strong>the</strong> high and low scenarios for <strong>the</strong> applications markets are used<br />
in <strong>the</strong> baselines for determining <strong>the</strong> infrastructure markets.<br />
Document III-16<br />
Document title: William M. Brown and Herman Kahn, “Long-Term Prospects for<br />
Developments in Space (A Scenario Approach),” Hudson Institute, Inc., Croton-on-<br />
Hudson, New York, Contract NASW-2924, October 30, 1977, pp. 257–274.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This study was very unusual for NASA. It developed several scenarios detailing possible long-term<br />
trends in space R&D, technology, defense, and environmental and economic development. These scenarios<br />
included pessimistic and optimistic growth and opportunities in space. Space is seen as a<br />
resource and a place for economic enterprise. The study did not detail economic benefits, but did make<br />
economic issues central to long-term space financing, exploration, and development. Few o<strong>the</strong>r studies<br />
of <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s were as far reaching as this one in vision.
Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space<br />
(A Scenario Approach)<br />
By<br />
William M. Brown and Herman Kahn . . .<br />
[257] Chapter VII<br />
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT<br />
A. Images of <strong>the</strong> Future<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 481<br />
Let us first review briefly what has been attempted in <strong>the</strong> first six chapters. The first<br />
chapter offers a typology of various space scenarios and of various <strong>the</strong>mes for constructing<br />
scenarios. The point is made that such scenarios have many uses, and that from<br />
NASA’s viewpoint an important, if somewhat neglected, one is <strong>the</strong> systematic formulation<br />
and dissemination of appropriate images of <strong>the</strong> future. Hopefully <strong>the</strong>se images would be<br />
realistically developed and become valuable to policymakers.<br />
We believe that NASA should try, in a low-keyed manner, to formulate and promulgate<br />
a concept of future space development as part of <strong>the</strong> manifest destiny of humanity,<br />
and as an obvious next phase in an historical process which started in <strong>the</strong> 15th century<br />
with <strong>the</strong> age of exploration and which has led to today’s modern world.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 19th century many Americans overtly believed in manifest destiny, a concept<br />
which encouraged <strong>the</strong> opening up of <strong>the</strong> West and extended this country to <strong>the</strong> Pacific.<br />
Through our scenarios we did find that space, to a ra<strong>the</strong>r remarkable degree, was likely to<br />
play roles similar to those which <strong>the</strong> frontier played in America’s past. According to some<br />
historians, such as Frederick J. Turner, much of <strong>the</strong> character of American life—<strong>the</strong> egalitarianism,<br />
<strong>the</strong> feelings of independence and competence, <strong>the</strong> sense of openness and<br />
unlimited vistas, <strong>the</strong> upward mobility, and a deep belief in democracy[—]seem to have<br />
been dependent on, or strongly influenced by, <strong>the</strong> existence of a frontier. We believe that<br />
this characteristic of our past [258] may well be continued—possibly in a modified or<br />
weaker form—through <strong>the</strong> exploration, development and exploitation of space.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> analogy is valid or not, an accepted image of <strong>the</strong> future can give rise to<br />
expectations that could materialize into real space projects. We also argued that for such<br />
images to have <strong>the</strong> greatest near-term impact in <strong>the</strong> U.S. <strong>the</strong>y should emphasize <strong>the</strong> practical<br />
uses of space—i.e., its scientific and economic values—and should treat its important<br />
psychological, political, social, and cultural consequences as by-products.<br />
We believe that basic images of <strong>the</strong> future such as we have presented in this report are<br />
generally unavailable in America, or elsewhere. It is clear <strong>the</strong>re is a large and active group<br />
of science fiction fans and it is clear that publicists have been very instrumental in spreading<br />
particular concepts (such as Professor O’Neill, for space colonies). But much more<br />
can be done. Many potential space activities, even if <strong>the</strong>y are unduly optimistic or exaggerated<br />
(for example, as some critics believe Professor O’Neill’s estimates to be), are still<br />
useful as part of a social process. If supported by NASA <strong>the</strong>y should be properly formulated<br />
and labeled. NASA should also furnish long-range estimates and images of <strong>the</strong><br />
future which are more or less consonant with its official positions; <strong>the</strong>se can be quite exciting<br />
and still be plausible, or even conservative, within NASA.<br />
The authors believe that a basis exists for a popular but serious book that will reflect<br />
much of <strong>the</strong> material in this report. We believe our activity has been a very useful one, even<br />
though that is clearly a self-serving remark. However, we would not have entered this project<br />
unless we felt that it was useful from a broad national perspective. Enough is now happen-
482<br />
ing in space to guarantee a moderate level of future activity. [259] This means that whatever<br />
unexpected treasures are yet to be found have some reasonable probability of being discovered<br />
even in a pessimistic context. We should add that <strong>the</strong> spirit and need of scientific<br />
inquiry, and <strong>the</strong> spirit and need for exploration, will remain as permanent forces which create<br />
varying pressures for some kind of activity almost everywhere—and in most of our scenarios<br />
<strong>the</strong>se needs and pressures increase—if not in <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>the</strong>n elsewhere.<br />
B. Earth-Centered Perspective<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
In Chapter II we try to visualize <strong>the</strong> coming economic role of space developments in<br />
an earth-centered perspective. Our view lies between that of <strong>the</strong> more extreme space<br />
enthusiasts who feel that society’s problems on earth are basically intractable and should<br />
not be allowed to hinder <strong>the</strong> future of space, and those who conceive of <strong>the</strong> space potential<br />
as very limited, and often as an activity to enthrall <strong>the</strong> young or <strong>the</strong> technostructure—<br />
and thus often a place for expensive, sterile, dangerous or foolish exploits.<br />
We first offer evidence that <strong>the</strong> basic physical problems relating to <strong>the</strong> world’s future<br />
needs can, in principle, be solved without recourse to outer space, that <strong>the</strong> earth has more<br />
than enough resources to supply an adequate standard of living for all. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand<br />
it seems quite clear that cis-lunar space and possibly <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> solar system could turn<br />
out to be extraordinarily important in an economic and technological sense. This outcome<br />
appears to follow from just <strong>the</strong> current reasonably projected potential in space—<br />
that is, without having to conjure up unforeseeable great breakthroughs. Of course it also<br />
seems to be reasonable [260] to expect that future space development will yield some<br />
equivalents of Middle East oil or Klondike gold—that is, vast treasures which have not yet<br />
been dreamed of. Thus, it is almost certain that space exploration will lead to great benefits,<br />
and possibly to an extraordinary economic and technological impact.<br />
In our basic Surprise-Free Earth-Centered Scenario we concluded that good longterm<br />
prospects existed for technological solutions to current concerns about <strong>the</strong> adequacy<br />
of <strong>the</strong> world’s physical resources—although social and political problems could—and<br />
probably will—create many difficulties in applying such solutions. When potential space<br />
developments are added to <strong>the</strong> above scenario <strong>the</strong> outlook for <strong>the</strong> required solutions is<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r brightened. That is, over time space technology and spinoffs from it will certainly<br />
contribute to <strong>the</strong>se solutions—perhaps enormously. With our necessarily poor vision into<br />
<strong>the</strong> future we can still list a few general ways in which space activities are likely to contribute.<br />
In each category below we include spinoffs and serendipities, since <strong>the</strong>y are often<br />
<strong>the</strong> most productive, although intrinsically obscure, avenues:<br />
Energy:<br />
1) Space-based electric power stations<br />
2) LANDSAT information for oil and gas exploration<br />
3) Spinoffs and serendipities<br />
Materials:<br />
1) Superior materials from unique processing capabilities in space industries<br />
2) Lunar and asteroidal sources of minerals<br />
3) LANDSAT assistance in mineral exploration on earth<br />
4) Spinoffs and serendipities<br />
Food & Water:<br />
1) Improving wea<strong>the</strong>r forecasts for days, weeks, months, and possibly over<br />
longer intervals<br />
2) LANDSAT information on crops, disease, insects, water, etc.<br />
3) Spinoffs and serendipities
[261] Environment:<br />
1) Monitoring pollutants by satellites<br />
2) LANDSAT information on environment and land use<br />
3) Processing in space (e.g., nuclear power or o<strong>the</strong>r radioactive processes)<br />
4) Spinoffs and serendipities<br />
The economic and technological potential of space leads us “paradoxically” to conclude<br />
that <strong>the</strong> near-term “soft,” or socio-psychological, effects may equal or outweigh <strong>the</strong><br />
“hard” returns. As an analogous example, it might seem wise for <strong>the</strong> United States to<br />
devote, say, 1 percent of its GNP to building “pyramids” and “ca<strong>the</strong>drals” in order to<br />
improve public morale and national unity. However, a direct attempt toward this end<br />
would almost certainly be doomed to failure. In our culture it is also vital for most<br />
“grandeur-creating” projects to be economically sensible—o<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong> average citizen<br />
will reject <strong>the</strong>m. No great national interest exists in “climbing mountains because <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
<strong>the</strong>re.” Most Americans have to feel that a practical, scientific, military, economic or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
purpose is served in “climbing mountains” before <strong>the</strong>y will support and take pride in such<br />
activities. Isolated events may be exciting—and create temporary heroes—but a deep lasting<br />
pride and a solid sense of achievement usually require practical projects.<br />
So many tangible economic and scientific opportunities do exist in outer space that<br />
<strong>the</strong> country can afford to pursue <strong>the</strong>m with intensity—and also reap <strong>the</strong> important psychological,<br />
political, social and cultural benefits as “by-products” of <strong>the</strong> main effort. In a<br />
cost-benefit analysis <strong>the</strong> space projects cannot be given explicit credit for such “byproducts,”<br />
but it can note <strong>the</strong> potential which exists. It should be made clear that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
“by-products” could be as valuable as <strong>the</strong> more tangible objectives, including any windfalls.<br />
That would be our judgment, at least for <strong>the</strong> balance of this century.<br />
[262] C. Space Technology<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 483<br />
Chapter III explores some of <strong>the</strong> technology expected to be associated with space in<br />
<strong>the</strong> near, medium and long term. Some readers may find this chapter exciting because <strong>the</strong><br />
technological possibilities portrayed are greater than many relatively knowledgeable<br />
groups currently seem to understand. This chapter indicates that a basic change in <strong>the</strong><br />
character of our practical activities in space is likely to occur by <strong>the</strong> late ‘80s or early ‘90s.<br />
As knowledgeable NASA personnel and o<strong>the</strong>r space-oriented professionals know, up until<br />
now space systems have attempted to keep <strong>the</strong> large, complex, expensive equipment on<br />
<strong>the</strong> ground, where possible, and place <strong>the</strong> smaller or cheaper equipment into space. (The<br />
present situation may be compared to <strong>the</strong> use of river ferries which are severely limited in<br />
<strong>the</strong> loads <strong>the</strong>y can transport.) In ten or fifteen years, we expect to find many new systems<br />
which deploy <strong>the</strong> large complex equipment in space and keep <strong>the</strong> small inexpensive, but<br />
numerous, parts of <strong>the</strong> system on <strong>the</strong> ground. (To continue <strong>the</strong> analogy this change would<br />
be similar to <strong>the</strong> replacement of most river ferries with modern bridges. That change was<br />
basic and effective.)<br />
Although Chapter III focuses strongly on technology, it also attempts to indicate that<br />
future developments in space, especially in terms of manned activities, are probably dependent<br />
more on a number of imponderables o<strong>the</strong>r than successful technology. For example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> personal health and safety of a space traveler—or tourist—is potentially crucial to<br />
many activities. Although safety is more or less a direct consequence of technology, future<br />
health in space is still a mystery which may involve risks that are subject to straightforward<br />
technological solution—or at least not for quite a long [263] time. At <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong>re<br />
appears to be some useful information from prior life science studies, but <strong>the</strong>se are reliable<br />
mainly for relatively short-term exposures to <strong>the</strong> space environment.<br />
Space tourism, which appears in every scenario as a major new growth industry, should<br />
not be taken as quite that certain. That is, even assuming that problems of health, safety
484<br />
and cost do not become intrinsic deterrents, it is possible at least to conceive of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
developments that might hamper that potential industry. For example, <strong>the</strong> excitement<br />
might vanish after <strong>the</strong> first few years. After all, will <strong>the</strong>re be enough important experiences<br />
which an expensive tour can bring that <strong>the</strong> advanced electronic systems anticipated for<br />
<strong>the</strong> 21st century could not? Many of <strong>the</strong> visual experiences in space might be better perceived<br />
through electronics, and probably a lot more comfortably. Still <strong>the</strong> experience of<br />
weightlessness, or <strong>the</strong> knowledge of <strong>the</strong> new realities, such as being suspended in space,<br />
perhaps 25,000 miles above <strong>the</strong> earth, or a chance to walk on <strong>the</strong> moon, might prove to<br />
be priceless. Certainly electronics has not been a sufficient substitute to date. These uncertainties<br />
might possibly be resolved fully during this century.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r consideration might be that of <strong>the</strong> possible fragility of <strong>the</strong> upper atmosphere.<br />
If it is found that this protective envelope would be seriously degraded beyond<br />
some calculated number of annual launches, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> future tourist industry could be<br />
greatly hampered since it would probably have a relatively low priority. This might not rule<br />
tourism out but could limit it severely or restrict it to only a very few high priority needs.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> upper atmosphere might not prove to be fragile at all for properly<br />
designed propulsive systems.<br />
[264] These potential issues are raised for balance in this discussion. Space tourism has<br />
an exciting long-term potential but it first needs to be developed and shown to yield sufficient<br />
benefits. During <strong>the</strong> next few decades unforeseen problems will undoubtedly arise<br />
and will need to be solved satisfactorily. Until that time space tours are likely to remain in<br />
<strong>the</strong> limbo of hopes or dreams.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> health problems associated with protracted journeys into space should become<br />
relatively severe, various solutions may emerge over time that will permit space development<br />
to continue. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> major competitors to <strong>the</strong> human presence in space have<br />
been and undoubtedly will be <strong>the</strong> various automated devices—robots, in one form or<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r. Currently, according to Carl Sagan, “As a rule of thumb, a manned mission costs<br />
50 to 100 times more than a comparable unmanned mission.” 1 Over time, automation has<br />
become increasingly compact and effective. That is, <strong>the</strong> robots tend to shrink in size and<br />
increase <strong>the</strong> range of <strong>the</strong>ir activities. Humans can learn to do <strong>the</strong> latter, but <strong>the</strong>y will have<br />
difficulty in shrinking.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, a human presence in space will be needed and is likely to grow. The economics<br />
of <strong>the</strong> competition with <strong>the</strong> robots generally will determine <strong>the</strong> relative balance<br />
only when <strong>the</strong> same tasks can be done by both. As space development proceeds, <strong>the</strong> balance<br />
may shift ei<strong>the</strong>r way. However, as space industrialization grows in complexity <strong>the</strong><br />
need for human specialists may grow in proportion. The first Space Shuttle decade, <strong>the</strong><br />
‘80s, should give us some early clues about <strong>the</strong> outcome of this long-term competition.<br />
[265] D. The Scenarios<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Optimistic Scenario: Some of <strong>the</strong> potential technology discussed in Chapter III is used<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Optimistic Scenario of Chapter IV. This scenario simply exercises <strong>the</strong> possible technological<br />
and economic muscles to show what could reasonably occur in an environment<br />
of sustained funding, high morale, dedication, cooperation, good management, and reasonable<br />
luck. It is intended to open up some vistas, to make it clear that extraordinary possibilities<br />
exist that are not necessarily Utopian. Although <strong>the</strong> events portrayed are<br />
generally not expected to happen as soon as indicated, we believe that <strong>the</strong> sequence is not<br />
intrinsically forbidden. It may only require a change in public attitudes, which is certain-<br />
1. The New York Times Magazine, July 10, 1977.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 485<br />
ly possible. The scenario not only is intended to give a sense of some ultimate possibilities<br />
but also of an eventual outcome. Almost all of <strong>the</strong> technological developments that “happen”<br />
in <strong>the</strong> first 100 years are likely to occur sooner or later—even in a pessimistic scenario,<br />
although probably much later and on a reduced scale. As is discussed below, <strong>the</strong><br />
economic and technological progress associated with <strong>the</strong> Optimistic Scenario is amazing<br />
in its long-term outcome, but is relatively modest in any particular year or decade.<br />
Pessimistic Scenario: Chapter V portrays <strong>the</strong> two New International Order Scenarios.<br />
Part I carries out a <strong>the</strong>me which today is widely accepted in <strong>the</strong> world, although not by <strong>the</strong><br />
authors. This is a perspective which suggests that <strong>the</strong> developed nations generally are relatively<br />
“decadent” and that <strong>the</strong> developing nations have <strong>the</strong> energy and dynamism to push<br />
<strong>the</strong>m aside and become <strong>the</strong> focus of <strong>the</strong> future. The second (Part II) version of [266] <strong>the</strong><br />
scenario assumes that richer countries will, in part through <strong>the</strong> transfer of resources,<br />
greatly accelerate <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> poorer countries and that <strong>the</strong>se, as <strong>the</strong>y attain<br />
comparable wealth and technological advancement, will adopt <strong>the</strong> social attitudes and<br />
ideology of <strong>the</strong>ir former benefactors. Both of <strong>the</strong>se scenarios strike us as being relatively<br />
improbable—but <strong>the</strong>y do raise important issues.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, we do find that many formerly poor nations are now middleincome<br />
ones and progressing very rapidly. Scenario I gives special roles to China and<br />
Brazil in determining <strong>the</strong> world’s future, each for different reasons. Scenario II gives a<br />
much weakened and modified form of this New International Order in which both <strong>the</strong><br />
middle-income nations and <strong>the</strong> poor nations eventually become post-industrial, after<br />
which fur<strong>the</strong>r economic progress is very slow.<br />
In both scenarios, it is <strong>the</strong> middle-income nations that appear likely to “challenge” <strong>the</strong><br />
lead of <strong>the</strong> U.S. and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union in space activities by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> century or soon<br />
afterwards. In fact, in <strong>the</strong>se scenarios <strong>the</strong> U.S. lead—as measured by budgets—is lost to<br />
both <strong>the</strong> Russians and <strong>the</strong> Chinese before <strong>the</strong> year 2000, and to <strong>the</strong> Brazilians soon afterwards.<br />
We believe that in this respect <strong>the</strong> two scenarios depicted are not implausible; it<br />
may well turn out that <strong>the</strong>se newcomers in advanced technology and growing affluence<br />
will become technologically dominant, including space development. Perhaps nothing<br />
succeeds like success in a space “race.” Moreover, <strong>the</strong> successes of <strong>the</strong> former middleincome<br />
countries in space could greatly increase <strong>the</strong>ir ability to become wealthier than<br />
<strong>the</strong> present developed nations. In <strong>the</strong>se scenarios it occurs, not only because of<br />
[267] direct economic and technological achievements, but because <strong>the</strong>ir success creates<br />
a high morale and a sense of competence from <strong>the</strong> attainment of communal goals—attitudes<br />
that growing space activities might also engender in <strong>the</strong> [Organization for<br />
Economic Cooperation and Development] nations under appropriate circumstances.<br />
Because visible signs of success are so important, many of <strong>the</strong> Third World countries<br />
often attempt to “fake” <strong>the</strong>m. That is, <strong>the</strong>y are attracted to four-lane highways and jet airliners<br />
in order to achieve <strong>the</strong> appearance of success before <strong>the</strong>y have properly attended<br />
to <strong>the</strong>ir problems in rural roads, agriculture, employment, and education. The diversion<br />
of resources to showy projects can be tragic even if <strong>the</strong> showy projects are successful; usually<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are not. Thus it may be undesirable for a Third World country to jump into space<br />
development rapidly. Unless both <strong>the</strong>ir economies and technological resources are substantial<br />
it can represent a serious and impractical diversion of scarce resources. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> appropriate economic conditions and technological development can appear with<br />
astonishing rapidity. In fact, even S. Korea and Taiwan may be ready for certain specialized<br />
space ventures in <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future because of <strong>the</strong> rapidity with which <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
been progressing. Potential economic and technological giants such as China and Brazil<br />
may also develop a space capability much more quickly than generally expected, if <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
recent progress continues.<br />
In our most Pessimistic Scenario progress in economics and technology becomes very<br />
low after a country becomes post-industrial. Still, a surprising outcome (one which struck
486<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
both authors forcibly) was that eventually, despite a general pessimism about space projects<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r technological developments, space activities still become surprisingly<br />
extensive. [268] (Consider, as an analogy, that even if Queen Isabella had not financed<br />
Columbus, or if he had failed on his voyage, <strong>the</strong> Western Hemisphere would still be <strong>the</strong>re,<br />
waiting to be found; since <strong>the</strong> time was ripe for worldwide exploration and exploitation<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r Europeans would have reached it before many more years had passed.)<br />
The pressures for exploring and exploiting outer space basically derive from increasing<br />
wealth and advancing technologies. Over time <strong>the</strong> projects become easier to fund and,<br />
with advances in technology, less difficult to do. At some appropriate time, barring an<br />
almost religious aversion to new technology, a sufficient desire for space development will<br />
arise—even if long intervals occur when support is hard to find.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r analogy might be made with <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> U.S. railroads and <strong>the</strong><br />
West. The railroads were stimulated by gifts of free land by <strong>the</strong> government and <strong>the</strong> belief<br />
that, as <strong>the</strong> railroads were built, <strong>the</strong> traffic would follow—that a great deal of industrial<br />
mining and agricultural development, including forestry, would occur quite rapidly and<br />
justify <strong>the</strong>ir investment. The time was ripe and it did.<br />
A similar experience could occur with <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle system. In space <strong>the</strong>re may be<br />
no equivalent to <strong>the</strong> free 160-acre homesteads which were once available to <strong>the</strong> average<br />
American, but great opportunities are likely to exist for various “railroad” companies who<br />
“stake out claims” in outer space. At <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> space frontier and its available<br />
resources seem relatively unlimited. Relatively few critical regions appear to exist that might<br />
eventually become <strong>the</strong> cause of major conflicts and hinder commercial development.<br />
[269] Moderate Scenario: Chapter VI develops our Moderate Scenario which is intended<br />
to be more plausible than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. It has an implied conviction that <strong>the</strong> progress represented<br />
is worth striving for—and can be achieved without undue reaching. It represents<br />
our “median” image of future developments in space. It contains some fictional elements<br />
which are intended to be prototypes of actual historical events, including individuals who<br />
are “movers” and “shakers” and who play central roles in forcing a more rapid space development.<br />
The Moderate Scenario emphasizes two new commercial opportunities: space industrialization<br />
and tourism, both of which appear to have extremely large potential in all <strong>the</strong> scenarios.<br />
The term, “space tourism,” alone may not convey <strong>the</strong> intended meaning. If we<br />
assume that space travel is <strong>the</strong> moving experience that it has been to many astronauts, at<br />
some future time various organizations or societies may wish to provide this experience to<br />
selected people. It may be a reward for dedicated service or special contributions, or a ritual<br />
associated with special religious groups. Or it could be arranged through an open or<br />
limited access lottery.<br />
Shortly after <strong>the</strong> beginning of space tourism, assuming it is successful, we find <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
of great interest in establishing permanent orbiting colonies—possibly with many<br />
of <strong>the</strong> same motivations. We have not dwelt upon <strong>the</strong> desire for utopias or choices for<br />
one’s preferred life style. However, it may well turn out that one of <strong>the</strong> major motivations<br />
for colonies in space is similar to that which drove <strong>the</strong> Pilgrims to New England: <strong>the</strong> desire<br />
to choose <strong>the</strong>ir way of life with minimal interference from <strong>the</strong> home country. This outcome,<br />
of course, would depend very much on [270] <strong>the</strong> cost and viability of such colonies.<br />
But even relatively small sects, given a growing future affluence, could eventually finance<br />
a colony if <strong>the</strong>y were sufficiently motivated—particularly if <strong>the</strong>y had ability to ti<strong>the</strong>, like<br />
<strong>the</strong> Mormons or Black Muslims. 2<br />
2. For example, if 1,000,000 families each contributed $2,500 a year for 40 years, without interest this<br />
[would] become $100 billion, enough to establish a substantial colony in <strong>the</strong> early to mid-21st century, according<br />
to our projections. The contribution could appear to a believer as a tax-exempt investment in <strong>the</strong> future ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than as a gift.
In many religions <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> church is thought of as a common resource for its<br />
members to help those in difficulties and sometimes, even when some members are successful,<br />
to be used to facilitate additional success. To <strong>the</strong> extent that space colonies, in<br />
addition to <strong>the</strong>ir religious connotation, might look like profitable ventures <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
investments would eventually increase <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> church. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, through<br />
merit criteria or lotteries, every member would have a chance to become a colonist, or a<br />
tourist. The church might deem <strong>the</strong> high costs well worth <strong>the</strong> increased faith and activity<br />
of its members—particularly if <strong>the</strong>se “tourists” returned with an inspired and zealous commitment<br />
to <strong>the</strong> church.<br />
E. Potential for Growth<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 487<br />
Our very rough estimate of current world space project expenditures is about $9 billion<br />
per year on non-military developments and perhaps half that much on military space<br />
programs. That is, total expenditures on space projects are about .2 percent of <strong>the</strong> GWP<br />
(about .13 percent non-military, and .07 percent military).<br />
In a pessimistic space scenario that small (.13 percent) fraction generally remains stable<br />
or decreases, despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> cost of transportation to space must almost certainly<br />
fall by more than a factor [271] of 10 during <strong>the</strong> next century. Still <strong>the</strong> GWP during<br />
<strong>the</strong> next 100 years is expected—in our earth-centered surprise-free projections—to rise by<br />
about a factor of 20. . . . If space expenditures merely keep pace with GWP <strong>the</strong>y would be<br />
approximately $200–$300 billion by <strong>the</strong>n and would almost double again in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
100-year period. The “truly” pessimistic space scenario would, on average, maintain a slower<br />
growth in space investments than <strong>the</strong> GWP. On average means that “temporary” fluctuations<br />
may vary that projection somewhat over periods of a few decades or less.<br />
A moderate scenario, in our view, would, on average, but probably with erratic fluctuations,<br />
show a growth rate in space which exceeds that on earth—perhaps by about a<br />
factor of 2 or 3. Thus, <strong>the</strong> world’s space budget would have a mean growth rate of 3-1/2<br />
percent to 5 percent, which would lead to space budgets between $200 and $1,200 billion<br />
at <strong>the</strong> Tricentennial. We arrived at $700 billion for our particular Moderate Scenario<br />
(Chapter VI).<br />
However, we notice that <strong>the</strong> 2076 budget (or annual investment) estimate is extremely<br />
sensitive to <strong>the</strong> assumed average growth rate. Over a hundred years a 2-percent change<br />
in this average affects <strong>the</strong> budget by about a factor of 7—and, over 200 years, by a factor<br />
of 50. Yet it appears to us that <strong>the</strong> inherent uncertainty in <strong>the</strong> average future growth rate<br />
is intrinsically greater than 2 percent and may be as high as 5 percent—<strong>the</strong> latter leads to<br />
a factor of more than 100 over a century and more than an astonishing 10,000 over two<br />
centuries!<br />
[272] On <strong>the</strong> positive side—that is, from a space enthusiast’s point of view—<strong>the</strong> high<br />
growth rates lead to an optimistic scenario. In <strong>the</strong> Optimistic Scenario of Chapter IV <strong>the</strong><br />
average growth rate in worldwide space investments rose during <strong>the</strong> last quarter of <strong>the</strong><br />
20th century at about 10 percent per annum (about <strong>the</strong> average for a “glamour” or high<br />
technology industry currently). During <strong>the</strong> first 100 years after a brief rise to a 12-percent<br />
growth rate, <strong>the</strong> Gross Space Product (GSP) <strong>the</strong>n declined steadily to about an 8-percent<br />
growth rate, and during <strong>the</strong> second 100 years to 5 percent. . . . We note that <strong>the</strong> growth<br />
rate in space, per capita, ends at about 2-1/2 percent—actually, less than <strong>the</strong> productivity<br />
increase of <strong>the</strong> average American worker in recent decades. Thus, <strong>the</strong> Optimistic Scenario<br />
portrayed would not be perceived as having an astonishing growth during any year of its<br />
history—except perhaps during 1980–2000, when a general change in societal attitudes<br />
toward space is assumed to occur. After <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> century it is just <strong>the</strong> assumed longterm<br />
steadiness of <strong>the</strong> slowly declining growth rate that brings about a “miraculous” transformation—first<br />
to a $30 trillion GSP and <strong>the</strong>n, during <strong>the</strong> much slower growth of <strong>the</strong>
488<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
second 100 years, to an awesome $12,000 trillion. . . . Stated only in this last way <strong>the</strong> numbers<br />
tend to be hard to accept as having any reality; <strong>the</strong> average annual GWP/capita,<br />
including <strong>the</strong> GSPs after 200 years, reaches almost $1 million—about 600 times greater<br />
than <strong>the</strong> average today!<br />
The 200-year progression of moderate successes in <strong>the</strong> Optimistic Scenario not only<br />
leads to fantastic developments in space, it also demands an extremely rich society on<br />
earth—one in which essentially everyone (except those who voluntarily opt out) is an<br />
active participant. To <strong>the</strong> [273] average citizen, today, this must represent an unbelievable<br />
outcome—even though <strong>the</strong> path to it is relatively straightforward. For example, to go<br />
from <strong>the</strong> current GWP of roughly $6.6 trillion to one of $6,700 trillion over 200 years (on<br />
earth . . .), requires “only” an average growth rate of 3.5 percent—less than that which <strong>the</strong><br />
world as a whole has experienced during <strong>the</strong> last few decades! What is so astonishing<br />
about that? The answer appears to be nothing to an optimist, everything to a pessimist.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> above sense of economic and technological progress, we have portrayed pessimistic,<br />
moderate, and optimistic scenarios. In <strong>the</strong> pessimistic one <strong>the</strong> intrinsically hightechnology<br />
enterprises are treated as fascinating but dangerous tools to be kept under<br />
very tight control. Society responds to science and technology as if it were a “foreign” culture<br />
beyond its real understanding, and potentially fraught with great new risks.<br />
The Moderate Scenario is more of a long-term business-as-usual perspective. Where<br />
space projects are profitable <strong>the</strong> economic rewards tend, over time, to dominate <strong>the</strong> sociopolitical<br />
restraints and, accompanied by numerous problems, difficulties and interruptions,<br />
space development erratically but slowly climbs <strong>the</strong> ladder of progress. But even<br />
such erratic slow progress over a “mere” 100 years brings about changes which in today’s<br />
world could only seem amazing—for example, a $600-billion annual investment in space<br />
when transport costs are about 1/25 of <strong>the</strong> present ones, coupled with tremendous<br />
advances (to take a few examples) in automation, instruments, materials, and new designs<br />
(for vehicles, industries, communication systems, and processes in space). Thus, even<br />
[274] <strong>the</strong> slow, erratic Moderate Scenario reveals a potentially astounding transformation,<br />
one that may be almost impossible to comprehend fully or foresee accurately. That is, <strong>the</strong><br />
projections we have made are likely to appear primitive 100 years from now—just as do<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. projections from 100 years ago that could not seriously imagine <strong>the</strong> general use<br />
of automobiles, let alone airliners, space flight, electronic computers, television, or<br />
nuclear energy—to name just a few of <strong>the</strong> evolved “miracles”—and all this with an average<br />
growth in per capita GNP of less than 2 percent.<br />
How <strong>the</strong>n, when <strong>the</strong> business-as-usual projection becomes shocking or incomprehensible,<br />
can we expect anything but incredulous reactions for any optimistic scenario? Our<br />
Optimistic Scenario requires, for <strong>the</strong> world as a whole, merely that human beings opt for<br />
growth and set about to obtain it with roughly <strong>the</strong> same, but sustained, vigor that on average<br />
we find exists today. That is all.<br />
Document III-17<br />
Document title: Robert Dunn, “NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial Investment in<br />
Space,” internal NASA document, September 13, 1983.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
As part of a larger review of commercial space activities, this report reviews <strong>the</strong> various policies NASA<br />
had developed over <strong>the</strong> years concerning industrial and commercial involvement in space. Such documentation<br />
reveals a new way of thinking at NASA; <strong>the</strong> agency was beginning to consider <strong>the</strong> future<br />
users of space ra<strong>the</strong>r than just demonstrating national technological competence and exploration.<br />
This was partly in preparation for <strong>the</strong> space station, partly for continued pressure to find commercial<br />
R&D ventures for <strong>the</strong> Shuttle, and partly to bolster NASA support throughout <strong>the</strong> economy.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 489<br />
[no pagination]<br />
NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial<br />
Investment in Space<br />
It is national policy to effectively apply <strong>the</strong> resources of <strong>the</strong> nation to preserve <strong>the</strong> role<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States as a leader in space science and technology and <strong>the</strong>ir applications.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> maturing of <strong>the</strong> Space Transportation System (STS) to a reliable and operational<br />
status and in light of recent initiatives in space industrialization, it is evident that <strong>the</strong> dawn<br />
of <strong>the</strong> era of wide-spread commercial activities in space is at hand. Maintenance of national<br />
leadership in space requires <strong>the</strong> support and expansion of commercial space activities.<br />
The President’s National Space Policy of July 4, 1982, directs NASA to expand United<br />
States private sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities.<br />
In light of this directive and since substantial portions of <strong>the</strong> United States technological<br />
base and motivation reside in <strong>the</strong> United States private sector, NASA will invigorate its<br />
efforts to take necessary and proper actions to promote a climate conducive to expanded<br />
private sector investment and involvement in space by United States domestic concerns.<br />
NASA views its role in <strong>the</strong> commercialization of space in light of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (Space Act), which establishes NASA as<br />
<strong>the</strong> agency responsible for <strong>the</strong> direction of civil “space . . . activities” of <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
The legislative history of <strong>the</strong> Act states that “<strong>the</strong> term ‘activities’ should be construed<br />
broadly enough to enable <strong>the</strong> Administration . . . to carry on a wide spectrum of activities<br />
which relate to <strong>the</strong> successful use of outer space. These activities would include scientific<br />
discovery and research not directly related to travel in outer space but utilizing outer<br />
space, and <strong>the</strong> development of resources which may be discovered in outer space.”<br />
The Space Act also establishes that space activities will be conducted to make <strong>the</strong><br />
“most effective utilization of <strong>the</strong> scientific and engineering resources of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
. . . in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment.” NASA<br />
has made large scale use of private industry as contractors in carrying out its activities. It<br />
has provided space launch services for commercial purposes since 1962. Beginning in<br />
1979 it has entered into “partnership” arrangements with private sector firms to enhance<br />
<strong>the</strong> commercial utilization of space resources. These and o<strong>the</strong>r activities carry on and<br />
expand <strong>the</strong> tradition of NASA’s cooperation with industry and o<strong>the</strong>r private sector institutions<br />
which dates back to NASA’s predecessor agency, <strong>the</strong> National Advisory Committee<br />
[for] Aeronautics.<br />
In light of <strong>the</strong> Presidential policy of July 4, 1982, NASA will continue and expand its<br />
effort to facilitate private sector investment in outer space and will encourage commercial<br />
space activities consistent with that policy.<br />
In order to more effectively encourage and facilitate private sector involvement and<br />
investment in civil space and space-related activities, NASA will redirect a portion of its space<br />
research and development activities to assure that its R&D program supports <strong>the</strong> research,<br />
development and demonstration of space technologies with commercial application.<br />
To fur<strong>the</strong>r support this objective, NASA will directly involve <strong>the</strong> private sector in initiatives<br />
which are consistent with NASA program objectives and which support commercial<br />
space activity.<br />
These initiatives may include, but are not limited to: (1) engaging in joint arrangements<br />
with United States domestic concerns to operate on a commercial basis facilities or<br />
services which relieve NASA of an operational responsibility; (2) engaging in joint<br />
arrangements with U.S. domestic concerns to develop facilities or hardware to be used in<br />
conjunction with <strong>the</strong> STS or o<strong>the</strong>r aspects of <strong>the</strong> U.S. space program; and (3) by entering<br />
into transactions with United States concerns designed to encourage <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
exploitation of space.
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SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Principle NASA incentives available in joint arrangements may include in addition to<br />
making available <strong>the</strong> results of NASA research: (1) providing flight time on <strong>the</strong> space<br />
transportation system on appropriate terms and conditions as determined by <strong>the</strong><br />
Administrator; (2) providing technical advice, consultation, data, equipment and facilities<br />
to participating organizations; and (3) entering into joint research and demonstration<br />
programs where each party funds its own participation. In making <strong>the</strong> necessary determination<br />
to proceed under this policy, <strong>the</strong> Administrator will consider <strong>the</strong> need for NASA<br />
funded support or o<strong>the</strong>r NASA action to commercial endeavors and <strong>the</strong> relative benefits<br />
to be obtained from such endeavors. The primary emphasis of <strong>the</strong>se joint arrangements<br />
will be to provide support to ventures which result in or facilitate industrial activity in<br />
space when such activity would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be unlikely to occur due to high technological<br />
or financial risk. O<strong>the</strong>r ventures involving new commercial activities in space will also be<br />
supported. In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, private capital must be at risk.<br />
As major areas for NASA enhancement of total United States capability, including <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector, may become apparent from time to time, <strong>the</strong> factors to be considered by<br />
NASA prior to providing incentives may include, but not be limited to, some or all of <strong>the</strong><br />
following considerations: (1) <strong>the</strong> effect of <strong>the</strong> private sector activity on NASA programs;<br />
(2) <strong>the</strong> enhanced exploitation of NASA capabilities such as <strong>the</strong> Space Transportation<br />
System; (3) <strong>the</strong> contribution to <strong>the</strong> maintenance of United States technological superiority;<br />
(4) <strong>the</strong> amount of proprietary data or background information to be furnished by <strong>the</strong><br />
concern; (5) <strong>the</strong> rights in date to be granted <strong>the</strong> concern in consideration of its contribution;<br />
(6) <strong>the</strong> impact of NASA sponsorship on a given industry; (7) provision for a form<br />
of exclusivity in special cases when needed to promote innovation; (8) recoupment of <strong>the</strong><br />
contribution under appropriate circumstances; (9) support of socio-economic objectives<br />
of <strong>the</strong> government; and (10) <strong>the</strong> willingness and ability of <strong>the</strong> proposer to market any<br />
resulting products and services.<br />
This policy supersedes <strong>the</strong> NASA Guidelines Regarding Early Usage of Space for Industrial<br />
Purposes. It does not affect existing programs (such as Materials Processing in Space) and<br />
relationships which are consistent with or outside <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> policy. This policy is not<br />
to be construed as authorizing or requiring NASA to perform a regulatory review of a proposed<br />
commercial use of space where no cooperative agreement or o<strong>the</strong>r appropriate<br />
arrangement between NASA and <strong>the</strong> commercial entity is contemplated. . . .<br />
II.B. Description and Discussion of Actions and Transactions<br />
In order to understand NASA’s view of its role in <strong>the</strong> commercialization of space, it<br />
should be noted that <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics end Space Act of 1958, as amended (Space<br />
Act), establishes NASA as <strong>the</strong> agency responsible for <strong>the</strong> direction of civil “space . . . activities”<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States. The legislative history states that “<strong>the</strong> term ‘activities’ should be<br />
construed broadly enough to enable <strong>the</strong> Administration to carry on a wide spectrum of<br />
activities which relate to <strong>the</strong> successful use of outer space. These activities would include<br />
scientific discovery and research not directly related to travel in outer space but utilizing<br />
outer space, and <strong>the</strong> development of resources which may be discovered in outer space.”<br />
The Space Act also establishes that space activities will be conducted to make <strong>the</strong><br />
“most effective utilization of <strong>the</strong> scientific and engineering resources of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
. . . in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment.” NASA<br />
has made large scale use of private industry as contractors in carrying out its activities. It<br />
has provided space launch services for commercial purposes since 1962. Beginning in<br />
1979 it has entered into “partnership” arrangements with private sector firms to enhanced<br />
<strong>the</strong> commercial utilization of space resources.<br />
In light of <strong>the</strong> Presidential policy of July 4, 1982, NASA will continue and expand its<br />
effort to facilitate private sector investment in space and will encourage commercial space<br />
activities consistent with that policy.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 491<br />
The following is a description of <strong>the</strong> mechanisms NASA uses to enter into cooperation<br />
with <strong>the</strong> private sector. These various actions and transactions are or may be used by<br />
NASA in varying degrees to assure <strong>the</strong> application of non-public resources to <strong>the</strong> exploitation<br />
of space for commercial purposes.<br />
1. Procurements. NASA carries out most of its research and development (R&D)<br />
activities as well as space launch operations through <strong>the</strong> use of procurement contracts<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than through use of its own personnel and facilities. The United States Code prescribes<br />
that a procurement contract shall be used when:<br />
“(1) <strong>the</strong> principle purpose of <strong>the</strong> instrument is to acquire (by purchase, lease, or<br />
barter) property or services for <strong>the</strong> direct benefit or use of <strong>the</strong> United States government;<br />
or (2) <strong>the</strong> agency decides in a specific instance that <strong>the</strong> use of a procurement<br />
contract is appropriate.” 31 U.S.C. § 6303.<br />
NASA’s Procurement Regulations are found in Chapter 18, Title 41, Code of Federal<br />
Regulations. Unlike most civilian agencies NASA’s procurement authority is based on <strong>the</strong><br />
Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. The Federal Property and<br />
Administrative Services Act, 40 U.S.C. § 471 et seq., as it relates to disposal of property, is<br />
also applicable.<br />
NASA implements <strong>the</strong> principles of OMB Circular A-76 “Performance of Commercial<br />
Activities” as it relates to commercial activities in support of R&D even though in most<br />
instances A-76 is not directly applicable to NASA functions. NASA’s current approach to<br />
space commercialization is much broader than <strong>the</strong> A-76 concept.<br />
2. Cooperative Agreement (Chiles Act). NASA seldom enters into cooperative<br />
agreements as defined in <strong>the</strong> Chiles Act (as distinguished from various Space Act cooperative<br />
arrangements). Such a cooperative agreement is used when:<br />
“(1) <strong>the</strong> principal purpose of <strong>the</strong> relationship is to transfer a thing of value to <strong>the</strong><br />
State, local governments or o<strong>the</strong>r recipient to carry out a public purpose of support<br />
or stimulation authorized by a law of <strong>the</strong> United States instead of acquiring (by purchase<br />
lease, or barter) property or services for <strong>the</strong> direct benefit or use of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Government; and<br />
(2) substantial involvement is expected between <strong>the</strong> executive agency and <strong>the</strong> State,<br />
local government or o<strong>the</strong>r recipient when carrying out <strong>the</strong> activity contemplated in<br />
<strong>the</strong> agreement.” 31 U.S.C. § 6305.<br />
NASA is prepared to explore <strong>the</strong> possibility of expanding its use of such agreements<br />
to support commercialization.<br />
3. Grant Agreement. NASA has made use of grants principally to fund universitysponsored<br />
research and development. Grants are used when:<br />
“(1) <strong>the</strong> principal purpose of <strong>the</strong> relationship is to transfer a thing of value to <strong>the</strong><br />
State or local government or o<strong>the</strong>r recipient to carry out a public purpose of support<br />
or stimulation authorized by a law of <strong>the</strong> United States instead of acquiring (by purchase,<br />
lease, or barter) property or services for <strong>the</strong> direct benefit or use of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States Government; and<br />
(2) substantial involvement is not expected between <strong>the</strong> executive agency and <strong>the</strong><br />
State, local government, or o<strong>the</strong>r recipient when carrying out <strong>the</strong> activity contemplated<br />
in <strong>the</strong> agreement.” 31 U.S.C. § 6304.<br />
NASA intends to direct a portion of its grant-funded research toward areas with potential<br />
viability for commercial space ventures. NASA regulations covering research Grants<br />
and Cooperative Agreements are found in Part 1260, Title 14, Code of Federal<br />
Regulations.<br />
4. Space Act Arrangements. Independent of its authority to enter into contracts for<br />
procurement, cooperative agreements or grants as defined above, <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, authorizes NASA to enter into a variety
492<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
of flexible arrangements with public and private institutions. Sections 203(c)(5) and (6)<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Act provide:<br />
“(5) without regard to section 3648 of <strong>the</strong> Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C.<br />
529), to enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r transactions as may be necessary in <strong>the</strong> conduct of its work and on such terms<br />
as it may deem appropriate, with any agency or instrumentality of <strong>the</strong> United States,<br />
or with any State, Territory, or possession, or with any political subdivision <strong>the</strong>reof, or<br />
with any person, firm, association, corporation, or educational institution. To <strong>the</strong><br />
maximum extent practicable and consistent with <strong>the</strong> accomplishment of <strong>the</strong> purposes<br />
of this Act, such contracts, leases, agreements and o<strong>the</strong>r transactions shall be allocated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Administrator in a manner which will enable small-business concerns to<br />
participate equitably and proportionately in <strong>the</strong> conduct of <strong>the</strong> work of <strong>the</strong><br />
Administration;<br />
(6) to use, with <strong>the</strong>ir consent, <strong>the</strong> services, equipment, personnel and facilities of<br />
Federal and o<strong>the</strong>r agencies with or without reimbursement, and on a similar basis to<br />
cooperate with o<strong>the</strong>r public and private agencies and instrumentalities in <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
services, equipment, and facilities. Each department and agency of <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Government shall cooperate fully with <strong>the</strong> Administration in making its services,<br />
equipment, personnel, and facilities available to <strong>the</strong> Administration, and any such<br />
department or agency is authorized, notwithstanding any o<strong>the</strong>r provision of law, to<br />
transfer to or to receive from <strong>the</strong> Administration, without reimbursement, aeronautical<br />
and space vehicles, and supplies and equipment o<strong>the</strong>r than administrative supplies<br />
or equipment.”<br />
The following are examples of arrangements and transactions supporting space commercialization<br />
which NASA has entered into under its Space Act authority.<br />
a. Early Initiatives in Commercial Space Activity.<br />
(1) Communications Satellites. On July 10, 1962, a NASA Delta launch vehicle<br />
launched <strong>the</strong> first privately-owned satellite which was also <strong>the</strong> world’s first active communications<br />
satellite. Telstar I was a product of private industry, American Telephone &<br />
Telegraph Company, launched for AT&T by NASA on a reimbursable basis. This satellite<br />
enabled a whole continent to “see” across oceans. Television programs from and to<br />
Europe, for instance, brought new, real-time sights and sounds into <strong>the</strong> homes of millions.<br />
Even though Telstar’s “mutual visibility”—<strong>the</strong> time during which signals could be sent and<br />
received—was relatively short (approximately 15 to 20 minutes), <strong>the</strong> portents of this new<br />
communications medium was immediate. With an elliptical orbit that crossed <strong>the</strong> Van<br />
Allen belts, Telstar I taught engineers a great deal about radiation damage to communications<br />
equipment. Telstar I’s technology did not prove commercially feasible, however.<br />
A legislative debate soon ensued on Capitol Hill as to how this new communications<br />
system was to be used operationally—by private industry, by a public utility, or by a<br />
Governmental agency. On August 31, 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed <strong>the</strong><br />
“Communications Satellite Act of 1962.” This law created a “communications satellite corporation<br />
for profit which will not be an agency or establishment of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government, but which would have government representation on its Board of Directors<br />
and have many of its activities regulated by Government.” A space-age development<br />
became a new business enterprise and marked a new form of Government-business collaboration.<br />
Rapid strides were made by NASA in <strong>the</strong> area of improved communication techniques.<br />
Technological advances produced by AT&T’s Telstar, NASA’s Echo, Relay, and<br />
Syncom systems soon found fur<strong>the</strong>r applications. In 1965 <strong>the</strong> control of Syncom II and<br />
Syncom III was transferred to <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense for operational communications<br />
and for study in design of military communications systems. Early Bird, <strong>the</strong> world’s
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 493<br />
commercial communications satellite, was built by <strong>the</strong> Syncom contractor, Hughes<br />
Aircraft Co., for <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation and was closely patterned on<br />
<strong>the</strong> earlier Syncom.<br />
The communications satellite in geo-synchronous orbit has become <strong>the</strong> basis for subsequent<br />
government and commercial communications satellites. In less than twenty years<br />
a multi-billion dollar industry has grown up in international and domestic space telecommunications.<br />
Applications have resulted in <strong>the</strong> rapid expansion of <strong>the</strong> cable television<br />
industry and new applications of direct broadcast technology are in <strong>the</strong> offing.<br />
One of NASA’s most recent advances in communications satellite, <strong>the</strong> Tracking and<br />
Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), was originally proposed as a commercial venture but<br />
later reorganized as a more traditional procurement.<br />
(2) Launch Vehicle Upgrade and Upper State Developments. In 1972 <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States committed itself to <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> reusable Space Shuttle and a decision<br />
was made not to spend additional public funds to improve expendable launch vehicles<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> Delta. McDonnell Douglas, <strong>the</strong> Delta’s manufacturer, undertook in 1973, a<br />
performance upgrade of <strong>the</strong> Delta called <strong>the</strong> 3914, which increased <strong>the</strong> Delta payload<br />
capability to 2000 lbs. into <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous transfer orbit. The emerging domestic<br />
communications satellite industry was very interested in <strong>the</strong> cost effectiveness of <strong>the</strong> additional<br />
Delta launch capability and this set <strong>the</strong> stage for McDonnell Douglas’ first commercial<br />
space venture. RCA became <strong>the</strong> first customer and agreements were structured<br />
between RCA, McDonnell Douglas and NASA to operate <strong>the</strong> projects as follows:<br />
• McDonnell Douglas agreed to design and develop <strong>the</strong> uprated vehicle at <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
risk on commercial funds but with profit limitations.<br />
• McDonnell Douglas agreed to recover its investment through a specified “not to<br />
exceed” customer charge for each commercial launch; however, <strong>the</strong>re would be no<br />
“investment charge” for U.S. Government use of <strong>the</strong> vehicle.<br />
• NASA agreed to contract for production and launch services of <strong>the</strong> improved vehicle<br />
as an integral part of <strong>the</strong> on-going Delta Program and would provide technical monitoring.<br />
• RCA agreed to contract with NASA for three vehicles and launch services and with<br />
McDonnell Douglas for three user development amortization payments.<br />
The first launch was successful in 1975 and as of mid-1983 <strong>the</strong>re have been 23 launches<br />
of which seven have been U.S. government missions with <strong>the</strong> remainder being commercial<br />
and foreign customers.<br />
McDonnell Douglas’ second commercial venture in this field was <strong>the</strong> Payload Assist<br />
Module (PAM-D) undertaken in 1976. PAM-D is an upper stage vehicle for Delta class<br />
satellites designed to assist launch vehicle customers in planning launches in <strong>the</strong> era of<br />
transition between expendable launch vehicles and <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle. The PAM is basically<br />
a part of <strong>the</strong> payload cargo element and as such it may be used ei<strong>the</strong>r as a third stage<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Delta or as an upper stage on Shuttle to carry <strong>the</strong> satellite into <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous<br />
transfer orbit. This provides <strong>the</strong> customer with <strong>the</strong> flexibility to plan a launch on Delta or<br />
Shuttle and a relatively easy means to shift between <strong>the</strong> two if conditions should so warrant.<br />
Again, McDonnell Douglas began this development after reaching an agreement<br />
with NASA on how <strong>the</strong> program would be performed. The primary features of this agreement<br />
were as follows:<br />
• McDonnell Douglas agreed to develop <strong>the</strong> system completely on commercial funds on<br />
a schedule compatible with <strong>the</strong> Shuttle operational requirements.<br />
• McDonnell Douglas agreed to sell PAM commercially at a specified “not-to-exceed”<br />
ceiling price along with a fixed escalation for inflationary factors in addition to profit<br />
limitations.
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SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
• NASA agreed not to fund or formally solicit <strong>the</strong> development of competitive or alternate<br />
system.<br />
• NASA agreed to provide suitable building facilities at [Kennedy Space Center] for<br />
PAM processing activities with reimbursement as a part of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle launch service<br />
contract with each customer using PAM.<br />
• NASA agreed to provide interface data and technically monitor <strong>the</strong> project.<br />
The first commercial PAM contract was signed between Hughes and McDonnell<br />
Douglas in 1978. The first flight was successful for Satellite Business Systems on Delta in<br />
November 1980. The first two flights on Shuttle were successfully completed in November<br />
1982. To mid-1983, McDonnell Douglas had contracted 29 PAM-D missions and successfully<br />
flown 10 out of 10 scheduled.<br />
In 1977 McDonnell Douglas signed a similar agreement to develop a larger PAM for<br />
Shuttle launch only called “PAM-A.” This version has comparable payload capability to <strong>the</strong><br />
Atlas Centaur ELV. After a competition with ano<strong>the</strong>r aerospace firm, NASA awarded<br />
McDonnell Douglas a Firm Fixed Price Contract for 6 PAM-A launches which has subsequently<br />
been increased to 8. There are, however, no currently assigned missions for PAM-<br />
A and no commercial sales have been achieved.<br />
In 1982 customers began requesting additional performance from <strong>the</strong> PAM-D system,<br />
but short of <strong>the</strong> more expensive PAM-A capability. As a result McDonnell Douglas decided<br />
to commercially undertake a growth version called “PAM-DII,” which includes a new<br />
motor and raises <strong>the</strong> payload capability to approximately 4100 lbs. into <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous<br />
transfer orbit. An initial commercial contract resulted from a 1983 order by GTE<br />
Satellite Corporation. NASA has agreed to provide technical monitoring.<br />
In early 1983 NASA entered into a cooperative agreement with Orbital Systems<br />
Corporation, an entirely new company, to provide for <strong>the</strong> production of ano<strong>the</strong>r shuttlecompatible<br />
upper stage, <strong>the</strong> Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS). NASA has no current need for<br />
such an upper stage for its in-house programs but is cooperating with Orbital Systems to<br />
optimize Shuttle capabilities for commercial customers who may wish to purchase such an<br />
upper stage. The TOS is privately funded but has NASA technical monitoring and NASA’s<br />
agreement not to build a competing upper stage.<br />
b. Joint Endeavor Agreements. The Joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA) was originally<br />
developed to facilitate NASA’s interest in involving <strong>the</strong> private sector in materials processing<br />
in space (MPS) but its basic provisions are applicable to o<strong>the</strong>r areas of space industrialization.<br />
The JEA is a cooperative arrangement in which private participants and NASA share<br />
common program objectives, program responsibilities, and financial risk. The objective of<br />
a JEA is to encourage early space ventures and demonstrate <strong>the</strong> usefulness of space technology<br />
to meet marketplace needs. A JEA is a legal agreement between equal partners,<br />
and is not a procurement action; no funds are exchanged between NASA and <strong>the</strong> industrial<br />
partner. A private participant selects an experiment and/or technology demonstration<br />
for a joint endeavor which complies with MPS program objectives, conducts <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary ground investigation, and develops flight hardware at company expense. As<br />
incentive for this investment, NASA agrees to provide free Shuttle flights for projects<br />
which meet certain basic criteria, such as technical merit, contribution to innovation, and<br />
acceptable business arrangements. As fur<strong>the</strong>r incentive, <strong>the</strong> participant is allowed to<br />
retain certain proprietary rights to <strong>the</strong> results, particularly <strong>the</strong> nonpatentable information<br />
that yields a competitive edge in marketing products based on MPS results. However,<br />
NASA receives sufficient data to evaluate <strong>the</strong> significance of <strong>the</strong> results and requires that<br />
any promising technologies be applied commercially on a timely basis, or published.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 495<br />
The first JEA signed in 1980 involved McDonnell Douglas and OrthoPharmaceuticals<br />
in a project titled continuous flow electrophoresis which promises higher quantities and<br />
quality of certain pharmaceuticals produced in space. Successful experiments have been<br />
conducted on several Shuttle flights. A JEA for <strong>the</strong> purpose of producing Galium [sic]<br />
Arsenide crystals in space was signed between NASA and Micro Gravity Research<br />
Associates in 1983. O<strong>the</strong>r MPS JEA’s are under consideration.<br />
An example of JEA extending outside <strong>the</strong> MPS area is <strong>the</strong> recent NASA-Fairchild JEA<br />
concerning <strong>the</strong> development of a space platform for lease. O<strong>the</strong>r proposed JEA’s deal with<br />
development of Shuttle payload carriers.<br />
c. Technical Exchange Agreements. For companies interested in applying microgravity<br />
technology, but not ready to commit to a specific space flight experiment or venture,<br />
NASA has developed <strong>the</strong> Technical Exchange Agreement (TEA). Under a TEA,<br />
NASA and a company agree to exchange technical information and cooperate in <strong>the</strong> conduct<br />
and analysis of ground-based research programs. In this agreement, a firm can<br />
become familiar with microgravity technology and its applicability to <strong>the</strong> company product<br />
line at minimal expense. Under TEA, <strong>the</strong> private company funds its own participation,<br />
and derives direct access to and results from NASA facilities and research, with NASA gaining<br />
<strong>the</strong> support and expertise of <strong>the</strong> private company’s industrial research capability.<br />
Several MPS TEAs have been signed and o<strong>the</strong>rs are proposed. NASA has provided<br />
microgravity drop tube use and aircraft flights, among o<strong>the</strong>r facilities, to support <strong>the</strong>se<br />
efforts.<br />
d. Industrial Guest Investigators. In an Industrial Guest Investigator (IGI)<br />
Agreement NASA and industry share sufficient mutual scientific interest that a company<br />
arranges for one of its scientists to collaborate (at company expense) with a NASA-sponsored<br />
principal investigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once <strong>the</strong> parties agree to<br />
<strong>the</strong> contribution to be made to <strong>the</strong> objectives of <strong>the</strong> experiment, <strong>the</strong> IGI becomes a member<br />
of <strong>the</strong> investigation team, thus adding industrial expertise and insight to <strong>the</strong> experiment.<br />
A number of IGI agreements have been undertaken.<br />
e. Commercial Launch Vehicles.<br />
(1) Commercialization of NASA ELV Systems. Because of <strong>the</strong> nation’s commitment<br />
to <strong>the</strong> reusable Space Shuttle both NASA and <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense plan to<br />
terminate use of expendable launch vehicles. In May 1983 <strong>the</strong> President decided that <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector should be given <strong>the</strong> opportunity to operate <strong>the</strong>se systems on a commercial<br />
basis. NASA is in <strong>the</strong> process of exploring ways to transfer <strong>the</strong> production and operation<br />
of its ELV systems to <strong>the</strong> private sector. By transferring <strong>the</strong>se systems it is hoped that <strong>the</strong><br />
existing production and launch facilities will remain a valuable national resource ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than be reduced to scrap but that government will be relieved of <strong>the</strong> cost of maintaining<br />
a redundant launch system. Transfer will require termination of various procurement contracts<br />
and execution of multi-faceted facility use agreements.<br />
(2) Privately Developed Launch Vehicles. NASA personnel provided advice and<br />
guidance to Space Services, Inc. (SSI) in its attempts to develop a space rocket. In 1982<br />
SSI successfully launched a sub-orbital rocket to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> ability of a private company<br />
in this field. Pursuant to a cooperative agreement, NASA provided <strong>the</strong> rocket motor<br />
for SSI’s demonstration flight. It is believed that this demonstration generated great interest<br />
in <strong>the</strong> private operations of space launch vehicles and support system. SSI is continuing<br />
to develop a low cost orbital launch vehicle which will have slightly greater capability<br />
than NASA’s Scout vehicle. SSI has requested NASA to agree not to restart Scout production<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>rwise compete in <strong>the</strong> low weight, low earth-orbit commercial market.
496<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
NASA has also provided limited advice and technical assistance to ARC Technologies<br />
in its attempt to develop a launch vehicle. The proposed ARC vehicle is based on propulsion<br />
technology originally developed by <strong>the</strong> government but later abandoned. If successful,<br />
ARC may add to America’s technological resources. In addition to NASA’s advice ARC<br />
has requested tracking and data services from ano<strong>the</strong>r government agency.<br />
f. O<strong>the</strong>r Transactions. NASA’s current and projected programs and policies can<br />
facilitate commercial space ventures in a variety of ways.<br />
(1) Patents. NASA views its patent program as an integral portion of its mission<br />
responsibility to encourage new technology and foster <strong>the</strong> utilization and commercialization<br />
of NASA supported technologies. The statutory basis for <strong>the</strong> agency’s patent policy is<br />
Section 305 of <strong>the</strong> Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. Accordingly, NASA acquires title to<br />
all inventions under contract unless <strong>the</strong> Administrator decides that waiver of title to <strong>the</strong><br />
contractor would be in <strong>the</strong> public interest (sec. 305(f)). Thus, <strong>the</strong> agency was granted<br />
broad waiver authority, but is required to retain a broad royalty-free license to all inventions<br />
under contract so that <strong>the</strong> waiver of title in actuality amounts to a waiver of commercial<br />
rights only. NASA patent regulations are found at Title 14 Code of Federal<br />
Regulations, Part 1245.<br />
(i) Patent Waivers.<br />
There are two types of domestic waivers granted by NASA: (1) advance waivers which<br />
are applicable to inventions made under a contract; and (2) waivers for inventions subsequently<br />
reported under a contract. The granting of waivers is authorized by <strong>the</strong><br />
Administrator upon <strong>the</strong> recommendation of <strong>the</strong> Inventions and Contributions Board set<br />
up under section 305(f) of <strong>the</strong> 1958 Act. However, all waivers are subject to <strong>the</strong> retention<br />
of NASA of a broad, irrevocable royalty-free license and of “march-in rights.” March-in<br />
rights permit <strong>the</strong> agency to intervene if it believes that inventions are being suppressed,<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re is a danger to <strong>the</strong> public health and safety, or that a company is not meeting<br />
Government regulations. The agency also retains <strong>the</strong> authority to void waivers if a firm<br />
fails to report on its commercialization activities.<br />
Seventy-five percent of <strong>the</strong> requests for waiver have been granted. However, to date<br />
this represents only a small number of waivers because <strong>the</strong>re have been few requests.<br />
(ii) Patent Licenses.<br />
NASA patent licensing regulations were promulgated to use <strong>the</strong> patent system to promote<br />
<strong>the</strong> utilization of inventions arising from NASA supported research and development.<br />
An applicant is required to supply NASA with a satisfactory plan for development<br />
or marketing of <strong>the</strong> licensed inventions, or both, and with information about <strong>the</strong> applicant’s<br />
capability to fulfill <strong>the</strong> plan.<br />
(iii) Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in Commercial Space Activities.<br />
In recognition of <strong>the</strong> substantial investment necessary to develop <strong>the</strong> electrophoresis<br />
experiment and o<strong>the</strong>r activities conducted as joint endeavors, NASA negotiated special<br />
clauses dealing with inventions and technical data. Typical clauses provide that as long as<br />
<strong>the</strong> party engaged in <strong>the</strong> joint endeavor with NASA continued to pursue <strong>the</strong> experiment,<br />
that party would retain all rights to inventions and proprietary technical data. NASA<br />
would not take a government license or any “march-in” rights to require licensing of o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
The only exception is if <strong>the</strong> NASA Administrator, in response to a national emergency,<br />
determines that an invention made in <strong>the</strong> performance of <strong>the</strong> joint endeavor is urgently<br />
needed for public health reasons. NASA intends to continue to use its flexibility to accord<br />
full rights to inventions and proprietary technical information to private parties willing to<br />
invest substantial sums in joint endeavor agreements.<br />
(2) Privatization and Commercialization of Space Infra-structure. The transfer of<br />
Government ELV systems based on a Presidential decision was described above and men-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 497<br />
tion was made of privately financed upper-stages. These are prototypes for transferring<br />
existing infra-structure and creating new infra-structure through private investment.<br />
NASA believes its policy of acquiring and operating its facilities, equipment, and technical<br />
services through industrial contractors has built a competence for supporting new<br />
initiatives and exploiting space technology in <strong>the</strong> private sector. For example, several proposals<br />
to NASA involve private financing of some of <strong>the</strong> shuttle infrastructure. These are<br />
opportunities to facilitate <strong>the</strong> commercialization process and reduce NASA funding<br />
requirements without posing a threat to NASA’s principal mission—research and development.<br />
Therefore, in certain instances, after identifying a specific requirement for a product<br />
or service and determining that <strong>the</strong>re is no compelling need to meet <strong>the</strong> requirement<br />
through a traditional NASA-controlled development program, NASA will advertise <strong>the</strong><br />
need within <strong>the</strong> private sector as a commercial opportunity concurrently announcing that<br />
it will not initiate a competitive development. Difficulties encountered in <strong>the</strong> tracking and<br />
data relay satellite program in accommodating governmental and commercial function in<br />
a single spacecraft have made NASA keenly aware of <strong>the</strong> importance of a thorough examination<br />
of <strong>the</strong> government’s interest before making a private sector commitment.<br />
(3) The Aeronautics Model. Events over <strong>the</strong> past twenty years have established a<br />
two-fold R&D role for NASA in space applications—namely, to explore new opportunities<br />
for <strong>the</strong> application of space technology and to improve demonstrated technologies to<br />
achieve <strong>the</strong> extensive operational capabilities available today. NASA believes <strong>the</strong>se activities<br />
support critical national needs; <strong>the</strong>refore, this NASA role should be continued and<br />
expanded. An element of this role is perhaps best illustrated by <strong>the</strong> need to advance communications<br />
technology including work in <strong>the</strong> 30–20 GHz frequency range. Since its<br />
demonstration in <strong>the</strong> early 1960’s, <strong>the</strong> private sector has translated synchronous communications<br />
satellite technology into a highly successful growth industry. The communications<br />
satellite industry is <strong>the</strong> principal current example of commercialization of space<br />
technology, yet new technological breakthroughs are now required to maintain U.S. leadership<br />
and to realize continued economic benefits. The estimated cost of this advanced<br />
technology development exceeds <strong>the</strong> financial capability of any single firm in <strong>the</strong> industry.<br />
NASA intends to pursue this R&D requirement and any similar cases in space applications<br />
through demonstration of <strong>the</strong> applicable technology. In so doing, NASA will<br />
explore <strong>the</strong> feasibility of adapting <strong>the</strong> mutually beneficial experience accruing from <strong>the</strong><br />
government/industry working relationships in conducting its aeronautical research programs,<br />
wherein NASA conducts R&D and in certain cases industry performs hardware fabrication<br />
and flight testing of new technologies under cost-sharing arrangements.<br />
(4) Small Business Innovation Research. NASA has implemented <strong>the</strong> first stage of<br />
its SBIR program pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Small Business Innovation Development Act. The purpose<br />
of <strong>the</strong> statute is to set aside a portion of each agency’s extramural R&D budget to<br />
assist in a substantial way small business in bringing to market advanced R&D products<br />
and services. The SBIR program though not specifically related to “in space” commercialization<br />
does attempt to develop space technology and its applications to <strong>the</strong> point of<br />
commercial viability.<br />
The Small Business Innovation Development Act requires an escalated expenditure of<br />
an agency’s R&D funds according to a set formula where <strong>the</strong> extramural R&D budget is over<br />
$100,000,000: in <strong>the</strong> first year 0.2 percent; 0.6 in <strong>the</strong> second; 1.0 in <strong>the</strong> third fiscal year; and,<br />
not less than 1.25 percent in all subsequent fiscal years. For NASA, this means $5 million in<br />
1983 and $12 million in 1984, with a subsequent reduction in dollar amounts in later years<br />
as all Shuttle activities are treated as operational and not R&D for budget purposes.<br />
The SBIR program is required to be conducted in three phases, only two of which will<br />
be funded by <strong>the</strong> Government. In <strong>the</strong> first phase, contractors are to prove <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir proposed scientific and technical ideas. Up to $50,000 will be awarded for selected<br />
Phase I proposals which will be conducted, normally, within six months. Price
498<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
competition is not a factor in selection, but value to <strong>the</strong> Government is. In Phase II,<br />
embodying <strong>the</strong> principal research effort, awards will be made to Phase I contractors whose<br />
work shows promise of producing something of value for <strong>the</strong> agency in terms of technical<br />
merit and feasibility. Special consideration will be given to proposals which demonstrate<br />
funding commitments to development of commercial application of <strong>the</strong> idea. Phase II<br />
awards are expected to be in amounts of up to $500,000 for a period of performance, generally,<br />
not to exceed 24 months. In both Phase I and II contracts, a profit or fee may be<br />
included. Phase III, hopefully, will involve private market funding support of contractor<br />
efforts with ultimate commercialization of <strong>the</strong> product or service.<br />
In order to be eligible to propose, a contractor must be a small business. And, <strong>the</strong> proposer<br />
must be <strong>the</strong> primary source of employment of <strong>the</strong> principal investigator. However,<br />
some subcontracting is permitted in both phases and joint ventures are permitted and<br />
even encouraged, providing small business eligibility standards for <strong>the</strong> proposers are<br />
maintained.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> most significant aspects of <strong>the</strong> SBIR contracts yet to be resolved is <strong>the</strong> exact<br />
nature of <strong>the</strong> data rights issue; nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> statute nor <strong>the</strong> SBA [Small Business<br />
Administration] have given clear guidance on this issue which must be resolved in a uniform<br />
manner throughout <strong>the</strong> SBIR program.<br />
An SBIR program was established at NASA Headquarters in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Aeronautics<br />
and Space Technology to coordinate and handle <strong>the</strong> development of topics, and to conduct<br />
<strong>the</strong> selection process. Topics were proposed by <strong>the</strong> NASA field centers, evaluated and culled<br />
at Headquarters for inclusion in a topic list sent out with <strong>the</strong> solicitation. Evaluation and<br />
selection of winning proposals are accomplished through panels of NASA scientific and<br />
technical experts. Awards of contracts will be made by <strong>the</strong> SBIR office with <strong>the</strong> administration<br />
at <strong>the</strong> field center from which <strong>the</strong> topic originated. Initial first phase contract awards<br />
have been made. If this program proves successful, NASA may extend <strong>the</strong> concept beyond<br />
<strong>the</strong> original statutory requirements as an adjunct of its commercialization program.<br />
Document III-18<br />
Document title: “Space Commercialization Meeting,” memo with agenda, participants,<br />
and outline of policy issues, The White House, August 3, 1983.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
In 1983, <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration decided to encourage <strong>the</strong> private sector to invest in space research<br />
and commercialization and wanted to understand what government policies would provide <strong>the</strong> best<br />
climate for private investment in space. A meeting was held at <strong>the</strong> White House with business and<br />
government leaders to discuss measures that would stimulate private-sector industrial activity in<br />
space. This meeting was one of <strong>the</strong> first very high-level and visible signals from <strong>the</strong> government to business<br />
to plan for a new era in space of profit-making opportunities, manufacturing, and o<strong>the</strong>r activities.<br />
It was also a direct signal to business that <strong>the</strong> planned space station would be available for<br />
commercial opportunities and that to advance <strong>the</strong> plans for <strong>the</strong> station, <strong>the</strong> lobbying and support of<br />
<strong>the</strong> business sector would be important.
August 3, 1983<br />
Space Commercialization Meeting<br />
Agenda<br />
1. Introduction Craig L. Fuller<br />
2. Welcome Edwin Meese III<br />
James M. Beggs<br />
3. Review of Issue Outline Craig L. Fuller<br />
4. Discussion of Commercial Space Issues All Participants<br />
5. Lunch with <strong>the</strong> President All Participants<br />
6. Summary All Participants<br />
Luncheon With <strong>the</strong> President<br />
Old Family Dining Room<br />
August 3, 1983<br />
12 noon<br />
Participants<br />
Mr. John F. Yardley<br />
President, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics<br />
St. Louis, Missouri<br />
Mr. Maxime A. Faget<br />
President, Space Industries, Inc.<br />
Houston, Texas<br />
Mr. Robert A. Hanson<br />
Chairman and Chief Executive <strong>Office</strong>r<br />
Deere & Company<br />
Moline, Illinois<br />
Mr. Frederick W. Smith<br />
Chairman and Chief Executive <strong>Office</strong>r<br />
Federal Express Corporation<br />
Memphis, Tennessee<br />
Mr. George Jeffs<br />
President of North American Space Operations<br />
Rockwell International<br />
El Segundo, California<br />
Mr. George Skurla<br />
Chairman and President<br />
Grumman Aerospace Corporation<br />
Bethpage, New York<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 499
500<br />
Mr. David Thompson<br />
President, Orbital Systems Corporation<br />
Vienna, Virginia<br />
Mr. David Hannah<br />
President, Space Services Incorporated<br />
Houston, Texas<br />
Mr. Oliver C. Boileau<br />
President, General Dynamics Corporation<br />
St. Louis, Missouri<br />
Dr. Klaus P. Heiss<br />
New York, New York<br />
Mr. John Latshaw<br />
Executive Vice President and Managing Director<br />
E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc.<br />
Kansas City, Missouri<br />
Dr. John W. Townsend, Jr.<br />
President<br />
Fairchild Space Company<br />
Germantown, Maryland<br />
Departments<br />
The Honorable James M. Beggs<br />
Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
The Honorable Clarence J. Brown<br />
Deputy Secretary-designate<br />
Department of Commerce<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Mr. Llewellyn Evans<br />
Assistant to <strong>the</strong> Associate Deputy Administrator<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
White House Staff<br />
Edwin Meese III<br />
Richard G. Darman<br />
Craig L. Fuller<br />
George A. Keyworth, II<br />
Gilbert D. Rye<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 501<br />
Outline of Commercial Space Policy Issues<br />
1. How does <strong>the</strong> Administration insure a consistent Federal space policy?<br />
2. What constitutes a fair and favorable pricing policy?<br />
3. What economic incentives should be considered to promote commercial space activity?<br />
• profit<br />
• tax credits<br />
• depreciation<br />
• low cost capital<br />
• free R&D flight time<br />
• risk sharing/risk reduction<br />
• insurance pools<br />
4. What Federal funding/program commitments are important?<br />
• shuttle availability<br />
• space station: manned and unmanned<br />
• basic research<br />
5. How will property rights be protected?<br />
• patent law<br />
• proprietary protections<br />
6. What techniques should be used to expand <strong>the</strong> market for commercial space activities?<br />
• special government procurement policies<br />
• period of exclusivity for high risk, high-cost, high-benefit ventures<br />
• facilitate private sector access to government data<br />
• provide market guarantees for space products<br />
• heighten awareness about commercial space ventures<br />
7. What is <strong>the</strong> appropriate role for NASA?<br />
• STS operations<br />
• research<br />
• regulator<br />
8. What regulatory barriers exist that could retard commercial space development?<br />
• overlapping jurisdictions<br />
• unfavorable regulations<br />
9. What national security issues affect commercial space ventures?<br />
• need to reexamine classification policies and procedures<br />
• reassess international space issues (technology transfer, foreign cooperative projects,<br />
etc.) given foreign competition<br />
Document III-19<br />
Document title: Craig L. Fuller, The White House, Memorandum for <strong>the</strong> Cabinet Council<br />
on Commerce and Trade, “Commercial Space Initiatives,” April 10, 1984, with attached:<br />
“Private Enterprise in Space—An Industry View,” pp. iv–v.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.<br />
This memo and <strong>the</strong> attached document (below is only <strong>the</strong> introduction) summarized a series of issue<br />
papers prepared by business and government interests. The White House was a strong supporter of<br />
space commercialization, and this memo detailed <strong>the</strong> initiatives that industry felt would be necessary<br />
for <strong>the</strong> government to begin opening space to business opportunities. Craig Fuller was a White House<br />
staff member for <strong>the</strong> Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade who had a particular interest in space<br />
commercialization.
502<br />
April 10, 1984<br />
Memorandum for <strong>the</strong> Cabinet Council<br />
on Commerce and Trade<br />
FROM: Craig L. Fuller [hand-initialed: “CLF”]<br />
SUBJECT: Commercial Space Initiatives<br />
The President and Congress have expressed strong support of expanding private sector<br />
involvement in space. The success of recent shuttle flights has stimulated interest in<br />
possibilities of profitable free-enterprise businesses in space. The attached set of issue<br />
papers were developed by a diverse group of business leaders who met with <strong>the</strong> President<br />
last summer. The issue papers deal with initiatives that <strong>the</strong> Nation might take to help stimulate<br />
commercial space endeavors. With <strong>the</strong> Government as a partner, private sector<br />
enterprise can help turn space into an arena of immense benefits for our Nation.<br />
In light of <strong>the</strong> President’s desire to encourage such private investment in space, I<br />
would appreciate your having your staff review <strong>the</strong> attached issue papers. Please appoint<br />
a representative to serve on a Cabinet Council for Commerce and Trade Working Group<br />
that will be responsible for assuring appropriate coverage of critical agency concerns.<br />
NASA will chair <strong>the</strong> working group to discuss agency comments.<br />
Please provide initial comments by c.o.b., April 16th.<br />
cc: Members of SIG/Space<br />
**********<br />
[this page and <strong>the</strong> following pages are rubber stamped “DRAFT”]<br />
Private Enterprise in Space—An Industry View<br />
The following analyses of potential commercial initiatives were drawn by a<br />
15-member Commercial Space Group made up of representatives from diverse private<br />
sector firms. They examined opportunities in and impediments to <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
use of space. . . .<br />
[iv] INTRODUCTION<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Historians may look at <strong>the</strong> 1980’s as <strong>the</strong> beginning of an industrial revolution in space.<br />
They may pinpoint <strong>the</strong>se years as <strong>the</strong> period in which U.S. business and Government<br />
joined in partnership to set up shop in orbit. The industrial move spaceward may presage<br />
a new economic and social expansion as well as a reemphasis of <strong>the</strong> United States’ technological<br />
leadership.<br />
Private undertakings in space promise <strong>the</strong> same rewards for our national welfare<br />
which free enterprise has historically bestowed on our people—jobs, higher living standards,<br />
new outlets for innovation and imagination, additional stimulation of technical<br />
education and new possibilities for investments and profits. It also can be expected to<br />
enhance our balance of payments and our national security and prestige.<br />
Nine spectacularly successful flights by NASA’s two Shuttles have shown that our<br />
nation is on <strong>the</strong> verge of a space transportation system sufficiently dependable to support
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 503<br />
space industries. Facilities for permanent manned operations in orbit are becoming feasible.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> first time it could become possible to assure industry of routine access to<br />
orbit and a suitable place to work once <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
Though <strong>the</strong> technology is ripe, manmade barriers block or slow private sector<br />
entrance to space. Laws and regulations enacted long before private investments in space<br />
were envisioned still govern commercial space operations. Onerous tax and tariff laws and<br />
regulations and outdated or inappropriate administrative mechanisms are discouraging<br />
even some of <strong>the</strong> staunchest advocates of investment in commercial space endeavors.<br />
To <strong>the</strong>se artificial handicaps must be added <strong>the</strong> natural high risks and costs inherent<br />
in space operations. Expenditures for building and launching research and manufacturing<br />
equipment for use in space can require investments from 10 to more than 100 times<br />
as large as for comparable facilities on <strong>the</strong> Earth. The danger of loss is many times greater<br />
in space. The possibilities of quick profit are low.<br />
Yet, <strong>the</strong> ultimate social, economic and technological benefits for our nation and individual<br />
citizens justify <strong>the</strong> risks. Privately owned and operated, highly profitable communications<br />
satellites are already demonstrating that free enterprise in space works well.<br />
Prolonged near-weightlessness and o<strong>the</strong>r unique attributes of space may make possible<br />
<strong>the</strong> manufacture of unprecedented products: medical preparations for fighting some<br />
of our most widespread diseases; alloys stronger yet lighter than any presently known; electronic<br />
components for faster and smarter computers and better electronic machines than<br />
are now available, and systems for almost universal information availability to increase <strong>the</strong><br />
diffusion of knowledge.<br />
[v] Domestic and international markets for space-based products and services are estimated<br />
to be immense and <strong>the</strong>y may grow geometrically. Understandably, competitors<br />
abroad are experimenting in all of <strong>the</strong>se fields. Foreign subsidies are often large and<br />
extend beyond research and development into production and marketing.<br />
The accompanying 20 issue papers, in six categories, discuss each of <strong>the</strong> major problems<br />
connected with <strong>the</strong> commercialization of space:<br />
National Commercial Space Policy. Because commercial developments in space often<br />
require many years to reach <strong>the</strong> production phase, entrepreneurs need assurances of<br />
consistent Government actions and policies over long periods.<br />
Economic Incentives. Laws and regulations which discriminate against commercial<br />
space ventures need to be changed or eliminated.<br />
Expanded Government Research. In partnership with industry and academia, NASA<br />
needs to expand basic and applied research and improve dissemination of research<br />
results which may have implications for investors aiming to develop marketable products<br />
and services.<br />
Role of Federal Agencies. Responsibilities of U.S. Government Agencies relating to<br />
commercial space activities need to be firmly assigned and clearly defined.<br />
Legal and Regulatory Barriers. Laws and regulations predating space operations need<br />
to be updated to accommodate space commercialization.<br />
National Security Issues. Gaining access to Government-owned technical information<br />
and assuring fair international competition are among major concerns of prospective<br />
investors in space endeavors.
504<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The entrance of free enterprise into space for commercial activities conforms with<br />
national traditions. Private initiative has been <strong>the</strong> foundation of our nation’s development<br />
and progress from its beginning. Even during <strong>the</strong> earliest explorations of <strong>the</strong> North<br />
American continent, explorers and pioneers were followed by traders and craftsmen who<br />
came to serve new settlements. Now, industrial entrepreneurs are following our astronauts<br />
into <strong>the</strong> new realms.<br />
Commercial expertise will perhaps do for space what <strong>the</strong> earliest American settlers did<br />
for our continent. They turned forbidding regions into prosperous and hospitable inhabited<br />
areas.<br />
Commercialization will also perhaps do for space what Charles Lindbergh did for aviation.<br />
It will show that space is a vital arena for commercial and industrial activities. Outer<br />
space is perhaps <strong>the</strong> 21st-century equivalent of a new continent waiting to share its wealth.<br />
The partnership required for <strong>the</strong>se undertakings by <strong>the</strong> Government, industry, academia<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r sectors in our society can only streng<strong>the</strong>n our nation. Space commercialization<br />
is perhaps as much our nation’s manifest destiny as was <strong>the</strong> taming of lands earlier in our<br />
history. . . .<br />
Document III-20<br />
Document title: “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing, Phase II Final<br />
Report,” Volume I: Executive Summary, MDC E1625, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics<br />
Company, East St. Louis, Missouri, January 15, 1977, pp. 1–2, 8–20.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This is one of a series of studies that were done for <strong>the</strong> Marshall Space Flight Center in <strong>the</strong> late 1970s.<br />
Initial NASA funding of industry to look at manufacturing goods in space led to fur<strong>the</strong>r R&D by<br />
companies and to experiments on <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle.<br />
Feasibility Study of<br />
Commercial Space Manufacturing<br />
Phase II<br />
Final Report<br />
Volume I<br />
Executive Summary<br />
[1] SPACE MANUFACTURING<br />
1.0 INTRODUCTION<br />
15 January 1977<br />
[originally set in two newspaper-style columns] Space processing experiments conducted<br />
during <strong>the</strong> Skylab and ASTP [Apollo-Soyuz Test Project] missions have shown that<br />
<strong>the</strong> space environment has some unique effects on materials processing. It is potentially<br />
possible to translate <strong>the</strong>se effects into tangible benefits such as commercial products produced<br />
in space. To fully develop this potential, however, requires industry participation to
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 505<br />
guide, direct and implement space manufacturing operations. The purpose of this study<br />
was to examine <strong>the</strong> feasibility of establishing commercial space manufacturing operations,<br />
and thus assess <strong>the</strong> potential participation of commercial industry. This study analysis was<br />
divided into two phases. Phase I assessed <strong>the</strong> technical feasibility along with a preliminary<br />
economic evaluation; Phase II assessed <strong>the</strong> commercial and business aspects of implementing<br />
commercial space manufacturing.<br />
The approach taken was to use a model product to assess <strong>the</strong> technical and economic<br />
feasibility of commercial space manufacturing. The principal data to aid <strong>the</strong> selection of a<br />
model product were <strong>the</strong> experimental results of space processing experiments on Skylab.<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> most promising experimental results were in <strong>the</strong> area of crystal growth, such<br />
as uniform distribution of dopant elements(1) and crystal facets which were flat within a<br />
few hundred Angstroms(2). Because of <strong>the</strong>se potential improvements, crystal processing<br />
was selected for fur<strong>the</strong>r investigation. Since <strong>the</strong> most widely used crystal material is semiconductor<br />
silicon, and technical and economic data were available as a basis for study, it<br />
was selected as our candidate material. One economic consideration that led to silicon<br />
selection as a model product was that new products have a better chance of success if <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are entering existing, growing markets(3) and silicon was found to be in a growing market.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> selection of a model product for analysis, <strong>the</strong> following steps were found to<br />
be necessary in formulating an implementation plan for a space-manufactured product:<br />
• Market analysis for system sizing } Phase I<br />
• Technical evaluation and plant design } Phase I<br />
• Product value assessment relative to earth product } Phase I<br />
• Financial analysis for commercial operations } Phase II<br />
• Risk assessment } Phase II<br />
• Adjust financial returns for risk } Phase II<br />
• Organizational evaluation } Phase II<br />
A nominal market analysis was completed during <strong>the</strong> Phase I study and is updated for<br />
this Phase II analysis. Evaluation of <strong>the</strong> first three steps were reported in detail in <strong>the</strong><br />
Phase I final report and will only be summarized here for background information.<br />
[2] 2.0 MARKET ANALYSIS<br />
In order to determine how <strong>the</strong> value and market for space produced silicon could<br />
best be developed, an analysis of <strong>the</strong> semiconductor market was undertaken to both<br />
understand and identify market characteristics. These characteristics included type and<br />
extent of market segmentation, trends, product life cycle, and competition.<br />
The market analysis results are illustrated by <strong>the</strong> projected world market for semiconductor<br />
devices as shown in Figure 1. This market is composed of discrete devices and<br />
integrated circuits, is currently about $5B, and is growing at an annual rate of 11%. Single<br />
crystal silicon for use in integrated circuits requires extremely high quality material in<br />
terms of purity and structure. The damaging effect of defects increases with circuit size<br />
and is greatest for large scale integrated circuits (LSI). These LSI would be a candidate<br />
application for space processed silicon if <strong>the</strong> promising experimental results could be realized<br />
in a developed process.<br />
Crystal manufacturers estimate silicon material sales to be about 8% of device sales;<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore, materials sales [original placement of Figure 1] for LSI, <strong>the</strong> fastest growing<br />
market segment, is projected to be about $0.64B annually by 1985. Ten percent of <strong>the</strong> LSI<br />
segment of <strong>the</strong> 1985 market was set as a goal. Since <strong>the</strong>re are approximately 10 companies<br />
currently producing single crystal silicon, and <strong>the</strong> market is growing at an 11% rate, this<br />
10% market capture was felt to be a reasonable, conservative objective. This 10% market<br />
set our initial production rate which was used to size <strong>the</strong> overall production system. . . .
506<br />
Total Semiconductor Sales—$B<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Figure 1. Project world semiconductor market<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Large Scale<br />
Integrated<br />
Circuits (LSI)<br />
0<br />
0<br />
1975 1980 1985 1990<br />
[8] 5.0 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS<br />
The ten plant economic analysis baseline was selected on <strong>the</strong> basis of satisfying 10%<br />
of <strong>the</strong> 1985 LSI silicon substrate market. The estimated 1985 Earth manufactured silicon<br />
sales for LSI of $0.64B shown in Figure 1 would correspond to an annual production of<br />
0.47M kg of wafers at $1360 per kg, equivalent in kg to <strong>the</strong> output of 200 space manufacturing<br />
plants. Because of increased processing yield, however, only 110 plants would be<br />
required for <strong>the</strong> same number of integrated circuits with each plant satisfying about 1%<br />
of <strong>the</strong> 1985 LSI material market.<br />
To illustrate <strong>the</strong> potential economic feasibility of <strong>the</strong> space manufacture of silicon ribbon,<br />
<strong>the</strong> allowable cost of $7560/kg is compared with <strong>the</strong> manufacturing cost of<br />
$2930/kg. This comparison results in a positive economic benefit of $4630/kg. In Figure<br />
11 all <strong>the</strong> costs and sales for <strong>the</strong> three years of design, development, test, engineering, and<br />
fabrication, <strong>the</strong> five years of production, and one year of run out are included over <strong>the</strong><br />
five year production period for a ten plant operation.<br />
Figure 11 illustrates <strong>the</strong> distribution of all <strong>the</strong> cal-<br />
$900M Sales 118,000kg at $7560/kg<br />
$460M Pretax Earnings<br />
(51% of Sales)<br />
$180M Launch and Depreciation<br />
$140M Selling and Administrative<br />
(15% of Sales)<br />
$120M Revisit and Raw Materials<br />
Total<br />
Semiconductor Sales<br />
Integrated<br />
Circuit Sales<br />
LSI Sales<br />
Figure 11. Pretax earnings (10 plants, 5 years)<br />
culated cost elements for space manufacturing and<br />
<strong>the</strong> resultant earnings. The pretax earnings are 51%<br />
of sales. The costs include launch (Shuttle user<br />
charge $21M/launch), depreciation, selling and<br />
administrative cost at 15% of sales, <strong>the</strong> shared-launch<br />
revisit charge of $840/kg, and raw material cost of<br />
$70/kg. If production continues after <strong>the</strong> fifth year<br />
when all <strong>the</strong> launch and depreciation costs are<br />
expensed, <strong>the</strong> pre-tax earnings for subsequent years<br />
would be 71% of sales.<br />
While it is important that <strong>the</strong> potential value of<br />
silicon ribbon manufactured in space is about two<br />
and one half (2-1/2) times <strong>the</strong> space manufacturing<br />
cost for a ten plant operation, space [original placement<br />
of Figure 11] manufacturing must also be evaluated<br />
in terms of <strong>the</strong> capital investment and risks<br />
involved. Capital investment decisions must take into<br />
account <strong>the</strong> time value of money; that is, a dollar<br />
spent on plant today is worth more than <strong>the</strong> promise<br />
2<br />
1<br />
Material Sales—$B
of a dollar of profit from future operations. This is accomplished by discounting <strong>the</strong><br />
future expenditures and receipts (cash flows) at a constant annual rate. If <strong>the</strong> sum of all<br />
<strong>the</strong> discounted cash flows for a project equals zero, <strong>the</strong>n this rate is defined as <strong>the</strong> rate of<br />
Return on Investment (ROI) or Internal Rate of Return (IRR). This rate is analogous to<br />
an annual after-tax interest rate on <strong>the</strong> dollars at risk. The cash flows for a 10 plant operation<br />
are shown in Figure 12. The shaded areas represent <strong>the</strong> present values of <strong>the</strong> cash<br />
flows discounted at [9] [original placement of Figure 12] <strong>the</strong> rate of return on investment.<br />
The negative cash flows during <strong>the</strong> first three years represent <strong>the</strong> investment for<br />
plant construction. As shown, <strong>the</strong> ROI is 29.5%, which for an effective corporate tax rate<br />
of 48%, is analogous to a pretax return of 57%.<br />
Annual Cash Flow—$M<br />
120<br />
80<br />
40<br />
Figure 12. 10 plant cash flow<br />
0<br />
-40<br />
-80<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 507<br />
Cash Flow, Receipts Positive<br />
Present Value at 29.5% Return on Investment (ROI)<br />
Cumulative Cash Flow $248M<br />
Cumulative Present Value 0<br />
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9<br />
Year<br />
In a sensitivity analysis of rate of return on investment <strong>the</strong> number of plants, plant first<br />
unit cost, and integrated circuit processing yield (ribbon value) were found to be <strong>the</strong><br />
major cost drivers, while Shuttle transportation cost was found to have a more moderate<br />
effect. The variation of return on investment with <strong>the</strong> total number of plants deployed is<br />
shown in Figure 13. Return on investment for one plant is relatively low, because <strong>the</strong><br />
design, development, test and engineering (DDT&E) costs are approximately equal to <strong>the</strong><br />
plant cost or $16M. As <strong>the</strong> number of plants increases, <strong>the</strong> DDT&E costs are spaced over<br />
more plants and <strong>the</strong> plant unit cost is decreased by a 91% learning curve, thus increasing<br />
return on investment. The return on investment for <strong>the</strong> selected 10 plant baseline (5% of<br />
1985 market) is calculated as 29.5%. The number of plants also has an effect on <strong>the</strong> payback<br />
period or time required for <strong>the</strong> manufacturer to get his investment [original placement<br />
of Figure 13] back as shown in Figure 14. This figure shows cumulative cash flows,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> low points reflecting <strong>the</strong> maximum cash investment, <strong>the</strong> crossover points, <strong>the</strong> payback<br />
periods, and <strong>the</strong> end points <strong>the</strong> total after tax earnings. For <strong>the</strong> baselined 10 plants,<br />
<strong>the</strong> maximum investment is $120M, <strong>the</strong> payback period is 5.3 years, and <strong>the</strong> total net earnings<br />
are $248M.
508<br />
Figure 13. Return on investment<br />
Plant first unit cost was determined to be a major cost driver and its effect on <strong>the</strong><br />
return on investment for a ten plant operation is shown in Figure 15. This first unit cost<br />
effect is in contrast to DDT&E cost, which has a lesser effect because it is spread over <strong>the</strong><br />
total number of plants. The sensitivity of return on investment to plant first unit cost illustrates<br />
<strong>the</strong> importance of designing a silicon ribbon processor and plant for efficient serial<br />
production.<br />
[10]<br />
Return on Investment*—%<br />
Figure 14. Cumulative cash flow<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Cumulative Cash Flow—$M<br />
29.5%<br />
* After Taxes<br />
Selected Baseline<br />
(10% of 1985 LSI Market)<br />
0<br />
0 5 10<br />
Number of Plants<br />
15 20<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
Selected Baseline<br />
(10% of 1985 LSI Market)<br />
Plant Launch<br />
DDT&E Production<br />
Number of Plants 20<br />
0 2 4 6 8 10<br />
Years<br />
10<br />
5<br />
1
Return on Investment*—$M<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Figure 15. Plant cost sensitivity (10 plants)<br />
The sensitivity of rate of return on investment to integrated circuit processing yield<br />
improvement is shown in Figure 16. As noted earlier, <strong>the</strong> integrated circuit processing cost<br />
savings determine its allowable cost premium over ground processed material. The importance<br />
of this parameter prompted an independent assessment of yield improvement from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation (ICE), a consulting firm to <strong>the</strong> industry.<br />
For a composite market, with a ratio of MOS device sales to bipolar device sales of 3 to 1,<br />
<strong>the</strong> processing yield for .38 cm x .38 cm baseline chips using space processed material is<br />
expected to increase from 14% for ground material to 25% for space manufactured ribbon.<br />
It should be noted that a yield increase of only 5% would result in a rate of return<br />
on investment comparable to current industry operations.<br />
[Figure 16 originally placed here]<br />
[11] The sensitivity of return on investment to Shuttle user charge is shown in Figure 17.<br />
The estimated Shuttle user charge of $21M per launch amounts to a cost of about<br />
$840 per kg. This cost is a significant portion of <strong>the</strong> silicon ribbon manufacturing cost per<br />
kg, so return on investment decreases rapidly with increased Shuttle user charge.<br />
[Figure 17 originally placed here]<br />
0<br />
29.5%<br />
[12] 6.0 RISK ASSESSMENT<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 509<br />
* After Taxes<br />
Estimated Cost $16M<br />
(Excluding DDT&E)<br />
0 10 20 30 40<br />
Plant First Unit Cost—$M<br />
To compare <strong>the</strong> 29.5% rate of return on investment for ten plants with a typical industry<br />
return on investment of 10% requires that it be adjusted for risk. In industry this is usually<br />
done by requiring a higher expected rate of return on investment for new projects<br />
than that resulting from current operations. In our survey of four crystal manufacturers
510<br />
Return on Investment*—%<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Figure 16. IC processing yield sensitivity<br />
Return on Investment*—%<br />
0<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Figure 17. Shuttle user cost sensitivity<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Earth<br />
Material<br />
Yield<br />
*After Taxes<br />
Space<br />
Material<br />
Yield<br />
29.5%<br />
Current<br />
Industry ROI<br />
0 10 20 30 40<br />
Integrated Circuit Processing Yield—%<br />
29.5%<br />
*After Taxes<br />
Estimated<br />
User Charge<br />
$21M<br />
0 0 5 10 15 20<br />
Shuttle User Charge/Launch—$M<br />
25
<strong>the</strong> desired average expected return on investment was 20.8%, or a risk premium of about<br />
11% over current operations. The 29.5% projected return on investment for silicon ribbon<br />
manufacturing exceeds this criterion by a substantial margin.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r more comprehensive method of risk analysis is to evaluate risk as a function<br />
of time and <strong>the</strong>n risk-adjust <strong>the</strong> cash flows for use in calculating a risk adjusted rate of<br />
return. To do this, first <strong>the</strong> technical, legal, and market risks associated with <strong>the</strong> commercial<br />
space manufacturing of silicon ribbon are evaluated.<br />
Evaluation of technical risk required definition of <strong>the</strong> research and development<br />
activities for <strong>the</strong> silicon ribbon process and process apparatus. The research and development<br />
required was divided into three phases, ground and sounding rocket research and<br />
development, Shuttle sortie development, and pilot plant demonstration. A proposed<br />
timetable for <strong>the</strong>se activities is shown in Figure 18. The approximate cost of <strong>the</strong>se activities<br />
is $36M, not including launch costs. For <strong>the</strong> purpose of risk analysis, three objectives<br />
were identified as being necessary to <strong>the</strong> technical implementation of space manufacturing;<br />
basic process development, manufacturing plant development, and mission operations.<br />
These objectives were divided into thirty-six technical risk elements in three levels<br />
of detail similar to a work breakdown structure. These elements were <strong>the</strong>n classified as<br />
(1) proven space technology, (2) existing knowledge requiring development for space<br />
application, and (3) new technology requiring research. The applicable range of probability<br />
of success for <strong>the</strong>se categories is: (1) greater than 0.99, (2) more than 0.95 but less<br />
than 0.99, and (3) less than 0.95, respectively. A subjective evaluation was made of where<br />
<strong>the</strong> risk for each element fell within <strong>the</strong> applicable range. The results of this analysis are<br />
shown in Figure 19. The probability of technical success increases with time from 0.22<br />
today, to 0.48 at <strong>the</strong> completion of ground and sounding rocket research and development<br />
in 1981, to 0.69 at <strong>the</strong> completion of Shuttle sortie process demonstration, and finally<br />
to 0.95 at <strong>the</strong> completion of a pilot plant demonstration in 1985.<br />
Figure 18. Research and development schedule<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 511<br />
Microgravity Flights<br />
Ground Experiments<br />
Physical Properties<br />
Meniscus Shaping<br />
Process Apparatus Development<br />
Sounding Rocket<br />
Physical Properties<br />
Melt Stability and Liquid/Solid Interface<br />
Melt-Seed Interaction<br />
Crystal Growth in Microgravity<br />
Crystal Morphology<br />
Meniscus Shaping in Microgravity<br />
Shuttle Sorties<br />
Meniscus Shaping<br />
Melt/Feed Rod Interaction<br />
Continuous Crystal Growth<br />
Reseed Effects<br />
Thermal and Mechanical Control<br />
Solar Furnace<br />
Prototype Process Operation<br />
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
512<br />
Three areas of concern were addressed in evaluating legal risk: patents, trade secrets<br />
and liabilities. These concerns were evaluated with respect to U.S. and international law<br />
as illustrated by Figure 20. The recommendations indicate [13] [original placement of<br />
Figure 19] [original placement of Figure 20] [14] that <strong>the</strong>re are no insurmountable legal<br />
problems. Based on this evaluation, a subjective estimate was made of <strong>the</strong> probability of<br />
completion of <strong>the</strong> manufacturing program through 1990 without losses caused by legal<br />
problems (today). This probability of success was estimated as three chances in four. The<br />
amount of risk is a function of time[;] thus it decreases to zero as <strong>the</strong> 1990 completion<br />
date is approached. Early concentration on problem areas is expected to substantially<br />
reduce <strong>the</strong> risk to about 10% by <strong>the</strong> start of sortie missions.<br />
Probability of Success<br />
Commercial Space Manufacturing<br />
1.0<br />
0.9<br />
0.8<br />
0.7<br />
0.6<br />
0.5<br />
0.4<br />
0.3<br />
0.2<br />
0.1<br />
0<br />
Ps = 0.22<br />
Figure 19. Technical risk assessment<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Basic Process<br />
Development<br />
Mfg. Plant<br />
Development<br />
Ps = 0.48<br />
Space Manufacturing Program<br />
Mission<br />
Operations<br />
Demonstration<br />
Ps = 0.69<br />
Ps = 0.95<br />
1976 1977 1978 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985<br />
1<br />
Today<br />
2<br />
Ground and<br />
Sounding Rocket<br />
R&D Complete<br />
Program Milestone<br />
3<br />
Process Apparatus<br />
Demonstration in<br />
Shuttle Complete<br />
4<br />
Pilot Plant<br />
Demonstration<br />
Complete<br />
Three areas of concern were evaluated to determine market risk. The first was that silicon<br />
might be replaced by ano<strong>the</strong>r material, <strong>the</strong> second was that even if <strong>the</strong> projected market<br />
for high quality silicon existed, a competitive ground based process might be<br />
developed, and <strong>the</strong> third was that <strong>the</strong> space material might not command a premium<br />
price and thus not be price competitive.<br />
Analysis of competitive materials failed to identify a material which would supplant silicon<br />
as <strong>the</strong> base substrate material for all LSI technologies. However, <strong>the</strong> risk was adjusted<br />
to account for potential competitive impact of silicon-on-sapphire (SOS) on <strong>the</strong><br />
metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) LSI market segment. In terms of competitive processes,<br />
some ribbon processes are being developed as part of <strong>the</strong> government sponsored solar<br />
cell research program. These processes are directed towards <strong>the</strong> development of low-cost
Patents<br />
Trade<br />
Secrets<br />
Liabilities<br />
International<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 513<br />
Outer Space Treaty 1958 Space Act<br />
Article VIII<br />
• States have control<br />
• Ownership not affected by<br />
location<br />
Same as Patents<br />
Figure 20. Legal risk assessment<br />
Article VI<br />
• States have responsibility and<br />
control<br />
Article VII<br />
• Owners are liable for damages<br />
United States<br />
NASA owns funded development<br />
rights<br />
•Will grant conditional waivers<br />
Possible disclosure through<br />
safety-of-flight documentation<br />
No provision<br />
Patent Law<br />
Owners have<br />
exclusive rights<br />
• U.S. laws apply only<br />
to U.S. territory<br />
Common law applies<br />
Not applicable<br />
Recommended<br />
Action<br />
Congress extend U.S.<br />
territory to spacecraft<br />
(as for ships at sea)<br />
NASA permit safetyof-flight<br />
certification<br />
by commercial<br />
operator<br />
Government<br />
formulate licensing<br />
and liability<br />
regulations<br />
terrestrial solar cells for which <strong>the</strong> quality requirements are not as high as for integrated<br />
circuits. Although <strong>the</strong> projected material characteristics of solar cell silicon are not acceptable<br />
for integrated circuits, process improvements and new developments may occur at<br />
any time. Thus, a significant adjustment in market risk was made to account for <strong>the</strong> impact<br />
of ground processes competing for <strong>the</strong> same market segment.<br />
Essential to <strong>the</strong> financial success of <strong>the</strong> space manufacturing venture is <strong>the</strong> ability to<br />
charge a price which provides sufficient revenue for an adequate return on investment.<br />
For space-produced silicon this involves <strong>the</strong> establishment of a price higher than its material<br />
cost and at a level equivalent to <strong>the</strong> value of processing yield improvement benefits.<br />
An assessment of <strong>the</strong> cost trends of LSI devices identified that as device size increases,<br />
costs increase substantially. This is evidenced by <strong>the</strong> sharply higher cost for recently<br />
marketed devices such as a microprocessor as compared to <strong>the</strong> cost of a relatively simple<br />
baseline .38 cm x .38 cm calculator chip. Of greater significance is <strong>the</strong> increasing dependence<br />
upon processing yields to make ever larger LSI devices economically competitive.<br />
For future products such as computers-on-a-single chip and 64K Random Access<br />
Memories (RAMs), increased yields are critically important.<br />
It is highly probable that, as compared to value of <strong>the</strong> yield improvement benefits of<br />
<strong>the</strong> relatively small baseline calculator chip, a much higher value will be associated with<br />
<strong>the</strong> use of space-produced silicon for <strong>the</strong>se larger sized future products. Thus, a premium<br />
price can probably be charged to differentiate <strong>the</strong> space-produced silicon from groundmade<br />
material which cannot produce similar yield improvement values.<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong>se considerations, today’s probability of market success was subjectively<br />
determined to be four chances in ten. This market risk is expressed as today’s probability<br />
that space-produced silicon ribbon will capture 10% of <strong>the</strong> projected 1985 LSI material<br />
market. It is determined by multiplying <strong>the</strong> probabilities for each market risk factor<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r at each of <strong>the</strong> four major milestones prior to project completion. This is depicted<br />
in Figure 21 where <strong>the</strong> early [15] 1977 risk evaluation is established at 0.38, and<br />
increases to 1.0 in 1990 at program completion when all market functions are complete<br />
and known.
514<br />
Probability of Success<br />
1.0<br />
0.8<br />
0.6<br />
0.4<br />
0.2<br />
0<br />
Figure 21. Space manufacturing implementation risk<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Ground &<br />
Rocket R&D<br />
Pilot<br />
Plant<br />
Sortie<br />
R&D<br />
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90<br />
Year<br />
Production<br />
[16] 7.0 RISK ADJUSTED FINANCIAL RETURN<br />
The combined probability of successful implementation of <strong>the</strong> space manufacture of<br />
silicon ribbon is <strong>the</strong> product of <strong>the</strong> technical, legal, and market success probabilities given<br />
in Figure 21. The cash flows were adjusted for risk by considering each year as a fork of a<br />
decision tree. The value associated with continuing <strong>the</strong> project for a year is <strong>the</strong> cash flow<br />
for that year and <strong>the</strong> value associated with failure is zero. Risk adjusted cash flows are <strong>the</strong><br />
product of <strong>the</strong> year’s cash flow and <strong>the</strong> series probability of continuing <strong>the</strong> project<br />
through that year. Using <strong>the</strong>se cash flows, risk adjusted returns on investment were calculated<br />
for <strong>the</strong> years of <strong>the</strong> commercial design, plant fabrication, and production,<br />
1982–1990. The resulting risk adjusted rate of return on investment versus time is shown<br />
in Figure 22. While <strong>the</strong> expected rate of return after <strong>the</strong> five years of production in 1990<br />
is 29.5%, <strong>the</strong> risk adjusted rate of return when <strong>the</strong> private sector would first commit to<br />
development in 1982 is 14%. This is greater than <strong>the</strong> rate of return for continuing ground<br />
based operations and could justify initiation of commercial development at that time. It<br />
should be realized that this favorable risk adjusted return on investment assumed government<br />
sponsored research and development through <strong>the</strong> pilot plant demonstration in<br />
1984. If industry assumed <strong>the</strong>se risks and cost, <strong>the</strong> risk adjusted rate of return today would<br />
be 4%, and because <strong>the</strong> 4% is less than <strong>the</strong> 10% typical return on investment for earth<br />
based operations, industry would probably not invest. This means that <strong>the</strong> government<br />
will most likely have to [original placement of Figure 22] sponsor <strong>the</strong> process research<br />
and development for space manufacturing to become a reality.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> government to participate in any activity it is necessary that it be in <strong>the</strong> public<br />
interest. In general, advancing technology is considered to fall in this category because<br />
of <strong>the</strong> impetus it provides for continued economic growth. An example of government<br />
sponsorship of commercially applicable technology is NASA’s work in satellite communication.<br />
Although Telstar in 1962 was advertised as a $50M investment by a commercial<br />
firm, AT&T, <strong>the</strong> government had already spent approximately ten times that amount to<br />
develop and demonstrate <strong>the</strong> potential of space communications. This technology was<br />
later applied by <strong>the</strong> Congressionally chartered Communications Satellite Corporation<br />
(COMSAT) in implementing improved international communications.<br />
Legal<br />
Market<br />
Technical<br />
Overall
Risk Adjusted Return<br />
on Investment—%<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 515<br />
Government Sponsored<br />
Research and Development<br />
(through 1984)<br />
Industry<br />
Invests<br />
Typical ROI Current Operations<br />
Industry Will Not Invest<br />
Figure 22. Risk adjusted return on investment<br />
Industry Sponsored<br />
Research and Development<br />
(No Space Manufacturing)<br />
0<br />
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90<br />
[17] 8.0 ORGANIZATIONAL EVALUATION<br />
A COMSAT type congressionally chartered corporation was considered as a possible<br />
organizational arrangement for implementing commercial space manufacturing, and<br />
compared to a joint venture and existing separate company(s). While <strong>the</strong> financing of a<br />
Congressionally chartered corporation is aided by its special charter, and it or a joint venture<br />
would tend to spread <strong>the</strong> risk, existing separate companies were chosen, because of<br />
<strong>the</strong> tax advantage of being able to expense <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> required research and development<br />
against profits from operations as it is incurred. In <strong>the</strong> chosen arrangement, an aerospace<br />
company would design and fabricate plants for sale to electronics companies for <strong>the</strong><br />
manufacture of silicon ribbon. Implementing space manufacturing through existing separate<br />
companies has <strong>the</strong> additional advantage that Congressional interest and oversight is<br />
not required as in <strong>the</strong> case of COMSAT, and possible antitrust action is avoided that could<br />
result from <strong>the</strong> formation of a joint venture including major industry producers.<br />
[18] 9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
Year<br />
The following conclusions can be drawn about <strong>the</strong> implementation of space manufacturing:<br />
• A method of assessing <strong>the</strong> feasibility of space manufacturing has been formulated to<br />
evaluate <strong>the</strong> associated technical, economic and risk factors.<br />
• Product manufacturing in space appears to be feasible, but o<strong>the</strong>r product analyses<br />
and supporting research are necessary to verify assumptions.<br />
• The cost of space material in comparison with earth material is not necessarily a valid<br />
comparison. The value-added from material improvements must be computed and<br />
assessed to evaluate economic feasibility.<br />
• Ribbon manufacturing in space appears to be technically and economically feasible,<br />
but private initiative may be blocked by <strong>the</strong> long term, high risk development program<br />
required.<br />
• The government should sponsor space processing research and [original placement<br />
of Figure 23] development in <strong>the</strong> interest of promoting future economic benefits to<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S.
516<br />
1. Identify Products<br />
• Space Benefits<br />
• Economic Potential<br />
2. Proof of Concept<br />
• Verify Benefits<br />
• Design Data Base<br />
3. Apparatus Development<br />
• Processor Design<br />
• Processor Demonstration<br />
4. Pilot Plant Development<br />
• Systems Design<br />
• Operational Demonstration<br />
5. Commercial Operations<br />
• Plant Fabrication<br />
• Orbital Operations<br />
• Marketing<br />
Figure 23. Recommended roles<br />
Recommendations—The recommendations, in <strong>the</strong> form of an implementation plan<br />
for <strong>the</strong> commercial space manufacturing of silicon ribbon, recognize <strong>the</strong> need for NASA<br />
sponsorship along with <strong>the</strong> need to get commercial industry involved. Without early<br />
involvement, industry will not have a data base for <strong>the</strong> subsequent commercial operations<br />
investment decision. Specific recommendations, supported by <strong>the</strong> results of a crystal manufacturer’s<br />
survey conducted as part of <strong>the</strong> NASA study, are given in Figure 23. The message<br />
is that <strong>the</strong> government should sponsor space processing activities through pilot plant<br />
demonstrations, to decrease <strong>the</strong> implementation risk to a level commensurate with private<br />
venture capital commitment. The government in selecting processes for development can<br />
both stimulate economic growth and find solutions to problems of national concern such<br />
as <strong>the</strong> possible application of silicon ribbon in manufacturing solar cells for a solar power<br />
station. Without [19] this sponsorship it is possible that <strong>the</strong> potential economic benefits<br />
of space manufacturing may not be fully realized.<br />
The milestone schedule shown in Figure 24 identifies <strong>the</strong> major activities necessary to<br />
<strong>the</strong> implementation of space manufacturing of silicon ribbon. Included is a recommendation<br />
for sponsorship of <strong>the</strong> activity and identification of <strong>the</strong> group or organization that<br />
should take <strong>the</strong> initiative for any action. Immediate action toward technical development<br />
is necessary if space manufacturing is to become a reality by <strong>the</strong> 1985 target.<br />
[20] REFERENCES<br />
1. Witt, A. F., M562 Indium Antimonide Crystals, proc. Third Space Processing<br />
Symposium, Skylab Results, April 30–May 1, 1974, Huntsville, Ala.<br />
2. Walter, H. U., M560 Growth of Spherical Crystals, proc. Third Space Processing<br />
Symposium, Skylab Results, April 30–May 1, 1974, Huntsville, Ala.<br />
3. Business Week, February 16, 1976.<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Activity NASA Industry<br />
Sponsor Systems Studies<br />
Sponsor Ground, Sounding Rocket<br />
Research and Development<br />
Sponsor Shuttle Demonstrations<br />
Sponsor Demonstration<br />
(Aerospace Plant Design, Fabrication)<br />
Operate Space Transportation System<br />
Consultants<br />
Consultants<br />
Experimenters<br />
Design Review<br />
Product Experimentation<br />
Design Review<br />
Operations Control<br />
Characterize Product<br />
Test Market<br />
Venture Capital & Control<br />
(Aerospace Plant Fabrication)<br />
Manufacturing Operations<br />
Marketing<br />
Commercial Carriage
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 517<br />
Implementation Plan<br />
Activity<br />
Schedule<br />
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89<br />
Action By Sponsor<br />
• Research and Development<br />
– Ground Experiments<br />
– Sounding Rocket<br />
Experiments<br />
– Shuttle Sortie<br />
Experiments<br />
• Pilot Plant<br />
• Commercial Plants<br />
• Extend Sovereignty<br />
to Spacecraft<br />
•Waivers, Commercial<br />
Rights<br />
•Test Market<br />
Figure 24. Milestone schedule<br />
Physical Properties<br />
Meniscus Shaping<br />
Processing Apparatus Development<br />
Sounding Rocket Flights<br />
Physical Properties<br />
Crystal Growth<br />
Meniscus Shaping<br />
Shuttle Flights<br />
Ribbon Growth<br />
Apparatus Evaluation<br />
Ribbon Characterization<br />
Plant Launch<br />
Systems Engineering<br />
Apparatus Engineering<br />
Operational Evaluation<br />
Document III-21<br />
Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
Industry<br />
Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
Document title: “Space Industrialization: Final Report,” Volume 1. Executive Summary,<br />
SD 78-AP-0055-1, Rockwell International Space Division, Contract NAS8-32198, April 14,<br />
1978, pp. 1–8.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
By <strong>the</strong> late 1970s, with <strong>the</strong> first launch of <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle approaching, and with plans beginning<br />
to form for building a space station and/or larger platforms in space, NASA took particular interest<br />
in having industry study <strong>the</strong> possible uses of space for profit-making activities. This represented <strong>the</strong><br />
first steps in thinking about <strong>the</strong> commercialization of space activities in areas o<strong>the</strong>r than satellite<br />
telecommunications. These “roadmaps” for <strong>the</strong> industrialization of space included economic analyses.<br />
Unlike <strong>the</strong> earlier benefit-cost projections, <strong>the</strong>se futuristic looks emphasized more traditional business<br />
tools, including rates of return to investment and <strong>the</strong> relative demand for goods and services coupled<br />
with prices and costs. However, <strong>the</strong> true value of this and o<strong>the</strong>r studies of <strong>the</strong> era was <strong>the</strong> identification<br />
of space technologies with nonspace market demands that could be met through <strong>the</strong> use of space.<br />
NASA<br />
NASA<br />
NASA<br />
NASA<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
NASA<br />
NASA<br />
NASA<br />
NASA/Industry<br />
Industry Industry<br />
NASA<br />
Industry<br />
Industry<br />
Congress<br />
NASA<br />
Industry
518<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Space Industrialization<br />
Final Report<br />
Volume 1. Executive Summary<br />
April 14,1978<br />
[1] INTRODUCTION<br />
Space Industrialization can be defined as a new technology in which <strong>the</strong> special environmental<br />
properties of outer space are used for <strong>the</strong> social and economic benefit of <strong>the</strong><br />
people on earth. These special properties include zero-g, hard vacuum, low vibration,<br />
wide-angle view, and a complete isolation from earth’s biosphere. Design engineers have<br />
always been willing to go to great lengths to obtain those specific environmental conditions<br />
that fulfill <strong>the</strong>ir particular needs. For example, <strong>the</strong> Hale Observatory was constructed<br />
at <strong>the</strong> top of Mount Palomar so that it would be above a small portion of <strong>the</strong> earth’s<br />
atmosphere. Eight million pounds of steel and cement were hauled up <strong>the</strong> side of a<br />
rugged mountain to achieve air density reductions of less than 20 percent. When industrial<br />
processes are transferred into space, <strong>the</strong> environmental conditions are typically modified<br />
to a far greater degree. In fact, in-space pressure levels of one-trillionth of an<br />
atmosphere are relatively easy to obtain.<br />
Because so few experiments have been conducted in space, it is extremely difficult to<br />
envision all <strong>the</strong> benefits that might result from extremely low pressure levels <strong>the</strong>re. But if<br />
<strong>the</strong> past is a reliable guide, pressures 12 orders of magnitude lower than those encountered<br />
at sea level should lead to previously unsuspected benefits. As Figure 1 shows, vacuum<br />
levels ranging from 10 -2 to 10 -10 atmospheres have already been used in a number of<br />
practical ways. These include food processing and preservation (including freeze-drying<br />
and refrigeration), metal distillation, x-ray devices, TV picture tubes, thin film deposition,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> manufacture of vacuum diodes and solid state electronic devices. Moreover, many<br />
orbiting satellites have already capitalized on <strong>the</strong> natural vacuum of outer space. For<br />
example, when <strong>the</strong> semi-rigidized Echo balloon was tested on <strong>the</strong> ground, more than<br />
80,000 pounds of inflating gases were required to inflate it. When it was lofted into <strong>the</strong><br />
vacuum of outer space, only 30 pounds of gases were needed.<br />
The g-levels and <strong>the</strong> viewing areas achievable in space are also shown in Figure 1. In<br />
comparison with terrestrial conditions, <strong>the</strong>se parameters are improved approximately six<br />
orders of magnitude. Precise g-level control is important in medical and chemical centrifuges,<br />
in crystal growth, electrophoretic separation, solidification and purification<br />
processes, and in <strong>the</strong> construction of extremely lightweight orbiting structures such as<br />
large-scale solar arrays and multibeam antennas. A wide-angle earth-oriented view can be<br />
extremely beneficial to meteorology, cartography, reconnaissance, communications, earth<br />
sensing, and wide-area navigation—all of <strong>the</strong>se have already brought important benefits<br />
to <strong>the</strong> people on earth.<br />
Thus, it is not hard to see why <strong>the</strong> aerospace engineer is so keenly interested in <strong>the</strong><br />
beneficial environmental properties of outer space. But <strong>the</strong>se properties can form <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of a meaningful Space Industrialization program only if <strong>the</strong>y can be exploited in<br />
practical ways. Businessmen are keenly interested in environmental properties, but <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are much more concerned with profit-making opportunities to fill real human needs. The<br />
first task in our 18-month Space Industrialization study was thus quite clear. To match <strong>the</strong><br />
needs of humanity with <strong>the</strong> opportunities for filling <strong>the</strong>se needs through modern space<br />
technology.
As <strong>the</strong>y look to <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> century and beyond, many people see increasingly<br />
bleak prospects for <strong>the</strong> future. The pressures of population growth continue, particularly<br />
in <strong>the</strong> less-developed countries. The people in <strong>the</strong>se underdeveloped regions are surprisingly<br />
young with an average age of about 15, and (hopefully) <strong>the</strong>y will live to see several<br />
generations of offspring. By contrast, in <strong>the</strong> developed countries like our own, <strong>the</strong> average<br />
age is about 29 and steadily increasing. The developed world has nearly reached that<br />
magic time when each couple replaces itself [2] [original placement of Figure 1] [3] with<br />
only two offspring. Worldwide, however, that is not <strong>the</strong> case, and it is not likely to be in <strong>the</strong><br />
near future. As Figure 2 shows, <strong>the</strong> overwhelming majority of <strong>the</strong> world’s population is in<br />
<strong>the</strong> underdeveloped countries; and within 100 years, <strong>the</strong>ir fractional share of world population<br />
will nearly double. Of course, <strong>the</strong>ir populations will also increase in absolute<br />
terms. The birth rates in many areas have recently undergone encouraging declines, but<br />
so many of <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> world are below <strong>the</strong> critical childbearing ages that <strong>the</strong> earth<br />
is committed to supporting at least double, more likely triple, its present population. Most<br />
experts are convinced that <strong>the</strong> best way to cut population growth rates is to develop a<br />
healthy worldwide economy. Emerging affluence has always been accompanied by reductions<br />
in population growth rates.<br />
On Earth<br />
Mount Palomar<br />
Mount Everest<br />
Frozen Orange Juice<br />
Metal Soldering<br />
Distillation of Metals<br />
Refrigerator Manufacturer<br />
Vacuum Bottles<br />
TV Picture Tubes<br />
Joining by<br />
Organic Adhesives<br />
Electronics Manufacture<br />
Fusion Reactor<br />
Pressure Vessels<br />
Viton A. Gaskets and<br />
All-Metal Joints<br />
Best Vacuum Pumps<br />
Heli Arc Welding<br />
and Fluxless Brazing<br />
Typical Space<br />
Benefits<br />
Pressure Levels<br />
(Atmospheres)<br />
10 -2<br />
10 -4<br />
10 -6<br />
10 -8<br />
10 -10<br />
10 -12<br />
10 -14<br />
10 -16<br />
Sea Level<br />
• Highly Reflective<br />
Sodium Coatings<br />
• Ultra-Thin Films<br />
• Unenclosed<br />
Klystrons<br />
In Space<br />
Space<br />
Biological<br />
and Metal<br />
Processing<br />
Vacuum Welding<br />
Unenclosed<br />
Klystrons<br />
Ambient Conditions 500KM<br />
Echo Balloon<br />
Wake Shield 500KM<br />
Thin Film Vacuum Deposition<br />
Figure 1. Environmental Properties in Space<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 519<br />
On Earth<br />
Eye Level<br />
Firefighting<br />
Observation Towers<br />
Little Roundtop<br />
at Gettysburg<br />
Mount Palomar<br />
Military Aerial<br />
Reconnaissance<br />
Crop Surveys<br />
Commercial Jets<br />
Viewing Area<br />
(Fraction of <strong>the</strong> Globe)<br />
10 -8<br />
10 -7<br />
10 -6<br />
10 -5<br />
10 -4<br />
10 -3<br />
10 -2<br />
10 -1<br />
1<br />
• Nationwide<br />
Communication Links<br />
• Worldwide Observation<br />
Platforms<br />
• Accurate All-Wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Navigation<br />
100 N.MI. Orbit<br />
Earth Resources Satellites<br />
300 N.MI. Orbit<br />
Navigation Satellites<br />
12 Hour Orbit<br />
Geosynchronous Orbit<br />
(Communication Satellites)<br />
One key to a healthy worldwide economy is expanded trade—especially trade that<br />
results in a reasonable balance between imports and exports. The United States and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
industrialized countries sell large quantities of goods to <strong>the</strong> developing countries, but<br />
In Space<br />
On Earth G Levels In Space<br />
Maximum Human<br />
Tolerance<br />
(Shock G’s)<br />
Maximum Human<br />
Tolerance<br />
(Prolonged G’s)<br />
Most<br />
Manufacturing<br />
Processes<br />
Mount Palomar<br />
Civil War<br />
Minnie Ball<br />
Manufacturer<br />
Plastic Beads<br />
for Reflecting<br />
Highway Markers<br />
10 2<br />
10<br />
10 -1<br />
10 -2<br />
10 -3<br />
10 -4<br />
10 -5<br />
10 -6<br />
• Large Perfect Crystals<br />
• High-Strength<br />
Permanent Magnets<br />
• New Alloys and<br />
Optical Glasses<br />
Saturn V Max Loads<br />
Shuttle Max Loads<br />
Sea Level<br />
Lunar Gravity<br />
Minimum SPS Orbit<br />
Transfer Loads<br />
Space Crystal Growth<br />
Space Purification/Separation<br />
SPS Gravity Gradients<br />
During Construction<br />
100 N.MI. Orbit<br />
Sounding Rockets<br />
SPS Gravity Gradients<br />
During Operation<br />
Unmanned Orbital<br />
Processing Facility
520<br />
today only a discouraging trickle of trade flows in <strong>the</strong> opposite direction. This negative<br />
balance of trade endangers <strong>the</strong> economies of <strong>the</strong> underdeveloped countries; it also<br />
deprives us of a market that could be provided by <strong>the</strong> 2 billion people living in <strong>the</strong> underdeveloped<br />
regions. If United States investments (public and private) in <strong>the</strong> productive use<br />
of space could contribute to <strong>the</strong> economic growth and purchasing power of <strong>the</strong>se poverty-stricken<br />
areas, this could have an important positive effect on <strong>the</strong> economy of our own<br />
country and on <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> world. Specifically, if we could develop two-way markets of<br />
only $17 for each world citizen, 2.7 million new American jobs would be created—enough<br />
to reduce our unemployment level to 4 percent of our work force. This would not be a<br />
difficult level of trade to attain if underdeveloped regions could be edged toward slightly<br />
higher socioeconomic conditions. In fact, as Figure 3 shows, it is only 20 percent of <strong>the</strong><br />
per capita trade we are already achieving with West Germany and <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom.<br />
East<br />
Asia<br />
Now<br />
+100 Years<br />
U.S.S.R.<br />
South<br />
Asia<br />
Population<br />
Distribution<br />
Figure 2. World Population Shifts and Trade Levels<br />
[4] [original placement of Figure 3]<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
North<br />
America<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Latin<br />
America<br />
% of World<br />
Population<br />
Europe<br />
Oceania<br />
Africa<br />
Now +100<br />
Years<br />
Population Total<br />
Probable<br />
Low<br />
Projection<br />
Healthy worldwide trade would also help assure us of uninterrupted supplies of needed<br />
raw materials. As indicated in <strong>the</strong> bar charts of Figure 4, we are spending more than<br />
$46 billion each year for imported petroleum products, and we currently import more than<br />
50 percent of 14 important minerals, including platinum, tungsten, and magnesium.<br />
Without adequate exports to pay for <strong>the</strong>se crucial substances, our country would quickly slip<br />
into a declining economic position. Over <strong>the</strong> long run, our trade balance has been quite<br />
favorable; however, in three of <strong>the</strong> last five years, our balance of payments has been negative,<br />
and in 1977 alone, we almost exceeded <strong>the</strong> deficits of all previous years combined.<br />
Because of our high labor rates, high-technology items are essentially <strong>the</strong> only thing<br />
we, as a country, can export at competitive prices. Manufactured goods constitute about 61<br />
4B<br />
12B<br />
88B<br />
25B<br />
Possible<br />
Population (M)<br />
Exports ($B)<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
0<br />
0<br />
200<br />
400<br />
600<br />
Industrialized Countries<br />
585<br />
750<br />
Socialist Countries<br />
including China<br />
85<br />
1240<br />
Developing<br />
Countries<br />
230<br />
Industrial Products<br />
Raw Materials<br />
Foodstuffs<br />
2000
Exports (Dollar Per Capita)<br />
$500<br />
$400<br />
$300<br />
$200<br />
$100<br />
$17<br />
0<br />
Japan<br />
West Germany<br />
87 83<br />
956<br />
Canada<br />
Mexico<br />
Figure 3. U.S. Exports per Capita to Various Countries<br />
88<br />
United Kingdom<br />
80<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 521<br />
371<br />
Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands<br />
Iran<br />
137<br />
Brazil<br />
31<br />
60 50<br />
percent of our exports, and agricultural products make up ano<strong>the</strong>r 19 percent.*<br />
Unfortunately, o<strong>the</strong>r countries of <strong>the</strong> world have recently been making unusually heavy<br />
investments in research so that many high-technology items that were once solid American<br />
exports are now becoming common imports. Television sets, steel ingots, precision optics,<br />
and automobiles are a few obvious examples. Thus, <strong>the</strong> only way we can maintain a positive<br />
balance of trade is to increase worker productivity or to stay in <strong>the</strong> forefront of<br />
advanced technology. As will be shown in <strong>the</strong> remainder of this report, space industrialization<br />
offers us many possibilities for exercising both of <strong>the</strong>se important options.<br />
In 1973, when <strong>the</strong> OPEC oil cartel successfully raised <strong>the</strong> price of petroleum, it was<br />
widely feared that o<strong>the</strong>r fuels and minerals might also experience substantial price hikes.<br />
So far, however, this has not occurred. Prices have remained reasonably stable because of<br />
<strong>the</strong> widespread distribution of most minerals, <strong>the</strong> tacit threat of substitutions, and <strong>the</strong><br />
economies of large-scale mining operations. In many cases, however, <strong>the</strong> quality of ore has<br />
significantly declined. In particular, <strong>the</strong> copper ores now being mined are not nearly as<br />
rich as <strong>the</strong>y once were. As Phillip Morrison pointed [5] [original placement of Figure 4]<br />
out in a recent Science American article, “The ancient miners looked for showy minerals<br />
with a copper content of 15 percent. The grade has steadily declined; it was 8 percent in<br />
Europe by <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> Renaissance, and today most copper is won from low-grade ores,<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. average grade being about 0.65 percent.”**<br />
France<br />
Italy<br />
240<br />
Belgium<br />
306<br />
Australia<br />
Venezuela<br />
43<br />
Saudi Arabia<br />
$17 Per Capita<br />
= Cut U.S.<br />
Unemployment<br />
by 3%<br />
150<br />
India<br />
Ethiopia<br />
Uganda<br />
2 2 1<br />
* Agricultural products are, in effect, high technology items: our farmers use <strong>the</strong> highest technology<br />
farming methods in <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
** Scientific American, March 1978, p. 41.
522<br />
Oil Imports (Billions of $)<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
$4B<br />
$6B<br />
Figure 4. America’s Dependency on Oil and Minerals<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
American Oil Imports Percent of Various Materials Imported<br />
100%<br />
100 100 100<br />
98<br />
96<br />
$46B<br />
92<br />
$7B $8B<br />
$26B<br />
$24B<br />
$30B<br />
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77<br />
(EST)<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
Material Imported 80%<br />
20%<br />
The recent book The Limits to Growth provides an alternate evaluation of <strong>the</strong> status of<br />
<strong>the</strong> world’s future mineral supplies. Figure 5, taken from this popularized book, indicates<br />
that at least eight crucial minerals will be exhausted within <strong>the</strong> next fifty years at <strong>the</strong> present<br />
rates of increased usage. The assumptions made in this study on available reserves and<br />
recovery technology have been seriously challenged, and <strong>the</strong> projections are now widely<br />
regarded by most experts as needlessly pessimistic. For this reason and o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong> Rockwell<br />
analysis team does not believe that <strong>the</strong>se minerals will actually be exhausted in <strong>the</strong> indicated<br />
time frames. When supplies begin to run short, mankind will expend whatever energy<br />
and exploration efforts are required to locate and obtain needed supplies. Substitutions will<br />
also occur. Never<strong>the</strong>less, Figure 5 highlights a crucial problem: Our known mineral reserves<br />
are not infinite; large new supplies will be needed by future generations.<br />
Fortunately, as is shown on <strong>the</strong> right-hand column of <strong>the</strong> chart, many techniques are<br />
available for expanding our recoverable supplies. These include intensified exploitation,<br />
<strong>the</strong> extraction of minerals from sea water, and <strong>the</strong> exploitation of ocean-floor reserves.<br />
These techniques could expand our mineral supplies to an essentially unlimited extent;<br />
however, a careful study of <strong>the</strong> list will reveal that each available technique requires larger<br />
inputs of energy than we are now expending. Thus, adequate energy supplies are again<br />
a key to a prosperous future for <strong>the</strong> United States and, indeed, for all mankind. As we shall<br />
see, space technology can help ensure that <strong>the</strong> needed energy will be available through<br />
conservation and through <strong>the</strong> production of abundant new supplies.<br />
[6] [original placement of Figure 5]<br />
In addition to <strong>the</strong>ir physical needs, human beings also have psychological needs.<br />
These are basically similar for people everywhere. We need to be productive and feel useful<br />
(i.e., to have a job). We need an acceptable standard of living that improves each year<br />
and a quality of life compatible with our individual heritage. We think <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
must play <strong>the</strong> role of leader in this worldwide enterprise. The key direction of this leadership<br />
should not merely be good stewardship of what we have, but <strong>the</strong> continued creation<br />
of wealth for ourselves and for <strong>the</strong> people throughout <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> world. In <strong>the</strong><br />
0<br />
54<br />
64<br />
Tungsten<br />
Zinc<br />
84<br />
80<br />
76<br />
72 73 86<br />
Nickel<br />
Mercury<br />
>50% Dependency<br />
Tin<br />
Platinum Group Metals<br />
Bauxite & Aluminum<br />
Asbestos<br />
Chromium<br />
Cobalt<br />
Magnesium<br />
Strontium<br />
Mica<br />
Niobium<br />
Tungsten
Supply (Years)<br />
Rate of Increase<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
2<br />
4<br />
6<br />
8<br />
2025 (50 Years)<br />
N/A<br />
Source = The Limits of Growth Meadows, et al.<br />
Figure 5. Potential Exhaustion of Selected Minerals<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 523<br />
At present usage rates we will<br />
exhaust our known reserves of<br />
8 crucial minerals in <strong>the</strong> next<br />
50 years<br />
Aluminum<br />
Chromium<br />
Coal<br />
Cobalt<br />
Copper<br />
Gold<br />
Iron<br />
Lead<br />
Manganese<br />
Mecury<br />
Molyboenum<br />
Natural Gas<br />
Nickel<br />
Petroleum<br />
Platinum<br />
Silver<br />
Tin<br />
Tungsten<br />
Zinc<br />
face of population growth, a more just and equitable distribution of scarcity is not enough.<br />
For prolonged scarcity makes <strong>the</strong> future look bleak and disappointing for <strong>the</strong> average<br />
world citizen. What is necessary, <strong>the</strong>refore, is new ways to create wealth—wealth that will<br />
make <strong>the</strong> world a healthier, more stable place to live.<br />
[7] THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION<br />
During <strong>the</strong> course of this study, we attempted to look 50 years into <strong>the</strong> future and correlate<br />
real human needs with space opportunities. Our work proceeded down two parallel<br />
paths. Along one path, we looked into <strong>the</strong> future for meaningful trends in human needs;<br />
and along <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, we searched for practical and economically viable space opportunities.<br />
In general, <strong>the</strong>se opportunities can be broken down into <strong>the</strong> following categories:<br />
1. Services 3. Energy<br />
• Information transmission • Conservation<br />
• Data acquisition • New energy sources<br />
2. Products 4. Human activities<br />
• Organic • Space careers<br />
• Inorganic • Frontier for mankind<br />
As we proceeded into <strong>the</strong> study, we found that is [sic] was easier (and more fun) to<br />
think up new space projects than it was to reduce <strong>the</strong> list down to a more manageable<br />
number. We used <strong>the</strong> ideas that have been advanced by NASA (Outlook for Space), Ivan<br />
Bekey at <strong>the</strong> Aerospace Corporation, and many many o<strong>the</strong>rs. We also added many new<br />
N/A<br />
Methods for<br />
Expanding our<br />
Supplies:<br />
Intensified<br />
Exploration<br />
Exploitation<br />
of Low<br />
Grade Ores<br />
Substitute<br />
Materials<br />
(Plastics,<br />
Aluminum)<br />
Extremely<br />
Deep Mines<br />
>5 KM<br />
Ocean Floor<br />
Mining<br />
(Nodules)<br />
Extraction<br />
From<br />
Seawater<br />
Extraterrestrial<br />
Materials<br />
(Moon,<br />
Asteroids)<br />
Note: Each option requires far more energy than<br />
present mineral extraction techniques
524<br />
ideas of our own. The overall lists are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. It is not possible to<br />
discuss each one individually in any reasonably sized report, but it is reassuring to observe<br />
that <strong>the</strong> known opportunities are quite numerous. It is also encouraging that <strong>the</strong>se opportunities<br />
respond to <strong>the</strong> needs of mankind to a major degree. This suggests that <strong>the</strong> space<br />
program should be considered as a mainstream activity ra<strong>the</strong>r than a matter of minor<br />
interest, benefiting only a few people.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> next few paragraphs, we shall briefly discuss one or two opportunities from<br />
each of <strong>the</strong> four major categories: (1) services, (2) products, (3) energy, and (4) human<br />
activities. Once this has been done, an integrated plan will be revealed, showing what we<br />
believe to be <strong>the</strong> proper evolution for a relatively ambitious but entirely realistic program<br />
of Space Industrialization.<br />
SERVICES<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
In a very real sense, <strong>the</strong> services area of space industrialization is already a reality. For<br />
several years, space platforms have been providing valuable communication, navigation,<br />
observation, and wea<strong>the</strong>r services for people worldwide. Some of <strong>the</strong>se services have been<br />
earning comfortable profits for corporate shareholders. Today, communication satellites<br />
are owned and operated by more than a dozen countries, and more than 100 have <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own Intelsat ground terminals. These terminals transmit messages and data to and from<br />
such unlikely places as Niger, Bangladesh, Cameroon, and French Guiana [sic].<br />
The utilization of satellite technology in <strong>the</strong>se primitive locations is based on simple<br />
economics. The cost of <strong>the</strong> hardware necessary to handle a satellite voice circuit (see<br />
Figure 6) has been declining by a factor of 100 every 12 years In 1966, an Early Bird voice<br />
circuit cost more than $20,000 per year. Today Westar provides equivalent voice circuits<br />
for a little over $200. Moreover, large-scale Antenna Farms launched by <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle<br />
may soon bring about fur<strong>the</strong>r important cost reductions. Hardware investment costs as<br />
low as $14 per circuit-year seem entirely within <strong>the</strong> realm of possibility. With costs at this<br />
level, we will begin to see numerous new applications of advanced communications.<br />
[8] Complexity inversion . . . is quietly fostering ano<strong>the</strong>r revolution in our approach to<br />
space communications. Complexity inversion refers to <strong>the</strong> concept of putting large and<br />
complicated hardware in space so that <strong>the</strong> units on <strong>the</strong> ground can be small and simple.<br />
This philosophy contrasts sharply with <strong>the</strong> approach that was adopted in <strong>the</strong> early days of<br />
<strong>the</strong> space program when every effort was made to keep <strong>the</strong> space segment of <strong>the</strong> system<br />
small and light. In order to do this, <strong>the</strong> corresponding ground segments had to be massive<br />
and complex. For example, <strong>the</strong> Telstar communication satellite weighed only 150<br />
pounds. This compact design held down launch costs and simplified <strong>the</strong> satellite, but as a<br />
result, it could relay high-quality signals only between such massive ground installations as<br />
<strong>the</strong> 85-foot Goldstone antenna, which weighs 600,000 pounds. Numerous o<strong>the</strong>r examples<br />
can be found in both civilian and military programs in which huge ground antennas and<br />
major computer installations painstakingly processed raw data to extract useful information<br />
from weak and diffuse signals radiated by small, compact satellites.<br />
Because of recent advances in space technology and improved transportation capabilities,<br />
it is now possible to enlarge <strong>the</strong> orbiting satellites and, in turn, shrink <strong>the</strong> ground<br />
user sets. In particular, modern electronic devices and multibeam antennas allow <strong>the</strong><br />
space segment to be vastly more capable and complex, but still stay within reasonable<br />
launch cost limitations—especially considering <strong>the</strong> launch economics of <strong>the</strong> Space<br />
Shuttle.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 525<br />
Table 1. Attractive Opportunities in <strong>the</strong> Services Area<br />
Communications<br />
Information Relay<br />
• Direct TV broadcast<br />
• Electronic mail<br />
• Education broadcast<br />
• Rural TV<br />
• Meteorological information dissemination<br />
• Interagency data exchange<br />
• Electronic cottage industries<br />
• World medical advice center<br />
• Centralized “distributed” printing systems<br />
• Environmental information distribution<br />
• Time and frequency distribution<br />
Personal Communications<br />
• National information services<br />
• Personal communications wrist radio<br />
• Voting/polling wrist set<br />
• Diplomatic U.N. hot lines<br />
• 3-D holographic teleconferencing<br />
• Mobile communications relay<br />
• Amateur radio relay<br />
• “Telegraphing” personal communications systems<br />
• Worldwide electronic ping pong tournaments<br />
• Central computer service (for transmitting<br />
hand-held calculators)<br />
• Urban/police wrist radio<br />
Disaster Warning<br />
• Disaster warning relay<br />
• Pre-disaster data base (earthquake)<br />
• Earthquake fault measurements<br />
• Disaster communication set<br />
Land Data<br />
Agricultural Measurements<br />
• Soil type classification<br />
• Crop measurement<br />
• Crop damage assessment<br />
• Global wheat survey<br />
• Crop identification/survey<br />
• Agricultural land use patterns<br />
• Crop harvest monitor<br />
• Range land evaluation<br />
• Crop stress detection<br />
• Soil erosion measurement<br />
• Agricultural acreage survey<br />
• Soil moisture measurement<br />
• Soil temperature monitor<br />
Forest Management<br />
• Timber site monitoring<br />
• Logging residue inventory<br />
• Forest stress detection<br />
• Forest fire detection<br />
• Rural/forest environment hazards<br />
• Lightning contact prediction/detection<br />
Hydrological Information System<br />
• Snow moisture data collector<br />
• Wet lands monitor<br />
• Tidal patterns/flushing<br />
• Water management surveillance<br />
• Irrigation flow return<br />
• Run-off forecasting<br />
• Inland water/ice cover<br />
• Subsurface water monitor<br />
• Water resource mapping<br />
• Soil moisture data collector<br />
• Irrigation acreage measurement<br />
• Aquatic vegetation monitoring<br />
Navigation, Tracking, and Control<br />
Navigation<br />
• Public navigation system<br />
• Global position determination<br />
• Coastal navigation control<br />
• Global search and rescue locator<br />
Tracking and Location<br />
• Implanted sensor data collection<br />
• Wild animal/waterfowl surveillance<br />
• Marine animal migrations<br />
• Vehicular speed limit control<br />
• Rail anti-collision system<br />
• Nuclear fuel locator<br />
• Vehicle/package locator<br />
Traffic Control<br />
• Multinational air traffic control radar<br />
• Surface ship tracking<br />
Border Surveillance<br />
• U.N. truce observation satellite<br />
• Border surveillance<br />
• Coastal anti-collision passive radar<br />
• Underwater vegetation survey<br />
• Lake/river suspended solids<br />
• Sediment measurements (rivers)<br />
• Flooded area monitoring<br />
Land Management<br />
• Land capability inventory<br />
• Land use mapping<br />
• Wild land classification<br />
• Range vegetation mapping<br />
• Rangeland utilization/population<br />
• Flood damage assessment<br />
• Beach erosion<br />
Pollution Data<br />
• Advanced resources/pollution observatory<br />
• Salt accumulations (irrigation)<br />
• Agricultural pollutant monitoring<br />
• Lake eutrophication monitor<br />
• Great Lakes <strong>the</strong>rmal mapping<br />
• Effluent discharge patterns<br />
• Toxic spill detector<br />
• Air quality profilometer<br />
• Air pollutant chemistry (Freon)<br />
• Pollution detection and distribution<br />
• Mosquito control (wetlands flooding)<br />
Resource Measurements<br />
• Oil/mineral location<br />
• Drilling/mining operations monitor<br />
Geographic Mapping<br />
• Urban/suburban density<br />
• Recreation site planning<br />
• High-resolution earth mapping radar<br />
• Wildland vegetation mapping<br />
• Offshore structure mapping
526<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Data<br />
• Atmospheric temperature profile sounder<br />
• Rain monitor<br />
Ocean Data<br />
• Ocean resources and dynamics system<br />
• Marine environment monitor<br />
• Oil spill<br />
• Shoreline ocean current monitor<br />
• Algae bloom measurement<br />
• Saline intrusion<br />
Table 2. Attractive Opportunities<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Products Area<br />
Organic<br />
• Isozymes<br />
• Genetic engineering of hybrid plants<br />
• Urokinase<br />
• Insulin<br />
• New antibiotics via rapid mutation<br />
Inorganic<br />
• Large crystals<br />
• Super-large-scale integrated circuits<br />
• Transparent oxide materials<br />
• Surface acoustic wave devices<br />
• New glasses (including fiber optics)<br />
• Tungsten X-ray target material<br />
• Hollow ball bearings<br />
• High-temperature turbine blades<br />
• Separation of radioisotopes<br />
• High strength permanent magnets<br />
• Magnetic bubble memory crystal film<br />
• Thin film electronic devices<br />
• Filaments for high-intensity lamps<br />
• Aluminum-lead lubricated alloys<br />
• Continuous ribbon crystal growth<br />
• Cutting tools<br />
• Fusion targets<br />
• Microspheres<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Global Environment<br />
• Glacier movement<br />
• Ozone layer replenishment/protection<br />
• Highway/roadway environment impact<br />
• Radiation budget observations<br />
• Atmospheric composition<br />
• Energy monitor, solar terrestrial observatory<br />
• Tectonic plate observation<br />
Table 3. Attractive Opportunities<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Energy Area<br />
Lunetta<br />
• Night illumination for urban areas<br />
• Night illumination for agriculture and industrial<br />
operations<br />
• Night illumination for disaster relief operations<br />
Soletta<br />
• Night frost damage protection<br />
• Local climate manipulation<br />
• Reflected light for ground electricity conversion<br />
• Ocean cell warning for climate control<br />
• Controlled snow-pack melting<br />
• Stimulation of photosyn<strong>the</strong>sis process<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
• Satellite power system (solar)<br />
• Fusion in space<br />
• Nuclear waste disposal
Investment Cost Per<br />
Satellite Voice Circuit<br />
Per Year (Dollars)<br />
James Martin, Future<br />
Developments in<br />
Telecommunications, New York,<br />
Prentice Hall (1977)<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
200<br />
100<br />
10<br />
Figure 6. Investment in Satellite Voice Circuits<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 527<br />
Early Bird $20,000<br />
INTELSAT II<br />
INTELSAT III<br />
Document III-22<br />
INTELSAT IV<br />
Westar<br />
INTELSAT V<br />
$2,000<br />
Document title: “Space Industrialization: An Overview,” Final Report, Volume 1,<br />
SAI-79-662-HU, Science Applications, Inc., April 15, 1978, pp. 1–5, 10–12, 15–17.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This study was similar to <strong>the</strong> Rockwell study of <strong>the</strong> same era (Document III-21). It examined detailed<br />
industrial sectors and <strong>the</strong> potential demand and revenues from sample space ventures. It also urged<br />
<strong>the</strong> aerospace industry to look at <strong>the</strong> possibilities of space industrialization. What follows are excerpts<br />
from sections 1, 3, and 4 and a figure from section 5.<br />
RCA<br />
The potential of a largescale<br />
domestic satellite<br />
designed for launch by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle<br />
1965 1970 1975<br />
Year<br />
1980 1985<br />
$200<br />
$20<br />
$14/Circuit-<br />
Year 1987
528<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Space Industrialization<br />
An Overview<br />
15 April 1978<br />
Final Report<br />
Volume 1<br />
[1] 1. SUMMARY<br />
Space Industrialization (SI) is <strong>the</strong> medium by which services, energy and products are<br />
returned from space to Earth to provide economic and o<strong>the</strong>r pragmatic benefits to<br />
mankind. Although this study focuses on <strong>the</strong> United States as <strong>the</strong> mechanism for benefit<br />
generation and transfer (with an appropriate payback to its industry and citizenry for<br />
investing resources and labor), it is <strong>the</strong> world that benefits. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> underdeveloped<br />
and developing countries are now, and will continue to be, prime beneficiaries from Space<br />
Industrialization. It is possible to construct credible scenarios which step <strong>the</strong>se nations into<br />
<strong>the</strong> twentieth century equivalent of <strong>the</strong> U.S. in less than 100 years, without significant local<br />
or global economic or environmental damage. The great power for what is considered<br />
“good” in <strong>the</strong> western world (health, safety, knowledge, creative growth, etc.) afforded by<br />
Space Industrialization has been comprehended by a very few, but <strong>the</strong>re is evidence that<br />
realization is spreading. It is hoped that this document and this report, in conjunction with<br />
<strong>the</strong> companion report by Rockwell International, will assist in this realization, and help promote<br />
early expansion of <strong>the</strong> beneficial returns on humanity’s investment in space.<br />
The SAI study concentrated on <strong>the</strong> U.S. and what we may gain from <strong>the</strong> investing of<br />
our resources, both public and private, in SI. The future was examined to characterize<br />
resource pressures, requirements and supply (population, energy, materials, food); also,<br />
<strong>the</strong> backdrop of probable events, attitudes and trends against which SI will evolve were postulated.<br />
The opportunities for space industry that would bring benefits to Earth were compiled<br />
and screened against terrestrial alternatives. Most survived, and a population of <strong>the</strong><br />
survivors were [sic] examined to determine if SI would ever be “worth <strong>the</strong> investment.” A<br />
cursory market survey was conducted for <strong>the</strong> selected services and products provided by<br />
<strong>the</strong>se initiatives and <strong>the</strong> results were astounding. Space Industrialization is a billion dollar<br />
a year business now; in thirty years it could grow by 100 times that amount—or more!<br />
[2] But, space is expensive. Might not <strong>the</strong> investment outweigh <strong>the</strong> gain? Programs of SI<br />
evolution corresponding to <strong>the</strong> postulated future scenarios were developed, and <strong>the</strong><br />
investments compared to <strong>the</strong> revenues and <strong>the</strong>ir associated benefits. The program analysis<br />
results brought two observations: SI investments will be good investments and <strong>the</strong> sooner<br />
<strong>the</strong> investment, <strong>the</strong> better for all concerned (in terms of <strong>the</strong> pure ma<strong>the</strong>matics). It was<br />
recognized, however, that certain o<strong>the</strong>r factors may control <strong>the</strong> practical rate of progress.<br />
These “o<strong>the</strong>r factors” were examined to <strong>the</strong> extent practical in this study; a great deal<br />
remains to be done. The following observations are in order, however, based on this<br />
assessment.<br />
(1) Foreign competition is becoming very strong in SI. It is no longer “our” domain and<br />
<strong>the</strong>se pressures will increase. This may limit or spur U.S. increased involvement.<br />
(2) The developing and underdeveloped nations of <strong>the</strong> world may consider <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
and SI a threat or a powerful tool for progress depending on how we promote it.<br />
(3) Prospects for economic return to <strong>the</strong> government (public sector) are excellent, so<br />
long term investments should be justifiable A few billion dollars invested in <strong>the</strong><br />
eighties will result in hundreds of billions in tax revenues, millions of jobs created,<br />
strong economic growth and good balance of trade impacts in twenty years or less.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 529<br />
(4) Although some U.S. industry will resist SI, a strong support base can be built<br />
among U.S. private enterprise.<br />
(5) In both domestic and international law <strong>the</strong>re are no legal entanglements which will<br />
seriously inhibit SI development, if we develop proper policies and stick to <strong>the</strong>m!<br />
(6) Although many social and political institutions will be affected by SI, <strong>the</strong> most significant<br />
are those institutions governing industry and government relations and<br />
those relating <strong>the</strong> U.S. to <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> world. Nothing precludes mutually beneficial<br />
arrangements in both of <strong>the</strong>se arenas. Historically, such arrangements have<br />
taken several years to evolve.<br />
[3] (7) The most important SI initiatives would appear to have ra<strong>the</strong>r high initial investments,<br />
and payback periods longer than normal for private investment. A mechanism<br />
for reducing initial risk and shortening <strong>the</strong>se payback times is possible and<br />
will attract substantial industry support upon initiation.<br />
Thus, in sum, this study has concluded that Space Industrialization exists and is substantial<br />
and sustained growth is highly desirable. From examination of <strong>the</strong> SI programs<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir characteristics <strong>the</strong> following recommendations were drawn.<br />
(1) Strong industry involvement in all areas of SI from planning to ultimate operations<br />
is necessary to return maximum benefits.<br />
(2) A central group, perhaps under <strong>the</strong> Administrator of NASA, especially tasked to<br />
plan, integrate and advocate SI activities is needed badly. Such a group, located<br />
within <strong>the</strong> government, may indeed be essential if private enterprise can not meet<br />
<strong>the</strong> challenge on its own.<br />
(3) Space Industries will need 25 to 75 KW of raw power in <strong>the</strong> early to mid-eighties,<br />
100 to 500 KW in <strong>the</strong> latter eighties and 1–10 MW in <strong>the</strong> early to mid-nineties. A<br />
Solar Power Satellite prototype development program to prove technical/economic<br />
feasibility and environmental acceptability would have similar milestones<br />
and characteristics. Space power needs for products have a similar progression,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> possibility of a three to five year lag in demand relative to o<strong>the</strong>r requirements.<br />
A space power program designed to integrate and synergize <strong>the</strong>se requirements<br />
should be initiated, beginning with development of <strong>the</strong> 25 KW Power<br />
Module currently proposed. The requirements for a concurrent large structures<br />
program is implicit to <strong>the</strong> power program.<br />
[4] (4) The cost of space transportation to low Earth orbit must come down below shuttle<br />
projections by a factor of 10 to 100 to really open <strong>the</strong> products market in <strong>the</strong><br />
nineties. The Shuttle is <strong>the</strong> key, but <strong>the</strong> longer term SI requirements are already<br />
apparent. Increases in flexibility and decreases in cost are needed by high orbit<br />
operations in <strong>the</strong> latter eighties for both services and energy initiatives.<br />
Propulsion and vehicle programs to meet <strong>the</strong>se needs should be integrated into<br />
future transportation planning.<br />
(5) The U.S. (probably through <strong>the</strong> NASA) should embark on an intensive data ga<strong>the</strong>ring<br />
and planning effort during FY 79, 80 and 81 in parallel to initiation of early<br />
projects such as 25 KW Power Module. This effort would culminate in a carefully<br />
coordinated, evolutionary Space Industrialization Plan with domestic and international<br />
as well as government and industry segments.<br />
The above recommendations imply only modest budget commitments over <strong>the</strong> next<br />
three years (less than five million per year in studies and planning and less than fifty million<br />
per year in hardware commitments). The budget requirements for development and<br />
implementation of initiatives with early direct returns (mid to late eighties) plus long lead<br />
technology development for <strong>the</strong> nineties has a funding peak of less than four billion dollars<br />
annual. That cost could be shared in various ways between NASA, o<strong>the</strong>r government<br />
agencies, private industry and international (or foreign) organizations. The space technology<br />
peculiar funding requirements are less than two billion of <strong>the</strong> four billion total.
530<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A great deal of work remains before Space Industrialization enters <strong>the</strong> main stream of<br />
government and industry planning, and a proper public understanding is achieved. A<br />
solid information base, a dedicated advocacy group and very hard work are <strong>the</strong> essential<br />
ingredients to accomplishing <strong>the</strong>se objectives. The rewards will be worth <strong>the</strong> effort, and<br />
attaining <strong>the</strong>se goals will turn Space Industrialization into <strong>the</strong> mechanism for achieving<br />
<strong>the</strong> next plateau of human development.<br />
[5] The remainder of this document provides discussion in greater depth in <strong>the</strong> tasks of<br />
<strong>the</strong> study as outlined in <strong>the</strong> Summary. Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of this report contain <strong>the</strong> indepth<br />
discussion and data. . . .<br />
[10] 3. INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN SPACE<br />
The establishment of future markets and a space industrialization program for each<br />
future scenario required a compilation of potential opportunities. These were established<br />
to a level of detail and breadth of application sufficient to allow gross market survey and<br />
preliminary program formulation.<br />
The purpose of this compilation was not to create an exhaustive shopping list of<br />
opportunities but ra<strong>the</strong>r to key in certain indicative possibilities within each industrial<br />
activity identified (Information Services, Energy, Products, People). The goal was of sufficient<br />
breadth to insure represensative [sic] program formulation and appropriate market<br />
survey. The result of this is a compilation of over 200 potential applications for space related<br />
goods and services.<br />
As previously noted, <strong>the</strong> opportunities and <strong>the</strong>ir identified representative usage were compiled<br />
under four industry activity categories: Information Services, Energy, Products and People<br />
(in space). Each of <strong>the</strong>se categories was fur<strong>the</strong>r subdivided into subcategories as follows.<br />
Information Services Energy<br />
Communications Solar Power Satellite<br />
Observations Redirected Isolation<br />
Navigation Nuclear Waste Disposal<br />
Location Nuclear Power/Breeder Satellite<br />
Sensor Polling Power Relay<br />
Products People<br />
Biologicals Tourism<br />
Electronics Medical<br />
Electrical Entertainment/Art<br />
Structural Recreation<br />
Process Education<br />
Opticals Support<br />
[11] 4. THE TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES<br />
Thirty-two candidates for space utilization were compared to potential Earth based<br />
alternatives. Comparisons were based on examining <strong>the</strong> initial cost of installation on a first<br />
order basis and a cursory review of qualitative factors such as ease of use, reliability, technology<br />
requirements, etc. If costs and capability obtained appeared comparable between<br />
<strong>the</strong> alternatives, <strong>the</strong>y were retained for fur<strong>the</strong>r study. In certain instances <strong>the</strong> identified<br />
space uses exhibited much lower cost for similar capability or <strong>the</strong> reverse. These were<br />
identified as clearly viable candidates. Where cost and/or capability were clearly superior<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Earth alternative, <strong>the</strong> candidate was dropped from fur<strong>the</strong>r consideration.
For five of <strong>the</strong> thirty-two <strong>the</strong> terrestrial alternative was deemed clearly superior, seven<br />
appeared more favorable accomplished from space and twenty depended too much on<br />
specific details (too close to call).<br />
The generic lessons culminate with <strong>the</strong> conclusion that alternatives do exist, or can be<br />
visualized for most space initiatives. “Uniqueness” of <strong>the</strong> space candidates detailed was not<br />
deemed strong enough to warrant special consideration in a competitive environment.<br />
Significant technological “lead” for space options was found only in <strong>the</strong> area of earth<br />
resources. And, in <strong>the</strong> case of communications, implementation may be tipped already<br />
toward terrestrial options. In concert with <strong>the</strong>se arguments it is concluded that market<br />
softness, in terms of systems requirements, remove <strong>the</strong> constraint that terrestrial alternative<br />
systems must duplicate exactly space products and services.<br />
The implications of <strong>the</strong> above statements gives rise to <strong>the</strong> following observations on<br />
<strong>the</strong> viability of terrestrial alternatives.<br />
(1) Complexity from detailed assessment of non-cost issues substantially reduces <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunity to develop a “winning” mix of space efforts based on generalized benefits.<br />
(2) In lieu of a mandate, space viability must be aggressively advocated/studied<br />
against competitors in <strong>the</strong> mid 1980’s.<br />
[12] (3)The current involvement of an existing industry will typically indicate which alternative<br />
would be favored by it unless forced by competition to change directions.<br />
New entries in an industry will select a path based on investment and risk considerations.<br />
Most space initiatives considered in this study will appear highly favorable<br />
over terrestrial alternatives only after steps toward risk reduction are<br />
implemented. . . .<br />
[15]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 531<br />
Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for<br />
Selected Information Services Initiatives<br />
(1977 Dollars)<br />
Potential Revenues<br />
(in Millions of Dollars)<br />
Annual Cumulative<br />
(Peak) (1985–2010)<br />
Information Services<br />
Pocket Telephone 20,000 100,000<br />
Teleconferencing 9,000 90,000<br />
National Information Services 6,000 40,000<br />
Electronic Mail 9,000 90,000<br />
Disaster Communications Set 30 500<br />
Advanced TV Broadcast 2,000 8,000<br />
Vehicle Inspection 300 4,000<br />
Global Search and Rescue 50 300<br />
Nuclear Fuel Locators 3 40<br />
Ocean Resources 2 50<br />
Transportation Services (Equipment Sales) 70 400<br />
Rail Anti-Collision System 40 600<br />
Personal Navigation Sets (Equipment Sales) 100 400<br />
Vehicle/Package Locator 300 5,000<br />
Voting/Polling Wrist Set 40 200<br />
~$47B/Year ~$340 Billion
532<br />
Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for<br />
Selected Energy Initiatives<br />
(1977 Dollars)<br />
Potential Revenues<br />
(in Millions of Dollars)<br />
Annual Cumulative<br />
(Peak) (1985–2010)<br />
Energy<br />
Solar Power Satellite (First SAT in 1996)<br />
49 5GW at 27 MILS/KWH 50,000 300,000<br />
60 10GW at 11.5 MILS/KWH→7.1 MILS/KWH 30,000 200,000<br />
60 10GW at 27 MILS/KWH 100,000 600,000<br />
Urban Night Illuminator 200 2,000<br />
Nuclear Waste Disposal 1,000 3,000<br />
[16]<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
~30–$100B ~$200–$600B<br />
Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for<br />
Selected Products<br />
(1977 Dollars)<br />
Potential Revenues<br />
(in Millions of Dollars)<br />
Annual Cumulative<br />
(Peak) (1985–2010)<br />
Products<br />
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 600 7,000<br />
Electronics<br />
Semiconductors 2,000 20,000<br />
Electrical<br />
Magnets 300 4,000<br />
Superconductor (generating only) 2,000 20,000<br />
Optical<br />
Fiber Optics 80 800<br />
Special Metals<br />
Perishable Cutting Tools 800 8,000<br />
Bearings and Bushings 200 2,000<br />
Jewelry 100 2,000<br />
~$6B/Year ~$64 Billion
Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for<br />
Selected People Initiatives<br />
(1977 Dollars)<br />
Potential Revenues<br />
(in Millions of Dollars)<br />
Annual Cumulative<br />
(Peak) (1985–2010)<br />
People<br />
Space Tourism 50 900<br />
Space Hotel 50 600<br />
[17]<br />
Annual Revenues (in 10 9 Dollars)<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 533<br />
~$100M/Year ~$1.5 Billion<br />
Information<br />
Services<br />
People<br />
Energy<br />
Products<br />
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010<br />
Year<br />
Note: All values shown are additive to <strong>the</strong> present (1977) revenues of approximately<br />
one billion dollars per year. All Figures are in 1977 dollars.<br />
Figure 5-1. Projected Revenues for Space Industry Activities Assuming <strong>the</strong> Baseline Scenario for Terrestrial Background
534<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Document III-23<br />
Document title: “Feasibility of Commercial Space Manufacturing: Production of<br />
Pharmaceuticals,” Final Report, Volume 1, Executive Summary, MDC E2104, McDonnell<br />
Douglas Astronautics Company, St. Louis Division, Contract NAS8-31353, November 9,<br />
1978, pp. 1–3, 26–30.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This is ano<strong>the</strong>r one of <strong>the</strong> series of studies conducted in <strong>the</strong> late 1970s for <strong>the</strong> Marshall Space Flight<br />
Center. In <strong>the</strong> 1980s, McDonnell-Douglas teamed with Johnson and Johnson to experiment with an<br />
improved electrophoresis instrument that could make new drugs in microgravity aboard <strong>the</strong> Space<br />
Shuttle. Although <strong>the</strong> program was publicized as a privately funded effort, <strong>the</strong> genesis of <strong>the</strong> project<br />
can be traced back to <strong>the</strong> early support that NASA gave <strong>the</strong> company in looking at all aspects (technological,<br />
economic, and so on) of space industrialization.<br />
9 November 1978<br />
Feasibility of Commercial Space Manufacturing<br />
Production of Pharmaceuticals<br />
Final Report<br />
Volume 1<br />
Executive Summary<br />
[1] 1.0 INTRODUCTION<br />
The environment of space holds great promise for new manufacturing processes<br />
which take advantage of <strong>the</strong> absence of such earthbound phenomena as natural convection<br />
and sedimentation. Using <strong>the</strong>se processes, space manufacturers can not only produce<br />
products superior to those produced on <strong>the</strong> ground, <strong>the</strong>y can produce entirely new classes<br />
of products. Though characteristics of space—including high vacuum and radiation—<br />
can be duplicated on earth, <strong>the</strong> most important characteristic, weightlessness, can be<br />
achieved only for an extremely brief period. In <strong>the</strong> microgravity of space, molten materials<br />
can be suspended without containers—eliminating a major source of contaminants.<br />
More importantly, in space we can escape gravity-induced convection. Convection currents—which<br />
are caused by <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>rmal gradients in fluids—can lead to undesirable structural<br />
differences in <strong>the</strong> solid materials produced. Having escaped <strong>the</strong> problems posed by<br />
<strong>the</strong>se currents, space manufacturers will be able to grow crystals of great purity with highly<br />
controllable characteristics; <strong>the</strong>y will find it much easier to mix and homogenize liquids,<br />
to cast metals, and to separate and purify <strong>the</strong> elements of mixtures.<br />
The question immediately arises, why is not industry actively pursuing opportunities<br />
to develop materials and processes in space? The first reason is that industry is not generally<br />
familiar with <strong>the</strong> potentials of space. NASA and key aerospace organizations are<br />
working continually to rectify that situation. The second, and by far <strong>the</strong> dominant, reason<br />
is that observation of basic phenomena with potential application is only <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong><br />
industrial process. A major body of data on applied research into processes and materials<br />
characteristics, material applications potential, potential markets and <strong>the</strong>ir probable
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 535<br />
growth, and <strong>the</strong> characteristics of production systems and logistics must be developed as<br />
a vital decision base. Before private industry will invest <strong>the</strong> money required to begin such<br />
untried processes, it must be reasonably confident that <strong>the</strong> product will have a high value,<br />
that <strong>the</strong> benefits of processing in space will be substantially greater than processing on <strong>the</strong><br />
ground (i.e., capable of producing less expensive, more useful products, or producing<br />
products that cannot be made on earth). The investor must also be reasonably confident:<br />
that <strong>the</strong> space process can be developed in a given time at an affordable cost; that a market<br />
exists at a price which assures a reasonable return on investment; and that this market<br />
will [2] not disappear because a new product appears and captures <strong>the</strong> market, or because<br />
a breakthrough in <strong>the</strong> technology occurs that permits competitive ground production.<br />
Because <strong>the</strong>se risks are so difficult to assess, and because <strong>the</strong> required initial investment<br />
is so large, most industries adopt a “wait and see” attitude. Until more data are available,<br />
industries find it extremely difficult to assess <strong>the</strong> potential of new processes and<br />
products.<br />
To address this problem, we approached NASA with a proposal to study <strong>the</strong> feasibility<br />
of commercial manufacturing of pharmaceuticals. The goal of this undertaking was to<br />
induce pharmaceutical firms to participate actively, on a continuing basis, in exploring <strong>the</strong><br />
possibilities of using <strong>the</strong> unique environment of space to produce new products. The<br />
MDAC-St. Louis’ approach was, first, to secure <strong>the</strong> initial commitment of <strong>the</strong>se firms by providing<br />
key management and technical executives with preliminary data and forecasts of <strong>the</strong><br />
business and technical potential of space processing. The second aspect of <strong>the</strong> approach<br />
was to foster <strong>the</strong> initial commitments by establishing continuing technical and management<br />
exchanges with <strong>the</strong> interested pharmaceutical companies to our mutual benefit.<br />
Our enthusiasm for space processing focused on <strong>the</strong> promise shown by our company<br />
funded efforts with electrophoresis. In order to accomplish <strong>the</strong> facets of this goal we had<br />
to expand <strong>the</strong> data base we had developed—including significant laboratory work and an<br />
awareness of <strong>the</strong> state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art—and we had to target companies potentially interested in<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefits of <strong>the</strong> process.<br />
In our early company funded work with electrophoresis, we learned how to separate<br />
relatively large quantities of test materials. We also experienced <strong>the</strong> adverse effects of gravity<br />
on <strong>the</strong> process—causing <strong>the</strong> vertically flowing stream to collapse on itself (if <strong>the</strong> sample<br />
were denser than <strong>the</strong> carrier fluid) or to ball up and float to <strong>the</strong> top of <strong>the</strong> chamber<br />
(if <strong>the</strong> sample is less dense than <strong>the</strong> carrier fluid). On <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong>se experiences we<br />
began developing, with MDAC-St. Louis funds, our own ma<strong>the</strong>matical models of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
effects so that we could predict effects of design changes and operating conditions, and<br />
ultimately forecast <strong>the</strong> benefits of operating in space. We also ran company funded preliminary<br />
mass balance calculations; <strong>the</strong>se activities assured us that we could define [3] and<br />
demonstrate <strong>the</strong> types of requirements needed to characterize conceptual space and<br />
ground production systems, with <strong>the</strong>ir requisite logistics capabilities, in presentations to<br />
NASA and industry.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> contract, we addressed <strong>the</strong> problem of targeting pharmaceutical companies.<br />
Our first step was to engage <strong>the</strong> services of Price Waterhouse and Company to provide<br />
important drug industry data. The overall drug industry analysis provided by Price<br />
Waterhouse included: detailed assessments of <strong>the</strong> top twenty companies in <strong>the</strong> industry,<br />
focusing on <strong>the</strong>ir apparent commitment to innovation, <strong>the</strong>ir research and production<br />
emphasis on products having high potential for space production, and <strong>the</strong> prominence of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir executives. Price Waterhouse also helped us prepare <strong>the</strong> presentation to be made to<br />
<strong>the</strong>se companies, recommending a “businessman to businessman” approach.<br />
Letters were written to <strong>the</strong> selected companies. These letters gave an overview of <strong>the</strong><br />
feasibility study, listed some of <strong>the</strong> potential benefits to pharmaceutical manufacturing by<br />
processing in space, and requested an opportunity to make a presentation. Ten of fourteen<br />
companies requested <strong>the</strong> presentation.
536<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> pharmaceutical company personnel were generally skeptical at first,<br />
once <strong>the</strong>y understood <strong>the</strong> benefits of microgravity, <strong>the</strong> implications of <strong>the</strong> preliminary<br />
results of continuous flow electrophoretic separation, and <strong>the</strong> potential of an integrated<br />
space pharmaceutical production system manufacturing products of great value, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
became increasingly intrigued. As a result of <strong>the</strong>se initial contacts, six companies responded<br />
positively to our invitation for assistance and cooperation in this study. Two companies<br />
agreed to participate actively in <strong>the</strong> form of laboratory testing a product of specific interest<br />
to <strong>the</strong>mselves. Four additional companies agreed to participate in a more passive mode<br />
by suggesting products, providing marketing information and reviewing <strong>the</strong> analysis of<br />
results. One of <strong>the</strong> conditions for <strong>the</strong>ir participation, however, was that <strong>the</strong> companies not<br />
be linked with any potential product or process data because of <strong>the</strong> highly competitive<br />
nature of <strong>the</strong> industry. With NASA concurrence, <strong>the</strong>refore, and participating company<br />
approval, we have deleted <strong>the</strong> names of any company associated with this study and,<br />
instead, emphasized <strong>the</strong> important product and process information obtained from <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
This report describes our method of obtaining pharmaceutical company involvement,<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of protocols with two of <strong>the</strong>se companies, laboratory results of <strong>the</strong> separation<br />
of serum proteins by <strong>the</strong> continuous flow electrophoresis process, <strong>the</strong> selection and<br />
study of candidate products, and <strong>the</strong>ir production requirements. From <strong>the</strong> twelve candidate<br />
products discussed with, or suggested by, <strong>the</strong> visited pharmaceutical companies, six<br />
were selected for fur<strong>the</strong>r evaluation: antihemophilic factor, beta cells, erythropoietin, epidermal<br />
growth factor, alpha-1-antitrypsin and interferon. Production mass balances for<br />
antihemophilic factor, beta cells, and erythropoietin were compared for space versus<br />
ground operation. Selection of <strong>the</strong> best mode of operation for <strong>the</strong>se three representative<br />
products permitted a conceptual description of a multiproduct processing system for<br />
space operation. Production requirements for epidermal growth factor, alpha-1antitrypsin<br />
and interferon were found to be satisfied by <strong>the</strong> system concept.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> technical interchanges that occurred with <strong>the</strong>se pharmaceutical companies,<br />
significant data were generated and many valuable lessons were learned. These data and<br />
lessons, detailed in this report, are intended to serve o<strong>the</strong>rs interested in exploring <strong>the</strong><br />
possibilities of space processing. . . .<br />
[26] 6.0 LESSONS LEARNED<br />
During this study a number of lessons have been learned about obtaining and fostering<br />
commercial producer participation in studies of space processing. These should be<br />
given due consideration in formulating plans for future studies of this nature. They are<br />
presented here in brief, and MDAC-St. Louis recommends that <strong>the</strong>y be adopted as elements<br />
in <strong>the</strong> NASA model for exploring o<strong>the</strong>r market sectors considered for <strong>the</strong> commercialization<br />
of space.<br />
The key to involving industry in space processing is to establish a fully business-like<br />
footing for <strong>the</strong>ir participation. In most cases, <strong>the</strong> producer industry is relatively unfamiliar<br />
with <strong>the</strong> space environment, operations in space and <strong>the</strong> requirements and techniques<br />
of designing and integrating systems hardware to be flown in space missions. Dealing<br />
directly with NASA would involve <strong>the</strong>m in a new form of governmental interface to which<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are not accustomed.<br />
By establishing a buffer team between itself and <strong>the</strong> industry with which it desires to<br />
build participatory agreements, NASA can establish <strong>the</strong> businessman-to-businessman relationship<br />
so essential to nurturing commercial enterprise in space. The aerospace company<br />
chosen for <strong>the</strong> buffer team should have established a competence in dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />
particular process NASA wishes to advance as a candidate for production operations in<br />
space. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> company should have made a significant commitment on its own, in<br />
terms of funds and manpower, to <strong>the</strong> development of that process before NASA chooses
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 537<br />
that firm to serve on <strong>the</strong> buffer team. The buffer team should also include an independent<br />
business analysis firm specializing in <strong>the</strong> particular industry to be approached. The<br />
right business analysis firm not only knows <strong>the</strong> industries of interest, but is familiar with<br />
<strong>the</strong> particular environment in which <strong>the</strong> producers operate. It has access to business documentation<br />
resources beyond <strong>the</strong> aerospace horizon; and, most importantly, such a firm<br />
will know key management and technical personnel of <strong>the</strong>se companies plus <strong>the</strong> correct<br />
business basis on which to approach <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
The candidate producer firms identified by <strong>the</strong> buffer team should be subjected to a<br />
penetrating business analysis by <strong>the</strong> business consultant member of <strong>the</strong> team. This analysis<br />
should include such factors as: <strong>the</strong> firm’s annual sales and growth; [27] <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong><br />
company; <strong>the</strong> new products it has marketed; <strong>the</strong> tenure of <strong>the</strong> firm’s senior officers; <strong>the</strong><br />
surplus funds available for investment; <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> firm’s R&D budget; and <strong>the</strong> identifiable<br />
constraints on <strong>the</strong> firm’s growth. In addition, <strong>the</strong>re will be factors requiring evaluation<br />
which are peculiar to <strong>the</strong> specific class of industry being approached.<br />
Having made contact with <strong>the</strong> companies by introductory letter, follow-up telephone<br />
calls should arrange for a formal presentation at <strong>the</strong> producer’s own facility. After establishing<br />
a degree of rapport with <strong>the</strong>ir business or technical management, <strong>the</strong> presenting<br />
company should tailor each presentation to <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> key people in each producer<br />
company, i.e., <strong>the</strong> corporate decision makers and senior technical personnel.<br />
Personnel making <strong>the</strong> presentation should be thoroughly familiarized with <strong>the</strong> segment<br />
of industry <strong>the</strong>y will be visiting; at least one member should have credible experience<br />
in that producer industry. All members should be prepared to speak <strong>the</strong> vocabulary<br />
distinct to that industrial field of endeavor. The presentors [sic] should be a systems team<br />
that is capable of addressing all aspects of space processing to <strong>the</strong> audience’s satisfaction.<br />
Not only must <strong>the</strong>y be knowledgeable in <strong>the</strong> area of products and processes, but also familiar<br />
with space flight systems and how day-to-day activities in space are carried out. They<br />
must be thoroughly prepared, as well, to discuss resource requirements, costs and manpower,<br />
and schedules. Inclusion of a life sciences specialist in <strong>the</strong> team is highly desirable<br />
so that questions on man’s contributions and requirements in space can be answered.<br />
The presentation approach should reflect <strong>the</strong> businessman-to-businessman relationship<br />
desired between <strong>the</strong> buffer team and <strong>the</strong> manufacturing firm. It must reflect that<br />
industry is profit oriented ra<strong>the</strong>r than knowledge oriented; research must ultimately lead<br />
to increased corporate profit. By selecting products of particular interest to that company<br />
and presenting relevant market and business forecasts, a profit potential can be demonstrated<br />
in a way to engage both <strong>the</strong> technical and management attention of <strong>the</strong> audience.<br />
Using a conservative approach in <strong>the</strong> presentation, especially with technical and business<br />
values familiar to <strong>the</strong> audience, will give individuals an excellent chance to contribute to<br />
<strong>the</strong> discussions and to realize that <strong>the</strong>ir experience and participation would greatly<br />
enhance <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
[28] In this situation, <strong>the</strong> presentation approach should reflect that a joint working<br />
arrangement between <strong>the</strong> visited company and <strong>the</strong> aerospace industry would be mutually<br />
beneficial, using <strong>the</strong> strengths of each partner to achieve new goals. It must convey <strong>the</strong><br />
attitude: “We are deeply involved and would like you to join us” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “You tell us<br />
what we can do for you in space.” If <strong>the</strong> presentation features working hardware, ma<strong>the</strong>matical<br />
analyses and models, as well as preliminary product data with <strong>the</strong>ir related market<br />
and risk analyses, <strong>the</strong> audience will feel that <strong>the</strong> presenters have a strong corporate investment<br />
in <strong>the</strong> concept, both financially and in terms of manhours of effort.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> presentation, <strong>the</strong> question is invariably asked of <strong>the</strong> presentor [sic], “Why<br />
should we manufacturers be interested in space processing?” Placing a good reason for<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir interest early in <strong>the</strong> presentation can forestall <strong>the</strong> inquiry. The reason can easily be<br />
developed by identifying <strong>the</strong> visited company with a candidate product that has <strong>the</strong> potential<br />
of being produced in space and that also complements <strong>the</strong>ir already existing product
538<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
line. We have found it is also essential to indicate very early in our presentations that <strong>the</strong><br />
products discussed are of <strong>the</strong> very low volume-very high value type. Many of <strong>the</strong> proprietary<br />
pharmaceutical companies think in terms of large volume-low cost products which<br />
are not applicable in <strong>the</strong> space operations we visualize.<br />
Results of <strong>the</strong> presentations will develop relatively slowly. The companies visited will<br />
take time to digest what is presented and investigate <strong>the</strong> claims made. Experience in this<br />
study has shown that this phase will take about three months. If results of <strong>the</strong> initial investigation<br />
are favorable, <strong>the</strong> company will present <strong>the</strong> concept to <strong>the</strong>ir corporate management.<br />
This second phase usually will take two more months. The formal development of<br />
participating documentation (e.g., protocols, agreements, etc.) and approval of budgets<br />
will ordinarily consume an additional six to twelve months. All during this time, routine<br />
contact between <strong>the</strong> two companies should be maintained with pertinent management<br />
and technological data exchange by both sides as required.<br />
During this period, it is extremely important not to exploit <strong>the</strong> manufacturing<br />
company names or <strong>the</strong> products <strong>the</strong>y have under consideration. If such information<br />
[29] became generally known without <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> candidate participant, cooperation<br />
would probably be terminated. The privacy of a manufacturing company considering<br />
participation must be respected until <strong>the</strong> firm decides to announce publicly, for itself, its<br />
intent to participate in <strong>the</strong> exploration of space applications.<br />
A data base concerning a potentially profitable candidate product must be developed<br />
upon which a technology interchange can be established between <strong>the</strong> interfacing company<br />
and <strong>the</strong> candidate producing company. Cooperative laboratory activities are essential<br />
tools in building <strong>the</strong> required data base. In this way MDAC-St. Louis established a technology<br />
interchange with <strong>the</strong> participating pharmaceutical companies. This, in turn, we<br />
believe, has enhanced <strong>the</strong> level of interest of <strong>the</strong>se companies in <strong>the</strong> potential offered by<br />
processing pharmaceuticals in space.<br />
Many potential products can be proposed for space processing by reviewing <strong>the</strong> literature<br />
and discussing <strong>the</strong> subject with professionals in <strong>the</strong> field of interest. Many of <strong>the</strong> suggestions<br />
may be of interest scientifically for <strong>the</strong>ir own sake but will have little chance of<br />
being rapidly adopted by <strong>the</strong> workers in that field if <strong>the</strong>y offer no substantial improvement<br />
over existing materials. If <strong>the</strong> companies do not see a significant return on <strong>the</strong>ir investment<br />
in research and development of a product <strong>the</strong>y will ignore that product.<br />
Development of market data on products important to candidate participating firms<br />
is a key to securing <strong>the</strong>ir interest. A search of <strong>the</strong> literature, supplemented by consultations<br />
with clinical authorities will provide <strong>the</strong> information necessary to develop a picture<br />
of <strong>the</strong> current market open for <strong>the</strong> model products. Reasonable assumptions, based on<br />
<strong>the</strong> guidance of clinical research teams, will yield use market projections for advanced<br />
clinical uses. Finally, appropriate business risk analysis should be employed to assess <strong>the</strong><br />
market risks for processes and products as <strong>the</strong>y move from initial R&D commitment<br />
through ground and flight experimentation to achieve successful flight production<br />
demonstrations. By offering <strong>the</strong>se preliminary analyses to prospective participators, much<br />
useful data can be obtained during <strong>the</strong> presentation itself. Most important, <strong>the</strong> potential<br />
participating firms will be assured that <strong>the</strong> presentor [sic] has a business understanding<br />
and an investment attitude appropriate for cooperative endeavors for <strong>the</strong>ir mutual benefit.<br />
[30] A hardware system that is capable of producing a variety of products with only minor<br />
operational changes, e.g., instrument settings and chemical substrates, would offer significant<br />
operational logistics and cost advantages to a producer. Using conservative assumptions<br />
based on data from <strong>the</strong> literature, tempered by laboratory experience, <strong>the</strong><br />
requirements for such a system can be developed and its significant operating characteristics<br />
can be defined. This was <strong>the</strong> approach used by MDAC-St. Louis to define a system<br />
for processing pharmaceuticals in space. All of <strong>the</strong> twelve biological products reviewed in
this study could exercise <strong>the</strong> system in part, or in its entirety, thus supporting <strong>the</strong> concept<br />
of a true multiproduct system.<br />
While this study was done to assess <strong>the</strong> commercial feasibility of manufacturing pharmaceutical<br />
products in space, it serves as a model for those who wish to consider o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
processes or products in <strong>the</strong> same environment. The use of <strong>the</strong> mass balance analytical<br />
concept forces a delineation of what must be accomplished in <strong>the</strong> process for each product<br />
in a stepwise fashion. The calculated quantities of materials at each step will quickly<br />
determine if <strong>the</strong> process is feasible with current technology, where <strong>the</strong> areas of information<br />
must be obtained to fill in <strong>the</strong> gaps, and anticipated recurring transportation costs to<br />
haul <strong>the</strong> material to and from space. While it does not define <strong>the</strong> total cost of <strong>the</strong> system,<br />
it does give <strong>the</strong> prospective manufacturer and NASA a general idea of <strong>the</strong> size, power and<br />
weight of <strong>the</strong> processing equipment as well as <strong>the</strong> extent and type of storage requirements.<br />
The length of <strong>the</strong> missions will be defined to determine economic feasibility. This will<br />
have to be interwoven with <strong>the</strong> NASA program and schedules to determine if, and when,<br />
a vehicle capability will be available to support such a manufacturing facility. Legal and<br />
regulatory considerations will also have to be defined.<br />
Recommendations for future work are presented. . . . It is recommended that drug<br />
firm involvement be continued and encouraged both in ground research and product<br />
evaluation. Because of companies’ sensitivity about government interference and disclosure<br />
of trade secrets, each company should be dealt with on an individual basis with some<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r private firm serving as a buffer or interface between <strong>the</strong> individual companies and<br />
<strong>the</strong> government. Heavier involvement through evolutionary processes will probably lead<br />
to direct participation in space activities. Such participation will logically require a user<br />
development laboratory for <strong>the</strong>se companies’ product developments.<br />
Document III-24<br />
Document title: James Beggs, Administrator, NASA, to William Clark, Assistant to <strong>the</strong><br />
President for National Security Affairs, August 26, 1983, with attached: John F. Yardley,<br />
President, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, to James Beggs, Administrator,<br />
NASA, August 23, 1983.<br />
Source: Ronald W. Reagan Library, Sima, California.<br />
After an August 3, 1983, meeting with President Ronald Reagan, John Yardley, <strong>the</strong> president of<br />
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, offered to be <strong>the</strong> first commercial user of a NASA space<br />
station. In <strong>the</strong> interim, before <strong>the</strong> station became operational, Yardley proposed manufacturing by<br />
using free-flying spacecraft. The business plan revolved around <strong>the</strong> successful results of experiments<br />
in drug production aboard <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle.<br />
Honorable William Clark<br />
Assistant to <strong>the</strong> President for<br />
National Security Affairs<br />
The White House<br />
Washington, D.C. 20506<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 539<br />
August 26, 1983<br />
Dear Bill:<br />
I just received <strong>the</strong> [handwritten underlining] enclosed letter from John Yardley of<br />
McDonnell Douglas. [“This is our” crossed out by hand and replaced by handwritten “re:
540<br />
<strong>the</strong>”] [handwritten underlining] first formal industrial commitment to use Space Station<br />
commercially. I am confident <strong>the</strong>re will be many more commitments of this kind as we<br />
move into planning and implementing a Space Station.<br />
With best personal regards.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
[hand-signed: “Jim”]<br />
James M. Beggs<br />
Administrator<br />
[handwritten note: “McDonnell will go fur<strong>the</strong>r than this if asked. They also would make<br />
this public if we desire it.” hand-initialed: “B”]<br />
cc:<br />
Commerce - Mr. Baldridge<br />
CIA - Mr. Casey<br />
23 August 1983<br />
Mr. James M. Beggs<br />
Administrator<br />
NASA<br />
4th and Maryland Avenues, S.W.<br />
Washington, D.C. 20546<br />
Dear Jim:<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
**********<br />
After participating in <strong>the</strong> recent White House meeting on commercial space activity,<br />
I thought it appropriate to review <strong>the</strong> McDonnell Douglas Electrophoresis Operations in<br />
Space (EOS) Program relative to <strong>the</strong> potential development of a man-habited [sic] space<br />
station by NASA.<br />
As you know, McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson are actively pursuing <strong>the</strong><br />
development of an electrophoresis process that will use <strong>the</strong> gravity-free environment of<br />
space to produce pharmaceutical products that cannot be economically produced on<br />
Earth. We are now developing our first protein product, a natural hormone currently<br />
unavailable. Since 1976, we have spent many millions of dollars on this effort. We have<br />
been successful in proving <strong>the</strong> validity of our concept in our first three Shuttle flights with<br />
our continuous flow electrophoresis research equipment. We are now designing a production<br />
version of our system which will fly in <strong>the</strong> payload bay of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle in 1985 and<br />
1986 and <strong>the</strong>refore, our expenditure rate has greatly accelerated.<br />
We believe that <strong>the</strong> potential for manufacturing new and improved pharmaceuticals<br />
in space is real and attainable. While shuttle-based research has been successful, this<br />
method is slow and laborious. [handwritten underlining] With <strong>the</strong> opportunity for<br />
research and development of new products that a space station would provide, we could<br />
during <strong>the</strong> 1990s bring five times <strong>the</strong> number of new breakthrough pharmaceuticals to<br />
market. Also, <strong>the</strong> costs of development and production of <strong>the</strong>se new products can be<br />
greatly reduced.
Our recent work with live cell material such as <strong>the</strong> islets (beta cells) being studied in<br />
cooperation with Washington University School of Medicine as a potential cure for diabetes,<br />
leads us to believe that it will be impossible to automate a facility that could successfully<br />
separate live cells by electrophoresis. Unlike protein materials, <strong>the</strong> sensitivity of<br />
[2] living organisms, i.e., beta cells, to operating conditions within <strong>the</strong> systems dictates a<br />
man interface during processing to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir survival. If <strong>the</strong> current treatment under<br />
investigation proves successful, it follows that without a space station <strong>the</strong> probability of<br />
achieving a population-wide cure for diabetes is low.<br />
As you know, we are striving to begin commercial production of our first protein product<br />
in early 1987 or before. Because a space station would not be available until <strong>the</strong> early<br />
1990s, we are planning to use dedicated unmanned free flying spacecraft for increased<br />
production. Serious negotiations are presently under way with three companies willing to<br />
invest private funds to build this spacecraft. We look at this initial commercial step as<br />
being only interim.<br />
We have been encouraged by <strong>the</strong> progress NASA has been making in defining such a<br />
space station program. [handwritten underlining] Consider this a formal request for <strong>the</strong><br />
McDonnell Douglas EOS Program to be included as <strong>the</strong> first commercial user of a NASA<br />
space station.<br />
Assuming our continued success in this activity, you may consider this a formal commitment<br />
to use <strong>the</strong> space station as <strong>the</strong> major base of operations for carrying out and<br />
expanding this new industry.<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
John F. Yardley<br />
President<br />
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY<br />
Document III-25<br />
Document title: L. Smith, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, “Electrophoresis Operations<br />
in Space,” briefing charts, September 1983, pp. 6–7, 30.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.<br />
This McDonnell Douglas viewgraph summary of <strong>the</strong> EOS program illustrates that <strong>the</strong> company had<br />
prepared detailed business plans and saw potential profits in drug production in space using its electrophoresis<br />
instrument. It emphasizes <strong>the</strong> potential market growth and demand, as well as <strong>the</strong> relative<br />
efficiency of microgravity production compared to similar terrestrial production of <strong>the</strong>se drugs.<br />
[6] WHY SPACE?<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 541<br />
• Gravity Limits <strong>the</strong> Full Potential of <strong>the</strong> Continuous Flow System as a Commercial<br />
Process<br />
• Gravity Limits Sample Concentration, Flow Volume, and Purity in Continuous Flow<br />
Electrophoresis<br />
— 100 to 800 Times More Throughput in Space for Same Degree of Purity (Varies<br />
for Different Product Materials)<br />
— Five Times Improvement in Purification Potential in Space
542<br />
• Electrophoresis Operations in Space Necessary to Satisfy Patient Population<br />
— Ground Scale-up Costs Prohibitive to Achieve Meaningful Plant Output<br />
— Price of Ground Derived Product Would Be Substantially Higher<br />
— Purity Levels That Are Achievable Only in Space May Be Required<br />
[7] INITIAL BUSINESS STRATEGY<br />
Objectives Accomplishments<br />
Find Pharmaceutical Company as Ortho Pharmaceutical Became Active Partner<br />
Active Partner in July 1978<br />
Obtain Free Flights from NASA to MDAC/NASA Joint Endeavor Agreement<br />
Verify Concepts and Equipment Signed January 1980<br />
Optimize <strong>the</strong> Electrophoresis Process Five Years Development of Electrophoresis<br />
for Ground Research Technology 1977 Thru 1981<br />
Ensure Proprietary Nature of Process Five Invention Disclosures Written,<br />
and Hardware Two Patents Issued, One Pending<br />
Identify at Least One Product for Product Identified and Detail Market Research<br />
Development and Marketing of Ortho Confirmed Large Market<br />
Assess Feasibility of EOS Program Economic Feasibility Established and Presented<br />
Including Economic Viability of in Business Plan in June 1981<br />
Commercial Phase<br />
[no page number] PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY<br />
Number of Products<br />
• 1 Product Industry<br />
• 6 Product Industry<br />
• 12 Product Industry<br />
Market Capture<br />
• 25% Domestic<br />
• Pharmaceutical Products Only<br />
Modes of Operation<br />
• Shuttle Sortie<br />
• Shuttle + Unmanned Platform<br />
• Shuttle + Space Station<br />
Time Frame<br />
• Until <strong>the</strong> Year 2000<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
[no page number]<br />
Annual Gross Sales (Billion Dollars)<br />
5.0<br />
4.0<br />
3.0<br />
2.0<br />
1.0<br />
[30] CONCLUSIONS<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 543<br />
Annual Market Potential for Electrophoresis<br />
25% Market Capture USA Only<br />
0<br />
0 2 4 6 8 10 12<br />
Number of Products EOS Industry<br />
• Potential for Manufacturing New and Improved Products in Space Is Real<br />
• Without Long Duration Capability Market Penetration for Any One Product Is<br />
Limited<br />
• Unmanned Free Flight Support Will Allow Market Development for One or More<br />
Products Within <strong>the</strong> Limitations of <strong>the</strong> Space Transportation System<br />
• Manned Long Duration Facility Can Provide <strong>the</strong> Basis for Industry Growth With<br />
Improved Economics<br />
Document III-26<br />
• Population<br />
USA 230 Million (5.12%)<br />
World 4585 Million<br />
• Gross National Product (GNP)<br />
USA $2.626 Trillion<br />
Europe/Japan $4.530 Trillion<br />
Document title: U.S. General Accounting <strong>Office</strong>, “Commercial Use of Space: Many<br />
Grantees Making Progress, but NASA Oversight Could be Improved,” Executive<br />
Summary, GAO/NSIAD-91-142, May 1991, pp. 2–5.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.
544<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
In 1986, NASA initiated a program establishing Centers for <strong>the</strong> Commercial Development of Space at<br />
a number of universities. It was aimed at encouraging universities and business to form partnerships<br />
to perform R&D on space-related topics. NASA would initially fund <strong>the</strong> program with <strong>the</strong> expectation<br />
that <strong>the</strong> business sector would eventually take over <strong>the</strong> funding responsibilities. NASA would benefit<br />
from having customers who would want to perform experiments in space, and <strong>the</strong> universities and<br />
private sector would benefit from <strong>the</strong> knowledge—and profit potential—of space activities. As this<br />
General Accounting <strong>Office</strong> (GAO) report suggests, this technological development program had some<br />
success, but it did not fulfill all of its initial goals.<br />
[2] Executive Summary<br />
Purpose<br />
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long recognized<br />
that to help <strong>the</strong> United States maintain a technological edge throughout <strong>the</strong> world, it<br />
must find ways to encourage and support <strong>the</strong> development of a domestic commercial<br />
space industry. In 1985, NASA began to provide grants and o<strong>the</strong>r types of support to <strong>the</strong><br />
Centers for <strong>the</strong> Commercial Development of Space to encourage <strong>the</strong> melding of <strong>the</strong><br />
resources and talents of government, industry, and academic institutions for researching<br />
and developing space-related technologies that have potential commercial applications.<br />
After a limited period of grant support of 5 to 7 years, NASA expected <strong>the</strong> centers to<br />
become self-sufficient.<br />
The Chair, Subcommittee on VA [Veterans Affairs], HUD [Housing and Urban<br />
Development], and Independent Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations, asked<br />
GAO to review <strong>the</strong> extent of private sector involvement in <strong>the</strong> centers’ programs, <strong>the</strong> centers’<br />
progress toward and prospects for self-sufficiency, and NASA’s management of <strong>the</strong><br />
program.<br />
Background<br />
Through 1990, NASA has provided about $81 million in grants to 16 centers, most of<br />
which are located at state and private universities. The centers work in one of seven areas<br />
of specialization: materials processing, life sciences, remote sensing, automation and<br />
robotics, space structures and materials, space propulsion, and space power. The centers,<br />
which have operated from 3 to 5 years, reported that by <strong>the</strong> beginning of 1990 <strong>the</strong>y had<br />
established about 300 affiliations with o<strong>the</strong>r organizations and companies, and <strong>the</strong>y had<br />
completed over 750 flight tests and o<strong>the</strong>r experiments, including 18 conducted in space.<br />
At that time, <strong>the</strong>y were also planning over 300 more flight tests.<br />
Results in Brief<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> inception of <strong>the</strong> program, NASA has had some success in establishing centers<br />
capable of attracting and sustaining industry interest and support. It is too soon to<br />
gauge <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> program may ultimately achieve its goals, although it is clear<br />
that <strong>the</strong> centers will not become self-sufficient in 5 to 7 years. However, such a fixed period<br />
of support applicable to all centers fails to recognize differences among <strong>the</strong> centers.<br />
Recognizing such differences would require NASA to establish grant support goals for <strong>the</strong><br />
individual centers based primarily on <strong>the</strong> 3 to 5 years’ operating experience each center<br />
has had.<br />
NASA also has opportunities to make improvements elsewhere in <strong>the</strong> program. With<br />
<strong>the</strong> expectation for significant growth in <strong>the</strong> number of [3] future experiments requiring<br />
access to space, <strong>the</strong> process for evaluating <strong>the</strong> centers’ payload requests should be examined<br />
to ensure that it efficiently provides <strong>the</strong> desired mix of expertise to adequately review<br />
requests. Also, NASA needs to examine <strong>the</strong> adequacy of <strong>the</strong> internal controls it employs
to ensure that its accounting system contains timely, complete, and accurate information<br />
reported by grantees on <strong>the</strong>ir uses of federal funds.<br />
Principal Findings<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 545<br />
Growth of Industry Involvement and Support<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> inception of <strong>the</strong> program, <strong>the</strong> centers have been increasing <strong>the</strong> number of<br />
organizations and companies with which <strong>the</strong>y have become affiliated. More importantly,<br />
<strong>the</strong> number of such affiliates that represent industry has also been increasing, from<br />
63 reported by 6 centers for 1986 to an estimated 199 reported by 16 centers for 1990.<br />
The level of cash support <strong>the</strong> centers have received from <strong>the</strong>ir industry affiliates has<br />
also been increasing. In 1986, industry affiliates provided less than $1 million. By 1990, <strong>the</strong><br />
amount of cash support from industry was estimated at $4.1 million for <strong>the</strong> 13 centers that<br />
received such support. The industry affiliates that were working with a center in 1989 had<br />
been doing so for an average of 2.3 years, and almost all of <strong>the</strong>m had provided cash or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r types of support to <strong>the</strong>ir center.<br />
Centers Will Not Be Self-Sufficient Soon<br />
The proportion of centers’ support provided by NASA grants has been increasing, not<br />
decreasing. For example, NASA provided 28 percent of <strong>the</strong> centers’ total support in 1986,<br />
but by 1990 NASA’s share was estimated at 47 percent. The centers’ heavy reliance on<br />
NASA grants will continue for <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future. The main reason for this pattern of<br />
increasing support is that NASA’s overall grant support to help <strong>the</strong> centers fund <strong>the</strong> cost<br />
of access to space and <strong>the</strong> cost of unique hardware and facilities has increased.<br />
None of <strong>the</strong> center directors believe that <strong>the</strong>ir centers will be able to continue at <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
present levels of activity if grant support is withdrawn before 1995. The most optimistic<br />
directors believe <strong>the</strong>ir centers can achieve self-sufficiency somewhere between 1995 and<br />
2000. At <strong>the</strong> opposite end of <strong>the</strong> scale, five directors do not ever foresee a time when <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
centers will be able to do without NASA grant assistance.<br />
[4] Structure of <strong>the</strong> Payload Review Process Should Be Reviewed<br />
For about 2 years NASA has used a Payload Selection Board to assist in reviewing <strong>the</strong><br />
centers’ requests for flying <strong>the</strong>ir payloads on <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle. However, little specific<br />
guidance has been provided to Board members about <strong>the</strong> review process and what <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were expected to contribute to it. Some Board members expressed uncertainty and concern<br />
about <strong>the</strong> process and <strong>the</strong>ir role in it. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Board’s membership, which<br />
was initially planned to include three members representing industry, has not had more<br />
than one.<br />
Availability of Good Fiscal Information Should Be Ensured<br />
Timely, complete, and accurate fiscal information on grantees is not routinely available<br />
from NASA’s accounting system because reporting requirements on <strong>the</strong> use of federal<br />
funds are not effectively enforced. Even after <strong>the</strong> reports are received, <strong>the</strong><br />
information is not routinely entered into <strong>the</strong> agencywide accounting records in a timely<br />
fashion.<br />
NASA accounting personnel have been able to get <strong>the</strong> centers to voluntarily correct<br />
various reporting problems, including a number of instances of erroneous and incomplete<br />
reporting. However, late reporting has proven to be much more difficult to deal<br />
with. NASA accounting personnel estimate that a majority of <strong>the</strong> required quarterly<br />
reports are late.<br />
Information from grantees’ financial reports is used to update <strong>the</strong> agencywide<br />
accounting records. However, sometimes such updates are not done until two or more
546<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
quarterly reports are on file. NASA accounting personnel frequently receive complaints<br />
about <strong>the</strong> lack of current financial information on grantees in <strong>the</strong> agencywide data base.<br />
Recommendations<br />
GAO recommends that <strong>the</strong> Administrator, NASA,<br />
• establish, in consultation with each center, a grant support goal with interim targets<br />
for tracking progress toward self-sufficiency and for determining <strong>the</strong> need<br />
for, and to help measure <strong>the</strong> results of, corrective actions;<br />
• review <strong>the</strong> flight request and approval process to ensure that <strong>the</strong> expertise needed<br />
for such reviews is available in <strong>the</strong> most efficient manner possible and that<br />
those who are asked to assess flight requests fully understand <strong>the</strong> intended scope<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir participation; and<br />
• assess and, as necessary, streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> internal controls for ensuring that timely,<br />
complete, and accurate fiscal information on grantees is available in NASA’s<br />
accounting system.<br />
Agency Comments and GAO’s Evaluation<br />
In commenting on a draft of GAO’s report, NASA said that it provides a useful commentary<br />
on one of NASA’s newest and fastest growing commercial space programs. NASA<br />
noted that GAO’s recommendations were reasonable and could be implemented.<br />
However, while recognizing <strong>the</strong> slower-than-anticipated pace of <strong>the</strong> program, NASA said<br />
that determining how and when to establish grant support time limits would be considered<br />
in <strong>the</strong> future. GAO believes that a grant program that is essentially intended to be<br />
self-liquidating must include a constantly visible grant support goal to focus and encourage<br />
each grantee’s efforts to develop alternative revenue sources. GAO recognizes that<br />
support goals may change as circumstances warrant, but each such change should be a<br />
highly visible management action subject to review and to a determination that <strong>the</strong><br />
change in <strong>the</strong> goal, ra<strong>the</strong>r than grant termination, is justified.<br />
NASA also offered o<strong>the</strong>r specific suggestions, which GAO incorporated into <strong>the</strong><br />
report where appropriate. . . .<br />
Document III-27<br />
Document title: Leo S. Packer, Special Assistant to Associate Administrator, <strong>Office</strong> of<br />
Advanced Research and Technology, NASA, “Proposal for Enhancing NASA Technology<br />
Transfer to Civil Systems,” September 26, 1969, pp. 1–9.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
This Apollo-era document specifically relates to technology transfer. Economic benefits are deemphasized<br />
in favor of public and social benefits. The objective of <strong>the</strong> technology transfer program was primarily<br />
to use NASA technology to help solve problems in “public fields.” Although technological help<br />
for business is discussed, it is generally dismissed as not being appropriate or useful.
Proposal for Enhancing NASA Technology<br />
Transfer to Civil Systems<br />
September 26, 1969 . . .<br />
[1] CHAPTER III<br />
Objectives<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> assignment for this study was phrased in very general terms, it was helpful<br />
initially to break down <strong>the</strong> subject matter into manageable categories. The following list<br />
indicates <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> study, with <strong>the</strong> understanding that it represents a selection of<br />
<strong>the</strong> most important elements, without which one cannot obtain a valid picture. The objectives<br />
flow quite naturally from <strong>the</strong> list.<br />
1) Examine <strong>the</strong> current status of Federal public policy for R&D, with emphasis on congressional<br />
and public attitudes and <strong>the</strong> guidance of <strong>the</strong> White House advisory<br />
organizations.<br />
2) Understand <strong>the</strong> history and nature of NASA as a national R&D resource.<br />
3) Obtain some feeling for <strong>the</strong> diversified and scattered NASA activities in nonaerospace<br />
and non-aeronautical R&D. How did <strong>the</strong>se projects arise, how are <strong>the</strong>y justified<br />
and funded, and why are <strong>the</strong>y relatively inconspicuous within NASA’s program<br />
structure?<br />
4) What is <strong>the</strong> current best understanding of <strong>the</strong> nature of technology transfer among<br />
government, industry, universities, and institutes? What is NASA’s perceived role and<br />
effectiveness?<br />
5) Assemble a list of national, civil, social problem areas that have some obvious technology<br />
components.<br />
6) Develop generalized criteria for evaluation of <strong>the</strong> above in order to reduce <strong>the</strong> list to<br />
a fewer number suitable for NASA interest and investigation.<br />
7) Recommend a small number of problems for serious consideration as NASA challenges,<br />
with appropriate suggestive pros and cons for each.<br />
8) Propose policy, organizational adaptation, and actions that NASA might consider to<br />
enhance its responsiveness and contributions to <strong>the</strong> public welfare, in addition to its<br />
major responsibility for assigned missions.<br />
[2] CHAPTER IV<br />
I - Observations<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 547<br />
Observations and Recommendations<br />
1. NASA possesses certain unique talents and experience that are relevant to technology<br />
needs of public problems, ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or with minor modification. These are<br />
generally in <strong>the</strong> categories of specific technology, systems engineering, and organization<br />
and management.<br />
2. NASA is faced with an opportunity to take new organizational and program initiatives<br />
to apply a small portion of its resources, say two percent, on a continuing basis to technology<br />
applications in public fields.<br />
3. There are many indications that <strong>the</strong> public and government environment is now generally<br />
favorable to such initiatives if <strong>the</strong>y are convincingly explained and vigorously<br />
advocated. Although some political and jurisdictional problems will be encountered,
548<br />
an appropriate and timely action by NASA is expected to be welcomed and supported.<br />
I believe it would also streng<strong>the</strong>n NASA’s “mainstream” plans and programs.<br />
4. There is a reservoir of potential support among NASA people, based on response to<br />
challenge and social sensitivity and altruism. An overt organizational step toward<br />
social application of technology, no matter how restricted and cautious, would generate<br />
considerable enthusiasm. There would also be opposition based on resistance to<br />
change, administrative obstacles, and dislike of unfamiliar, difficult and frustrating<br />
problems.<br />
5. I find no difficulty in extending NASA’s technology charter to include direct participation<br />
in civil problems of national scope. NASA does study, penetrate and exploit<br />
unconventional and hostile environments for man, such as zero gravity, underseas,<br />
radiation, aeronautical flight conditions, closed life cycle, extreme temperatures, vacuum,<br />
etc. Since hostile environments can be natural or social, we can also include<br />
crowding, malnourishment, air and water pollution, noise pollution, violence and<br />
insecurity, fear, economic dislocation, resource depletion, earthquakes, destructive<br />
storms, and one can go on as far as one wishes to include most of <strong>the</strong> social ills of our<br />
time.<br />
6. There should be no doubt that NASA’s primary job is space exploration and space<br />
operations as well as aeronautical R&D. I believe that <strong>the</strong> Apollo achievement provides<br />
an appropriate time to propose that technology transfer to serve public and<br />
social purposes is now a major concern of <strong>the</strong> Agency, that it will be pursued with <strong>the</strong><br />
same mission-oriented concentration that characterized <strong>the</strong> space program. This new<br />
policy does not preclude a careful approach to unfamiliar application environments.<br />
We have to try to structure as favorable an environment as possible in order that our<br />
technology contributions have a maximum impact.<br />
[3] 7. NASA needs a strong and visible focus for people and activities involved in new<br />
arrangements, new technology and new applications to civil and social problems.<br />
Recommendations<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
1. I recommend <strong>the</strong> formation of a new Program <strong>Office</strong> (<strong>Office</strong> of Civil Systems<br />
Technology) to assume responsibility for all of NASA’s technology activities for public<br />
programs, with <strong>the</strong> exception of those directly tied to aeronautics, space exploration<br />
and space operations. The basic components of <strong>the</strong> Program <strong>Office</strong> are:<br />
a) An Advisory Council for policy guidance, composed of people from industry,<br />
from o<strong>the</strong>r NASA Program <strong>Office</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> Administrator’s office, <strong>Office</strong> of DOD and<br />
Interagency Affairs, <strong>Office</strong> of Policy, [National Science Foundation, President’s<br />
Science Advisory Committee, <strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology], Bureau of <strong>the</strong><br />
Budget, and possibly o<strong>the</strong>r agencies.<br />
b) Technology Utilization. I believe that this activity would be more effective in a line<br />
technical organization directly related to its function, ra<strong>the</strong>r than in an administrative<br />
staff organization.<br />
c) Market Research and Requirements Analysis Division to provide initial technical<br />
and feasibility analysis of proposed problems, evaluation of NASA capabilities,<br />
projection of evolving technical needs in public problem areas, interaction with<br />
NAE, [National Academy of Sciences] and o<strong>the</strong>r agencies and industry, state-of<strong>the</strong>-art<br />
studies, and exploratory technology studies to provide a basis for NASA<br />
decisions.<br />
d) A program management organization that will coordinate projects in being, initiate<br />
new efforts, channel information from projects to management and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
agencies, and act as “customer representatives” or “account executives” for outside<br />
agencies concerned with NASA work under <strong>the</strong> Program <strong>Office</strong>.
e) A Special Mission Development Division that will concern itself with implementing<br />
standard and innovative institutional arrangements with o<strong>the</strong>r agencies and<br />
interests, such as special-purpose institutes, seminars, training agreements, development<br />
of R&D cadres for o<strong>the</strong>r agencies, NASA-industry cooperation for specific<br />
purposes, assistance to public affairs objectives, and o<strong>the</strong>r administrative and<br />
management support for <strong>the</strong> Program <strong>Office</strong>.<br />
I emphasize that no scientific and technological work, o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> Market<br />
Research and Mission Requirements Analysis, is to be performed in <strong>the</strong> Program <strong>Office</strong>.<br />
The reservoir of technology resources will be in <strong>the</strong> Centers, industry, universities and<br />
institutes. The Program <strong>Office</strong> acts as <strong>the</strong> integrative mechanism for policy, decision making,<br />
planning, allocation of resources, program control, communication and progress<br />
reporting.<br />
[4] 2. After deciding on its desired course, NASA management should conduct a discreet<br />
program of persuasion among leaders of Congress, Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget, <strong>Office</strong> of<br />
Science and Technology, o<strong>the</strong>r government agencies, private industry, and o<strong>the</strong>rs to<br />
gain prior acceptance of <strong>the</strong> policy.<br />
3. NASA management should identify at Headquarters and in <strong>the</strong> Centers existing and<br />
potential capabilities applicable to those programs and opportunities deemed worthy<br />
of NASA participation. Of particular interest are people who would wish to apply <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
skills and experience in new need environments.<br />
4. NASA should, after application of proper criteria and adequate problem definition<br />
studies, select a limited number of promising challenges, negotiate <strong>the</strong> required<br />
agreements, develop objectives, assign resources and move ahead under a new major<br />
Program <strong>Office</strong> as it normally does when assuming new missions. NASA identification,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> scientific and technical communities and in <strong>the</strong> public eye, with a limited number<br />
of major programs of perceived urgency will follow naturally.<br />
5. The new activity should receive separate funding as a line item titled, “non-aerospace<br />
technology transfer and applications” to maintain its identity and permit adequate<br />
congressional exposure.<br />
II - Observation<br />
Although a broad management consensus and policy are lacking, NASA currently has<br />
an impressive number of projects, some of <strong>the</strong>m quite promising, relating directly to public<br />
problem areas. Many of <strong>the</strong>m do not show up in <strong>the</strong> formal management control system.<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong>m are disguised, some are bootlegged, whereas some are shown explicitly<br />
in <strong>the</strong> formal system. It would be a formidable task to assemble <strong>the</strong>m for consideration as<br />
a single group, but it would be extremely useful to do so, if only to provide integrative<br />
management and source information for a splendidly cogent answer to <strong>the</strong> question of<br />
what NASA is now doing for <strong>the</strong> common man.<br />
Recommendation<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 549<br />
NASA should organize a team effort to visit all <strong>the</strong> Centers, dig into and underneath<br />
<strong>the</strong> formal documentation, interview key people, and assemble a current catalog of efforts<br />
applicable to public problem fields, in accordance with clearly understood criteria. This<br />
information should be kept current and be made available to NASA public affairs, congressional<br />
relations and top level NASA staff, as well as to o<strong>the</strong>r government agencies,<br />
[<strong>Office</strong> of Science and Technology, Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget], etc. It is important to make<br />
this largely invisible activity respectable and subject to evaluation, planning, and management<br />
awareness.
550<br />
[5] III - Observation<br />
It is a fact that NASA is held up as a model of spectacular achievement in difficult<br />
problem areas. It does not matter to <strong>the</strong> public that <strong>the</strong>re is a wide difference between<br />
NASA’s technology accomplishments and desired accomplishments in social areas and<br />
that comparison of <strong>the</strong> two is illogical and uninformed. The reality of <strong>the</strong> situation is that<br />
NASA is perceived by <strong>the</strong> public (and <strong>the</strong> Congress) as a ray of hope and a source of<br />
potential leadership and help with problems that are deeply and emotionally felt. Arguing<br />
that space problems and social problems are vastly different and that <strong>the</strong> latter are much<br />
more difficult will have little effect on <strong>the</strong> public o<strong>the</strong>r than causing bitterness toward<br />
NASA and <strong>the</strong> space program.<br />
Recommendation<br />
NASA should make a clear (but not defensive) statement to include:<br />
a) An unequivocal determination to continue primary work in space exploration<br />
and aeronautics.<br />
b) A persuasive summary of NASA’s impact on science, technology, <strong>the</strong> nation’s<br />
economy, and <strong>the</strong> quality of life in this country.<br />
c) What NASA is doing today to help solve social and civil problems of national<br />
importance. This is actually quite impressive when properly presented.<br />
d) An intention to develop new areas for NASA participation in solving civil systems<br />
problems, with an outline of organizational and policy steps taken or to be taken.<br />
IV - Observation<br />
NASA does a poor job of bringing its scientific and general technology activities to<br />
public attention.<br />
Recommendation<br />
A special public relations effort should be mounted in connection with NASA’s work<br />
for public welfare and social progress. Enough material for successful exploitation exists<br />
at present and more should be available later. Recent speeches by NASA officials have<br />
been less than inspirational on <strong>the</strong> subject of NASA and its relationship to <strong>the</strong> needs of<br />
<strong>the</strong> nation. We must appreciate and counter <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> space program, although<br />
exciting and challenging to <strong>the</strong> imagination, is unfortunately remote from <strong>the</strong> daily concerns<br />
of <strong>the</strong> common man.<br />
[6] V - Observation<br />
As far as <strong>the</strong> public is concerned, NASA has expertly demonstrated <strong>the</strong> “what” and <strong>the</strong><br />
“how” of space exploration, but has not been as articulate or successfully communicative<br />
with <strong>the</strong> “why” of space exploration. Similarly, <strong>the</strong>re is inadequate understanding of <strong>the</strong><br />
impact that NASA has had and is causing in technology, <strong>the</strong> economy, and <strong>the</strong> quality of<br />
life, although some perceptive observers have recently begun to understand this question<br />
in its truly dramatic sense.<br />
Recommendation<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A comprehensive study of <strong>the</strong> national impact of space exploration and technology,<br />
far broader than anything yet attempted, would be extremely valuable. In Chapter IX,
“NASA Social Impact,” I have suggested some of <strong>the</strong> unique and impressive contributions<br />
attributable to NASA. This list could serve as a tentative outline for such a study.<br />
VI - Observation<br />
One frequently hears and sees in print <strong>the</strong> statement, “If we can put a man on <strong>the</strong><br />
moon, we should be able to do so-and-so.” “So-and-so” usually is a complex social problem.<br />
Recommendation<br />
The proper response to this hostile or uninformed statement should be to point out<br />
that:<br />
a) The Apollo program had a clear and unambiguous objective, a realistic time period,<br />
an unrestricted long-range allocation of resources, consistent support and a<br />
continuing commitment, an available source of people, technology and building<br />
blocks of organization, high morale and committed people, and a central authority<br />
to run <strong>the</strong> program. It also had no opposing vested interests.<br />
b) The typical social problem has no clear and unambiguous objectives, no longrange<br />
allocation of resources, spotty and controversial support, inadequate numbers<br />
of skilled people, inadequate technology and lack of applications<br />
experience, no measures of progress, inadequate or non-existent organizations to<br />
lean on, and generally no central authority to organize and run <strong>the</strong> program. A<br />
powerful space technology cannot solve all <strong>the</strong>se problems. It can only help when<br />
<strong>the</strong> social problem environment is ready to accept and use <strong>the</strong> technology.<br />
[7] VII - Observation<br />
In social problems, <strong>the</strong>re are many hazards and obstacles to <strong>the</strong> successful application<br />
of technology.<br />
Recommendations<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 551<br />
1. In selecting technology areas to work on, primary emphasis should be placed on those<br />
that derive from space capabilities in a ra<strong>the</strong>r direct manner. Then we should consider<br />
those that require talents and technology unique to NASA. Then we should consider<br />
minor modifications and conversions of NASA technology. Following that, we<br />
would consider major modifications of NASA technology and significant investments<br />
in applying NASA technology to new needs. Finally, we might consider <strong>the</strong> generation<br />
of new technology that does not exist, that no one is working on, and where we have<br />
reason to expect a high probability of success. I use <strong>the</strong> term “technology” to include<br />
both hardware and software as well as organizational, management, procurement,<br />
legal, personnel, and leadership skills residing within NASA. (Specific criteria for evaluation<br />
of proposed opportunities are discussed in Chapter XI, and some of <strong>the</strong> pitfalls<br />
in social fields are mentioned in Chapter VII.)<br />
2. Certain safeguards and cautions must be applied to prevent premature, inadequate or<br />
technically unsound approaches to problems. Certain kinds of problems, particularly<br />
where technology is not <strong>the</strong> dominant deficiency, should not be touched until <strong>the</strong><br />
environment is more favorable for achievement. Certain problems are and will be<br />
intractable or unattractive for some years. These factors are discussed fur<strong>the</strong>r in<br />
Chapter XI of this report.<br />
3. In general, I feel that NASA should avoid basic research, hardware development that<br />
can be done by industry, social, psychological, behavioral or sociological studies,
552<br />
operational functions, minor or trivial projects, anything in which industry or government<br />
already has a heavy investment and on-going work, anything lacking a direct<br />
link to NASA skills and experience, undertakings lacking definable goals and with a<br />
very long-range payoff, and projects without a reassuring prospect of success for <strong>the</strong><br />
overall (not only <strong>the</strong> technological) objectives.<br />
VIII - Observation<br />
NASA has a very creditable record of interagency cooperation and coordination.<br />
Some innovative and imaginative initiatives have been taken by Headquarters and by <strong>the</strong><br />
Centers but have not exhausted <strong>the</strong> possibilities for fur<strong>the</strong>r development of technology<br />
transfer arrangements.<br />
[8] Recommendations<br />
1. NASA should critically examine its current work for o<strong>the</strong>r government agencies with<br />
a view to trimming it down to significant, challenging, and promising efforts for which<br />
NASA has a unique capability. We should not be a generalized R&D job shop for o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
agencies, nor should we do in-house work that can be purchased on contract from<br />
industry or universities.<br />
2. NASA should broaden its policy of interagency cooperation to accommodate a spectrum<br />
of modes to satisfy different needs and conditions. I would include:<br />
a) On-<strong>the</strong>-job training of personnel from o<strong>the</strong>r agencies on NASA activities—an<br />
excellent start has been made with <strong>the</strong> Army.<br />
b) Dedication of specialized personnel to specific tasks for o<strong>the</strong>r agencies.<br />
c) Transfer of facilities and operating staff under certain conditions to o<strong>the</strong>r agencies.<br />
d) Exchange personnel with o<strong>the</strong>r agencies by sabbaticals and training assignments.<br />
e) Joint creation with o<strong>the</strong>r agencies of special-purpose research institutes. (For<br />
example, possibilities might be aircraft structures, urban systems engineering,<br />
crime technology, building systems research, highway safety, syn<strong>the</strong>tic food<br />
research, and air traffic control.)<br />
f) Creation within NASA of cadre R&D organizations to work on technology problems<br />
of o<strong>the</strong>r agencies with a commitment to transfer a productive, mature and<br />
viable activity to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r agency after a number of years. Although many administrative<br />
problems will be encountered, I believe <strong>the</strong>y can be solved if <strong>the</strong> basic<br />
policy enjoys strong management support.<br />
IX - Observations<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
1. One hears a frequent criticism that spinoff from <strong>the</strong> space program has done little or<br />
nothing for business. I take a dim view of prospects of dramatic success in this area. In<br />
general, small business is not interested in knowledge per se, it merely wants a specific<br />
product or production technique problem to be solved. Our [Technology<br />
Utilization] program, which dispenses knowledge, information and reports finds an<br />
unresponsive recipient in small business, in spite of its many innovative attempts to<br />
identify, package and push its product. Since we cannot send [9] government or contract<br />
engineers to small business to solve <strong>the</strong>ir specific problems, we will continue to<br />
hear <strong>the</strong>ir complaints for many years. Until small business realizes that it must develop<br />
<strong>the</strong> recipient capability ei<strong>the</strong>r by individual or group initiatives (industry or trade associations),<br />
it will look longingly and grudgingly at government R&D expenditures.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, government must continue to try to develop, by every feasible means, its
flow of technology information to small business. Big business can take care of itself<br />
since it is frequently <strong>the</strong> depository for technology or it knows how to obtain and use<br />
it.<br />
2. NASA’s Technology Utilization program has been <strong>the</strong> subject of contentious discussion<br />
over <strong>the</strong> years. What many people fail to realize is that technology transfer is a<br />
social communication process that is just now beginning to be understood. The capability<br />
of <strong>the</strong> source to direct and push application of technology is severely limited.<br />
The entrepreneurial element is often lacking and <strong>the</strong> receptor environment is often<br />
unresponsive. Nei<strong>the</strong>r can be controlled by <strong>the</strong> source of <strong>the</strong> technology.<br />
Documentation, screening, identification and dissemination are absolutely necessary<br />
but are not sufficient to [e]nsure <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> technology. These activities are among<br />
<strong>the</strong> least potent factors in stimulating <strong>the</strong> movement and use of technology.<br />
Recommendation<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 553<br />
NASA should re-affirm its commitment to technology transfer in its broadest sense, to<br />
<strong>the</strong> private sector of <strong>the</strong> economy and to o<strong>the</strong>r government entities. There should be less<br />
emphasis on devices, techniques, materials and components since we know that repeated<br />
enumeration of <strong>the</strong>se items, while impressive to engineers, is less than persuasive to <strong>the</strong><br />
public. The major emphasis should be on direct technology support of a small number of<br />
major programs and missions of government and industry, especially in innovative<br />
arrangements that help o<strong>the</strong>r organizations to apply existing technology more effectively.<br />
The cooperative efforts of people should be stressed ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> dissemination of<br />
technical documentation and <strong>the</strong> natural, long-term, diffusion of space technology. NASA<br />
needs to accept <strong>the</strong> principle that <strong>the</strong>re is no easy shortcut method of technology transfer<br />
(Chapter VI). The most effective methods involve <strong>the</strong> generous giving of our resources<br />
with no o<strong>the</strong>r consideration than being of service. This idea runs counter to conventional<br />
indoctrination, but it produces new challenge and <strong>the</strong> kind of dynamism in an R&D<br />
organization that NASA needs to foster at this point in history. . . .<br />
Document III-28<br />
Document title: F. Douglas Johnson, Panayes Gastseos, and Emily Miller, with assistance<br />
from Charles F. Mourning, Thomas Basinger, Nancy Gundersen, and Martin Kokus,<br />
“NASA Tech Brief Program: A Cost Benefit Evaluation,” Executive Summary, University<br />
of Denver Research Institute, Contract NASW-2892, May 1977, pp. i–iii.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s, while NASA’s budget was declining from its peak spending period, a series of economic<br />
evaluation studies was commissioned. The main purpose of <strong>the</strong>se studies was to bolster <strong>the</strong><br />
arguments for increased funding based on <strong>the</strong> premise that <strong>the</strong> cumulative benefits from NASA R&D<br />
were large enough for <strong>the</strong> nation to continue to invest in space. Because NASA had an active technology<br />
transfer program in place, <strong>the</strong> monitoring of this program for economic impacts and case analyses<br />
was important information to document <strong>the</strong> spinoff benefits. The University of Denver Research<br />
Institute had <strong>the</strong> ongoing contract for collecting this information. This study was performed to estimate<br />
aggregate benefits from <strong>the</strong> information-dissemination-based technology transfer program.
554<br />
NASA Tech Brief Program:<br />
A Cost Benefit Evaluation<br />
May 1977<br />
[i] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
A cost benefit study of <strong>the</strong> NASA Tech Brief Program was conducted by <strong>the</strong> Denver<br />
Research Institute under contract to <strong>the</strong> Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong>. Net benefits to<br />
public and private sector organizations due to Technical Support Package (TSP) requests<br />
between 1971 and mid-1976 were statistically estimated from random sample data.<br />
Program operating costs for <strong>the</strong> same time period were based on a unit cost analysis conducted<br />
by <strong>the</strong> [Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong>] Program Evaluation and Control Division.<br />
The study objectives, methodology and results are summarized below.<br />
Objectives<br />
The Tech Brief/TSP Program is one of several operational mechanisms in <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />
Technology Utilization [TU] Program designed to transfer aerospace technology to both<br />
public and private sectors of <strong>the</strong> economy. It is, however, <strong>the</strong> oldest of <strong>the</strong>se mechanisms,<br />
dating back to 1963, and has been one of <strong>the</strong> principal mainstays of NASA’s technology<br />
transfer efforts over <strong>the</strong> years. Tech Briefs and o<strong>the</strong>r new technology announcements published<br />
by <strong>the</strong> TU Program have generated an annual average of over 26,000 inquiries since<br />
1964. In addition, NASA has maintained, under contract, a data bank on requests and<br />
applications for new technology announced by Tech Briefs since 1968. This data bank<br />
contains over 120,000 entries and provides one of <strong>the</strong> most complete records of any technology<br />
transfer program operated by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government. Based on <strong>the</strong> availability<br />
of data and <strong>the</strong> request by Congress in <strong>the</strong> FY 1977 NASA Authorization Bill to conduct<br />
“a cost benefit follow-up analysis,” <strong>the</strong> Agency elected to study its Tech Brief/TSP<br />
Program. The second objective for this study was to develop an evaluation method which<br />
satisfies <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget guidelines for evaluation managements.<br />
Methodology<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
Between 1971 and mid-1976, 72,500 TSP requests due to Tech Briefs were recorded in<br />
<strong>the</strong> data bank and 15,500 questionnaires had been returned from <strong>the</strong> ongoing six month<br />
mail questionnaire survey. A two-tiered random sample of questionnaires was selected to<br />
assure a 95 percent confidence level for extrapolating <strong>the</strong> sample data to <strong>the</strong> entire population<br />
of TSP requests. Structured telephone interviews were conducted for <strong>the</strong> second tier<br />
random sample cells defined by request year and questionnaire responses.<br />
[ii] The interview data included responses to <strong>the</strong> following questions:<br />
a) What specific use was made of <strong>the</strong> TSP (e.g., information source on solar energy<br />
or developed new computer control software for chemical processing)?<br />
b) What costs and gross benefits are directly attributed to <strong>the</strong> particular TSP, how<br />
were <strong>the</strong>se quantities estimated, and when did <strong>the</strong>y occur (e.g., number of hours<br />
saved in 1972 times <strong>the</strong> hourly rate including overhead)?<br />
Only data which satisfied Federal guidelines on costs and benefits were accepted for<br />
analysis. Standard statistical methods were used to estimate three probability distributions<br />
for <strong>the</strong> sample data, and an expected net benefit value per TSP request was calculated<br />
from <strong>the</strong>se distributions. The expected net benefit per request was multiplied by <strong>the</strong> total<br />
requests to obtain <strong>the</strong> estimated total benefits from requests made between 1971 and mid-
1976. This figure includes net benefits which are expected to occur after 1976, with some<br />
net benefit streams continuing into <strong>the</strong> 1980’s.<br />
NASA costs were calculated for each operating year by multiplying <strong>the</strong> total units<br />
(e.g., Tech Briefs published and mailed, TSP’s reproduced) times <strong>the</strong> cost per unit. Unit<br />
costs were estimated by experienced TU personnel for all direct and indirect cost factors.<br />
Total net benefits to users were divided by NASA costs to calculate a benefit-to-cost<br />
ratio for <strong>the</strong> Program.<br />
Results<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 555<br />
The benefit-to-cost ratio for <strong>the</strong> Tech Brief/TSP Program is between 10:1 and about<br />
11:1. The total NASA costs, discounted to 1976, were $6.4 million for <strong>the</strong> five and one-half<br />
year period. Total net benefits, discounted to 1976, were between $63.8 million and<br />
$72.5 million for requests made in <strong>the</strong> same time period. Federal tax revenues due to corporate<br />
taxes only for <strong>the</strong>se net benefits were estimated to be from one and one-half to<br />
three times <strong>the</strong> Program costs, which indicates that <strong>the</strong>se costs are more than recovered<br />
without charging for <strong>the</strong> documents.<br />
Applications for TSP’s were characterized in four application modes, each having an<br />
expected net benefit and probability of occurrence:<br />
Mode 0 - no application, $0 net benefit; 34% chance.<br />
[iii]Mode 1 - information acquisition, $100 net benefit, 54% chance.<br />
Mode 2 - improved process, product or service, $5,000 net benefit, 11% chance.<br />
Mode 3 - new process, product or service, $22,600 to $31,100 net benefit, 1% chance.<br />
The expected net benefit per TSP request is about $875, but three out of five requests<br />
produce net benefits less than $100.<br />
The benefit-to-cost ratio is quite good for any type of government program, and it<br />
compares very favorably with <strong>the</strong> results from o<strong>the</strong>r technical information dissemination<br />
programs. The overall assessment for <strong>the</strong> Tech Brief/TSP Program, based on qualitative<br />
data from <strong>the</strong> interview sample, is also good. A high potential for improving <strong>the</strong> Program<br />
was indicated by fur<strong>the</strong>r statistical analyses of <strong>the</strong> data and opportunities for doing so are<br />
recommended.<br />
Document III-29<br />
Document title: Robert J. Anderson, Jr., William N. Lanen, and Carson E. Agnew, with<br />
Faye Duchin and E. Patrick Marfisi, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Selected Technology<br />
Utilization <strong>Office</strong> Programs,” Executive Summary, MathTech, Contract NASW-2731,<br />
November 7, 1977, pp. 1–6.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
As a followup to <strong>the</strong> March 1976 Ma<strong>the</strong>matica study, MathTech, <strong>the</strong> successor company of<br />
Ma<strong>the</strong>matica, analyzed <strong>the</strong> benefits and costs of several successful technology transfer office projects.<br />
The study added to <strong>the</strong> succession of very positive benefit-cost ratios that NASA was generating during<br />
this era in its budget support activities and, in particular, for <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> technology transfer<br />
budget. The economic methodology was straightforward and well documented. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
narrow focus, which included only <strong>the</strong> costs associated with technology transfer activities, tended to<br />
overstate <strong>the</strong> ratios and results.
556<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Selected<br />
Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong> Programs<br />
November 7, 1977<br />
[1] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
Since its establishment in 1958, <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
(NASA) has played a major role in technology transfer through activities which encourage<br />
<strong>the</strong> adoption, by o<strong>the</strong>r sectors of <strong>the</strong> economy, of technologies or techniques developed<br />
for <strong>the</strong> space program. To provide a formal program to support and monitor<br />
technology transfer, NASA, in 1962, established its Industrial Applications <strong>Office</strong>, <strong>the</strong> predecessor<br />
of today’s Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong> (TUO).<br />
This summary briefly reports <strong>the</strong> results of a study applying standard methods of costbenefit<br />
analysis to selected program activities managed by TUO. Our primary objective in<br />
<strong>the</strong> study is to analyze <strong>the</strong> costs and benefits of selected TUO activities, based upon available<br />
data.<br />
In order to meet this objective, we have selected a subset of TUO’s projects or activities<br />
for analysis. The main criterion for selection was <strong>the</strong> availability of data. To ease <strong>the</strong><br />
burden of data ga<strong>the</strong>ring, we have fur<strong>the</strong>r limited <strong>the</strong> activities examined to those conducted<br />
during <strong>the</strong> period 1970 to 1976. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> available data for <strong>the</strong> projects<br />
we have selected are sometimes incomplete, or are subject to considerable uncertainty.<br />
The individual activities that we have analyzed are grouped into two general categories:<br />
information activities and applications projects. Information activities are directed<br />
toward <strong>the</strong> production and dissemination of documents describing NASA technology as<br />
well as computer programs and documentation. Application projects are designed to support<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer of a specific technology or technique by participating with o<strong>the</strong>rs in <strong>the</strong><br />
[2] development of a new product or process.<br />
We have estimated two different indicators of value for each activity/project we examine.<br />
For both information activities and applications projects, we estimate <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
which are directly associated with TUO’s costs. For convenience we will call <strong>the</strong>se “TUO<br />
Benefits.” The “cost-benefit test” which we make in each of our analyses of TUO activities<br />
consists of comparing TUO benefits with <strong>the</strong> TUO costs of <strong>the</strong> activity generating <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
If TUO benefits exceed TUO costs, <strong>the</strong> activity passes <strong>the</strong> cost-benefit test. This is an indication<br />
that society gained more from TUO’s activities (in <strong>the</strong> form of new information,<br />
new processes, or new products) than it lost in <strong>the</strong> taxes, user costs, and user charges<br />
which were incurred in <strong>the</strong> provision of use of <strong>the</strong>se activities.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> primary results of this study estimate <strong>the</strong> costs and benefits of TUO’s technology<br />
transfer activities, we also present two o<strong>the</strong>r special indicators of <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
impact of <strong>the</strong>se activities to provide some perspective. These indicators differ for information<br />
activities and applications projects.<br />
For information activities, we estimate <strong>the</strong> sum of TUO benefits, user charges, and<br />
user costs. This number provides an indication of <strong>the</strong> value society places on <strong>the</strong> information<br />
contained in <strong>the</strong> transfer media. For convenience, we refer to this measure as<br />
“activity scale.” The measure of activity scale for information activities is intended to indicate<br />
<strong>the</strong> resources o<strong>the</strong>rs are willing to spend to extract <strong>the</strong> information contained in <strong>the</strong><br />
various media. As such, it provides one (albeit imperfect) estimate [3] of <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong><br />
technology contained in <strong>the</strong> information. For applications projects, we estimate <strong>the</strong> sum<br />
of TUO benefits and those benefits that are attributable to o<strong>the</strong>r participants. We refer to<br />
this measure as “applications benefits.” Applications benefits are intended to estimate <strong>the</strong><br />
value to society of <strong>the</strong> new project or process to which TUO is a contributor.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 557<br />
It is important to recognize that only <strong>the</strong> TUO benefits measure can be used to pass<br />
on <strong>the</strong> merits of TUO’s activities. In addition, activity scale and applications benefits do<br />
not measure comparable values. In our estimate of applications benefits, we measure <strong>the</strong><br />
value of <strong>the</strong> product or process which includes both <strong>the</strong> technology transferred through<br />
TUO and <strong>the</strong> technology contributed by o<strong>the</strong>r participants. The estimate of activity scale<br />
is an estimate of <strong>the</strong> value of technology contained in <strong>the</strong> transfer mechanism alone.<br />
A summary of our findings is presented in Table 1. Employing standard methods of<br />
cost-benefit analysis, we find that <strong>the</strong> TUO benefits of those activities we have examined<br />
are greater than <strong>the</strong> TUO costs incurred.<br />
In Table 1, estimates of both types of all measures are expressed in present values in<br />
1976 of <strong>the</strong> stream of benefits over <strong>the</strong> relevant period, measured in 1976 constant dollars.<br />
For each of <strong>the</strong> individual activities, TUO benefit results are presented in both dollar<br />
terms and as ratios to <strong>the</strong> corresponding activity cost borne directly by TUO.<br />
Each of <strong>the</strong> estimates reported in columns 2–4 of Table 1 has been adjusted by a<br />
realization probability factor, which is reported in column 1. This realization factor<br />
reflects our estimate of <strong>the</strong> likelihood that positive [4] [original placement of Table 1]<br />
[5] benefits have or will derive from <strong>the</strong> activities we have examined. For <strong>the</strong> information<br />
activities, <strong>the</strong> realization probabilities are 1.0, because expected benefits of <strong>the</strong> activities<br />
may be inferred directly from actual market data on user demand for <strong>the</strong> activities. Our<br />
estimates of realization probabilities for applications projects are generally less than one.<br />
This is because most of <strong>the</strong> project technologies have yet to reach <strong>the</strong> marketplace, and<br />
accordingly <strong>the</strong>re is uncertainty about whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y will. The method by which <strong>the</strong>se realization<br />
probabilities were estimated for <strong>the</strong> applications projects is discussed in Chapter V.<br />
The ratio shown in column 4 is <strong>the</strong> ratio of TUO benefits, i. e., benefits attributable to<br />
TUO, to TUO activity costs. This ratio shows whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong> TUO benefits of a given<br />
TUO activity are greater than its cost. If this ratio is greater than one, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> costbenefit<br />
test is passed.<br />
Table 1<br />
Summary of Estimated Benefits and Benefit-Cost Ratios<br />
of Selected Activities Initiated 1970–1976 1<br />
(All Benefits in Millions of 1976 Dollars Discounted to 1976)<br />
a. Information Activities<br />
1 2 3 4<br />
Realization TUO Benefits TUO Benefits TUO Benefits-<br />
Probability Plus User Costs TUO Cost Ratio<br />
and Charges<br />
Technical Support Packages 1.0 $ 83.0 $ 2.0 1.2<br />
COSMIC 1.0 307.0 6.1 4.1<br />
1. For Information Programs, <strong>the</strong> estimates are for <strong>the</strong> period 1970–1976. For <strong>the</strong> Applications<br />
Projects, <strong>the</strong> estimates are for ten years after expected (or actual) commercialization.
558<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
b. Applications Projects<br />
1 2 3 4<br />
Realization TUO Benefits TUO Benefits TUO Benefit-<br />
Probability Plus O<strong>the</strong>r TUO Cost Ratio<br />
Biomedical:<br />
Cataract Tool 0.5 31.0 6.4 41.0<br />
Burns Diagnosis 0.5 2.7 1.8 8.2<br />
Meal Systems 0.10 10.5 .8 5.8<br />
Pacemaker<br />
Human Tissue<br />
1.00 72.0 .7 4.1<br />
Stimulator<br />
Engineering:<br />
0.30 516.0 2.6 9.6<br />
Nickel-Zinc Battery 0.50 328.0 15.0 68.0<br />
Zinc-Rich Coatings 0.80 68.0 14.6 340.0<br />
Track-Train Dynamics2<br />
Firefighter’s Breathing<br />
0.20 98.0 .02 2.6<br />
System2 1.00 6.1 3.8 3.6<br />
The total TUO benefits from <strong>the</strong> applications projects analyzed are estimated to be<br />
$44.9 million with a benefit-cost ratio of 22. However, because <strong>the</strong> applications projects<br />
evaluated do not constitute a random sample, <strong>the</strong> results reported in Table 1 cannot be<br />
used to impute benefits to <strong>the</strong> overall applications program. The corresponding total and<br />
ratio for <strong>the</strong> information activities we examined are respectively $8.1 million and 2.5.<br />
Remembering that <strong>the</strong> information activity estimates are based upon data on transactions<br />
that actually took place during <strong>the</strong> period 1970–1976, while <strong>the</strong> applications project estimates<br />
are generally for projects that will be completed after 1976, an approximate overall<br />
estimate of <strong>the</strong> TUO benefits of <strong>the</strong> activities analyzed can be derived from <strong>the</strong> sum of <strong>the</strong><br />
benefits shown in <strong>the</strong> table. When this is done, we obtain estimated TUO benefits for <strong>the</strong>se<br />
[6] selected activities of $53 million and a benefit-cost ratio of 10 for TUO’s activity.<br />
It is important to understand that our estimates of benefits and benefit-cost ratios<br />
should be taken as averages about which some uncertainties exist. There are three main<br />
sources of this uncertainty: possible measurement error in <strong>the</strong> data; possible errors in our<br />
modeling of relationships using <strong>the</strong> data; and errors in forecasting <strong>the</strong> future. Because <strong>the</strong><br />
last of <strong>the</strong>se types of uncertainty does not pose a problem for our estimates of <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
associated with <strong>the</strong> information activities, those benefits probably have less uncertainty associated<br />
with <strong>the</strong>m. However, <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> data sources and <strong>the</strong> compounding of many<br />
random events prevents any quantitative estimates of <strong>the</strong>se error bounds from being made.<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong> information in Table 1, it can be concluded that for those programs and<br />
projects that we have analyzed, <strong>the</strong> contribution of TUO in <strong>the</strong> form of benefits gained<br />
through its technology transfer programs is greater than <strong>the</strong> costs it incurred in <strong>the</strong><br />
process. . . .<br />
2. Estimated parametrically. . . .
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 559<br />
Document III-30<br />
Document title: Richard L. Chapman, Loretta C. Lohman, and Marilyn J. Chapman, “An<br />
Exploration of Benefits from NASA ‘Spinoff,’ ” Chapman Research Group, Contract<br />
88-01 with NERAC, Inc., June 1989, pp. 1–5, 23–28.<br />
Source: Chapman Research Group, Inc., Littleton, Colorado.<br />
Since 1976, NASA has annually published <strong>the</strong> book Spinoff, which reports on successful cases of technology<br />
transfer. This study examined <strong>the</strong> various technologies that have been featured in Spinoff. The<br />
Chapman Research Group concluded that <strong>the</strong> benefits from more than 400 cases may have been as<br />
great as $21 billion in sales. These figures do not include any costs, nor any unsuccessful technologies.<br />
The primary purpose of this study was to update and expand on <strong>the</strong> earlier studies of <strong>the</strong> technology<br />
transfer program that were used to support both <strong>the</strong> NASA budget and <strong>the</strong> technology transfer<br />
budget, which historically has always been under scrutiny.<br />
An Exploration of Benefits<br />
From NASA “Spinoff”<br />
June 1989<br />
[1] The focus of this study has been to explore those applications of NASA technology (or<br />
NASA-assisted technology transfer) that have been reported in <strong>the</strong> annual report, Spinoff.<br />
The primary purpose has been to identify what benefits resulted from those applications,<br />
and, fur<strong>the</strong>r, to quantify benefits (where possible) toward which <strong>the</strong> applications made a<br />
contribution.<br />
Part I of this report, “Study Approach and Conduct,” summarizes <strong>the</strong> methodology<br />
used and <strong>the</strong> challenges faced by <strong>the</strong> study team. . . . However, <strong>the</strong> reader should be aware<br />
of several important, general conditions which affect <strong>the</strong> scope and inclusiveness of this<br />
study in terms of how fully it captures <strong>the</strong> benefits of NASA-furnished technology.<br />
First, <strong>the</strong> Spinoff magazine does not include even all of <strong>the</strong> “good” examples known.<br />
Some examples have not been published simply because <strong>the</strong>y are difficult to illustrate in<br />
a meaningful way to <strong>the</strong> general public. Such is <strong>the</strong> case with <strong>the</strong> many uses of<br />
NASTRAN—a computer program initially developed by NASA for structural analysis of<br />
large rockets, and considerably modified for literally thousands of non-NASA applications.<br />
Second, in working “backwards” from known applications, one misses those applications<br />
where NASA technology is “embedded” into whatever was applied. That is, <strong>the</strong> original<br />
NASA-furnished technology may have been <strong>the</strong> basis for a series of modifications<br />
during which <strong>the</strong> original technology, now embedded in <strong>the</strong> changes, has been “lost” as<br />
to its origins.<br />
[2] Third, <strong>the</strong>se benefits resulted from <strong>the</strong> contributions of only 259 applications of<br />
NASA-sponsored or furnished technology. It excludes a number of important benefits<br />
which should be obvious to even <strong>the</strong> casual observer: (1) direct NASA or Department of<br />
Defense use: such as NASA commercialization programs, mission-directed applications<br />
(such as wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, communication satellites and <strong>the</strong> like); and, (2) social benefits:<br />
such as lives saved, leng<strong>the</strong>ned or improved; labor days saved from illness, accident or<br />
death; improvements in <strong>the</strong> environment or <strong>the</strong> quality of life; productivity improvements<br />
and <strong>the</strong> like.<br />
As revealed in this study, <strong>the</strong> technology transfer process includes not only <strong>the</strong> hardware<br />
end of technology, but managerial and economic aspects as well. It includes
560<br />
suppliers and users, inputs and outputs, products and processes. Working back, in an historical<br />
sense, also provides challenges of information gaps where people move or forget,<br />
organizations which have changed or disappeared, and where <strong>the</strong>re may be a reluctance<br />
to fully acknowledge a particular benefit or its origins. In many respects this study represents<br />
a serious probe into <strong>the</strong> complexity (and difficulty) of capturing “spinoff” applications.<br />
It certainly demonstrates <strong>the</strong> need for early and systematic attention to means for<br />
identifying and tracking potential spinoff applications—if only to more fully understand<br />
this phenomenon and its contributions to <strong>the</strong> Nation.<br />
[3] PART I. STUDY APPROACH AND CONDUCT<br />
An examination of <strong>the</strong> benefits of spinoffs of NASA technology presents a particular<br />
challenge in <strong>the</strong> delineation of study parameters because <strong>the</strong> scope is vast and <strong>the</strong> documentation<br />
is sparse. Since Spinoff articles provide <strong>the</strong> only continuous source of technology<br />
transfer information, this research has as its principal source <strong>the</strong> articles which<br />
appeared in <strong>the</strong> annual Spinoff report between 1978 and 1986.<br />
Defining and Locating Information Sources<br />
The basic information for <strong>the</strong> study was composed of persons, companies and institutions<br />
or agencies that had been mentioned in any Spinoff article or on an accompanying<br />
list from <strong>the</strong> Spinoff files. Information available from <strong>the</strong>se files was cross-checked with<br />
former Denver Research Institute (DRI) case files and with available directories such as<br />
Moody’s, Thomas Register, Dun & Bradstreet, and <strong>the</strong> Corporate Technology Directory 1987, to<br />
obtain <strong>the</strong> most recent corporate or business address, CEO, telephone number, and any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r relevant information.<br />
Development of an Interview Guide<br />
An interview guide was developed concurrently with <strong>the</strong> basic study contact list. A<br />
study of <strong>the</strong> Spinoff articles and old case [4] files in conjunction with <strong>the</strong> study’s statement<br />
of work and discussions with various NASA Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong> and Industrial<br />
Application Center personnel contributed to defining what data was needed and what<br />
data might be possible to obtain. Earlier studies about <strong>the</strong> benefits of NASA (and o<strong>the</strong>r)<br />
research and development were reviewed for content and completeness. From this<br />
process guideline questions were drafted, discussed and revised. The interview guide was<br />
accompanied by a one page instruction sheet for interviewers.<br />
Data Collection Through Telephone Interviews<br />
Eight months of telephone interviews yielded some 600 useful interviews involving<br />
400 companies. Approximately 2500 outgoing and 500 return calls were made during <strong>the</strong><br />
course of <strong>the</strong> study. It took an average of five contacts to obtain a completed interview and<br />
<strong>the</strong> average interview length (including all contacts) was approximately 15 minutes.<br />
There were almost no refusals to cooperate, but it was a challenge to persist until<br />
someone with an appropriate corporate memory could be contacted. Contacts were<br />
almost universally responsive to a request for help in a study for NASA.<br />
Standardization of Interview Data<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
A spreadsheet system of record keeping, which placed <strong>the</strong> technology application into<br />
categories determined by “end use,” [5] was developed by extrapolating from an array of
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 561<br />
earlier benefits studies. Monetary data was standardized by using current estimates and<br />
converting labor-saving information into dollars whenever possible. Relevant information<br />
was highlighted using key words or phrases. . . .<br />
[23] PART III. BENEFITS: CONTRIBUTION TO SALES OR SAVINGS<br />
The primary focus of <strong>the</strong> study has been <strong>the</strong> nature and extent of benefits from <strong>the</strong><br />
application of NASA developed or NASA provided technology. This has been expressed,<br />
where it was possible to make estimates of quantification, in terms of ei<strong>the</strong>r sales or in savings—stated<br />
in dollars or as a percentage of business. Where dollar savings could not be<br />
elicited from <strong>the</strong> respondents, emphasis was placed upon man months or man years, and<br />
also savings that might be estimated resulting from materials, utilities, equipment, maintenance<br />
and even avoided research and development costs. As noted in <strong>the</strong> section on <strong>the</strong><br />
study approach, [Chapman Research Group] researchers have attempted to “standardize”<br />
<strong>the</strong>se sales and savings benefits (where <strong>the</strong>y were provided) so that <strong>the</strong> resulting figures<br />
presented in this study represent total dollars in sales or savings, even though <strong>the</strong> initial<br />
answers may have been given on a yearly basis, on a percentage of sales, or in man years<br />
of effort.<br />
The term sales includes such items as new products, additional sales because of an<br />
improved product, or increased sales because of NASA use. No attempt was made to isolate<br />
<strong>the</strong> specific economic contributions of <strong>the</strong> particular technology or assistance to <strong>the</strong><br />
full range of sales. However, this report excludes gross sales/savings figures that probably<br />
included o<strong>the</strong>r products or processes. . . . The complete assurance of [24] excluding all<br />
but directly “provable” benefits can only be done through detailed case studies and examination<br />
of accounting information from <strong>the</strong> particular firms involved. Since all of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
interviews involved telephone interviews, <strong>the</strong> researchers relied upon <strong>the</strong> estimates of <strong>the</strong><br />
respondents and often accepted total sales figures of a particular product where <strong>the</strong> technology<br />
was used. This means that <strong>the</strong> NASA technology contributed to <strong>the</strong> sales, but that<br />
contribution can vary substantially from a relatively small percentage of <strong>the</strong> total sales or<br />
saving figure to one where a new product or process was completely dependent upon <strong>the</strong><br />
NASA technology.<br />
Savings include such concerns as increased efficiency, labor saved, reduction in materials,<br />
maintenance, utilities and processing costs and research and development avoided.<br />
The various applications were categorized according to end use as described in <strong>the</strong><br />
Spinoff article. This resulted in nine categories: communication/data processing, energy,<br />
industrial (manufacturing and processes), medical, consumer products, public safety,<br />
transportation, environmental, and o<strong>the</strong>r. Leaving aside <strong>the</strong> “o<strong>the</strong>r” category, <strong>the</strong> largest<br />
contributions were made to industrial use, followed by transportation, medical, and consumer<br />
products. See Table I, “Benefits Realized from NASA-furnished Technology, Case<br />
Applications from Spinoff Reports, By Categories of End Use, Sales or Savings,” for a breakdown<br />
by end use description, showing number of cases, sales and savings.
562<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
[25] Table I<br />
Benefits Realized from NASA-Furnished Technology<br />
Case Applications from Spinoff Reports<br />
By Categories of End Use, Sales or Savings, $ (000)*<br />
End Use Number Number of cases Benefits Realized $(000)<br />
Description of Cases with sales or savings Sales Savings Total<br />
Communication/Data<br />
Processing 51 32 171,007 51,964 222,971<br />
Energy 30 13 203,500 15,613 219,113<br />
Industrial<br />
(mfg &<br />
process) 170 107 5,767,649 67,837 5,835,486<br />
Medical 61 31 2,003,036 30,613 2,033,649<br />
Consumer<br />
Products 24 18 1,278,294 524 1,278,818<br />
Public Safety 27 16 347,888 555 348,443<br />
Transportation 40 18 9,887,865 116,623 10,004,488<br />
Environmental 16 11 16,962 21,788 38,750<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r 22 13 1,654,989 10,232 1,665,221<br />
Total 441 259 $21,331,190 $315,749 $21,646,939<br />
* Estimates were obtained from company officials, or derived from company estimates of manpower or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r types of savings. . . . The 441 cases were reported in Spinoff magazine, 1978–86; of <strong>the</strong>se 368 had acknowledged<br />
sales or savings, but 109 cases could not be estimated as to extent.<br />
[26] A few comments are appropriate regarding <strong>the</strong> distribution by end use. It is not<br />
unusual, given <strong>the</strong> nature of NASA’s high technology, that <strong>the</strong> largest share would be<br />
directed toward manufacturing and processing where <strong>the</strong> principal user (in a direct<br />
sense) of <strong>the</strong> NASA technology is a supplier or manufacturer. The ultimate user may be a<br />
consumer at <strong>the</strong> end of a particular chain. However, <strong>the</strong> end use description here is determining<br />
<strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> use prior to that process being completed elsewhere or <strong>the</strong> product<br />
moving on for a fur<strong>the</strong>r refinement or o<strong>the</strong>r use. For example, <strong>the</strong> “consumer<br />
product” end use description was used only in those instances where <strong>the</strong> company making<br />
<strong>the</strong> application actually produced consumer goods.<br />
One might also anticipate that transportation would rank high (second) in <strong>the</strong> use of<br />
technology since NASA is one of <strong>the</strong> primary if not <strong>the</strong> principal producer of technology<br />
for aeronautics and aerospace. Aviation uses of technology clearly were <strong>the</strong> most predominant<br />
within this category of transportation.
Finally, <strong>the</strong> medical end use category also rates high (here, third) and not unexpectedly<br />
so, because of <strong>the</strong> virtual explosion in medical use of such computer technology as<br />
digital-imaging techniques and <strong>the</strong> like. The microminiaturization of electronic circuits as<br />
well as mechanical features, are especially adaptable to medical needs. The development<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Programmable Implantable Medication System (PIMS) and its substantial potential,<br />
along with digital imaging used for both brain and whole body scans and subsequent<br />
diagnostic procedures are only partial evidence of <strong>the</strong> [27] explosive growth of this type<br />
of technology in <strong>the</strong> future.<br />
Of 441 separate instances of <strong>the</strong> application of NASA-sponsored or provided technology,<br />
<strong>the</strong> study team was able to identify 368 cases where <strong>the</strong> respondents acknowledged<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re were contributions toward savings or sales—this amounted to 83 percent of <strong>the</strong><br />
total cases identified. Of <strong>the</strong> cases in which sales or savings were acknowledged, 109<br />
(25 percent) involved circumstances in which <strong>the</strong> respondent ei<strong>the</strong>r could not estimate<br />
sales or savings or was unwilling to because of <strong>the</strong> proprietary nature of <strong>the</strong> information.<br />
Of <strong>the</strong> 259 cases in which <strong>the</strong> respondents were able to identify sales or savings, it was<br />
possible to identify contributions toward sales of $21.3 billion ($21,331,190,000).<br />
Contributions toward savings were $315.7 million ($315,749,000). Total contributions<br />
toward sales and savings were $22 billion. This figure excludes nearly $12 billion in sales<br />
that included NASA-furnished technology, but which were given as total sales figures for<br />
a company, including all products. . . .<br />
Discussions with corporate officials revealed 67 instances in which a product, process,<br />
or even an entire company would not have come into existence had it not been for <strong>the</strong><br />
NASA-furnished technology. These represented 18 percent of all cases involving sales/savings<br />
and amounted to $5.1 billion in sales/savings. . . .<br />
[28] O<strong>the</strong>r Benefits of Economic Value<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 563<br />
Once one has an estimate of additional revenues, it is possible to postulate <strong>the</strong> revenues<br />
or jobs (created or saved) associated with that revenue. Using standard economic<br />
projection procedures, it is estimated <strong>the</strong> Federal Government received corporate income<br />
tax receipts of nearly $356 million as a result of <strong>the</strong>se spinoffs and that over 352,000 jobs<br />
were created or saved. And <strong>the</strong>se jobs were in relatively high skilled categories. . . .<br />
Document III-31<br />
Document title: H. R. Hertzfeld, “Technology Transfer White Paper,” internal NASA document,<br />
June 23, 1978.<br />
Source: Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington<br />
University, Washington, D.C.<br />
This internal paper was intended to assess a program called FEDD (For Early Domestic<br />
Dissemination) that NASA initiated in <strong>the</strong> 1970s during <strong>the</strong> early years of <strong>the</strong> Nixon administration.<br />
The intent was to make U.S. space technology available to American firms first. The U.S. balance of<br />
trade was turning negative during <strong>the</strong> period, and such programs represented an effort to stem <strong>the</strong><br />
flow of American technology abroad. The FEDD program was ineffective, and this memo addressed<br />
<strong>the</strong> issues involved.
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[1] [handwritten note: “6/23/78”]<br />
Technology Transfer White Paper<br />
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS<br />
• Technology<br />
Technology is a term loosely applied to know-how, end products and even <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
of technology. Dictionaries and <strong>the</strong> aerospace industry define it effectively as knowhow<br />
applied to practical purposes.<br />
Technology is generally distinguished from basic (scientific) knowledge and from end<br />
products and <strong>the</strong>ir uses, but <strong>the</strong>re are important exceptions.<br />
The Bucy report 1 defined technology as know-how for design, development, manufacturing,<br />
quality control and testing, performance analysis, maintenance and repairs, etc.<br />
Closely associated with such know-how may be instrumentation and basic knowledge necessary<br />
to its use. However, basic knowledge is generally widely available and not restricted.<br />
It <strong>the</strong>refore becomes of concern for <strong>the</strong> control or dissemination of technology only in<br />
rare cases where fundamental knowledge is critical to its application and is new in character<br />
or not yet generally known.<br />
Thus, technology as used here refers primarily to know-how, supplemented as necessary<br />
by <strong>the</strong> equipment and scientific knowledge required for its implementation—and all<br />
at relatively sophisticated levels.<br />
[2] • Technology transfer<br />
Technology transfer is a term referring to all types of exchanges involving technology,<br />
including both those that <strong>the</strong> nation takes pains to control or limit, and those which <strong>the</strong><br />
nation wishes to make (domestically and internationally). Thus, we have export licensing<br />
regulations to prevent or condition <strong>the</strong> commercial transfer of certain non-military,<br />
unclassified technologies and products abroad. We also have policies designed to encourage<br />
transfers in <strong>the</strong> interest of US industry and government entities or in <strong>the</strong> interests and<br />
support of developing countries and military allies. For <strong>the</strong> sake of clarity, <strong>the</strong> control of<br />
transfer will be discussed separately from <strong>the</strong> encouragement of transfer.<br />
• NASA’s charter<br />
NASA’s charter (under Sec. 102 (c) of <strong>the</strong> Space Act) directs <strong>the</strong> agency “to contribute<br />
materially to . . . <strong>the</strong> following objectives: . . .<br />
(2) The improvement of <strong>the</strong> usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency of<br />
aeronautical and space vehicles; . . .<br />
(4) The establishment of long-range studies of <strong>the</strong> potential benefits to be gained<br />
from, <strong>the</strong> opportunities for, and <strong>the</strong> problems involved in <strong>the</strong> utilization of aeronautical<br />
and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes<br />
(5) The preservation of <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> United States as a leader in aeronautical and<br />
space science and technology and in <strong>the</strong> application <strong>the</strong>reof to <strong>the</strong> conduct of<br />
peaceful activities within and outside <strong>the</strong> atmosphere.”<br />
Thus, NASA is in effect directed to generate technology, so that <strong>the</strong> US will be a leader<br />
in world aerospace technology, and to contribute to <strong>the</strong> utilization and application of that<br />
technology.<br />
[3] Section 203 (a) states that “The Administration, in order to carry out <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
this Act, shall— . . .<br />
1. An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology—A DOD Perspective, A Report of <strong>the</strong> Defense Science<br />
Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, J. Fred Bucy, Jr., Chairman, February 4, 1976.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 565<br />
(3) provide for <strong>the</strong> widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information<br />
concerning its activities and <strong>the</strong> results <strong>the</strong>reof.”<br />
Note that <strong>the</strong> provision does not state, as sometimes suggested, that NASA must provide<br />
<strong>the</strong> widest dissemination of information but only that which is practicable and appropriate.<br />
“Practicable” presumably means within <strong>the</strong> limits of budgets, personnel, and<br />
communications and dissemination systems. “Appropriate” would mean within <strong>the</strong> limits<br />
of security classification, audience and user characteristics, commercial considerations<br />
and national self-interest.<br />
NASA’s statutory obligations to develop and lead in aeronautics and space technology<br />
and to disseminate results widely may sometimes conflict. NASA may properly develop<br />
more technology than it need report, reporting only that which is practicable and appropriate.<br />
(Obviously, NASA cannot “preserve” US technological leadership if it publishes <strong>the</strong><br />
full details of its technological activities and expertise in all circumstances.)<br />
GENERATION AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY<br />
• Generation of technology<br />
The generation of technology (in NASA) derives from in-house and contracted work<br />
in space programs and projects, aeronautical programs and projects, energy programs<br />
and projects and <strong>the</strong> developmental aspects of <strong>the</strong> technology utilization program.<br />
Supporting research and technology and <strong>the</strong> NASA capabilities in quality assurance and<br />
management also significantly contribute to <strong>the</strong> technology base.<br />
[4] • Transfer of technology<br />
The transfer of technology occurs both deliberately and inadvertently, and transfers<br />
may be prime objectives or entirely incidental to o<strong>the</strong>r activities. Examples of <strong>the</strong> variety<br />
of transfer mechanisms which operate are <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
Transfer Mechanisms Involving Personal Contact<br />
Advisory committees<br />
NASA seminars and workshops<br />
Professional activity<br />
Personnel mobility<br />
Ongoing technical exchanges<br />
Personal discussions<br />
Transfer Mechanisms Involving Agreements, Contracts and Patents<br />
Cooperative NASA programs:<br />
with governmental agencies<br />
with US industry<br />
with foreign nations<br />
Industry use of NASA facilities<br />
NASA RFP’s and work statements (US and foreign)<br />
Contract and Subcontract implementation<br />
Patents, licenses, waivers, etc.<br />
Transfer Mechanisms Involving Technical Literature<br />
Publications:<br />
Tech Briefs, STAR, [Industrial Applications Center] searches,<br />
Technology for Aviation and Space<br />
Documentation provided with licenses<br />
Literature informally provided upon request<br />
Test reports and analyses<br />
COSMIC
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[5] O<strong>the</strong>r Transfer Mechanisms<br />
Exhibits<br />
Technology Utilization program projects<br />
Theft, leaks, espionage<br />
• Effectiveness of different transfer mechanisms<br />
The effectiveness of different transfer mechanisms was rated according to <strong>the</strong> following<br />
table (see page 6) reproduced from <strong>the</strong> Bucy Report (which focused primarily on <strong>the</strong><br />
problem of <strong>the</strong> export control of DOD technology, but has broader implications).<br />
CURRENT NASA POLICIES/PRACTICES<br />
PROMOTING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER<br />
• Domestic policies<br />
In aeronautics, NASA carries on <strong>the</strong> tradition of NACA in working closely with <strong>the</strong><br />
Defense agencies and with US industry to contribute an advancing technology base upon<br />
which both can draw. Recent examples relating to Defense are <strong>the</strong> dual inter-active flight<br />
simulation at LaRC [Langley Research Center], <strong>the</strong> helicopter program at ARC [Ames<br />
Research Center], <strong>the</strong> Hi-Mat project at DFRC [Dryden Flight Research Center], etc.<br />
More broadly relating to <strong>the</strong> aeronautical industry are <strong>the</strong> energy-efficient engine and<br />
composite primary aircraft structures programs. These programs are most often shaped,<br />
organized and funded in NASA, <strong>the</strong>n carried out through contractor work or a combination<br />
of in-house and contractor work. Where <strong>the</strong> defense agencies are involved, <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
generally joint funding; even in non-defense work, industry may contribute in some part<br />
to <strong>the</strong> funding requirements.<br />
Also in aeronautics, NASA actively supports developmental or operational research of<br />
interest to <strong>the</strong> Department of Transportation, generally managing <strong>the</strong> projects and providing<br />
or sharing <strong>the</strong> funding.<br />
[6] [Effectiveness of Technology Transfer According to Industry and Transfer Mechanism<br />
originally placed here]<br />
[7] In applications, NASA carries out a variety of programs designed to transfer technology<br />
to <strong>the</strong> private and public sectors. Congress, as well as states and local governments,<br />
exert pressures on NASA to develop affirmative and aggressive programs of technology<br />
transfer. NASA’s efforts to transfer technology parallel those of o<strong>the</strong>r government agencies<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> Department of Agriculture and <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce.<br />
Space applications in <strong>the</strong> field of communications and meteorology, for example,<br />
were developed in NASA, demonstrated successfully and <strong>the</strong>n taken up in <strong>the</strong> first case by<br />
both public agencies and private corporations and in <strong>the</strong> second case by <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
of Commerce for operational use. Currently, NASA is developing satellite remote sensing<br />
and assisting particularly <strong>the</strong> public sector to assimilate and apply <strong>the</strong> analytical techniques<br />
required to use <strong>the</strong> satellite data product.<br />
The NASA applications program stretches over a broad range of activities. New technology<br />
is developed, particularly in <strong>the</strong> civil systems area. There are R&D projects which<br />
apply NASA know-how to non-aerospace civil sector problems. Projects such as <strong>the</strong> activated<br />
carbon water treatment system represent potential contributions to <strong>the</strong> solution of<br />
significant scientific, social and economic problems. O<strong>the</strong>rs such as <strong>the</strong> system for underwater<br />
survey and exploration represent <strong>the</strong> unique contribution of NASA technology and<br />
expertise to <strong>the</strong> solution of non-aerospace problems.<br />
Application System Verification and Test (ASVT) programs are cooperative projects<br />
with Federal and non-Federal public sector agencies. Potential ASVT projects are identified<br />
at <strong>the</strong> field centers, with final selection at <strong>the</strong> Headquarters office of NASA. The field
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 567<br />
Effectiveness of Technology Transfer According to<br />
Industry and Transfer Mechanism*<br />
Transfer<br />
Effectiveness<br />
Highly<br />
Effective<br />
(Tight Control)<br />
Effective<br />
Moderately<br />
Effective<br />
Low<br />
Effectiveness<br />
(Decontrol)<br />
Instrumentation<br />
Semiconductor<br />
Jet Engine<br />
Airframe<br />
Transfer<br />
Mechanism<br />
H H H H Turnkey Factories<br />
H H H H Licenses with Extensive Teaching Effort<br />
H H H H Joint Ventures<br />
H H H H Technical Exchange with Ongoing Contact<br />
H H H H Training in High-Technology Areas<br />
MH H M M Processing Equipment (with Know-how)<br />
M H MH MH Engineering Documents and Technical Data<br />
M H MH MH Consulting<br />
M MH M M Licenses (with Know-how)<br />
L L M M Proposals (Documented)<br />
L MH L L Processing Equipment (without Know-how)<br />
L LM L L Commercial Visits<br />
L L L L Licenses (without Know-how)<br />
L L L L Sale of Products (without Maintenance & Operations Data)<br />
L L L L Proposals (Undocumented)<br />
L L L L Commercial Literature<br />
L L L L Trade Exhibits<br />
L = Low Effectiveness<br />
LM = Low to Medium Effectiveness<br />
M = Medium Effectiveness<br />
MH = Medium to High Effectiveness<br />
H = High Effectiveness<br />
* Taken from 1976 Bucy Report<br />
centers manage <strong>the</strong> projects, working closely with <strong>the</strong> future user of <strong>the</strong> system. New R&D<br />
is often necessary. The immediate problem as well as <strong>the</strong> future use of <strong>the</strong> technology is<br />
worked out with <strong>the</strong> cooperating agency, and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> commitment to transfer <strong>the</strong><br />
technology developed is strong. There is also <strong>the</strong> necessary personnel interaction to make<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer fast and effective.<br />
Active Donor Activity Passive
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[8] The university applications program is managed from NASA Headquarters.<br />
Universities identify state and local problems that can be aided by <strong>the</strong> application of<br />
remote sensing techniques. The transfer process is directly from NASA to <strong>the</strong> universities<br />
(not <strong>the</strong> ultimate users) and much of <strong>the</strong> program involves <strong>the</strong> support of undergraduate<br />
and graduate courses in remote sensing techniques. Therefore, this program is aimed at<br />
educating a potential user community ra<strong>the</strong>r than directly transferring NASA technology.<br />
The regional applications program, like <strong>the</strong> university program, primarily involves <strong>the</strong><br />
use of Landsat data. NASA personnel directly market <strong>the</strong> data and remote sensing data<br />
processing techniques to <strong>the</strong> various states, but it is <strong>the</strong> user (state) that identifies problems<br />
and proposes <strong>the</strong> cooperative projects. NASA directly trains <strong>the</strong> users of <strong>the</strong> data, but<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is no new NASA R&D involved.<br />
Beyond this, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Space and Terrestrial Applications conducts an active and<br />
aggressive program for <strong>the</strong> identification of promising technologies resulting from both<br />
in-house and contracted work with a view to stimulating <strong>the</strong> application of those technologies,<br />
where appropriate, to non-space uses in American industry or <strong>the</strong> public sector.<br />
This Technology Utilization program utilizes a number of university-based and o<strong>the</strong>r centers<br />
around <strong>the</strong> country as technical data centers servicing industrial subscribers and o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
interested in exploring and possibly acquiring <strong>the</strong> technologies identified for potential<br />
non-space uses.<br />
The Technology Utilization program also includes “applications teams” of experts<br />
who conduct new R&D for projects which have commercial potential. These projects are<br />
managed by NASA field centers and Headquarters. They are cooperative projects, with<br />
joint funding with o<strong>the</strong>r Federal agencies where appropriate. If a commercial vendor is<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> new technology, <strong>the</strong>re is joint participation with <strong>the</strong><br />
vendor in <strong>the</strong> development stage.<br />
[9] In a more general sense, <strong>the</strong> advent of <strong>the</strong> Space Transportation System has been shaped<br />
by NASA so as to encourage <strong>the</strong> use of launch services for public and private R&D, thus<br />
stimulating <strong>the</strong> development of new technologies by users but not necessarily transferring<br />
actual technology (know-how) to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
• International policies<br />
NASA support for o<strong>the</strong>r government agency programs includes support for<br />
[Department of] State/AID [Agency for International Development] objectives in<br />
extending <strong>the</strong> benefits of advanced technology to <strong>the</strong> developing countries. Thus, NASA<br />
in cooperation with [<strong>the</strong> Department of <strong>the</strong>] Interior makes Landsat data available to all<br />
users and provides technical guidance and training for <strong>the</strong> data processing and analysis<br />
techniques required to make use of it. The same thing is done in <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
field where, in addition, launch services are provided to permit foreign acquisition of<br />
domestic Comsat systems.<br />
CURRENT NASA POLICIES/PRACTICES<br />
LIMITING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER<br />
Limitations on NASA technology transfer apply to both in-house and contractor<br />
developed technology and are all essentially predicated on considerations of security or<br />
foreign competition.<br />
• In-house Technology<br />
In-house technology is rarely classified but this control is available where (defenserelated)<br />
security is applicable. To control <strong>the</strong> transfer of unclassified in-house technology,<br />
<strong>the</strong> agency may also obtain patents which combine disclosure with controls in <strong>the</strong> US and<br />
abroad. Patent policy, though, has <strong>the</strong> stated objective of encouraging commercialization<br />
of an invention.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 569<br />
[10] A broader attempt to limit <strong>the</strong> wholesale dissemination of unclassified NASA technology<br />
was initiated in 1973 in response to two stimuli: (1) <strong>the</strong> suggestion in some congressional<br />
forums that NASA was a major conduit of technology to competitors of <strong>the</strong><br />
United States, and (2) <strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong> supercritical wing, as a valuable US technology,<br />
may have been compromised by early open publication.<br />
The FEDD program was <strong>the</strong> result. 2 It provides for identifying certain technology as<br />
having possible early and significant commercial potential, <strong>the</strong>n marking any documentation<br />
on that technology For Early Domestic Dissemination. Efforts to benefit US industry<br />
and defer general availability to foreign industry <strong>the</strong>n could be implemented for <strong>the</strong><br />
technology so identified. The Departments of State and Commerce were consulted and<br />
endorsed <strong>the</strong> program as a desirable experiment.<br />
Similar controls on <strong>the</strong> COSMIC computer software distribution program were adopted<br />
recently. 3 These regulations call for <strong>the</strong> identification of computer programs by <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
potential commercial usefulness. Restrictions on distribution to foreign nationals are<br />
placed on <strong>the</strong> most critical software programs for a designated period of years. Less critical<br />
programs may be exchanged or sold.<br />
The transfer of NASA-generated technology is fur<strong>the</strong>r controlled in <strong>the</strong> context of<br />
international cooperative space programs. It is a general precondition of such programs<br />
that <strong>the</strong> foreign partner have <strong>the</strong> essential technological capability required to discharge<br />
<strong>the</strong> responsibilities which he undertakes in <strong>the</strong> cooperative agreement. Then, where<br />
appropriate, it is specified that in <strong>the</strong> event that <strong>the</strong> foreign partner discovers a need for<br />
technical assistance, NASA may refer that need to commercial sources in <strong>the</strong> US (where<br />
it becomes subject to export controls). NASA also reserves <strong>the</strong> right to require that any<br />
technical assistance given be provided in “black box” form (as end product ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
[11] technology). In general, however, <strong>the</strong>re are relatively clean interfaces in international<br />
space projects and <strong>the</strong> transfer of technological know-how is not involved or<br />
required between <strong>the</strong> cooperating agencies. There is, however, substantial commercial<br />
involvement directly with US aerospace companies (see section below).<br />
A certain amount of discretion is exercised at both NASA Headquarters and field centers<br />
with regard to <strong>the</strong> subject matter and treatment of technical papers to be presented<br />
by NASA personnel abroad, <strong>the</strong>reby controlling in some degree transfer of know-how by<br />
this means.<br />
Also, NASA requires <strong>the</strong> field centers to report and clear invitations to foreign nationals<br />
attending symposia. This requirement is informal and probably warrants formalization<br />
and centralization.<br />
There has been a change in administration of <strong>the</strong> NASA foreign resident research<br />
associate program. The policy now in practice discourages associates in technical disciplines<br />
in favor of those in scientific areas.<br />
Finally, in connection with export controls discussed below, NASA, although not subject<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Munitions Controls of <strong>the</strong> Department of State, never<strong>the</strong>less takes steps on<br />
those rare occasions when technology transfer is contemplated, to assure through informal<br />
coordination with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Munitions Control that such transfer would be consistent<br />
with government practice.<br />
• Contracted Technology<br />
Limitations on <strong>the</strong> export of contracted technology are essentially outside NASA’s<br />
responsibilities, since <strong>the</strong> export of space technology by a private contractor falls under<br />
<strong>the</strong> International Traffic in Arms Regulations Act administered by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Munitions<br />
2. NASA NMI 2210.1 dated December 13, 1973.<br />
3. NASA NMI 2210.2 dated April 24, 1978.
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Control of <strong>the</strong> State Department. The same applies to aeronautical technology of primarily<br />
military character. Aeronautical technology of dual use [12] (military and civilian),<br />
plus a very extensive list of o<strong>the</strong>r technologies covering sensors, data processing, communications<br />
equipment, etc., is covered by Department of Commerce export controls. NASA<br />
provides technical advice to both State and Commerce when requested and participates<br />
in <strong>the</strong> development of lists of controlled items, but <strong>the</strong> responsibility for granting or denying<br />
export licenses rests with those agencies.<br />
If technical material is published (made generally available), it is considered to have<br />
a general license for export and is not <strong>the</strong>n controlled. Therefore, NASA and its contractors<br />
have some responsibility to consider whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> publication of particular technical<br />
data could compromise <strong>the</strong> intent of State and Commerce control activities. In this connection,<br />
both <strong>the</strong> NASA patent program and <strong>the</strong> FEDD program, described above, are relevant<br />
and apply to contracted technology as well as to in-house technology.<br />
Since unilateral US export controls would obviously have little effect if a foreign purchaser<br />
could simply turn to o<strong>the</strong>r nations for his needs, <strong>the</strong> United States has been active<br />
in organizing COCOM, an effort of <strong>the</strong> NATO nations and Japan to concert <strong>the</strong>ir export<br />
controls on critical items vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Communist world. This system is in some sense an<br />
international projection of <strong>the</strong> US Munitions Control procedure, but suffers from considerable<br />
differences of view and competitive pressures among <strong>the</strong> participating nations.<br />
Finally, of course, NASA-contracted technology may be classified on defense grounds,<br />
but this is relatively rare.<br />
To generate advice for State or Commerce on specific export license requests, <strong>the</strong><br />
central coordinating point in NASA is <strong>the</strong> International Affairs Division. That Division<br />
draws on <strong>the</strong> technical expertise of <strong>the</strong> entire agency for this purpose. The final recommendation<br />
is treated according to general guidelines, contained in a policy paradigm<br />
approved by <strong>the</strong> NASA Deputy Administrator several years ago. The guideline distinguishes<br />
technical know-how from end product. Know-how which is uniquely available<br />
from <strong>the</strong> US would presumptively [13] be denied export. But if <strong>the</strong> know-how is readily<br />
available from o<strong>the</strong>r foreign sources, <strong>the</strong> presumption would be that US industry should<br />
be allowed to compete. End products, whe<strong>the</strong>r uniquely available from <strong>the</strong> US or not, are<br />
presumptively exportable unless unique know-how could be extracted from <strong>the</strong>m. Of<br />
course, <strong>the</strong>re may be over-riding considerations where, e.g., an end product might be critical<br />
to an objectionable end-use, as in <strong>the</strong> case of missile components destined for a country<br />
thought to be developing a nuclear weapons delivery system, or in <strong>the</strong> case of a<br />
computer whose capacity could be diverted to weapons system design. The policy paradigm,<br />
which appears on <strong>the</strong> following page, has been incorporated in a classified<br />
[National Security Decision Memorandum] as an available guideline for <strong>the</strong> government<br />
as a whole.<br />
DISCUSSION<br />
• Issues<br />
The principal questions which have been raised with respect to NASA policy and practice<br />
in technology transfer, whe<strong>the</strong>r positive or restrictive, appear to be <strong>the</strong>se:<br />
– Should NASA be developing aeronautical technology for defense and for private<br />
industry? To what extent and according to what criteria?<br />
– What role should NASA play in stimulating <strong>the</strong> industrial R&D needed to produce<br />
innovations consistent with national goals, and are significant changes needed in<br />
current policies to maximize industry’s investment in this R&D?<br />
– Similarly, in fields such as space communications and remote sensing, should<br />
NASA be developing and promoting an advancing technology base for o<strong>the</strong>r agencies and<br />
for private industry and under what criteria?
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 571<br />
[14] POLICY PARADIGM* FOR EXPORT AND MUNITIONS CONTROL<br />
KNOW-HOW END PRODUCT<br />
1. Items unique to U.S. 1A 1B Consider export if:<br />
or critical to U.S. Presumptively, – end-use conditions met<br />
commercial lead no release – cannot be reverse-engineered<br />
If reverse-engineering feasible;<br />
evaluate risk and decide<br />
accordingly.<br />
2. Items available elsewhere 2A Consider export if 2B Export should be approved if<br />
end-use conditions met end-use conditions met<br />
3. Items involved in U.S. 3A Consider export (even 3B Should be approved unless<br />
coop. programs if unique) in light of critical elements of technology<br />
relevant provisions of unique to U.S. are subject to<br />
cooperative agreement, reverse-engineering, in which<br />
quid pro quo, and/or case we consider as in 3A and<br />
U.S. interest reserve right to deliver in<br />
black box state.<br />
* Intended to serve as fundamental guidance subject to exception in special cases in <strong>the</strong> national interest.<br />
[15] – Should NASA maintain a technology utilization program directed to non-space<br />
uses and under what criteria?<br />
– To what extent should NASA continue and develop <strong>the</strong> multiplicity of public and<br />
private sector experiment-and-demonstration projects now begun in specific technology<br />
applications? How controlled or flexible should <strong>the</strong>se activities be? What mechanism<br />
should coordinate <strong>the</strong>m, if any?<br />
– With respect to overseas participation and benefit, as in <strong>the</strong> Landsat program,<br />
what policies should be followed?<br />
– Should NASA continue to try to control unclassified technical data (as in <strong>the</strong><br />
FEDD and COSMIC programs) and how?<br />
– Is NASA’s foreign patent filing program cost-effective? Should it be continued?<br />
– To what extent should NASA “market” its technology and in what style? What role<br />
should cost-benefit studies have in this connection?<br />
• Options<br />
The foregoing issues are briefly discussed in <strong>the</strong> paragraphs below:<br />
– Aeronautical technology transfer. The Space Act obligates NASA to foster US<br />
leadership in aeronautics. Leadership in aeronautics equates with broad national security<br />
objectives which encompass both defense and commercial interests. Since NASA’s fundamental<br />
mission is conceived in R&D terms, clearly it has no choice under current legislation<br />
but to develop technology for <strong>the</strong> defense and commercial aspects of <strong>the</strong> aeronautics<br />
industry. It follows that NASA must find suitable mechanisms for transferring its technology<br />
output to industry so that it can best serve <strong>the</strong> spirit and <strong>the</strong> objectives of <strong>the</strong> Act.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> Bucy report makes quite clear, <strong>the</strong> most effective means of transfer entail integral<br />
relationships in <strong>the</strong> [16] various phases of <strong>the</strong> R&D process. NASA certainly practices<br />
most of <strong>the</strong> mechanisms identified for such transfer in <strong>the</strong> aeronautical field under a fairly<br />
well-understood set of criteria. These generally make <strong>the</strong> greatest government support<br />
available for public interest purposes (environmental and safety objectives, e.g.) and<br />
require more industrial (or defense) support to <strong>the</strong> degree that end product development<br />
is approached. Where government regulation or private profit motivation can elicit
572<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
technical advances from <strong>the</strong> industry, NASA should presumably leave those developments<br />
to <strong>the</strong> industry. Where national considerations of safety, environment, or strategic competition<br />
in <strong>the</strong> military or commercial fields becomes critical, or where <strong>the</strong> cost, risk and<br />
facilities for technical advance are beyond industry’s capacity in a competitive system,<br />
NASA as <strong>the</strong> government’s agent must consider filling <strong>the</strong> gap.<br />
In sum, it is difficult to conceive of a very different role for NASA than its traditional<br />
one in <strong>the</strong> development of aeronautical technology; however, its transfer to industry and<br />
defense must be responsive to national needs and international pressures on US industry.<br />
Fine tuning of <strong>the</strong> operating policies, of course, is always appropriate. Major innovations<br />
may be required for one-of-a-kind situations.<br />
– Space applications. The principal options are to leave <strong>the</strong> development of supporting<br />
and advancing technologies to operational interests once <strong>the</strong> operational stage is<br />
reached or, in <strong>the</strong> alternative, to continue technology development in some degree. What<br />
technology should NASA generate for transfer to <strong>the</strong> commercial sector? If a commercial<br />
industry exists, should we consider any fur<strong>the</strong>r development?<br />
The communications field provides a useful example. It is clear that <strong>the</strong> operational<br />
interests are indeed carrying forward R&D for much of <strong>the</strong>ir needs, <strong>the</strong>reby removing justification<br />
for government R&D in those particular areas. But <strong>the</strong>re are public interest<br />
areas where <strong>the</strong> private sector may have no motivation to do R&D. In communications<br />
<strong>the</strong>se areas include technological developments for conserving <strong>the</strong> spectrum and also for<br />
conserving <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous orbit.<br />
[17] It would <strong>the</strong>refore seem that NASA should consider continuing its R&D program<br />
(including test and demonstration projects) in such areas. These programs in <strong>the</strong> communications<br />
area should be carefully and narrowly defined. A positive answer should be<br />
contingent upon thorough advance discussion with those government agencies and<br />
potential user communities which may have real or fancied concerns in a given area to<br />
develop <strong>the</strong> necessary degree of support. Cost-benefit considerations should be included<br />
but (a) will often be very difficult to measure for not-yet-existing applications, and<br />
(b) should not necessarily be determinative in public interest areas in any case, since<br />
intangible values may be of overriding importance.<br />
Where NASA itself may be given operational responsibilities for space applications, as<br />
could occur in <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, NASA would, of course, determine <strong>the</strong> R&D requirements<br />
to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> user agencies, working in conjunction with <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
– Technology utilization, ASVT programs. The major options are to run a push program<br />
or a pull program. In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, NASA must, under <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> Space Act, be prepared<br />
to transfer technology to public and private interests of this country in <strong>the</strong> most<br />
effective and appropriate way, whe<strong>the</strong>r for space or non-space applications. NASA’s experience<br />
to date seems abundantly clear that technology transfer is a sometimes slow and<br />
difficult-to-measure process. Energetic measures can be taken to speed-up <strong>the</strong> process by<br />
identifying possibilities, bringing <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> attention of possible users, organizing a body<br />
of data, establishing a retrieval system and, in many cases, testing and demonstrating <strong>the</strong><br />
applications. This is particularly true for <strong>the</strong> public sector (cities and states, e.g., and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
government agencies) where non-space needs may be strongly felt but <strong>the</strong> expertise required<br />
for adaption [sic], test, demonstration and implementation may be entirely lacking.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time, experience also suggests that <strong>the</strong> dangers of internal enthusiasms<br />
for applications in fields outside <strong>the</strong> agency’s experience and expertise dictate some measure<br />
[18] of conservatism. It would seem, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong> agency should continue substantially<br />
along its present course but with greater visibility for management for <strong>the</strong> many<br />
non-space applications explored and tested.<br />
This means that both headquarters and centers should continue <strong>the</strong>ir initiatives and<br />
responses but that a system should be established to permit parallel awareness of specific
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 573<br />
activities so <strong>the</strong>re may be independent consideration of sensitivities, implications and additional<br />
coordination requirements of a public, international, governmental, congressional<br />
or industry affairs character. The system should not be designed to delay or screen activities<br />
but ra<strong>the</strong>r to permit “flagging” problems on a timely basis if <strong>the</strong>y should be perceived.<br />
Cost-benefit analysis may be <strong>the</strong> appropriate tool for evaluating some applications.<br />
Before resources are committed to doing such studies, <strong>the</strong> criteria noted under <strong>the</strong> paragraph<br />
above on Space Applications should be considered. But <strong>the</strong>re is a continuing need<br />
for such cost-benefit studies for many potential projects. Traditionally <strong>the</strong>se studies have<br />
been done by <strong>the</strong> various program offices. As more are done, <strong>the</strong>re is a need for uniform<br />
techniques to be applied to cost-benefit analysis so that <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> various studies<br />
can be compared. These criteria should be determined by a central office and <strong>the</strong>n<br />
applied with <strong>the</strong> assistance of <strong>the</strong> various program offices or field centers.<br />
– International. The Space Act mandates a program of international cooperation,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Outer Space Treaty calls for <strong>the</strong> sharing of <strong>the</strong> benefits of space activity. There is<br />
no requirement to transfer technology itself abroad.<br />
The options are to conduct “give-away” or support and aid-type programs or to seek<br />
cost-sharing or o<strong>the</strong>r economic return. Until <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, <strong>the</strong> precedents established<br />
for cooperative programs were generous, but most often were subjected to requirements<br />
of scientific validity and mutual interest.<br />
[19] Thus, in <strong>the</strong> first experimentation with communications satellites, foreign states were<br />
permitted to participate in <strong>the</strong> testing phase (not <strong>the</strong> R&D) on <strong>the</strong> basis that <strong>the</strong>y funded<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessary overseas ground stations. NASA <strong>the</strong>reby saved <strong>the</strong> expense of funding facilities<br />
at both ends of <strong>the</strong> experiments. Even in <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite field, <strong>the</strong> initial cooperation<br />
entailed comparison flights by foreign aircraft coordinated with spacecraft passes<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r activities designed to help calibrate and validate <strong>the</strong> first satellite data analyses.<br />
Landsat. In <strong>the</strong> Landsat case, it was felt that a peculiarly economic application was<br />
involved and that cost-sharing for <strong>the</strong> space segment should be established in principle.<br />
(The foreign users, of course, fund all <strong>the</strong>ir ground-based facilities and activities.) Before<br />
cost-sharing was even broached, however, NASA’s agreement to program Landsats to read<br />
out for foreign stations was offset by several quid-pro-quos: <strong>the</strong> foreign stations undertook<br />
to supply data free to [principal investigators] selected by NASA; <strong>the</strong>y were obligated to<br />
provide data of interest to NASA on request; and <strong>the</strong>y represented valuable insurance to<br />
NASA for desired foreign coverage when <strong>the</strong> spacecraft tape recorders should fail.<br />
Technology transfer, in <strong>the</strong> sense of industrial know-how, is not involved in <strong>the</strong> above<br />
Landsat type foreign involvement. Here we are speaking more of <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />
of a technology, but some transfers of data processing and analysis know-how are<br />
required by training personnel. NASA does not operate training programs as such,<br />
although limited on-<strong>the</strong>-job training opportunities are made available under certain conditions.<br />
Industry and [<strong>the</strong> Agency for International Development], along with o<strong>the</strong>r specialized<br />
government agencies, often provide training services.<br />
FEDD. The options are whe<strong>the</strong>r to continue to try to control unclassified technical<br />
outputs by NASA and its contractors or not, and if so, whe<strong>the</strong>r through <strong>the</strong> FEDD program<br />
or ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
[20] The arguments for control are <strong>the</strong>se: NASA has been criticized for its large output of<br />
technical information available to foreign competitors. The circumstances of release of<br />
supercritical wing information at least suggested that major innovations with significant<br />
military and/or commercial potential might be compromised and that professional motivation<br />
and tradition may operate to obscure <strong>the</strong> national interest. The fact that public<br />
funds are used to underwrite such R&D would, with o<strong>the</strong>r factors, seem to require some<br />
regard for <strong>the</strong> national interest.
574<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
The arguments against FEDD are that it carries no sanctions, that it “flags” <strong>the</strong> most<br />
important items so that foreign interests can focus on obtaining <strong>the</strong>m, that <strong>the</strong> “troops”<br />
at <strong>the</strong> centers do not like it, that it creates a useless work load, etc.<br />
In a series of NASA Middle Management Seminars, FEDD was discussed in depth. The<br />
participants recognized that “something ought to be done” to assure preferential use by<br />
US interests of unclassified technology which might have significant early commercial<br />
potential. When asked if <strong>the</strong>y could think of something better than FEDD, <strong>the</strong> answers<br />
were negative with a single exception. Langley has felt, given <strong>the</strong> inability to control FEDD<br />
publications and <strong>the</strong> danger that <strong>the</strong> FEDD label might simply target <strong>the</strong>m, that colloquiums<br />
bringing toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> interested US firms are to be preferred. Significant items<br />
should be discussed in depth anyhow. This approach appears to be meritorious and has<br />
been commended to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r field centers.<br />
An important question raised by efforts to implement <strong>the</strong> FEDD program is this: Since<br />
only a handful of publications has been “FEDD’ed” by NASA, are we doing <strong>the</strong> job of review<br />
and identification very badly, is NASA admitting that only a minuscule percentage of its<br />
technical reports possess any significant early commercial potential or is <strong>the</strong> present program<br />
simply unworkable? It would seem essential that a thorough review of <strong>the</strong> FEDD program<br />
as it now stands in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Aeronautics and Space Technology be undertaken,<br />
along with a comparison and evaluation of any similar programs [21] in o<strong>the</strong>r government<br />
agencies. Suggestions for revising <strong>the</strong> program, coordinating it with o<strong>the</strong>r government<br />
programs and policies, or abolishing it could <strong>the</strong>n be more rigorously evaluated.<br />
Foreign patent program. Since <strong>the</strong> current cost of <strong>the</strong> foreign patent program greatly<br />
exceeds <strong>the</strong> very small revenues obtained, it might be argued that <strong>the</strong> program should be<br />
dropped. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it would seem worthwhile to evaluate experience with <strong>the</strong><br />
supercritical wing patents over <strong>the</strong> next few years to better judge <strong>the</strong> future of this program.<br />
– Marketing. As noted above, <strong>the</strong> dangers of internal enthusiasms for applications<br />
in fields beyond <strong>the</strong> agency’s own experience and competence dictate some measure of<br />
conservatism in pushing such applications. Therefore, “markets” must be carefully<br />
explored in advance with <strong>the</strong> best-informed user groups; cost-benefit considerations<br />
should be included but are especially difficult and may often have limited validity in connection<br />
with innovations in new fields or where public interests override.<br />
It remains true, never<strong>the</strong>less, that NASA’s statutory obligation to contribute to technological<br />
advance will not implement itself. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> agency must undertake wellconsidered<br />
programs to inform possible users, to experiment with, test, and on occasion,<br />
demonstrate space and non-space applications in <strong>the</strong> national interest.<br />
Because of <strong>the</strong> implications for <strong>the</strong> agency’s image, its congressional and o<strong>the</strong>r government<br />
agency relationships, its industry, international and university relationships, it is<br />
important that headquarters and center undertakings looking to new user groups and<br />
markets be given timely visibility for management. A “flagging” system that does not inhibit<br />
activities or establish new clearance requirements is <strong>the</strong>refore important, to permit control<br />
by exception.<br />
Document III-32<br />
Document title: “NASA Technology Transfer: Report of <strong>the</strong> Technology Transfer Team,”<br />
December 21, 1992.<br />
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
NASA’s technology transfer program has been lauded as one of <strong>the</strong> more successful of such government<br />
programs, and at <strong>the</strong> same time it has been severely criticized as not being very effective. Traditionally,<br />
NASA has focused on technology development for space and has downplayed employee rewards for <strong>the</strong><br />
transfer of technology outside NASA. This report, however, which was <strong>the</strong> result of an intensive inhouse<br />
review of <strong>the</strong> program, recommended improving internal incentives for managers to stimulate<br />
<strong>the</strong> transfer of technology.<br />
[no pagination]<br />
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 575<br />
NASA Technology Transfer<br />
Report of <strong>the</strong> Technology Transfer Team<br />
December 21, 1992<br />
BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
1. NASA is accountable to transfer its special capabilities and technology. This is an<br />
important mission of <strong>the</strong> agency.<br />
2. Success in technology transfer requires deliberate dedicated effort. Thus NASA must<br />
initiate technology transfer activities.<br />
3. Technology transfer occurs mainly in <strong>the</strong> context of an appropriate person-to-person<br />
relationship between <strong>the</strong> providers and recipients.<br />
4. Experience suggests that technology transfer is most successful when recipients want<br />
technology for <strong>the</strong>ir needs. Effective, proactive outreach creates this desire. Thus a marketing<br />
model for technology transfer has greater potential for success. A passive diffusion<br />
model leaves much to chance.<br />
5. Technology transfer is inseparable from <strong>the</strong> technology development process.<br />
6. The influence of customer interests on NASA R&D goals is a vital indicator of potential<br />
success. This influence shows early recipient involvement, and shows that a technology<br />
transfer relationship exists that is more likely to succeed.<br />
7. For technology transfer process management and improvement, effectiveness metrics<br />
are better than activity metrics. Activity metrics having strong, causative influence on<br />
effectiveness are useful.<br />
8. The technology transfer process should be conducted such that employees’ interests<br />
are benefited (ideally) and protected (at minimum).<br />
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS BEST ACHIEVED AS A MARKET-ORIENTED,<br />
TECHNICALLY CONDUCTED, LEGALLY SUPPORTED ACTIVITY<br />
[Why What We Found Was There to Be Found/What We Suggest Doing About It originally<br />
placed here]<br />
RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
All NASA elements must implement and be evaluated on <strong>the</strong>ir technology transfer program<br />
1. Each center must manage to <strong>the</strong> recommended metrics . . . or define and manage<br />
to more effective set<br />
2. Headquarters must implement a unified plan to support technology transfer<br />
Specified roles and missions of each office
576<br />
Why What We Found Was<br />
There To Be Found<br />
No clear NASA policy for technology<br />
transfer<br />
Too often, employees, managers,<br />
contractors, and universities don’t consider<br />
technology transfer part of <strong>the</strong>ir job<br />
No systematic metrics/statistics used for<br />
decisions<br />
Technology transfer processes are nonintegrated,<br />
undocumented, and too slow<br />
Application studies are expensive—causes<br />
gap between idea and application<br />
We are not fundamentally limited by<br />
legislation, we are limited by our will<br />
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />
What We Suggest<br />
Doing About It<br />
Change <strong>the</strong> culture<br />
(Recommendations 3–8)<br />
Protect employees interests<br />
(Recommendations 8–9)<br />
Define a systematic set of metrics which<br />
encourage and capture technology<br />
transfer successes<br />
(Recommendations 1–2)<br />
Empower process action teams to<br />
improve processes<br />
(Recommendation 9)<br />
Foster secondary targeted<br />
technology transfer<br />
(Recommendations 9–10)<br />
Provide infrastructure activities supporting all centers (SBIR, Tech Brief, COS-<br />
MIC, . . .)<br />
Institute a proactive effort to change <strong>the</strong> agency’s technology transfer culture and ensure<br />
broader participation by all employees.<br />
3. NASA should specifically mention technology transfer in V-M-V statement . . .<br />
4. Administrator should send a directive to [Associate Administrators] and [Center<br />
Directors] stating that technology transfer is a mission of NASA and specifically<br />
that secondary targeted and non-targeted are fully valued, important NASA missions<br />
which should be managed accordingly . . .<br />
5. Administrator should continue strong technology transfer support and measure<br />
overall agency performance . . .<br />
6. Each center should include technology transfer in <strong>the</strong>ir mission statement<br />
7. Each center should provide technology transfer training for all employees . . .<br />
8. Assess, promote, and reward employees according to metrics/contributions<br />
9. Form and empower at least <strong>the</strong> following process action and process development<br />
teams: . . .
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 577<br />
Tech Briefs—information acquisition to publication<br />
Patent applications and licensing<br />
Software distribution and transfer<br />
Conversion of non-targeted to secondary targeted } Including use of<br />
Conversion/integration of primary targeted to } jointly sponsored<br />
secondary targeted } research activities<br />
Execution of secondary targeted programs }<br />
Define relationship of centers to [Centers for <strong>the</strong><br />
Commercial Development of Space]<br />
Employee motivation and incentive for technology transfer activities<br />
10. Secondary technology transfer activities should be proactively sought. The budget<br />
allocated to each center for its use in secondary targeted transfer programs<br />
should grow and be taken “off <strong>the</strong> top” as is SBIR.
A<br />
Biographical Appendix<br />
William A. Anders (1933– ) was a career U.S. Air Force officer, although a graduate of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Naval Academy.<br />
Chosen with <strong>the</strong> third group of astronauts in 1963, he was <strong>the</strong> backup pilot for Gemini 11 and <strong>the</strong> lunar module<br />
pilot for Apollo 8. He resigned from NASA and <strong>the</strong> Air Force (active duty) in September 1969, when he<br />
became executive secretary of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Council. Joined <strong>the</strong> Atomic Energy<br />
Commission in 1973 and became chair of <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1974. He was named U.S.<br />
ambassador to Norway in 1976. Later, he worked as a vice president of General Electric and <strong>the</strong>n as senior executive<br />
vice president of operations for Textron, Inc. Anders retired as chief executive officer of General Dynamics<br />
in 1993, but he remained chair of <strong>the</strong> board. See “Anders, W.A.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />
Clinton P. Anderson (1895–1975) (D–NM) was elected to <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives in 1940 and served<br />
through 1945, when he was appointed secretary of agriculture. He resigned from that position in 1948 and was<br />
elected to <strong>the</strong> Senate, where he served until 1973. See Biographical Directory of <strong>the</strong> United States Congress, 1774–1989<br />
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, 1989).<br />
B<br />
Peter Badgley (1925– ) received a Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1951 and was a specialist in geology and<br />
tectonics. He served for a time in <strong>the</strong> 1960s as chief of <strong>the</strong> Earth Resources Survey Program within NASA’s Space<br />
Applications Programs <strong>Office</strong> and as chief of advanced missions for <strong>the</strong> Manned Space Science Program within<br />
NASA’s <strong>Office</strong> of Space Science and Applications. See “Badgley, Peter,” biographical file, NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection.<br />
D. James Baker (1937– ) has served as <strong>the</strong> administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Oceanographic and Atmospheric<br />
Administration in <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce since 1993. See Who’s Who in America 1996 (New Providence,<br />
NJ: Marquis Who’s Who, 1996).<br />
Malcolm Baldridge (1922–1987) served as secretary of commerce from 1981 until his death. See Who’s Who in<br />
America, 44th edition, 1986–1987 (Wilmette, IL: Marquis Who’s Who, 1987).<br />
James E. Beggs (1926– ) served as NASA’s administrator from July 10, 1981, to December 4, 1985, when he<br />
took an indefinite leave of absence pending disposition of an indictment from <strong>the</strong> Justice Department for activities<br />
taking place prior to his tenure at NASA. This indictment was later dismissed, and <strong>the</strong> U.S. attorney general<br />
publicly apologized to Beggs for any embarrassment. His resignation from NASA was effective on February 25,<br />
1986. Prior to NASA, Beggs had been executive vice president and a director of General Dynamics in St. Louis.<br />
Previously, he had served with NASA in 1968–1969 as associate administrator for advanced research and technology.<br />
From 1969 to 1973, he was under secretary of transportation. He went to Summa Corporation in Los<br />
Angeles as managing director of operations and joined General Dynamics in January 1974. Before joining NASA<br />
<strong>the</strong> first time, he had been with Westinghouse Electric in Sharon, Pennsylvania, and Baltimore, Maryland, for<br />
thirteen years. A 1947 graduate of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Naval Academy, he served with <strong>the</strong> Navy until 1954. In 1955, he<br />
received a master’s degree from <strong>the</strong> Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. See “Beggs, James E.,”<br />
biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Anatoli A. Blagonravov (1895–1975) was head of an engineering research institute in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. As Soviet<br />
representative to <strong>the</strong> United Nations Committee on <strong>the</strong> Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in <strong>the</strong> early<br />
1960s, he was also senior negotiator, with NASA’s Hugh L. Dryden, for cooperative space projects at <strong>the</strong> height<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Cold War in <strong>the</strong> early 1960s. He worked on developing infantry and artillery weapons in World War II and<br />
on rockets afterward. See “Blagonravov, A.A.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
579
Ralph Braibanti joined <strong>the</strong> Department of State in 1972 and held a number of assignments related to Latin<br />
American and East Asian affairs before joining <strong>the</strong> State Department’s Bureau of Oceans and International<br />
Environmental and Scientific Affairs in 1985. He currently serves as director of that bureau’s space and advanced<br />
technology staff. See biographical sketch provided by Ralph Braibanti, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928– ) served as <strong>the</strong> President Carter’s national security advisor from 1977 to 1981. See<br />
Who’s Who in America 1996.<br />
George E. Brown, Jr. (1920– ) (D–CA), served in <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives from January 3, 1963, to January<br />
3, 1971, and <strong>the</strong>n again from January 3, 1973, to <strong>the</strong> present. He chaired <strong>the</strong> House Committee on Science,<br />
Space, and Technology for a number of years and currently is its ranking minority member. See Biographical<br />
Directory of <strong>the</strong> American Congress, 1774–1996 (Alexandria, VA: CQ Staff Directories, Inc., 1997).<br />
Ronald Brown (1941–1996) served as secretary of commerce from 1993 until his death in a plane crash. See<br />
Who’s Who in America 1996.<br />
David K. Bruce (1898–1977) was one of <strong>the</strong> most notable diplomats of <strong>the</strong> twentieth century. He served in World<br />
War I, and he was admitted to <strong>the</strong> Maryland bar in 1921 before turning his attention to farming in 1928. In 1941,<br />
he helped organize <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Strategic Services and later became <strong>the</strong> director of <strong>the</strong> economic cooperation<br />
mission, charged with <strong>the</strong> task of administering <strong>the</strong> Marshall Plan. He served in several coveted ambassadorial<br />
posts, most notably France (1948–1952), West Germany (1957–1959), Great Britain (1961–1969), and NATO<br />
(1974–1976). He was also a representative to <strong>the</strong> Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris (1970–1971) and was liaison<br />
officer to Communist China from 1973 to 1974. See “Bruce, David K.,” in John S. Bowman, ed., The Cambridge<br />
Dictionary of American Biography (Cambridge, Eng.: The Cambridge University Press, 1995).<br />
C<br />
William Casey (1913–1987) served as chief of secret intelligence in Europe for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Strategic Services<br />
during World War II. After <strong>the</strong> war, he became a wealthy businessman. From 1971 to 1975, he served successively<br />
as <strong>the</strong> chair of <strong>the</strong> Security and Exchange Commission, as under secretary of state for economic affairs, and as<br />
head of <strong>the</strong> Export-Import Bank. He also served on <strong>the</strong> Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President<br />
Ford. He was President Reagan’s first presidential campaign manager and <strong>the</strong>n served as Reagan’s director of<br />
central intelligence until his death at <strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> Iran-Contra scandal. See “Casey, William,” biographical<br />
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Emanuel Celler (1888–1981) (D–NY) graduated from Columbia Law School in 1912 and immediately began<br />
practicing law in New York City. During World War I, he served as an appeal agent on <strong>the</strong> draft board. Following<br />
<strong>the</strong> war, he made a successful run for <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives in 1923 and served as a Democratic until<br />
1973, for a time as chair of <strong>the</strong> powerful Judiciary Committee. Following his defeat in 1973, he joined a commission<br />
to revise <strong>the</strong> federal appellate court system and, in 1975, returned to his law practice. See “Celler,<br />
Emanuel,” in Bowman, The Cambridge Dictionary of American Biography.<br />
Arthur C. Clarke (1917– ), one of <strong>the</strong> most well-known science fiction authors, has also been an eloquent writer<br />
on behalf of <strong>the</strong> exploration of space. In 1945, before <strong>the</strong> invention of <strong>the</strong> transistor, Clarke wrote an article<br />
in Wireless World describing <strong>the</strong> possibility of a geosynchronous orbit and <strong>the</strong> development of communications<br />
relays by satellite. He also wrote several novels, <strong>the</strong> most known being 2001: A Space Odyssey, based on a screenplay<br />
of <strong>the</strong> same name that he prepared for director Stanley Kubrick. The movie is still one of <strong>the</strong> most realistic<br />
depictions of <strong>the</strong> rigors of spaceflight ever filmed. See “Clarke, A.C.,” biographical file, NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection.<br />
580
Edgar M. Cortright (1923– ) earned a master of science degree in aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer<br />
Polytechnic Institute in 1949, <strong>the</strong> year after he joined <strong>the</strong> staff of Lewis Laboratory. He conducted research at<br />
Lewis on <strong>the</strong> aerodynamics of high-speed air induction systems and jet exit nozzles. In 1958, he joined a small<br />
task group to lay <strong>the</strong> foundation for a national space agency. When NASA came into being, he became chief of<br />
advanced technology at NASA Headquarters, directing <strong>the</strong> initial formulation of <strong>the</strong> agency’s meteorological<br />
satellite program, including <strong>the</strong> TIROS and Nimbus projects. Becoming assistant director for lunar and planetary<br />
programs in 1960, Cortright directed <strong>the</strong> planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger,<br />
and Surveyor. He became deputy director and <strong>the</strong>n deputy associate administrator for space science and applications<br />
in <strong>the</strong> next few years and was deputy associate administrator for manned spaceflight in 1967. In 1968, he<br />
became director of <strong>the</strong> Langley Research Center, a position he held until 1975, when he went to work for private<br />
industry, becoming president of <strong>the</strong> Lockheed-California in 1979. See “Cortright, Edgar M.,” biographical<br />
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
D<br />
John M. Deutch (1938– ) served as deputy secretary of defense from 1994 to 1995 and <strong>the</strong>n as director of central<br />
intelligence from 1995 to 1997. He received a Ph.D. from <strong>the</strong> Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also<br />
served as that school’s dean of science and provost. See “Deutch, John M.,” biographical file, NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection.<br />
Hugh L. Dryden (1898–1965) was a career civil servant and an aerodynamicist by discipline who had also begun<br />
life as something of a child prodigy. He graduated at age 14 from high school and went on to earn an A.B. in<br />
three years from Johns Hopkins (1916). Three years later (1919), he earned his Ph.D. in physics and ma<strong>the</strong>matics<br />
from <strong>the</strong> same institution, even though he had full-time employment at <strong>the</strong> National Bureau of Standards<br />
since June 1918. His career <strong>the</strong>re, which lasted until 1947, was devoted to studying airflow, turbulence, and particularly<br />
<strong>the</strong> problems of <strong>the</strong> boundary layer—<strong>the</strong> thin layer of air next to an airfoil that causes drag. In 1920,<br />
he became chief of <strong>the</strong> bureau’s aerodynamics section. His work in <strong>the</strong> 1920s on measuring turbulence in wind<br />
tunnels facilitated research in <strong>the</strong> National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) that produced <strong>the</strong> laminar<br />
flow wings used in <strong>the</strong> P-51 Mustang and o<strong>the</strong>r World War II aircraft. From <strong>the</strong> mid-1920s to 1947, his publications<br />
became essential reading for aerodynamicists around <strong>the</strong> world. During World War II, his work on a<br />
glide bomb named <strong>the</strong> Bat won him a Presidential Certificate of Merit. He capped his career at <strong>the</strong> Bureau of<br />
Standards by becoming its assistant director and <strong>the</strong>n associate director during his final two years <strong>the</strong>re. He <strong>the</strong>n<br />
served as director of <strong>the</strong> NACA from 1947 to 1958, after which he became deputy administrator of NASA under<br />
T. Keith Glennan and James E. Webb. See Richard K. Smith, The Hugh L. Dryden Papers, 1898–1965 (Baltimore,<br />
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Library, 1974).<br />
E<br />
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was president of <strong>the</strong> United States between 1953 and 1961. Previously, he<br />
had been a career U.S. Army officer and, during World War II, was supreme allied commander in Europe. As<br />
president, he was deeply interested in <strong>the</strong> use of space technology for national security purposes and directed<br />
that ballistic missiles and reconnaissance satellites be developed on a crash basis. For more information on<br />
Eisenhower’s space efforts, see Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy (Bloomington,<br />
IN: Indiana University Press, 1991); R. Cargill Hall, “The Eisenhower Administration and <strong>the</strong> Cold War: Framing<br />
American Astronautics to Serve National Security,” Prologue: Quarterly of <strong>the</strong> National Archives 27 (Spring 1995):<br />
59–72; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Satellite (New York, NY: Oxford<br />
University Press, 1993).<br />
John D. Erlichman was a senior assistant to <strong>the</strong> president during <strong>the</strong> Nixon administration. See John Erlichman,<br />
Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1982).<br />
James Exon (1921– ) served as <strong>the</strong> governor of Nebraska from 1971 to 1979. Since 1979, he has served as a<br />
Democratic Senator from Nebraska. See Who’s Who in America 1996.<br />
581
F<br />
Philip J. Farley (1916– ) earned a Ph.D. from <strong>the</strong> University of California at Berkeley in 1941 and was on <strong>the</strong><br />
faculty at Corpus Christi Junior College from 1941 to 1942 before entering government work for <strong>the</strong> Atomic<br />
Energy Commission (1947–1954) and for <strong>the</strong> State Department (1954–1969). From 1957 until 1961, he was a<br />
special assistant to <strong>the</strong> secretary of state for disarmament and atomic energy, and from 1961 to 1962, his responsibilities<br />
shifted to atomic energy and outer space. After several years of assignment to <strong>the</strong> North Atlantic Treaty<br />
Organization (NATO), he returned to Washington and became deputy secretary of state for political-military<br />
affairs (1967–1969). Then from 1969 to 1973, he became deputy director of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Arms Control and<br />
Disarmament Agency. See “Farley, P.J.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
James Brown Fisk (1910–1981) received his Ph.D. in physical science from <strong>the</strong> Massachusetts Institute of<br />
Technology in 1935 and served in a variety of educational and industry positions. He was heavily involved in work<br />
at Bell Telephone Laboratories, ultimately becoming its president. See “Fisk, J.B.,” biographical file, NASA<br />
Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Peter M. Flanigan (1923– ) was an assistant to <strong>the</strong> president on <strong>the</strong> White House staff from 1969 to 1974.<br />
Previously, he had been involved in investment banking with Dillon, Read, and Co. He returned to business<br />
when he left government service. His position in <strong>the</strong> White House involved him in efforts to gain approval to<br />
build <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle during <strong>the</strong> 1969–1972 period. See “Miscellaneous O<strong>the</strong>r Agencies,” biographical file,<br />
NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
James C. Fletcher (1919–1991) received an undergraduate degree in physics from Columbia University and a<br />
doctorate in physics from <strong>the</strong> California Institute of Technology. After holding research and teaching positions<br />
at Harvard and Princeton Universities, he joined Hughes Aircraft in 1948 and later worked at <strong>the</strong> Guided Missile<br />
Division of <strong>the</strong> Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation. In 1958, Fletcher co-founded <strong>the</strong> Space Electronics Corporation<br />
in Glendale, California, which after a merger became <strong>the</strong> Space General Corporation. He was later named systems<br />
vice president of <strong>the</strong> Aerojet General Corporation in Sacramento. In 1964, he became president of <strong>the</strong><br />
University of Utah, a position he held until he was named NASA’s administrator in 1971. He served until 1977.<br />
He also served as NASA administrator a second time, for nearly three years following <strong>the</strong> loss of <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle<br />
Challenger, from 1986 until 1989. During his first administration at NASA, Dr. Fletcher was responsible for beginning<br />
<strong>the</strong> Shuttle effort. During his second tenure, he presided over <strong>the</strong> effort to recover from <strong>the</strong> Challenger accident.<br />
See Roger D. Launius, “A Western Mormon in Washington, D.C.: James C. Fletcher, NASA, and <strong>the</strong> Final<br />
Frontier,” Pacific Historical Review 64 (May 1995): 217–41.<br />
Arnold W. Frutkin (1918– ) was deputy director of <strong>the</strong> U.S. National Committee for <strong>the</strong> International<br />
Geophysical Year in <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Sciences when NASA hired him in 1959 as director of international<br />
programs, a title that changed in 1963 to assistant administrator for international affairs. In 1978 ,he became<br />
associate administrator for external relations, a post he relinquished in 1979 when he retired from federal service.<br />
During his career, he had been NASA’s senior negotiator for almost all of <strong>the</strong> important international space<br />
agreements. See “Frutkin, Arnold,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
G<br />
John H. Gibbons (1929– ) headed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Technology Assessment under Congress for fourteen years<br />
before becoming President Clinton’s science advisor and head of <strong>the</strong> White House <strong>Office</strong> of Science and<br />
Technology Policy in 1993. He received a Ph.D. in physics from Duke University in 1954. See “Gibbons, John,”<br />
biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
582
T. Keith Glennan (1905–1995) was NASA’s first administrator. He was educated at Yale University and worked in<br />
<strong>the</strong> sound motion picture industry with <strong>the</strong> Electrical Research Products Company. He was also studio manager<br />
of Paramount Pictures and Samuel Goldwyn Studios in <strong>the</strong> 1930s. Glennan joined Columbia University’s<br />
Division of War Research in 1942, serving through <strong>the</strong> war, first as administrator and <strong>the</strong>n as director of <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Navy’s Underwater Sound Laboratories at New London, Connecticut. In 1947 he became president of <strong>the</strong> Case<br />
Institute of Technology in Cleveland. During his administration, Case rose from a primarily local institution to<br />
rank with <strong>the</strong> top engineering schools in <strong>the</strong> nation. From October 1950 to November 1952, Glennan served as<br />
a member of <strong>the</strong> Atomic Energy Commission. He also served as administrator of NASA while on leave from Case,<br />
between August 7, 1958 and January 20, 1961. After leaving NASA, he returned to <strong>the</strong> Case, where he was continued<br />
to serve as president until 1966. See J.D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan<br />
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993).<br />
H<br />
James C. Hagerty (1909–1981) had been on <strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> New York Times from 1934 to 1942, <strong>the</strong> last four years<br />
as legislative correspondent at <strong>the</strong> paper’s Albany bureau. He served as executive assistant to New York Governor<br />
Thomas Dewey from 1943 to 1950 and <strong>the</strong>n as Dewey’s press secretary for <strong>the</strong> next two years before becoming<br />
press secretary for President Eisenhower from 1953 to 1961. See “Miscellaneous O<strong>the</strong>r Agencies,” biographical<br />
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Irwin P. Halpern served as <strong>the</strong> director of NASA’s policy analysis staff in <strong>the</strong> mid-1960s. He previously worked at<br />
<strong>the</strong> Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet and Chinese political-military affairs and doctrine. He received a Ph.D.<br />
in soviet history from Columbia University. See “Miscellaneous NASA,” biographical file, NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection.<br />
Henry R. Hertzfeld (1943– ) is a senior research scientist at <strong>the</strong> George Washington University’s Space Policy<br />
Institute. Previously, he served as <strong>the</strong> senior economist at NASA and as a policy analyst at <strong>the</strong> National Science<br />
Foundation. He received a Ph.D. in economics from Temple University and a J.D. degree from George<br />
Washington University. See “Miscellaneous NASA,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Walter J. Hickel (1919– ) was governor of Alaska and <strong>the</strong>n secretary of <strong>the</strong> interior from 1969 to 1970. See<br />
Who’s Who in America 1996.<br />
J<br />
Leonard Jaffe joined <strong>the</strong> National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in 1948 and worked for it and its successor<br />
organization, NASA, for thirty-three years before moving to <strong>the</strong> private sector in 1981. He primarily<br />
worked in <strong>the</strong> field of space applications, overseeing many of NASA’s early efforts in remote sensing and satellite<br />
communications. See “Jaffe, Leonard,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Karl G. Jansky (1905–1950) was a researcher for Bell Laboratories in New Jersey who, while studying <strong>the</strong> static<br />
that often disrupted radio communications, discovered interstellar radio waves. Thus <strong>the</strong> field of radio astronomy<br />
was born. See “Karl G. Jansky,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
David S. Johnson was <strong>the</strong> Environmental Satellite Center director at <strong>the</strong> Environmental Science Service<br />
Administration in <strong>the</strong> mid-1960s. See “Miscellaneous O<strong>the</strong>r Agency,” biographical file, NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection.<br />
John A. Johnson (1915– ), after completing law school at <strong>the</strong> University of Chicago in 1940, practiced in<br />
Chicago until 1943, when he entered military service with <strong>the</strong> Navy. From 1946 to 1948, he was an assistant for<br />
international security affairs in <strong>the</strong> Department of State. He joined <strong>the</strong> office of <strong>the</strong> general counsel of <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Air Force in 1949 and served until October 7, 1958 (for <strong>the</strong> last six years as <strong>the</strong> general counsel),<br />
when he accepted <strong>the</strong> general counsel position at NASA. In 1963, he left <strong>the</strong> space agency to become director<br />
of international arrangements at <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat). The next year, he<br />
became a vice president of Comsat and <strong>the</strong>n, in 1973, senior vice president and later chief executive officer. He<br />
retired in 1980. See “Johnson, J.A.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
583
Lyndon B. Johnson (1908–1973) (D–TX) was elected to <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives in 1937 and served until<br />
1949. He was a senator from 1949 to 1961, U.S. vice president from 1960 to 1963, and president from <strong>the</strong>n until<br />
1969. Best known for <strong>the</strong> social legislation he passed during his presidency and for his escalation of <strong>the</strong> war in<br />
Vietnam, he was also highly instrumental in revising and passing <strong>the</strong> legislation that created NASA and in supporting<br />
<strong>the</strong> U.S. space program as chair of <strong>the</strong> Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and of <strong>the</strong> preparedness<br />
subcommittee of <strong>the</strong> Senate Armed Services Committee. He later as chaired <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics<br />
and Space Council when he was vice president. On his role in support of <strong>the</strong> space program, see Robert A.<br />
Divine, “Lyndon B. Johnson and <strong>the</strong> Politics of Space,” in Robert A. Divine, ed., The Johnson Years: Vietnam, <strong>the</strong><br />
Environment, and Science (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1987), pp. 217–53; Robert Dallek, “Johnson,<br />
Project Apollo, and <strong>the</strong> Politics of Space Program Planning,” unpublished paper delivered at a symposium on<br />
“Presidential Leadership, Congress, and <strong>the</strong> U.S. Space Program,” sponsored by NASA and American University,<br />
March 25, 1993.<br />
Nicholas L. Johnson is NASA’s chief scientist for orbital debris at <strong>the</strong> Johnson Space Center. Previously, he<br />
worked in private industry and was considered an expert on <strong>the</strong> Soviet space program. See “Johnson, Nicholas<br />
L.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Roy W. Johnson (1906–1965) was named <strong>the</strong> first director of <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense’s Advanced Research<br />
Projects Agency and served from 1958 to 1959. As such, he was head of Defense Department’s initial space<br />
efforts. Prior to joining <strong>the</strong> government, he worked for General Electric and retired as an executive vice president.<br />
See “Johnson, Roy W.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
K<br />
Frederick R. Kappel was <strong>the</strong> chair of <strong>the</strong> board of directors of <strong>the</strong> American Telephone and Telegraph Company<br />
in 1963. See “Miscellaneous Industry,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Nicholas Katzenbach (1922– ) was twenty-one when he was captured by <strong>the</strong> Germans during World War II, and<br />
he was a prisoner of war for two years until <strong>the</strong> war ended. He returned to <strong>the</strong> United States and became a<br />
Rhodes Scholar in 1947. When he returned from England in 1950, he was admitted to <strong>the</strong> New Jersey bar. He<br />
became a law professor at Yale University in 1952 and <strong>the</strong>n at <strong>the</strong> University of Chicago from 1956 until 1960.<br />
He joined <strong>the</strong> Justice Department in 1961 as assistant attorney general, and he was promoted to deputy attorney<br />
general in 1962. He remained in that position until <strong>the</strong> end of 1964 and was instrumental in drafting <strong>the</strong> Civil<br />
Rights Act of that same year. He became attorney general in 1965 and under secretary of state in 1966. He left<br />
government service to work for IBM in 1969, where he stayed until 1986. He returned to private practice and<br />
was named chair of <strong>the</strong> failing Bank Credit and Commerce International in 1991. See “Katzenbach, Nicholas (de<br />
Belleville),” in Bowman, The Cambridge Dictionary of American Biography.<br />
Estes Kefauver (1903–1963) (D–TN) served in <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives from 1939 to 1949 and in <strong>the</strong><br />
Senate from 1949 to 1963. He ran unsuccessfully as Adlai Stevenson’s vice presidential choice in 1956. See<br />
Biographical Directory of <strong>the</strong> United States Congress, 1774–1989.<br />
John F. Kennedy (1916–1963) (D–MA) was U.S. president from 1961 to 1963. A senator from Massachusetts<br />
between 1953 and 1960, he successfully ran for president as <strong>the</strong> Democratic candidate, with party wheelhorse<br />
Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. Using <strong>the</strong> slogan “Let’s get this country moving again,” Kennedy<br />
charged <strong>the</strong> Republican Eisenhower administration with doing nothing about <strong>the</strong> myriad social, economic, and<br />
international problems that festered in <strong>the</strong> 1950s. He was especially hard on Eisenhower’s record in international<br />
relations, taking a “cold warrior” position on a supposed “missile gap” (which turned out not to be <strong>the</strong><br />
case) wherein <strong>the</strong> United States lagged far behind <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union in intercontinental ballistic missile technology.<br />
On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy announced to <strong>the</strong> nation <strong>the</strong> goal of sending an American to <strong>the</strong><br />
Moon before <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> decade. The human spaceflight imperative was a direct outgrowth of it; Projects<br />
Mercury (at least in its latter stages), Gemini, and Apollo were each designed to execute it. On this subject, see<br />
Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens and <strong>the</strong> Earth: A Political <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Space Age (New York, NY: Basic Books,<br />
1985); John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to <strong>the</strong> Moon: Project Apollo and <strong>the</strong> National Interest (Cambridge, MA:<br />
MIT Press, 1970).<br />
584
Robert S. Kerr (1896–1963) (D–OK) had been governor of Oklahoma from 1943 to 1947 and was elected to <strong>the</strong><br />
Senate <strong>the</strong> following year. From 1961 until 1963, he chaired <strong>the</strong> Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee.<br />
See Anne Hodges Morgan, Robert S. Kerr: The Senate Years (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977).<br />
Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894–1971) was premier of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union from 1958 to 1964 and first secretary of <strong>the</strong><br />
Communist party from 1953 to 1964. He was noted for an astonishing speech in 1956 denouncing <strong>the</strong> crimes<br />
and blunders of Joseph Stalin and for gestures of reconciliation with <strong>the</strong> West in 1959–1960, ending with <strong>the</strong><br />
breakdown of a Paris summit with President Eisenhower and <strong>the</strong> leaders of France and Great Britain in <strong>the</strong> wake<br />
of Khrushchev’s announcement that <strong>the</strong> Soviets had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over<br />
<strong>the</strong> Urals on May 1, 1960. Then in 1962, Khrushchev attempted to place Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba.<br />
This led to an intense crisis in October, following which Khrushchev agreed to remove <strong>the</strong> missiles if <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States promised to make no more attempts to overthrow Cuba’s Communist government. Although he could be<br />
charming at times, Khrushchev was also given to bluster (extending even to shoe-pounding at <strong>the</strong> United<br />
Nations). He was also a tough negotiator, although he believed, unlike his predecessors, in <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />
Communist victory over <strong>the</strong> West without war. For fur<strong>the</strong>r information about him, see his own Khrushchev<br />
Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974), as well as Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A<br />
Career (New York, NY: Viking, 1966); Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and The U-2 Affair (New<br />
York, NY: Harper and Row, 1986); Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and <strong>the</strong> Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University<br />
Press, 1981).<br />
Henry A. Kissinger (1923– ) was assistant to <strong>the</strong> president for national security affairs from 1969 to 1973 and<br />
secretary of state <strong>the</strong>reafter until 1977. In <strong>the</strong>se positions, he was especially involved in international aspects of<br />
spaceflight, particularly <strong>the</strong> joint Soviet-American flight, <strong>the</strong> Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, in 1975. See “Kissinger,<br />
Henry,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr. (1924– ), was a long-standing official with NASA throughout <strong>the</strong> Apollo program. He<br />
received a bachelor of science degree in aeronautical engineering from Virginia Polytechnic University in 1944<br />
and joined <strong>the</strong> Langley Aeronautical Laboratory of <strong>the</strong> NACA <strong>the</strong> next year. In 1958, still at Langley, he became<br />
a member of <strong>the</strong> Space Task Group developing Project Mercury and moved with <strong>the</strong> group to Houston in 1962.<br />
He was flight director for all of <strong>the</strong> Mercury and many of <strong>the</strong> Gemini missions and directed <strong>the</strong> design of Mission<br />
Control at <strong>the</strong> Manned Spacecraft Center, which was renamed <strong>the</strong> Johnson Space Center in 1973. He was named<br />
<strong>the</strong> Manned Spacecraft Center’s deputy director in 1970 and its director two years later, a position he held until<br />
his retirement in 1982. Since <strong>the</strong>n, he has remained active as an aerospace consultant. See “Kraft, Christopher<br />
C., Jr.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
L<br />
William E. Lilly (1921– ) entered federal civilian service in 1950 as a budget and program analyst with <strong>the</strong> Navy<br />
Ordnance Test Station in California and held a variety of positions with <strong>the</strong> Navy and <strong>the</strong> Bureau of Standards<br />
until 1960, when he joined NASA as chief, plans and analysis, for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Launch Vehicles. He served NASA<br />
for twenty-one years, becoming its first comptroller—a position with associate administrator status—in 1973. He<br />
retired in 1981 with thirty-seven years of federal service, including service in <strong>the</strong> Navy from 1940 to 1946. See<br />
“Lilly, W.E.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
George M. Low (1926–1984), a native of Vienna, Austria, came to <strong>the</strong> United States in 1940 and received an<br />
aeronautical engineering degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1948 and a master of science in <strong>the</strong><br />
same field from that school in 1950. He joined <strong>the</strong> NACA in 1949, and at Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory,<br />
he specialized in experimental and <strong>the</strong>oretical research in several fields. He became chief of manned spaceflight<br />
at NASA Headquarters in 1958. In 1960, Low chaired a special committee that formulated <strong>the</strong> original plans for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Apollo lunar landings. In 1964, he became deputy director of <strong>the</strong> Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston,<br />
<strong>the</strong> forerunner of <strong>the</strong> Johnson Space Center. He became deputy administrator of NASA in 1969 and served as<br />
acting administrator from 1970 to 1971. He retired from NASA in 1976 to become president of Rensselaer, a<br />
position he still held until his death. In 1990, NASA renamed its quality and excellence award after him. See<br />
“Low, G.M.,” Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
585
M<br />
Leonard H. Marks was one of <strong>the</strong> original Comsat incorporators appointed by President Kennedy. He resigned<br />
from Comsat’s board of directors in 1965 to become director of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Information Agency. See “Miscellaneous<br />
Industry,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Robert P. Mayo (1916– ) was an economist and President Nixon’s first director of <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget.<br />
On July 1, 1970, when <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget was replaced with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget, Mayo<br />
was shifted to <strong>the</strong> White House as a presidential assistant. Shortly <strong>the</strong>reafter, he left Washington to assume <strong>the</strong><br />
presidency of <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. See “Mayo, Robert P(orter),” Current Biography 1970,<br />
pp. 282–84.<br />
Richard C. McCurdy (1909– ), an engineer specializing in petroleum, was associate administrator for organization<br />
and management at NASA Headquarters from 1970 to 1973 and a consultant to <strong>the</strong> agency from 1973<br />
until 1982. See “McCurdy, R.C.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Newton Minow (1926– ) was a lawyer in Chicago before being appointed as chair of <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />
Communications Commission by President Kennedy. He gained a reputation by attacking <strong>the</strong> quality of television<br />
programming and threatening to revoke broadcast licenses based on programming. He returned to his law<br />
practice following Kennedy’s assassination and joined <strong>the</strong> Public Broadcasting System board in 1973. He became<br />
chair of that organization in 1978, and <strong>the</strong>n he became director of <strong>the</strong> Annenberg Communications Program<br />
in Washington in 1987. See “Minow, Newton (Norman),” in Bowman, The Cambridge Dictionary of American<br />
Biography.<br />
George E. Mueller (1918– ) was NASA’s associate administrator for manned spaceflight from 1963 to 1969; as<br />
such, he responsible for overseeing <strong>the</strong> completion of Project Apollo and beginning <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong><br />
Space Shuttle. He moved to General Dynamics as senior vice president in 1969, where he remained until 1971.<br />
He <strong>the</strong>n became president of <strong>the</strong> Systems Development Corporation (1971–1980) and <strong>the</strong>n its chair and corporate<br />
executive officer (1981–1983). See “Mueller, George E.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection.<br />
Karl Mundt (1900–1974) (R–SD) served in <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives from January 3, 1939, until December<br />
30, 1948. He <strong>the</strong>n served as a senator from December 31, 1948, until January 3, 1973. See Biographical Directory<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States Congress, 1774–1996.<br />
N<br />
Homer E. Newell (1915–1983) earned his Ph.D. in ma<strong>the</strong>matics from <strong>the</strong> University of Wisconsin in 1940 and<br />
served as a <strong>the</strong>oretical physicist and ma<strong>the</strong>matician at <strong>the</strong> Naval Research Laboratory from 1944 to 1958. During<br />
part of that period, he was science program coordinator for Project Vanguard and was acting superintendent of<br />
<strong>the</strong> atmosphere and astrophysics division. In 1958, he transferred to NASA to assume responsibility for planning<br />
and developing <strong>the</strong> new agency’s space science program. He soon became deputy director of spaceflight programs.<br />
In 1961, he became director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Space Sciences, and in 1963, he became associate administrator<br />
for space science and applications. Over <strong>the</strong> course of his career, he became an internationally known<br />
authority in <strong>the</strong> field of atmospheric and space sciences as well as <strong>the</strong> author of numerous scientific articles and<br />
seven books, including Beyond <strong>the</strong> Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211, 1980).<br />
He retired from NASA at <strong>the</strong> end of 1973. See “Newell, Homer,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection.<br />
Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994) was U.S. president between January 1969 and August 1974. Early in his presidency,<br />
Nixon appointed a Space Task Group under <strong>the</strong> direction of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to assess <strong>the</strong><br />
future of spaceflight in <strong>the</strong> nation. Its report recommended a vigorous post-Apollo exploration program culminating<br />
in a human expedition to Mars. Nixon did not approve this plan, but he did decide in favor of building<br />
one element of it, <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle, which was approved on January 5, 1972. See Roger D. Launius, “NASA and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Decision to Build <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle, 1969–72,” The Historian 57 (Autumn 1994): 17–34.<br />
586
Herman Noordung (1892–1929) was a pseudonym for Herman Potôcnik. He was a relatively obscure officer in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Austrian army who became an engineer. Encouraged by Hermann Oberth, he wrote an early seminal book<br />
titled The Problem of Space Travel: The Rocket Motor, which mostly focused on <strong>the</strong> engineering aspects of space stations.<br />
See Hermann Noordung, edited by Ernst Stuhlinger and J.D. Hunley with Jennifer Garland, The Problem<br />
of Space Travel: The Rocket Motor (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4026, 1995).<br />
Robert G. Nunn, Jr. (1917–1975), earned a law degree from <strong>the</strong> University of Chicago in 1942. After four years<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Army during World War II, <strong>the</strong>n private practice of law for eight years in Washington, D.C., and in his<br />
hometown of Terre Haute, Indiana, he joined <strong>the</strong> office of general counsel of <strong>the</strong> Air Force in 1954. He became<br />
NASA’s assistant general counsel in November 1958 and <strong>the</strong>n special assistant to T. Keith Glennan in September<br />
1960. He helped draft many legal and administrative regulations for NASA, and <strong>the</strong>n he went to work for <strong>the</strong><br />
Washington law firm of Sharp and Bogan. Later, he formed <strong>the</strong> firm of Batzell and Nunn, specializing in energy<br />
legislation and administrative law. See “Nunn, R.G., Jr.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection.<br />
P<br />
John R. Pierce (1910– ) is commonly referred to as <strong>the</strong> inventor of <strong>the</strong> communications satellite in 1954. He<br />
worked for thirty-five years as an engineer at Bell Laboratories and <strong>the</strong>n worked at <strong>the</strong> California Institute of<br />
Technology and its Jet Propulsion Laboratory. See “Pierce, J. R.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection.<br />
Frank Press (1924– ) served as President Carter’s science advisor. From 1981 to 1993, he served as president<br />
of <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Sciences. He received a Ph.D. in geophysics from Columbia University in 1949. See<br />
“Press, Frank,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
William Proxmire (1915– ) (D–WI) served as a senator from August 29, 1957, to January 3, 1989. He chaired<br />
<strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs for several sessions of Congress. He was also an<br />
outspoken critic of wasteful government spending, often awarding his infamous “Golden Fleece” award to those<br />
people or government organizations he felt wasted taxpayer money. See Biographical Directory of <strong>the</strong> American<br />
Congress 1774–1996; “Proxmire, William,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
R<br />
Harold A. Rosen (1926– ) was one of <strong>the</strong> key scientists at <strong>the</strong> Hughes Aircraft who developed Syncom, <strong>the</strong> first<br />
geosynchronous communications satellite, for NASA. He received <strong>the</strong> National Medal of Technology in 1985.<br />
“Rosen, Harold,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
S<br />
William C. Schneider joined NASA in June 1963 and was <strong>the</strong> Gemini mission director for seven of <strong>the</strong> ten<br />
manned Gemini missions. From 1967 to 1968, he served as Apollo mission director and <strong>the</strong> Apollo program’s<br />
deputy director for missions. He <strong>the</strong>n served from 1968 to 1974 as <strong>the</strong> Skylab program’s director. After that, he<br />
worked as <strong>the</strong> deputy associate administrator for space transportation systems for almost four years. From 1978<br />
to 1980, he served as <strong>the</strong> associate administrator for space tracking and data systems. He received a Ph.D. in engineering<br />
from Catholic University. See “Schneider, William C.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection.<br />
587
Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (1918– ), had been involved in aerospace issues since he completed his Sc.D. degree<br />
at <strong>the</strong> Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1951. He was on <strong>the</strong> faculty at MIT’s department of aeronautical<br />
engineering from 1949 to 1955, when he joined <strong>the</strong> Radio Corporation of America (RCA) as manager of <strong>the</strong><br />
Airborne Systems Laboratory. In 1958, he became <strong>the</strong> chief engineer of <strong>the</strong> Missile Electronics and Control<br />
Division and joined NASA in 1960 as associate administrator. In December 1965, he became NASA’s deputy<br />
administrator. He left NASA in 1968, and in 1969, he became secretary of <strong>the</strong> Air Force, serving until 1973.<br />
Seamans was president of <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Engineering from May 1973 to December 1974, when he<br />
became <strong>the</strong> first administrator of <strong>the</strong> new Energy Research and Development Administration. He returned to<br />
MIT in 1977, becoming dean of its School of Engineering in 1978. In 1981, he was elected chair of <strong>the</strong> board of<br />
trustees of Aerospace Corporation. See “Seamans, Robert C., Jr.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference<br />
Collection; Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (Washington, DC:<br />
NASA SP-4106, 1996).<br />
Willis H. Shapley (1917– ), <strong>the</strong> son of famous Harvard astronomer Harlow Shapley, earned a bachelor of arts<br />
degree from <strong>the</strong> University of Chicago in 1938. From that point until 1942, he did graduate work and performed<br />
research in political science and related fields at <strong>the</strong> University of Chicago. He joined <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget<br />
in 1942 and became a principal examiner in 1948. From 1956 to 1961, he was assistant chief (Air Force) in <strong>the</strong><br />
bureau’s military division, becoming progressively deputy chief for programming (1961–1965) and deputy chief<br />
(1965) in that division. He also served as special assistant to <strong>the</strong> director for space program coordination. In<br />
1965, he moved to NASA as associate deputy administrator, with his duties including supervision of <strong>the</strong> public<br />
affairs, congressional affairs, Department of Defense and interagency affairs, and international affairs offices. He<br />
retired in 1975 but rejoined NASA in 1987 to help it recover from <strong>the</strong> Challenger disaster. He served as associate<br />
deputy administrator (policy) until 1988, when he again retired but continued to serve as a consultant to <strong>the</strong><br />
administrator. See “Shapley, W.H.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
George P. Shultz (1920– ) served as director of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget after 1970, during <strong>the</strong><br />
Nixon administration. Before that time, he had been Nixon’s secretary of labor. During <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration<br />
(1981–1989), Shultz served as secretary of State. See “Shultz, George P.,” 1988 Current Biography Yearbook,<br />
pp. 525–30.<br />
Eugene Skolnikoff served on <strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> White House science advisor from 1958 to 1963. Afterward, he went<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he served as a political science professor specializing in science,<br />
technology, and foreign policy issues. See “Skolnikoff, Eugene,” biographical file, NASA Historical<br />
Reference Collection.<br />
Jacob E. Smart rose to <strong>the</strong> rank of general in <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army, serving as deputy commander of <strong>the</strong> U.S. European<br />
Command. He joined NASA in 1966 as special assistant to <strong>the</strong> administrator. He <strong>the</strong>n became <strong>the</strong> acting assistant<br />
administrator for administration, <strong>the</strong> assistant administrator for policy analysis, and <strong>the</strong> assistant administrator<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense and interagency affairs. He graduated from <strong>the</strong> U.S. Military Academy at<br />
West Point in 1931. See “Smart, Jacob,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Cyrus R. Smith (1899–1990) worked in banking until he became manager of Texas Air Transport, a subsidiary<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Texas-Louisiana Power Company. In 1934, this company reorganized, becoming American Airlines. He<br />
was chief executive until he became secretary of commerce in 1968, a position he held for one year. He retired<br />
in 1969. See “Smith, C.R. (Cyrus Rowlett),” in Bowman, The Cambridge Dictionary of American Biography.<br />
T<br />
Robert A. Taft (1889–1953) (R–OH), <strong>the</strong> son of President William Taft, served as a senator from January 3, 1939,<br />
until July 31, 1953. See Biographical Directory of <strong>the</strong> United States Congress, 1774–1996.<br />
588
Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskiy (1857–1935) became enthralled with <strong>the</strong> possibilities of interplanetary travel as a boy<br />
and, at age fourteen, started independent study using books from his fa<strong>the</strong>r’s library on natural science and<br />
ma<strong>the</strong>matics. He also developed a passion for invention, and he constructed balloons, propelled carriages, and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r instruments. To fur<strong>the</strong>r his education, his parents sent him to Moscow to pursue technical studies. In 1878,<br />
he became a teacher of ma<strong>the</strong>matics in a school north of Moscow. Tsiolkovskiy first started writing on space in<br />
1898, when he submitted for publication to <strong>the</strong> Russian journal, Nauchnoye Obozreniye (Science Review), a work<br />
based on years of calculations that laid out many of <strong>the</strong> principles of modern spaceflight. The article,<br />
“Investigating Space with Rocket Devices,” presented years of calculations that laid out many of <strong>the</strong> principles of<br />
modern spaceflight and opened <strong>the</strong> door to future writings on <strong>the</strong> subject. In it, Tsiolkovskiy described in depth<br />
<strong>the</strong> use of rockets for launching orbital spaceships. There followed a series of increasingly sophisticated studies<br />
on <strong>the</strong> technical aspects of spaceflight. In <strong>the</strong> 1920s and 1930s, he proved especially productive, publishing ten<br />
major works, elucidating <strong>the</strong> nature of bodies in orbit, developing scientific principles behind reaction vehicles,<br />
designing orbital space stations, and promoting interplanetary travel. He also fur<strong>the</strong>red studies on many principles<br />
commonly used in rockets today: specific impulse to gauge engine performance, multistage boosters, fuel<br />
mixtures such as liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, <strong>the</strong> problems and possibilities inherent in microgravity, <strong>the</strong><br />
promise of solar power, and spacesuits for extravehicular activity. Significantly, he never had <strong>the</strong> resources—nor<br />
perhaps <strong>the</strong> inclination—to experiment with rockets himself. After <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and <strong>the</strong> creation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, Tsiolkovskiy was formally recognized for his accomplishments in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of spaceflight.<br />
Among o<strong>the</strong>r honors, in 1921 he received a lifetime pension from <strong>the</strong> state that allowed him to retire from<br />
teaching at <strong>the</strong> age of sixty-four. Thereafter, he devoted full time to developing his spaceflight <strong>the</strong>ories studies.<br />
His <strong>the</strong>oretical work greatly influenced later rocketeers both in his native land and throughout Europe. While<br />
less well known during his lifetime in <strong>the</strong> United States, Tsiolkovskiy’s work enjoyed broad study in <strong>the</strong> 1950s and<br />
1960s, when Americans sought to understand how <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union had accomplished such unexpected success<br />
in its early spaceflight efforts. See “Tsiolkovskiy, K.E.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
W<br />
James E. Webb (1906–1992) was NASA’s administrator between 1961 and 1968. Previously, he had been an aide<br />
to a congressman in New Deal Washington, an aide to Washington lawyer Max O. Gardner, and a business executive<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Sperry Corporation and <strong>the</strong> Kerr-McGee Oil Company. He had also been director of <strong>the</strong> Bureau<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Budget between 1946 and 1950 and under secretary of state from 1950 to 1952. See W. Henry Lambright,<br />
Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).<br />
Caspar W. Weinberger (1917– ), longtime Republican government official, was a senior member of <strong>the</strong> Nixon,<br />
Ford, and Reagan administrations. For Nixon and Ford, he was deputy director (1970–1972) and director<br />
(1972–1976) of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget. In this capacity, he had a leading role in shaping <strong>the</strong><br />
direction of NASA’s major effort of <strong>the</strong> 1970s, <strong>the</strong> development of a reusable Space Shuttle. For Reagan, he<br />
served as secretary of defense, in which he oversaw <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle in <strong>the</strong> early 1980s for <strong>the</strong> launching of<br />
classified Department of Defense payloads into orbit. See “Weinberger, Caspar W(illard),” Current Biography<br />
1973, pp. 428–30.<br />
Edward C. Welsh (1909–1990) had a long career in various private and public enterprises. He had served as legislative<br />
assistant to Democratic Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri from 1953 to 1961, and he was <strong>the</strong> executive<br />
secretary of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Council through <strong>the</strong> 1960s. See “Welsh, E.C.,” biographical<br />
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Harry Wexler (1911–1962) worked for <strong>the</strong> U.S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau from 1934 until his death. He was one of <strong>the</strong><br />
first scientists to envision using satellites for meteorological purposes and was known as <strong>the</strong> fa<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> TIROS<br />
satellite. From 1955 to 1958, he was also <strong>the</strong> chief scientist for <strong>the</strong> U.S. expedition to Antarctica for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Geophysical Year. In 1961, he was a lead negotiator for <strong>the</strong> United States in drafting plans for joint<br />
U.S.-Soviet Union use of meteorological satellites. He received a Ph.D. in meteorology from <strong>the</strong> Massachusetts<br />
Institute of Technology in 1939. See “Wexler, Harry,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
589
Robert M. White (1923– ) served as head of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau and <strong>the</strong> Environmental Science Services<br />
Administration in <strong>the</strong> 1960s, as administrator of <strong>the</strong> National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in <strong>the</strong><br />
1970s, and as head of <strong>the</strong> National Academy of Engineering in <strong>the</strong> late 1980s. See “White, Robert M.,” biographical<br />
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Clay T. Whitehead was a White House staff assistant during <strong>the</strong> Nixon administration from 1969 to 1972 who was<br />
heavily involved in space policy associated with <strong>the</strong> decision to build <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle and post-Apollo planning<br />
for NASA. See Launius, “NASA and <strong>the</strong> Decision to Build <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle, 1969–72”; Launius, “A Western<br />
Mormon in Washington, D.C.”<br />
Donald D. Williams (1931–1966) was instrumental in <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> Early Bird and Syncom communications<br />
satellites. He was employed by Hughes Aircraft and was named one of America’s ten outstanding young<br />
men of 1965 by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce. On February 21, 1966, Williams committed suicide. See<br />
“Academic and Scientific Miscellaneous,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.<br />
Y<br />
John Yardley began his career in aerospace in 1946, when he joined McDonnell Aircraft. While with that company,<br />
he assumed a major role in <strong>the</strong> Mercury and Gemini programs. In 1974, he came to NASA as <strong>the</strong> associate<br />
administrator for manned spaceflight. His title <strong>the</strong>n changed to associate administrator for spaceflight, and<br />
in 1978, he became associate administrator for space transportation systems. In 1981, he returned to <strong>the</strong> private<br />
sector as president of <strong>the</strong> McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company. See “Yardley, John,” biographical file,<br />
NASA Historical reference Collection.<br />
John D. Young (1919– ) earned a master of science degree from Syracuse in 1943 and served as an officer in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps from 1942 to 1945. He worked for various government agencies in <strong>the</strong> next few years and <strong>the</strong>n<br />
became a management consultant with McKinsey & Co. from 1954 to 1960. He served as NASA’s director of management<br />
analysis from 1960 to 1961 and <strong>the</strong>n became, successively, deputy director for administration and<br />
deputy associate administrator at NASA Headquarters. He left NASA in 1966 for a series of management positions<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget and <strong>the</strong> Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Thereafter, he<br />
became a professor of public management at American University. See “Young, J.D.,” biographical file, NASA<br />
Historical Reference Collection.<br />
590
A<br />
Index<br />
Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), 9, 145-47; and “Federal Research and Development<br />
for Satellite Communications,” 135-45<br />
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 158, 203-04<br />
Agriculture, Department of, 167, 168-69<br />
Air Force, United States, 157<br />
American Broadcasting Company (ABC), 106<br />
American Rocket Society, 62<br />
American Securities Corp., 62<br />
American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T), 2, 3, 5, 39-41; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and “Establishment<br />
of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and “Exotic Radio<br />
Communications,” 22-30; and “FCC Relation to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “Federal Research and<br />
Development for Satellite Communications,” 135-45; and F.R. Kappel, 45-60; and legislation about, 67-72; and<br />
Newton Minnow, 60-61, 76; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95; and Telstar, 89-90<br />
Anders, William A., 135<br />
Anderson, Clinton P., 269-71<br />
Andrews, Duane P., 375, 377-78<br />
Anik, 10, 138<br />
Applications Technology Satellite (ATS), 9, 161<br />
APSTAR, 10<br />
ARABSAT, 10<br />
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 157<br />
ASIASAT, 10<br />
ASTRA, 10<br />
Atlas launch vehicle, 2<br />
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 385<br />
ATS-6, 139<br />
Augenstein, Bruno, 282-93<br />
B<br />
Badgley, Peter C., 237-40; and “Current Status of NASA’s Natural Resources Program” (1966), 226-37<br />
Baker, D. James, 213-14, 224-25<br />
Baldridge, Malcolm, 151-53<br />
Ball Aerospace Corp., 7<br />
Beggs, James M., 396, 539-41; and “NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial Investment in Space,” 488-98; and<br />
“Space Commercialization Meeting,” 498-501<br />
Bell Laboratories, 31, 32; and “Exotic Radio Communications,” 22-30; and F.R. Kappel, 45-60; and Telstar, 89-90<br />
Berg, Otto, 157<br />
Best, G.L., 46, 48-49, 51<br />
Boileau, Oliver C., 498-501<br />
Bolster, Edward A., 85-89<br />
Braibanti, Ralph, 375, 378<br />
British Interplanetary Society, 11<br />
Brown, Clarence J., 498-501<br />
Brown, George E., 164, 213-14, 368-72<br />
Brown, Ron, 164, 213, 215-16<br />
Brown, William M., and “Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space,” 480-88<br />
Bruce, David, 96-99<br />
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 294-95<br />
591
Bullington, Kenneth, 25<br />
Bush, George W., 173, 175-76; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and “Landsat<br />
Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47; and “U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines,” 460-63<br />
Byerly, Radford, 145-47<br />
C<br />
California Institute of Technology (CIT), 29<br />
Cape Canaveral, FL, 35<br />
Carter, James E. (Jimmy), 171; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and “Planning for a Civil<br />
Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306<br />
Cedar Rapids, IA, 24<br />
Celler, Emanuel, 67-71<br />
Chase Econometric Associates, Inc., 389, 390, 391, 426, 427, 431, 451; and “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D<br />
Spending,” 414-26<br />
Chance-Vought Corp., and Hughes “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35; and Rosen’s<br />
Commercial Communications Satellite, 35-39<br />
Chapman Research Group, and “An Exploration of Benefits from NASA ‘Spinoff,’” 559-63<br />
Clark, Tim, 145-47<br />
Clarke, Arthur C., 1, 4; and “Extra-Terrestrial Relays,” 16-22; and “The Space Station,” 11-15<br />
Clinton, William J., and “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165,<br />
221-23; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and “Landsat Remote Sensing<br />
Strategy,” 372-75; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and “U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation<br />
of Private Remote Sensing Systems,” 379-81<br />
Commerce, Department of, 171-72; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and “Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000,”<br />
473-80; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23;<br />
and “Earth Information from Space by Remote Sensing,” 282-93; and Earth resource satellite commercialization,<br />
175-76; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Land Remote-Sensing<br />
Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and<br />
“Landsat Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,” 372-75; and National<br />
Performance Review, 164-65, 216-21; and “National Plan for a Common System of Meteorological Observation<br />
Satellites, 204-206; and “Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,” 177-83; and “Planning for a Civil<br />
Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and “The President’s Space Policy and<br />
Commercial Space Initiatives to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century,” 455-60; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical<br />
Review Panel on Industry Responses on Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems,” 309-21; and<br />
“Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-08;<br />
and “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,” 321-29; and “U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation of<br />
Private Remote Sensing Systems,” 379-81<br />
Communications, satellite, 1-153; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong> Authorization of<br />
Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and Advanced Communications Technology<br />
Satellite (ACTS), 9; and Anik, 10; and Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) program, 9; and APSTAR, 10;<br />
and ARABSAT, 10; and ASIASAT, 10; and ASTRA, 10; and AT&T proposals, 45-60; and brief history of, 6-10;<br />
and Clarke’s “Extra-Terrestrial Relays,” 16-22; and Clarke’s “The Space Station,” 11-15; Communications<br />
Satellite Act of 1962, 5, 61, 63, 76-85, 85-89; and Communications Satellite Corp. (Comsat), 4-5, 72-76, 85-89;<br />
and Communications Technology Satellite program, 9; and Defense Satellite Communications System<br />
(DSCS), 10; and early concepts of, 2-4; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by<br />
Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTEL-<br />
SAT), 10; and “FCC Relation to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “Federal Research and Development for<br />
Satellite Communications,” 135-45; and F.R. Kappel,<br />
45-60; and “A Global System of Satellite Communications,” 99-108; and Hughes “Commercial Satellite<br />
Communication Project,” 31-35; and INMARSAT, 11; and INTELSAT, 4-5, 6-10, 11, 91-95; and international<br />
relations, 4-10; and International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 10-11, 65, 89-90; and legislation about,<br />
67-72; and National Aeronautics and Space Council, 65-67, 76-77; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73;<br />
592
and Newton Minnow, 60-61, 76; and Orion Satellite System, 9; and PanAmSat, 10; and Pierce’s “Exotic Radio<br />
Communications,” 22-30; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign<br />
Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on Definitive<br />
Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and Rosen’s<br />
Commercial Communications Satellite, 35-39; and Soviet Union, 85-89; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95; and<br />
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), 9; and Telstar, 89-90; and T. Keith Glennan, 29, 39-41; and<br />
“Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,” 96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early<br />
Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “White Paper on New International Satellite<br />
Systems,” 147-53; and “U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines,” 460-63<br />
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 5, 61, 63, 76-85; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-<br />
Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95<br />
Communications Satellite Corp. (Comsat), 4-5, 72-76, 155; and ACTS, 145-47; and “Establishment of Domestic<br />
Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and “Federal Research and<br />
Development for Satellite Communications,” 135-45; and “A Global System of Satellite Communications,”<br />
99-108; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign Communications Satellite<br />
Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation…on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95; and<br />
Telstar, 89-90; and “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,” 96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong><br />
Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “White Paper on New International<br />
Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
Communications Technology Satellite, 9<br />
Cortright, Edgar M., and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 253-56<br />
Courier 1B, 3, 90<br />
Craven, T.A.M., 43-44<br />
Crawford, A.B., 25<br />
Cross, David M., 426<br />
Cygnus Corp., and “White Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
D<br />
Darman, Richard G., 498-501<br />
Deere & Company, 498-501<br />
Defense Early Warning (DEW) line, 25<br />
Defense, Department of (DOD), 2, 5, 7, 9, 31; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong><br />
Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and “Basic Agreement<br />
Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning<br />
Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,” 206-11; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and<br />
“Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Earth<br />
Information from Space by Remote Sensing,” 282-93; and Earth resource satellites, 167-76; and<br />
“Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and<br />
“FCC Relation to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “Federal Research and Development for Satellite<br />
Communications,” 135-45; and F.R. Kappel, 45-60; and “A Global System of Satellite Communications,”<br />
99-108; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Land Remote-Sensing<br />
Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and<br />
“Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,” 372-75; and “Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program,” 347-52; meteorological<br />
satellites, 156-63; and National Performance Review, 164-65, 216-21; and “National Plan for a<br />
Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites, 204-206; and “National Space Policy” (1996),<br />
463-73; and “Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and “Policy<br />
Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95;<br />
and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International<br />
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and “Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector<br />
Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-08; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95; and Telstar,<br />
89-90; and TIROS, 157, 158, 161-62, 203-06; and “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,”<br />
96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “White<br />
Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
593
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), 10<br />
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), 158, 215-16<br />
Delta launch vehicle, 35<br />
Denver Research Institute, 390; and “Mission Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology,” 432-45<br />
Deutch, John , 370<br />
Dingman, J.E., 56-57, 58-59<br />
Dryden, Hugh L., 47, 58-60, 88, 203-04; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11<br />
Dunn, Robert, and “NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial Investment in Space,” 488-98<br />
Dutton, Frederick G., 71-72<br />
E<br />
Early Bird, 5<br />
Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT), 172, 344-45; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,”<br />
173-75, 352-68; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47<br />
Earth Resources Observation Satellite (EROS) Program, 244-48, 256-57, 275-76<br />
Earth Observing Satellite (EOS), 163, 396<br />
Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS), see Landsat<br />
Echo 1, 2-3, 22, 30, 50<br />
Echo 2, 3<br />
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2, 4, 39, 41-42, 86, 158<br />
Elliott, Linda, and “Mission Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology,” 432-45<br />
Energy, Department of (DOE), 385<br />
European Organisation for <strong>the</strong> Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), 165-67; and Earth<br />
resource satellites, 167-76, 224-25<br />
European Posts and Telecommunications, Committee on, 6<br />
European Space Agency (ESA), 165-66; and Earth resource satellites, 167-76, 224-25<br />
European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), 10<br />
Evans, Llewellyn, 498-501<br />
Evans, Michael K., and “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,” 414-26<br />
Exon, James, 164, 213, 215-16<br />
F<br />
Faget, Maxime A., 498-501<br />
Fairchild Aviation Corp., 7, 498-501; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by<br />
Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32<br />
Farley, Philip, 85-89<br />
Faucett, Jack G., 388, 401-402<br />
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 9, 10; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and Communications<br />
Satellite Act of 1962, 5, 61, 63, 76-85; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by<br />
Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and “FCC Relation to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “Federal<br />
Research and Development for Satellite Communications,” 135-45; and “A Global System of Satellite<br />
Communications,” 99-108; and legislation about, 67-72; and National Aeronautics and Space Act, 72-85, 392;<br />
and National Aeronautics and Space Council, 65-67, 76-85; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and<br />
Newton Minnow, 60-61, 76; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign<br />
Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on Definitive<br />
Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and Soviet Union,<br />
85-89; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95; and “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,”<br />
96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “White<br />
Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
Federal Express Corp., 498-501<br />
Felkel, Ed, 33<br />
594
Fletcher, James C., 132-35, 259-62, 269-71, 277-81<br />
Ford Aerospace Corp., 7<br />
Ford Foundation, 106<br />
Friis, H.T., 24, 25<br />
Frutkin, Arnold W., 259-62, and “Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite,” 262-69<br />
Fuller, Craig L., 394, 498-501, 501-04<br />
Fuqua, Don, 321-29<br />
G<br />
General Electric Corp., 7, 62, 168-69<br />
General Accounting <strong>Office</strong> (GAO), 269-71; and “Commercial Use of Space,” 543-46; and “NASA Report May<br />
Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Research and Development Spending,” 430-32<br />
General Dynamics Corp., 498-501<br />
Geological Survey, U.S., 168, 240; and EROS, 275-76; and Landsat, 257-59; and “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological<br />
Survey . . . Regarding Remote Sensing and South America,” 240-44<br />
Gibbons, John H., 368-72<br />
Glennan, T. Keith, 29, 39-41; and AT&T, 45-60<br />
Goldstone, CA, 29<br />
Goodall, W.M., 24-25<br />
Goddard Space Flight Center, MD, 51, 54-56, 449<br />
Gore, Al, 164-65<br />
Government Performance and Results Act, 400<br />
Granger, John V.N., 262-69<br />
Green, E.I., 46, 49-50<br />
Green Bank, WV, 24, 45<br />
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 498-501<br />
H<br />
Haeff, A.V., and “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35<br />
Hannah, David, 498-501<br />
Halpern, Irwin P., and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50<br />
Hanson, Robert A., 498-501<br />
Harper, Ed, 306-308<br />
Hayden Planetarium, 177<br />
Heiss, Klaus P., 498-501<br />
Hertzfeld, Henry, 426-27; 563-74<br />
Hodges, Lu<strong>the</strong>r H., and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,” 206-11<br />
Hogg, D.C., 25<br />
Holman, Mary, 388<br />
Holmdel Laboratory, 25, 50-50<br />
Hough, Roger W., 402-07<br />
Houston, TX, 133<br />
Hudson Institute, 394; and “Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space,” 480-88<br />
Hudspeth, Thomas, and “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35<br />
Hughes Aircraft Corp., 3-4, 5, 7; and ACTS, 145-47; and “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35;<br />
and EOSAT, 172; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental<br />
Entities,” 120-32; and “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and Rosen’s Commercial<br />
Communications Satellite, 35-39<br />
Hutton, E.F., and Co., 498-501<br />
595
I<br />
Indiana University, 388<br />
Initial Defense Satellite Communication System (IDSCS), 5<br />
INMARSAT, 11<br />
“Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle,” 157, 185-202<br />
INTELSAT I, 5<br />
Interior, Department of <strong>the</strong>, and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polarorbiting<br />
Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Earth’s Resources to be Studied<br />
from Space,” 244-46; and Landsat, 168-73; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47; and “Land Remote<br />
Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and “Operational<br />
Requirements for Global Resource Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites,” 246-48; and “Planning for a Civil<br />
Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306<br />
International Telecommunications Satellites Consortium (INTELSAT), 4-5, 6-10, 11, 91-95; and “FCC Relation<br />
to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “Federal Research and Development for Satellite Communications,”<br />
135-45; and “A Global System of Satellite Communications,” 99-108; and “Land Remote-Sensing<br />
Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of<br />
Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on<br />
Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and<br />
“Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,” 96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early<br />
Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “White Paper on New International Satellite<br />
Systems,” 147-53<br />
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 10-11, 65, 89-90<br />
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), 5; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong><br />
Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and State Department,<br />
85-89, 91-95<br />
I.R.E, Proceedings of <strong>the</strong>, 25<br />
J<br />
Jaffe, Leonard, 237-40, and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />
Geological Survey . . . Regarding Remote Sensing and South America,” 240-44<br />
Jansky, Karl G., 24<br />
Janus, Project, 157-58<br />
Jeffs, George, 498-501<br />
Jet Propulsion, 22; and “Exotic Radio Communications,” 22-30<br />
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 7, 29<br />
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratories, 7<br />
Johnson, David S., 296-306<br />
Johnson, E. Douglas, 553-55<br />
Johnson, John, 72<br />
Johnson, Lyndon B., and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental<br />
Entities,” 120-32; and “FCC Relation to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “A Global System of Satellite<br />
Communications,” 99-108; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign<br />
Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on Definitive<br />
Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and “Transfer of U.S.<br />
Communications Satellite Technology,” 96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of<br />
Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96<br />
Johnson, Ray W., 203-04<br />
K<br />
Kahn, Herman, and “Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space,” 480-88<br />
Kappel, F.R., 45-60<br />
Kefauver, Estes, 5, 72<br />
Kelley, John A., and “Mission Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology,” 432-45<br />
596
Kennedy, John F., 2, 4-5, 46, 60-61, 65, 67-72, 87, 89, 159<br />
Kerr, Robert S., 5, 72-76, 87<br />
Keyworth, George A., III, 498-501<br />
Khrushchev, Nikita A., 85-89<br />
Kissinger, Henry A., 135<br />
Kraft, Christopher C., Jr., 281-82<br />
L<br />
Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE), 170<br />
Landsat, 133, 168-73; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting<br />
Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Crop Forecasting by Satellite,” 272-75; and<br />
“Earth Information from Space by Remote Sensing,” 282-93; and “Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth<br />
Resource Surveying by Satellite,” 262-69; and “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44;<br />
and “Landsat Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,” 372-75; and<br />
“Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program,” 347-52; and “Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote<br />
Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and “Private Sector Operation of Landsat Satellites,” 281-82; and “Report<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical Review Panel on Industry Responses on Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote<br />
Sensing Systems,” 309-21; and “Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing<br />
Satellite Activities,” 306-08; and “Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-1,” 259-62<br />
Latshaw, John, 498-501<br />
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 175<br />
Lincoln Experimental Satellite (LES), 4, 9-10, 142<br />
Lincoln Laboratory, 4, 7, 9-10, 141<br />
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 7, 62, 381-83; and commercialization of Earth resource satellites, 176; and<br />
“Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32<br />
Lovell, Robert, 145-47<br />
Low, George M., 132-35, 259-62<br />
Luce, Charles F., and “Operational Requirements for Global Resource Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites,”<br />
246-48<br />
Luton, Jean-Marie, and Earth resource satellites, 224-25<br />
Lutz, S.G., and “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35<br />
M<br />
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 396, 498-501, 539-41; and “Electrophoresis Operations in Space,” 541-43; and<br />
“Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing,” 504-17; and “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space<br />
Manufacturing: Production of Pharmaceuticals,” 534-39<br />
McGhee, George, 85-89<br />
Madison, John J., 145-47<br />
Mandel, J.T., 33<br />
Markey, David J., 147-53<br />
Marks, Leonard H., 108-20<br />
Marshall Space Flight Center, 395<br />
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 141, 389<br />
Ma<strong>the</strong>matica, Inc., 390; and “Quantifying <strong>the</strong> Benefits to <strong>the</strong> National Economy from Secondary Applications of<br />
NASA Technology,” 445-49<br />
MathTech, Inc., 399; and “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Selected Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong> Programs,” 555-58;<br />
Mayo, Robert P., 257-59<br />
Meese, Edwin III, 498-501<br />
Meteorological satellites, 156-63; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11; and “Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle,” 157, 185-202;<br />
and METOP, 166; and “National Plan for a Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,”<br />
204-06; and Nimbus Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellite, 159-60, 168; and TIROS, 157, 158, 161-62, 203-06; and “Transfer of Civil<br />
Meteorological Satellites,” 321-29<br />
597
METOP satellite series, 166<br />
Midwest Research Institute, 389, 390, 391, 415; and “Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,”<br />
408-14; and “Economic Impact and Technological Progress of NASA Research and Development<br />
Expenditures,” 427-30<br />
Miernyk, William, 388<br />
Mignogno, Michael, 375, 378<br />
Minnow, Newton, 60-61, 76<br />
Molniya (“Lightning”), 5<br />
Morgan, John, and Earth resource satellites, 224-25<br />
Morrill, William, 133<br />
Motorola Corp., and ACTS, 145-47<br />
Mueller, George E., 388; and Earth resources survey program, 248-50, 250-52, 253-56<br />
Mundt, Karl, 169<br />
N<br />
NASA Alumni League, 391; and “The Economic Effects of a Space Station,” 450-51<br />
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), 389, 391<br />
National Academy of Sciences, and “Federal Research and Development for Satellite Communications,” 135-45<br />
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 2, 397<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 72-76, 392, 397<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 2, 4, 7; and ACTS, 9, 145-47; and “Administrative and<br />
Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong> Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications<br />
Systems,” 61-64; and AT&T, 45-60; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and “Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000,”<br />
473-80; and “Commercial Use of Space,” 543-46; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational<br />
Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Selected Technology Utilization<br />
<strong>Office</strong> Programs,” 555-58; and “Crop Forecasting by Satellite,” 272-75; and “Earth Information from Space by<br />
Remote Sensing,” 282-93; and Earth resource satellites, 167-76; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,”<br />
248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Earth’s Resources to be Studied from Space,” 244-46; and “The Economic Effects<br />
of a Space Station,” 450-51; and “The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program,” 451-55; and “Economic<br />
Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,” 408-14; and Eisenhower, 39-41; and “Economic Impact and<br />
Technological Progress of NASA Research and Development Expenditures,” 427-30; and “Electrophoresis<br />
Operations in Space,” 541-43; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-<br />
Governmental Entities,” 120-32; and EOS, 163, 396; and “An Exploration of Benefits from NASA ‘Spinoff,’”<br />
559-63; and “FCC Relation to Space Communication,” 42-45; and “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space<br />
Manufacturing,” 504-17; and “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing: Production of<br />
Pharmaceuticals,” 534-39; and “Federal Research and Development for Satellite Communications,” 135-45;<br />
and “Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite,” 262-69; and F.R. Kappel, 45-60;<br />
and “A Global System of Satellite Communications,” 99-108; and Hughes “Commercial Satellite<br />
Communication Project,” 31-35; and “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and<br />
“Landsat Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and<br />
Landsat, 133, 168-73; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,” 372-75; and Large Area Crop Inventory<br />
Experiment (LACIE), 170; and “Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space,” 480-88; and “Management<br />
Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program,” 347-52; and “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey . . . Regarding Remote<br />
Sensing and South America,” 240-44; and Meteorological Satellites, 156-63; and “Mission Oriented R&D and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology,” 432-45; and “NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial Investment in Space,”<br />
488-98; and “NASA Report May Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Research and Development Spending,”<br />
430-32; and “NASA Tech Brief Program,” 553-55; and “NASA Technology Transfer: Report of <strong>the</strong> Technology<br />
Transfer Team,” 574-77; and National Aeronautics and Space Act, 72-76, 392; and National Aeronautics and<br />
Space Council, 65-67, 76-77; and National Performance Review, 164-65, 216-21; and “National Plan for a<br />
Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,” 204-06; and “National Space Policy” (1996),<br />
463-73; and Newton Minnow, 60-61, 76; and Nimbus Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellite, 159-60, 168; and NOAA, 163-67; and<br />
“Operational Requirements for Global Resource Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites,” 246-48; and “Planning<br />
598
for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and Polar-orbiting Operational<br />
Environmental Satellites (POES), 163; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign<br />
Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and “The President’s Space Policy and Commercial Space<br />
Initiatives to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century,” 455-60; and “Private Sector Operation of Landsat Satellites,” 281-82;<br />
and “Proposal for Enhancing NASA Technology Transfer to Civil Systems,” 546-53; and remote sensing,<br />
155-383; and “Quantifying <strong>the</strong> Benefits to <strong>the</strong> National Economy from Secondary Applications of NASA<br />
Technology,” 445-49; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical<br />
Review Panel on Industry Responses on Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems,” 309-21; and<br />
“Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-308;<br />
and Rosen’s Commercial Communications Satellite, 35-39; and “Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-1,”<br />
259-62; and “Space Commercialization Meeting,” 498-501; and space economics, 385-577; and “Space<br />
Industrialization: An Overview,” 527-33; and “Space Industrialization Final Report,” 517-27; and State<br />
Department, 85-89, 91-95; and “Technology Transfer White Paper,” 563-74; and TIROS, 158-60, 161-62,<br />
203-06; and T. Keith Glennan, 29, 39-41, 203-04; and “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,” 321-29; and<br />
“Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,” 96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early<br />
Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines,”<br />
460-63; and “U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems,” 379-81; and “White<br />
Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
National Aeronautics and Space Council, 65-67, 76-77; and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong><br />
Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and State Department, 85-89<br />
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 215-16; and “Basic Agreement Between<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning<br />
Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,” 206-11; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and<br />
“Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000,” 473-80; and “Earth Information from Space by Remote<br />
Sensing,” 282-93; and Earth resource satellites, 167-76, 224-25; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,”<br />
248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Earth’s Resources to be Studied from Space,” 244-46; and NASA, 163-67; and<br />
“Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Foreign<br />
Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite,” 262-69; and “Land Remote-Sensing<br />
Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and<br />
Landsat, 133, 168-73; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Policy,” 345-47; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,”<br />
372-75; and Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE), 170; and “Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat<br />
Program,” 347-52; and National Performance Review, 164-65, 216-21; and “National Plan for a Common<br />
System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,” 204-06; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and<br />
“Operational Requirements for Global Resource Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites,” 246-48; and “Planning<br />
for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and Polar-orbiting Operational<br />
Environmental Satellites (POES), 163; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical Review Panel on Industry<br />
Responses on Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems,” 309-21; and “Resolution of Issues<br />
Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-308; and “Some Recent<br />
International Reactions to ERTS-1,” 259-62; and “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,” 321-29; and “U.S.<br />
Policy on Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems,” 379-81<br />
National Performance Review (NPR), 164-65, 216-21<br />
National Radio Observatory, 24, 45<br />
National Research Council, and “Federal Research and Development for Satellite Communications,” 135-45<br />
National Science Foundation (NSF), 7, 240, 385<br />
National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service, 173<br />
Naval Research Laboratory, 157<br />
Newell, Homer E., 211-13; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Meeting at <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. Geological Survey . . . Regarding Remote Sensing and South America,” 240-44; and “Some Recent<br />
International Reactions to ERTS-1,” 259-62<br />
Nimbus Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellite, 159-60, 168<br />
Nixon, Richard M., 133-35<br />
Noordung, Hermann, 11<br />
Nunn, Robert, 39<br />
599
O<br />
O’Connell, James D., 91-95, 99-108<br />
Orbital Solar Observatory (OSO)-1, 133<br />
Orbital Systems Corp., 498-501<br />
Orion Satellite System, 9; and “White Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
P<br />
Packer, Leo S., 546-53<br />
PanAmSat, 10<br />
Pasadena, CA, 29<br />
Pennsylvania, University of, 388<br />
Pharsalia, NY, 25<br />
Pierce, John R., 2-3, 48, 90; and “Exotic Radio Communications,” 22-30<br />
Potôcnik, Herman, 11<br />
“Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship,” 156, 183<br />
Proxmire, William, and “NASA Report May Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Research and Development<br />
Spending,” 430-32<br />
R<br />
Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 3, 5, 7; and ACTS, 145-47; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems<br />
Relating to <strong>the</strong> Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and<br />
EOSAT, 172; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental<br />
Entities,” 120-32; and Hughes “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35; and “Land Remote-<br />
Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and meteorological satellites, 157; and Rosen’s Commercial<br />
Communications Satellite, 35-39; and “White Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
RAND Corp., 156, 157; and “Earth Information from Space by Remote Sensing,” 282-93; and “Inquiry into <strong>the</strong><br />
Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle,” 157, 185-202<br />
Reagan, Ronald, and ACTS, 145-47; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23;<br />
and “Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of<br />
1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and “The President’s Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiatives to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next<br />
Century,” 455-60; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical Review Panel on Industry Responses on<br />
Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems,” 309-21; and “Resolution of Issues Related to Private<br />
Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-08; and space commercialization, 498-501,<br />
539-41; and space economics, 392-400; and “Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites,” 321-29; and “White<br />
Paper on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
Reeves, Robert G., and “Meeting at <strong>the</strong> U.S. Geological Survey . . . Regarding Remote Sensing and South<br />
America,” 240-44<br />
Reichdelerfer, F.W., and “National Plan for a Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,” 204-06<br />
Relay 1, 3, 35<br />
Remote sensing, 155-383; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,” 206-11;<br />
and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and commercialization of, 175-76; and “Commercial Space<br />
Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000,” 473-80; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental<br />
Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Crop Forecasting by Satellite,” 272-75; and “Current Status of NASA’s<br />
Natural Resources Program” (1966), 226-37; and “Earth Information from Space by Remote Sensing,” 282-93;<br />
and Earth resource satellites, 167-76; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and<br />
“Earth’s Resources to be Studied from Space,” 244-46; and “Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource<br />
Surveying by Satellite,” 262-69; and “Inquiry into <strong>the</strong> Feasibility of Wea<strong>the</strong>r Reconnaissance from a Satellite<br />
Vehicle,” 157, 185-202; and “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 173-75, 352-68; and “Land Remote-<br />
Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 329-44; and Landsat, 133, 168-73; and “Landsat Remote Sensing<br />
Policy,” 345-47; and “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,” 372-75; and Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment<br />
(LACIE), 170; and “Management Plan for <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program,” 347-52; and meteorological satellites,<br />
600
156-63; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and Nimbus Wea<strong>the</strong>r Satellite, 159-60, 168; and<br />
“Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,” 177-83; and “Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote<br />
Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), 163; and<br />
“Private Sector Operation of Landsat Satellites,” 281-82; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> Government Technical Review<br />
Panel on Industry Responses on Commercialization of <strong>the</strong> Civil Remote Sensing Systems,” 309-21; and<br />
“Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-08;<br />
and Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT), 171, 173, 476; and TIROS, 157, 158, 161-62, 203-06; and<br />
“Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-1,” 259-62; and “U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation of<br />
Private Remote Sensing Systems,” 379-81<br />
Richardson, Elliot L., 111<br />
Robbins, Martin D., and “Mission Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology,” 432-45<br />
Robinove, Charles J., 275-76<br />
Rockwell International, Inc., 391; and “The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program,” 451-55; and “Space<br />
Commercialization Meeting,” 498-501; and “Space Industrialization Final Report,” 517-27<br />
Rosen, Harold A., and Commercial Communications Satellite, 35-39; and Hughes “Commercial Satellite<br />
Communication Project,” 31-35<br />
Rye, Gilbert D., 498-501<br />
S<br />
Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT), 171, 173, 476<br />
Satellite Military Observation System (SAMOS), 157<br />
Saturn launch vehicle, 32<br />
Sawhill, John C., 277-81<br />
Schmookler, Jacob, 408<br />
Schneider, William, 147-53<br />
Science Applications, Inc., and “Space Industrialization: An Overview,” 527-33<br />
SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbital Relay Equipment), Project, 2, 89-90<br />
Scott, Walter S., 375-77<br />
Scout Launch Vehicle, 32, 33, 35<br />
Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 237-40; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Operational<br />
Requirements for Global Resource Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites,” 246-48<br />
Shapley, Willis, 133, 259-62, 282-93, 401-02<br />
Shriner, Robert D., 426-27<br />
Shultz, George P., 151-53, 277<br />
Shupe, Walter C., 269-71<br />
Signal Corps, U.S., 2; and Hughes “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35<br />
Sioux Falls, SD, 169, 259-62<br />
Skellett, A.M., 24-25<br />
Skolnikoff, Eugene B., 282-93<br />
Skurla, George, 498-501<br />
Skylab, 134<br />
Smart, Jacob E., 250-52<br />
Smith, Albert E., 381-83<br />
Smith, Bromley, 95-96<br />
Smith, C.R., 54-56, 59<br />
Smith Frederick W., 498-501<br />
Solow, Robert, 389<br />
Southworth G.C., 24<br />
Space economics, 385-577, and “Commercial Space Industry in <strong>the</strong> Year 2000,” 473-80; and “Commercial Use of<br />
Space,” 543-46; and “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Selected Technology Utilization <strong>Office</strong> Programs,” 555-58; and<br />
“The Economic Effects of a Space Station,” 450-51; and “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,”<br />
414-26; and “The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program,” 451-55; and “Economic Impact of Stimulated<br />
Technological Activity,” 408-14; and “Economic Impact and Technological Progress of NASA Research and<br />
Development Expenditures,” 427-30; and “Electrophoresis Operations in Space,” 541-43; and “An Exploration<br />
of Benefits from NASA ‘Spinoff,’” 559-63; and “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing,”<br />
504-17; and “Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing: Production of Pharmaceuticals,” 534-39;<br />
601
and “Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space,” 480-88; and measuring impact of, 387-392; and<br />
“Mission Oriented R&D and <strong>the</strong> Advancement of Technology,” 432-45; and NASA activities, 386-87; and<br />
“NASA Report May Overstate <strong>the</strong> Economic Benefits of Research and Development Spending,” 430-32; and<br />
“NASA Tech Brief Program,” 553-55; and “NASA Technology Transfer: Report of <strong>the</strong> Technology Transfer<br />
Team,” 574-77; and national policy, 392-96; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and “The President’s<br />
Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiatives to Begin <strong>the</strong> Next Century,” 455-60; and “Quantifying <strong>the</strong><br />
Benefits to <strong>the</strong> National Economy from Secondary Applications of NASA Technology,” 445-49; and “Proposal<br />
for Enhancing NASA Technology Transfer to Civil Systems,” 546-53; and “Some Major Impacts of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Space Program,” 402-407; and “Space Industrialization: An Overview,” 527-33; and “Space Industrialization<br />
Final Report,” 517-27; and stimulation of technology transfer, 396-400; and “Technology Transfer White<br />
Paper,” 563-74; and “U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines,” 460-63<br />
Space Electronics Corp., and Hughes “Commercial Satellite Communication Project,” 31-35<br />
Space Industries, Inc., 498-501<br />
Spaceflight, 11; and “The Space Station,” 11-15<br />
“Space Station, The,” 11-15<br />
Space Services, Inc., 498-501<br />
Space Systems/Loral, 7<br />
Sputnik 1, 2, 26<br />
Stanford Research Institute, 389<br />
State, Department of, 85-89; and “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 294-95; and “Convergence of U.S.-Polarorbiting<br />
Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,” 165, 221-23; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,”<br />
248-50, 250-52, 253-56; and “Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite,” 262-69;<br />
and “A Global System of Satellite Communications,” 99-108; and “National Space Policy” (1996), 463-73; and<br />
“Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System,” 296-306; and “Policy Concerning<br />
U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States Delegation . . . on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong> International Telecommunications<br />
Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and “Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land<br />
Observing Satellite Activities,” 306-308; and “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology,” 96-99;<br />
and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,” 95-96; and “White Paper<br />
on New International Satellite Systems,” 147-53<br />
Sterling, VA, 24<br />
Stewart, Irvin, 85<br />
Sugar Grove, WV, 45<br />
Syncom 1, 4, 5, 35<br />
Syncom 2, 4, 5<br />
Syncom 3, 4, 5<br />
T<br />
Television Infrared Operational Satellite (TIROS), 155, 157, 158, 203-06; and NASA, 158-62; and “National Plan<br />
for a Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,” 204-06<br />
Telstar, 3, 22, 72, 89-90<br />
Thompson, David, 498-501<br />
Thor launch vehicle, 2<br />
Titan launch vehicle, 2<br />
Townsend, John W., Jr., 498-501<br />
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), 9<br />
TRW Aerospace, 7; and ACTS, 145-47<br />
Tsiolkovskiy, Konstantin, 11<br />
U<br />
United Nations, and APSTAR, 10; and ARABSAT, 10; and ASIASAT, 10; and ASTRA, 10; and Communications<br />
Satellite Act of 1962, 5, 61, 63, 76-85, 85-89; and Communications Satellite Corp. (Comsat), 4-5, 72-76, 85-89;<br />
and European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), 10; and “A Global System of<br />
Satellite Communications,” 99-108; and INMARSAT, 11; and INTELSAT, 4-5, 6-10, 11, 91-95; and international<br />
relations, 4-10; and International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 10-11, 65, 89-90; and PanAmSat, 10;<br />
602
V<br />
and “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Development of Foreign Communications Satellite<br />
Capabilities,” 91-95; and “Report of <strong>the</strong> United States Delegation…on Definitive Arrangements for <strong>the</strong><br />
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium,” 108-20; and “Some Recent International Reactions<br />
to ERTS-1,” 259-62; and State Department, 85-89, 91-95; and “Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite<br />
Technology,” 96-99; and “U.S. Assistance in <strong>the</strong> Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service,”<br />
95-96<br />
V-2 rocket, 157<br />
Vanguard, Project, 2<br />
Viking, Project, 134<br />
W<br />
Waple, Ben F., 56-57, 61-64; and “Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-<br />
Governmental Entities,” 120-32<br />
Washington University, George, 388<br />
Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau, U.S., 158-60, 168; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11; and “National Plan for a Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites,” 204-06; and<br />
“Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,” 177-83<br />
Webb, James E., and AT&T, 45-60; and “Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of Commerce and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Operational Meteorological Satellite Systems,”<br />
206-11; and “Earth Resources Survey Program,” 248-50, 250-52, 253-56<br />
WEFA Group, Inc., 391; and “The Economic Impact of <strong>the</strong> Space Program,” 451-55<br />
Weinberger, Caspar, 135<br />
Welsh, Edward C., 71, 76-77<br />
Wenk, Edward, Jr., 86<br />
Western Electric Co., 54-56, 69<br />
Western Union International Corp., 5; and “Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to <strong>the</strong><br />
Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems,” 61-64; and “Establishment of<br />
Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,” 120-32<br />
Wexler, Harry, 156; and “Observing <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r from a Satellite Vehicle,” 177-83<br />
White, Robert M., 211-13<br />
White Sands, NM, 157<br />
Williams, Donald D., and Commercial Communications Satellite, 35-39; and “Commercial Satellite Communication<br />
Project,” 31-35<br />
Winokur, Robert S., 381-83<br />
Wireless World, 1; and “Extra-Terrestrial Relays,” 16-22<br />
Wi<strong>the</strong>e, Gregory W., 375-78<br />
Wolf, Francis Colt de, 89<br />
Wright, George W., 401-02<br />
Y<br />
Yardley, John F., 396, 498-501, 539-41<br />
Z<br />
Zimmerman, James V., 262-69<br />
603
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Hacker, Barton C., and Grimwood, James M. On Shoulders of Titans: A <strong>History</strong> of Project Gemini (NASA SP-4203,<br />
1977).<br />
Benson, Charles D. and Faherty, William Barnaby. Moonport: A <strong>History</strong> of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations<br />
(NASA SP-4204, 1978).<br />
Brooks, Courtney G., Grimwood, James M., and Swenson, Loyd S., Jr. Chariots for Apollo: A <strong>History</strong> of Manned Lunar<br />
Spacecraft (NASA SP-4205, 1979).<br />
Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (NASA SP-4206, 1980).<br />
606
SP-4207 not published.<br />
Compton, W. David, and Benson, Charles D. Living and Working in Space: A <strong>History</strong> of Skylab (NASA SP-4208,<br />
1983).<br />
Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Ezell, Linda Neuman. The Partnership: A <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Apollo- Soyuz Test Project (NASA<br />
SP-4209, 1978).<br />
Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A <strong>History</strong> of Project Ranger (NASA SP-4210, 1977).<br />
Newell, Homer E. Beyond <strong>the</strong> Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (NASA SP-4211, 1980).<br />
Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Ezell, Linda Neuman. On Mars: Exploration of <strong>the</strong> Red Planet, 1958–1978 (NASA<br />
SP-4212, 1984).<br />
Pitts, John A. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in <strong>the</strong> Manned Space Program to 1980 (NASA SP-4213, 1985).<br />
Compton, W. David. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A <strong>History</strong> of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions (NASA SP-4214,<br />
1989).<br />
Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (NASA SP-4215, 1991).<br />
Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley's Boeing 737 Flying Laboratory (NASA SP-4216,<br />
1994).<br />
Butrica, Andrew J., editor. Beyond <strong>the</strong> Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (NASA SP-4217, 1997).<br />
Butrica, Andrews J. To See <strong>the</strong> Unseen: A <strong>History</strong> of Planetary Radar Astronomy (NASA SP-4218, 1996).<br />
Reed, R. Dale, with Lister, Darlene. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story (NASA SP-4220, 1997).<br />
Center Histories, NASA SP-4300<br />
Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA SP-4301, 1985).<br />
Hartman, Edwin, P. Adventures in Research: A <strong>History</strong> of Ames Research Center, 1940–1965 (NASA SP-4302, 1970).<br />
Hallion, Richard P. On <strong>the</strong> Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946–1981 (NASA SP- 4303, 1984).<br />
Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching <strong>the</strong> Horizon: A <strong>History</strong> of Ames Research Center, 1940–1976 (NASA SP-4304, 1985).<br />
Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917–1958 (NASA SP-4305,<br />
1987).<br />
Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology (NASA SP-4306,<br />
1991).<br />
Dethloff, Henry C. “Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . .”: A <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Johnson Space Center (NASA SP-4307, 1993).<br />
Hansen, James R. Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo (NASA SP-4308, 1995).<br />
Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: 50 Years at <strong>the</strong> NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (NASA SP-4309, 1996).<br />
Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> John C. Stennis Space Center (NASA SP-4310, 1997).<br />
Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and <strong>the</strong> Creation of <strong>the</strong> American Space Program (NASA SP-4311, 1997).<br />
607
General Histories, NASA SP-4400<br />
Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958–1968: A Historical Summary (NASA SP-4401, 1971).<br />
Wells, Helen T., Whiteley, Susan H., and Karegeannes, Carrie. Origins of NASA Names (NASA SP-4402, 1976).<br />
Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A <strong>History</strong> of NACA and NASA, 1915–1980 (NASA SP-4403, 1981).<br />
Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959 (NASA SP-4404, 1978).<br />
Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight (NASA SP-4405, 1985).<br />
Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> NACA and NASA, 1915–1990 (NASA SP-4406, 1989).<br />
Logsdon, John M., editor, with Lear, Linda J., Warren-Findley, Jannelle, Williamson, Ray A., and Day, Dwayne A.<br />
<strong>Exploring</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Unknown</strong>: Selected Documents in <strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for<br />
Exploration (NASA SP-4407, 1995).<br />
Logsdon, John M., editor, with Day, Dwayne A., and Launius, Roger D. <strong>Exploring</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Unknown</strong>: Selected Documents<br />
in <strong>the</strong> <strong>History</strong> of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II: External Relationships (NASA SP-4407, 1996).<br />
608