Catiline and the "Concordia Ordinum" - Historia Antigua
Catiline and the "Concordia Ordinum" - Historia Antigua
Catiline and the "Concordia Ordinum" - Historia Antigua
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Classical Association of Canada<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> "<strong>Concordia</strong> Ordinum"<br />
Author(s): E. D. Eagle<br />
Source: Phoenix, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1949), pp. 15-30<br />
Published by: Classical Association of Canada<br />
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1086989<br />
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CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM<br />
E. D. EAGLE<br />
ANYONE who attempts to investigate political life in ancient Rome<br />
is faced with a thorny problem at <strong>the</strong> very outset. Were <strong>the</strong>re or were<br />
<strong>the</strong>re not in ancient Rome political parties of <strong>the</strong> modern national type?<br />
Scholars of <strong>the</strong> nineteenth <strong>and</strong> early twentieth century assumed without<br />
question that <strong>the</strong>re were. But <strong>the</strong> recent trend has been to affirm that<br />
Roman politics amounted to nothing more than "a nexus of personal<br />
obligations" <strong>and</strong> many scholars adhere to this position.' It is <strong>the</strong> purpose<br />
of this investigation to consider <strong>the</strong> year 63 B.C., <strong>the</strong> year in which<br />
Cicero scored his greatest political triumphs, with this problem in mind.<br />
The period has been examined before, <strong>and</strong> with most success by John<br />
<strong>and</strong> Hardy.2 But <strong>the</strong> currents <strong>and</strong> cross-currents of political strife are<br />
so numerous <strong>and</strong> intermingled that no account has as yet succeeded<br />
in giving a definitive interpretation of <strong>the</strong> events of <strong>the</strong> year. Two of<br />
<strong>the</strong> most interesting phenomena are <strong>the</strong> conspiracy of <strong>Catiline</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
creation of unity between <strong>the</strong> financial interests <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> governing<br />
oligarchy (<strong>the</strong> concordia ordinum). The major concern of this study is<br />
to determine <strong>the</strong> relationship of <strong>the</strong>se phenomena to each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> to<br />
<strong>the</strong> political situation.<br />
It is advisable at <strong>the</strong> outset to underst<strong>and</strong> clearly what constitutes<br />
a modern national political party. Such parties may be regarded from<br />
several points of view. If attention is fastened on <strong>the</strong>ir organization,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y appear as elaborate machines, with a hierarchy of officers, with<br />
conventions <strong>and</strong> caucuses, with a programme <strong>and</strong> a slate of c<strong>and</strong>idates<br />
for election. In modern states, where <strong>the</strong>re is manhood suffrage <strong>and</strong><br />
representative government, some such organization is needed to reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> multifarious interests of individuals <strong>and</strong> groups to a manageable<br />
number. The size of modern states makes it impossible for <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
operate on <strong>the</strong> town hall principle. If <strong>the</strong> membership of a modern<br />
political party is examined, however, it will be found to consist mainly<br />
of a number of groups that consider <strong>the</strong>ir major interests to be identical.<br />
These groups usually have an economic or socio-economic basis, although<br />
regionalism, race, <strong>and</strong> religion play important roles.3 Moreover, usually<br />
'Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), 10, n. 3. This conception<br />
originated with M. Gelzer in his monumental work Die Nobilitat der romischen Republik<br />
(Berlin, 1912). See also Hermann Strasburger, <strong>Concordia</strong> Ordinum (Leipzig, 1931) <strong>and</strong><br />
J. M. Cobban, Senate <strong>and</strong> Provinces, 78-49 B.C. (Cambridge, 1935).<br />
2Constantin John, Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Catilinarischen Verschworung<br />
(Leipzig, 1876); E. G. Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context: A Restudy<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Evidence (Oxford, 1924).<br />
3T. W. Cousens, Politics <strong>and</strong> Political Organizations in America (New York, 1942),<br />
19-22; A. L. Lowell, The Government of Engl<strong>and</strong> (New York, 1912), vol. 2, 123 ff.<br />
15
16 THE PHOENIX<br />
one or two groups control <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>and</strong> action of <strong>the</strong> party, while<br />
<strong>the</strong> subordinate groups render support, believing that <strong>the</strong>ir best interests<br />
are served by serving <strong>the</strong> best interest of <strong>the</strong> controlling group or groups.<br />
Mutual self-interest is <strong>the</strong> guiding principle throughout. Both <strong>the</strong>se<br />
aspects of <strong>the</strong> modern political parties, structure <strong>and</strong> membership, need<br />
to be kept in mind in evaluating <strong>the</strong> nature of ancient political life.<br />
The two political parties assumed to be operating in <strong>the</strong> last century<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Roman Republic (133-27 B.c.) were <strong>the</strong> populares (<strong>the</strong> people's<br />
party) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> optimates (<strong>the</strong> party of <strong>the</strong> gentry). Gelzer, however,<br />
in his study of Roman political life, demonstrated that during <strong>the</strong> period<br />
of <strong>the</strong> republic <strong>the</strong> election of officials depended entirely on <strong>the</strong> personal<br />
ties between <strong>the</strong> c<strong>and</strong>idate <strong>and</strong> his supporters.4 To begin with, <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>and</strong>idate had to be a member of <strong>the</strong> richest propertied class. And<br />
within that class, preference was always given to those whose ancestors<br />
had held <strong>the</strong> consulship or its equivalent. In fact, <strong>the</strong> highest offices<br />
were regarded as <strong>the</strong> special preserve of <strong>the</strong> nobiles, those whose ancestors<br />
had held <strong>the</strong> highest offices. Not only were all citizens below <strong>the</strong><br />
required property qualification ineligible for office, but <strong>the</strong>y were also<br />
circumscribed in <strong>the</strong> c<strong>and</strong>idates <strong>the</strong>y could support: <strong>the</strong>y had to vote<br />
for those aristocrats to whom <strong>the</strong>y were bound by obligations of various<br />
kinds or for c<strong>and</strong>idates whom <strong>the</strong>ir aristocratic patrons preferred. Even<br />
within <strong>the</strong> aristocracy, preference was dictated by ties of blood, marriage,<br />
friendship, gratitude, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like. Here Mfiinzer supplemented <strong>the</strong><br />
work of Gelzer by examining <strong>the</strong> ties of kinship between members of<br />
<strong>the</strong> aristocracy.5 He discovered factions within <strong>the</strong> ruling class, but<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir struggles with each o<strong>the</strong>r, in his view, were simply <strong>the</strong> result of<br />
one or o<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> kinship groups striving for dominance. On <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of <strong>the</strong> findings of Gelzer <strong>and</strong> Miinzer, Strasburger flatly asserted<br />
that political parties of <strong>the</strong> modern national kind did not exist in ancient<br />
Rome, <strong>and</strong> that terms such as populares <strong>and</strong> optimates were merely<br />
political catchwords, employed with little real significance by political<br />
opponents.6<br />
The work of Gelzer <strong>and</strong> Mtinzer is unquestionably of fundamental<br />
importance, <strong>and</strong> one must agree with Strasburger, too, up to a point.<br />
Rome did not have national political machines with officers, conventions,<br />
party programmes, <strong>and</strong> slates of c<strong>and</strong>idates. A Roman election was<br />
really a city election <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> better modern parallel would be <strong>the</strong> local<br />
political machines found in some modern cities.7 But that still leaves<br />
unsettled <strong>the</strong> matter of personnel. Were Roman political combinations<br />
mere aggregations of individuals or did groups work toge<strong>the</strong>r for a<br />
4Gelzer, Die Nobilitdt d. r. R.; see especially <strong>the</strong> summaries on pages 42 <strong>and</strong> 115f.<br />
5Friedrich Miinzer, Romische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart, 1920).<br />
6Strasburger, <strong>Concordia</strong> Ordinum, Iv. Cf. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 16, n. 2<br />
<strong>and</strong> Cobban, Senate <strong>and</strong> Provinces, 8f.<br />
7See F. B. Marsh, History of <strong>the</strong> Roman World 146-30 B.C. (London, 1935), 21 ff.;<br />
370-77.
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 17<br />
common end? And fur<strong>the</strong>r, was <strong>the</strong>re no real content to <strong>the</strong> terms<br />
populares <strong>and</strong> optimates?<br />
It has been mentioned above that, according to Miinzer, cliques<br />
formed among <strong>the</strong> nobiles from time to time, <strong>and</strong> that often one clique,<br />
whose members were usually related by marriage or birth, would dominate<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs for a considerable period. Factio is <strong>the</strong> Latin term for<br />
such a clique <strong>and</strong> among <strong>the</strong> Romans it had a derogatory connotation.8<br />
Syme calls it a "gang," but a very convenient term might be borrowed<br />
from Canadian history <strong>and</strong> applied with more accuracy to <strong>the</strong> Roman<br />
scene than to <strong>the</strong> Canadian-"<strong>the</strong> Family Compact."' Sulla, in his<br />
reconstruction of Roman life, placed such a group in control, basing it<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Caecilii Metelli.o0 This Family Compact was mainly concerned<br />
with getting its relations <strong>and</strong> friends elected to <strong>the</strong> consulship. That<br />
office gave great power at <strong>the</strong> time, a dominant place in <strong>the</strong> senate<br />
afterwards, <strong>and</strong>, in addition, <strong>the</strong> governorship of a province, by which<br />
<strong>the</strong> ex-consul could recoup his own fortunes <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong> out patronage<br />
to his friends <strong>and</strong> relatives." The office of pontifex maximus, however,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> position of princeps senatus were also coveted for <strong>the</strong> prestige<br />
<strong>and</strong> important political influence connected with <strong>the</strong>m. The Family<br />
Compact was naturally reactionary because it could keep its supremacy<br />
only by maintaining <strong>the</strong> status quo. In consequence it opposed all change;<br />
it vigorously <strong>and</strong> with much success contested every consular election;<br />
it fought <strong>the</strong> granting of extraordinary power to anyone; <strong>and</strong> it was<br />
content to exploit <strong>the</strong> Roman Empire as it was. But, although kinship,<br />
friendship, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r ties gave it cohesion, underlying <strong>the</strong>se was self-<br />
interest. The dominant members, moreover, were of one social <strong>and</strong><br />
economic class-l<strong>and</strong>-owning aristocracy-that regarded rule <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
rewards of rule as its birthright. Those of inferior status who were<br />
linked with <strong>the</strong> dominant members by ties of obligation also had <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own interest at heart in defending <strong>the</strong> interest of <strong>the</strong>ir patrons. That<br />
is to say, <strong>the</strong> membership consisted of interest groups, one of which<br />
8Cicero applies <strong>the</strong> term factio to a group of people, called optimates, who control<br />
<strong>the</strong> commonwealth by reason of wealth, birth, or some kind of power (De Re Publica,<br />
in. 13, 23; cf. I. 45, 69). Both Julius Caesar <strong>and</strong> Augustus used <strong>the</strong> term to describe<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir enemies (De Bello Civili, I. 22, 5 <strong>and</strong> Monumentum Ancyranum, I. 2).<br />
9This term was applied to <strong>the</strong> local oligarchy that joined <strong>the</strong> lieutenant-governor<br />
in ruling Upper Canada in <strong>the</strong> period 1800-41. Though not actually linked by ties<br />
of blood or marriage, it formed a close-knit clique that managed political <strong>and</strong> economic<br />
life to its own best advantage. See W. S. Wallace, The Family Compact (Toronto <strong>and</strong><br />
Glasgow, 1920), 1-7.<br />
s0Syme, The Roman Revolution, 20-2 <strong>and</strong> genealogical tables at end. Q. Metellus<br />
Pius was consul in 80 B.c. <strong>and</strong> pontifex maximus down to 63 B.c. The o<strong>the</strong>r consul in<br />
80 B.c., <strong>the</strong> dictator Sulla, was married to a Metella, as were <strong>the</strong> consuls of 79 B.c.,<br />
P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus <strong>and</strong> Appius Claudius Pulcher. Catulus, consul in 78 B.c.,<br />
Hortensius, consul in 69 B.c., <strong>the</strong> Licinii Luculli <strong>and</strong> Cato likewise, were connected by<br />
kinship with each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Metelli. In 69 B.c. one Metellus was consul, one<br />
praetor, <strong>and</strong> one governor in Sicily. That <strong>the</strong> Metelli, like <strong>the</strong> Republican party of<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States, had <strong>the</strong> elephant for <strong>the</strong>ir heraldic badge is pure.coincidence.<br />
"For a complete account of <strong>the</strong> possibilities for graft see R. O. Jolliffe, Phases of<br />
Corruption in Roman Administration in <strong>the</strong> Last Half-Century of <strong>the</strong> Roman Republic<br />
(Menasha, 1919).
18 THE PHOENIX<br />
united <strong>and</strong> led <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. This Roman Family Compact had, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
much in common with <strong>the</strong> modern political party, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> term optimates<br />
may be used to designate it if <strong>the</strong> considerations adduced above are<br />
kept in mind.<br />
By no means all <strong>the</strong> nobiles <strong>and</strong> certainly not all those eligible for<br />
office were connected with <strong>the</strong> Family Compact. To an "outsider" two<br />
courses of action were open: he might court <strong>the</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong> dominant<br />
clique, or he could try to build up a clique of his own to supplant <strong>the</strong><br />
one in power. The latter course was followed by Pompey, Crassus, <strong>and</strong><br />
Caesar, although not with complete consistency by Pompey.<br />
The careers of Pompey, Crassus, <strong>and</strong> Caesar demonstrate a very<br />
well-defined trend. In 70 B.C. Pompey <strong>and</strong> Crassus revived <strong>the</strong> censorship,<br />
one function of which was to let state contracts, so lucrative for<br />
<strong>the</strong> financial section of <strong>the</strong> equestrian class, <strong>the</strong> tax-farmers (publicani).12<br />
They also revised <strong>the</strong> composition of <strong>the</strong> juries in <strong>the</strong> courts dealing<br />
with provincial extortion <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r crimes-again a favour to <strong>the</strong><br />
equestrian class. Then, in 67 B.c., Pompey was given an extraordinary<br />
comm<strong>and</strong> to clear <strong>the</strong> seas of pirates, <strong>the</strong> main beneficiary being <strong>the</strong><br />
equestrian class with its Eastern interests. And in 66 B.C. Pompey<br />
took over <strong>the</strong> Eastern War from Lucullus, a member of <strong>the</strong> Family<br />
Compact who had affronted <strong>the</strong> publicani.'3 In his Eastern campaigns<br />
Pompey showed himself <strong>the</strong> first outst<strong>and</strong>ing Roman imperialist, organizing<br />
<strong>the</strong> new areas in <strong>the</strong> way best suited for exploitation by <strong>the</strong><br />
publicani.14 While Pompey was winning prestige <strong>and</strong> popularity by his<br />
military prowess, Crassus was making friends in politics, in <strong>the</strong> law<br />
courts, <strong>and</strong> by judicious use of his money.'5 He had <strong>the</strong> means <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
inclination to help those who were <strong>the</strong> victims of political, judicial, or<br />
financial misfortune.'6 His friends could borrow money without interest,<br />
although <strong>the</strong>y had to be prompt in repayment." He championed <strong>the</strong><br />
Transpadani in <strong>the</strong>ir plea for Roman citizenship."8 For a time (66 B.C.-<br />
63 B.C.) he seems to have tried to supplant Pompey in <strong>the</strong> affections<br />
of <strong>the</strong> publicani, but he was later persuaded by circumstances <strong>and</strong> by<br />
Caesar to ab<strong>and</strong>on this dangerous course of action <strong>and</strong> to work with<br />
Pompey in <strong>the</strong>ir common interest.19 Caesar himself played a canny<br />
12A. H. J. Greenidge, Roman Public Life (London, 1901), 229 ff.<br />
13Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 9 (Cambridge, 1932), 340 f.; 346; 348 f.<br />
14Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York, 1929), 323 f. The whole chapter<br />
(313 ff.) is worth attention for <strong>the</strong> picture it gives of <strong>the</strong> activities of Pompey <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
business interests.<br />
15Plutarch, Crassus, 7.<br />
16Such people were called calamitosi or naufragi. Examples are Autronius <strong>and</strong><br />
P. Sulla (Cicero. Pro Sulla, 1. 1; 13. 36 <strong>and</strong> 38; 32. 91); <strong>the</strong> children of <strong>the</strong> proscribed<br />
(Velleius Paterculus, II. 28); C. Curtius (Cicero, Ad Familiares, xiix. 5. 2); see also<br />
Pro Sex. Roscio, 50. 147; fragment vi of In Clodium et Curionem in Scholia Bobiensia,<br />
edited by Hildebr<strong>and</strong>t (Leipzig, 1907), 22; Pro Sulla, 14. 41; Philippic xii. 8. 19.<br />
17Plutarch, Crassus, 3.<br />
18Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 9, 481.<br />
"9Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy, discusses <strong>the</strong> attempts made by Crassus to<br />
outdo Pompey in power <strong>and</strong> prestige, but believes this ended before <strong>the</strong> tribunician<br />
elections in 63 B.C. (see notes 50 <strong>and</strong> 57).
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 19<br />
game. He made at least one attempt before 63 B.C. to identify himself<br />
with Pompey that he might <strong>the</strong>reby identify <strong>the</strong> interests of Pompey's<br />
supporters with himself.20 At <strong>the</strong> same time he worked along with<br />
Crassus, making use of his influence <strong>and</strong> money as <strong>the</strong> occasion dem<strong>and</strong>ed.21<br />
He, too, showed active sympathy for victims of misfortune;<br />
he attached <strong>the</strong> remnants of <strong>the</strong> old Marian faction to his cause; he<br />
won friends in <strong>the</strong> Italian municipalities, among <strong>the</strong> Transpadani, <strong>and</strong><br />
in <strong>the</strong> western provinces; Balbus, <strong>the</strong> wealthy equestrian business man<br />
from Spain, became his most ardent friend <strong>and</strong> adviser.22 It should be<br />
emphasized that <strong>the</strong> non-aristocratic supporters of Caesar were not<br />
riff-raff but members of <strong>the</strong> equestrian class, i.e. men of wealth <strong>and</strong><br />
property.23<br />
We see, <strong>the</strong>refore, that in this period Pompey, Crassus, <strong>and</strong> Caesar<br />
were playing up to those elements in Rome, Italy, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> provinces<br />
that were usually at odds with <strong>the</strong> optimates. The publicani (<strong>the</strong><br />
financiers) welcomed action that would benefit <strong>the</strong>ir tax-ga<strong>the</strong>ring <strong>and</strong><br />
money-lending operations, but, given that, <strong>the</strong>y were quite content to<br />
let <strong>the</strong> Family Compact h<strong>and</strong>le politics. Certainly <strong>the</strong>y had no interest<br />
in a revolutionary upheaval that might endanger <strong>the</strong> very existence of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir financial operations. In <strong>the</strong> political struggle, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
a very unstable element.24 A number of nobiles or potential nobiles who<br />
had suffered political, judicial, or financial misfortune wanted to break<br />
<strong>the</strong> power of <strong>the</strong> optimates. Then <strong>the</strong>re were wealthy <strong>and</strong> distinguished<br />
men in <strong>the</strong> Italian towns who had not been able to get into political<br />
life, or who wanted a government interested in opening up avenues for<br />
trade. Similarly, <strong>the</strong>re were in <strong>the</strong> provinces men of equestrian census<br />
<strong>and</strong> commercial interests who wanted a group in control which would<br />
be willing <strong>and</strong> able to improve <strong>the</strong> conditions for commerce in <strong>the</strong><br />
Mediterranean. So, if <strong>the</strong>re was no party of populares at this time,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re were numerous groups with a common hatred for <strong>the</strong> Family<br />
Compact that could be used by a clever man to create a party capable<br />
of destroying <strong>the</strong> ruling clique, with important consequences for <strong>the</strong><br />
economic, social, <strong>and</strong> political conditions of Italy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean<br />
area. The period prior to 63 B.C. saw Crassus <strong>and</strong> Caesar trying to<br />
win <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong>se groups. Ultimately, when Crassus was killed<br />
at Carrhae <strong>and</strong> Pompey was taken over in desperation by <strong>the</strong> optimates<br />
to destroy Caesar, Caesar was able to unite <strong>the</strong>se various groups under<br />
20He spoke in favour of <strong>the</strong> Gabinian law (Plutarch, Pompeius, 25).<br />
21The sources constantly associate <strong>the</strong> names of Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus from 66 B.C.<br />
to Crassus' death in 53 B.c. It was only Crassus' money that enabled Caesar to pacify<br />
his creditors in 61 B.C. (Plutarch, Caesar, 11).<br />
22Cicero, Pro Rege Deiotaro, 14. 40; Syme, The Roman Revolution, 65, 72, 74 ff.,<br />
79 f., 82, 86 f., 89-94.<br />
23The charge of obscure origin simply meant lack of senatorial rank. See Ronald<br />
Syme, "Caesar, <strong>the</strong> Senate <strong>and</strong> Italy," (British School at Rome, Papers, 14, 1938, 12 ff.).<br />
24A good description of <strong>the</strong> fluctuating role of <strong>the</strong> equestrian class in politics is<br />
found in Greenidge, Roman Public Life, 333 f.
20 THE PHOENIX<br />
his banner.25 This Caesarian party was revolutionary in that it wished<br />
to supplant <strong>the</strong> ruling clique; it was progressive in that its actions<br />
ultimately made possible social, economic, <strong>and</strong> political changes that<br />
brought life in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean area to a higher social <strong>and</strong> economic<br />
plane than had ever been reached before. The groups of aristocrats<br />
with which Caesar surrounded himself were little more than <strong>the</strong> instruments<br />
needed in <strong>the</strong> political struggle. The significant elements usually<br />
stayed in <strong>the</strong> background, although history has recorded <strong>the</strong> continual<br />
advice <strong>and</strong> services of so capable a business man as Balbus. But in<br />
<strong>and</strong> around 63 B.C. <strong>the</strong> anti-optimate elements were not as yet knit, as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were later, into a united party.<br />
In discussing <strong>the</strong> events of 63 B.C., <strong>the</strong>refore, one must first of all<br />
reckon with a well-organized, dominant clique-<strong>the</strong> Family Compact,<br />
or optimates. Opposed'to it was a number of disunited, opposition<br />
groups, varying in <strong>the</strong>ir antipathy to <strong>the</strong> optimates. There were <strong>the</strong><br />
tax-farmers, an unstable group. There were men of wealth <strong>and</strong> property<br />
in Italy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> provinces, many of <strong>the</strong>m interested primarily in trade,<br />
whose hatred of <strong>the</strong> Family Compact was more deep-rooted <strong>and</strong> permanent.<br />
There were many hard-pressed aristocrats whose personal<br />
aspirations made <strong>the</strong>m a source of danger to <strong>the</strong> ruling group. And<br />
<strong>the</strong>re were numerous o<strong>the</strong>r groups, lower down in <strong>the</strong> social scale, whose<br />
dissatisfaction could easily be turned to advantage by anyone who<br />
wished to exploit it. Lastly <strong>the</strong>re were Pompey, Crassus, <strong>and</strong> Caesar,<br />
who wanted to lead one or more of <strong>the</strong>se groups to break <strong>the</strong> power of<br />
<strong>the</strong> clique in control <strong>and</strong> replace it with <strong>the</strong>ir own clique.26<br />
II<br />
Before dealing with <strong>the</strong> events of 63 B.C., it is necessary to consider<br />
<strong>the</strong> position of Cicero <strong>and</strong> <strong>Catiline</strong> in relation to <strong>the</strong> political groups<br />
already in existence. For, in some respects, 63 B.C. was <strong>the</strong> culmination<br />
of what had gone before.<br />
By birth Cicero was of <strong>the</strong> eqestrian order, <strong>and</strong>, although he disliked<br />
<strong>the</strong> depredations of <strong>the</strong> tax-farmers in <strong>the</strong> provinces as much as he did<br />
those of unenlightened aristocratic governors, basically he had <strong>the</strong><br />
interests of <strong>the</strong> tax-farmers at heart.27 His forensic <strong>and</strong> political career,<br />
however, had been under <strong>the</strong> aegis of certain noble houses. Strasburger<br />
5The wars between Rome <strong>and</strong> Parthia may have been caused by commercial<br />
rivalry for control of <strong>the</strong> overl<strong>and</strong> trail to China (J. W. Thompson, Economic <strong>and</strong> Social<br />
History of <strong>the</strong> Middle Ages (New York, 1928), 22 ff.).<br />
26The relative importance of <strong>the</strong> individual <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> group in determining <strong>the</strong><br />
course of history is a highly debatable problem. It is not to be denied that Caesar,<br />
Pompey, <strong>and</strong> Crassus had strong personal ambitions <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> course which Roman<br />
history took from 70 B.C. to 49 B.C. was in large part <strong>the</strong> product of <strong>the</strong>ir respective<br />
drives for supremacy. But what is often overlooked is that <strong>the</strong> desires of <strong>the</strong> groups<br />
to which <strong>the</strong>se men appealed for support helped to determine <strong>the</strong> policies <strong>and</strong> actions<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se men. If this article seems to over-emphasize this point it is simply to correct<br />
<strong>the</strong> balance. There is no intention of minimizing <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> powerful individuals<br />
involved.<br />
27Cicero, Ad Quintum Fratrem, I. 1. 32 ff.
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 21<br />
is right in depicting Cicero's attitude. Cicero did not execute a political<br />
volte-face in 63 B.c. His policy <strong>and</strong> actions in that year were a logical<br />
consequence of his ties both with <strong>the</strong> tax-farmers <strong>and</strong> with a section of<br />
<strong>the</strong> nobility. If some of his pronouncements <strong>and</strong> actions had been<br />
"popular" in a limited sense, <strong>the</strong>y had never been revolutionary. And<br />
to be elected consul, something that had not happened to a man without<br />
noble ancestors for a generation, it was absolutely essential that both<br />
tax-farmers <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ruling clique give him enthusiastic support.28<br />
In his canvass for <strong>the</strong> consulship in 64 B.C. Cicero relied heavily on<br />
<strong>the</strong> advice <strong>and</strong> personal support of his good friend Atticus.29 Atticus,<br />
a business man primarily concerned with large loans <strong>and</strong> real estate,<br />
had left Rome years before to avoid entanglements in <strong>the</strong> political<br />
squabbles of his youth. He had, <strong>the</strong>refore, been able to maintain<br />
friendship not only with business people but also with powerful noble<br />
families, including members of <strong>the</strong> Family Compact. He was <strong>the</strong> ideal<br />
person to give Cicero advice <strong>and</strong> support. As has been pointed out,<br />
<strong>the</strong> importance of Atticus in determining Cicero's policy <strong>and</strong> success<br />
has often been overlooked.29 Atticus was with Cicero in Rome in<br />
64 B.c., <strong>and</strong> must have been extremely helpful in winning for him <strong>the</strong><br />
backing of <strong>the</strong> optimates.<br />
The political situation in 64 B.c., moreover, was in Cicero's favour.<br />
Intrigue by Crassus <strong>and</strong> Caesar against Pompey, <strong>and</strong> doubts about <strong>the</strong><br />
political intentions of all three great leaders, brought <strong>the</strong> tax-farmers<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Family Compact very close toge<strong>the</strong>r. The tax-farmers had<br />
succeeded in getting <strong>the</strong>ir man Pompey to work on opening up new<br />
areas for investment, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y feared that schemes which upset <strong>the</strong><br />
organization of <strong>the</strong> state would interfere with <strong>the</strong> realization of <strong>the</strong><br />
profits <strong>the</strong>y were expecting. At <strong>the</strong> moment, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
conservative in outlook. The optimates naturally did not want <strong>the</strong><br />
precedent set by Pompey's extraordinary powers to go any fur<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Thus it was not difficult for Cicero to unite <strong>the</strong> two groups <strong>and</strong> win <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
combined support. The fragments of his speech In Toga C<strong>and</strong>ida show<br />
us how he did this. He attacked two of his competitors, Antonius <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Catiline</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir backers, Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus, as revolutionaries bent<br />
on destroying <strong>the</strong> state.30 As champion of law <strong>and</strong> order it was a<br />
simple matter for him to head <strong>the</strong> polls. He was successful also in<br />
procuring <strong>the</strong> defeat of <strong>Catiline</strong>. Actually, although <strong>the</strong> fullest harmony<br />
of <strong>the</strong> orders-<strong>the</strong> most powerful sections of <strong>the</strong> equestrian <strong>and</strong> senatorial<br />
classes-was not reached until 63 B.C., Cicero's election was a<br />
symbol of <strong>the</strong> existence of that harmony as early as July, 64 B.c.3"<br />
There was nothing about <strong>Catiline</strong> prior to 63 B.C. to mark him off<br />
28Strasburger, <strong>Concordia</strong> Ordinum, 13 ff. For <strong>the</strong> combined voting power of <strong>the</strong><br />
two orders see Marsh, History of <strong>the</strong> Roman World, app. 2.<br />
29Alice H. Byrne, Titus Pomponius Atticus (Lancaster, Pa., 1920), 1-4; 54 ff.<br />
3oAsconius, In Orationem in Toga C<strong>and</strong>ida, ed. A. C. Clark (Oxford, 1907), 93;<br />
cf. 83.<br />
31Strasburger, <strong>Concordia</strong> Ordinum, 38. See Cicero, De Lege Agraria, 11. 3 ff.;<br />
In Pisonem, 3.
22 THE PHOENIX<br />
from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r aristocrats who were striving to establish <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
politically in <strong>the</strong> face of opposition from <strong>the</strong> Family Compact, <strong>and</strong> who<br />
were being used by Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus as shock troops in <strong>the</strong>ir attack<br />
on <strong>the</strong> optimates. Cicero at one time had thought of defending him in<br />
court <strong>and</strong> of making his canvass for <strong>the</strong> consulship in partnership with<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong>.32 Even after <strong>the</strong> events of 63 B.C. Cicero was able to say that<br />
prior to <strong>the</strong> conspiracy of that year many distinguished <strong>and</strong> law-abiding<br />
citizens had seen no harm in associating with <strong>Catiline</strong>.33 Sallust made<br />
much of <strong>the</strong> so-called First Catilinarian Conspiracy in 66-65 B.C., but<br />
John has put this in its proper perspective.34 It was Autronius <strong>and</strong><br />
Sulla, <strong>the</strong> consuls-elect unseated on bribery charges, who were to take<br />
<strong>the</strong> place of <strong>the</strong> consuls-elect of <strong>the</strong> second election; <strong>Catiline</strong> was merely<br />
to assist in <strong>the</strong> assassination of <strong>the</strong> latter; Crassus <strong>and</strong> Caesar were <strong>the</strong><br />
men behind <strong>the</strong> scenes who were using <strong>the</strong> dissatisfaction of Autronius<br />
<strong>and</strong> Sulla to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir own ends. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, it was not a<br />
Catilinarian conspiracy at all. As usual, <strong>Catiline</strong> was merely a tool in<br />
<strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s of Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus. Bribery <strong>and</strong> collusion from friendly<br />
sources procured <strong>Catiline</strong>'s acquittal in <strong>the</strong> extortion court in 65 B.C.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> canvass for <strong>the</strong> consulship in 64 B.c. <strong>Catiline</strong> combined with<br />
Antonius, ano<strong>the</strong>r down-at-heel aristocrat, in order to defeat Cicero,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> pair were backed by Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus.35 Later in 64 B.c.,<br />
when <strong>Catiline</strong> came before Caesar in <strong>the</strong> court trying assassins of <strong>the</strong><br />
Sullan regime, he was acquitted although o<strong>the</strong>rs no less guilty were<br />
convicted.36<br />
The long-cherished lust for absolutism accredited to <strong>Catiline</strong> by<br />
Sallust has been shown to have been invented in order to provide adequate<br />
psychological motivation in what was primarily a moral treatise.37<br />
Perhaps Sallust drew some inspiration from <strong>the</strong> highly coloured account<br />
given by Cicero in his Catilinarian orations. One thing <strong>Catiline</strong> did<br />
want, <strong>and</strong> that was <strong>the</strong> consulship.38 He had wanted it in 66 B.C., but<br />
opposition to his c<strong>and</strong>idature in high circles had persuaded him to give<br />
up <strong>the</strong> idea. He ran in 64 B.C. <strong>and</strong> again in 63 B.C. When he left<br />
Rome on November 8, 63 B.c., his first act was to assume <strong>the</strong> insignia<br />
of consul.39 To underst<strong>and</strong> this persistent personal desire, one must<br />
remember that <strong>the</strong> consulship gave not only financial but also social<br />
<strong>and</strong> political rewards. It is true that even before <strong>the</strong> elections in 64 B.C.<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong> was in straitened circumstances <strong>and</strong> that two successive defeats<br />
would make his creditors disinclined to wait any longer for repayment.<br />
32Ad Atticum, I. 2. 1.<br />
33Pro Caelio, 5. 12 ff.<br />
34Sallust, De Catilinae Coniuratione, 18 f.; John, Die Entstehungsgesch. d. Cat. Verschw6rung,<br />
706-26.<br />
uAsconius, In Orationem in Toga C<strong>and</strong>., 83, 87 <strong>and</strong> 90.<br />
36Asconius, ibid., 91; Dio Cassius, xxxvii. 10.<br />
37John, Die Entstehungsgesch. d. Cat. Verschwbrung, 808.<br />
38Ibid., 714.<br />
39Dio Cassius xxxvin. 33; Sallust, De Catilinae Coniuratione, 36.
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 23<br />
Like all aristocrats who had l<strong>and</strong> but little cash, he needed <strong>the</strong> consulship<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincial comm<strong>and</strong> that would follow, to rehabilitate his<br />
finances.40 But he was by birth one of <strong>the</strong> nobiles <strong>and</strong> he considered<br />
it his birthright to occupy high office <strong>and</strong> to become an influential<br />
senator.4' Moreover, his was a nobilitas that needed refurbishing. No<br />
one in his family had held high office since his great-gr<strong>and</strong>fa<strong>the</strong>r, M.<br />
Sergius Silus, had reached <strong>the</strong> praetorship in 197 B.C.42 Not only his<br />
own honour but that of his family was at stake. The affront he had<br />
received from <strong>the</strong> Family Compact <strong>and</strong> his defeat in 64 B.C. by Cicero,<br />
a man whose ancestors had never held office, served to embitter him<br />
against both <strong>the</strong> optimates <strong>and</strong> Cicero <strong>and</strong> to make him resolve to carry<br />
on <strong>and</strong> try to reach <strong>the</strong> consulship, come what might. But, although<br />
he might differ from his fellow-aristocrats in <strong>the</strong> intensity of his desire<br />
to become consul, <strong>the</strong> reasons for that desire were <strong>the</strong> same in his case<br />
as in <strong>the</strong>irs.<br />
Prior to 63 B.c., <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>Catiline</strong> was merely a minor figure in<br />
political life, exerting himself to <strong>the</strong> utmost to achieve <strong>the</strong> consulship<br />
<strong>and</strong> receiving support from Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus. Cicero, as much from<br />
personal necessity as from political conviction, was engaged in activity<br />
likely to unite <strong>the</strong> publicani <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> optimates in a common front against<br />
all disturbers of <strong>the</strong> peace, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y were unimportant individuals<br />
like <strong>Catiline</strong> or major figures like Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus.<br />
III<br />
Cicero began his year as consul by promising to be a consul popularis.43<br />
Events showed, however, that he put his own construction on<br />
this term <strong>and</strong> intended to do what he thought was good for <strong>the</strong> people<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than what <strong>the</strong>y wanted done. The nature of <strong>the</strong> support he<br />
had received in his election, as well as his own inclination, dem<strong>and</strong>ed<br />
that he continue to work for harmony between <strong>the</strong> publicani <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
optimates. And this meant in actual fact a vigorous campaign against<br />
every proposal or move made by <strong>the</strong> not inactive opposition.44 A l<strong>and</strong><br />
bill was proposed that would have made its ten commissioners virtual<br />
rulers of <strong>the</strong> Roman Empire. Cicero attacked it, partly on this ground<br />
<strong>and</strong> partly because Pompey was virtually excluded from <strong>the</strong> commission.45<br />
It was proposed to reinstate <strong>the</strong> children of <strong>the</strong> proscribed.<br />
Cicero spoke against this, not because it was unjust, but because it<br />
40Cicero's bro<strong>the</strong>r Quintus described both Antonius <strong>and</strong> <strong>Catiline</strong> as egentes (Commentariolum<br />
Petitionis, 8). Cf. ibid., 9 <strong>and</strong> Gelzer, Die Nobilitdt d. r. R., 19.<br />
41Sallust, De Catilinae Coniuratione, 5. See Q. Cicero, Commentariolum Petitionis,<br />
9, 11 <strong>and</strong> 12, <strong>and</strong> Sallust, ibid., 35.<br />
42P. Willems, Le Senat de la rdpublique romaine (Louvain, 1883), vol. 1, 332, n. 60.<br />
Gelzer, Die Nobilitdt d. r. R., 28.<br />
43De Lege Agraria, 11. 3. 6 ff. Cf. I. 7. 23.<br />
44A discussion of <strong>the</strong> proposals is to be found in Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy,<br />
33 ff.<br />
46De Lege Agraria, 11. 6. 15, 9. 23 f.
24 THE PHOENIX<br />
might disrupt <strong>the</strong> commonwealth.46 A prosecution was launched against<br />
a senator who had participated in <strong>the</strong> murder of an insurgent tribune<br />
nearly forty years before. Cicero joined in defending him.4' The only<br />
real victory for <strong>the</strong> opposition was <strong>the</strong> reintroduction of voting procedure<br />
for pontiffs, altered by Sulla.48 This resulted in <strong>the</strong> election of<br />
Caesar as pontifex maximus. Everywhere else Cicero carried <strong>the</strong> day<br />
<strong>and</strong> his defence was not a passive one. On every occasion he took <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunity of br<strong>and</strong>ing his opponents as revolutionaries.49 He <strong>and</strong> his<br />
coalition succeeded in thwarting <strong>the</strong> troublemakers on all major issues.<br />
Even before <strong>the</strong> election campaign in July, 63 B.c., it must have<br />
become apparent to Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus that <strong>the</strong>ir attack was too<br />
narrowly based <strong>and</strong> that it had been a mistake to give Cicero any<br />
opportunity to swing Pompey's following, primarily <strong>the</strong> publicani,<br />
behind his campaign to maintain <strong>the</strong> status quo. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
must have seen <strong>the</strong> necessity of revising <strong>the</strong>ir plans in order to have<br />
Pompey <strong>and</strong> his followers on <strong>the</strong>ir side. Hardy is of <strong>the</strong> opinion that<br />
<strong>the</strong> return of Metellus Nepos from Pompey's camp to st<strong>and</strong> for tribune<br />
gave <strong>the</strong>m an opportunity to lay <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> First Triumvirate.50<br />
This is quite probable. At any rate, Metellus Nepos was elected, <strong>and</strong><br />
one of his first acts as tribune was to launch an attack on Cicero. In<br />
62 B.c. he <strong>and</strong> Caesar fought side by side against <strong>the</strong> optimates.<br />
The decision of Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus to revise <strong>the</strong>ir strategy in order<br />
to win Pompey <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> financiers to <strong>the</strong>ir side would not at first necessitate<br />
<strong>the</strong> withdrawal of support from <strong>Catiline</strong> when he stood for <strong>the</strong><br />
consulship in July, 63 B.c. They had certainly intended to continue to<br />
use him, as Caesar had indicated by allowing his acquittal <strong>the</strong> year<br />
before. It would have been valuable, too, for <strong>the</strong>m to have had a<br />
friendly consul in 62 B.c. But <strong>the</strong> measure of <strong>the</strong>ir support would<br />
depend on <strong>the</strong> extent to which he was willing to work in <strong>the</strong> interests<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir new strategy.<br />
The groups on which <strong>Catiline</strong> drew for support in his canvass,<br />
however, would make it seem likely that he was not prepared to follow<br />
<strong>the</strong> new strategy but was inclined to take an independent course. His<br />
supporters were predominantly anti-optimate in nature: <strong>the</strong> descendants<br />
of <strong>the</strong> proscribed, bankrupt aristocrats, a b<strong>and</strong> of unprincipled<br />
<strong>and</strong> Bohemian young bloods, <strong>and</strong>, from <strong>the</strong> rural areas, dispossessed<br />
farmers <strong>and</strong> Sullan veterans, who had not found <strong>the</strong> farms to which<br />
<strong>the</strong>y had gone sufficiently remunerative.5' But <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>the</strong> most<br />
desperate <strong>and</strong> militant of <strong>the</strong> anti-optimates. And <strong>the</strong> developments<br />
46Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria xx. 1. 85.<br />
47In <strong>the</strong> speech Pro C. Rabirio Perduellionis Reo.<br />
48Dio Cassius, xxxvII. 37. See Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy, 38, n. 2.<br />
49De Lege Agraria, I. 7. 21, 9. 26, II. 3. 8; Pro C. Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, 1 <strong>and</strong> 12.<br />
s0Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy, 61 f.; 105 f.; 108.<br />
"5Pro Murena, 24. 49. See John, Die Entstehungsgesch. d. Cat. Verschw5rung, 740 ff.<br />
The most prominent were <strong>the</strong> calamitosi.
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 25<br />
in <strong>the</strong> closing days of <strong>the</strong> campaign make it abundantly clear that<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong> was pursuing a course not simply independent of Caesar <strong>and</strong><br />
Crassus but absolutely anti<strong>the</strong>tic to <strong>the</strong>ir new strategy. When Cato<br />
threatened him with prosecution, <strong>Catiline</strong> replied that if a conflagration<br />
were kindled against him he would extinguish it not with water but<br />
by pulling <strong>the</strong> house down.52 In a private harangue to his followers<br />
he was reported to have said: "No loyal defender of those in distress<br />
can be found save him who himself is in distress; <strong>the</strong> injured <strong>and</strong> distressed<br />
ought not to trust <strong>the</strong> promises of those who are unimpaired<br />
in fortune; <strong>the</strong>refore, let those who want to replenish <strong>the</strong>ir empty<br />
pockets or to recover what has been taken from <strong>the</strong>m consider my debts,<br />
my possessions <strong>and</strong> my daring; that man ought to be least fearful <strong>and</strong><br />
most victimized by fortune who is going to be <strong>the</strong> leader <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
bearer of <strong>the</strong> victims of misfortune." On <strong>the</strong> strength of <strong>the</strong>se vague<br />
but dangerous utterances Cicero was able to get <strong>the</strong> elections postponed<br />
for a day or two so that <strong>Catiline</strong> could be called before <strong>the</strong> senate to<br />
clear himself.53 <strong>Catiline</strong>, however, took advantage of <strong>the</strong> occasion to<br />
deliver a manifesto: "There are two bodies in <strong>the</strong> community, one weak<br />
with an addled head; <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r strong without a head; if <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
serves me well, it will not lack a head while I am alive." These remarks<br />
indicate clearly that <strong>Catiline</strong> was proclaiming himself as champion of all<br />
in distress, particularly those in financial difficulty. That in itself was<br />
enough to alarm <strong>the</strong> financiers, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> obvious implication that, when<br />
he became consul, he would engineer a debt cancellation programme put<br />
<strong>the</strong>m resolutely against him <strong>and</strong> solidly behind <strong>the</strong> Family Compact.<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong>, of course, was playing right into Cicero's h<strong>and</strong>. But to<br />
make absolutely sure that men of wealth would unite with <strong>the</strong> optimates<br />
to defeat <strong>Catiline</strong>, Cicero spread rumours that <strong>Catiline</strong> was going to<br />
have him assassinated at <strong>the</strong> elections <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n appeared at <strong>the</strong> elections<br />
wearing a breastplate imperfectly concealed under his toga. <strong>Catiline</strong><br />
was defeated.<br />
Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus could not help but be alarmed when <strong>the</strong>y saw<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong> playing an independent <strong>and</strong> increasingly militant role that<br />
enabled Cicero to weld <strong>the</strong> financiers even more solidly to <strong>the</strong> optimates.<br />
That, <strong>and</strong> his inevitable defeat in <strong>the</strong> elections, would show <strong>the</strong>m that<br />
he was of no more use to <strong>the</strong>m. Moreover, in flirting with <strong>the</strong> idea of<br />
debt cancellation, <strong>Catiline</strong> irretrievably lost <strong>the</strong> sympathy <strong>and</strong> support<br />
of both Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus. Crassus, as a money-lender <strong>and</strong> friend<br />
of money-lenders, could not possibly have any sympathy with it. And<br />
nei<strong>the</strong>r could Caesar. It is true that Cicero at a later date made some<br />
spiteful remarks about Caesar on <strong>the</strong> subject, after Caesar had carried<br />
through a programme of debt adjustment. But Caesar's settlement was<br />
52For this <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> following quotations see Pro Murena, 25. 50 f.<br />
"5John, Die Entstehungsgesch. d. Cat. Verschwirung, 747; Hardy, The Catilinarian<br />
Conspiracy, 43 ff.
26 THE PHOENIX<br />
one acceptable to creditor as well as to debtor, as Caelius, who wanted<br />
outright cancellation, found to his sorrow.54 As for his indebtedness in<br />
63 B.c., Caesar had Crassus to back him, <strong>and</strong> his political career was<br />
just at <strong>the</strong> point where a provincial comm<strong>and</strong>, with all its opportunities<br />
for recouping one's fortunes, seemed assured. And, as he was anxious<br />
for <strong>the</strong> support of men of wealth, he would have to oppose any plan<br />
for outright violation of <strong>the</strong> sanctity of contract. For <strong>the</strong>se reasons<br />
Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus must have made it quite clear to <strong>Catiline</strong> that he<br />
could no longer rely on <strong>the</strong>m for support, financial or political.<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong>'s feelings after <strong>the</strong> election are not hard to imagine. He<br />
could not fail to realize that if events pursued <strong>the</strong>ir normal course he<br />
was ruined-financially, socially, <strong>and</strong> politically. Two defeats made it<br />
unlikely that his creditors would wait for him to try ano<strong>the</strong>r time.<br />
His hatred of <strong>the</strong> parvenu, Cicero, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> financiers, who had twice<br />
prevented him from realizing his destiny as an aristocrat, was at a peak.<br />
In his now desperate situation he must have viewed with even greater<br />
disgust than before <strong>the</strong> new direction being taken by Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus.<br />
To a man of his calibre a vigorous frontal attack on those responsible<br />
for his plight would seem <strong>the</strong> only way out of his difficulties.<br />
Up to <strong>and</strong> including <strong>the</strong> election, <strong>the</strong>refore, Cicero <strong>and</strong> his coalition<br />
were <strong>the</strong> decisive political element. In <strong>the</strong> early part of <strong>the</strong> year <strong>the</strong><br />
concordia ordinum was able to defeat <strong>the</strong> major aims of <strong>the</strong> anti-optimates.<br />
That defeat gave <strong>the</strong> initial impetus to a cleavage among <strong>the</strong>m. The<br />
events of <strong>the</strong> election campaign, where again Cicero <strong>and</strong> his coalition<br />
played a dominant role, fur<strong>the</strong>r developed <strong>the</strong> cleavage among <strong>the</strong><br />
opposition forces <strong>and</strong> forced <strong>the</strong>m to travel widely divergent roads.<br />
Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus revised <strong>the</strong>ir strategy <strong>and</strong> laid long-range plans to<br />
bring <strong>the</strong> financiers to <strong>the</strong>ir side. <strong>Catiline</strong>, unable <strong>and</strong> disinclined to<br />
follow such a policy, now that <strong>the</strong> constitutional road to his goal was<br />
blocked, was obliged to think in terms of desperate <strong>and</strong> direct action,<br />
if he was not to sink back forever into oblivion.55<br />
IV<br />
The formation of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy took place after <strong>the</strong> consular elections<br />
in July, 63 B.c. <strong>and</strong> was <strong>the</strong> direct result of <strong>Catiline</strong>'s defeat in those<br />
"4Cicero, De Officiis, 11. 84; Caesar, De Bello Civili, iii. 1 <strong>and</strong> 20 ff.; Suetonius,<br />
Divus ulius, 42. See discussion in Th. Mommsen, The History of Rome, vol. 5 (London,<br />
1894), 317 f.; 398-402.<br />
66A parallel is to be noted in <strong>the</strong> events in Upper Canada in 1836-7. Unyielding<br />
resistance to dem<strong>and</strong>s for reform, <strong>and</strong> an election in which almost all <strong>the</strong> Reformers<br />
went down to defeat precipitated a crisis. William Lyon Mackenzie <strong>and</strong> his militant<br />
friends carried out an armed insurrection. O<strong>the</strong>r Reformers, such as Robert Baldwin<br />
<strong>and</strong> Marshall Spring Bidwell, refused to have anything to do with this violent course of<br />
action (Wallace, The Family Compact, 114 ff.). My attention was drawn to this interesting<br />
parallel by C. B. Sissons, Professor Emeritus of Ancient History, Victoria College,<br />
Toronto.
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 27<br />
elections.56 The organization of it occupied <strong>the</strong> interval up to <strong>the</strong><br />
middle of October <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> original day for putting it into effect was<br />
October 28. About ten days before, however, Crassus <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r aristocrats<br />
received anonymous letters informing <strong>the</strong>m of trouble to come.<br />
These, with <strong>the</strong> secret information Cicero received <strong>and</strong> reports of activity<br />
in Etruria, brought about a declaration of martial law. So, although<br />
trouble broke out in Etruria, <strong>the</strong> 28th passed quietly. The original<br />
plan of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy, to have been put into effect on that day, was a<br />
relatively simple one. Manlius <strong>and</strong> his force of rural malcontents were<br />
to attack Rome from without while <strong>the</strong> conspirators within <strong>the</strong> city<br />
were murdering Cicero <strong>and</strong> a few o<strong>the</strong>r leading citizens. <strong>Catiline</strong> was<br />
to become consul. Nothing more than a short, vigorous palace revolution<br />
was planned. But <strong>the</strong> revelations <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> consequent declaration<br />
of martial law disrupted this plan, checking action within <strong>the</strong> city, if<br />
not in Etruria. It was not proved who <strong>the</strong> conspirators were or that<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong> was <strong>the</strong>ir head, so no steps could be taken against him. It was<br />
November 6 when <strong>the</strong> conspirators assembled to reconsider <strong>the</strong> situation.<br />
It was at this meeting that arson was added to <strong>the</strong>ir programme, <strong>and</strong><br />
that elaborate plans for appealing to <strong>the</strong> disaffected all over Italy were<br />
drawn up. In <strong>the</strong>ir desperation <strong>the</strong> conspirators were heading toward<br />
a general social upheaval. Cicero, who had information of this meeting,<br />
was able to use <strong>the</strong> attack that was made on his life in <strong>the</strong> presence of<br />
witnesses as corroboration of his statements about <strong>the</strong> conspiracy. He<br />
unmasked <strong>Catiline</strong> <strong>and</strong> drove him from <strong>the</strong> city into Etruria, where<br />
he could do least harm <strong>and</strong> could be dealt with by <strong>the</strong> military. It was<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r month, however, before Cicero was able to catch <strong>the</strong> remaining<br />
conspirators in treasonous action, to apprehend <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>and</strong> to put <strong>the</strong>m<br />
to death. After that it was an easy matter to surround <strong>and</strong> annihilate<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r rebels by armed force. By his astuteness <strong>and</strong><br />
energy Cicero checked what might have become a very dangerous<br />
situation.<br />
John <strong>and</strong> Hardy are agreed that Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus had no part in<br />
<strong>the</strong> conspiracy.57 Certainly, if <strong>the</strong> foregoing analysis of <strong>the</strong> position<br />
adopted by <strong>the</strong>se men is correct, not only would <strong>the</strong>y have had no part<br />
in it, but <strong>Catiline</strong> would have been very careful to see that <strong>the</strong>y knew<br />
56John <strong>and</strong> Hardy, working independently, have convincingly demonstrated that<br />
Sallust placed <strong>the</strong> inception of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy more than a year too early (see John,<br />
Die Entstehungsgesch. d. Cat. Verschworung, 754-62; Hardy, 51 f.). For <strong>the</strong> following<br />
description of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy see John, 758, 788-92, 795; Hardy, 53-8, 65, 70-97, 101 f.<br />
57John, 738, 815 f.; Hardy, 49 f., 82 ff. I cannot agree with E. T. Salmon ("<strong>Catiline</strong>,<br />
Crassus, <strong>and</strong> Caesar," American 7ournal of Philology, 56, 1935, 302-10) that<br />
Crassus encouraged <strong>Catiline</strong> to cause social disorder that he might have an army with<br />
which to face Pompey on his return. That Crassus manoeuvred for a point d'appui<br />
against Pompey up to <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> Rullan Bill is very likely. But if Crassus<br />
<strong>and</strong> Caesar came to terms with Pompey before <strong>the</strong> election in July 63 <strong>the</strong> need to<br />
secure an army no longer existed. This <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> conspiracy was not<br />
organized until after <strong>the</strong> election makes it difficult to believe that Crassus engaged in<br />
<strong>the</strong> dangerous machinations attributed to him by Professor Salmon.
28 THE PHOENIX<br />
nothing about it. Members of <strong>the</strong> Family Compact tried to get Cicero<br />
to include <strong>the</strong>ir names but he refused, <strong>and</strong> it is well known that Crassus<br />
at least, <strong>and</strong> probably Caesar too, were instrumental in making <strong>the</strong><br />
existence of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy known. They did so not only because <strong>the</strong>y<br />
had to clear <strong>the</strong>mselves of past association with <strong>Catiline</strong>, but also<br />
because <strong>the</strong> conspiracy was inimical to <strong>the</strong>ir programme. But less<br />
prominent people from <strong>the</strong> anti-optimate groups were involved. The<br />
leading conspirators were aristocrats forced into a difficult position by<br />
financial or political reverses.58 There were leading citizens from rural<br />
municipalities.59 There was <strong>the</strong> freedman, Umbrenus, a business man<br />
who had had extensive business dealings in Gaul. Manlius, <strong>the</strong> Sullan<br />
settlers, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r elements of rural unrest played an important part.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> predominance of disgruntled aristocrats who were taking<br />
action primarily to remove <strong>the</strong>ir own disabilities, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence of<br />
those who could provide constructive leadership indicate that <strong>the</strong><br />
conspiracy was basically a protest movement, engendered by <strong>the</strong> success<br />
of Cicero <strong>and</strong> his coalition in blocking all attempts to correct longst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
abuses.<br />
One group on which <strong>the</strong> conspirators may have counted for support<br />
in <strong>the</strong>ir protest movement should be mentioned-aristocrats who had<br />
incurred debts, but were reluctant to sell <strong>the</strong>ir estates to pay off <strong>the</strong>se<br />
debts.60 They might very well have regarded <strong>the</strong>mselves as misfortune's<br />
next crop of victims. Their indebtedness was, in large part, <strong>the</strong> result<br />
of <strong>the</strong> continually increasing amounts being spent in pursuit of political<br />
careers."' Several factors impelled <strong>the</strong> creditors to call in <strong>the</strong>ir loans.<br />
The prospects of profitable investment in <strong>the</strong> East were bright.62 On<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> political turmoil in Rome had reached a point where<br />
creditors could not help but be nervous, especially since Cicero had done<br />
all he could to increase <strong>the</strong>ir fears, in order to solidify his concordia<br />
ordinum. The situation was explosive <strong>and</strong>, when <strong>the</strong> news of <strong>the</strong><br />
conspiracy broke, only <strong>the</strong> resolute action of Considius kept creditors<br />
from panicking <strong>and</strong> debtors from taking desperate action.63 Cicero's<br />
energy <strong>and</strong> resolution in dealing with <strong>the</strong> situation contributed immensely<br />
to keeping this group quiet.<br />
68E.g. Autronius (see note 16); for Lentulus see Willems, Le Senat, vol. 1, 419 f.;<br />
Q. Curius, ibid., 418; Cassius, ibid., 461, n. 5. Cicero describes <strong>the</strong>m as naufragi (In<br />
Catilinam, I. 12. 30, II. 11. 24).<br />
59Sallust, De Catilinae Coniuratione, 17 <strong>and</strong> 40.<br />
60Cicero makes it one of <strong>the</strong> groups in <strong>the</strong> conspiracy (In Catilinam, II. 8. 18) but<br />
Hardy (The Catilinarian Conspiracy, 53) is of <strong>the</strong> opinion that Cicero was merely trying<br />
to frighten <strong>the</strong>m into supporting <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
61More <strong>and</strong> more was being spent on elections every year (Marsh, A History of <strong>the</strong><br />
Roman World, 160 f.). The lavish amounts spent by Caesar as aedile are symptomatic<br />
(Suetonius, Divus 7ulius, 10; Plutarch, Caesar, 5).<br />
62The winding-up of Pompey's campaign in <strong>the</strong> East was opening up attractive<br />
prospects for investment (Cary, History of Rome, 356 f.). The ban on <strong>the</strong> export<br />
of gold <strong>and</strong> silver suggests that capital was moving eastward (Cicero, In Vatinium, 5.<br />
12; Pro Flacco, 28. 67).<br />
63He refused to call in ei<strong>the</strong>r principal or interest, remarking that he traded in<br />
money, not in <strong>the</strong> blood of citizens (Valerius Maximus, Iv. 8. 3).
CATILINE AND THE CONCORDIA ORDINUM 29<br />
A word of caution is necessary here. Debt was not <strong>the</strong> cause of<br />
<strong>the</strong> conspiracy. It is true that heavy indebtedness made many favour<br />
drastic action; that it was those in financial distress to whom <strong>Catiline</strong><br />
appealed for support; that among <strong>the</strong> conspirators <strong>the</strong>mselves debt was<br />
one of <strong>the</strong> most urgent disabilities. But <strong>the</strong> initiation of action came<br />
from those who had been driven into a tight corner by <strong>the</strong> success of<br />
Cicero's efforts to maintain <strong>the</strong> concordia ordinum. That is to say, <strong>the</strong><br />
economic situation provided <strong>the</strong> opportunity for rousing support for a<br />
protest movement, but it was <strong>the</strong> political situation that actually gave<br />
<strong>the</strong> impetus to <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy.<br />
The development of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy can now be described with precision.<br />
Cicero's campaign to keep <strong>the</strong> financiers <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Family Compact<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r created a cleavage among <strong>the</strong> anti-optimates <strong>and</strong> forced <strong>Catiline</strong><br />
into a position from which he could extricate himself only by strong<br />
measures. He found a number of those who had supported him in his<br />
second canvass willing to follow him. Debt <strong>and</strong> general discontent<br />
throughout Italy, which <strong>the</strong> repressive policies of <strong>the</strong> government had<br />
considerably augmented, made <strong>the</strong> occasion seem favourable. Initially,<br />
<strong>the</strong> conspiracy aimed merely at substituting an anti-optimate consul,<br />
<strong>Catiline</strong>, for <strong>the</strong> optimate one, Cicero. But, when Cicero was successful<br />
in rendering that plan impracticable, <strong>the</strong> conspirators were forced along<br />
<strong>the</strong> road to a general social upheaval. The decisive element throughout<br />
had been Cicero <strong>and</strong> his temporary alliance of <strong>the</strong> financiers with <strong>the</strong><br />
optimates.64<br />
V<br />
In its dinouement <strong>the</strong> conspiracy had an effect upon <strong>the</strong> concordia<br />
ordinum. Cicero in his Fourth Catilinarian states: "Brought back after<br />
years of disagreement with this order [<strong>the</strong> senatorial class] to alliance<br />
<strong>and</strong> harmony with it, <strong>the</strong>y [<strong>the</strong> financiers] have been brought into<br />
union with you by this day <strong>and</strong> this affair."66 Strasburger gives content<br />
to this statement by showing that on this occasion, <strong>the</strong> fifth of December,<br />
<strong>the</strong> equites took up arms <strong>and</strong> registered as an emergency police force,<br />
indicating by this overt action <strong>the</strong>ir identification with <strong>the</strong> optimates.66<br />
Atticus, incidentally, <strong>the</strong> one man most capable of bridging <strong>the</strong> gap<br />
between <strong>the</strong> two groups, was in comm<strong>and</strong> of this force.67 The revelations<br />
of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy, <strong>the</strong>refore, streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> concordia ordinumjust<br />
what Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus had been trying to prevent. The conspiracy<br />
also placed Crassus <strong>and</strong> Caesar in a somewhat dangerous position.<br />
The immediate political effect of <strong>the</strong> conspiracy, <strong>the</strong>refore, was to aid<br />
<strong>the</strong> optimates.<br />
64The unknown author of a speech against Cicero puts forward much <strong>the</strong> same<br />
thought from a partisan point of view (In Ciceronem Declamatio, 2. 3).<br />
61In Catilinam, Iv. 7. 15.<br />
66<strong>Concordia</strong> Ordinum, 42.<br />
s6Ad Atticum, II. 1. 7.
30 THE PHOENIX<br />
The events of 63 B.C., however, were not without value to those<br />
engaged in ousting <strong>the</strong> Family Compact. It had been amply demonstrated<br />
that <strong>the</strong> publicani <strong>and</strong> Pompey had to be weaned away from<br />
<strong>the</strong> optimate side. This was speedily done, <strong>and</strong>, when Cicero continued<br />
his opposition, advantage was taken of <strong>the</strong> fact that in 63 B.C. he had<br />
put Roman citizens to death without a trial.68<br />
In conclusion, it may be said that this investigation has demonstrated<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessity for taking social <strong>and</strong> economic groupings into account if<br />
<strong>the</strong> events of 63 B.C. are to be intelligible. It has shown that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was one political machine, <strong>the</strong> optimates or Family Compact, in existence<br />
<strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r one, <strong>the</strong> Caesarian party, in process of formation. The<br />
year opened with anti-optimates staging an offensive which was met by<br />
Cicero with a counter-offensive. The success of <strong>the</strong> latter was made<br />
possible by <strong>the</strong> coalition of <strong>the</strong> financiers <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Family Compact.<br />
The effect of <strong>the</strong> counter-offensive was to drive a wedge between those<br />
who could bide <strong>the</strong>ir time <strong>and</strong> those who could not, <strong>and</strong>, in consequence,<br />
a militant faction developed which had recourse to violence. That, in<br />
turn, streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> concordia ordinum <strong>and</strong> brought Caesar <strong>and</strong> Crassus<br />
into jeopardy. But <strong>the</strong>y wea<strong>the</strong>red <strong>the</strong> storm <strong>and</strong> took steps to break<br />
up <strong>the</strong> coalition. In short, <strong>the</strong> year 63 B.C. was one of outst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
significance in <strong>the</strong> political history of <strong>the</strong> late republic.<br />
6sPlutarch, Pompeius, 46; Cicero, Ad Atticum, I. 17. 8 <strong>and</strong> 9, 11. 1. 8; Dio Cassius,<br />
xxxviii. 14.<br />
ANNOUNCEMENT<br />
The Census of Medieval <strong>and</strong> Renaissance Manuscripts in <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States <strong>and</strong> Canada, compiled by <strong>the</strong> late Seymour De Ricci with <strong>the</strong><br />
assistance of W. J. Wilson <strong>and</strong> published in two volumes in 1935 <strong>and</strong> 1937<br />
(followed by <strong>the</strong> Index in 1940) is now outdated. A Supplement to <strong>the</strong><br />
Census is now being prepared under <strong>the</strong> auspices of <strong>the</strong> American<br />
Council of Learned Societies with Professor C. U. Faye of <strong>the</strong> University<br />
of Illinois Library as editor. Inquiries should be addressed to him<br />
at P.O. Box 395, Champaign, Illinois.<br />
The Supplement will contain descriptions of manuscripts not listed<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Census <strong>and</strong> amplifications <strong>and</strong> emendations of entries in that<br />
publication. Like <strong>the</strong> Census, it will exclude Oriental manuscripts,<br />
manuscripts written after 1600, epigraphic material, <strong>and</strong> Greek <strong>and</strong> Latin<br />
papyri.